Optimizing control in a transportation network when users may choose their OD-path
Please always quote using this URN: urn:nbn:de:0297-zib-42330
- This thesis represents a game-theoretic investigation of the allocation of inspectors in a transportation network, comparing Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium strategies to a strategy in which inspections are conducted proportionally to the traffic volume. It contains specifications for the integration of space and time dependencies and extensive experimental tests for the application on the transportation network of German motorways using real data. Main results are that - although the formulated spot-checking game is not zero-sum - we are able to compute a Nash equilibrium using linear programming and secondly, that experimental results yield that a Nash equilibrium strategy represents a good trade-off for the Stackelberg equilibrium strategy between efficiency of controls and computation time.
Author: | Julia Buwaya |
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Document Type: | Master's Thesis |
Tag: | Game Theory; Linear Programming; Mixed Integer Programming; Nash Equilibrium; Optimization; Security Game; Stackelberg Equilibrium; Transportation Network |
MSC-Classification: | 90-XX OPERATIONS RESEARCH, MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING |
CCS-Classification: | G. Mathematics of Computing |
Granting Institution: | Technische Universität Berlin |
Advisor: | Martin Grötschel, Ralf Borndörfer |
Date of final exam: | 2013/06/07 |
Publishing Institution: | Zuse Institute Berlin (ZIB) |
Date of first Publication: | 2013/09/04 |
Page Number: | 81 |
Licence (German): | Creative Commons - Namensnennung-Keine kommerzielle Nutzung-Weitergabe unter gleichen Bedingungen |