The Price of Spite in Spot-checking games
- We introduce the class of spot-checking games (SC games). These games model problems where the goal is to distribute fare inspectors over a toll network. Although SC games are not zero-sum, we show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed by linear programming. The computation of a strong Stackelberg equilibrium is more relevant for this problem, but we show that this is NP-hard. However, we give some bounds on the \emph{price of spite}, which measures how the payoff of the inspector degrades when committing to a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we demonstrate the quality of these bounds for a real-world application, namely the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways.
Author: | Guillaume Sagnol, Ralf BorndörferORCiD, Thomas Schlechte, Elmar Swarat |
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Editor: | Ron Lavi |
Document Type: | In Proceedings |
Parent Title (English): | 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT'2014) |
Volume: | 8768 |
First Page: | 293 |
Series: | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
Publisher: | Springer |
Year of first publication: | 2014 |
Page Number: | 1 |
Notes: | Brief Announcement included in Back Matter p. 293 following |
Preprint: | urn:nbn:de:0297-zib-52775 |
DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8 |