The Price of Spite in Spot-checking games

  • We introduce the class of spot-checking games (SC games). These games model problems where the goal is to distribute fare inspectors over a toll network. Although SC games are not zero-sum, we show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed by linear programming. The computation of a strong Stackelberg equilibrium is more relevant for this problem, but we show that this is NP-hard. However, we give some bounds on the \emph{price of spite}, which measures how the payoff of the inspector degrades when committing to a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we demonstrate the quality of these bounds for a real-world application, namely the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways.

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Author:Guillaume Sagnol, Ralf Borndörfer, Thomas Schlechte, Elmar Swarat
Editor:Ron Lavi
Document Type:In Proceedings
Parent Title (English):7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT'2014)
First Page:293
Series:Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Year of first publication:2014
ISBN: 978-3-662-44802-1
Brief Announcement included in Back Matter p. 293 following

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