Optimizing Toll Enforcement in Transportation Networks: a Game-Theoretic Approach

  • We present a game-theoretic approach to optimize the strategies of toll enforcement on a motorway network. In contrast to previous approaches, we consider a network with an arbitrary topology, and we handle the fact that users may choose their Origin-Destination path; in particular they may take a detour to avoid sections with a high control rate. We show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed with an LP (although the game is not zero-sum), and we give a MIP for the computation of a Stackelberg equilibrium. Experimental results based on an application to the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways are presented.

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Author:Ralf Borndörfer, Julia Buwaya, Guillaume Sagnol, Elmar Swarat
Document Type:In Proceedings
Parent Title (English):Proceedings of INOC'2013
First Page:253
Last Page:260
Series:Electronic Notes in Discrete Mathematics
Year of first publication:2013

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