Optimizing Toll Enforcement in Transportation Networks: a Game-Theoretic Approach
- We present a game-theoretic approach to optimize the strategies of toll enforcement on a motorway network. In contrast to previous approaches, we consider a network with an arbitrary topology, and we handle the fact that users may choose their Origin-Destination path; in particular they may take a detour to avoid sections with a high control rate. We show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed with an LP (although the game is not zero-sum), and we give a MIP for the computation of a Stackelberg equilibrium. Experimental results based on an application to the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways are presented.
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| Author: | Ralf BorndörferORCiD, Julia Buwaya, Guillaume Sagnol, Elmar Swarat |
|---|---|
| Document Type: | In Proceedings |
| Parent Title (English): | Proceedings of INOC'2013 |
| Volume: | 41 |
| First Page: | 253 |
| Last Page: | 260 |
| Series: | Electronic Notes in Discrete Mathematics |
| Year of first publication: | 2013 |
| Preprint: | urn:nbn:de:0297-zib-17401 |
| DOI: | https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org//10.1016/j.endm.2013.05.100 |
