Decarbonizing the global energy system requires large-scale investment flows, with a central role for international climate finance to mobilize private funds. The willingness to provide international finance in accordance with common but differentiated responsibilities was acknowledged by the broad endorsement of the Paris Agreement, and the Green Climate Funds in particular. The international community aims to mobilize at least USD 100 billion per year for mitigation and adaption in developing countries. In this article, we argue that too little attention has been paid on the spending side of climate finance, both in the political as well as the academic debate. To this end, we review the challenges encountered in project-based approaches of allocating climate finance in the past. In contrast to project-based finance, we find many advantages to spending climate finance in support of price-based national policies. First, the support for international climate cooperation is improved when efforts of successively rising domestic carbon pricing levels are compensated. Second, carbon pricing sets incentives for least-cost mitigation. Third, investing domestic revenues from emission pricing schemes could advance a country's individual development goals and ensure the recipient's ‘ownership’ of climate policies. We conclude that by reconciling the global goal of cost-efficient mitigation with national policy priorities, climate finance for carbon pricing could become a central pillar of sustainable development and promote international cooperation to achieve the climate targets laid down in the Paris Agreement.
Im Dezember 2015 wurde in Paris Geschichte geschrieben: Die Weltklimakonferenz einigte sich auf das erste Klimaschutzabkommen, das alle Länder in die Pflicht nimmt. Damit bekennt sich die Weltgemeinschaft völkerrechtlich verbindlich zum Ziel, die Erderwärmung auf unter zwei Grad zu begrenzen. Doch was ist dieses Paris-Abkommen wert? Wo liegen seine Stärken, welche Herausforderungen kommen auf die Weltgemeinschaft zu? Welche Risiken birgt es? Was muss jetzt politisch folgen? Expertinnen und Experten aus Wissenschaft, Politik, Medien und NGOs analysieren in diesem Buch Hintergründe, Inhalte und Konsequenzen des neuen Weltklimavertrages.
The performance of the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading System (ETS) and other cap-and-trade schemes has been under scrutiny because of their inability to create a stable price for greenhouse gas emissions. This article seeks to inform the often confusing debate about the economic performance of cap-and-trade systems over time, with a focus on the EU ETS. Based on a simple intertemporal framework of emissions trading and a review of the literature, we show that different frameworks and notions of efficiency result in both different assessments of performance and different recommended strategies for improving performance. More specifically, we argue that if cap-and-trade systems have temporal flexibility (i.e., they include banking and borrowing of emissions allowances), it can be highly misleading to base the economic assessment on short-term efficiency. We seek to draw attention to the concept of long-term economic performance, which takes into account the intertemporal nature of emissions trading systems. In particular, we identify market and government distortions (e.g., myopia, lack of policy credibility, excessive discounting) that may depress allowance prices and hamper intertemporal efficiency. We then examine whether the recently adopted Market Stability Reserve and the alternative price collar are likely to address these distortions.
Global mitigation efforts remain insufficient to limit the global temperature increase to well below 2 °C. While a growing academic literature analyzes this problem, perceptions of which obstacles inhibit goal attainment and which responses might be most effective seem to differ widely. This makes prioritization and agreement on the way forward difficult. To inform prioritization in global climate policy and research agendas, we present quantitative data on how 917 experts from the IPCC and the UNFCCC perceive the importance of different obstacles and response options for achieving 2 °C. On average, respondents consider opposition from special interest groups the most important obstacle and technological R&D the most important response. Our survey also finds that the majority of experts perceives a wide range of issues as important, supporting an agenda that is inclusive in terms of coverage. Average importance ratings differ between experts from the Global North and South, suggesting that balanced representation in global fora and regionally differentiated agendas are important. In particular, opposition from special interest groups is a top priority among experts from North America, Europe and Oceania. Investigating the drivers of individual importance ratings, we find little difference between experts from the IPCC and the UNFCCC, while expert's perceptions correlate with their academic training and their national scientific, regulatory, and financial contexts.