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Decarbonizing the global energy system requires large-scale investment flows, with a central role for international climate finance to mobilize private funds. The willingness to provide international finance in accordance with common but differentiated responsibilities was acknowledged by the broad endorsement of the Paris Agreement, and the Green Climate Funds in particular. The international community aims to mobilize at least USD 100 billion per year for mitigation and adaption in developing countries. In this article, we argue that too little attention has been paid on the spending side of climate finance, both in the political as well as the academic debate. To this end, we review the challenges encountered in project-based approaches of allocating climate finance in the past. In contrast to project-based finance, we find many advantages to spending climate finance in support of price-based national policies. First, the support for international climate cooperation is improved when efforts of successively rising domestic carbon pricing levels are compensated. Second, carbon pricing sets incentives for least-cost mitigation. Third, investing domestic revenues from emission pricing schemes could advance a country's individual development goals and ensure the recipient's ‘ownership’ of climate policies. We conclude that by reconciling the global goal of cost-efficient mitigation with national policy priorities, climate finance for carbon pricing could become a central pillar of sustainable development and promote international cooperation to achieve the climate targets laid down in the Paris Agreement.
Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, industrialized countries have agreed to cover the incremental costs of climate change mitigation in developing countries and recent climate negotiations have reaffirmed the central role of climate finance for global mitigation efforts. We use an integrated energy–economy–climate model to assess the potential magnitude of financial transfers to developing countries that can be expected under non-market transfer mechanisms as well as international emission trading with several allocation schemes. Our results indicate that for the latter, depending on international permit allocation rules financial transfers to developing countries could reach almost USD bln 400 per year in 2020, with Sub-Saharan Africa receiving financial inflows of as much as 14.5% of its GDP. Reviewing the literature on natural resource revenues, official development assistance and foreign direct investment, we identify three major channels through which such sizable financial inflows may induce harmful effects for recipients: volatility, Dutch disease, and rent-seeking and corruption. We discuss the relevance of these mechanisms for climate finance and identify institutional arrangements which could help to avoid a ‘climate finance curse’. We conclude that there is no deterministic relationship between financial inflows and adverse consequences, as the most serious problems could be prevented or at least alleviated by appropriately designed policies and governance provisions.
The linking of emission trading systems (ETS) is a widely discussed policy option for future international cooperation on climate change. Benefits are expected from efficiency gains and the alleviation of concerns over competitiveness. However, from trade-theory it is known that due to general equilibrium effects and market distortions, linking may not always be beneficial for all participating countries. Following-up on this debate, we use a Ricardo-Viner type general equilibrium model to study the implications of sectoral linking on carbon emissions (‘leakage’), competitiveness, and welfare. By comparing pre- and post-linking equilibria, we show analytically how global emissions can increase if one of the ‘linked’ countries lacks an economy-wide emissions cap, although in case of a link across idiosyncratic sectors a decrease of emissions (‘anti-leakage’) is also possible. If – as a way to address concerns about competitiveness – a link between the EU ETS and a hypothetical US system is established, the partial emission coverage of the EU ETS can lead to the creation of new distortions between the non-covered domestic and international sector. Finally, we show how the welfare effect from linking can be decomposed into gains-from-trade and terms-of-trade contributions, and how the latter can make the overall effect ambiguous.
Carbon pricing is widely considered a key policy instrument for achieving substantial climate change mitigation. However, implementation remains patchy and price levels vary significantly across countries and regions. In this article, we analyze the structural social, political, and economic conditions under which carbon prices have been implemented so far. We estimate a Tobit regression model to investigate variations in explicit carbon prices over 262 national and subnational jurisdictions. Our results highlight well-governed institutions and public attitudes as the most important conditions for carbon pricing and characterize fossil fuel consumption as a barrier to the implementation of carbon prices. The results suggest that governance and public attitude need to be integrated into political economy analysis. Policy makers should take regulatory capacities and public attitudes seriously when designing carbon pricing policies.
Devising policies that facilitate a transition to low-carbon energy systems requires a close understanding of the country-specific political economy of energy and climate policy. We develop a generalized AOC (‘Actors, Objectives, Context’) political economy framework to inform and enable comparison of country-specific case studies of how economic structure, political institutions, and the political environment shape policy outcomes. Our actor-centered perspective is built on the assumption that those policies are implemented that best meet the objectives of actors with the greatest influence on policy decisions. Applying the framework in practice includes four basic steps: i) identifying the societal and political actors most relevant for the formulation, implementation and enforcement of energy and climate policies; ii) spelling out these actors’ underlying objectives; iii) assessing the economic, institutional, discursive and environmental context which determines how certain objectives matter for certain societal actors; and iv) analyzing the dynamic interactions among these factors leading to aggregate policy outcomes. Context factors determine how societal actors influence political actors engaged in formal public policy formulation, implementation and enforcement, and how the dynamic interplay of different political actors’ interests results in energy and climate policy outcomes. The framework can accommodate a wide range of theoretical perspectives. We illustrate how the framework enables conducting comparable energy and climate policy country case studies, using the example of coal use in India, Indonesia and Vietnam. Finally, we discuss how the framework can contribute to the identification of entry points that could bring about policy change.