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Inclusive groups can avoid the tragedy of the commons

  • The public goods game is a famous example illustrating the tragedy of the commons (Hardin in Science 162:1243–1248, 1968). In this game cooperating individuals contribute to a pool, which in turn is distributed to all members of the group, including defectors who reap the same rewards as cooperators without having made a contribution before. The question is now, how to incentivize group members to all cooperate as it maximizes the common good. While costly punishment (Helbing et al. in New J Phys 12:083005, 2010) presents one such method, the cost of punishment still reduces the common good. The selfishness of the group members favors defectors. Here we show that including other members of the groups and sharing rewards with them can be another incentive for cooperation, avoiding the cost required for punishment. Further, we show how punishment and this form of inclusiveness interact. This work suggests that a redistribution similar to a basic income that is coupled to the economic success of the entire group could overcome theThe public goods game is a famous example illustrating the tragedy of the commons (Hardin in Science 162:1243–1248, 1968). In this game cooperating individuals contribute to a pool, which in turn is distributed to all members of the group, including defectors who reap the same rewards as cooperators without having made a contribution before. The question is now, how to incentivize group members to all cooperate as it maximizes the common good. While costly punishment (Helbing et al. in New J Phys 12:083005, 2010) presents one such method, the cost of punishment still reduces the common good. The selfishness of the group members favors defectors. Here we show that including other members of the groups and sharing rewards with them can be another incentive for cooperation, avoiding the cost required for punishment. Further, we show how punishment and this form of inclusiveness interact. This work suggests that a redistribution similar to a basic income that is coupled to the economic success of the entire group could overcome the tragedy of the commons.show moreshow less

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Metadaten
Author:Arend Hintze, Jochen StaudacherORCiDGND, Katja Gelhar, Alexander Pothmann, Juliana Rasch, Daniel Wildegger
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-79731-y
Identifier:2045-2322 OPAC HS OPAC extern
Parent Title (English):Scientific Reports
Publisher:Nature Publishing
Place of publication:London
Document Type:Article
Language:English
Date of Publication (online):2020/12/28
Year of first Publication:2020
Tag:Agent-based simulation; evolutionary game theory
GND Keyword:Spieltheorie; Evolutionäre Spieltheorie; Simulation
Volume:10
Issue:1
Article Number:22392 (2020)
Number of pages:8
Institutes:Fakultät Informatik
IFI - Institut für Internationalisierung
Dewey Decimal Classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 30 Sozialwissenschaften, Soziologie
3 Sozialwissenschaften / 32 Politikwissenschaft
3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft
5 Naturwissenschaften und Mathematik / 57 Biowissenschaften; Biologie
Open Access:open_access
Research focus:FSP4: Soziale Innovationen
Publication Lists:Staudacher, Jochen
Publication reviewed:begutachtet
Licence (German):Creative Commons - CC BY - Namensnennung 4.0 International
Release Date:2021/02/16
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