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Since 2005, several European countries, coordinated by the European Association of Competent Authorities (EACA), have been developing a guide on contents and structure of the documentation demonstrating the compliance with the regulations for packages for the transport of radioactive material (package design safety report, PDSR). This guide has been periodically improved, considering feedback from Designers and authorities.
Taking into account the successful application of this guide in Europe, in 2013 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) decided to establish a similar guide as an IAEA document for promotion of worldwide use. The development of this IAEA guide started from the latest version of the European PDSR guide. In 2016/2017, during a 120-day review period, comments on the draft were received from member states and international organizations. These were incorporated into the draft in a series of meetings in 2017.
In another meeting in December 2018 the draft was updated to be in line with the latest revision of the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (SSR-6).
In this process the draft has been improved significantly, regarding structure as well as implementation of a graded approach depending on the package type, and clarified.
This paper points to the major considerations in developing the guide and important improvements over the last version of the European PDSR guide.
German spent nuclear fuel and high level waste is stored in dry conditions in interim storage facilities until a final repository will be ready for operation in the future. Dual purpose casks are used for the packaging of the materials to ensure transportability at any time during long-term interim storage and fulfilling both requirements from interim storage as well as transport. Germany’s 2011 decision to phase out utilization of nuclear energy has led to a high demand for casks for decommissioning power plants as quickly as possible. Cask serial production will continue at a high level for the next few years. In the process, a system of quality assurance measures ensures that every cask reliably complies with design specification according the transport approval certificate and storage license.
When the first casks were manufactured in Germany about 40 years ago, quality assurance was oriented towards pressure vessel and general nuclear manufacturing. The system was continuously adapted to the state of the art. In particular serial production, globalization of manufacturing and deep supplier chains had to be taken into account. The system of quality assurance measures applied today for cask manufacturing shall be presented here.
The quality assurance measures can be categorized as system-related and design-related. With respect to transport regulations for example, they are independently approved and monitored by the competent authority BAM and its authorized inspection experts. The qualification of the applicant is reviewed first in the context of the design approval procedure and then periodically. The qualification of component and cask manufacturers is also checked at the start of manufacturing and then periodically. Before the start of manufacturing documents such as quality plans are pre-assessed. Manufacturing and inspection are then performed according to the pre-assessed documents. Cask manufacturing is completed by a final inspection before commissioning. Periodic inspections during operation ensure preservation of the properties specified in the approval certificate over package life time. The type and the time interval of periodic inspections depend on the use of the package. For transport after interim storage a system of specific tests and inspections is prescribed.
For disposal of the German research reactor of the Technical University Munich FRM II a new transport and storage cask design was under approval assessment by the German authorities. The Bundesanstalt für Materialforschung und -prüfung (BAM) assessed the mechanical and thermal package safety and performed drop tests. The activity release approaches and subjects of quality assurance and surveillance for manufacturing and operation of the package were assessed by BAM as well.
The cask body is made of ductile cast iron and closed by two bolted lid systems with metal seals. The material of the lids is stainless steel. On each end of the cask a wood-filled impact limiter is installed to reduce impact loads to the cask under drop test conditions. In the cavity of the cask a basket for five spent fuel assemblies is arranged.
For the safety case a combination of experimental testing and analytical/numerical calculations were applied. In total, four drop tests were carried out at the BAM large drop test facility. Two tests were carried out as a full IAEA drop test sequence consisting of a 9m drop test onto an unyielding target and a 1m puncture bar drop test. The other two drop test were performed as single 9m drop tests and completed by additional analyses for considering the effects of an IAEA drop test sequence.
The main objectives of the drop tests were the investigation of the integrity of the package and its safety against release of radioactive material as well as the test of the fastening system of the impact limiters. Furthermore, the acceleration and strain signals measured during the tests were used for the verification of Finite-Element-Analysis (FEA) used for the safety analysis of the package design.
The finite-element models incorporated in the package design safety report include the cask body, the lid system, the inventory and the impact limiters with the fastening system. In this context special attention was paid to the modeling of the encapsulated wood-filled impact limiters.
Additional calculations using the verified numerical models were done by the applicant and assessed by BAM to investigate e.g. the brittle fracture of the cask body made of ductile cask iron within the package design approval procedure.
This paper describes the package design assessment from the view of the competent authority BAM including the applied assessment strategy, the conducted drop tests and the additional calculations by using numerical and analytical methods.
The safety demonstrations realized by applicants in the case of approval request for the package designs containing enriched UF6 have to take into account some specific technical issues. Concerning the shipment of enriched UF6, the package designs consist in general of a filled 30B cylinder surrounded by an overpack.
The description of the content, considering the UF6 origin, i.e. natural or reprocessed, shall be clearly justified especially when the UF6 isotopic composition exceeds the limits specified in ASTM standards.
Concerning the containment of the UF6, the applicant shall demonstrate in all conditions of transport the leak-tightness of the valve and plug of the cylinders filled with enriched UF6. In this regard, when mechanical justifications are based on numerical calculations, the absence of contact between these components of the cylinder and the internal surfaces of the overpack after the regulatory drop tests shall be shown to respect the IAEA regulations.
Furthermore, the representativeness of the ballast used to simulate the behaviour of the UF6 loaded within the cylinder shall be justified if drop tests are performed. The representativeness of the ballast should also be justified for numerical calculations.
In addition, the applicant shall demonstrate that the melting temperature of the valve and the plug, including the tinned joint, will not be exceeded during the regulatory fire test.
Finally, specific provisions relative to the use of plugs and the maintenance of cylinders should be included in the safety analysis report.
The interaction between the package lid system and internal Content during mechanical drop testing is a decisive matter in evaluating Impact loads and the safety of the package. In the case of movable contents ist impact onto the inner side of the package lid can cause additional load peaks on the lid and the lid bolts. Some aspects of this issue were discussed on the basis of experimental results from instrumented drop tests with transport casks and on the basis of analytical approaches.
For transport package design and operation according to the IAEA regulations, the package shall be securely stowed and its retention system shall be capable to withstand load conditions of routine transport. The supporting IAEA Advisory Material SSG-26 provides information how to do that.
Up to now package designers in different countries use other load factors for the design of attachment points than those specified in the IAEA guidance material. In particular the acceleration values vary between different countries and lead to difficulties during the validation of foreign approval certificates. Therefore the IAEA started a discussion process to review the existing guidance text. An international working group was constituted in 2013. Representatives came from different stakeholders, e.g. transport operators, competent authorities and modal organizations. The discussions concluded especially on the transport conditions which has to be considered for stowage design, including on the one hand the relevance of the load factors used for strength and fatigue analysis and on the other hand the criteria which have to be considered for the attachment points.
The proposed acceleration values will be compared to those measured during recent multi-modal testing by Sandia National Laboratories that measured the acceleration levels experienced by a spent fuel flask during heavy-haul truck, sea, and rail transport.
The ISO standard 10276 is dealing with the load attachment systems of packages as well. This standard considers the trunnion design, manufacturing and operational aspects. The regular standard revision phase started in 2017. An expert group discussed new state-of-the-art technology, different analysis approaches for strength and fatigue analysis and proposed revised text for the ISO standard for international discussion. The finite-element analysis approach incl. appropriate acceptance criteria are described and referenced.
The paper describes relevant tie-down aspects, gives background argumentation relevant to analysis approaches, and tries to support harmonized application of the revised IAEA guidance material and the future revised ISO standard.
Transport and storage containers for low and midlevel radioactive waste are getting more and more of relevance due to the nuclear phase out decision in 2011. For higher activities Type B(U) approved waste containers will be needed for the shut down and dismantling phases of NPPs. It is expected that large quantities are required in the near future. German waste containers are generally approved for transport and interim storage and are also intended for the final disposal in the Konrad repository. BAM is involved in the authority licensing of transport package designs in Germany. In this context, BAM is responsible for the assessment of safe containment, mechanical, thermal and quality management issues. BAM also operates test facilities and performs drop as well as thermal tests during package licensing procedures.
This paper summarizes our experience in the transport package design assessment of Type B(U) waste containers. A general overview of the approval process, the requirements and approaches BAM applies are described. Some examples are used to illustrate different aspects and technical issues we are addressing during the package assessment. In the first part of the paper the specific design aspects of German waste containers are described. Here, a general overview is given e.g. about closure systems, impact limiter designs, and the handling concepts. Furthermore, the wide range of radioactive content and their physical behavior including the impact on the packages assessment are described. The second part is focused on questions about the licensing and assessment process of German waste containers from the BAM authority point of view. The general approaches for the strategy of demonstration are outlined on the basis of the test conditions according to IAEA Regulations SSR-6. Furthermore, particular issues of the mechanical and thermal assessment with respect to the specific test conditions are discussed. For accident conditions of transport, aspects to be mentioned are e.g. the assessment of the lid bolts, the axial gap applied between content and lid, and the thermal behavior of the wood filled impact limiter after the fire test. However, issues of the assessment for routine and normal conditions of transport are addressed in this paper, too. The intention of this paper is introduce recent approval procedure experience in Germany, describing technical evaluation issues and so reduce rounds of questions during applications.
Damaged spent nuclear fuel (DSNF) can be loaded in German dual-purpose casks (DPC) for transport and interim storage. Encapsulations are needed to guarantee a safe handling and a tight closure, separated from the package enclosure. These encapsulations shall be durable and leak-tight for a long storage period, because they are usually not accessible within periodical inspections of the DPC. Due to the general design of DPCs for standard fuel assemblies, specific requirements have to be considered for the design of encapsulations for DSNF to ensure the loading in existing package designs. Especially the primary lid system of a DPC is designed for maximum loads due to the internal impact of the content during drop test conditions. The main difference of encapsulations for damaged spent nuclear fuel is that they have usually a much higher stiffness than standard fuel assemblies. Therefore the design of an internal shock absorber, e.g. at the head of an encapsulation is required to reduce mechanical loads to the primary lid system during impacts.
BAM as part of the German competent authority system is responsible for the safety assessment of the mechanical and thermal package design, the release of radioactive material and the quality assurance of package manufacturing and operation. Concerning the mechanical design of the encapsulation BAM was involved in the comprehensive assessment procedure during the package design approval process. An internal shock absorber was developed by the package designer with numerical analyses and experimental drop tests. Experimental drop tests are needed to cover limiting parameters regarding, e.g. temperature and wall thickness of the shock absorbing element to enable a detailed specification of the whole load-deformation behavior of the encapsulation shock absorber.
The paper gives an overview of the assessment work by BAM and points out the main findings which are relevant for an acceptable design of internal shock absorbers. The physical drop tests were planned on the basis of pre-investigations of the applicant concerning shape, dimension and material properties. In advance of the final drop tests the possible internal impact behavior had to be analyzed and the setup of the test facility had to be validated. The planning, performance and evaluation of the final drop tests were witnessed and assessed by BAM. In conclusion it could be approved that the German encapsulation system for damaged spent nuclear fuel with shock absorbing components can be handled similar to standard fuel assemblies in existing package designs.
Packages for the transport of radioactive material shall meet the mechanical and thermal test requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regulations for package design approval. Besides mechanical testing, the Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing (BAM) performs thermal tests in accordance with the IAEA regulations. The thermal test includes a 30-minute 800°C fully engulfing fire.
BAM continuously performs various thermal experiments for the investigation of the thermal response of packages with respect to the IAEA fire. The purpose of this paper is to give an overview of the already performed, ongoing and future physical tests and experiments of BAM in the field of thermal investigations. These research and development works shall support our competencies for the authority package design assessment.
BAM operates a propane gas fire test facility. To be able to carry out comparative investigations and validity between the propane fire and the in detail prescribed pool fire test in the regulations, BAM carries out various calorimetric tests and investigates the boundary conditions of the fire with the help of fire reference packages. At the same time, we are conducting various fire scenarios with wood-filled impact limiters. Large-scale fire tests of impact limiters are carried out on a full scale as well as on a small scale. Influencing variables are investigated in particular by means of geometric changes and the consideration of artificial damages, in particular holes. In addition to propane fire as a heat source, thermal scenarios are also investigated with hydrogen as heat source and an infrared radiator system to ignite test specimens. For these numerous test arrangements, the transferability to existing and newly developed transport package designs is essential and fruitful within the review of design approvals, especially for Dual Purpose casks with a long-lasting operation time.
The first German package design approval certificate for a dual purpose cask intended for loading with damaged spent nuclear fuel was issued recently. BAM as part of the competent authority system in Germany carried out a comprehensive assessment procedure with respect to the mechanical and thermal design, the release of radioactive material and the quality assurance aspects of manufacturing and operation. Packages for the transport and storage of radioactive material have been assessed by BAM for many years, thus the common assessment procedure is well-known and good practice. Up to now only SNF without defects or HLW with well-defined properties were designated for long-term Interim storage and transports afterwards. Due to Germany’s nuclear phase out all other kinds of spent nuclear fuel in particular damaged spent nuclear fuel shall be packed as well. Damaged spent nuclear fuel needs a tight closure with Special encapsulations and clearly defined properties in Germany. In addition, these encapsulations shall be long-term durable, because they are not accessible after loading in a packaging within periodical inspections. The main difference to Standard package components is that encapsulations with a permanent closure achieve their specified conditions not after manufacturing but only during operation, after loading and closing. To ensure compliance with the specific conditions, special measures for quality assurance are necessary during operation of each encapsulation, e.g. drying and sealing, which were assessed by BAM. The present paper gives an overview of the conducted assessment from BAM and point out the findings concerning to the special closure lid of the approved encapsulation, which is screwed and welded. A wide verification concept is necessary to show the specific tightness under transport conditions. Together with quality assurance measures during first operation steps these encapsulations with damaged spent nuclear fuel can be handled like standard fuel assemblies in approved package designs.