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The introduction of hydrogen as a safe energy carrier needs a robust knowledge base, tools for the design and safety assessment of hydrogen technologies built on it, and an internationally harmonized set of standards and regulations. Many of the innovative technologies imply hydrogen at high pressures and/or cryogenic temperatures, with which private users come into contact for the first time in distributed applications. In order to avoid over-conservative, expensive safety solutions, while at the same time demonstrating the usability and safety of hydrogen applications and maintaining acceptance for the technology, safety research must also keep pace with, or better yet anticipate, trends in technological development. Thus, this overview article describes not only the current state of knowledge and technology regarding hydrogen safety, but also its further development.
Die Einführung von Wasserstoff als sicherer Energieträger braucht eine robuste Wissensbasis, darauf aufgebaute Werkzeuge zur Auslegung und Sicherheitsbewertung von Wasserstofftechnologien und ein international harmonisiertes Regelwerk. Viele der innovativen Technologien implizieren Wasserstoff bei hohen Drücken und/oder kryogenen Temperaturen, mit denen in verteilten Anwendungen erstmalig private Nutzer in Kontakt kommen. Um überkonservative, teure Sicherheitslösungen zu vermeiden, gleichzeitig aber die Einsetzbarkeit und Sicherheit von Wasserstoffanwendungen zu demonstrieren und die Akzeptanz für die Technologie aufrecht zu halten, muss auch die Sicherheitsforschung mit den Trends der technologischen Entwicklung Schritt halten, oder sie besser noch antizipieren. So beschreibt dieser Überblicksartikel nicht nur den gegenwärtigen Stand der Kenntnisse und Technik bezüglich Wasserstoffsicherheit, sondern auch ihre Weiterentwicklung.
The silicon based semiconductor structure Si/SiO2/Si3N4/LaF3/Pt can be used as a potentiometric oxygen sensor working at room temperature. A thermal re-activation can be applied to overcome the earlier disadvantage of an increase in response time with continuous use. Using the Pt gate electrode as a resistive heater, very short electrical high-power pulses can be applied. A heating time as short as 300 ns was sufficient for the re-activation of the sensor. This way, only the sensitive thin layer system LaF3/Pt was heated, and the whole sensor was at room temperature immediately after heating. Impedance spectroscopy, X-ray photoelectron spectroscopy (XPS) and quadruple mass spectrometric (QMS)thermogravimetry (TG) were used to investigate the mechanism of deterioration in dynamic sensor behaviour and re-activation. The formation of hydrated carbonate and the desorption of CO2 and H2O have been shown to be the causes.
This paper describes a modified experimental setup for the test apparatus 20-L-Sphere (also known as 20-L Siwek Chamber), that enables the test samples to be kept under inert atmospheric conditions nearly until ignition. This setup was designed to allow the determination of safety characteristics of nano powders under most critical circumstances (e.g. minimisation of the influence of oxidation before the test itself). The aim of this modification was to determine, whether or not the current setup and procedures underestimate the explosion violence and ignitability of nano powders. For this purpose, two different methods, the so called inerting method and the modified method (using a special nozzle called mushroom nozzle) are used. Both methods are described in the paper. The work includes experimental results of micrometer dusts to validate the modified method. Moreover first results of nanometer iron and aluminium dusts are presented, which were kept at inert conditions until shortly before the ignition. The tested nano iron was found to react pyrophoric, as soon as it gets in contact with air, while the tested nano aluminium did not generally show such behaviour. Tests with nano aluminium using the inerting method revealed a higher pressure rise in comparison to the standard test procedure. This could suggest a different extent of passivation. To investigate this effect more closely, further testes with more nano powders are required.
Modified setup of 20-L-sphere for the determination of safety characteristics of nano powders
(2013)
This paper describes a modified experimental setup for the test apparatus 20-L-Sphere (also known as 20-L Siwek Chamber), that enables the test samples to be kept under inert atmospheric conditions nearly until ignition. This setup was designed to allow the determination of safety characteristics of nanopowders under most critical circumstances (e.g. minimisation of the influence of oxidation before the test itself). The aim of this modification was to determine, whether or not the current setup and procedures underestimate the explosion violence and ignitability of nanopowders. The work includes experimental results of micrometer dusts to validate the modified setup. Moreover first results of nanometer iron and Aluminium dusts are presented, which were kept at inert conditions until shortly before the ignition. The tested nano iron was found to react pyrophoric, as soon as it gets in contact with air, while the tested nano Aluminium did not generally show such behaviour.
In practice, occurring explosive dust/air mixtures are usually not homogeneous and in many cases do not spread over the whole enclosure. For the safety measure explosion venting, a smaller venting area might be sufficient as calculated according to venting standards (EN 14491 'Dust Explosion Venting Protective Systems'). The tendency of bulk materials to form dust clouds is not taken into account so far. To optimize the design of explosion protection measures, a new safety characteristic the so-called 'dustiness' (see VDI 2263 part 9 'Determination of Dustiness of Bulk Materials'.) could be useful. Dustiness means the tendency of dust to form dust clouds. There are six dustiness groups (DG) from one to six (one means little tendency to stay airborne, six the opposite). The paper describes first results on the reasons for different dustiness and on dust explosion venting for several dusts of different dustiness. A 75 L vertical tube apparatus for vented dust explosion experiments was created. Pressure, pressure rises and flame speeds were measured to evaluate the course of the dust explosions. In addition the paper includes CFD simulations (ANSYS CFX) about the possibilities to model the dust/air mixtures with the Euler/Lagrange approach. In order to simulate the settling of dust clouds more realistic the particle surface area was adjusted and the particle size distribution was taken into account. Results were compared to experimentally determined terminal velocities.
Determination of measurement uncertainties in adiabatic hot storage experiments for flammable dusts
(2012)
Experimentelle Untersuchungen zum Einfluss von Brandbeschleuniger auf den Verlauf von Raumbränden
(2013)
Observed autoignition events and extinguishing the resulting smouldering fires in an underground storage system of a coal-fired power plant have provided insight into the array of contributing variables, and some experience on quantifying the risk with alternative scenarios of event initiation, progress and potential mitigation. Although the first attempts to quantify the risk suggest high sensitivity to the sequence of action taken after fire alarm, and no similar storage sites really exist, some recommended preventive, corrective and other mitigating activities can be at least partly defined and improved by using the cumulative experience and parallel efforts in other closed or underground storage sites. However, there are also so-called black (or at least grey) swans: unexpected events for which the facility may be poorly prepared for. In the case of the underground storage silos, such an event was experienced when incoming cold coal during a harsh winter season froze the sewer system that normally protects the stored coal from seepage water. With blocked normal bypass, the seepage water found its way to the coal silos and created large clumps of icy coal that blocked the coal conveyors. Although freezing weather is not unusual at high-latitude power plants, the common methods to combat freezing of coal are mainly useful for open storage sites and above-ground transport. Options for mitigation are discussed, as well as the event chain leading to an event that had never previously occurred. The case is discussed from the point of view of options to prepare for rare or unforeseen events.