Refine
Document Type
- Article (2)
- Working Paper (1)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (3)
Keywords
- ARIADNE (1)
Eine Teilung des deutschen Marktgebietes würde die Marktwerte erneuerbarer Energien beeinflussen. Wind und Photovoltaik (PV) im Süden Deutschlands würden an Wert gewinnen, während Erneuerbare im Norden Erlöse einbüßen würden. Bei einer auch zukünftig stärkeren Konzentration von erneuerbaren Energien im Norden bedeutet dies insgesamt einen höheren Förderbedarf für PV – Wind wäre trotz niedriger Marktwerte in den meisten Regionen wirtschaftlich. Wenn eine regionale Steuerung erreicht werden soll, müsste die auszuzahlende Förderung für neue PV-Anlagen anhand des zonenübergreifenden Referenzmarktwertes berechnet werden. Durchschnittliche Börsenstrompreise würden durch eine Gebotszonenteilung im Süden Deutschlands leicht angehoben und im Norden gesenkt, die Effekte auf Endkundenpreise und damit verbundene Anreize zur Standortwahl von Industrieunternehmen sind allerdings als gering einzuschätzen.
This study assesses the extent to which auctions for compensation payments are a suitable policy instrument for ending coal-fired power generation at minimum cost and thus achieving national climate targets. Germany is the first country to apply such a market-based mechanism. Evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of the auction, we find that the first five of seven auction rounds will retire 10 GW of coal-fired capacity at a cost of 68 ± 5 EUR/kW, corresponding to an additional carbon price of 2.4 ± 0.2 EUR/tCO2. The possibility of administratively shutting down power plants from 2024 and a decreasing ceiling price have ensured that average compensation payments are well below the ceiling price, and low compared to other policies, even though there was no competition in two of five auction rounds. As the government cancels the freed emission allowances, the policy will result in lower emissions, even though the carbon intensity of the German coal power fleet increased slightly by 2%. Thus, the German auctions can serve as a model for national phase-out strategies in countries with similar institutional frameworks and provide a reference case for integrating conflicting policy objectives into auctions.
European Union competition law, intended to thwart subsidies paid out by national governments, plays an important role in shaping EU Member States’ support schemes for renewable energy. The Environmental and Energy State Aid Guidelines 2014–2020, which formalize the European Commission’s take on subsidies in the electricity sector, prescribe technology-neutral auctions as the standard mechanism to determine support levels. In this study, we have assessed the formal decisions of the Commission with respect to technology-neutrality between July 2014 and May 2018. It turns out that 16 out of 18 schemes are not technology-neutral and figure high degrees of technology-differentiation. We have also studied the exemption clauses invoked to justify technology-discrimination, finding that the most ambiguous clause is used most frequently, and that the application and level of scrutiny varies strongly from case to case. The State Aid Guidelines are meant to increase transparency and legal certainty. We find that with respect to technology-neutral auctions for renewable energy, the Guidelines fail to deliver on their purpose.