This article investigates the reasons behind varying institutional positions in the European Union’s (EU) area of justice and home affairs (JHA). It argues that such instances of institutional behaviour cannot be fully understood without examining how each institution seeks to legitimize its role in the EU political system. A novel theoretical framework on institutional behaviour is advanced, connecting individual policy positions and governance choices to (1) institutional roles developed within different types of organizational structure, and (2) the representative claims made by officials involved in decision-making. The framework draws on insights from organizational theory regarding institutional role expectations and a constructivist approach to representation borrowed from the work of Michael Saward. Using three cases of JHA legislation from the post-Lisbon period, it is shown that the framework can explain varying patterns of institutional behaviour by exploring lines of justification present in the institutional discourse.
This article explores the applicability of democratic functionalism as a theoretical framework explaining mechanisms of European Union (EU) politicization during immigration crises. Since most existing studies on the politicization of EU crisis situations focus on the Euro crisis, it is unclear if and how the politicization of EU immigration crises differs. Drawing on a 2011 crisis with legislative implications for the free movement of people in the Schengen Area, the article illustrates that immigration crises are politicized along exclusionary identities rather than along pro-/anti-European lines—as expected by democratic functionalism. Moreover, unlike in the Euro crisis, the 2011 case illustrates how the media can be instrumentalized by governments during immigration crises, with little political mobilization from the public. This case is relevant given the widespread politicization of the 2015 refugee crisis, which conversely attracted close media attention and caused serious public concern. As it stands, democratic functionalism is shown to lack a conceptualization of how much and for how long an issue needs to be contested in the European public sphere for the mechanisms of EU politicization described by the theory to hold.
This article problematises the proliferation of European Union (EU) agencies with operational tasks as a new phenomenon capturing the exercise of joint sovereignty in European integration. While joint decision-making has been a feature of EU politics for decades, joint sovereignty is a broader category that additionally involves the creation of EU bodies able to intervene ‘on the ground’ alongside national public actors. We argue that the choice for joint sovereignty opens a Pandora’s box of implementation deficiencies which undermine the ability of both national and supranational actors to conduct operational activities effectively. We subsequently identify two frequent dysfunctions in policy implementation and connect them to ambiguity and conflict at the decision-making stage. Empirically, we illustrate the systemic link between decision-making and implementation problems in the functioning of two agencies with operational tasks active in the fields of border management (Frontex) and police cooperation (Europol).
This article aims to understand the lack of consensus at the European Union (EU) level during the refugee crisis based on the discursive polarization of the main governmental and institutional actors involved in decision-making. Drawing on de Wilde’s representative claims analysis, the goal is to trace competing claims of representation made on ‘Europe’s behalf’ by multiple actors claiming to defend EU values or the interests of citizens. The analysis covers Politico Europe articles published during 2015–16, capturing the height of the crisis. The findings illustrate the self-understandings of actors on a humanitarian-communitarian axis that became intertwined with concerns for internal EU solidarity and the survival of the Schengen Area. The analysis contributes to the literature on EU politicization and discursive framing during the refugee crisis, showing how the actors involved in EU decision-making had very different conceptions of what was at stake in the episode.
The establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) raised expectations regarding theability of the European Parliament (EP) to hold the European Central Bank (ECB) accountable forits decisions. This article examines the accountability interactions between the two institutions inthefirst years of the functioning of the SSM (2013–18). The focus is on the extent to which the EPcontests ECB supervisory decisions in practice through letters and public hearings. The analysisshows a frequently-used infrastructure of political accountability that is however limited in ensur-ing the contestation of ECB conduct in banking supervision. The study identifies problems withthe performance of the EP as an accountability forum and with the tight confidentiality rules ofthe SSM, which allow the ECB to silence contestation on many politically salient issues. Thefind-ings are based on an innovative analytical framework on the study of accountability interactions.
Accountability in the EU's para-regulatory state: The case of the Economic and Monetary Union
(2021)
This article revisits Majone's famous argument about accountability in the regulatory state in reference to the European Union's (EU) Economic and Monetary Union. We show that the EU has entered the stage of a “para-regulatory state” marked by increasing EU regulation in areas linked to core state powers. Despite the redistributive and politicized nature of these policy areas, the EU's “para-regulatory state” has continued to rely on its regulatory model of accountability, focused on decisionmaking processes, and interest mediation. In line with Majone, we describe the model as procedural and contrast it to substantive accountability – which is necessary when regulation has clear redistributive implications. Using two case studies from fiscal policy and monetary affairs, we illustrate the predominance of procedural accountability as exercised by the European Parliament and EU Courts. We complement the empirical analysis with a normative discussion of how substantive accountability could potentially be rendered in both fields.
his article introduces a new normative framework for analysing accountability in the European Union’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The framework is anchored in four normative ‘goods’ that accountability is supposed to ensure: openness, non-arbitrariness, effectiveness, and publicness. All of these can be achieved in a procedural or substantive way, depending on whether actors are held accountable for the quality of their decision-making processes or for the actual merit of their decisions. Transposed to EMU, this conceptualisation shows both the payoffs and trade-offs of prioritising procedural accountability. Using different examples across EMU governance, the article illustrates how current mechanisms of political, legal, and administrative accountability predominantly evaluate the procedures followed by EU institutions when performing their tasks. While such an approach can bring clarity, predictability, and autonomy for the actors involved, it distracts attention from the substantive assessment of EMU decisions. The article contributes to the EMU accountability literature by going beyond principal-agent expectations of democratic control rooted in the nation-state or legal debates about principles for accountable behaviour found in EU Treaties. The EMU, and the EU more broadly, need a different perspective on accountability focused on generally-applicable standards for holding power to account.
This article revisits the balancing act between independence and accountability at the European Central Bank (ECB). It contrasts procedural and substantive concepts of accountability, and challenges the mainstream idea that independence and accountability can be reconciled through narrow mandates, the indiscriminate increase of transparency, the creation of multiple channels of accountability, and the active use of judicial review. These assumptions form the pillars of a procedural type of accountability that promises to resolve the independence/accountability dilemma but fails to do so in practice. The article brings evidence to show how ECB accountability has become a complex administrative exercise that focuses on the procedural steps leading up to monetary and supervisory decisions while simultaneously limiting substantive accountability. The failure to acknowledge the trade‐off between independence and accountability (said to be ‘two sides of the same coin’) has resulted in a tendency to privilege the former over the latter.