Ingenieurwissenschaften und zugeordnete Tätigkeiten
Filtern
Dokumenttyp
- Vortrag (8)
- Beitrag zu einem Tagungsband (3)
- Zeitschriftenartikel (1)
- Dissertation (1)
Schlagworte
- Human factors (13) (entfernen)
Eingeladener Vortrag
- nein (8)
Dass die Zuverlässigkeit der ZfP eine sehr wichtige Rolle bei der Bewertung sicherheitsrelevanter Systeme spielt, ist bekannt. Laut dem modularen Zuverlässigkeitsmodell für zerstörungsfreie Prüfprozesse hängt die Zuverlässigkeit von der innewohnenden (physikalisch-technischen) Fähigkeit der Prüfsystems, den Anwendungsparametern, den menschlichen Faktoren und dem organisatorischen Kontext ab. Seit Einführung des Modells während des ersten Workshops zur Zuverlässigkeit der ZfP (European-American Workshop on Reliability of NDE) wurde das Modell in weiteren fünf Workshops stetig weiterentwickelt, diskutiert und an den Stand der Wissenschaft angepasst. Das Ziel dieser Publikation ist es, den aktuellen Stand der Diskussion und die neusten Fragestellungen der internationalen Zuverlässigkeitsgemeinschaft vorzustellen. Im Einzelnen werden die Entwicklung fortgeschrittener Modelle zur Bewertung der Probability of Detection (POD), Bewertungsansätze im Bereich Structural Health Monitoring und Fragestellungen zu den menschlichen Faktoren dargestellt. Besonderer Wert wurde sowohl auf die Entwicklung, als auch auf die Anwendung der Ansätze in der industriellen Praxis gelegt.
Dass die Zuverlässigkeit der ZfP eine sehr wichtige Rolle bei der Bewertung sicherheitsrelevanter Systeme spielt, ist bekannt. Laut dem modularen Zuverlässigkeitsmodell für zerstörungsfreie Prüfprozesse hängt die Zuverlässigkeit von der innewohnenden (physikalisch-technischen) Fähigkeit der Prüfsystems, den Anwendungsparametern, den menschlichen Faktoren und dem organisatorischen Kontext ab. Seit Einführung des Modells während des ersten Workshops zur Zuverlässigkeit der ZfP (European-American Workshop on Reliability of NDE) wurde das Modell in weiteren fünf Workshops stetig weiterentwickelt, diskutiert und an den Stand der Wissenschaft angepasst. Das Ziel dieser Publikation ist es, den aktuellen Stand der Diskussion und die neusten Fragestellungen der internationalen Zuverlässigkeitsgemeinschaft vorzustellen. Im Einzelnen werden die Entwicklung fortgeschrittener Modelle zur Bewertung der Probability of Detection (POD), Bewertungsansätze im Bereich Structural Health Monitoring und Fragestellungen zu den menschlichen Faktoren dargestellt. Besonderer Wert wurde sowohl auf die Entwicklung, als auch auf die Anwendung der Ansätze in der industriellen Praxis gelegt.
Analyzing the reliability of non-destructive tests using the modular modell - a practical approach
(2016)
Non-destructive testing is an important tool to guarantee the safety of railway traffic.
The infrastructure with tracks, switches and sleepers is regularly tested, the
locomotives and wagons with their wheels, bogies and axles as well. Many years of experience and some events lead in Germany to a good practice in testing the railway components. Now, European authorities are drafting a system of common requirements and standards for the European Railway Market. The German practice combines an intensive training of the NDT-personnel including sufficient time for practical exercises with organizational measures of the companies, responsible for rolling stock and infrastructure. Through the example of UT-testing of railway axles it will be shown, how training and organizational measures influence the reliability of such testing.
Reliability of NDT depends not only on the intrinsic capability of the measuring systems and on the application factors (the conditions under which NDT is applied), but also—and to a great extent—on human factors and the organisational context under which each inspection is carried out.
Adoption of a systematic approach to the identification and prevention of risks.
Critical defects could be missed, even if the inspection process is semi-automated. The causes of that risk lie in the technology, people and in the organisation. Currently installed preventive measures are insufficient to prevent from risks New preventive measures could be installed, e.g. further automation, installing alarms, implementing human redundancy, developing software and hardware solutions, optimising procedures, etc.
Human factors studies are not only essential for the operation but also during the development process.
Ultrasonic phased array is, currently, the technology which is being applied as the solution to a lot of inspection problems. The perceived benefits are seen to be worth the outlay on equipment and specialised personnel. Yet, there is a source of knowledge, freely available, which can also deliver immediate benefits, through more reliable inspection results, and consequently increased
client confidence, but which is largely ignored by the greater part of the NDT community. This talk will review the latest Human Factors knowledge and provide practical illustrations of how companies can use it to improve their competitive edge.
Ultrasonic phased array is, currently, the technology which is being applied as the solution to a lot of inspection problems. The perceived benefits are seen to be worth the outlay on equipment and specialised personnel. Yet, there is a source of knowledge, freely available, which can also deliver immediate benefits, through more reliable inspection results, and consequently increased client confidence, but which is largely ignored by the greater part of the NDT community. This talk will review the latest Human Factors knowledge and provide practical illustrations of how companies can use it to improve their competitive edge.
Human factors have puzzled the non-destructive testing (NDT) community since the NDT’s beginnings. It is well known that various human and organisational factors affect the reliability of NDT in the field. Hence, various efforts have been made to improve the technology, the training and the qualification process, the inspection procedures, and the working conditions, among others. However, human factors still puzzle the NDT community and the efforts to fill the gap in knowledge are rather scarce. In comparison to other fields, human factors in NDT have been a rather poorly investigated field. In the past 30 years, only a handful of institutes engaged into the research in this field. However, the recent efforts from the UK and Germany have brought the topic into spotlight. This paper will provide an overview of existing knowledge in the field and discuss future directions.
Non-destructive testing (NDT) is regarded as one of the key elements in ensuring quality of engineering systems and their safe use. A failure of NDT to detect critical defects in safetyrelevant components, such as those in the nuclear industry, may lead to catastrophic consequences for the environment and the people. Therefore, ensuring that NDT methods are capable of detecting all critical defects, i.e. that they are reliable, is of utmost importance. Reliability of NDT is affected by human factors, which have thus far received the least amount of attention in the reliability assessments. With increased use of automation, in terms of mechanised testing (automation-assisted inspection and the corresponding evaluation of data), higher reliability standards are believed to have been achieved. However, human inspectors, and thus human factors, still play an important role throughout this process, and the risks involved in this application are unknown. The overall aim of the work presented in this dissertation was to explore for the first time the risks associated with mechanised NDT and find ways of mitigating their effects on the inspection performance. Hence, the objectives were to (1) identify and analyse potential risks in mechanised NDT, (2) devise measures against them, (3) critically address the preventive measures with respect to new potential risks, and (4) suggest ways for the implementation of the preventive measures. To address the first two objectives a risk assessment in form of a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) was conducted (Study 1). This analysis revealed potential for failure during both the acquisition and evaluation of NDT data that could be assigned to human, technology, and organisation. Since the existing preventive measures are insufficient to defend the system from identified failures, new preventive measures were suggested. The conclusion of the study was that those preventive measures need to be carefully considered with respect to new potential risks, before they can be implemented, thus serving as a starting point for further empirical studies. To address the final two objectives, two preventive measures, i.e. human redundancy and the use of automated aids in the evaluation of NDT data, were critically assessed with regard to potential downfalls arising from the social interaction between redundant individuals and the belief in the high reliability of automated aids. The second study was concerned with the potential withdrawal of effort in sequential redundant teams when working collectively as opposed to working alone, when independence between the two redundant individuals is not present. The results revealed that the first redundant inspector, led to believe someone else will conduct the same task afterwards, invested the same amount of effort as when working alone. The redundant checker was not affected by the information about the superior experience of his predecessor and—instead of expected withdrawal of effort—exhibited better performance in the task. Both results were in contradiction to the hypotheses, the explanations for which can be found in the social loafing and social compensation effects and in the methodological limitations. The third study examined inappropriate use of the aid measured in terms of (a) agreement with the errors of the aid in connection to the frequency of verifying its results and in terms of (b) the overall performance in the task. The results showed that the information about the high reliability of the aid did not affect the perception of that aid’s performance and, hence, no differences in the actual use of the aid were to be expected. However, the participants did not use the aid appropriately: They misused it, i.e. agreed with the errors committed by the aid and disused it, i.e. disagreed with the correct information provided by the aid, thereby reducing the overall reliability of the aid in terms of sizing ability. Whereas aid’s misuse could be assigned to low propensity to take risks and reduced verification behaviour because of a bias towards automation, the disuse was assigned to the possible misunderstanding of the task. The results of these studies raised the awareness that methods used to increase reliability and safety, such as automation and human redundancy, can backfire if their implementation is not carefully considered with respect to new potential risks arising from the interaction between individuals and complex systems. In an attempt to minimise this risk, suggestions for their implementation in the NDT practice were provided.
Laut dem Modularen Zuverlässigkeitsmodel (Müller et al., 2013) für zerstörungsfreie Prüfprozesse, hängt die Zuverlässigkeit der ZfP nicht nur von der innewohnenden (physikalisch-technischen) Fähigkeit der Prüfsystems und den Anwendungsparametern ab, sondern auch von den menschlichen Faktoren und dem organisationalen Kontext. Allerdings begegnete man den Schwankungen in der Prüfleistung bei der ZfP bisher üblicherweise mit der Verbesserung der Geräte und der Veränderung der Prüfanweisungen oder der technischen Ausbildung – nur wenig Ressourcen wurden in die Erforschung der menschlichen und organisationalen Faktoren investiert, obwohl diese die häufigste Ursachen für die Leistungsvariationen der Prüfer darstellen.
Human Factors beziehen sich auf Faktoren aus der Umwelt, der Organisation und der Arbeit sowie auf menschliche oder individuelle Charakteristika, die einen sicherheits- und gesundheitsrelevanten Einfluss auf das Arbeitsverhalten haben (HSE, 1999). D.h. dass nicht nur der Mensch und die menschliche Fehler an den Leistungsvariationen „schuld“ sind, sondern dass man die Fehlerursachen auch in den Arbeitsbedingungen und in der Organisation, sowie in der Interaktion zwischen dem Individuum, dem Team, der Technik, der Organisation und dem Umwelt suchen soll. Letztendlich geht es darum eine ganzheitliche Aufmerksamkeit für die Arbeitsplatzgestaltung zu entwickeln, die Bestandteil einer betrieblichen Sicherheitskultur werden kann.
Dieser Beitrag wird einen Überblick über die vorhandene Literatur sowie den eigenen Forschungsergebnissen auf dem Gebiet der menschlichen Faktoren in der ZfP geben mit dem Ziel das Potential aufzuzeigen, dass in der Beachtung der menschlichen Faktoren für die Leistungsfähigkeit der ZfP in der industriellen Praxis liegt.