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The number of cars which use a battery for propulsion, like BEV (battery electric vehicle) or PHEV (plug-in hybrid electric vehicle), is increasing. Following, the probability of these car types being involved in car accidents will increase. In a worst-case accident scenario, the installed batteries could go under thermal runaway (TR). A TR could be initiated by various causes, e.g., high temperatures from outside, mechanical damage of the cells/modules/batteries or internal and external short circuits. During such an event, large amounts of heat and toxic and/or flammable gases are released. This poses a great hazard to people and property in the immediate vicinity. The paper describes a large-scale test series on the lithium-ion battery TR consequences of automobile cells and modules up to E = 6.85 kWh. Near field temperatures of ΔT > 800°C in a distance of l = 2 m were measured. During an overcharge test, fragment throwing distances of l > 30 m were detected. Subsequent gas explosions of the released gases were documented. Hydrogen fluoride (HF) was measured in all tests, from cell to module. The highest measured concentration was cHF = 76 ppm, which is significantly higher than the 30-min-level for AEGL 2 (acute exposure guideline level 2). Based on the experimentally determined consequences, concrete measures for the accident analysis are subsequently drawn.
Hydrogen is a central component of the energy transition and the European Green Deal for a climate-neutral Europe. To be able to achieve the targets defined by 2045, the EU and the German government have drafted a framework for action and are making long-term investments in research, development and the rapid implementation of innovative hydrogen technologies.
The conditions for a successful energy transition and the economic use of green hydrogen as a clean energy carrier are Hydrogen readiness and a rapid market ramp-up, as well as the establishment of the necessary value chains in the national and European framework. Reliable quality and safety standards are the prerequisite for ensuring safety of supply and environmental compatibility and for creating trust in these technologies.
BAM has bundled its expertise in the field of hydrogen technologies into a competence center H2Safety@BAM to create confidence in the technology and to support the hydrogen strategies of the German government and the EU. The topic of hydrogen has been current at BAM for more than one hundred years and is also currently the focus of numerous research and cooperation activities. The competence centre H2Safety@BAM and its vision of “We build trust in hydrogen technologies” will be presented with its many safety-related topics, which can be found throughout the entire hydrogen value chain. Two deep dives will present the results on projects dealing with the design-to-cost issue of classical pressurized gas storage containments and the consequences of the release of liquid hydrogen, which will be roughly compared to the release of ammonia.
15 identical off-the-shelf propane cylinders (m = 11 kg liquid propane) were underfired. The infrared Radiation of the Explosion, that occurred in the aftermath of the vessel failure, was recorded using four bolometers. These measurements are compared with an estimation of the Maximum intensity gained by an Analysis of the Video data, an Extended Version of the Stefan-Boltzmann law and a BLEVE model.
Commercial, off-the shelf propane cylinders are subjected to high safety regulations. Furthermore, those cylinders are equipped with safety devices like pressure relief valves (PRV).
Nevertheless, a failure of the container is possible in case of being exposed to an intensive fire. The result of this is severe hazard for users. rescue forces and infrastructure. Within the framework of a destructive test series, 15 identical propane cylinders have been exposed to an intensive fire in horizontal position. The cylinders were not equipped with a pressure relief device. Each cylinder was filled with a mass of m = 11 kg of liquid propane. Three different types of fire have been used (wood. petrol. propane). The experiments reveal the failure of all cylinders in a time period t < 155 s. The failure leading to a fragmentation into up to seven major parts with throwing distances of up to I = 262 m. In all trials, the temperature of the cylinder wall (three positions). of the liquid phase inside and of the surrounding fire (three positions) was recorded. Furthermore the inner cylinder pressure and the induced overpressure of the pressure wave after the failure were recorded. Overpressures in the close-up range (I= 5 m) of up top=0.27 bar were recorded. All tests were documented by video from several positions (general view, close-up, high-speed 5000 fps). This test series creates the basis for further experimental studies in the field of alternative fuels for vehicles. The aim of this test series is to assess and analyse the consequences of the failure of gas vessels (for LPG. CNG, CGH2) in the aftermath of severe incidents.
Small, mobile propane gas vessels are widely spread and comprise additional hazards in case of a surrounding, intensive fire. The aim of the presented work is to holistically investigate the potential consequences of failure of these off-the-shelf propane gas vessels in case of an absence or malfunction of safety devices. In order to generate a statistically valid dataset, a total of 15 identical propane gas bottles without pressure relief device, each containing m = 11 kg of liquid propane, were underfired in horizontal position. For each selected fire type (wood fire, petrol pool fire, propane gas fire), five vessels were tested under identical conditions. Next to extensive camera equipment including a high-speed camera, systems to record the internal pressure of the gas cylinder, the resulting shock wave overpressure (three positions) and the flame and vessel temperature (three + three positions) during the underfiring were used. Also the unsteady, highly dynamical thermal radiation caused by the explosion of the expanding gas cloud was logged. The fragments were georeferenced and weighed after each test. The experiments prove the failure of all the gas cylinders at a burst pressure of pb = [71 … 98 bar] with a fragmentation into up to seven parts (average: four objects) and a subsequent explosion of the expanding vapour after mixing with the surrounding air. The overpressure measured in the close-up range (distance to the cylinder d = 5 m) resulting from the shockwave caused by the cylinder burst was up to pmax = 0.27 bar, which can potentially lead to significant injuries to humans and damage to building structures and infrastructure, especially in connection with the explosion and the resultant thermal radiation. The distance covered by the fragments after the failure was up to r = 260 m; 47% of the fragments hit the ground more than r = 50 m away from the position of failure.