3.4 Sicherheit von Lagerbehältern
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The paper focuses on the preliminary determination of the bar length and the experimental performance of the 1m-puncture test in compliance with the guidelines of the IAEA under the given boundary conditions. Following aspects have to be considered concerning the determination of an appropriate length of the bar to obtain maximum damage to the specimen: the design of the package, its drop orientation and the impact point as well as a pre-damage of the package resulting from a previous 9m drop test. According to the Regulations the minimum length of the bar is defined as 20 cm, which has to be adapted to the outer surface of the package, especially to packages with large impact limiters.
In this context, two main aspects are important: First, the realisation of a maximum puncture load applied to the package while no other component of the package has contact with the impact target. Second, the reduction of the risk of buckling and maximising the stiffness of the bar by a length which is as short as possible. In order to optimize the bar length, finite element calculations are often done by simulating the global behaviour of the package during the puncture test. The evaluation of the conducted puncture test regarding IAEA compliance is done by analysing deceleration measurements. The paper presents a possible approach to determine the length of the bar and the construction of a form-fitted connection to the target showing various examples of puncture tests.
Accident safe packages for the transport of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste shall fulfil international IAEA safety requirements. Compliance is shown by consecutive mechanical and thermal testing. Additional numerical analysis are usually part of the safety evaluation. For damage protection some package designs are equipped with wood filled impact limiters encapsulated by steel sheets. The safety of these packages is established in compliance with IAEA regulations. Cumulative mechanical and fire tests are conducted to achieve safety standards and to prevent loss of containment. Mechanical reliability is proven by drop tests. Drop testing might cause significant damage of the impact limiter steel sheets and might enable sufficient oxygen supply to the impact limiter during the fire test to ignite the wood filling. The boundary conditions of the fire test are precisely described in the IAEA regulatory. During the test the impact limiter will be subjected to a 30 minute enduring fire phase. Subsequent to the fire phase any burning of the specimen has to extinguish naturally and no artificial cooling is allowed. At BAM a large-scale fire test with a real size impact limiter and a wood volume of about 3m³ was conducted to investigate the burning behaviour of wood filled impact limiters in steel sheet encapsulation. The impact limiter was equipped with extensive temperature monitoring equipment. Until today burning of such impact limiters is not sufficiently considered in transport package design and more investigation is necessary to explore the consequences of the impacting fire. The objective of the large scale test was to find out whether a self-sustaining smouldering or even a flaming fire inside the impact limiter was initiated and what impact on the cask is resulting. The amount of energy, transferred from the impact limiter into the cask is of particular importance for the safety of heavy weight packages. With the intention of heat flux quantification a new approach was made and a test bench was designed. A first computational simulation of transport package temperatures taking into account the results of the conducted fire test was performed.
The Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing (BAM) is assessing the mechanical and thermal safety performance of packages for the transport of radioactive materials. Drop testing and numerical calculations are usually part of the safety case concepts, where BAM is performing the regulatory tests at their own test facility site.
Among other mechanical tests the 1 meter drop onto a steel puncture bar shall be considered for accident safe packages. According to the IAEA regulations “the bar shall be of solid mild steel of circular section, 15.0 ± 0.5 cm in diameter and 20 cm long, unless a longer bar would cause greater damage…”.
Particularly with regard to the German transport- and storage cask designs, often made from ductile cast iron, an accurate determination of the puncture bar length to guarantee a load impact covering the worst case scenario can be imperative. If the fracture mechanical proof for the cask material shall be provided by a test, small deviations in the concentrated load applied can be decisive for the question if the cask fails or not.
The most damaging puncture bar length can be estimated by iterative procedure in numerical simulations. On the one hand, a sufficient puncture bar length shall guarantee that shock absorbers or other attachments do not prevent or reduce the local load application to the package, on the other hand, a longer and thus less stiff bar causes a smaller maximum contact force. The contrary influence of increasing puncture bar length and increasing effective drop height shall be taken into account if a shock absorber is directly placed in the target area. The paper presents a numerical approach to identify the bar length that causes maximum damage to the package. Using the example of two typical package masses the sensitivity of contact forces and puncture bar deformations to the initial length are calculated and assessed with regard to the international IAEA package safety requirements.
Among other mechanical tests the 1 meter drop onto a steel puncture bar shall be considered for accident safe packages for the transport of radioactive material. According with the IAEA regulations “the bar shall be of solid mild steel of circular section, 15.0 ± 0.5 cm in diameter and 20 cm long, unless a longer bar would cause greater damage…”. The most damaging puncture bar length can be estimated by iterative processes in numerical simulations. On the one hand, a sufficient puncture bar length has to guarantee that shock absorbers or other attachments do not prevent or reduce the local load application to the package, on the other hand, a longer and thus less stiff bar causes a smaller maximum contact force. The contrary influence of increasing puncture bar length and increasing effective drop height shall be taken into account if a shock absorber is directly placed in the target area. The paper presents a numerical approach to identify the bar length that causes maximum damage to the package. Using the example of two typical package masses the sensitivity of contact forces and puncture bar deformations to the initial length are calculated and assessed with regard to the international IAEA package safety requirements.
Packages for the transport and storage of radioactive materials are often sealed with elastomer or metal seals. These seals are basic components to meet the leak tightness criteria for these kind of packages. An overview over ongoing research and development concerning metal and elastomer seals is given in the presentation. Introductions in the fundamental functionality of elastomer and metal seals are presented. Ageing processes are shown for both components regarding to different ageing effects.