### Filtern

#### Erscheinungsjahr

- 2018 (2) (entfernen)

#### Referierte Publikation

- nein (2) (entfernen)

#### Schlagworte

- CFD (1)
- Damage detection system (1)
- Evacuation (1)
- Metamodel (1)
- Risk (1)
- SHM (1)
- Uncertainty (1)
- Value of information (1)

#### Organisationseinheit der BAM

This paper addresses how the value of damage detection Information depends on key Parameters of the Structural Health Monitoring (SHM) system including number of sensors and sensor locations. The Damage Detection System (DDS) provides the information by comparing ambient vibration measurements of a (healthy) reference state with measurements of the current structural system. The performance of DDS method depends on the physical measurement properties such as the number of sensors, sensor positions, measuring length and sensor type, measurement noise, ambient excitation and sampling frequency, as well as on the data processing algorithm including the chosen type I error for the indication threshold. The quantification of the value of Information (VoI) is an expected utility based Bayesian decision analysis method for quantifying the difference of the expected economic benefits with and without information. The (pre-)posterior probability is computed utilizing the Bayesian updating theorem for all possible indications. If changing any key parameters of DDS, the updated probability of system failure given damage detection information will be varied due to different indication of probability of damage, which will result in changes of value of damage detection information. The DDS system is applied in a statically determinate Pratt truss bridge girder. Through the analysis of the value of information with different SHM system characteristics, the settings of DDS can be optimized for minimum expected costs and risks before implementation.

Fires in road tunnels constitute complex scenarios with interactions between the fire, tunnel users and safety measures. More and more methodologies for risk analysis quantify the consequences of these scenarios with complex models. Examples for complex models are the computational fluid dynamics model Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) and the microscopic evacuation model FDS+Evac. However, the high computational effort of complex models often limits the number of scenarios in practice. To balance this drawback, the scenarios are often simplified. Accordingly, there is a challenge to consider complex scenarios in risk analysis.
To face this challenge, we improved the metamodel used in the methodology for risk analysis presented on ISTSS 2016. In general, a metamodel quickly interpolates the consequences of few scenarios simulated with the complex models to a large number of arbitrary scenarios used in risk analysis. Now, our metamodel consists of the projection array-based design, the moving least squares method, and the prediction interval to quantify the metamodel uncertainty. Additionally, we adapted the projection array-based design in two ways: the focus of the sequential refinement on regions with high metamodel uncertainties; and the combination of two experimental designs for FDS and FDS+Evac.
To scrutinise the metamodel, we analysed the effects of three sequential refinement steps on the metamodel itself and on the results of risk analysis. We observed convergence in both after the second step (ten scenarios in FDS, 192 scenarios in FDS+Evac). In comparison to ISTSS 2016, we then ran 20 scenarios in FDS and 800 scenarios in FDS+Evac. Thus, we reduced the number of scenarios remarkably with the improved metamodel. In conclusion, we can now efficiently integrate complex scenarios in risk analysis. We further emphasise that the metamodel is broadly applicable on various experimental or modelling issues in fire safety engineering.