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Germany had been transporting spent fuel to the reprocessing plant in Sellafield and La Hague for decades until around 2005. Resulting from the obligation to take back the vitrified high-level waste from reprocessing six CASTOR® HAW28M filled with 168 canisters with radioactive waste in vitrified form were transported from Sellafield to the interim storage facility Biblis in 2020. Rail wagons were used for the transport to the port in Barrow-in-Furness, where they were loaded into a dedicated seagoing vessel, certified as INF Class 3 according to the INF Code. This was the first time that vitrified high level waste with considerable heat load was transported under a German design approval certificate.
BAM was involved in the authority assessment of the conditions for the sea transport. For the first transport BAM required among others, assessment of temperature distribution during transport, logging of temperatures of cargo bays and graphical imaging of temperatures of the bay with the cask in order to ensure compliance with temperature specifications, e.g. maximal neutron absorber and gasket temperatures. Special interest was taken in the identification of possible events exceeding the specified temperatures considering the different philosophies of IMDG code and its supplement INF code regarding temperature control of hatches. Results show compliance with assumed conditions.
Simulation of the Crushing of Wood Filled Impact Limiters for Packages of Radioactive Material
(2008)
Mechanical and thermal safety assessment of packages for transport of radioactive material in Germany is carried out by the Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing (BAM). Both experimental and computational (analytical, numerical) methods combined with material and/or component tests are the basis for the state of the art safety assessment concept at BAM. The required mechanical tests according to IAEA regulations include, among others, a 9-m-drop-test on an unyielding target. Impact limiting components, which are attached to the cask at both ends, limit forces applied on the cask body and lid system by absorbing a major part of the impact energy. In Germany, impact limiters of packages for transport of radioactive materials are typically of steel-wood-sandwich construction, combining a relatively stiff steel structure bolted to the cask body, outer steel plates and different types of wood. By crushing the wood-steel-sandwich-structure between an unyielding target and the cask, the kinetic energy of a 9-m-free-fall is absorbed. The main energy absorber is wood under a high level of deformation. Wood under large deformations exhibits destruction of the fibre matrix. By analysing compression of the impact limiter wood after the drop tests with prototype casks for radioactive material, underlying mechanisms of wood crushing and corresponding energy absorption under large deformations are identified. Softening occuring at compression of the wood is a function of the lateral strain restriction of wood. Against the background of continuum mechanics an analogous model for compression of the fibre bundle is presented. The model takes the lateral strain restriction as triaxiality of the stress state into account. Further modelling possibilities for wood with a continuum approach are described. Different material laws in the explicit finite element code LS-DYNA are analysed for possible application using the analogous model for the fibre bundle. Small scale compression tests with wooden specimens are modelled in order to evaluate the ability of different modelling techniques to simulate softening. Although modelling of the compression of wood under large deformations is possible, softening could not be simulated purposefully. A drop test of a cask with impact limiting devices similar to existing impact limiters is simulated with different material laws for wood. The behaviour of impact limiting devices could not be simulated universally including the influence of the lateral strain restriction; nevertheless loading of the cask by crushing of the impact limiter could be simulated purposefully. Verification with experimental results is essential.
Impact limiters of packages for transport of radioactive materials are in Germany typically steel-wood-sandwich-constructions, combining a relatively stiff steel structure bolted to the cask body, outer steel plates and different types of wood. By crushing the wood-steel-sandwich-structure between unyielding target and cask, kinetic energy of 9-m-free-fall is absorbed. Main energy absorber is wood under a high level of deformation. Wood under large deformations exhibits destruction of the fibre matrix. By analysing compression of impact limiter wood after drop tests with prototype casks for radioactive material, underlying mechanisms of wood crushing and corresponding energy absorption under large deformations are identified. Softening occurring at compression of wood is a function of lateral strain restriction of wood. Against the background of continuum mechanics an analogous model for compression of fibre bundle is presented. The model takes lateral strain restriction as triaxiality of stress state into account. Further modelling possibilities for wood with a continuum approach are described. Different material laws in the explicit Finite Element code LS-DYNA are analysed for possible application on the analogous model for the fibre bundle. Small scale compression tests with wooden specimens were modelled in order to evaluate the ability of different modelling techniques to simulate softening. Although modelling of compression of wood under large deformations is possible, softening could not be simulated purposefully. A drop test of a cask with impact limiting devices similar to existing impact limiters is simulated with different material laws for wood. Behaviour of impact limiting devices could not be simulated universally including influence of lateral strain restriction; nevertheless loading of the cask by crushing of impact limiter could be simulated purposefully. Verification with experimental results is compulsory.
BAM as competent authority regarding assessment of mechanical and thermal design, activity release and quality assurance measures of Type-B(U) transport packages developed a thesaurus of experience feedback topics from recent assessment procedures. The list is structured according to the European PDSR guide. It involves issues, which from BAM's point of view, needed clarification during the last package design assessment procedures. The list contains issues from Operation (e.g. deactivation of handling lugs not intended for package handling), maintenance (e.g. leak tightness of impact limiting devices) to technical assessment (e.g. formation of hydrogen by radiolysis and its impact on pressure and ignitability, consideration of ageing mechanisms, thermo-mechanical assessment, impact of gaps between content and flask) as well as to general and specific safety analysis report requirements (e.g. report structure and required data).
TN®24 E, a new package design, was developed and applied for by Areva TN for German transport approval certificate. The certificate was issued by BfS, Federal Office for Radiation Protection, on 24th of July 2013. The package is designed as a dual purpose cask for transport and storage of up to 21 PWR spent fuel assemblies from German NPPs. BAM is the German competent authority responsible for the design assessment of RAM packages regarding mechanical and thermal safety cases, activity release analysis and all issues of quality assurance during manufacturing and operation of packages. Certain assessment experiences as well as new developments resulting from the BAM TN®24E approval procedure are presented. The mechanical safety case of the TN®24E is based mainly on finite element calculations, which were verified by the TN®81 1/3 scale drop test program performed at BAM. Thermal analyses rely upon calculations, while the activity release criterion is based upon leakage rate results of TN®81 drop tests. The BAM-GGR 012 guideline for the analysis of bolted lid and trunnion systems has been fully implemented. Due to requirements by BAM, AREVA TN developed a new assessment strategy for fracture mechanical evaluation of welding seams. The material qualification and documentation is also an important aspect of BAM assessment; the qualification of borated aluminum basket material, the determination of strength values for thermal aged hardened aluminum alloys for the basket or consideration of high burn-up fuel assemblies are remarkable issues in this context. In addition, the consideration of the material compatibility, especially taking into account a transport after 40 years of dry interim storage in German facilities, has gained significant importance in the licensing process of the TN®24E. Next to obvious mechanical issues such as the assessment of shell ovalization under 9 m drop test scenario and its impact on basket load, thermo-mechanical interactions had to be addressed in the safety case. Due to BAM requirements, AREVA TN performed a full thermo-mechanical analysis of the cask behavior under fire test conditions.
BAM as competent authority regarding assessment of mechanical and thermal design, activity release and quality assurance aspects of SNF and HLW transport packages developed a thesaurus of experience feedback topics from recent approval procedures. The list is structured according to the European PDSR guide. It involves issues, which from BAM point of view, needed clarification during last package design assessment procedures. The list contains issues from operation (e.g. deactivation of handling lugs not intended for package handling), maintenance (e.g. leak tightness of impact limiting devices) to technical assessment (e.g. formation of hydrogen by radiolysis and its impact on pressure and ignitability, consideration of ageing mechanisms, thermo-mechanical assessment, impact of gaps between content and flask, spent fuel behaviour) as well as to general and specific safety analysis report requirements (e.g. report structure and required data).
BAM as competent authority regarding assessment of mechanical and thermal design, activity release and quality assurance aspects of SNF and HLW transport packages developed a thesaurus of experience feedback topics from recent approval procedures. The list is structured according to the European PDSR guide. It involves issues, which from BAM point of view, needed clarification during last package design assessment procedures. The list contains issues from operation (e.g. deactivation of handling lugs not intended for package handling), maintenance (e.g. leak tightness of impact limiting devices) to technical assessment (e.g. formation of hydrogen by radiolysis and its impact on pressure and ignitability, consideration of ageing mechanisms, thermo-mechanical assessment, impact of gaps between content and flask, spent fuel behaviour) as well as to general and specific safety analysis report requirements (e.g. report structure and required data).
In accordance with IAEA SSR-6 para 306 a management system shall be established and implemented to ensure compliance with the relevant provisions of the IAEA regulations. BAM has issued an update of the guideline: the BAM-GGR 011. The new revision describes necessary quality assurance measures for design, manufacture, testing, documentation, use, maintenance and inspection of packagings for package designs requiring competent authority approval for the transport of radioactive material.
The measures can be categorised as system-related and design-related. They are independently approved and monitored by the German competent authority BAM and its authorised expert (BAM/T). The qualification of the organisation applying for the design approval certificate is reviewed in the context of the design approval procedure. The quality assurance measures for manufacture consist of three main steps. Pre-assessment of manufacturing documents such as quality plans, specifications etc., Manufacturing inspections according the pre-assessed documents and inspection before commissioning including documentation review. Periodic inspections during operation as well as relevant specifications for use and maintenance ensure that the properties specified in the approval certificate are preserved over the package life time. Special provisions for the return on experience regarding operational feedback for design, manufacture, use, maintenance and inspection are given.
Special focus shall be given here to the rearranged and meanwhile established system of manufacturing inspections. This includes more transparent roles for a) the producers authorised inspection 11282 representative, b) the independent inspection expert (S), acting on behalf of the manufacturer with acceptance of BAM, and c) BAM or its authorised expert (BAM/T). Additional attention shall be drawn to the management of deviations during manufacturing and provisions for maintenance and periodic inspections.
In accordance with IAEA SSR-6 para 306 a management system shall be established and implemented to ensure compliance with the relevant provisions of the IAEA regulations. BAM has issued an update of the guideline: the BAM-GGR 011. The new revision describes necessary quality assurance measures for design, manufacture, testing, documentation, use, maintenance and inspection of packagings for package designs requiring competent authority approval for the transport of radioactive material.
The measures can be categorised as system-related and design-related. They are independently approved and monitored by the German competent authority BAM and its authorised expert (BAM/T). The qualification of the organisation applying for the design approval certificate is reviewed in the context of the design approval procedure. The quality assurance measures for manufacture consist of three main steps. Pre-assessment of manufacturing documents such as quality plans, specifications etc., Manufacturing inspections according the pre-assessed documents and inspection before commissioning including documentation review. Periodic inspections during operation as well as relevant specifications for use and maintenance ensure that the properties specified in the approval certificate are preserved over the package life time. Special provisions for the return on
experience regarding operational feedback for design, manufacture, use, maintenance and inspection are given. Special focus shall be given here to the rearranged and meanwhile established system of manufacturing inspections. This includes more transparent roles for a) the Producers authorised inspection 11282 representative, b) the independent inspection expert (S), acting on behalf of the manufacturer with acceptance of BAM, and c) BAM or its authorised expert (BAM/T). Additional attention shall be drawn to the management of deviations during manufacturing and provisions for maintenance and periodic inspections.
Germany had been transporting spent fuel to the reprocessing plant in Sellafield and La Hague for decades until around 2005. Resulting from the obligation to take back the vitrified high-level waste from reprocessing six CASTOR® HAW28M filled with 168 canisters with radioactive waste in vitrified form were transported from Sellafield to the interim storage facility Biblis in 2020. Rail wagons were used for the transport to the port in Barrow-in-Furness, where they were loaded into a dedicated seagoing vessel, certified as INF Class 3 according to the INF Code. This was the first time that vitrified high level waste with considerable heat load was transported under a German design approval certificate.
BAM was involved in the authority assessment of the conditions for the sea transport. For the first transport BAM required among others, assessment of temperature distribution during transport, logging of temperatures of cargo bays and graphical imaging of temperatures of the bay with the cask in order to ensure compliance with temperature specifications, e.g. maximal neutron absorber and gasket temperatures. Special interest was taken in the identification of possible events exceeding the specified temperatures considering the different philosophies of IMDG code and its supplement INF code regarding temperature control of hatches. Results show compliance with assumed conditions.
The BAM-GGR 016 explains the requirements of ADR, RID, ADN and IMDG for management systems for design, manufacturing, testing, documentation, use, maintenance, and inspection of packagings for package designs for the transport of radioactive material not requiring competent authority approval for all designs of exempted packages, packages type IP-1, IP-2, IP-3 and type A.