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Existing spent nuclear fuel (SF) and high active waste (HAW) management policies and practices worldwide are the result of past presumptions that sufficient reprocessing and/or disposal capacity would be available in the near term. Consequently, in the past many countries have developed specific solutions for different periods of time due to their individual national nuclear policies.
In Germany the concept of dry interim storage in dual purpose metal casks before disposal is being pursued for SF and HAW management and transport and storage licenses have been issued accordingly. The current operation licenses for existing storage facilities have been granted for a storage period of up to 40 years. This concept has demonstrated its suitability for over 20 years so far. Relevant safety requirements have been assessed for the short-term as well as for the long-term for site-specific operational and accidental storage conditions. But in the meantime significant delays in the national repository siting procedure occurred which will make extended storage periods necessary in the future.
In Germany dual purpose casks for spent nuclear fuel (SF) or high level radioactive waste (HLW) are used for safe transportation and interim storage. Key safety issues in both fields are the safe enclosure of the radioactive material, the safe removal of decay heat, securing nuclear criticality safety, limitation of radiation exposure to acceptable levels and keeping it as low as reasonable achievable (ALARA principle).
Whereas these safety requirements during transportation are ensured by the Type-B(U)-design testing and approval procedure on basis of internationally agreed IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) requirements storage licenses are issued on national and site specific safety analyses.
This paper presents experiences from recent interim storage safety evaluation and licensing procedures in Germany on basis of a Type-B(U) certified cask designs concerning specific differences from Operation and accident conditions inside the storage facility. The focus is laid on the interaction of cask and building structures with regard to shielding, heat removal and accident analyses including aircraft crash. Basic safety is assured by thick-walled metal casks with monitored double lid Systems. They also reduce radiation to levels where workers can safely operate and maintain the casks inside the storage facility. The storage building e. g. provides additional shielding and protection against extemal hazards depending on the building construction. In addition, the storage building helps to reduce radiation levels at the boundary of the storage site well below regulatory limits given by the German Radiation Protection Ordinance (StrSchV).