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This presentation addresses safety aspects concerning dual purpose casks for transportation and storage of spent fuel and high level radioactive waste. The long term performance of casks and their safety relevant components like sealed lid systems and the long term performance of cask internals, especially spent fuel assemblies are discussed. Transportation after interim storage is another key issue and due to the fact of delayed disposal projects current interim storage periods need to be extended causing additional safety demonstration needs for longer periods of time. Regarding this situation present BAM research activities in this area and their preliminary outcomes are presented.
The design of a special form radioactive material has to resist a severe transport accident without undue loss or dispersal of radioactive material.
Safety assessment by authorities competent for design approval has to include besides the required test program (impact, percussion, bending and heat test) also the evaluation of the quality management system for design, manufacture, testing, documentation, use, maintenance and inspection.
These quality assurance measures have to assure that every specimen of the approved design is produced in the same verified quality and every specimen must be able to survive the severe mechanical and thermal tests without undue loss or dispersal of radioactive material at any time of its working life.
All important aspects in the design approval procedure by BAM as the competent authority for approvals of special form radioactive material in Germany are summarized in a guideline published in 2014. This paper will give additional explanations to some aspects in safety assessment, e.g.:
the applicability of leak test methods and the need to consider ageing aspects.
This presentation addresses the current German policy in nuclear waste management and illustrates significant changes throughout the last decades. With the reset of the high level waste repository siting process in 2013 the need for extending interim storage beyond initial license periods will become a future challenge. For that purpose knowledge needs to be enhanced and data gaps need to be closed timely. In addition, international collaboration in R&D and regulatory improvements are explained.
Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) is routinely used in aerospace, nuclear, railway and automotive industries. The most common use of NDT is to find flaws in components. In dynamically loaded components, flaws grow, and if they are not detected in time and no corrective measures are taken they can reach critical sizes. When a flaw reaches a critical size, it endangers the structural integrity of the component and will likely cause the component to fail. To detect flaws before they reach a critical size, components are inspected in fixed time intervals with non-destructive testing systems. In order to determine the amount of time between inspections, three variables are necessary: the critical size of the flaw, the flaw propagation speed and the size of the flaw that can be reliably detected by NDT. All three variables are, to a certain extent, stochastic. The critical size of the flaw and flaw propagation speed are questions of fracture mechanics. The size of the flaw that can be reliably detected by NDT is predicted by POD curves. The POD is determined for a given inspection scenario. The inspection scenario includes the NDT system, the component geometry and the type of the flaw. If one of these changes, the POD will also change and needs to be recalculated. As a result, the design of a dynamically loaded safety-relevant components is an iterative process in which a geometry is sought that provides an optimum between structural integrity and inspectability. A model that describes the iterative process for the design of the safe components with examples from praxis will be presented.
This presentation mentions the most important safety items that should be improved from the perspective of Germany.
These are the improvement of the understanding and definition of term "safety", the agreement on procedures for the measurement of safety and the issue of degradation in combination with the safety level to be ensured until end of life.
For using probabilistic experience for the whole production adequate measures for surveillance of the production should additionally become mandatory to be taken into account.
The essential aspects of these issues are shortly explained and highlighted by especially aspects of the slow burst testing with respect to non-cycle fatigue sensitive designs and the hint on the general scatter of properties (Monte-Carlo simulation).
This Presentation adresses the major needs and challenges of qualification processes for nuclear waste packages performed by BAM. Packages include those for high level radioactive waste like spent fuel as well as those for low and intermediate level waste to be disposed of in the Konrad repository.
Beginning with the current German nuclear waste management policy design testing capabilities and experience at BAM is explained followed by illustrating the major strategic process to identify future challenges including specific R&D needs.