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Ultrasonic phased array NDE has been applied to ensure the integrity of canisters for encapsulation of spent nuclear fuel. The performance of the NDE system is evaluated by the POD analysis. The POD analysis using a common method, â versus a, has been modified for the phased array ultrasonic inspections by two approaches: to take more influencing parameters into a, and to use a more sophisticated quantity as â. The POD with new a allows more detailed interpretation of POD for each parameter, and the new â gives more realistic POD. The methods are discussed and demonstrated with experimental data. In addition, an investigation of human factors is being planned and the plan is discussed.
The General Guidance in the Swedish regulations state that the safety assessment for a final repository for spent nuclear fuel should be 1 million years after closure. SKB developed the KBS-3 method, according to which the spent nuclear fuel is protected by three barriers. It is encapsulated in canisters with a diameter of 1 metre and a length of 5 metres. The canister consists of a cast iron insert surrounded by a 5 centimetre thick shell of copper. The canisters are disposed in the bedrock at a depth of about 500 meters surrounded by bentonite clay. In order to assess the safety over this extremely long period, an extensive quality control programme is applied to the canisters before deposit. In this programme, the use of
non-destructive testing (NDT) is vital. The safety assessment of the canister in turn places high demands on the coverage, detectability, and reliability of the applied NDT inspections of the canister parts, i.e. cast iron insert, copper base, tube and lid, and the copper friction stir welds (FSW). This paper presents the extensive full-scale inspection development programme that runs at the Canister Laboratory in Oskarshamn (Sweden). In order to fulfil the high demands, phased array ultrasonic inspection techniques are developed using practical trials aided by ultrasonic modelling. The techniques apply, for example, different frequencies, inspection angles, focus depths, and both longitudinal and shear waves. Increased inspection reliability of the FSW is achieved by applying digital X-ray technique using a 9 MeV linear accelerator and a line detector. To complete the coverage, complementary surface inspections methods, i.e. eddy current array, magnetic flux sensor techniques and magnetic particle inspection, are applied. The canister safety assessment was the driving force to include reliability studies during the NDT development. Initially, the technical reliability was considered, resulting in development of advanced POD models (probability of detection). In combination with human factors studies, these models were implemented as tools in the development of the NDT techniques. Human factors studies were also applied to improve the inspection procedures to be more user-friendly enabling reliable inspections.
This report describes the methodology of the reliability investigation performed on the ultrasonic
phased array NDT system, developed by SKB in collaboration with Posiva, for inspection of the
canisters for permanent storage of nuclear spent fuel.
The canister is composed of a cast iron insert surrounded by a copper shell. The shell is composed
of the tube and the lid/base which are welded to the tube after the fuel has been place, in the
tube. The manufacturing process of the canister parts and the welding process are described.
Possible defects, which might arise in the canister components during the manufacturing
or in the weld during the welding, are indentified.
The number of real defects in manufactured components have been limited. Therefore the reliability
of the NDT system has been determined using a number of test objects with artifical defects.
The reliability analysis is based on the signal response analysis. The conventional signal response
analysis is adopted and further developed before applied on the modern ultrasonic phased-array
NDT system. The concept of multi-parameter a, where the response of the NDT system is dependent
on more than just one parameter, is introduced. The weakness of use of the peak signal response
in the analysis is demonstrated and integration of the amplitudes in the C-scan is proposed as an
alternative. The calculation of the volume POD, when the part is inspected with more configurations,
is also presented. The reliability analysis is supported by the ultrasonic simulation based on the
point source synthesis method.
When pushed to the limits of their detection capability, NDE systems do not produce consistent hit/miss
indications. Their capability of detecting small defects is therefore expressed in terms of POD. An adequate
NDE system is required to ensure the structural integrity. In conventional signal response analysis, the POD is
expressed as a function of the defect size, and its adequacy for the inspection task is tested against the maximum
allowable defect size which will not undermine the structural integrity. Analyses of modern structures show that
other parameters, beside the defect size, can both significantly influence the POD and determine the severity of
the defect for the structure. Within the multi-parameter reliability analysis, the POD is expressed as a function of
those influencing parameters. When determining the adequacy of the NDE system, the capability of detecting a
defect has to be expressed and tested against the critical value of exactly that parameter that determines defects
severity for the structure. Failing to do so can lead to a rejection of the healthy, or acceptance of the bad part.
The principle is demonstrated on the example of the Transmit-Receive Longitudinal (TRL) ultrasonic inspection
of the iron cast component for semi-elliptical surface defects.
The canister for the permanent storage of spent nuclear fuel used by SKB in Sweden consists of a cast iron insert surrounded by a five centimetre thick shell of copper. It is a safety critical component and in order to secure long-term structural integrity non-destructive methods are used to inspect 100% of the volume of each canister, before it is disposed of in the repository. One of the critical components that requires inspection is a sealing weld, joining the copper tube and the lid. The friction stir weld is inspected using an ultrasonic phased array system. The area of the weld is inspected with several inspection channels with different angles and varying coverage. To make sure that no defects that might occur in the weld are overseen, the reliability of the inspection must be quantified. The reliability of NDT is usually quantified with the probability of detection curves. The influence of the parameters that might influence the POD of the flaws in the weld is investigated analysing the experimental results, as well as with a help of a numerical simulation of the inspection.
Im Zuge der Anwendung des Schadens-Toleranz-Prinzips wird ein adäquates zerstörungsfreies Prüfsystem benötigt um strukturelle Integrität sicher zu stellen. Wenn ein zerstörungsfreies Prüfsystem jedoch bis zu den Grenzen der Detektionsfähigkeit beansprucht wird, liefert es keine übereinstimmende Indikationen der Defektentdeckung (Hit/Miss). Deshalb wird dessen Fähigkeit Defekte zu entdecken als Entdeckungswahrscheinlichkeit (POD Probability of Detection) ausgedrückt. In der herkömmlichen 'Signal Response' Signal-Antwort-Zuverlässigkeitsanalyse wird die Entdeckungswahrscheinlichkeit als eine Funktion der Defektgröße angegeben. Die Eignung des Prüfsystems wird durch den Vergleich der Größe des Defektes, der zuverlässig entdeckt wird, mit der des größten zulässigen Defektes, der die strukturelle Integrität nicht gefährdet, verifiziert. Analysen moderner Strukturen zeigen aber, dass auch andere Parameter den Schweregrad des Defektes bzgl. der Integrität der Struktur bestimmen können. Im Rahmen der Multi-Parameter-Zuverlässigkeitsanalyse kann die Entdeckungswahrscheinlichkeit als eine Funktion verschiedener Einflussparameter ausgedrückt werden. Wenn die Eignung des zerstörungsfreien Prüfsystems bestimmt wird, muss die Fähigkeit des Systems Defekte zu entdecken gegenüber dem kritischen Wert genau des Parameters ausgedrückt und geprüft werden, der den Schweregrad des Defektes für die Integrität der Struktur bestimmt. Die Nichterfüllung dieser Forderung kann zur Ablehnung von intakten Teilen oder der Akzeptanz von schlechten Teilen führen. Das Prinzip wird anhand von longitudinalen Ultraschall-Sende-Empfangs-Prüfdaten der Gußeisenmatrix mit oberflächenoffenen, semi-elliptischen, rißartigen Defekten demonstriert.