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This paper proposes the first model for toll enforcement optimization
on German motorways. The enforcement is done by mobile control teams and our
goal is to produce a schedule achieving network-wide control, proportional to
spatial and time-dependent traffic distributions. Our model consists of two
parts. The first plans
control tours using a vehicle routing approach with profits and some side
constraints. The second plans feasible rosters for the control teams. Both
problems can be modeled as Multi-Commodity Flow Problems. Adding additional
coupling constraints produces a large-scale integrated integer programming
formulation. We show that this model can be solved to optimality for real
world instances associated with a control area in East Germany.
Today the railway timetabling process and the track allocation
is one of the most challenging problems to solve by a railway company.
Especially due to the deregulation of the transport market in the recent years several
suppliers of railway traffic have entered the market in Europe. This leads to more
potential conflicts between trains caused by an increasing demand of train paths.
Planning and operating railway transportation systems is extremely hard due
to the combinatorial complexity of the underlying discrete optimization problems,
the technical intricacies, and the immense size of the problem instances.
In order to make best use of the infrastructure and to ensure economic operation,
efficient planning of the railway operation is indispensable.
Mathematical optimization models and algorithms can help
to automatize and tackle these challenges.
Our contribution in this paper is to present a renewed planning process
due to the liberalization in Europe and an associated concept for track allocation, that consists
of three important parts, simulation, aggregation, and optimization.
Furthermore, we present results of our general framework for real world data.
We introduce the class of spot-checking games (SC games). These games model
problems where the goal is to distribute fare inspectors over a toll network.
Although SC games are not zero-sum, we show that a Nash equilibrium
can be computed by linear programming.
The computation of a strong Stackelberg equilibrium is
more relevant for this problem, but we show that this is NP-hard.
However, we give some bounds on the \emph{price of spite},
which measures how the
payoff of the inspector
degrades when committing to a Nash equilibrium.
Finally, we demonstrate the quality of these bounds for a real-world application,
namely the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways.
We present a game-theoretic approach to optimize the strategies of toll enforcement
on a motorway network. In contrast to previous approaches,
we consider a network with an arbitrary
topology, and we handle the fact that
users may choose their Origin-Destination path; in particular they may take a detour to
avoid sections with a high control rate. We show that a Nash equilibrium can be
computed with an LP (although the game is not zero-sum), and we give a MIP for the computation
of a Stackelberg equilibrium. Experimental results based on an application to the
enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways are presented.