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Institute
Empirical evidence suggests that there is substantial cross-firm variation in the extent of tax avoidance. However, this variation is not well understood. This paper provides a theoretical background for testing, and thus explaining, cross-firm differences in tax avoidance. We develop a formal model with two agents to analyze the incentives that lead firms to engage in tax avoidance. The tax avoidance decision is a function of moral hazard, tax-planning costs, and the potential to increase earnings. If the potential to increase earnings is low, the tax-planning decision is determined by moral-hazard problems. In contrast, when this potential is high, the tax-planning decision is mainly driven by taxplanning costs, such as reputational and political costs. One implication of our model is that moral hazard can (partly) explain why some firms do not engage in tax avoidance: Severe problems of moral hazard make tax avoidance less likely. Our model can be applied to test dierences in tax avoidance between different types of firms.
This study investigates why countries mandate accruals in the definition of corporate taxable income. Accruals alleviate timing and matching problems in cash flows, which smoothes taxable income and thus better aligns it with underlying economic performance. These accrual properties can be desirable in the tax setting as tax authorities seek more predictable corporate tax revenues. However, they can also make tax revenues procyclical by increasing the correlation between aggregate corporate tax revenues and aggregate economic activity. We argue that accruals shape the distribution of corporate tax revenues, which leads regulators to incorporate accruals into the definition of taxable income to balance the portfolio of government revenues and expenditures. Using a sample of 26 OECD countries, we find support for several theoretically motivated factors explaining the use of accruals in tax codes. We first provide evidence that corporate tax revenues are less volatile in high accrual countries, but high accrual countries collect relatively higher (lower) tax revenues when the corporate sector grows (contracts). Critically, we then show that accruals and smoother tax revenues are favored by countries with higher levels of government spending on public services and uncertain future expenditures, while countries with procyclical other tax collections favor cash rules and lower procyclicality of corporate tax revenues.
This paper empirically examines why tax avoidance differs across individuals. We use rich Swedish administrative panel data on all taxpayers, with a link between corporate and individual tax returns. Surprisingly, few individuals utilize legal and observable tax avoidance opportunities. Our results show that there are several frictions in tax avoidance participation. In addition to monetary benets from tax avoidance (incentives), the opportunity to participate in tax avoidance (access), as well as information and knowledge about these opportunities (awareness), are important factors for the individual's tax avoidance decision. We further show that information about tax avoidance opportunities spreads within informal networks.
We examine the role of tax incentives, tax awareness, and complexity in tax evasion. We observe a specific type of tax evasion among business owners in Swedish administrative panel data, after the tax authority has approved all tax returns. For the period 2006–2009, approximately 5% of tax returns overstate a claimed dividend allowance. Tax awareness decreases and complexity increases the likelihood of misreporting. Our results indicate that some observed misreporting could be accidental, while some misreporting is deliberate tax evasion. We identify a positive and significant effect of tax rates on tax evasion, by exploiting a large kink in the tax schedule. The majority of misreporting cases remains undetected by the tax authority. Self-correction of tax evasion by taxpayers is the dominant type of detection.
This paper analyzes heterogeneity in capital gains tax elasticities across individuals. Using panel data of over 260,000 individuals, I find that the sensitivity of capital gains to taxes is decreasing over the individual life cycle. Younger individuals respond more strongly to changes in capital gains taxes than older individuals. An increase in age of 18 years decreases the lock-in effect of capital gains taxes by approximately 10%.
This paper contrasts the individual capital gains realization behavior between progressive and proportional tax regimes. Using a longitudinal panel of over 288,000 individuals in Sweden, I exploit the 1991 tax reform in Sweden that changed progressive capital gains tax rates ranging from 12% to 80% to a proportional tax rate of 30%. Using the proportional tax system to control for non-tax reasons to realize capital gains, I show that individuals are highly responsive to capital gains tax incentives created by temporary income changes under a progressive capital gains tax. More specifically, I find that individuals with temporary negative (positive) income changes sell (hold) shares that they would hold (sell) in the absence of temporary tax incentives. Further, I show that high-income individuals are more tax sensitive than low-income individuals. This result indicates that low-income individuals facing temporary negative income changes could trade predominantly for non-tax reasons.
Tax loss carrybacks
(2016)
Tax regimes treat losses and profits asymmetrically when profits are immediately taxed but losses are not immediately refunded. We find that treating losses less asymmetrically by granting refunds less restrictively increases loss firms' investment: A third of the refund is invested and the rest is held as cash or returned to shareholders. However, the investment response is driven primarily by firms prone to engage in risky overinvestment. Consistent with the risk of misallocation, we find a delayed exit of low-productivity loss firms receiving less restrictive refunds, indicating potential distortion of the competitive selection of firms. This distortion also negatively affects aggregate output and productivity. Our results suggest that stimulating loss firms' investment with refunds unconditional on their future prospects comes at the risk of misallocation.
whether the moral evaluation of tax evasion is subject to a self-serving bias. We find that tax morale is egoistically biased: Subjects with the opportunity to evade taxes judge tax evasion as less unethical as opposed to those who cannot evade. The detection probability does not affect this result. Further, we do not find moral spillover effects, for example, on legal activities.
We study the importance of owner wages and dividends as alternative payout channels in privately held firms. Using data on all Swedish closely held corporations and their owner–managers over the period 2000–2009, we find that dividends comprise one-fourth of total payout to owner–managers. Dividends are used as a flexible payout channel. Wages are the preferred payout channel and are rather sticky. Choice of payout channel and level of payout are affected by dividend and wage taxation. Consistent with the difference in flexibility across payout channels, shareholder taxes have a stronger impact on dividends than on wages.
The paper studies the effect of uncertainty in firm-speciffic tax avoidance on firm value. We first show in a clean surplus valuation model that expectations about future profitability interact with corporate tax avoidance. Two dimensions of corporate tax avoidance strategies matter for valuation: uncertainty and level of expected future tax rates. We confirm the importance of level and uncertainty of tax avoidance for forecasts of future tax rates using a small sample of analyst tax rate forecasts. Consistent with the model and the implications from analyst forecasts, we derive a tax signal-to-noise ratio based on historical tax information. In our sample of 2,820 firms, we show empirically that this tax signal-to-noise ratio amplifies the effect of pre-tax earnings on firm value. Pre-tax earnings have a stronger effect on firm value for firms with effective and persistent tax avoidance. Firms with volatile effective tax rates receive a discount on their earnings.