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We examine the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the economic decline expected in Germany in 2020. The magnitude of the economic slump that will occur in 2020 depends on the extent of the slump during the shutdown, on the point in time, at which a significant easing of shutdown occurs, and on the length of adjustment process towards the structures that prevailed before the pandemic. We derive several scenarios and find that the shutdown will only remain in the single-digit percentage range if we apply very optimistic assumptions about the extent of the initial decline in GDP during the shutdown and the speed of adjustment after opening up of the economy. However, assuming that the economic crisis cannot end before the medical crisis ends, which medical experts project not to happen before the end of 2020, such optimistic assumptions do not appear realistic. Hence, we find it more likely that the percentage decline of GDP in Germany will be two-digit in 2020. Our findings are in contrast to the growth projections recently issued by the German Council of Economic Experts or by the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy of Germany.
In der vorliegenden Studie werden die finanzwirtschaftlichen und makroökonomischen Effekte der Einführung einer Leverage Ratio Regel in das internationale Bankensystem untersucht. Die Leverage Ratio ist eine risikoungewichtete Maßzahl zur Bestimmung der Eigenkapitalausstattung von Banken. Sie soll an die Seite der herkömmlichen Basel II Regeln gestellt werden, die das Risiko bei der Bestimmung des geforderten Eigenkapitals berücksichtigen. Die Studie kommt zu folgenden Ergebnissen: Erstens setzt die Leverage Ratio Anreize, die in eine unerwünschte Richtung gehen. Sie schafft Anreize für Banken, Bilanzpositionen in Zukunft verstärkt über den Kapitalmarkt abzuwickeln, Absicherungspositionen in Derivaten aufzulösen und das Kreditangebot zurück zu fahren. Zweitens benachteiligt die Leverage Ratio deutsche Banken stärker als andere europäische oder angelsächsische Banken. Drittens sind die volkswirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen der Einführung einer Leverage Ratio markant. Sie dürfte zu einer Reduzierung des Kreditangebots und damit zu einer Verlangsamung der wirtschaftlichen Aktivität führen. Dennoch gehen die Autoren dieser Studie davon aus, dass die Leverage Ratio als weiteres Regulierungselement kommen wird. Dieses Gutachten rät aber dazu, die Leverage Ratio nur mit einer beträchtlichen Übergangsfrist einzuführen. Dadurch kann den Banken Gelegenheit gegeben werden, die Anpassung des tatsächlichen an das regulatorische Niveau der Leverage Ratio über die Bildung von Eigenkapital zu erreichen. Dies würde auch unerwünschte volkswirtschaftliche Kosten zu vermeiden helfen.
This paper studies the effect of the strength of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) on FDI activity. We develop an index for the strength of international dispute settlement provisions included in BITs in order to examine the role the content of BITs plays in attracting FDI. To this end we make use of data from the UNCTAD's International Investment Agreement Mapping Project and measure the provision strength of 1,676 BITs. Using panel data of bilateral and total inward FDI flows and stocks we study the effect of BITs on FDI. Our main finding indicates that stronger international dispute settlement provisions in BITs are indeed associated with positive effects on FDI activity.
We used the oil-price forecasts of the 'Survey of Professional Forecasters' published by the European Central Bank to analyze whether oil-price forecasters herd or anti-herd. Oil-price forecasts are consistent with herding (anti-herding) of forecasters if forecasts are biased towards (away from) the consensus forecast. Based on a new empirical test developed by Bernhardt et al. (J. Financ. Econ. 80: 657-675, 2006), we found strong evidence of anti-herding among oil-price forecasters.
We use data from the Consensus Economics Forecast Poll to analyze how current account forecasters form expectations. Our results suggest that forecasts do not satisfy traditional unbiasedness and orthogonality criteria for forecast rationality. In addition, we find anti-herding behavior among forecasters for the Euro area and G7 countries. We also show that the cross-sectional heterogeneity in anti-herding is associated with cross-sectional heterogeneity in forecast accuracy. More specifically, we find some evidence indicating that forecasters who tend to herd provide more accurate forecasts than their colleagues who follow an anti-herding strategy.
In this paper, we study the bias in interest rate projections for four central banks, namely for Czech Republic, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden. We examine whether central bank projections are based on an asymmetric loss function and report evidence that central banks perceive an overprojection of their longer-term interest rate forecasts as twice as costly as an underprojection of the same size. We document that rationality is consistent with biased interest rate projections which contribute to explaining the central banks’ behavior.
Using a large international data set we analyze whether business cycle forecasters tend to herd or anti-herd. Applying different measures of economic crises, we distinguish between normal economic circumstances and times of crises. We fnd evidence for anti-herding behavior for most industrial economies, i.e. forecasters eliberately stick out their neck with extreme forecasts for strategic reasons. For a set of emerging market economies, by contrast, we find evidence for herding behavior. We relate this finding to the high incidence of economic and financial crises in these countries. A test for herding behavior during economic crises confirms that forecasters tend to herd in times of high forecast uncertainty.