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"Ex-ante" Taylor rules
(2008)
This paper addresses the question whether financial market participants apply the framework of Taylor-type rules in their forecasts for the G7 countries. Therefore, we use the Consensus Economic Forecast poll providing us a unique data set of inflation, interest and growth rate forecasts for the time period 1989 - 2007. We provide evidence that Taylor-type rules frameworks are present in forecasts of financial markets. Thus, the paper, uses ex-ante data for the estimation of Taylor rules. This is novel, since so far only ex-post (revised) or real-time data have been applied.
At the beginning of their career civil servants in Germany can choose between the social health insurance (SHI) system and a private plan combined with a direct reimbursement of the government of up to 70 percent. Most civil servants chose the latter, not only but also because they have to cover all contribution payments in the social system themselves, while normal employees get nearly 50 percent from their employers. The city state of Hamburg decided to change the system by paying a share of the contributions if civil servants choose the social plan. We use a stochastic microsimulation model to analyse which socio-economic types of civil servants could benefit from the Hamburg plan and if this changes the mix of insured persons in the SHI system. Our results show that low income and high morbidity types as well as families have a substantially higher incentive to choose SHI. This reform might thereby increase the adverse selection of high risk cases towards SHI.
We consider a public and congested airport served by airlines that may have market power, and two types of travelers with different relative values of time. We find that in the absence of passenger-type-based price discrimination by airlines, it can be useful to increase the airport charge so as to protect passengers with a great relative time value from excessive congestion caused by passengers with a low relative time value. As a result, the socially efficient airport charge can be substantially higher than what we learned from the recent literature on congestion pricing with non-atomistic airlines.
This paper develops a tractable model of third-degree price discrimination in airline markets that features two types of passengers with different time valuations, carriers in Cournot competition and a congested infrastructure. We find that price discrimination always leads to a loss of social welfare when, in the first stage, the congestion charge is chosen to maximize welfare by incorporating carriers’ behavior in the second stage. We also show that the welfare loss can be small if, in the process of choosing the optimal airport charges, carriers were treated as atomistic.
This paper considers a congested airport that provides aeronautical services to airlines and concessions to retailers or, respectively, car rental companies. It is shown that airport retailers exert downward pressure on the private aeronautical charge. On the other hand, the effect of car rentals on the private aeronautical charge is ambiguous. By contrast, the first-best airfare and aeronautical charge are independent of retail profits, while they are positively related to car rentals. Finally, the comparison of private and welfare-oriented airport behavior shows that private behavior can lead to the welfare-optimal outcome when commercial services exist.
The economic analysis of trade-secret protection has traditionally focused on the interests of companies to conceal information from competitors in order to gain a competitive advantage through trade-secret law. This has neglected cases in which the interest is not in concealing information from competitors, but from trading partners. We investigate the social efficiency effects of trade-secret protection in such cases. Many results from economic theory state that asymmetric information (and therefore also its legal protection) is socially undesirable since it leads to inefficient trade. At the same time, protecting private information might create incentives for socially desirable investments. We model this trade-off in a simple buyer-seller model and
nd that, indeed, trade-secret protection has ambiguous welfare effects. However, a simple, informationally undemanding rule, conditioning the applicability of legal protection on a minimum investment by the informed party to conceal the information, helps to apply trade-secret protection only when it increases welfare. This rationalizes important features of current legal practice.