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We study uncertain linear complementarity problems (LCPs), i.e., problems in which the LCP vector q or the LCP matrix M may contain uncertain parameters. To this end, we use the concept of Γ-robust optimization applied to the gap function formulation of the LCP. Thus, this work builds upon [16]. There, we studied Γ-robustified LCPs for l1- and box-uncertainty sets, whereas we now focus on ellipsoidal uncertainty set. For uncertainty in q or M, we derive conditions for the tractability of the robust counterparts. For these counterparts, we also give conditions for the existence and uniqueness of their solutions. Finally, a case study for the uncertain traffic equilibrium problem is considered, which illustrates the effects of the values of Γ on the feasibility and quality of the respective robustified solutions.
Complementarity problems are often used to compute equilibria made up of specifically coordinated solutions of different optimization problems. Specific examples are game-theoretic settings like the bimatrix game or energy market models like for electricity or natural gas. While optimization under uncertainties is rather well-developed, the field of equilibrium models represented by complementarity problems under uncertainty - especially using the concepts of robust optimization - is still in its infancy. In this paper, we extend the theory of strictly robust linear complementarity problems (LCPs) to Γ-robust settings, where existence of worst-case-hedged equilibria cannot be guaranteed. Thus, we study the minimization of the worst-case gap function of Γ-robust counterparts of LCPs. For box and l1-norm uncertainty sets we derive tractable convex counterparts for monotone LCPs and study their feasibility as well as the existence and uniqueness of solutions. To this end, we consider uncertainties in the vector and in the matrix defining the LCP. We additionally study so-called ρ-robust solutions, i.e., solutions of relaxed uncertain LCPs. Finally, we illustrate the Γ-robust concept applied to LCPs in the light of the above mentioned classical examples of bimatrix games and market equilibrium modeling.
We consider uncertain robust electricity market equilibrium problems including transmission and generation investments. Electricity market equilibrium modeling has a long tradition but is, in most of the cases, applied in a deterministic setting in which all data of the model are known. Whereas there exist some literature on stochastic equilibrium problems, the field of robust equilibrium models is still in its infancy. We contribute to this new field of research by considering Γ-robust electricity market equilibrium models on lossless DC networks with transmission and generation investments. We state the nominal market equilibrium problem as a mixed complementarity problem as well as its variational inequality and welfare optimization counterparts. For the latter, we then derive a Γ-robust formulation and show that it is indeed the counterpart of a market equilibrium problem with robustified player problems. Finally, we present two case studies to gain insights into the general effects of robustification on electricity market models. In particular, our case studies reveal that the transmission system operator tends to act more risk-neutral in the robust setting, whereas generating firms clearly behave more risk-averse.
Linear bilevel optimization problems have gained increasing attention both in theory as well as in practical applications of Operations Research (OR) during the last years and decades. The latter is mainly due to the ability of this class of problems to model hierarchical decision processes. However, this ability makes bilevel problems also very hard to solve. Since no general-purpose solvers are available, a "best-practice" has developed in the applied OR community, in which not all people want to develop tailored algorithms but "just use" bilevel optimization as a modeling tool for practice. This best-practice is the big-M reformulation of the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of the lower-level problem - an approach that has been shown to be highly problematic by Pineda and Morales (2019). Choosing invalid values for M yields solutions that may be arbitrarily bad. Checking the validity of the big-Ms is however shown to be as hard as solving the original bilevel problem in Kleinert et al. (2019). Nevertheless, due to its appealing simplicity, especially w.r.t. the required implementation effort, this ready-to-use approach still is the most popular method. Until now, there has been a lack of approaches that are competitive both in terms of implementation effort and computational cost.
In this note we demonstrate that there is indeed another competitive ready-to-use approach: If the SOS-1 technique is applied to the KKT complementarity conditions, adding the simple additional root-node inequality developed by Kleinert et al. (2020) leads to a competitive performance - without having all the possible theoretical disadvantages of the big-M approach.
Bilevel problems are used to model the interaction between two decision makers in which the lower-level problem, the so-called follower's problem, appears as a constraint in the upper-level problem of the so-called leader. One issue in many practical situations is that the follower's problem is not explicitly known by the leader. For such bilevel problems with unknown lower-level model we propose the use of neural networks to learn the follower's optimal response for given decisions of the leader based on available historical data of pairs of leader and follower decisions. Integrating the resulting neural network in a single-level reformulation of the bilevel problem leads to a challenging model with a black-box constraint. We exploit Lipschitz optimization techniques from the literature to solve this reformulation and illustrate the applicability of the proposed method with some preliminary case studies using academic and linear bilevel instances.
In this paper we analyze peak-load pricing in the presence of network constraints. In our setup, firms facing fluctuating demand decide on the size and location of production facilities. They make production decisions constrained by the invested capacities, taking into account that market prices reflect scarce transmission capacities. We state general conditions for existence and uniqueness of the market equilibrium and provide a characterization of equilibrium investment and production. The presented analysis covers the cases of perfect competition and monopoly - the case of strategic firms is approximated by a conjectural variations approach. Our result is a prerequisite for analyzing regulatory policy options with computational multilevel equilibrium models, since uniqueness of the equilibrium at lower levels is of key importance when solving these models. Thus, our paper contributes to an evolving strand of literature that analyzes regulatory policy based on computational multilevel equilibrium models and aims at taking into account individual objectives of various agents, among them not only generators and customers but also, e.g., the regulator deciding on network expansion.
We study the existence and uniqueness of equilibria for perfectly competitive markets in capacitated transport networks. The model under consideration is rather general so that it captures basic aspects of related models in, e.g., gas or electricity networks. We formulate the market equilibrium model as a mixed complementarity problem and show the equivalence to a welfare maximization problem. Using the latter we prove uniqueness of the resulting equilibrium for piecewise linear and symmetric transport costs under additional mild assumptions. Moreover, we show the necessity of these assumptions by illustrating examples that possess multiple solutions if our assumptions are violated.
We consider uniqueness and multiplicity of market equilibria in a short-run setup where traded quantities of electricity are transported through a capacitated network in which power flows have to satisfy the classical lossless DC approximation. The firms face fluctuating demand and decide on their production, which is constrained by given capacities. Today, uniqueness of such market outcomes are especially important in more complicated multilevel models for measuring market (in)efficiency. Thus, our findings are important prerequisites for such studies. We show that market equilibria are unique on tree networks under mild assumptions and we also present a priori conditions under which equilibria are unique on cycle networks. On general networks, uniqueness fails to hold and we present simple examples for which multiple equilibria exist. However, we prove a posteriori criteria for the uniqueness of a given solution and characterize situations in which multiple solutions exist.
We propose an equilibrium model that allows to analyze the long-run impact of the electricity market design on transmission line expansion by the regulator and investment in generation capacity by private firms in liberalized electricity markets. The model incorporates investment decisions of the transmission system operator and private firms in expectation of an energy-only market and cost-based redispatch. In different specifications we consider the cases of one vs. multiple price zones (market splitting) and analyze different approaches to recover network cost—in particular lump sum, generation capacity based, and energy based fees. In order to compare the outcomes of our multilevel market model with a first best benchmark, we also solve the corresponding integrated planner problem. Using two test networks we illustrate that energy-only markets can lead to suboptimal locational decisions for generation capacity and thus imply excessive network expansion. Market splitting heals these problems only partially. These results are valid for all considered types of network tariffs, although investment slightly differs across those regimes.
We propose a decomposition based method for solving mixed-integer nonlinear optimization problems with “black-box” nonlinearities, where the latter, e.g., may arise due to differential equations or expensive simulation runs. The method alternatingly solves a mixed-integer linear master problem and a separation problem for iteratively refining the mixed-integer linear relaxation of the nonlinear equalities. The latter yield nonconvex feasible sets for the optimization model but we have to restrict ourselves to convex and monotone constraint functions. Under these assumptions, we prove that our algorithm finitely terminates with an approximate feasible global optimal solution of the mixed integer nonlinear problem. Additionally, we show the applicability of our approach for three applications from optimal control with integer variables, from the field of pressurized flows in pipes with elastic walls, and from steady-state gas transport. For the latter we also present promising numerical results of our method applied to real-world instances that particularly show the effectiveness of our method for problems defined on networks.
In this article, we continue our work (Krug et al., 2021) on time-domain decomposition of optimal control problems for systems of semilinear hyperbolic equations in that we now consider mixed two-point boundary value problems and provide an in-depth well-posedness analysis. The more general boundary conditions significantly enlarge the scope of applications, e.g., to hyperbolic problems on metric graphs with cycles. We design an iterative method based on the optimality systems that can be interpreted as a decomposition method for the original optimal control problem into virtual control problems on smaller time domains.
Time-Domain Decomposition for Optimal Control Problems Governed by Semilinear Hyperbolic Systems
(2020)
In this article, we extend the time-domain decomposition method described by Lagnese and Leugering (2003) to semilinear optimal control problems for hyperbolic balance laws with spatio-temporal varying coefficients. We provide the design of the iterative method applied to the global first-order optimality system, prove its convergence, and derive an a posteriori error estimate. The analysis is done entirely on the continuous level. A distinguishing feature of the method is that the decomposed optimality system can be interpreted as an optimality system of a local "virtual" optimal control problem. Thus, the iterative time-domain decomposition of the optimality system can be interpreted as an iterative parallel scheme for virtual optimal control problems on the subintervals. A typical example and further comments are given to show the range of potential applications. Moreover, we provide some numerical experiments to give a first interpretation of the role of the parameters involved in the iterative process.
We consider mixed-integer optimal control problems, whose optimality conditions involve global combinatorial optimization aspects for the corresponding Hamiltonian pointwise in time. We propose a time-domain decomposition, which makes this problem class accessible for mixed-integer programming using parallel-in-time direct discretizations. The approach is based on a decomposition of the optimality system and the interpretation of the resulting subproblems as suitably chosen mixed-integer optimal control problems on subintervals in time. An iterative procedure then ensures continuity of the states at the boundaries of the subintervals via co-state information encoded in virtual controls. We prove convergence of this iterative scheme for discrete-continuous linear-quadratic problems and present numerical results both for linear-quadratic as well as nonlinear problems.
One of the most frequently used approaches to solve linear bilevel optimization problems consists in replacing the lower-level problem with its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions and by reformulating the KKT complementarity conditions using techniques from mixed-integer linear optimization. The latter step requires to determine some big-M constant in order to bound the lower level's dual feasible set such that no bilevel-optimal solution is cut off. In practice, heuristics are often used to find a big-M although it is known that these approaches may fail. In this paper, we consider the hardness of two proxies for the above mentioned concept of a bilevel-correct big-M. First, we prove that verifying that a given big-M does not cut off any feasible vertex of the lower level's dual polyhedron cannot be done in polynomial time unless P=NP. Second, we show that verifying that a given big-M does not cut off any optimal point of the lower level's dual problem (for any point in the projection of the high-point relaxation onto the leader's decision space) is as hard as solving the original bilevel problem.
Pricing of access to energy networks is an important issue in liberalized energy sectors because of the natural monopoly character of the underlying transport infrastructures. We introduce a general pricing framework for potential-based energy flows in arbitrarily structured transport networks. In different specifications of our general pricing model we discuss first- and second-best pricing results and compare different pricing outcomes of potential-free and potential-based energy flow models. Our results show that considering nonlinear laws of physics leads to significantly different pricing results on networks and that these differences can only be seen in sufficiently complex, e.g., cyclic, networks as they can be found in real-world situations.
Many long-term investment planning models for liberalized electricity markets either optimize for the entire electricity system or focus on confined jurisdictions, abstracting from adjacent markets. In this paper, we provide models for analyzing the impact of the interdependencies between a core electricity market and its neighboring markets on key long-run decisions. This we do both for zonal and nodal pricing schemes. The identification of welfare optimal investments in transmission lines and renewable capacity within a core electricity market requires a spatially restricted objective function, which also accounts for benefits from cross-border electricity trading. This leads to mixed-integer nonlinear multilevel optimization problems with bilinear nonconvexities for which we adapt a Benders-like decomposition approach from the literature. In a case study, we use a stylized six-node network to disentangle different effects of optimal regional (as compared to supra-regional) investment planning. Regional planning alters investment in transmission and renewable capacity in the core region, which affects private investment in generation capacity also in adjacent regions and increases welfare in the core region at the cost of system welfare. Depending on the congestion-pricing scheme, the regulator of the core region follows different strategies to increase welfare causing distributional effects among stakeholders.
The Cost of Not Knowing Enough: Mixed-Integer Optimization with Implicit Lipschitz Nonlinearities
(2018)
It is folklore knowledge that nonconvex mixed-integer nonlinear optimization problems can be notoriously hard to solve in practice. In this paper we go one step further and drop analytical properties that are usually taken for granted in mixed-integer nonlinear optimization. First, we only assume Lipschitz continuity of the nonlinear functions and additionally consider multivariate implicit constraint functions that cannot be solved for any parameter analytically. For this class of mixed-integer problems we propose a novel algorithm based on an approximation of the feasible set in the domain of the nonlinear function---in contrast to an approximation of the graph of the function considered in prior work. This method is shown to compute approximate global optimal solutions in finite time and we also provide a worst-case iteration bound. In some first numerical experiments we show that the ``cost of not knowing enough'' is rather high by comparing our approach with the open-source global solver SCIP. This reveals that a lot of work is still to be done for this highly challenging class of problems and we thus finally propose some possible directions of future research.
Liberalized gas markets in Europe are organized as entry-exit regimes so that gas trade and transport are decoupled. The decoupling is achieved via the announcement of technical capacities by the transmission system operator (TSO) at all entry and exit points of the network. These capacities can be booked by gas suppliers and customers in long-term contracts. Only traders who have booked capacities up-front can "nominate" quantities for injection or withdrawal of gas via a day-ahead market. To ensure feasibility of the nominations for the physical network, the TSO must only announce technical capacities for which all possibly nominated quantities are transportable. In this paper, we use a four-level model of the entry-exit gas market to analyze possible welfare losses associated with the decoupling of gas trade and transport. In addition to the multilevel structure, the model contains robust aspects to cover the conservative nature of the European entry-exit system. We provide several reformulations to obtain a single-level mixed-integer quadratic problem. The overall model of the considered market regime is extremely challenging and we thus have to make the main assumption that gas flows are modeled as potential-based linear flows. Using the derived single-level reformulation of the problem, we show that the feasibility requirements for technical capacities imply significant welfare losses due to unused network capacity. Furthermore, we find that the specific structure of the network has a considerable influence on the optimal choice of technical capacities. Our results thus show that trade and transport are not decoupled in the long term. As a further source of welfare losses and discrimination against individual actors, we identify the minimum prices for booking capacity at the individual nodes.
In this work we analyze the structural properties of the set of feasible bookings in the European entry-exit gas market system. We present formal definitions of feasible bookings and then analyze properties that are important if one wants to optimize over them. Thus, we study whether the sets of feasible nominations and bookings are bounded, convex, connected, conic, and star-shaped. The results depend on the specific model of gas flow in a network. Here, we discuss a simple linear flow model with arc capacities as well as nonlinear and mixed-integer nonlinear models of passive and active networks, respectively. It turns out that the set of feasible bookings has some unintuitive properties. For instance, we show that the set is nonconvex even though only a simple linear flow model is used.
This paper mainly studies two topics: linear complementarity problems for modeling electricity market equilibria and optimization under uncertainty. We consider both perfectly competitive and Nash–Cournot models of electricity markets and study their robustifications using strict robustness and the Γ-approach. For three out of the four combinations of economic competition and robustification, we derive algorithmically tractable convex optimization counterparts that have a clear-cut economic interpretation. In the case of perfect competition, this result corresponds to the two classical welfare theorems, which also apply in both considered robust cases that again yield convex robustified problems. Using the mentioned counterparts, we can also prove the existence and, in some cases, uniqueness of robust equilibria. Surprisingly, it turns out that there is no such economic sensible counterpart for the case of Γ-robustifications of Nash–Cournot models. Thus, an analogue of the welfare theorems does not hold in this case. Finally, we provide a computational case study that illustrates the different effects of the combination of economic competition and uncertainty modeling.