Jacques Delors Centre
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Despite its place at the core of EU integration, support for the EU’s single market is under-investigated by European public opinion scholars. This paper uses novel survey data from eight EU member states to compare how utilitarian concerns, postmaterialist values and national identities shape popular views of the EU’s single market. Focusing on the freedom of movement for goods, workers, and services, we find that postmaterialist attitudes more consistently predict attitudes towards the single market than economic positioning. We thus contribute to the literature on attitudes towards European integration by showing that postmaterialist values and national identities matter not only for views of highly politicized issues like migration, but also for “bread-and-butter” policies like single market governance. These results are particularly surprising given that we would expect utilitarian expectations to be particularly prominent for these kinds of economic policies.
Money Can’t Stay on the Sidelines: A Long‑Term Investment Product for the EU and Its Citizens
(2026)
EU citizens are active savers but invest less in capital markets than their US counterparts, forgoing potentially higher returns. Additionally, the capacity of the EU financial system to transfer household savings into productive investments (that is, investing in the economy rather than in the property sector) is limited, hindering economic growth. The current initiatives of the Savings and Investment Union (SIU) have only partially addressed these challenges and lack inter alia focus when it comes to fostering productive investments in the EU. This Policy Brief proposes the creation of an EU long-term investment product (ELTIP) to strengthen retail participation in capital markets and channel household savings into productive and sustainable investments in the bloc’s economy. The proposal combines fostering EU economic investment with global risk diversification, strong investor protection, cost efficiency, accessibility for investors, and adaptability to unforeseen changes in investors’ life circumstances. Current debates around the Savings and Investment Union offer a timely window of opportunity to introduce an ELTIP that supports EU growth and strategic priorities in a challenging geopolitical environment.
With the Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA), the European Commission is, for the first time, proposing EU-wide local-content and low-carbon requirements for national procurement and subsidy schemes. Done right, it could become one of Europe’s most consequential industrial-policy initiatives in years. Yet in its current form, the proposal risks becoming a paradigm shift on paper with little economic impact in practice. In most sectors, the proposed rules would apply to only a small share of demand, while broad exemptions could leave implementation largely at the discretion of member states. A more effective compromise remains within reach. Negotiators should keep Buy European rules as open as possible to trade partners while strengthening guardrails against circumvention. At the same time, local-content and low-carbon requirements need enough bite to incentivise manufacturing investment and supply-chain diversification.
Economic inequality, i.e. income and wealth inequality, varies across time and space. Preferences for and concerns about economic inequality in particular and political preferences in general are remarkably independent of such variation in economic inequality. Empirically, the mechanisms linking economic inequality and political preferences are difficult to study since economic inequality as a macro-level phenomenon can influence individual political preferences in many ways. A typical assumption in theoretically and empirically studying the effects of economic inequality on the formation of political preferences is that individuals have full information about economic inequality. This assumption, while analytically helpful, is conceptually and empirically contested. I study the formation of political preferences under incomplete, potentially biased, information about inequality by considering perceived economic inequality as linking mechanism between economic inequality and political preferences.
Chapter 2 studies the relevance of inequality perceptions for the formation of preferences for redistribution and finds that inequality perceptions are strong predictors for preferences for redistribution. I further find that inequality perceptions are independent of actual levels of income inequality but dependent on individual socio-economic and ideological positions. Chapter 3 builds upon this argument but looks at perceptions of tax inequality rather than income inequality and its effects on preferences for taxation. It shows that individuals perceive tax rates for different income groups differently depending on their own income position. Preferred tax rates for different income groups, however, are rather similar across individual income positions. Chapters 2 and 3 indicate that there is heterogeneity in perceived inequalities and that these perceptions are relevant to the formation of political preferences. While these chapters use individual level observational data to study potential mechanisms correlationally, I apply a quasi-experimental design to test whether perceived inequality—modelled as experience of inequality—causally influences political preferences in chapter 4: Studying populist voting in Germany, I find that experiencing regional inequality can affect populist voting.
This dissertation presents empirical evidence that considering perceived inequalities can help us to better understand why individual political preferences do not necessarily reflect levels and changes in economic inequality.
Economic inequality, i.e. income and wealth inequality, varies across time and space. Preferences for and concerns about economic inequality in particular and political preferences in general are remarkably independent of such variation in economic inequality. Empirically, the mechanisms linking economic inequality and political preferences are difficult to study since economic inequality as a macro-level phenomenon can influence individual political preferences in many ways. A typical assumption in theoretically and empirically studying the effects of economic inequality on the formation of political preferences is that individuals have full information about economic inequality. This assumption, while analytically helpful, is conceptually and empirically contested. I study the formation of political preferences under incomplete, potentially biased, information about inequality by considering perceived economic inequality as linking mechanism between economic inequality and political preferences.
Chapter 2 studies the relevance of inequality perceptions for the formation of preferences for redistribution and finds that inequality perceptions are strong predictors for preferences for redistribution. I further find that inequality perceptions are independent of actual levels of income inequality but dependent on individual socio-economic and ideological positions. Chapter 3 builds upon this argument but looks at perceptions of tax inequality rather than income inequality and its effects on preferences for taxation. It shows that individuals perceive tax rates for different income groups differently depending on their own income position. Preferred tax rates for different income groups, however, are rather similar across individual income positions. Chapters 2 and 3 indicate that there is heterogeneity in perceived inequalities and that these perceptions are relevant to the formation of political preferences. While these chapters use individual level observational data to study potential mechanisms correlationally, I apply a quasi-experimental design to test whether perceived inequality—modelled as experience of inequality—causally influences political preferences in chapter 4: Studying populist voting in Germany, I find that experiencing regional inequality can affect populist voting.
This dissertation presents empirical evidence that considering perceived inequalities can help us to better understand why individual political preferences do not necessarily reflect levels and changes in economic inequality.
A consensus is emerging in Europe that Chinese overcapacity and resulting import surges threaten the continent’s industrial base. Yet the EU remains divided on how to respond. Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures are overburdened to respond to a systemic shock, while new instruments would take years to design, legislate and operationalise. Nor would they remove the political difficulty of agreeing action in Council or the risk of Chinese retaliation. This brief argues that the EU must therefore make better use of the safeguard mechanism already available under existing rules. With defensible baselines, country-specific tariff-rate quotas, sectoral focus and systematic import surveillance, safeguards can provide immediate protection while limiting collateral damage to partners.
Saving Lives at Sea: Towards a Common European Approach to Search and Rescue in the Mediterranean
(2026)
This Policy Report considers the feasibility of a common European approach to search and rescue (SAR) in the Mediterranean. Grounded in the analysis of prevailing legal, political, operational, and financial conditions, it considers five possible models for a European SAR framework, arranged along a centralisation spectrum: 1) an EU integrated scheme; 2) a Frontex-led formula; 3) a ‘coalition of the willing’ mechanism, built around like-minded member states and related actors; 4) a system based on the delegation of SAR duties to third countries; and 5) a hybrid, staggered model. The authors make the case for a formula that is fully compliant with international and EU legal obligations, anchored in multi-stakeholder collaboration, solidarity and fair-sharing of responsibility. Central to this approach lies the decriminalisation of SAR, a paradigm shift of EU migration discourse and the introduction of legal pathways on a credible scale, rendering irregular crossings unnecessary.
In einem Interview mit der Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung überträgt Jordan Bardella seine innenpolitische Strategie auf die Europapolitik: meist sanft im Ton, dem ersten Eindruck nach unklar in der Sache. Was beruhigend wirken soll, beißt sich mit den Folgen, die das Programm des Rassemblement National (RN) hätte. Es offenbart ein strategisches Dilemma, das die Partei auch im Wahlkampf begleiten wird.
The Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA) introduces a logic of selective conditionality into EU foreign direct investment (FDI) policy, tying investment in strategic sectors to requirements on local employment, supplier integration, R&D, ownership, and technology transfer. Rather than constituting a broad protectionist turn, the shift is narrowly targeted and, in practice, primarily affects large-scale Chinese investments in the electric vehicle and battery value chain. Evidence from the battery sector illustrates the rationale behind this approach: while foreign investment has helped close urgent supply gaps, it has generated only modest spillovers in technological capabilities for European firms. As currently designed, however, the mechanism is likely to exert only limited leverage over foreign investors. Making selective conditionality effective will require tighter and more enforceable conditions, targeted trade policy to reduce outside options, and a coherent industrial policy framework capable of supporting domestic actors.
Linking EU funding to compliance with the rule of law has marked a shift in how the European Union safeguards its values within its member states. Orbán’s electoral defeat has opened an unprecedented window of opportunity to enshrine rule of law conditionality in the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) as is proposed by the Commission. Compared to the current rule of law conditionality toolkit, the Commission proposal would significantly broaden the scope of application and, crucially, also consolidate the Recovery and Resilience Facility model for rule of law conditionality. Both would be a very positive development. At the same time, some adjustment is needed to give the next MFF even greater bite in safeguarding the rule of law.
