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Public interventions that help European startups to scale up their businesses have so far focused mainly on establishing a functioning market for venture capital (VC) and making it attractive to private investors. However, VC funding in Europe remains a fraction of what is required, still relies heavily on the public purse and fails to channel resources into strategic green sectors. Changing this requires three measures. First, the EU should enable institutional investors to invest independently in VC. Second, the European Investment Fund should strengthen the sustainability impact of its support for VCs. And third, the European Investment Bank should expand its direct investments in cleantech scaleups that are too risky for private investors.
Der Policy Brief thematisiert die Herausforderungen und Defizite der aktuellen europäischen Migrationspolitik, insbesondere den „Wettbewerb nach unten“ der Mitgliedstaaten, vor dem Hintergrund einer sich verschärfenden Migrationsdebatte in Deutschland. Immer mehr EU-Mitgliedsstaaten ergreifen restriktivere Maßnahmen, von Auslagerungsabkommen über Binnengrenzkontrollen bis hin zur Aussetzung des Asylrechts, was zu einer immer ungleicheren Verteilung des Migrationsdrucks in Europa führt. Nationale Alleingänge und populistische Rhetorik untergraben die Solidarität innerhalb der EU und führen zu einer Aushöhlung unionsrechtlicher Prinzipien. Dabei sind viele dieser Maßnahmen symbolischer Natur und verfehlen ihre intendierte Wirkung. Zielführender wäre das Hinarbeiten auf eine gemeinsame europäische Lösung, die faire Asylverfahren und menschenwürdige Unterbringung in allen Mitgliedsstaaten sicherstellt. Deutschland könnte hierbei eine Vorbildfunktion einnehmen, insbesondere durch die Umsetzung der jüngst beschlossenen Reform des Gemeinsamen Europäischen Asylsystems (GEAS) und eine stärkere Einbindung von EU-Institutionen zur Überwachung und Durchsetzung der Asylstandards.
In March 2024, the Franco-German Parliamentary Assembly (FGPA) celebrated its fifth anniversary. This binational forum can be viewed as a genuine step towards integration in Franco-German relations besides the Aachen Treaty. The FGPA is designed to be a watchdog over the Franco-German treaties and to bring together political actors of both countries to discuss and resolve conflictual issues and contribute to European initiatives. After five years of its being, the results are mixed. Franco-German governmental relations are more conflictual than ever. While the FGPA proved added value during the Covid-19 pandemic by convincing the French and German interior ministers to lift border controls, it has been notably reticent on the Ukraine war and other foreign policy conflicts. The FGPA would benefit by being bolder and extricating itself step-by-step from national political constraints. In this way, parliamentary dialogue can help the two key partners to find common ground on a range of European issues.
Kein EU-Geld für Thüringen? - Die Anwendbarkeit von EU-Rechtsstaatlichkeitsmechanismen auf Regionen
(2024)
Am 1. September ist Landtagswahl in Thüringen. Dort könnte die rechtsextreme AfD mit deutlichem Vorsprung stärkste Kraft werden. Deshalb wird jetzt diskutiert, wie man Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit auf Landesebene vor autoritären Kräften schützen kann. Auch die EU könnte hier eine Rolle spielen. Bisher hat die Kommission hauptsächlich auf Angriffe auf demokratische Institutionen auf nationaler Ebene reagiert. Aber auch regionale Regierungen müssen sich an die Grundwerte der EU halten. In einem föderalen System wie Deutschland spielen die Bundesländer außerdem eine wichtige Rolle bei der Umsetzung von Europarecht und verwalten EU-Fördergelder in Milliardenhöhe. Die Analyse zeigt am Beispiel von Thüringen, dass die meisten Rechtsstaatlichkeitsinstrumente der EU auch auf regionaler Ebene angewandt werden könnten. Dabei wäre das Zurückhalten von EU-Fördergeldern das effektivste Mittel.
Between 6-9 July 2024, the 720 members of the European Parliament were elected across 27 Member States. While the elections have not led to a landslide shift to the right, there is a notable consolidation of far-right parties at the European level. Still, the pro-European centre is holding firm and maintains a majority. In this Policy Brief, Jannik Jansen and Thu Nguyen argue that the results likely indicate by-and-large continuity in the European Parliament, including an ongoing shift to the right on contested issues due to a perforated ‘cordon sanitaire’. But the election results had heavily disruptive consequences on the national level, which in France has triggered snap parliamentary elections. This will have pronounced impact on the balance of power in the (European) Council and on the EU as a whole.
At the beginning of the twenty‐first century, the large democracies of Western Europe experienced some of the most prosperous and peaceful decades in human history. Specifically, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Germany experienced high and stable quality of life, democratic accountability and state capacity between 2000 and 2019, according to the 2022 Berggruen Governance Index. While all four of these countries are among the top performers in the Index, substantial problems lurk beneath the surface. Notably, each failed to capitalise on the low interest rate environment in the decade following the global financial crisis of 2007–2009—albeit in different ways and for different reasons in each country. In particular, low investment in infrastructure and key technologies, the persistence of stubborn regional inequalities, and resulting sluggish GDP growth have prevented the ‘Big Four’ in Western Europe from improving further and future‐proofing their existing gains.
Much of Latin America has experienced a renewed ‘lost decade’, failing to substantially expand quality of life since the late 2000s. While the outcomes of governance performance across the largest countries – including Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico, Colombia, and Argentina – have discrete causes, common themes like internal conflict, corruption, and overreliance on natural resources plague the entire region. Put more generally, the inability to turn democratic accountability into a state mechanism able to deliver economic growth and public goods in a sustainable manner is a liability affecting all five countries. To explore the difficulties that the large Latin American countries have faced in the twenty‐first century, this article examines results from the 2022 Berggruen Governance Index, and then presents three key issues facing the region: insufficient state capacity, flirtations with authoritarianism, and economic inequality and inflation. While the challenges remain substantial, increased regional integration may offer one way out of the predicament.
AbstractThe United States—often hailed as the ‘oldest democracy in the world’ and the ‘leader of the free world’—has fallen on hard times. In addition to recent headline‐grabbing political events that have highlighted its political dysfunction, data from the 2022 Berggruen Governance Index (BGI) reveal that overall state capacity and democratic accountability have been declining for years. Although public goods provision has remained on a steady course, the US still trails much of the developed world. We find this struggling performance is largely the result of neglecting three types of infrastructure: civic, physical and social. Specifically, we argue that the crisis became particularly pronounced due to an insufficient response to the 2008 global financial crisis. Although some recent political achievements could slow the decline, more drastic action will be required to reverse these troubling trends.
Implementing the EU Green Deal requires annual investments of about €620 billion, most of which will have to be shouldered by the private sector. However, businesses and households are not investing enough as of now. An important lever for greater green investment is reducing uncertainty around such investment. At the start of the next institutional cycle, the EU should hence improve regulatory certainty for green investments, which should be palatable to most parties likely to form a majority in the Parliament. In addition, the EU should adopt concrete tools that reduce cost uncertainty for companies and households in a pragmatic manner. To this end, this policy position recommends using green lead markets and proposes moves to explore two novel mechanisms that cost taxpayers little to nothing but should boost green investments.