The Minimum Wage from a Two-Sided Perspective

  • This paper sheds new light on the effects of the minimum wage on employment from a two-sided theoretical perspective, in which firms’ job offer and workers’ job acceptance decisions are disentangled. Minimum wages reduce job offer incentives and increase job acceptance incentives. We show that sufficiently low minimum wages may do no harm to employment, since their job-offer disincentives are countervailed by their job-acceptance incentives.

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Metadaten
Document Type:Article
Language:English
Author(s):Alessio Brown, Christian Merkl, Dennis Snower
Parent Title (English):Economics Letters
Publication year:2014
Publishing Institution:Hertie School
First Page:389
Last Page:391
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.06.020
Release Date:2019/09/30
Volume:124
Issue:3
Licence of document (German):Metadaten / metadata
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