Voting over Taxes : The Case of Tax Evasion

  • This paper studies majority voting on taxes when tax evasion is possible. We characterize the voting equilibrium where the agent with median taxed income is pivotal. Since the ranking of true incomes does not necessarily correspond to the ranking of taxed incomes, the decisive voter can differ from the median income receiver. In this case, we find unconventional patterns of redistribution, e.g., from the middle class to the poor and the rich.

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Metadaten
Document Type:Article
Language:English
Author(s):Christian Traxler
Parent Title (English):Public Choice
ISSN:0048-5829
Publication year:2009
Publishing Institution:Hertie School
First Page:43
Last Page:58
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9411-5
Release Date:2017/08/02
Tag:Majority Voting; Redistribution; Tax Evasion; Welfare Analysis
Volume:140
Issue:1-2
Licence of document (German):Metadaten / metadata
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