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Foreclosure and Profit Shifting with Partial Vertical Ownership

  • We demonstrate how the incentives of firms that partially own their suppliers or customers to foreclose rivals depend on how the partial owner can extract profits from the target. Compared to a fully vertically integrated firm, a partial owner may obtain only a share of the target’s profit but influence the target’s strategy significantly. We show that the incentives for customer and input foreclosure can be higher, equal, or even lower with partial ownership than with a vertical merger, depending on how the protection of minority shareholders and transfer price regulations affect the scope for profit extraction.

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Metadaten
Document Type:Working Paper
Language:English
Author(s):Matthias Hunold, Vasilisa Petrishcheva
Parent Title (German):Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers
Hertie Collections (Serial Number):Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers (41)
Publication year:2024
Publishing Institution:Hertie School
Number pages:74
Related URL:https://berlinschoolofeconomics.de/insights/discussion-papers
DOI:https://doi.org/10.48462/opus4-5477
Release Date:2024/06/06
Edition:No. 41
Hertie School Research:BerlinSchoolOfEcon_Discussion_Papers
Licence of document (German):Creative Commons - CC BY - 4.0 International
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