FG Energiewirtschaft
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Auctions are a highly demanded policy instrument for the promotion of renewable energy sources. Their flexible structure makes them adaptable to country-specific conditions and needs. However, their success depends greatly on how those needs are operationalised in the design elements. Disaggregating data from the German onshore wind auction programme into individual projects, we evaluated the contribution of auctions to the achievement of their primary (deployment at competitive prices) and secondary (diversity) objectives and have highlighted design elements that affect the policy's success or failure. We have shown that, in the German case, the auction scheme is unable to promote wind deployment at competitive prices, and that the design elements used to promote the secondary objectives not only fall short at achieving their intended goals, but create incentives for large actors to game the system.
We quantify the net external effects of conventional and renewable electricity generators by analyzing housing prices in their vicinity. Using a Differences-in-Differences approach, we find that (1) wind turbines reduce prices significantly, (2) solar fields have no significant impact, and (3) conventional plants over 1 km away show positive net effects. We set out to explain this result by disentangling the positive local external effects of energy generation, which we measure in terms of local purchasing power and tax revenues. Our results show that the commissioning of conventional power stations results in a significant increase in both purchasing power and business tax income in the vicinity. We thus conclude that significant financial participation of the local public in the development of renewable energy projects, especially wind turbines, could be key to increasing their acceptance and accelerating their expansion.
Offshore wind energy is rapidly expanding, facilitated largely through auctions run by governments. We provide a detailed quantified overview of utilised auction schemes, including geographical spread, volumes, results, and design specifications. Our comprehensive global dataset reveals heterogeneous designs. Although most auction designs provide some form of revenue stabilisation, their specific instrument choices vary and include feed-in tariffs, one-sided and two-sided contracts for difference, mandated power purchase agreements, and mandated renewable energy certificates.
We review the schemes used in all eight major offshore wind jurisdictions across Europe, Asia, and North America and evaluate bids in their jurisdictional context. We analyse cost competitiveness, likelihood of timely construction, occurrence of strategic bidding, and identify jurisdictional aspects that might have influenced auction results. We find that auctions are embedded within their respective regulatory and market design context, and are remarkably diverse, though with regional similarities. Auctions in each jurisdiction have evolved and tend to become more exposed to market price risks over time. Less mature markets are more prone to make use of lower-risk designs. Still, some form of revenue stabilisation is employed for all auctioned offshore wind energy farms analysed here, regardless of the specific policy choices. Our data confirm a coincidence of declining costs and growing diffusion of auction regimes.