Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Part of a book (chapter) (44) (remove)
Way of publication
- Open Access (2)
Keywords
- Bildung (1)
- Deutschland (1)
- Europäische Union (1)
- Fernsehen (1)
- Film (1)
- Förderung (1)
- Gestaltung (1)
- Konferenzschrift (1)
- Kooperation (1)
- Massenmedien (1)
Institute
It is argued that the concepts of mission-oriented innovation policy and also of the entrepreneurial state will lead to the implementation of policies that are highly vulnerable to behavioral biases and the inefficient use of heuristics. In political practice, we can therefore not expect efficient mission-oriented policies. In particular, I argue that missions as a political commitment mechanism intended to devote massive resources to a specific cause will often only work if biases like the availability bias and loss aversion are deliberately used in order to secure voter consent. Furthermore, I also argue that the argument used by Mazzucato (Mission Economy: A Moonshot Guide to Changing Capitalism. London: Penguin UK, 2021) herself also contains several behavioral biases.
Allokation
(2017)
Die Wettbewerbsintensität auf dem Nachrichtenmarkt und die Offenheit kollektiver Lernprozesse
(2009)
Du sollst nicht lügen: Fake News aus der Perspektive der verhaltensökonomischen Theorie der Politik
(2020)
Ein Ordnungsrahmen für den Wettbewerb in Sportligen: das Beispiel der National Football League
(2021)
Finanzpolitik
(2018)
Lobby
(2019)
Mehrheitsprinzip
(2019)
Prozesspolitik
(2020)
Verhaltensökonomik
(2020)
This paper examines the interplay of horizontal and vertical reci- procity in determining the degree of tax compliance. Horizontal reciprocity is of the type that is frequently observed in public goods games, where reciprocally minded taxpayers may respond to non-contributing, strictly sel sh taxpayers by mimicking their sel sh behaviour. Vertical reciprocity is located in the relationship between the taxpayer and her government. Some recent empirical evidence is suggesting that initial cooperation of taxpayers with the scal authorities is not so much the result of positive reciprocity, but rather of a general tendency to obey authorities. Vertical reciprocity is therefore modeled as the propensity of taxpayers to retaliate against an uncooperative government by means of reducing the level of tax compliance. This allows us to identify feedback mechanisms between horizontal and vertical reciprocity.