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Institute
Wir analysieren die Nationale Industriestrategie 2030, die im Februar 2019 vom Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie veröffentlicht wurde. Bei dieser Strategie handelt es sich um einen Versuch, vertikale Industriepolitik in Deutschland zu stärken. Wir argumentieren, dass die theoretische und empirische Rechtfertigung für diese Strategie insgesamt schwach ist. Die vom Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (BMWi) vorgeschlagenen Instrumente weisen meist nur eine sehr geringe Passgenauigkeit zur mittelständisch geprägten deutschen Unternehmenslandschaft auf. Sie stellen Anforderungen an die Fähigkeiten der staatlichen Entscheidungsträger, die in der Realität kaum vorzufinden sind. Eine sinnvolle Alternative würde in einer Rückbesinnung auf ordnungspolitische Prinzipien, insbesondere die Gewährleistung einer hohen Wettbewerbsintensität, bestehen.
In explaining individual behavior in politics, economists should rely on the same motivational assumptions they use to explain behavior in the market: that is what Political Economy, understood as the application of economics to the study of political processes, is all about. In its standard variant, individuals who play the game of politics should also be considered rational and self-interested, unlike the benevolent despot of traditional welfare economics. History repeats itself with the rise of behavioral economics: Assuming cognitive biases to be present in the market, but not in politics, behavioral economists often call for government to intervene in a “benevolent” way. Recently, however, political economists have started to apply behavioral economics insights to the study of political processes, thereby re-establishing a unified methodology. This paper surveys the current state of the emerging field of “behavioral political economy” and considers the scope for further research.
Das Forschungsgebiet der Politischen Ökonomik kon-
zentrierte sich bisher vor allem darauf, das ökonomi-
sche Verhaltensmodell rational-eigeninteressierten Handelns auf den Forschungsgegenstand der Politik anzuwenden. Mit der empirischen Verhaltensökonomik gera-
ten aber strikte Annahmen individueller Rationalität zu-
nehmend in die Kritik. Dazu kommt, dass die Anreiz-
strukturen gerade bei kollektivem Handeln in der Politik nicht dafür sprechen, dass Menschen individuellen Aufwand betreiben, um vollständig rational zu handeln. Deshalb ist die Anwendung verhaltensökonomischer
Ansätze auf diesem Gebiet besonders vielversprechend.
Finanzpolitik
(2018)
The paper compares decision-making on the centralisation of public goods provision in the presence of regional externalities under representative and direct democratic institutions. A model with two regions, two public goods and regional spillovers is developed in which uncertainty over the true preferences of candidates makes strategic delegation impossible. Instead, it is shown that the existence of rent extraction by delegates alone suffices to make cooperative centralisation more likely through representative democracy. In the non-cooperative case, the more extensive possibilities for institutional design under representative democracy increase the likelihood of centralisation. Direct democracy may thus be interpreted as a federalism-preserving institution.