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**True Love**

**A Study in Integrated Multinationality within  
1 (German/Netherlands) Corps**

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Opinions expressed are solely  
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## **Introduction: 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps – Five Years of Service**

*Paul Klein*

### **1 1 German-Netherlands Corps and its objectives**

When in 1995 a common corps was established, Germany and the Netherlands continued a long lasting tradition of military co-operation. At the time of East-West confrontation, the First Netherlands Corps and the First German Corps stood side by side in the Northern German Lowlands putting up a joint defence effort under command of the NATO Northern Army Group (NORTHAG). The Netherlands were also the first European country after World War II to allow the Federal Republic of Germany the permanent deployment of German soldiers on their soil at the Dutch garrison of Budel by means of the Seedorf-Budel Treaty of 1963. In exchange, Dutch troops were garrisoned in Seedorf, in Northern Germany (Klovert/Krijger 1996).

On the one hand, both sides did comply with NATO requests by creating a common bi-national corps. The requests by NATO date back to July 6, 1990 and were put down in the London declaration of the Alliance's heads of states and of governments: 'The Alliance will rely increasingly on multinational corps' (Klein 1993: 1). On the other hand, with the decision of merging 1 (GE) Corps with 1 (NL) Corps into 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps<sup>1</sup> a new road was taken. It was not the 'lead nation' model that had been chosen as multinational principle for the merger of troops from two nations troops, but the creation of an integrated Dutch-German headquarters, under a periodically changing command.

In the early beginning, only the soldiers of the own nation were subordinated to the intents and purposes of the corps commander. For the soldiers of the other nation though, there were separate bi-national

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<sup>1</sup> Abbreviated as 1 (GE/NL) Corps.

and national command lines that came together at the deputy commander who acted as the national commander (Klein et al. 1999: 14). Meanwhile, things have changed. On October 6, 1997, the German Federal Minister of Defence, Volker R uhe, and the Dutch Minister of Defence, Dr. Joris Voorhoeve signed a corps agreement regulating deepened integration. This agreement stipulated that the corps commander has command and control authority over the soldiers of the respective other nation as well. Only administrative command and control over the national contingents of the corps and materiel cognisance remain national matters. By vesting the corps commander with full command and control authority, 1 (GE/NL) Corps went obviously beyond valid NATO subordination rules, thus acting as a model for other multinational units (Beck 1998: 55).

Upon formation of the corps neither the Germans nor the Dutch initially intended to merge or join military units from both nations. The idea of a mutual approach and reciprocal adjustment evolved gradually and was initiated from both sides. To enable mutual approach and adjustment, the corps encouraged projects offering the opportunity for bi-national contacts from its activation onwards. German and Dutch soldiers conducted joint exercises. There were exchanges of military elements and affiliations among the units. Under the roof of out-of-area missions, soldiers of both armed forces did co-operate. 'Thus, they intended to create a climate that would increase the willingness to withdraw from customary national regulations, procedures and habits, to compromise with the partner or to develop in common new conceptions.' (Klein et al. 1999: 21)

It was decided that sociological research should monitor whether or not the integration of 1 (GE/NL) Corps was successful, whether or not the soldiers from both countries had grown together more closely since the establishment of the corps and whether or not a common feeling of solidarity had developed. An accompanying research was therefore started immediately after the activation of 1 (GE/NL) Corps.

## 2 The accompanying sociological survey

The ‘Koninklijke Militaire Academie’ (Royal Netherlands Military Academy, RNLMA), in Breda, and the ‘Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr’ (SOWI, Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences), in Strausberg, first called this accompanying sociological survey, and were then, on the organisational level supported by the Corps Headquarters in Münster. The survey was based on standardised interviews with soldiers of the corps. The original plan was to accompany the integration process by means of research for two years only. Accordingly, a first survey took place at the time of the inauguration of the corps in 1995. A second survey was carried out in autumn 1997. After presenting the results of both surveys to the corps they were published in German in a report of the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences (Klein et al. 1999). Furthermore, the *Militaire Spectator* published essential results of the survey in Dutch (Rosendahl Huber et al. 1999).

At the request of the corps, a third survey took place in autumn 2000. On the one hand, this survey served to check whether results of the previous surveys had remained the same or had changed. On the other hand, it was intended as a follow-up focusing on the question of deepened integration. This issue had been raised by the first deputy commander of the corps, Freiherr von Steinaecker, with the words: “But the now intended ‘deep integration’ goes considerably further. It does not only require a gradual harmonisation of military procedures and terms but first of all of our thinking and acting and even of our human living with one another. The actual challenge hence is that soldiers coalesce, thus making a mere task organisation to become an efficient military force. For this aim, we all, military and civilian collaborators, should become acquainted with each other. Not only personally and with our families, but also with regard to our customs and habits, our countries, our history. Bi-nationality does enrich, but only if we look rather forward than backwards, if we rather prefer things in common than the separating ones. This is what we particularly should adhere to – all the national identities taken into consideration.” (Steinaecker 1996: 9f.)

All three surveys were based upon identical items related to the political and military intentions regarding the corps, its bi-national structure – differing between headquarters and troops – and the meeting of two different military cultures. Analogous to the assumptions of Klein et al. (1999: 22f.), the following questions were posed:

1. Does service within the First German-Netherlands Corps influence the understanding of the respective other nation and its soldiers?
2. Which is the influence of the frequency of contacts with soldiers from the respective other nation on attitudes, opinions and prejudices?
3. Do still existing national prejudices and stereotypes influence the co-operation within the corps and the evaluation of the soldiers from the partner army, and have there been any changes in the course of time?
4. Do the different structures (conscript army versus volunteer force; open or closed structures regarding female enlistment) influence co-operation within the corps and within the mixed headquarters in particular?
5. Do affiliations with German and Dutch Military Units improve mutual understanding?
6. Does a specific feeling of identity beyond the nation – such as a transnational organisational culture and the attitude towards integration of the European military – develop within the corps through the years?

Answers to these questions were gathered by means of a questionnaire developed on the basis of an evaluation of available documents and explorative qualitative interviews with soldiers from both nations covering all categories of ranks in the activation staff (and in the corps headquarters in Münster at a later stage). To conduct the survey, German and Dutch soldiers were handed out questionnaires with identical contents, but drawn up in their respective native language.



In order to find out the soldiers' expectations regarding the corps, on the one hand, and to ascertain possible changes of attitudes in the five years after the formation of the corps, on the other hand, the questionnaires of the three survey cycles were kept identical wherever possible. Additional items of the second and third survey either referred to experiences that could not have pre-existed at the moment 1 (GE/NL) Corps was established or to events that occurred in recent times round about the survey date, e. g. the suspension of conscription in the Netherlands. Covering all categories of ranks, German and Dutch soldiers from both integrated headquarters, from national headquarters and from the troops as well participated in the survey. Tables 1 and 2 below show the numeric composition of the samples.

Table 1: Composition of the samples according to rank categories

	Survey of		
	1995	1997	2000
German rank and file	443	283	342
Dutch rank and file	275	325	35
German NCOs	259	164	210
Dutch NCOs	216	214	152
German officers	134	119	151
Dutch officers	163	200	131
<b>Total Germans</b>	<b>836</b>	<b>566</b>	<b>703</b>
<b>Total Dutch</b>	<b>654</b>	<b>739</b>	<b>318</b>

Table 2: Composition of the samples according to bi-national HQ and national HQ/troops

	Survey of		
	1995	1997	2000
Germans in bi-national HQ	111	96	120
Dutch in bi-national HQ	134	118	125
Germans in national HQ/troops	690	470	579
Dutch in national HQ/troops	474	621	193

The interviews among the troops were carried out either by SOWI and RNLMA researchers or by officers in special charge. As for the headquarters, the questionnaires were distributed, then filled in, collected and sent back for evaluation. Data were statistically evaluated in Breda and Strausberg by means of the statistical survey evaluation program SPSS.

Methodologically spoken, the three surveys are harmonised parts of an accompanying longitudinal research. The gathering of the attitudes and opinions of the soldiers doing their service within the corps at three different points in time was the central aim of the research project. Because of the time stretch of five years between the first and the third survey, it was impossible to produce dependent samples in sufficient numbers, i. e. to interview the same soldiers three times. Conscripts doing their service within the corps at the time of its inauguration in 1995 already had left the armed forces at the time of the second survey in 1997. The major part of temporary-career soldiers had either been posted elsewhere during their tour of duty between 1995 and 2000 or had left the armed forces as well. Even among the career soldiers there were only a few in 2000 who had already joined the corps in 1995. This means that it was impossible to assess the attitudes and opinions of individual soldiers or identified groups over a period of time. The survey findings had to be compared and interpreted at aggregated levels of analysis across the three survey cycles.

### **3 The presentation of the results**

Since results and findings of the first and the second survey have already been represented in detail (Klein et al. 1999), this report only focuses on the third survey carried out in 2000 and compares results with those of the years 1995 and 1997. For publication, the form of a reader instead of a common final conclusive report was chosen, i. e. separate chapters dealing with one topic only and every chapter written by one or two authors at the most.

This way of proceeding ensured that the topics could be dealt with separately, effectively, efficiently and without necessity for frequent working sessions requiring the assembly of the entire working group. The fact that some chapters are composed by one Dutch and one German researcher, by just one Dutchman or one German, or by two Dutch authors provides the possibility to acquaint the reader with both national and bi-national points of view. The described manner of publication unfortunately has the disadvantage that overlap could not be avoided entirely.

Taking the assumptions mentioned before as a starting point, René Moelker and Joseph Soeters from the RNLMA deal with the question whether increasing contacts between the soldiers of both nations lead to a decrease in national stereotypes and to an increase in mutual sympathy. They find that the ideas and conceptions of each other grow closer and that mutual sympathy has been growing. In one of his three contributions, Ulrich vom Hagen from the SOWI, points out that these findings also apply to the evaluation of service within the corps. In another chapter, he deals with the acceptance of the corps by its soldiers and ascertains that a majority certainly perceives bi-national cooperation as positive – but per rank and nationality, attitudes have changed in a very different way over the three survey cycles. Looking at the two military cultures, Hagen finally finds out that there are differences between German and Dutch soldiers in their way of thinking about the role of the human being within the organisation.

The influence of the garrisons Münster and Eibergen on the attitudes of the soldiers deployed there is examined by René Moelker and

Ulrich vom Hagen. They verify that deploying Dutch and German soldiers abroad does not only improve language skills, but also increases the sympathy for the host country. In a further chapter, both authors deal with the attitudes of corps soldiers towards military mergers in Europe and demonstrate that the initial opinion of the majority is that 1 (GE/NL) Corps would constitute a step towards a European military and they demonstrate that the initial opinion of the majority that the 1 (GE/NL) Corps would constitute a step towards a European military meanwhile, in 2000, is held only by a minority.

Paul Klein from the SOWI deals with the questions concerning the different force structures, servicewomen in both armed forces, and affiliations of German and Dutch military units with units belonging to 1 (GE/NL) Corps. His upshot is that the Dutch transition towards all-volunteer armed forces and the far-reaching opening of the armed forces to women certainly is not supported unanimously in both countries but that the duty routine is only marginally affected by this fact. With respect to the affiliations, he shows that they contribute to a better mutual understanding. Joseph Soeters and René Moelker, from the RNLMA add an update to the survey. Their chapter investigates the co-operation in Münster and Kabul in the year 2003. Their aim is to examine collaboration when it is put to the test in a deployment situation and in the Münster headquarters. In the final chapter René Moelker and Joseph Soeters are drawing conclusions.

Last but not least, the authors would like to thank all the people who helped to make this project possible, the respondents who filled in the questionnaire, the points of contact at the personnel departments who distributed the questionnaires and drs. Geertjan de Boer and drs. Wouter van de Ridder, translators from 1 (GE/NL) Corps, who brushed up the English.

# Sympathy, Stereotypes and the Contact Hypothesis

*René Moelker and Joseph Soeters*

## 1 Introduction

In 1995, the First German-Netherlands Corps was established as a result of political processes that began with the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. This event stimulated many European countries to claim a 'peace dividend', i. e. to cut down the military expenditures and to restructure the armed forces. In this line of reasoning, Germany and the Netherlands decided to join forces and form a bi-national army corps. In this way, the countries intended to comply with policies to downsize the organisation while at the same time maintaining and enhancing the quality and sustainability of military capacities.

The formation of 1 (GE/NL) Corps is not a coincidence: Germany and the Netherlands are neighbouring countries with ample experience gained from military co-operation within NATO during some fifty years. Besides, the German and the Dutch national cultures are quite similar in many ways. However, this German-Dutch military co-operation is sometimes disputed. Some high-ranking Dutch officers would prefer a closer co-operation with the United Kingdom. And about some years ago the Dutch labour party proposed to disband 1 (GE/NL) Corps, but this proposal was not taken too seriously in Dutch politics. It was a signal of something, though.

The problem is that many, mostly young, Dutchmen seem to have a somewhat negative image of Germans, an image that certainly may act as a barrier to fruitful collaboration between the two countries. An example from civilian life may illustrate this. In a TV advertisement, a German was asking how to find a museum in Amsterdam. The answer given by some Dutchmen on the street was clear: 'left, right, right again, und dann immer gerade aus (straight forward)'. Following these instructions, the German tourist found himself standing with both feet in the North Sea. Several Dutchmen filed an official complaint and the

advertisement was taken off the air because of its discriminatory character. This happened in the spring of the year 2000.

One may argue that jokes about neighbouring countries are common. One can think of the Canadians and the Americans, the Scots and the English, the Dutch and the Belgians. But attitudes towards the Germans in the Netherlands were generally quite negative, much more than towards other nationalities. At least, that is what research findings by the prestigious Clingendael Institute (Jansen 1993) would have us believe. This research, which received quite some publicity, stated that the Dutch youngsters are not as tolerant (especially towards Germans) as they themselves think they are. Positive stereotypes towards the Germans relate to disciplined and orderly behaviour. The more frequent negative stereotypes, however, referred to items such as: 'the Germans think that they own Europe', and 'the Germans are proud that everything in their country is bigger and better'. From various sources<sup>1</sup>, it is known that the Germans are more often positive towards the Dutch. Germans think the Dutch are more open and flexible. Among the Germans there are, however, negative stereotypes towards the Dutch as well, such as: 'In traffic the Dutch are a disaster' and 'the Dutch are self-righteous'.

A basic condition for successful military collaboration between two nations is mutual friendliness and open-mindedness. At the time 1 (GE/NL) Corps was founded, there were reasonable doubts that the general climate was that friendly. This situation provided ample reason to monitor the formation and the development of this bi-national corps on the basis of sound social research. In 1996, Klein, Rosendahl Huber, and Soeters published first results. The findings indicated that feelings of sympathy among the Dutch and German military were better than could be expected on the basis of the report of the Clingendael Institute. Consequently, there was room for some optimism on the basis of this first study. A second survey followed in 1997. The findings of this survey, however, gave rise to some concern. The results indicated that the two-year-old collaboration did not result in a higher percentage of Dutch liking the Germans, something that one

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<sup>1</sup> Cited in Jansen (1993).


could have expected as a result of prolonged contacts. Discussing this somewhat worrying result, Rosendahl Huber et al. (1999) argued that more time and prolonged contacts were necessary to really get to know each other and to appreciate the colleagues of the other nationality. This argument was based on the so-called acculturation-hypothesis.<sup>2</sup>

Following this hypothesis, the first stage of collaboration between 'strange' parties is characterised by high expectations that may result in feelings of mutual sympathy and even some kind of excitement and euphoria. In the next stage, however, mutual sympathy will decrease because both parties increasingly see each other's weaknesses and problems. This may even result in what is commonly known as a 'culture shock'. During the following acculturation phase, routinisation and normalisation will return. Positive and negative experiences are being balanced and finally (in phase four) come to a new equilibrium. This new equilibrium, however, is seldom higher than during the first phase of euphoria. In general, one could say, this acculturation curve is a specification of the contact hypothesis: the more contacts people have with one another, the more they will start liking each other. Applying this acculturation curve to 1 (GE/NL) Corps, the authors expected that five years after the foundation sympathetic feelings would be higher than in 1997 because of this contact hypothesis: the more military personnel from both nations work and live together, the more they will like each other.

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<sup>2</sup> See figure 1, Hofstede (1991).

Figure 1: The acculturation curve



The three surveys among German and Dutch military supported these expectations. In 1995, 1997, and 2000 over forty per cent of respondents expected stereotypes and prejudices to diminish because of mutual daily contacts in 1 (GE/NL) Corps staff units.<sup>3</sup> Military in higher ranks were even more optimistic than those in lower ranks. So, the contact hypothesis was not only a concept in the head of the researchers, but the idea was very much part of the expectations of the military themselves.

<sup>3</sup> See table 1.



Table 1: Expectation that stereotypes and prejudices will fade away because of GE and NL military working together (answers in per cent)

	<b>1995</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>Total</b>
Yes, to a great degree	44	39	42	41
Yes, but only to a modest degree	40	44	43	43
No, nothing will change	13	12	12	12
No, prejudice will grow stronger	3	5	3	4
<b>N</b>	<b>1475</b>	<b>1252</b>	<b>1444</b>	<b>4171</b>

Sign. Chi-sq: P = .019

This chapter will provide an in-depth analysis of the contact hypothesis by analysing the data of the three surveys of 1995, 1997, and 2000. Some notes on theory and recent findings as well as some methodological information precede the presentation of our empirical findings. In the first empirical section, we will examine the mutual (stereotypical) images of German and Dutch military. The central question in this section, consequently, refers to the image Germans and Dutch military have of each other. After answering this question, we will try to find an answer to the question whether contacts between people of two nationalities working closely together will result in a higher percentage of people liking each other. The chapter ends with a concluding section.

## 2 Some theoretical notions on stereotypes

Stereotypes are closely connected to prejudice and discrimination, but they are not the same (Soeters 1997). According to the seminal work of Gordon Allport (1954), 'prejudice is antipathy based on a faulty and inflexible generalisation. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed towards a group or towards an individual because he (or she) is a member of that group'. Stereotypes are generalising attitudes of a group of people concerning another group of persons that apply to all members of that group. This generalisation does not necessarily have to be negative. There are many positive stereotypes. As already mentioned: it is a common idea in Dutch society that the Germans are correct, reliable and thorough in their work. Stereotypes make the world understandable by simplification and by this simplification they make it easier for people to act. This is a positive function of stereotypes. However, if negatively oriented and taken to the extreme, generalisations can result in negative consequences such as discrimination on the basis of race, religion, gender or sexual preference. There are three important theories on inter-group-relations that are relevant to the topic of stereotypes (van Oudenhoven 2000a).

The *social identity theory*<sup>4</sup> states that people in a group want to feel good about themselves by making favourable comparisons with another group of people. This concept explains why members of the in-group are evaluated more positive than the members of the out-group.<sup>5</sup> In addition, *attribution theory* states that good things, good achievements, or good character properties are ascribed to the in-group, whereas evil, wrong or bad things are ascribed to the out-group. In this theory, individuals are clearly looking for a kind of scapegoat to put the blame on, so that they themselves will have a positive appearance. As Merton's famous saying goes: 'the in-group's virtues are the out-groups vices'. From various studies it is known that when people behave in this manner, they will make the self-fulfilling prophecy work.<sup>6</sup> The relevance of the theory is that it can be used in a positive manner

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<sup>4</sup> Also Festinger's *social comparison theory*.

<sup>5</sup> See also: Merton's *reference group theory*, 1968.

<sup>6</sup> E. g. when white teachers consider black students to be lazy and unintelligent, these students will not perform as well as they would be doing otherwise.

when positive characteristics are ascribed to people from different nationalities in situations where co-operation is necessary.

The *contact hypothesis* was put forward by Allport (1954) in his classical text 'The Nature of Prejudice'. He states that contact between two different groups will result in sympathetic feelings and less negative stereotyping. But this will not occur unconditionally. For example: policy makers in the USA attempted to promote mutual understanding between the races by transporting black and white students to school together in buses. Contrary to what was expected, achievements of the black students did not improve, racial tensions augmented and black self-esteem lowered. The reason was that the 'busing project' did not meet the conditions that were formulated by Allport in 1954:

There has to be a climate of co-operation and a feeling of interdependency, which means that the groups need to have common goals.

- Contacts should be based on equal status; there should not be one group that is considered to be more important than the other.
- It is necessary that people have room for getting to know each other personally.
- Authorities, i. e. higher status people such as teachers, managers, commanders or politicians, should support contacts.

In the case of 1 (GE/NL) Corps, these conditions have been met from the early start in 1995 onwards. Germans and Dutch are equal partners in this project. Command positions are equally balanced and are rotated between the two nations every three years. The two national armed forces have several goals in common, which are defence-related as well as political (towards political co-operation and eventually perhaps even towards an integrated European army). People within 1 (GE/NL) Corps units in Münster and Eibergen know each other on a personal basis and even spend their leisure time together. The German-Netherlands collaboration in general is strongly supported by authorities from both countries. Following the theory, it may therefore be expected that the Dutch and the Germans will increasingly get to

like each other because of the regular and long standing contacts within 1 (GE/NL) Corps units.

### **3 Recent findings from other studies**

As mentioned previously, the Clingendael Institute published a report on the attitudes of Dutch youths towards the Germans (Jansen 1993). No less than fifty-six per cent of the respondents in this study showed a negative attitude towards the Germans. The report, however, was not undisputed. Firstly, it was criticised because of the unfortunate time of data collection. The data were collected soon after an extremist assault on Turkish minorities and refugees had taken place in Germany. Secondly, because of its focus on youths, no comparison was made with older generations. Without a comparison-group one does not have a contrast-group and this leaves us with knowledge that is limited in its use. And thirdly, during the data collection that had taken place at schools, the study had been presented as specifically focussing on Germans; this may have caused serious bias among the young respondents.

The recently published study by van Oudenhoven (2000b) does not have the aforementioned flaws as it was based on an a-select sample of the Dutch population. In 1994, 1728 Dutch people filled in the questionnaire of this study. In 1996, this research was replicated with 2389 persons. All age groups were included. The findings of this study show that the Dutch do not dislike the Germans at all. The report of the Clingendael Institute seems to have produced rather exaggerated and flawed results. Regarding the extent to which the Dutch have sympathetic feelings towards the Germans, the new study shows that the Germans occupy a position in between other bigger countries such as France, Italy, the United States and the United Kingdom. The French and the Italians are less popular than the Germans. Comparatively speaking, the position of Germany is average.

Granted, quite a few Dutchmen score Germany at the bottom end of the sympathy scale, but at the same time there is an only slightly smaller group that appreciates the Germans to a high degree and that

perceives a large degree of similarity between these two nations. Apparently, there is a division in the Netherlands between those who like and those who dislike the Germans. When we consider other nations like France or Italy, there is more agreement in the opinions of the Dutch. If Dutchmen have concrete contacts with Germans, they indicate that they are quite content with these interactions. Hence, if concrete interactions between Germans and the Dutch indeed do take place, the situation is evaluated positive and contacts between members of the two nations are mostly pleasant. But when it comes down to general opinions not based on concrete interaction, the situation is different. It then looks like as if there were a tacit norm not permitting someone to express positive feelings about Germans. Another major finding is that there is no significant difference between the various age groups. The sympathy scores of the older generations are not really different from those of the younger generations. The younger generations more frequently adhere to the opinion that the Germans and the Dutch are alike than the older generations do. This is an indication that history (World War II) is not such a big barrier in the mind of the younger generation anymore.

In van Oudenhoven's research, smaller countries like Belgium and Denmark score considerably higher on the sympathy scale. Seen through Dutch eyes, the most popular country is Belgium. Bigger countries such as Germany are perceived to be more threatening, for which reason smaller countries are seen as more sympathetic. Demographically, economically and politically, the Germans are stronger. The advantage of scale is apparent in the national sport of soccer, where the Germans prove to be strongest in many cases. The threat is perceived as being greater because of cultural and linguistic similarity. Cultural and linguistic similarity is also the reason why the Flemish (Dutch-speaking Belgians) consider the Dutch as more arrogant than the French-speaking Belgians do. To the (Flemish-speaking) Belgians, the Dutch are the bigger and threatening country. Hence, the Dutch are the Germans of the Belgians. Regarding Germany, the social-psychological factor sometimes described as the BIG-SISTER-syndrome may explain why (some) Dutch people develop negative stereotypes and prejudices towards the Germans. By means of stereo-

types and prejudices, the Dutch can compensate for their feelings of inferiority while developing some sort of moral superiority.

However, the replication of the 1994-study in 1996 showed a more positive attitude among the Dutch towards the Germans. The Dutch are gradually displaying a more sympathetic attitude towards the Germans. In addition, the number of Dutchmen preferring to live in Germany is growing. This finding is important with regard to the attitudes of German and Dutch military working for the First German-Netherlands Corps. Are German and Dutch soldiers also becoming more sympathetic towards each other? If so, this development may be favourable to the project of collaboration between the armies of the two nations.

#### **4 Sample size, weighting procedures and sampling method**

1499, 1305, and 1111 military personnel respectively participated in the surveys in 1995, 1997, and 2000. The total study therefore comprises 3915 cases. Of this total sample, 2177 respondents were Germans whereas 1738 were Dutch. As can be seen from table 2 324 German military in the sample worked in a bi-national headquarters over these three years. Among the Dutch respondents, 376 military worked in one of the two integrated units. The distinction between respondents in integrated bi-national units and those outside these units is vital to the contact hypothesis because, as mentioned earlier, the people in integrated staff-units have contact with the people of the other nation on a day-to-day basis.

As mentioned earlier, the sample size is 3915. But in table 2, the N is 4096. These numbers were the result of a weighting procedure. In the year 2000, the Dutch part of the study only succeeded in sampling 199 Dutch respondents that were not working in an integrated bi-national headquarters. This number was considerably lower than was the case in the surveys in 1995 and 1997. To have sample sizes large enough to test the contact hypothesis, we needed to have cells of about the same size as in 1995 and 1997. That is the reason why a weighting procedure has been applied in all analyses. This weighting procedure

consists of a multiplication of the original cell sample size of 199 with a factor three, producing a cell sample size of 597.<sup>7</sup> Because of this weighting procedure, the analyses seem to be based on a larger sample size, but in fact this is only artificial. All analyses in this chapter are based on the corrected (weighted) data file<sup>8</sup>.

The sampling method deserves some attention: we used a stratified sample. We approached persons within a certain number of military units and tasked these ‘contact persons’ to have the questionnaire filled in by as many people as possible. This method of sampling resulted in a fairly low non-response rate. In the year 2000 only approximately 50 per cent of the military contacted did in fact participate.

Table 2: ‘Are you working in an integrated (bi-national) staff?’\*

<b>Nation</b>		<b>1995</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>Total</b>
Germany	Bi-national staff	111	91	122	324
	Not in bi-national staff	690	449	591	1730
Netherlands	Bi-national staff	135	114	127	376
	Not in bi-national staff	478	591	<b>597</b>	1666
	N	1414	1245	1437	4096

\* Has been applied with regard to the cell sample size in bold print, the original cell sample size being 199.

<sup>7</sup> See table 2, in bold print.

<sup>8</sup> As a matter of fact, the weighting procedure was a necessary scientific correction, but it did not change the interpretation of the outcomes. The results of the unweighted analyses lead to exactly the same conclusions as the results of the weighted analyses.

## **5 The image of the comrades of the other nation**

Generally, it seems better to speak of images even when there is an explicit relation with certain stereotypes. The concept of 'image' is simply more neutral. Images only become stereotypes when they are connected with positive or negative connotations that influence the way people think about and interact with each other. In the questionnaire, several characteristics were used as items. Respondents could give a mark from 1 to 10 indicating the extent to which each characteristic was applicable to respectively the German soldiers and the Dutch soldiers. In this way, Dutch military respondents could rate the characteristic of 'reliability' and indicate to what extent this characteristic applies to the Germans. German military personnel gave marks to the Dutch soldiers in the same manner. This method makes it possible to draw a picture of what German soldiers think of the Dutch soldiers and vice versa. The marks on the characteristics were averaged and displayed in the figures below. In the questionnaires of 1995, the items were measured in a different way and therefore they have not been included in the analysis. Only 1997 and 2000 are compared.



Figure 2: Comparison between the two nations regarding xeno-image in 1997 and in 2000





Figure 3: Comparison between 1997 and 2000 concerning the xeno-image



It is surprising that most of the images with negative connotations are neither subscribed to by German soldiers nor by Dutch soldiers (see figure 2). The differences in averages of the negative characteristics are only small. The Dutch and the German military do not think of each other in terms of being boneless or reckless. It is also difficult to differentiate between German soldiers and Dutch soldiers on the ground of certain positive images. The Dutch and the German soldiers think of each other as about equally courageous, tough, prepared, temperamental and industrious. Germans see the Dutch as competent soldiers and the Dutch soldiers likewise appreciate the German soldiers. The differences in averages are small.

However, there are differences as to other characteristics. The Dutch soldiers perceive the Germans as being reliable: in 2000, the average score regarding this characteristic is somewhat higher than the German evaluation of the Dutch soldiers. The same goes for the sense of duty, which is a characteristic that is ascribed to the German soldiers more by the Dutch soldiers than to Dutch soldiers by the German soldiers. A major difference in averages can be seen when looking at the characteristic of independence. The average score on independence is low for German soldiers, which implies that the Dutch soldiers perceive the German soldiers to be rather dependent. The German soldiers, on the contrary, deem Dutch soldiers to be rather independent. Perhaps this difference can be explained by different decision-making cultures: whereas the Dutch soldiers are rather used to taking decisions themselves (also on the lower levels), the German soldiers seem to have to ask for permission more frequently.

The most striking difference refers to forms of interaction. Both German and Dutch soldiers seem to agree on these differences for they are mirror images. The Dutch soldiers perceive German soldiers as being stiff or surly, whereas the German soldiers rate the degree of sociability of the Dutch soldiers very high. German soldiers do not think of Dutch soldiers as being stiff or surly at all and consider their Dutch colleagues to be rather comradely. The Dutch image of the sociability of the German soldiers is considerably lower and they are considered to be less comradely. These differences may play an important role in the formal and informal codes of conduct in the integrated headquar-

ters because it – apparently – seems to be important to know whether one is dealing with a German or a Dutch soldier.


The development during the period of time in figure 3 is interesting as well. Here, data are the same, but they are presented in a different manner. In the upper part of figure 3, you can see the differences between the German image of the Dutch soldiers in 1997 and 2000. In the lower part of figure 3 the differences in the Dutch image of the German soldiers in 1997 and 2000 are depicted. It can be noted that the German image of the Dutch soldiers is almost completely stable; it has hardly changed in three years' time. The Dutch image of the German soldiers, however, has changed considerably and in a positive direction (mostly)! It has changed favourably regarding the scores on courageousness, reliability, sense of duty, preparedness, industriousness, independence, sociability, and competence.

In general, the mutual images of the Dutch and the German military are fairly positive: they seem to hold their neighbours in high regard when it comes to being a professional soldier. The most striking difference concerns the dimension of formal versus informal codes of conduct (the Dutch being the informal ones).

## **6 Changes in attitudes and feelings of sympathy towards the other nation**

Figure 4 is very informative with respect to the general evolution towards higher levels of sympathy. The general trend is upward. When the categories 'very sympathetic' and 'sympathetic' are combined, it can be concluded that the acculturation hypothesis has become true. In 1995, 42 per cent of the respondents were sympathetic towards the people of the other nation. In 1997, this percentage had fallen to 41 per cent. The percentages of the Dutch soldiers feeling sympathetic to the German people showed a much steeper decline. The year 2000 turns out favourably, with a rise to 55 per cent. How is it possible that this change for the better has occurred?

Figure 4: How sympathetic are the Germans resp. Dutch to you?  
(answers in per cent)



Sign. Chi-sq: P = 0,000

As mentioned earlier, the hypothesis is that contacts will lead to a higher percentage of military with sympathetic feelings towards the people of the other nation. But there are also other correlates of ‘sympathy’ that have to be taken into account. Before putting the contact hypothesis to the test by using multivariate methods, several variables will be presented in a more traditional manner by means of bi-variate cross tabulation analysis.

From earlier publications by Klein, Rosendahl Huber and Frantz (1999) it is known that sympathetic feelings correlate with rank and nation. It evolved that the higher the rank of the military, the higher the feelings of sympathy towards the other party are. With regard to nation, the Germans showed more positive attitudes towards the Dutch whereas the Dutch were negative more often. In the 2000-survey, these findings were replicated as can be seen in table 3. This table particularly shows that Dutch judgements have changed quite a bit.

The German military show remarkable stability in their attitude towards the Dutch. They were highly sympathetic towards the Dutch from the very start of 1 (GE/NL) Corps and still are! German soldiers did not think unfavourable of the Dutch at all in 1995 (46 per cent liked the Dutch) and their positive feelings even grew over the years. In 2000, 56 per cent liked their colleagues from the Netherlands. German NCOs were and remained very sympathetic towards the Dutch (60 per cent in 1995, 69 per cent in 2000). This attitude is comparable to that of their fellow countrymen on CO-level (65 per cent in 1995, 69 per cent in 2000).

Dutch attitudes towards the Germans have been developing favourably. This is true for all ranks. In 1995, Dutch soldiers started out with a quite negative attitude about their neighbouring colleagues: only 20 per cent of them displayed sympathetic feelings for the Germans whereas almost 30 per cent expressed negative feelings. In 2000, the situation had improved considerably with 36 per cent of the Dutch respondents liking the Germans. When looking at the attitudes of the NCOs, the conclusion again has to be that these are much more positive than five years before (from 25 per cent in 1995 to 37 per cent in 2000 feeling sympathetic towards Germans). Right from the beginning, Dutch officers were most positive with 44 per cent expressing feelings of sympathy towards Germans in 1995. In 2000, the attitude of Dutch officers is comparable to that of their German colleagues. No less than 62 per cent of them expressed feelings of sympathy towards the Germans in that year.

The asterisks in table 3, indicating a significant Chi-square statistic, can be interpreted as an indicator of change. Where asterisks are shown, a significant positive change has taken place. Where the symbol 'NS' (not significant) appears in the column, there is no change at all: the opinions have remained stable over the years.

Table 3: 'Do you find the Germans/Dutch sympathetic?' (in per cent)

Rank	Nation	1995	1997	2000	Total	Sign. Chi-sq
<b>Soldiers</b>	<b>Germany</b>					
	Sympathetic	46	58	56	52	**
	Neutral	39	31	35	36	
	Unsympathetic	15	11	9	12	
	N	424 (100%)	249 (100%)	333 (100%)	1006 (100%)	
	<b>Netherlands</b>					
	Sympathetic	20	18	36	21	**
	Neutral	51	59	34	52	
	Unsympathetic	29	23	30	27	
	N	173 (100%)	189 (100%)	64 (100%)	426 (100%)	
<b>NCOs</b>	<b>Germany</b>					
	Sympathetic	60	66	69	65	ns
	Neutral	31	28	26	28	
	Unsympathetic	9	6	5	7	
	N	244 (100%)	155 (100%)	212 (100%)	611 (100%)	
	<b>Netherlands</b>					
	Sympathetic	25	25	37	29	**
	Neutral	58	58	58	58	
	Unsympathetic	17	17	5	13	
	N	306 (100%)	322 (100%)	359 (100%)	987 (100%)	

Rank	Nation	1995	1997	2000	Total	Sign. Chi-sq
Officers	<b>Germany</b>					
	sympathetic	65	71	69	68	ns
	neutral	29	26	26	27	
	unsympathetic	6	3	5	5	
	N	132 (100%)	116 (100%)	150 (100%)	398 (100%)	
	<b>Netherlands</b>					
	sympathetic	44	33	62	49	**
	neutral	44	60	34	44	
	unsympathetic	12	7	4	7	
	N	169 (100%)	188 (100%)	281 (100%)	638 (100%)	

\*\* Sign. Chi-sq:  $P < .01$ ; ns = not significant

The contact hypothesis can be tested by means of several variables included in the survey, e. g.:

- The number of contacts the military of the two nations have with each other,
- the question whether soldiers, NCOs and officers spend their leisure time together,
- the contacts between Germans and the Dutch during deployment in peacekeeping missions (Kosovo in particular and Bosnia), and
- the contacts resulting from working together in a bi-national headquarters.

First of all, it can be observed that the frequency of contacts between Dutch and German military is clearly increasing. In 1995, we asked whether German and Dutch personnel expected that the frequency of contacts would rise. In 1997 and 2000 the question was rephrased; the new question related to the actual frequency of contacts between the military. Due to the incomparability of these questions, only findings of 1997 and 2000 can be compared. In 1997, 7 per cent of the military



indicated that contacts with the military of the other nation were very frequent. In 2000, this percentage had risen to 11 per cent. 15 per cent had many contacts in 1997. In 2000, 22 per cent of the military indicated that contacts were frequent. The percentage that only had sparse or no contact at all declined from 78 per cent in 1997 to 67 per cent in 2000. There is a strong correlation between the frequency of contact and rank. The higher the rank, the more persons have to do business with military of the other nation to co-ordinate their work (see appendix 1, table B).

Another indicator of the degree of interaction between Germans and the Dutch is the question whether Germans and the Dutch spend their leisure time together. In 1997, 5 per cent of all respondents did meet members of the other nation after hours on a regular basis. In 2000, this percentage had increased to 9. In 1997, 23 per cent of the respondents did have contacts in their leisure time but these were relatively scarce. In 2000, this percentage had risen to 27 per cent. Of all respondents, 72 per cent had no contact at all in 1997. In 2000, considerably less people – i. e. 64 per cent of the respondents – had no contact at all with members of the other nation's army. Not surprisingly the frequency of contacts again varies according to rank. The higher the rank, the higher the chances that the military are likely to interact after hours.

It is not long ago that German soldiers were not deployed in principle. Because the situation has changed and German soldiers were deployed recently, the last survey made it possible to find out whether German and Dutch military had been working together during deployment. In 2000, 347 respondents indicated that they had been deployed. Of these persons, 147 (42 per cent) had worked together with military from the other nation. Using the weighing procedure as we did in all analyses, we found 257 respondents who had actually worked together (see appendix 1, table C).

## 7 Testing the contact hypothesis

The contact hypothesis was tested by means of a regression analysis. The dependent variable was of course the question ‘how sympathetic are you towards the German/Dutch military?’ As independent variables in the regression, the variables discussed above (number of contacts, contacts after hours, nation, working at an integrated headquarters, rank) were used in the regression equation; the results can be found in table 4.

Table 4: How sympathetic are you towards the Germans/Dutch (regression equation)

	<b>B</b>	<b>BETA</b>
(Constant)	1,190**	
Number of contacts	,184	,214**
Contacts after hours	,192	,154**
Nation	,561	,340**
Working at integrated HQ?	-,165	-,079**
Rank	-,110	-,105**
<b>N</b>		<b>2201</b>
<b>Adj R<sup>2</sup></b>		<b>0,18</b>

\*\* Sign. t  $P < 0.01$

The regression technique is valuable because it allows for the statistical control of the effects of intervening factors such as ‘nation’ and ‘rank’. In the equations, the data of 1997 and 2000 are combined. We already concluded that ‘nation’ and ‘rank’ correlate with the dependent variable. Therefore, it is necessary to assess the effect of the ‘number of contacts’ – controlled for the impact of these variables – in order to test the contact hypothesis. The strongest effect on ‘sympathy’ comes from the variable ‘nation’. This means that ‘nation’ is the most important variable in predicting a military’s score on sympathy. When a military is of German origin, his or her score on ‘sympathy towards the other party’ will most likely be higher. This we already found earlier. The effect of ‘rank’ has decreased in the regression analysis. When the other variables are taken into account, rank plays a relatively smaller role. Most important for the contact hypo-

thesis are the significant values for the regression coefficients for 'number of contacts' and 'contacts after hours'. These significant values support the contact hypothesis. Again, it is the regression technique of controlling for the other variables that causes the effect of 'working in an integrated staff' to become relatively small. The regression equation for 'sympathy' all in all has a reasonably high explained percentage of variance of 18 per cent.

The diminished effect of 'working in an integrated staff' is intriguing. That is why we delved deeper into this variable's impact. On the basis of regression analyses not reported here, we received the impression that there is an interaction effect between 'nation' and 'working in an integrated staff'. The interaction effect also becomes visible when looking at the variable 'Did your experiences in 1 (GE/NL) Corps lead to a change in opinion on the Germans/Dutch military?' in a cross-table analysis (table 5). When people work together in an integrated staff, contacts are so frequent that one would expect effects on the dependent variable, but the effect on the Germans and the Dutch working in the same integrated headquarters is different. The Germans working in integrated staff show considerably more change in a positive direction than the Dutch do. The bold-printed figures in table 5 indicate that the Germans have changed favourably because of their experiences in the integrated bi-national staff. However, this kind of change does not occur among the Dutch. Maybe this interaction effect points to a differentiated effect of the contact hypothesis. The contact hypothesis holds for both the Germans and the Dutch. The effect and the amount of change as a result of the contact hypothesis, however, seem to be stronger and bigger whereas the Germans are concerned. In the conclusion we will try to interpret this puzzling finding.

Table 5: Did your experiences in 1 (GE/NL) Corps lead to a change in opinion on the Germans/Dutch? (in per cent)

Bi-national staff?	year		Germany	Netherlands	Total	Sign. Chi-sq
Bi-national staff	1997	More positive	42	15	27	**
		Not changed	50	71	62	
		More negative	8	14	11	
		N	84 (100%)	103 (100%)	187 (100%)	
	2000	More positive	52	25	38	**
		Not changed	40	68	55	
		More negative	8	7	7	
		N	116 (100%)	124 (100%)	240 (100%)	
Not in bi-national Staff	1997	More positive	20	8	13	**
		Not changed	79	88	84	
		More negative	1	4	3	
		N	249 (100%)	427 (100%)	676 (100%)	
	2000	More positive	17	19	18	ns
		Not changed	81	80	8	
		More negative	2	1	2	
		N	290 (100%)	516 (100%)	806 (100%)	

\*\* Sign. Chi-sq:  $P < 0.01$ ; ns = not significant

The contact hypothesis is also interesting because of the growing importance of peace support operations. While we conducted the third part of our study (in 2000), Dutch and German units of 1 (GE/NL) Corps worked together in an area of responsibility in Kosovo (KFOR). Actually, a Dutch battalion including a German company was deployed under supervision of a German brigade. The situation in Bosnia (SFOR) was similar, although collaboration between the Germans and the Dutch was less extensive. From the regression equation in table 6 (only data of 2000) it becomes apparent that contacts between Germans and the Dutch during these peacekeeping deployments have

strengthened mutual appreciation and indeed have contributed to the enhancement of feelings of sympathy towards one another.

Table 6: How sympathetic are you towards the GE/NL (regression equation)

	<b>B</b>	<b>Beta</b>
(Constant)	1,062	
Number of contacts	,166	,207**
Contacts after hours	,172	,149**
Nation	,463	,305**
Working in integrated staff?	-,182	-,091**
Rank	-,111	-,112**
Working together during deployments?	,197	,100**
<b>N</b>		<b>1352</b>
<b>Adj. R<sup>2</sup></b>		<b>0,14</b>

\* Sign. t P < 0.05 \*\* Sign. t P < 0.01; ns = not significant

## 8 Conclusion

In the earlier surveys on 1 (GE/NL) Corps, the findings did not give us cause for much optimism, at least not from the Dutch perspective. The Dutch military in general had a fairly negative image of the Germans and were not feeling sympathetic towards them. What is more, the ‘healing’ effects of the contact hypothesis could not be established after a period of two years of German-Dutch collaboration. In sharp contrast to the Dutch attitude, the attitude of the Germans towards the Dutch has been favourable from the start of 1 (GE/NL) Corps on.

However, after five years of collaboration the mutual appreciation has increased considerably. In 2000, the military of both nations seem to hold their colleagues from the other side in high esteem when it comes to being a professional soldier. The Dutch have changed the most in this connection. In 2000 there are only small differences between the images of the neighbour. The most striking difference still concerns

the dimension of formal versus informal codes of conduct (the Dutch being the informal ones).

With respect to the question whether the military from the two nations like each other, the same pattern of stability for the Germans and positive change for the Dutch occurs. The acculturation curve, which is a specific form of the contact hypothesis stating that positive attitudes will evolve in time, proved to become reality. In 1995, 42 per cent of the respondents (German and Dutch) were sympathetic towards the military personnel of the other nationality. In 1997, this percentage remained more or less stable (41 per cent), but it fell sharply among the Dutch. The year 2000, however, turns out favourably, with a general rise to 55 per cent. Regression analysis demonstrated a correlation between the contacts the military have and the dependent variable 'sympathy'. This finding unequivocally supports the contact hypothesis.

Remarkably, however, there is an interaction effect between 'nation' and 'working in an integrated staff'. With respect to the integrated headquarters it became clear that the contact hypothesis has a stronger effect on Germans than it has on the Dutch. The higher contact frequency in corps units makes Germans within these units like the Dutch even more than the German military outside the integrated headquarters do. As far as the Dutch in these units are concerned, this correlation between contact intensity and sympathetic feelings is weaker.

Viewing the findings from a slightly different perspective may help interpreting the puzzling outcomes.

We assumed in our study that contacts would lead to liking, but the study did not take the changes in Dutch society into account. The changes in Dutch society may account for the puzzling interaction effects we reported in this chapter. Van Oudenhoven's study (2000a and 2000b) demonstrates that Dutch society as a whole has developed a more favourable opinion about the Germans. The Dutch population in general has come to like the Germans better than seven or eight years ago! The positive change for Dutch military inside and outside

the integrated headquarters and units could easily be a reflection of this change in Dutch society at large. This general societal change would explain the interaction effects found in our data. It explains why the contact hypothesis does not have such a strong effect on the Dutch military in the integrated corps units as it does on the German military within 1 (GE/NL) Corps.

What can we learn from this analysis when it comes to the topic of attitude change and improvement of intercultural relations between the German and the Dutch military? The first lesson of course is to continue the policy of having integrated units commanding the two divisions. The study shows that integration is successful when improving working relations is the objective! This is of high importance since good working relations are inevitable when striving for an integrated army delivering outstanding achievements! And outstanding achievements are required these days. Headquarters 1 (GE/NL) Corps, being awarded the status of 'High Readiness Headquarters', has been selected to command the ISAF-operation in Afghanistan, near Kabul, as of February 2003. In that area, strange to all westerners, 1 (GE/NL) Corps has to show that it is fit to perform to the 'max'.

But this improvement of the quality of inter-group relations was (and is) only possible because of the fulfilment of the conditions for integration as mentioned by Gordon Allport (1954):

- Common goals and ambitions;
- equal status;
- personal contacts on day-to-day basis, and
- integration supported by the authorities.

So the second lesson is that when the objective is to develop 1 (GE/NL) Corps into the direction of more integrated divisions, the experiment of integration at corps unit level should be expanded to more units. The policy of integration could be carried further in order to realise forms of deepened integration even down to the level of mixed companies and platoons. In Kosovo, such experiments have been evaluated rather positively on both sides. More of these experi-

ments will be carried out near Kabul and undoubtedly more lessons will be learned (see the later chapter in this report by Soeters and Moelker).

The third lesson is coupled to social psychological theory. The research shows that there are possibilities to lessen inter-group differences (which find their cause in the need to belong to a certain group) by using the attribution theory. In common language, this means that the positive images of the Dutch and the Germans of the other nation can contribute to a better understanding! The findings show that main characteristics of the military profession are all positive. With regard to characteristics such as 'courageousness', 'reliability', 'preparedness', and 'competence', the differences between Dutch and German military are very small. Regarding the core characteristics of the military profession, the images are very similar, which implies that there is a common ground for mutual sympathetic feeling. These positive images can very easily be attributed to Germans and the Dutch, and serve as a basis for mutual understanding. Obviously, the Dutch and the Germans agree on the necessity to be military professionals.



## **Attitudes towards the Other Nation and Trust in the Partner within 1 (GE/NL) Corps**

*Ulrich vom Hagen*

When we want to find out about the construction of stereotypes, sympathy and their results, one can find surprising results. It often seems hard to understand how attitudes develop and why they change. The first five years of 1 (GE/NL) Corps witnessed such changes, which bear implications of high importance for the daily work and the operational functioning of the corps.

Positive and negative stereotypes play a pertinent role within the interaction between individuals from different nations. Their function seems to be to reduce the complexity of the world to a degree that is manageable for the individual. Stereotypes provide for this purpose images of other social groups, nations, etc. and claim to reflect 'reality'. Stereotypes are often deduced from the societal level to the individual level and to judgements about other individuals simply because they belong to one group or another. The contact on the individual level reinforces or changes the patterns in which the other group is judged and evaluated. Keeping this in mind, we are eager to learn from the situation within 1 (GE/NL) Corps, where soldiers from two nations are combined in order to work together in common structures. What are the expectations of and attitudes towards the soldiers from the other nation? Do soldiers trust their comrades from a neighbouring country?

In the year 2000, we examined the effect of the co-operation between German and Dutch soldiers on the reduction of stereotypes and the soldiers' attitudes towards their service together with soldiers from the other nation, it turned out that German and Dutch soldiers share the same expectations and attitudes. This might be illustrated by the case of the attitude towards service together with soldiers from the other nation.

Table 1: What is your attitude towards the fact, that you do your service in a corps together with Germans resp. Dutch?


Rank and nation	Answers in per cent								
	(Very) sympathetic			Indifferent			(Very) unsympathetic		
	1995	1997	2000	1995	1997	2000	1995	1997	2000
German rank & file	46	45	47	44	52	48	10	4	5
Dutch rank & file	38	33	35	51	64	59	10	3	6
German NCOs	70	67	67	23	30	30	7	4	3
Dutch NCOs	54	51	64	43	44	33	2	5	3
German officers	73	78	75	23	21	23	4	-	2
Dutch officers	69	64	75	29	34	23	2	2	2

Compared to the results of 1995 and 1997, we find that – at a rather higher or stable level – nearly all soldiers from both the nations have a sympathetic attitude towards serving together within 1 (GE/NL) Corps. In 2000, we find nearly equal percentages discriminated by rank groups. The only differences are found among Dutch soldiers who show lower levels of sympathetic attitudes towards serving together with Germans than German soldiers do. They are also more often indifferent<sup>1</sup>. Not only have attitudes of the Dutch NCOs and officers improved, but for the first time in the history of 1 (GE/NL) Corps, the rank category referring to NCOs and officers explains more about their attitudes than their German or Dutch passports. The percentage of Dutch soldiers who were indifferent decreased for all rank

<sup>1</sup> With respect to the sample it should be mentioned that, due to the end of conscription in the Netherlands in the year 2000, there were only 35 Dutch rank and file soldiers compared to 351 Germans. The low number for the Dutch soldiers might influence the representativeness of this result.

categories. But this has no influence on the sympathetic feelings of the Dutch soldiers towards the Germans.

46 Figure 1: Sympathy for the Dutch resp. Germans (year 2000, answers in per cent) \*



\* These data are unweighted. Because of this, there may be some negligible differences in the Dutch sample to Table 3 in the article of Moelker and Soeters.

Whilst the majority of the German soldiers find ‘the Dutch’ sympathetic or very sympathetic, the Dutch are less positive. 48 per cent of the Dutch consider Germans sympathetic or very sympathetic, while as much as 45 per cent are indifferent. The small number of soldiers who find the other nation’s population unsympathetic or even very unsympathetic is, on average, the same for Dutch and German soldiers. But the percentages for the Dutch rank and file soldiers disliking ‘the Germans’ are extraordinarily high and amounts to 27 per cent. Nine per cent of the German comrades in this group resent the Dutch. Compared to the percentages on ‘doing one’s service in a corps together’, there are more German rank and file soldiers and NCOs who are sympathetic towards ‘the Dutch’ and also more Dutch soldiers of all rank groups who find the Germans unsympathetic.

Table 2: Reduction of prejudices towards the other country by nation by experience with working together with GE respectively NL soldiers (year 2000, answers in per cent)

Nation	Reduction of prejudices	Experience with working together with GE/NL soldiers		
		Yes	No	Total
Germany	Yes, to a large degree	10	7	17
	Yes, but only to a small degree	29	26	55
	No, it stayed all the same	7	18	25
	No, prejudice became stronger	1	3	3
	<b>Total</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>100</b>
Netherlands	Yes, to a large degree	17	3	20
	Yes, but only to a small degree	48	6	54
	No, it stayed all the same	19	4	23
	No, prejudice became stronger	3		3
	<b>Total</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>100</b>

Due to round-up operations, deviations up to 1 per cent may emerge.

Did service within 1 (GE/NL) Corps influence the prejudices against the soldiers from the neighbouring country? In table two, we find a large number of soldiers supporting the statement that 1 (GE/NL)


Corps contributed to the reduction of prejudices against the other country.

More than 70 per cent of the German and Dutch soldiers hold this opinion. And even 20 per cent of the Dutch soldiers agree that prejudices have reduced. The majority of the Dutch soldiers had experience with working along with German comrades. This might indicate the importance of contacts to the reduction of prejudices.

The percentages of Dutch soldiers show a much stronger dynamism concerning those soldiers who had contacts with German soldiers at their working place and those who had not. A reason for this might lay in stronger prejudices on the Dutch side that existed before getting in touch with German soldiers of 1 (GE/NL) Corps. Only a tiny percentage of Dutch and German soldiers indicated that their prejudices had been influenced by their service within 1 (GE/NL) Corps. One quarter of the Dutch and German soldiers stated that experiences within 1 (GE/NL) Corps did not contribute to the reduction of prejudices against the other nation.

To illustrate the images that soldiers of 1 (GE/NL) Corps have in mind, we asked them about their impression of the tone between superiors and subordinates in the other army. The percentages related to this question draw a vivid picture of the perception of the other army because the way people communicate tells us a lot about their organisational culture and our own stereotypes at the same time.

Figure 2: Tone in the other army (year 2000, answers in per cent)



In general, a small majority of the German soldiers said that the tone between superiors and subordinates in the Dutch army is more relaxed and cordial than in the Bundeswehr. At the same time, a tremendous 96 per cent of the Dutch soldiers think that the tone between superiors and subordinates in the Bundeswehr is rougher and stricter than in their own army. But what is the explanation for this attitude? Is it only a stereotype or is it also founded in experience?

Table 3: ‘Relevance of experiences with the other army’ by ‘tone between superiors and subordinates in the other army’ (answers in per cent)

Nation	Already worked together with Dutch/German soldiers	Tone between superiors and subordinates in the other army			Total
		Rougher and stricter	Comparable	More relaxed and cordial	
Germany N=445	Yes	1	33	66	100 %
	No	10	53	38	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>54</b>	
Nether-lands N=294	Yes	97	3		100 %
	No	92	5	3	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	

Compared to the German soldiers who already worked together with Dutch soldiers, those who have no experience with Dutch soldiers more often think that the tone in the Dutch army is rougher and stricter or the same as in the Bundeswehr<sup>2</sup>. This indicates that contact with Dutch soldiers changes the image about the tone in the Dutch army. On the other side, this does not hold true for the image of the Dutch soldiers about the tone in the Bundeswehr, whether or not they have experience with German soldiers. With regard to the opinion that there is a rougher and stricter tone in the Bundeswehr, the opinion of soldiers in the Dutch army having no experience in co-operation with German soldiers hardly differed from that of the soldiers with experience (difference of 5 per cent only).

<sup>2</sup> Since the database here is a little bit bigger, some percentages differ slightly from the percentages above.



The Dutch and German soldiers within 1 (GE/NL) Corps seem to have the impression that the Corps plays a major role in the reduction of prejudices. This clearly demonstrates the importance of close military co-operation to the process of European integration because integration also has to take place in the minds. *Integrated multinationality* is not just a good weather activity. To prove its right to exist, a multinational corps at least has to function as good as, but preferably better than former, purely national corps. Apart from technical questions of interoperability etc. trust seems to be a major prerequisite for successful execution of corps tasks in theatre of operations. This is why we asked Dutch and German soldiers whether they trusted a platoon from the other nation to come to their rescue in a worst-case situation.


Table 4: Help by a platoon of the other nation in the worst case by nation by rank (answers in per cent)

Nation	Rank	Help by a platoon of the other nation in worst case?			
		Definitely	Most probable	Little probable	Unprobable
Germany	Rank & file	47	47	4	2
	NCOs	58	38	4	
	Officers	55	43	1	1
	<b>Total</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>
Netherlands	Rank & file	44	44	9	3
	NCOs	47	49	2	2
	Officers	73	27		
	<b>Total</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>

The table above shows that more than 95 per cent of the Dutch and German soldiers trust the platoon of the other nation to come to their assistance. Dutch soldiers demonstrate an even higher percentage of complete trust in the German soldiers (first column). A very high percentage of Dutch officers particularly agree that they would definitely receive help from the German side.

Of the 1111 soldiers in the sample of the year 2000, 184 Dutch and German soldiers had experiences on co-operation with German or Dutch soldiers in missions abroad. In missions like SFOR, Dutch and German soldiers found themselves in situations where trust in and knowledge about the other represent an important value for safe and professional management of one's duty.

Figure 3: Experience with each other in missions abroad (year 2000, answers in per cent)



The soldiers of 1 (GE/NL) Corps having experienced co-operation with soldiers from the other nation evaluated the collaboration positively. More than 60 per cent of the Germans and more than 80 per cent of the Dutch soldiers evaluated their experience of co-operation positive or very positive. German soldiers estimated their experience on the full scale from very positive to very negative, but with a clear tendency to positive. The Dutch soldiers gave a much clearer picture of their attitudes by 60 per cent of them evaluating co-operation as positive (see table above).

If we highlight attitudes towards and trust in the others within 1 (GE/NL) Corps, we find that German and Dutch soldiers find each other sympathetic. The higher the rank group, the more sympathy they feel for each other. This might be caused by the fact that officers have to work together closely. We could show that those soldiers who worked together before expect 1 (GE/NL) Corps to reduce prejudices to a much higher extent than soldiers who have not worked together up to now. Soldiers from both nations trust each other to receive help from the other nation's platoon in a worst-case scenario. The 17 per cent of the soldiers in the sample who had already participated in a mission abroad and had gained experience with soldiers from the other nation responded positively to a large extent.



## Co-operation and Acceptance of 1 (GE/NL) Corps

*Ulrich vom Hagen*

Daily service in a multinational unit means facing some of the same routines as in national units, but at the same time those routines are exceptional because they are characterised by the circumstance of intercultural co-operation within the same organisation. This makes 1 (GE/NL) Corps an exceptional organisation. This is the reason for the first step of our investigation on service, motivation and acceptance of 1 (GE/NL) Corps. Starting in 1995, we asked Dutch and German soldiers in the headquarters and in the troops about their experiences with co-operating with soldiers from the other nation.

Table 1: Evaluation of the co-operation with Dutch resp. German soldiers in the corps

Rank and nation	Answers in per cent								
	(Very) positive			Indifferent			(Very) negative		
	1995	1997	2000	1995	1997	2000	1995	1997	2000
German rank & file	56	61	78	37	26	18	7	13	4
Dutch rank & file	54	54	44	39	40	41	7	6	14


Rank and nation	Answers in per cent								
	(Very) positive			Indifferent			(Very) negative		
	1995	1997	2000	1995	1997	2000	1995	1997	2000
German NCOs	76	86	80	21	11	16	3	3	4
Dutch NCOs	84	66	74	14	33	23	2	1	3
German officers	88	84	82	10	12	16	2	4	2
Dutch officers	80	72	81	18	25	18	2	3	1

In the year 2000, approximately three quarters of the Dutch and German soldiers of all rank groups (with the exception of Dutch rank and file soldiers) evaluated co-operation with each other at least as 'positive' or even 'very positive'. This indicates that the perception of co-operation has improved after five years of existence of 1 (GE/NL) Corps. The only exception is the rank group of the Dutch rank and file, who evaluated co-operation with the German soldiers less positive than in the years before. With 44 per cent of them feeling positive or very positive about co-operation and 14 per cent feeling negative or very negative about co-operation with their German comrades, they show the most extreme attitudes. Since only 10 per cent of the soldiers in the sample on this item are Dutch rank and file, the results could be influenced by the phenomenon of the small number. After the end of conscription in the Netherlands, the smaller number of rank and file may have been the reason for their answers. Too many chiefs might have caused stress for the small number of warriors. At the same time, the numbers for the German rank and file show the opposite tendency. After comparably low numbers in 1995, there was a five per cent increase in 1997. This number has increased in the year 2000 to about 17 per cent and is now as high as the numbers for the NCOs and the officers.

After this more general evaluation of the co-operation between the Germans and the Dutch within the corps, there is still the question,

whether the soldiers feel that they are partners with equal rights. Because nearly the entire Dutch army has been integrated within 1 (GE/NL) Corps, in contrast to only part of the German army, it could be perceived that one or the other is dominant. Furthermore, Germany is bigger than the Netherlands, which could make things more difficult. In 2000, the soldiers answered as follows:

Figure 1: Do the Germans and the Dutch the corps have equal rights? (answers in per cent)





It turns out that nearly three quarters of the Dutch soldiers agree that Germans and Dutch soldiers in 1 (GE/NL) Corps are partners with equal rights. Even ten per cent more of the Germans agree with the question. So what do the soldiers think who disagree with the statement that Germans and Dutch are equal partners? Will the Dutch have a certain perception, since they agree to ten per cent less to the question compared to the Germans? We present only those answers, which involved a decision about whether the Germans or the Dutch are dominant:

Table 2: If not equal partners, who plays the dominant role by rank by nation? (answers in per cent)

Nation	Rank	Who plays the dominant role?		
		Germans	Dutch	Total
Germany N=90	Rank & file	71	29	100 %
	NCOs	44	56	
	Officers	55	46	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>41</b>	
Netherlands N=86	Rank & file	59	41	100 %
	NCOs	67	33	
	Officers	50	50	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>48</b>	

Our results show that the perception among those who feel that one nation dominates the other is quite balanced. Only a small majority of German and Dutch soldiers say that the German side is dominant. Only if we differentiate between rank groups, then the rank and file of both nations agree that the Germans are dominant. With respect to the wish for well-balanced relations within 1 (GE/NL) Corps, this can be evaluated as a good result because, on average, none of two partners feels outnumbered or subordinated by the partner.

Ever since the inauguration of 1 (GE/NL) Corps, the question about the depth of the integration within the respective units has been a big issue. In the military, the extent to which units from different nations could be mixed has always been much discussed.

Table 3: In what kind of unit would you have liked to be, if possible?

Rank and nation	Answers in per cent								
	Mixed Dutch/German unit			National units in common barracks			National units in solely national barracks		
	1995	1997	2000	1995	1997	2000	1995	1997	2000
German rank & file	51	48	47	25	28	31	24	24	22
Dutch rank & file	33	23	20	35	27	34	33	50	46
German NCOs	57	55	50	29	27	35	14	18	15
Dutch NCOs	55	35	45	28	35	25	17	30	30
German officers	58	57	50	31	34	36	11	9	14
Dutch officers	65	38	49	23	33	32	12	29	19

When we asked the Dutch and the German soldiers of 1 (GE/NL) Corps about their preferred form of co-operation within a Corps unit (units with soldiers from the other nation), their choice was clear: a majority of almost all rank groups preferred mixed units. This holds true and is stable for all three samples in 1995, 1997, and 2000, although it must be said that the first year showed the clearest result in favour of mixed units. Again, the Dutch rank and file were sceptic about deeper forms of integration, especially after 1997, when there was no conscription in the Netherlands anymore. The young Dutch rank and file in our survey would have preferred to have national units in national barracks. We could imagine, that the lack of conscripts with higher secondary education and more often open-minded attitudes within 1 (GE/NL) Corps and therefore in our sample since 1997, is one of the reasons for this result. Surprisingly, they show results comparable to most of the other rank groups when asked about their preferred major unit, given there would be the choice. Like a majority of the Dutch and German rank categories, the Dutch rank and file

soldiers preferred other bi- or multinational units to 1 (GE/NL) Corps, given there would be the choice. Next to this, the Dutch rank and file would prefer a nationally organised major unit.

Table 4: Preferred major unit, if you had the choice? (answers in per cent)

Rank and nation	1 (GE/NL) Corps			National corps			Other multinational corps			Indifferent		
	1995	1997	2000	1995	1997	2000	1995	1997	2000	1995	1997	2000
German rank & file	14	15	15	20	18	22	40	28	33	26	39	30
Dutch rank & file	7	4	12	32	30	26	42	38	41	19	28	21
German NCOs	26	26	23	19	18	15	25	25	32	30	31	30
Dutch NCOs	10	9	11	19	25	14	42	30	40	29	36	35
German officers	26	19	19	17	19	17	20	26	31	37	36	33
Dutch officers	21	9	8	12	24	10	46	39	49	21	28	33

The percentage of soldiers preferring to stay in 1 (GE/NL) Corps is, on average, as low as the percentage of soldiers preferring to serve in nationally organised major units. But a majority, especially among the Dutch soldiers, preferred to serve in other bi- or multinational units rather than 1 (GE/NL) Corps. A more indifferent point of view concerning the preferred military unit where one wants to serve dominates among the German rank and file, NCOs, and officers. This indicates that the Dutch soldiers do not identify with 1 (GE/NL) Corps as much as the German soldiers, even though the Dutch soldiers are still in favour of *integrated multinationality*. This must certainly have had consequences for the atmosphere within the corps.

All in all, there is a positive but also contradictory picture to be drawn concerning the attitudes of Dutch and German soldiers about 1 (GE/NL) Corps in general and co-operation with the other nation in particular. Three quarters of the Dutch and German soldiers of most rank groups in 2000 have a good or even very good impression of co-

operation. The same numbers of positive answers are to be found on the fundamental question about whether Dutch and German soldiers in 1 (GE/NL) Corps are partners with equal rights. A majority of almost all rank groups even preferred mixed units as their preferred form of co-operation within in a Corps unit. Therefore the reserved evaluation of 1 (GE/NL) Corps compared to other multinational corps, especially among the Dutch soldiers, comes as a surprise.

## Leisure Time and Language

*Ulrich vom Hagen and René Moelker*

First German-Netherlands Corps is not only a workplace but also a social place where people from two nations gather and get to know each other. Some soldiers develop friendships and meet up in their leisure time. Some do not only spend their leisure time together somewhere, but they invite each other to their homes or quarters. This is especially the case for the bi-national headquarters in Münster and Eibergen, where contacts with soldiers from the Netherlands or Germany respectively are part of the daily routine. Consequently, we asked the soldiers in both headquarters about their social contacts with their colleagues from the other nation. Exemplified by the question about invitations to their homes or to one's quarter, we found, that there are some with frequent contacts and some with more infrequent contacts in their spare time. Nearly half the soldiers do not have social contacts in the form of invitations. This is the same in both Eibergen and Münster. But if there are regular contacts, they are more intensive in Eibergen.

Table 1: 'Did you invite a Dutch respectively German soldier to your home or your quarter' by 'where stationed' (answers in per cent)

Where stationed	Nation	Did you invite a GE or NL soldier ....		
		Yes, often	Yes, seldom	No
Münster N=178	German	5	43	53
	Dutch	14	43	43
Eibergen N=69	German	16	53	32
	Dutch	18	30	52

As a first step we will use a stepwise regression to identify the variables that best predict whether or not there has been an invitation. In a next step we will have a closer look at these variables in a series of cross tables.

Of the nine variables we considered to be correlated with the dependent variable 'invitation', there were three variables that are directly relevant. Those three variables are: *application for the service in the bi-national staff, interest in learning the other's language and proficiency in Dutch or German respectively*. The six variables that we expected to be relevant, but were not, are: sympathy for 'the Dutch' resp. 'the Germans', knowledge of English, interest in learning English and attitude towards a common European army, experiences with Dutch soldiers, experiences with Dutch civilians. Together, the variables in our model explain 20 per cent of the dependent variable 'invitation', which represents a rather good result. Furthermore, all variables are significant at the 5 %-level.

Table 2: Have you invited a Dutch resp. German soldier to your home or quarter? (stepwise regression analysis; year 2000 survey)

		Non standardi- sed coefficients	Standardised coefficients	Sign.
Mo- del		B	Beta	
3	(Constant)	1,093		**
	Application for service in a bi-national staff?	,254	,265	*
	Interested in lear- ning Dutch resp. German or to a- meliorate it?	,378	,239	*
	Proficiency in Dutch resp. Ger- man?	,134	,222	*

N = 249; adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .209

\* = Sign. at P < .05

\*\* = Sign. at P < .01

The best variable to predict whether a soldier of the integrated headquarters had invited a comrade home or to his or her quarter is the application for a post in the bi-national headquarters. At the date of the survey in summer 2000, nearly the whole staff participated. According to their answers, 178 soldiers did their service in Münster/Germany and 69 soldiers in Eibergen/Netherlands. In Münster, the Dutch soldiers are the minority in numbers with about 43 per cent and in Eibergen the Germans are the minority with 27 per cent.

Table 3: Garrison and voluntarism (answers in per cent)

Nation	Where stationed	Voluntary in a bi-national staff?		
		Yes	No	Total
German N=82	Münster	56	44	100 %
	Eibergen	79	21	
	Total	<b>60</b>	<b>40</b>	
Dutch N=110	Münster	85	15	100 %
	Eibergen	62	38	
	Total	<b>76</b>	<b>24</b>	

Of those soldiers who work abroad, there are 79 per cent among German soldiers and even 85 per cent among the Dutch soldiers, who voluntarily chose to work in the bi-national headquarters. The numbers of soldiers who serve in their home country on a voluntary basis in a bi-national staff is considerably lower, i. e. 56 per cent for the German soldiers and 62 per cent for the Dutch soldiers.

Table 4: Garrison and language (answers in per cent)

Nation	Where stationed	Intention to learn or to ameliorate Dutch respectively German?		
		Yes	No	Total
German N=120	Münster	64	36	100 %
	Eibergen	74	26	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>34</b>	
Dutch N=126	Münster	79	21	100 %
	Eibergen	61	39	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>28</b>	

Another reason to invite colleagues from the other country at home or to one's quarter might be to learn or to improve one's knowledge of Dutch or German respectively. 66 per cent of the Germans, serving in one of the integrated headquarters said, that they intend to learn or to improve their Dutch. And an even bigger 72 per cent of the Dutch soldiers in the headquarters have the intention to learn German. Those doing their service abroad were more motivated to learn or to improve their knowledge of the language of the country they were living in, than those who did their service in their home country.

The last variable in our model predicting whether or not one is likely to invite friends and colleagues from the other nation is the proficiency in the other language. Those Dutch and German soldiers of the integrated headquarters who did their service abroad, clearly had a better understanding of their environment's idiom. Nevertheless, 64 per cent of the German soldiers in Münster and 61 per cent of the Dutch soldiers in Eibergen had the intention to learn or to improve their knowledge of the other nation's language.



Table 5: Garrison and proficiency in the other nation's language (answers in per cent)

Nation	Where stationed	Proficiency in Dutch respectively German				
		Good	Advanced	Basic	No knowledge	Total
German N=119	Münster	5	4	36	55	100 %
	Eibergen	26	21	26	26	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>50</b>	
Dutch N=127	Münster	55	42	4		100 %
	Eibergen	50	34	16		
	<b>Total</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>9</b>		

The data show that the openness towards the other nation exemplified by the three variables that are important for the explanation of an invitation is always higher, when a soldier is doing his or her service abroad. For this reason, it is worth having a look at the results with respect to 'sympathy' of those doing their job in their motherland or abroad.

Table 6: Garrison and sympathy (answers in per cent)

Nation	Where stationed	Sympathy for the Dutch resp. Germans			Total
		(Very) sympathetic	Indifferent	(Very) un-sympathetic	
German N=119	Münster	77	18	5	100 %
	Eibergen	84	5	11	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>6</b>	
Dutch N=125	Münster	62	30	8	100 %
	Eibergen	41	51	8	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>8</b>	

One important result is that those soldiers, who live abroad, generally speaking, have more sympathetic feelings towards colleagues from the other country than those who live in their homeland. Over all, it turns out, that the German soldiers like 'the Dutch' more than vice versa. 78 per cent of the German soldiers in the integrated headquarters say, that they find 'the Dutch' sympathetic or very sympathetic, but only 54 per cent of the Dutch soldiers say that they find 'the Germans' sympathetic or very sympathetic. With 38 per cent, the Dutch soldiers in the integrated headquarters are much more indifferent than the 16 per cent of the German soldiers. Fortunately, only 6 per cent of the German and 8 per cent of the Dutch soldiers find the other nation unsympathetic or even very unsympathetic.

The best variable to predict whether a soldier of the integrated headquarters has already invited a comrade home or to his or her quarter is the voluntary application for a post within the bi-national headquarters. It is followed by interest in learning the other's language. The last valid variable in the regression model for the explanation for an invitation is the proficiency in the other language. Those Dutch and German soldiers within the integrated headquarters who did their service abroad, clearly had a better understanding of Dutch or German respectively. The openness towards the other nation exemplified by the three variables improves when a soldier is doing his or her service abroad.

## **1 (GE/NL) Corps and Attitudes towards Integration of the European Military**

*Ulrich vom Hagen and René Moelker*

### **1 Political developments and military co-operation**

European integration, though slowly progressing, is on its way. The European Parliament is gaining power each year and after each European conference. National legislation in many instances has become subordinate to European guidelines, regulations and laws. In 2002, many European countries switched to one common European currency. The military is maybe even more symbolic of a nation's sovereignty than the national currency, for it symbolises the power of the state, the instrument of the state, which, in a Clausewitzian frame of reference was to be used, – when diplomacy had played its role – but only then. National armed forces are still the ultimate symbol of a nation's independence, sovereignty and political influence.

A realistic view regarding the symbolic value of the armed forces as guardian of a nation's independence has to take in account that there is not one single European state that is able to secure its borders without the help of neighbouring armed forces. NATO is an organisation that protects the treaty area by means of military collaboration. For different political reasons, such as the perception of too strong a military dependency on the United States of America, which, in turn, might lead to lesser influence in crises management and less effective instruments of the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) it is considered necessary that the EU should be militarily self-sufficient and have a defence organisation, that is able to operate independently of the United States of America (and includes France at the same time).

At the European Union's Helsinki summit in December 1999, European leaders took a decisive step towards the creation of the CESDP. The leaders present at the summit committed themselves to a number of goals: by the year 2003, the EU should be able to deploy a rapid

reaction force (RRC) of up to 60000<sup>1</sup> for so called ‘Petersberg’ missions (i. e. humanitarian, rescue, and peacekeeping missions), the force should be deployable within 60 days and able to sustain deployment for at least one year. The troops (approximately 15 brigades assembled from 15 nations) should be militarily self-sustaining and be comprised of the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics and other craft, such as 500 aircraft and 15 ships. The plans proved to be too ambitious, but they illustrate the mindset of a few years ago and they also illustrate the trend towards military collaboration and political unification at a European level.

Several types of military international collaboration are pioneers for future integration. The concept of deep integration within the headquarters of 1 (GE/NL) Corps is certainly an interesting form of collaboration that could be exemplary for other joint and combined units. The headquarters in Münster has become one of the high readiness headquarters that will be leading the European RRC. This is the reason why the attitudes of the soldiers within 1 (GE/NL) Corps towards European integration are important.

## **2 Attitudes of German and Dutch soldiers on European integration**

After examining the overall attitude towards European integration in the years 1995–2000, also with respect to a common currency and border controls, it can be concluded that the attitudes concerning these forms of integration seem to follow pragmatic self-interest. The opinions of the German and the Dutch soldiers of 1 (GE/NL) Corps do not differ much about these topics. In 1995, 38 per cent of German and Dutch respondents were in favour of a common currency. In 1997 this percentage fell to 35 per cent. And in 2000, 43 per cent were positive towards a common currency. However, soldiers working in the integrated headquarters in Eibergen or in Münster are much more positive. When we, for reasons of convenience, look only at the year 2000, 36 per cent of the soldiers *not* working in an integrated headquarters are positive, whereas 66 per cent of the soldiers working *in* integrated

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<sup>1</sup> Around 150000 troops will be required for rotational purposes.

headquarters show a positive attitude towards a common currency. These people of course travel much more and might be annoyed by having to change money all the time. One currency that pays the bills in the Netherlands and Germany would be much more convenient to them.

On the issue of border control, the same pattern holds true. 63 per cent of the military respondents in 1995 were in favour of cancelling border control. In 1997 and 2000, the percentages in favour of cancelling border control were 58 per cent and 57 per cent respectively. Again, there is a difference between the respondents who are working *in* integrated headquarters as opposed to those *not* working in integrated headquarters. The former are much more positive on the subject of cancelling border control. In 1995, the percentages in favour are 69 per cent of the headquarters soldiers to 63 per cent of the soldiers not working within the integrated headquarters. In the year 1997, the ratio is 67 per cent to 57 per cent, whereas in 2000 the ratio is 66 per cent to 55 per cent. Every year the respondents working in integrated headquarters are about 10 per cent more positive in their attitudes towards cancelling border control. Of course this finding could be easily explained by the fact that some of these people regularly have to travel across the borders.

### **3 The attitude towards a common European army**

Our hypothesis is that, because of the day-to-day contacts with soldiers from another European nation, the soldiers working in integrated headquarters will have more favourable attitudes towards European armed forces than soldiers working in national units. It is also expected that the high percentage of higher ranking soldiers in the integrated headquarters will foster more favourable attitudes, because of their higher level of education and higher frequency of contact with inhabitants of foreign countries, which leads to a more positive attitude towards common European armed forces.

1 (GE/NL) Corps soldiers' attitudes towards a common European army seem to follow a 'U-curve'<sup>2</sup>. It develops from optimism, through pessimism to realism (table 1). In the first year that the survey was taken, 58 per cent of the German soldiers were positive about the idea of a common European army. Two years later this idea had lost eight per cent of its supporters to gain only a meagre two per cent in the year 2000. Overall, the Germans seem to be more supportive of the idea of an European army than the Dutch. In 1995, 42 per cent of the Dutch soldiers showed a positive attitude towards a European army. In 1997, this percentage dropped considerably to 33 per cent to rise again to the level of 1995 in the year 2000 (42 per cent).

Table 1: Attitudes towards a common European army (in per cent)

Nation		Year			Total	Sign. Chi-sq
		1995	1997	2000		
Germany	no answer	7	10	10	9	*
	positive	58	50	52	54	
	neutral	18	21	18	19	
	negative	17	19	20	18	
	N	832	555	757	2144	
Netherlands	no answer	4	6	2	4	**
	positive	42	33	42	38	
	neutral	30	30	29	30	
	negative	25	31	27	28	
	N	661	723	331	1715	

\* = Sign. Chi-sq: P < .05

\*\* = Sign. Chi-sq: P < .01

The officer corps as a whole kept a positive attitude in all three sample years, German officers being most positive of all. The percentage of German officers showing a positive attitude towards a European army fluctuated around 65 per cent. Dutch officers, though more positive

<sup>2</sup> See for the 'U-curve' the chapter by René Moelker & Joseph Soeters 'Sympathy, Stereotypes and the Contact Hypothesis', where the U-hypothesis or acculturation thesis is explained in more detail.

than soldiers and NCOs, fluctuated around 45 per cent. The drop in percentages in 1997 must be attributed to a temporary change of attitude of soldiers and NCOs. In that year, both German and Dutch soldiers and NCOs were less positive. But in the year 2000 the attitudes improved much, even though they did not reach the level of 1995.

Another distinction can be made with respect to soldiers working *in* integrated headquarters and those *not* working in integrated headquarters. In all years those working within integrated headquarters showed much more favourable attitudes towards a European army. In 2000, 71 per cent of German soldiers in integrated headquarters showed a positive attitude. In national staffs and units, only 50 per cent of German soldiers expressed positive attitudes. Dutch soldiers in integrated headquarters in the year 2000 supported the idea of a European army with 47 per cent in contrast to 39 per cent in national headquarters and units. It is remarkable, that the scores for the total population of the soldiers within the integrated headquarters are even higher than the already high scores for the Dutch and German officers in the sample total.

In order to find an explanation for the soldiers' 'attitude towards the creation of a common European army' we conducted a stepwise regression analysis on the year 2000 results. We were only using the results of the year 2000. In this year, we added new questions that were not relevant before. The regression included items that we expected to correlate with the dependent variable<sup>3</sup>. Four variables from this analysis proved to be significant contributors to the explained variance. These four variables are depicted in table 2 as model 4<sup>4</sup>. However, the analysis also excluded several variables. These excluded variables were: education, application at the integrated headquarters in order to get to know Dutch or Germans respectively, application at the integrated headquarters in order to learn or to improve the knowledge of the English language, application at the integrated headquarters in order to learn or to improve the knowledge of the Dutch or German language respectively, application at the integrated headquarters in

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<sup>3</sup> Criteria we used in the regression analysis: Probability for acceptance of F-Value  $< = .050$ ; Probability for exclusion of F-Value  $> = .100$ ).

<sup>4</sup> Model 4 means, there are – step by step – altogether 4 models of the regression equation. Model 4 is the final one with all the four variables.

order to get the compensation for working abroad, application at the integrated headquarters since 1 (GE/NL) Corps is an extraordinary unit, application at the integrated headquarters in order to stay in or to come to the Münster/Eibergen area, application at the integrated headquarters in order to stay in the place where I've lived until now, application for the integrated headquarters out of curiosity.

Table 2: Attitude towards the creation of a common European army (year 2000 survey; stepwise regression analysis)

		<b>Non standard- ised coefficients</b>	<b>Standardised coefficients</b>	<b>Sign.</b>
<b>Model</b>		<b>B</b>	<b>Beta</b>	
4	(Constant)	1,253		**
	Attitude towards a common European currency	,256	,283	**
	Application at the integrated headquarters in order to support European integration	,354	,258	**
	Application at the integrated headquarters for career reasons	-,259	-,187	**
	Application at the integrated headquarters in order to learn/improve one's English	,218	,161	*

N = 1111; adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .205 (Model 4)

Out of the 14 items we considered to be relevant for an explanation of the Dutch and German soldiers' attitude in the year 2000 towards the creation of a common European army, their attitude towards a common European currency turned out to have the most explanatory po-




wer. Of course, this item and the dependent variable correlate quite strongly with each other. Together with the item 'application at the integrated headquarters in order to support European integration' the 'attitude towards a common European currency' belongs to the group of items that express the wish for a deeper European integration. Therefore it is no wonder that they explain very well the dependent variable 'attitude towards a common European army'.

Apart from these somewhat idealistic items, it is extremely interesting, that the more often soldiers applied for a job within the integrated headquarters for the simple wish to make a career the less they are in favour of a common European army. The rather personal item 'application at the integrated headquarters in order to learn/improve one's English' tells us, that the desire to enhance proficiency in English goes hand in hand with a positive attitude towards a common European army.

#### **4 1 (GE/NL) Corps as a step towards a European army**

Although many aspects of integration processes have been discussed, there remains the question whether or not 1 (GE/NL) Corps can be seen as a step towards a European army. The clear majority of the German soldiers and the larger portion of the Dutch soldiers of 1 (GE/NL) Corps express positive attitudes towards a European army, but both German and Dutch soldiers seem to be losing faith that 1 (GE/NL) Corps will be a step towards this European army. Respondents were asked whether or not they agreed with the statement 'do you believe that 1 (GE/NL) Corps is a step towards a European army?'. The results, graphically depicted in figure 1, illustrate a downward trend. From 1995 to 2000, the German percentage dropped in from 64 to 47 and the Dutch percentage dropped from 47 to 40.

Figure 1: Do you believe that 1 (GE/NL) Corps is a step towards a European army (category 'yes, I think so'; in per cent)



The effect of rank on the question whether 1 (GE/NL) Corps is a step towards a European army is difficult to interpret. Officers were consistent in their opinion over the years. About 53 per cent stated to believe that 1 (GE/NL) Corps is indeed the first step. The rank and file showed a remarkable drop from 60 per cent in 1995 to 40 per cent in 2000. NCOs evolved from 54 per cent to 38 per cent to 46 per cent.

The effect of working within an integrated headquarter is favourable to believing that 1 (GE/NL) Corps is a first step towards a European army. In the three sampling years, the percentages believing so were 57 per cent, 56 per cent and 54 per cent. In national headquarters and national units these percentages were 57 per cent, 41 per cent and 43 per cent.

Table 3: 1 (GE/NL) Corps as a first step towards the creation of a common European army (year 2000 survey; stepwise regression analysis)

		<b>Non standardised coefficients</b>	<b>Standardised coefficients</b>	<b>Sign.</b>
<b>Model</b>		<b>B</b>	<b>Beta</b>	
2	(Constant)	,823		**
	Application at the integrated head-quarters in order to support European integration	,187	,323	**
	Attitude towards a common European currency	,066	,172	*

N = 1111; adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .124 (Model 2)

The stepwise regression analysis suggests that the only strong variables predicting the soldiers' attitude on 1 (GE/NL) Corps as a first step towards the creation of a common European army are related to their pro-European motivation. If a soldier applied at the integrated head-quarters in order to support European integration he or she will view 1 (GE/NL) Corps as a first step. A pro-European attitude represented in the 'attitude towards a common European currency' is the second strongest predictive variable.

## 5 Conclusions

We found quite conflicting results with respect to the attitudes of the 1 (GE/NL) Corps soldiers' attitudes towards Europe. On the one hand, there is an overall positive attitude towards a common European army, but on the other hand there is a diminishing faith in 1 (GE/NL) Corps as a first step towards this common European army. It is possible that the five years of experience with 1 (GE/NL) Corps promotes realism concerning the possibilities and impossibilities of this kind of bilateral collaboration. Probably, 1 (GE/NL) Corps is perceived as a collabora-

tion that is uniquely restricted to two nations. After being confronted with the reality shock of five years of collaboration, the soldiers within 1 (GE/NL) Corps may realise that another form of broader collaboration is necessary to form a truly European army. Only in the eyes of a minority is bilateral collaboration the stepping-stone to a multilateral organisational combination. Although faith is lower now compared to the start of 1 (GE/NL) Corps, a large group (47 per cent of the German and 40 per cent of the Dutch soldiers) still believes that 1 (GE/NL) Corps is the first step towards a European army.

## **Structural Differences between the Dutch and the German Armed Forces and Resulting Consequences**

*Paul Klein*

The first and most important of the structural differences between the German and the Dutch armed forces is conscription. The manning of the Netherlands Armed Forces is entirely based on voluntary service and because conscription still exists in Germany, there are numerous conscripts in the Bundeswehr formations. A further significant difference at the time of the survey was the fact that the Dutch armed forces were voluntarily opening up a wide range of slots to women, whereas in the year 2000, only medical service and military music service were open to women in the Bundeswehr. Thus, two armed forces met in 1 (GE/NL) Corps, which, at the survey date, showed significant structural differences.

### **1 Conscript army and all-volunteer forces**

When the First German-Netherlands Corps was inaugurated in 1995, both armed forces were still conscript armies. But this was to change rather soon. Due to the earlier Dutch political decision to suspend conscription, the last of the conscripts already left the Dutch units at the end of 1996 (Moelker 2002: 163). To 1 (GE/NL) Corps this meant that, from that moment on, only German conscripts but no Dutch conscripts would be serving within the Corps. It was the assumption, that in the troops, but particularly within the integrated headquarters, this could lead to difficulties in co-operation since soldiers might depart from different perspectives regarding duty, service and work orientation. Table 1 below shows to which extent this assumption was true for the headquarters in Münster and Eibergen.

Table 1: Difficulties in the co-operation resulting from the introduction of all-volunteer forces in the Netherlands (answers in per cent)


Respondents	1997			2000		
	Yes	No	Don't know	Yes	No	Don't know
Germans within integrated HQ	24	62	14	18	68	14
Germans within national HQ	5	39	55	5	57	38
Germans within troops	9	22	67	5	27	68
Dutch within integrated HQ	17	64	19	21	65	13
Dutch within national HQ	8	47	45	8	58	34
Dutch within troops	7	25	68	15	45	40

As had been presumed, difficulties occurred particularly within the integrated headquarters because in 1997 – i. e. shortly after conscription had been suspended in the Netherlands – one fourth of the Germans and nearly one fifth of the Dutch working there expressed this particular opinion. Three years later, the number of Germans perceiving difficulties with respect to co-operation within the integrated headquarters had significantly decreased while the number of Dutch soldiers holding the same opinion had rather increased. This may have been caused by the fact that dealing with conscripts as well as volunteers is normal for German soldiers whereas getting along with the mentality of young men doing an obligatory service becomes more and more unusual to the Dutch soldiers.

Within the troops and within the national headquarters, difficulties resulting from direct contact of the two different force structures only play a marginal role, as expected, because there are rather scarce contacts between soldiers from the two armies. This presumption was underlined by the high ratio of ‘don't know’ answers.

Nevertheless, it is striking for the Dutch soldiers that the number of answers indicating difficulties doubled between 1997 and 2000. This is probably to be ascribed to the fact that, due to their long duration of tour, the Dutch soldiers did get into much more contact with German soldiers and hence the probability to experience difficulties was much bigger. The assumption that rank and file would, in particular, meet difficulties because of the contrast between conscript armed forces and all-volunteer forces (AVF), could not be confirmed for the German respondents but was confirmed with respect to NL ones.

82 Figure 1: Difficulties in co-operation resulting from the introduction of AVF in the Netherlands (year 2000 survey; answers in per cent)






As can be seen, particularly Dutch rank and file expressed difficulties in co-operation attributed to the introduction of AVFs in the Netherlands. Every fifth respondent of the Dutch junior NCOs uttered such an opinion as well. Since both rank categories get into direct contact with German rank and file most frequently, the presumption suggests that Dutch soldiers have problems dealing with conscripts.

In the 1997 survey, Dutch NCOs in particular rejected a transition of the Netherlands towards professional armed forces. Only one fourth of them expressed positive opinions on the choice of this structure. In contrast to this result, 41 per cent of Dutch rank and file and 47 per cent of Dutch officers gave affirmative answers. As for the German respondents, 56 per cent of rank and file, 47 per cent of NCOs and 32 per cent of officers showed positive attitudes towards the structural change in the partner's army. Figure 2 below shows the attitudes to this question in the 2000 survey.

Figure 2: Opinions on transforming the Dutch armed forces to AVF (year 2000 survey; answers in per cent)



Compared with 1997, opinions among Dutch NCOs on the transformation into an AVF have significantly changed towards the scale indication 'positive' but indifferent and negative opinions nevertheless prevail by far. The assessment made by Dutch officers and rank and file remained nearly identical, except for the fact that the officers did only scarcely reject.

This sharply contrasts with the evaluations of their German comrades of the same rank category. Among those, negative voices did preponderate, and the assessment turned even more towards the scale indication 'negative' in comparison to 1997. In contrast, the German rank and file and NCOs maintained by far their affirmative evaluations from the 1997 survey. In contrast to the officers, negative attitudes towards the AVF of the Netherlands are found rarely.

The following question that is dealt with is the question whether Germany should maintain the conscript armed forces or change it into an AVF.

Table 2: Opinions on the future force structure of the Bundeswehr (1997 and 2000 surveys in comparison; answers in per cent)

	1997			2000		
	Conscript	AVF	No Op.	Conscript	AVF	No Op.
German rank and file	29	63	8	33	56	11
German NCOs	46	50	4	44	49	7
German officers	66	34	-	73	19	8
Dutch rank and file	24	30	46	34	37	29
Dutch NCOs	44	19	38	38	25	37
Dutch officers	38	32	30	38	39	23

Already in 1997, but far more clearly in 2000, German officers supported conscription to be maintained in the German Armed Forces. In contrast, NCOs as well as rank and file at both survey dates preferred (50 per cent in 1997 and 49 per cent in 2000) for the Bundeswehr to be transformed into an all-volunteer force. In contrast, German officers were generally in favour of maintaining conscription. In 2000, 73 per cent of the officers supported a conscript army, whereas two

thirds of the German officers did so in 1997. As far as the question of conscription is concerned, there is a gap between German NCOs and rank and file on the one hand, and officers on the other hand.

In both surveys, only the majority of the rank and file of the Netherlands armed forces stated that the Bundeswehr should follow the Dutch example and be turned into an AVF. The officers who had turned out to be rather sceptical towards this idea in 1997 had changed their opinions in the 2000 survey. With a small majority, they now supported a transition of the Bundeswehr into a volunteer army. At both survey dates, only the Dutch NCOs did not recommend the Bundeswehr to becoming an AVF.

When comparing German and Dutch answers in both surveys, it becomes clear that German rank and file as well as NCOs have a stronger preference for the Bundeswehr to change into a volunteer army than their Dutch comrades of the same category. Among the officers, however, there was a contrary development. In the period between both surveys, the number of officers supporting the professional army strongly decreased on the German side but at the same time increased comparably on the Dutch side so that the 2000 survey clearly contrasts with almost balanced results of the 1997 survey. A majority on the Dutch side now is supporting the volunteer army whereas the German officers are now significantly supporting the conscript army.

With respect to a minority of the career volunteers among the respondents only, the force structure had influenced the decision to join the Bundeswehr or to stay in the Bundeswehr. In that context, 23 per cent of the NCOs and 29 per cent of the officers indicated they would not have joined the Bundeswehr in case conscription had been suspended or abolished.

## 2 Women in the armed forces

Although the Bundeswehr still had only partially opened up to female soldiers at the date the survey was carried out in 2000, 56 per cent of all German respondents within the corps indicated to have already worked together with servicewomen. With respect to the Dutch soldiers – who had become used to servicewomen holding a wide range of posts and their participation in tours of duty a long time ago – it turned out that co-operation with servicewomen had become so common that only 3 per cent of the respondents had never worked together with servicewomen yet<sup>1</sup>. Experiences on both sides were described as positive. There were some differences between the rank categories, though.

Table 3: Experience in the co-operation with servicewomen (year 2000 survey; answers in per cent)

	German			Dutch		
	Rank & file	NCOs	Of-ficers	Rank & file	NCOs	Of-ficers
Very good	28	15	12	15	10	11
Good	42	56	46	61	47	62
Neither/nor	24	19	30	15	36	25
Bad	2	10	9	9	7	2
Very bad	4	1	3	-	-	1
<b>N =</b>	<b>137</b>	<b>164</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>130</b>

On the German side, particularly NCOs and rank and file expressed to have had ‘good experiences’ or ‘very good experiences’ in co-operation with servicewomen. The officers, on the other hand, showed more sceptical attitudes – although bad experiences were exceptional for them too. Among them, particularly the ranks from lieutenant up to captain were reserved about this co-operation, not so the senior officers. Of them, 67 per cent stated to have had ‘very good experiences’ or ‘good experiences’, whereas this ratio only ran up to 50 per cent of the junior officers.

<sup>1</sup> At the survey date, the servicewomen ratio in the Dutch armed forces amounted to 7.6 per cent and to 1.8 per cent of the Bundeswehr. Source: IISS 2000; Office on Women in the NATO Forces 2000.

On the Dutch side, particularly the NCO cluster was not as positive. The evaluations ‘good experiences’ and ‘very good experiences’ were more than 15 per cent behind the assessments by rank and file or officers. Of this NCO, cluster, particularly the junior grades rarely reported positive experiences, whereas the senior grades were more positive in their assessments. The difference revealed among the German senior officers and the lieutenant/captain grades could not be found among the Dutch officers. The Dutch respondents did not show any difference between the headquarters and the troops since affirmative answers ran up to more than 97 per cent for both headquarters and the troops as well.

Among the German respondents, most experiences with servicewomen had been gained at the integrated headquarters (69 per cent). For the national headquarters and the troops these percentages were only 63 per cent and 49 per cent respectively. It was striking, to see that the German cluster showing the most experiences with servicewomen also was the least positive in its evaluations.

Table 4: Experience in the co-operation with servicewomen (year 2000 survey; answers in per cent)

	German in			Dutch in		
	Int. HQ	Nat. HQ	Troops	Int. HQ	Nat. HQ	Troops
Very good	15	17	21	14	9	9
Good	48	51	46	58	60	56
Neither/nor	27	22	23	26	27	24
Bad	6	7	8	2	3	11
Very bad	5	3	1	-	1	-
<b>N =</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>219</b>	<b>125</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>75</b>

Table 4 above synoptically proves that experiences gained with servicewomen in national headquarters and in the troops are positively shaped on the German side, whereas assessments in the integrated headquarters are more reserved. This contrast between integrated headquarters and the troops is also found on the Dutch side, but the situation is the other way round: Dutch soldiers belonging to the troops are somewhat reserved about women in the armed forces. The

fact that there is a difference between the Dutch and the German soldiers within the integrated HQ concerning the attitude towards female soldiers and that there is nearly no accumulated difference between the Dutch and German soldiers belonging to national HQs or the troops seems to be relevant from a sociological point of view.

When comparing German soldiers of the integrated HQ with German soldiers of the national HQs, it turns out that those male German soldiers having experience in working together with female soldiers from the integrated HQ express a more sceptical attitude towards their experience with servicewoman than their German comrades of the national HQs with no female soldiers. In the integrated HQ, though, male German soldiers met with Dutch servicewomen holding posts, which, in the Bundeswehr, were reserved to male soldiers at the time the survey was carried out. This might have caused prejudices and reservations among some German respondents and thus to a more reticent evaluation of own experiences with women in the armed forces. The evaluation difference between Dutch and German soldiers was probably caused by the fact that male soldiers within Dutch headquarters have become used to soldiers of the opposite sex a very long time ago. With respect to opening all assignments and duties in the armed forces up to women, opinions were very different according to rank category.

Table 5: Opinions regarding the armed forces being open to servicewomen (year 2000 survey; answers in per cent)

	German			Dutch		
	Rank & file	NCOs	COs	Rank & file	NCOs	COs
All assignments open	55	48	44	49	38	64
Only out of combat	27	34	40	37	49	33
Only medical and music	10	10	6	6	8	2
No women in army	8	8	10	9	5	1
<b>N</b>	<b>342</b>	<b>214</b>	<b>151</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>148</b>	<b>131</b>

Only small minorities in the Dutch and German armed forces were willing to exclude women from any assignment in the military or just to admit them into the medical and military music services. Contrary to this, only majorities of German rank and file and Dutch officers supported all assignments to be open to servicewomen. In this context, German officers are the most reluctant to open up all assignments to female soldiers, whereas the Dutch officers are mostly in favour of opening all assignments up to female soldiers (see table 5). Almost half of the NCOs from the Netherlands and 40 per cent of the officers from Germany preferred not to admit servicewomen to combat troops.

Table 6: Opinions regarding the armed forces being open to servicewomen (year 2000 survey; answers in per cent)

	German in			Dutch in		
	Int. HQ	Nat. HQ	Troops	Int. HQ	Nat. HQ	Troops
All assignments open	53	51	49	57	56	32
Only out of combat	29	33	33	38	38	52
Only medical and music	8	7	11	3	5	9
No women in army	10	9	7	2	2	7
<b>N =</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>168</b>	<b>414</b>	<b>125</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>75</b>

In both integrated and national headquarters, German and Dutch respondents in majority supported opening assignments in the military up to women. Nearly half of the interviewed German troop soldiers supported this opinion. Although two thirds of the troop soldiers from the Netherlands had, according to their own indications (see table 4), gained good or even very good experiences with servicewomen, more than half of them did not want to see female soldiers in combat troops. Thus, the positive experiences obviously referred to servicewomen in the troops in general, but not to servicewomen in combat units.



### **3 Conclusion**

The fact that the Netherlands have transformed their armed forces into a volunteer army whereas Germany has maintained conscription has caused some difficulties, particularly among Dutch rank and file and junior NCOs. These difficulties may probably be explained by the difference in motivation between conscripted and rather inexperienced young German soldiers and their Dutch counterparts who, on average, are older and more experienced. The perception of difficulties, however, is on the Dutch side as well expressed only by a minority. Thus, the duty routine should only be touched in a marginal manner, if at all.

The differences concerning opinions on servicewomen at the survey date were certainly due to the fact that the Netherlands have opened their armed forces up to women on a large scale whereas the German side knew servicewomen only in the medical and military music services. Meanwhile, the conditions have changed. Germany is now also opening up to women. This fact will certainly affect perceptions.



## **Affiliations of German and Dutch Military Units within 1 (GE/NL) Corps and their Consequences**

*Paul Klein*

### **1 The Objective of the Affiliations**

The troops within 1 (GE/NL) Corps as a whole have been put together from purely national units, stationed separate from one another<sup>1</sup>. Consequently, soldiers rarely have contacts with their comrades from the other nation. Moreover, all the German troops' garrisons are located in Germany, and – apart from Seedorf – all the Dutch ones are in the Netherlands. Without any doubt, this geographical separation hampers the development of a community feeling among the soldiers, it stands in the way of communication. Soldiers are seldom confronted with the phenomenon of their corps' bi-nationality. However, particularly when on a mission, such a kind of community feeling, the so-called 'We-spirit', could become especially important. It would also be an advantage when German and Dutch soldiers learn about the differences between both military cultures, the different habits of giving and receiving orders, and also the different manners and customs, thus avoiding prejudices or unnecessary misunderstandings.

One possibility of facilitating mutual acquaintance is establishing so-called *affiliations* between German and Dutch military elements. Such relations did also already exist before the corps' inauguration, but ever since then their number has increased significantly. "An affiliation aims at two objectives, namely improving military co-operation as well as stimulating mutual understanding. Hence, an affiliation is based upon two columns, a military and a social one. The social aspect may lead to mutual invitations to military ceremonies and/or sports events and other social activities. The military aspect gets its shape by exchanging companies. Thus, a German company may be the guest of a Dutch battalion for some weeks, participating there in military training activities and exercises, being lodged over this period in Dutch

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<sup>1</sup> As it was mentioned already before in the other chapters, solely the personnel of the two headquarters at Münster and Eibergen are deeply bi-nationally mixed.

barracks together with Dutch soldiers. At the same time, a Dutch company lives that kind of experience within a German battalion.” (Rosendahl Huber 1996: 235)

The experiences gained by soldiers on the occasion of such exchanges or in the frame of social activities could – presumably – contribute to dealing mentally with the particularities of the other party concerned, hence to a better mutual understanding. Finally, this would lead to an increase in mutual sympathy, thus benefiting the corps’ evaluation and bi-national co-operation.

## **2 Experiences with the Affiliations**

The experiences the soldiers gained with the affiliations already became a topic of the research survey in 1997, at the occasion of the second survey. However, a comparison with the results of the second survey was difficult due to the fact that the focus groups of the two surveys were different: The two headquarters constituted the survey focus of 2000, while in 1997 the headquarters and the troops were surveyed to the same extent<sup>2</sup>. Hence, the differences concerning the experiences with the affiliation between the two survey cycles are primarily to be understood as tendencies and therefore they are not examined with regard to their statistical significance.

During the second survey of 1997, a large majority of both Dutch and German officers and NCOs did evaluate their experiences with affiliations as good or very good. There were hardly any negative occurrences. The rank and file, however, showed more reserved attitudes on both sides. The majority characterised the overall experience as good. Indifference occurred rather often among Dutch rank and file.

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<sup>2</sup> Due to this different setting of focus, the number of those with affiliation experience did significantly decrease in the 2000 sample. This phenomenon must not be interpreted as a decrease in affiliations but is exclusively due to the different samples. The highly different numbers of respondents, though, impede a statistical comparison between the second and the third survey.

Table 1: Evaluation of experiences with the affiliations in 1997 and 2000 (answers in per cent)

Rank category	Very good/ good		Neither/ nor		Bad/ very bad	
	1997	2000	1997	2000	1997	2000
<b>German rank and file</b> N=94 (1997) N=22 (2000)	66	68	27	23	7	9
<b>Dutch rank and file</b> (60; 7)	50	71	42	29	8	-
<b>German NCOs</b> (63; 20)	81	92	16	4	3	4
<b>Dutch NCOs</b> (72; 52)	70	65	29	29	2	6
<b>German officers</b> (58; 24)	88	69	10	31	2	-
<b>Dutch officers</b> (67; 46)	76	91	18	7	6	2

This – on the whole a rather positive – image did not change significantly in 2000. As table 1 above shows, the evaluations by German rank and file and Dutch NCOs remained nearly stable in the positive range. The attitudes of Dutch officers and of German NCOs did develop significantly towards the positive, those of the German officers however, towards the negative. Nevertheless, in 2000 more than two thirds of the German officers evaluated their experiences with affiliations as good or very good, and none evaluated them as bad.

When asked about the activities under the umbrella of affiliations in 2000, both German and Dutch respondents ranked ‘common exercises’ in the first place. 40 per cent of German and 42 per cent of Dutch respondents who had experiences with affiliations gave this answer. For the Germans, participation in festivities (21 per cent) ranked second place, followed by common duty at the garrison (19 per cent) and sports events (6 per cent). The Dutch respondents, on the other hand, awarded common sports events (34 per cent) second place, whereas only 11 per cent named festivities.

In 2000, such affiliations caused contacts with soldiers of the partner country for a majority of those soldiers whose units maintain such affiliations. A ratio of 33 per cent of the Germans concerned spoke of many or very many contacts, 44 per cent of a few contacts, and 23 per cent of none at all. As for the Dutch respondents, 43 per cent felt they had had many of these contacts; 48 per cent mentioned a few ones, and only nine per cent mentioned none of these contacts at all.

Table 2 below shows whether, in the view of the respondents concerned, the affiliations also resulted in a breaking down of prejudice. This table distinguishes between soldiers who gave affirmative or negative answers to the affiliation question and those who did not know about them.

Table 2: Breaking down of prejudices by affiliations (answers in per cent)

Affiliations	Breaking down of prejudice		
	Yes, by far	Yes, a few	No
Do not know			
Germans	12	49	39
Dutch	18	52	30
Yes			
Germans	21	62	17
Dutch	21	54	25
No			
Germans	20	59	21
Dutch	19	56	25

Chi<sup>2</sup> Germans 35.861 p = .000  
 Chi<sup>2</sup> Dutch 0.797 p = .992

While those German respondents serving in units with affiliations gave significantly more affirmative answers with regard to the breaking down of prejudices than those from units without such relations or those with no knowledge about them, similar differences could not be proven for the Dutch respondents.

In the comparison between German and Dutch respondents it is particularly striking that the Germans, when they have such an affiliation, are obviously expecting to break down prejudices much more than the Dutch soldiers. This phenomenon also influences the sympathy with regard to the common duty amongst German and Dutch soldiers respectively.

Table 3: Existence of affiliations and attitudes towards the common service with Dutch/German soldiers (answers in per cent)

Affiliation	Attitudes towards common duty with Dutch/German soldiers			
	Very pleasant	Pleasant	Indifferent	Not pleasant
Do not know				
Germans	11	38	45	6
Dutch	10	44	46	0
Yes				
Germans	21	51	26	2
Dutch	18	51	29	2
No				
Germans	18	46	33	3
Dutch	19	49	28	4

Chi<sup>2</sup> Germans 27.293 p = .001

Chi<sup>2</sup> Dutch 13.438 p = .098

German soldiers from units with affiliations show significantly more sympathy for the common service with Dutch comrades than those serving in units without such relations or those who don't know about those affiliations. As for the Dutch respondents, there is a similar tendency to be found with regard to their German comrades, however without reaching such significant level. Though, when asked for their personal opinion about the partner army, both German and Dutch respondents reveal differences, which presupposes some influences and effects of affiliations.

Table 4: Existence of affiliations and personal opinions of the partner army (answers in per cent)

Affiliation	Opinion about the partner army			
	No opinion	Good	Indifferent	Bad
Do not know				
Germans	51	22	24	3
Dutch	5	55	29	11
Yes				
Germans	17	54	28	1
Dutch	-	69	24	7
No				
Germans	19	47	31	3
Dutch	2	66	23	9

Chi<sup>2</sup> Germans 105.850 p = .000

Chi<sup>2</sup> Dutch 28.847 p = .001

Certainly, the highly significant difference in the answer distribution among the German respondents of table 4 above is mainly due to the fact that those respondents never having heard of affiliations to a very high extent have no opinion at all of the Netherlands' armed forces – but it can be very clearly shown, however, that those soldiers from affiliated units have a better image of the partner army than those ignorant about affiliations or those from units without such relations.

For the Dutch respondents, the high value of Chi<sup>2</sup> is mainly due to those not expressing any opinion of the Bundeswehr. Their number is so low that the answer distribution shows a high inequality. Apart from that it can be shown for the Dutch respondents as well that soldiers from affiliated units have a better image of the Bundeswehr than those from units without such relations or those who are not aware of the existence of affiliations.



Table 5 below reveals whether the participation in events under the umbrella of affiliations also contributes to changing the image of the neighbouring people.

Table 5: Existence of affiliations and sympathy for the Germans/the Dutch (answers in per cent)

Affiliation	Sympathy for Germans/Dutch		
	Sympathy	Indifferent	No sympathy
Do not know			
Germans	57	36	7
Dutch	38	49	13
Yes			
Germans	68	26	6
Dutch	54	42	4
No			
Germans	65	27	8
Dutch	49	44	7

Chi<sup>2</sup> Germans 14.203 p = .077

Chi<sup>2</sup> Dutch 9.698 p = .287

Both German and Dutch soldiers from affiliated units show the most sympathy for the neighbouring people. The difference between them and the other respondents, though, is not significant and therefore it can only be regarded as a tendency. It only serves to support the assumption that affiliations contribute to a better image of the neighbour.

### 3 Conclusions

When summarising all the results here represented, it can be concluded that affiliations certainly do not constitute a universal remedy for ameliorating the sympathy for the soldiers and the people of the neighbour country in general, nevertheless, they contribute to a better mutual understanding because in many circumstances they offer the opportunity to become better acquainted with the national particulari-

ties of the other party concerned. Thus, contingent prejudice can be adjusted through personal experience, possibly resulting in their reduction or even breaking down.

As a results of the findings of the 1997 survey, it had already been proposed to go further on the way once taken (Klein/Rosendahl Huber/Frantz 1999: 46). The 2000 results can only reaffirm this recommendation. But they also point out the fact that still not nearly enough soldiers are involved in the activities under the umbrella of affiliation.

## The Organisational Culture within 1 (GE/NL) Corps

*Ulrich vom Hagen*

### 1 Introduction<sup>1</sup>

In the course of European integration, fundamental changes in structure have taken place – and continue to do so – in political, economic and cultural spheres. The domain of military organisation has by no means remained unaffected by this phenomenon of internationalisation. The non-permanent reorganisation of military structures along international lines is witnessed, among other instances, by SFOR, KFOR and a great deal of military missions that operate under the umbrella of the UN.

Taking the Bundeswehr as a typical example of a western European military organisation, it is obvious that its current structure is almost completely defined by bi- or multinational integration and cooperation. Single units are regularly comprised of German soldiers and soldiers from other NATO countries. To name a specific instance, the headquarters of First German-Netherlands Corps (1 (GE/NL) Corps) are already integrated. The creation of 1 (GE/NL) Corps demonstrates that the phenomenon of *integrated multinationality* within armed forces is based more on political-utilitarian reasons than on military-functional needs. One reason for building up 1 (GE/NL) Corps is given by the necessity of concentrating and rationalising resources, a general trend to be ascertained in the European context, as well as by the political goal of demonstrating the intended, deeper European integration through action. The intention of European military integration was to maintain a level of readiness for action or indeed, to exceed such a level.

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<sup>1</sup> NOTE: Some sections of a first draft of this paper were presented at the ISA RC 01 Interim Meeting in Strausberg, Germany, October, 13<sup>th</sup>–15<sup>th</sup> 2000, others at the IUS Conference in Baltimore, USA, October, 19<sup>th</sup>–21<sup>st</sup> 2001.  
I would like to thank Sarah Clift for her comments and her help in polishing the English version of this text.

The phenomenon of *multinationality*<sup>2</sup>, however, is much older than 1 (GE/NL) Corps. Within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), *multinationality* has always been an element of an integrated and commonly budgeted military structure, without being explicitly named as such. The use of the term was limited to units built-up in peacetime on the basis of bilateral or multilateral agreements, ones that also stipulated the question of financing. In general, different levels of standardisation constitute the means to obtain military integration: compatibility (capacity of undisturbed interaction), interoperability (capacity of complementary co-operation), functional interchangeability of military equipment and personnel, and equalisation of equipment and training. Not only are arms and equipment involved here, but also particularly important is the degree of communication between the soldiers of several armed forces (Hahn 1997: 341).

A problem with this rather technical use of the term *multinationality* seemed to consist not only in the fact that the level at which it was to be implemented remained vague (i. e. whether its assignment was pertinent to political/strategic, operational, or tactical commands, or to the differentiation between the structures of command and armed forces) but moreover, that doubts remained as to whether this term described structures built up in peacetime or whether it described arrangements for a particular mission (Siedschlag 1999: 815f.).

This form of *multinational military co-operation* – one which could be described as *horizontal* in nature – between military alliances and UN peacekeeping missions therefore differs qualitatively from the *vertical multinationality* that has been developing in Europe since the end of the East-West conflict (particularly, with the German-French Brigade, the 1 (GE/NL) Corps, and the Danish, German and Polish MNC NE). One significant difference is the fact that multinational units such as 1 (GE/NL) Corps are subordinate to a common supreme command during peacetime as well. 1 (GE/NL) Corps goes so far as to use an integrated command system, one which consists of a commander from one nation and a deputy commander from the other who, for three years, are in charge of all German and Dutch divisions of the corps.

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<sup>2</sup> A presentation of literature dealing with this phenomenon is offered by Klein/Kümmel (2000).

Concerning the concept of national sovereignty – one of whose clearest expressions is found in a country's armed forces – this is a change which might have further implications for European militaries, since troops of one nation are commanded by another nation's general.

Five years after its inauguration, we have undertaken to examine 1 (GE/NL) Corps as a model of modern multinational armed forces within the framework of *integrated multinationality*<sup>3</sup>, with a focus on theoretical questions about organisations. This research study addressed (among others) the questions about whether or not the soldiers from both nations became closer to each other, whether or not a feeling of solidarity developed or even whether a particular organisational culture of its own has been created.

The data used here were collected by means of the so-called 'Hofstede questions'. We are convinced that such research will contribute to comparative cultural research in military sociology<sup>4</sup>. A first step in this direction was already taken by Soeters (1997) and Soeters/Recht (1998), who used the essential 'culture survey' developed by Hofstede for IBM and applied it to the military for the first time. They questioned officer candidates from 18 military academies and used the results in order to contribute to the more general discussion of organisational models. Taking these works as our point of departure, this study will use the results of three random samples taken at three different times (1995, 1997, and 2000) to examine the following question: what were the similarities and differences between the German and the Dutch contingent of 1 (GE/NL) Corps at the date of the survey, and how have these relationships changed over time? One question here is of long-term interest: will a common organisational culture be developed in the future in the context of diverse nations, differentiated by culturally specific values? If so, what role does time play in the crystallisation of a common organisational culture?

The construct of *culture* as it is developed within organisational theory will be used to interpret the phenomenon of *integrated multinationality*.

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<sup>3</sup> Despite the fact that 1 (GE/NL) Corps consists of soldiers from just two nations, in the following we will use the more complex term 'military multinationality' for describing the phenomenon of deepened military multinationality.

<sup>4</sup> Such a kind of research is demanded by Keller (1997).

*lity*, since management problems within any organisation tend to occur when interacting members belong to (organisational) cultures unfamiliar to each other. This is precisely the case when military forces from different nations are integrated to form multinational units. However, the military poses unique and specific problems for the question of *integrated multinationality*, as Harold D. Lasswell's definition of the purpose of military organisations reveals. According to him, military organisations are the management of organised means for the use of force and for war. This very specific role that the military plays, demonstrates that the particular organisational aim of armed forces has traditionally been considered to be the orientation towards combat and towards the posing of a potential threat through the use of violence in order to attain political goals. For this reason, it is crucial to clarify from the outset whether or not 1 (GE/NL) Corps, as a military organisation, fulfils the pre-conditions necessary to be a proper organisation that can realise such goals.

## **2 The military as an organisation**

From the organisational-sociological, or military-sociological point of view, this intercultural study deals with the military as a general organisational type because it can be found throughout the world in a similar form<sup>5</sup>. Organisational theory understands planned, purpose-oriented acting and the similar social structures of an organisation as *formal organisation*, while unplanned, unintended aspects are called *informal organisation*.

For an analysis of the military as an organisation, it is necessary first of all to determine its defining organisational characteristics. Following the definition by Mayntz (1963: 36f.), *organisations* show the following characteristics:

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<sup>5</sup> See Soeters (1997), who comes to the conclusion that there is an international military culture.

### Organisations ...

- are social architectures with a finite circle of members and internal differentiation,
- are oriented towards specific purposes and aims, and
- are at least designed with the intention to achieve these aims in a rational manner<sup>6</sup>.

In the case of the military and because of the rather total character of this organisation, the creation of formal or informal structures is highly correlated to its purpose and tasks. Formal and informal structures have to be evaluated using the criterion of military efficiency. *Formal groups* are defined in their existence and personal structure. They are also defined by the aims and purposes of the organisation they belong to. Their character is therefore instrumental, the relations of the individuals towards each other and to the group are not personal and affectionately neutral.

The coming into existence of *informal groups* within the framework of the formal organisation can be seen as the wish of the individuals to influence the organisation by their dispositions, irrespective of whether happens consciously or subconsciously. *Informal structures* can be described as unplanned, iterated interactions of individuals within an organisation, that are constituted by an affection. *Norms* (rules for acting, that declare certain actions as obligatory) within a group allow their members to orient their behaviour, what supports the individual need for stability. *Informal structures* are essential for the understanding of human behaviour within 'total institutions' (Goffman 1972) such as 'the military' is to a certain extent<sup>7</sup>. With respect to their existence, those *informal structures* are distinct phenomena bound to the organisation in general and therefore they are as important as formal structures.

For a better understanding of social *processes* in organisations like the military, *norms* on the level of groups should be regarded. Those

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<sup>6</sup> Translation by the author.

<sup>7</sup> According to Goffmans, the military would belong to the fourth type of 'total institutions', which justify their total character by instrumental reasons (Goffman 1972: 16).

*norms* cannot be understood if one tries to understand them apart from the societies' *values* they come from. *Values* stand for the ideas in social groups, classes, societies etc. about conditions worth being wished. As such, they offer criteria for acting. *Values* of a society seem to influence the microstructure of the military organisation through the individual believing in them. Kinkead (1963: 137ff.) exemplifies this by the different performance of American and Turkish POWs concerning collaboration in the Korean War. These differences between soldiers from a 'traditional' country and from a 'modernistic' country can be understood as one indicum about the effect of *societal values* on an organisation.

Formally, the interaction of the soldiers assigned to 1 (GE/NL) Corps is being regulated by the corps' regulations in accordance with NATO standards. Social organisations however, show the particularity that these structures do not remain static, thus they do not guarantee that the same proceedings and results will occur time after time in accordance with fixed parameters. Rather, the structures of social organisations form channels for processes of interaction and communication that are highly influenced by the participating members.

For 1 (GE/NL) Corps, the organisational aims were politically defined by the declaration of the German and Dutch Ministers of Defence (dated March 30, 1993) on the intended fusion of the German 1 Corps with the Netherlands 1 Corps. The purpose of multinational units generally involves the same societal mission previously held by the national units. Multinational units are composed of aspects 'borrowed' from already existing national organisations; however, in order to create the coherency necessary for a new organisational structure as defined above, the terms upon which national units were formerly based must be adapted to the new framework of *integrated multinationality* in which military aims are now to be fulfilled. Such an organisation would have to avoid the phenomenon of a polarised bi-culturalism which is only held together by an overarching unity, one with which none of the participants can culturally identify with. It was probably in light of such a goal that the first commanding general of the Corps, Lieutenant-General Reitsma, described 1 (GE/NL) Corps on the day of its inauguration as a 'fusion'. Organisational theory can help to pinpoint the cultural similarities and differences within speci-



fic organisations, an understanding which is crucial for the intercultural integrity of a multinational military unit.


### 3 Culture

Social science generally understands *culture* to be a system of values, behavioural norms and ways of thinking that has been internalised by a community of people, and which distinguishes this community from others. Aside from these cognitive orientation patterns, observable aspects of human behaviour are manifested in social interactions and through the development of organisations. *Culture* here is regarded as a determinant for behaviour within organisations, and as a complex multidimensional entity. Thus, this construct of *culture* is particularly pertinent to organisation sociology.

Furthermore, the study of *culture* involves a differentiation at the levels of *micro culture* and *macro culture* (Dülfer 1999: 223f.). We talk about *macro culture* when the group is a people, a nation or an otherwise restricted collective of people. *Micro culture* (organisation culture) on the other hand, signifies a system of norms and ways of thinking and acting, which are actively learned and lived by the members of the organisation. It is through these organisational *practices* (symbols, heroes and rituals) that one social unit is differentiated from others. The usage of the word ‘culture’ for both nations and organisations should not make us forget that the two are of a different nature. In this view we will focus on the underlying level of values and its implication on the *organisational culture* of the Dutch and German soldiers within 1 (GE/NL) Corps.

For the differentiation of ideas and values on the one hand and, on the other hand, the detectable symbols and acts, Schein’s work (1985) remains pertinent. He differentiates between three levels and at each of these analysis of *culture* is possible:

Figure 1: Schein's levels for the analysis of culture



Source: Schein (1985: 14)

Empirical social research has given way to the development of a more refined method of analysing the significance of *cultural values*. Research on *culture* at the level of the 'invisible' is needed, since it is only by analysing the *unconscious aspects of culture* that more deeply embedded norms, values and basic assumptions can be worked out (Staehe 1999: 499). Earlier work on *integrated multinationality* relied on conventional empirical research methods and remained at the level of culture's visibility. The continued use of such a method threatens to mistake symptoms for causes and to thus entirely misrepresent its object of study.

Hofstede's directory research (1982) on *national cultural values* within organisations however, starts at the 'invisible' level of cultural values. He starts from the supposition that environment-specific ways of thinking characterise behaviour, which he calls 'cultural programmes'. Thus, culture is a form of collective 'mental programming' sha-

red and sustained by individuals within organisations, ethnic groups and cultural circles<sup>8</sup>. ‘Cultural programming’ means that certain reactions are more likely in certain cultures than in other. Values are the basic elements of the programme codes. Therefore, Hofstede differentiates between four different dimensions of the basic values held by members of different national cultures. As useful as such a development is as a rough research tool for categorisation, Hofstede’s analysis remains limited in that it is pertinent only to *national cultural identities*<sup>9</sup>. This macro-cultural view only allows for a comparison between cultures based on a national framework, in which differences within a nation are systematically omitted from consideration. That is why Kohr & Wakenhut (1992) ask for the *circumstances and forms* in which a nation could develop a common collective self-concept, a collective ego, and a collective conviction of control<sup>10</sup>. Since Kohr/Wakenhut do not see an answer to their central questions, they prefer the broader term ‘consciousness of national belonging’ (1992: 23).

Hofstede’s large-scale comparative management study is based upon the evaluation of 116000 questionnaires with data from IBM employees at all levels in national subsidiaries from 38 occupations and 20 languages around 1968 and, in a second round, around 1972. Since his study is based on the results of surveys in two different years, he fulfilled the requirement stipulated by Lammers/Hickson (1979: 5) that an intercultural comparison should involve study over a period of time. Of the over 100 standardised questions of the survey each that were available for a factor analysis; only a small number of those questions are used in his values survey module. From these surveys, Hofstede (1982) generated four cultural dimensions out of factor

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<sup>8</sup> Hofstede’s approach of ‘collective programming of the mind’ resembles Bourdieu’s concept of ‘habitus’; see Bourdieu (1980); see also Elias (1998), especially chapter I.

<sup>9</sup> Bloom (1990: 52) describes a *national identity* as the condition ‘(...) in which a mass of people have made the same identifications with national symbols – have internalised the symbols of the nation – so that they may act as one psychological group when there is a threat to, or the possibility of enhancement of, these symbols of national identity.’

<sup>10</sup> Maurice Halbwachs concept of ‘collective memory’ might be a fruitful access to this problem. Halbwachs develops his sociological theory of memory for instance. (Halbwachs 1950)

analysis<sup>11</sup>. His findings have been used since in subsequent studies as replications and as paradigms<sup>12</sup>. Hofstede states that differences in cultures can be captured by measuring the differences between people regarding the following four dimensions.

- *Power Distance*: the extent to which unequal power relations within an organisation and within society are perceived and accepted.
- *Uncertainty Avoidance vs. Ambiguity Tolerance*: the extent to which uncertain ambiguous situations are perceived as threatening and the attempt that is made to prevent ambiguity by formal rules.
- *Individualism vs. Collectivism*: whether life orientation aims at self-motivation, spare time and a self-supporting and private life, or whether it involves an orientation towards the environment of the work place, training and work for a community. *Individualism* describes societies where social ties are loose and one is only responsible for oneself and the family, while *collectivism* describes societies, where a person is integrated into cohesive in-groups right from the start of his life.
- *Masculinity vs. Femininity*: this dimension is about certitude or modesty as desirable behaviour. *Masculinity* characterises a given society where the gender roles are clearly delineated wherein both men and women fulfil traditional and entirely discreet roles. *Femininity* describes a society, where ‘feminine’ values such as human togetherness, quality of life, and an environment of politeness and sensitivity towards others dominate. In this context, ‘masculine’ values emphasise material rewards, career success and prestige.

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<sup>11</sup> Some reviewers questioned whether the use of only attitude-survey questionnaires was a valid base from which to infer values; see Triandis (1982: 89). This aspect will not be developed here further, but without a doubt we do require several research instruments to study cultural differences in their aspects.

<sup>12</sup> See Soeters (1997); Hoppe (1990).

#### 4 Typology of military cultures

Particularly in Europe, the anticipated peace dividend after the end of the East-West conflict was accompanied by budget cuts in the defence ministries. For reasons of new challenges and budget cuts, armed forces from different European countries were integrated for the purpose, among others, of reducing costs, a practice that also took place within industries in order to obtain 'scale results'. However, whereas in industrial enterprises, problems caused by mergers can be calculated on the basis of financial losses<sup>13</sup>, the integration of military organisations leads to difficulties, which are not detectable at the level of financial profit and loss. As such, another framework is called for, which allows for an analysis of the more complicated issue of military performance in a merger-situation.

Within the framework of organisation theory and management research, Hofstede explained the problem caused by mergers in the industrial sphere through the different national cultural backgrounds of the employees in the organisation. Influenced by the Hofstede dimensions, Soeters/Recht (1998) surveyed the cultures of military academies in thirteen countries, including Germany and the Netherlands, in order to classify and to explain the influence of culture on the topic of the armed forces<sup>14</sup>. In the Military Academies Study and this study, those dimensions are used as a conceptual framework outside their original setting. The Military Academies Study is useful for this study, in that it provides us with a unique opportunity to compare the military cultures existing in different nations, because this is the only contrastive survey of its kind. On the basis of the first (August/September 1995), the second (Summer/Fall 1997) and the third (Spring/Summer 2000) panel surveys of 1 (GE/NL) Corps, we are able to draw conclusions about the degree of compatibility of German and Dutch military cultures.

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<sup>13</sup> See Olie (1994).

<sup>14</sup> Soeters/Recht (1998). Since Germany does not hold a military academy for young officers in the traditional sense, studying officers of the Bundeswehr University in Munich were questioned for the survey; this implies qualifications from the methodical point of view.

## 4.1 Models

The I/O model of military sociology was used by Soeters/Recht (1998) to describe and evaluate the Hofstede dimensions *Individualism vs. Collectivism* and *Masculinity vs. Femininity*. It is based on Janowitz (1977) and Moskos' (1977) crucial essays that make the argument for the differentiation between the normative orientation of the military *institution* and the rational orientation of the military *occupation* itself<sup>15</sup>. The I/O model can be understood as a differentiation of military cultures that reflects both the institutional orientation on military life compared with that of mere occupation and private life, and also the importance of non-materialistic concerns compared with high income and career chances. Therefore it deals with various aspects and conceptualisations of the military profession. Hence we will use the integrative term 'professionalism' and speak of the '*professionalism model*', that includes the Hofstede dimensions *Individualism vs. Collectivism* and *Masculinity vs. Femininity*.

The Hofstede dimensions *Power Distance* and *Uncertainty Avoidance*, in turn, offer a model that reflects the level of a military organisation's degree of hierarchy. Therefore we call it the '*co-ordination model*'. This model refers to the functional relation of hierarchy and co-ordination of action, which can be loosely mapped on the dichotomy of the organisation types 'bureaucracy' and 'network'<sup>16</sup>. The classical definition of bureaucracy emerges out of the work of Max Weber as a legal and rational form of organisation. Furthermore, it has certain features that make it a centralised organisation with an authoritarian style of leadership and communication (Frese 1992: 391ff.). Opposed to 'bureaucracy' is the 'network'. It distinguishes itself from the 'bureaucracy' by virtue of its functional authority, interaction and communication, de-centralised decision-making and an openness to change, as well as a high level of participant dedication to the task. Networks are considered to be appropriate forms of organisation for new tasks that are carried out through the co-operation of many departments.

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<sup>15</sup> See Sorensen (1994: 599-603) on the conceptual differences between the two authors.

<sup>16</sup> Soeters/Recht (1998: 173), choose the differentiation (machine-) bureaucratic vs. professional (-bureaucratic) by Mintzberg (1979), and called their second model therefore 'bureaucracy'.

In general, the military is functionally defined by the ‘bureaucracy’, because of the unpredictable nature of its deployment, the continuous need for readiness and the difficulties of controlling performance during peacetime. This creates insecure situations, which lead to typical bureaucratic reactions (Roghmann/Ziegler 1977: 157). As such, armed forces have a general tendency towards bureaucracy rather than towards networks.

## 4.2 Results

The respective indices for the four dimensions of national culture were generated using Hofstede’s ‘Values Survey Module’<sup>17</sup>. He recommended further research into cultural comparison in 1980. With respect to concepts, our study follows Hofstede’s framework. It is used to classify and to explain the influence of culture on the military as an organisation. The first to do this were certainly Soeters and Recht (1998). We will use the dichotomization of the Military Academies Study, to classify our results for the Dutch and the German soldiers of HQ 1 (GE/NL) Corps concerning the four Hofstede dimensions.

### 4.2.1 Study of military academies


For the dimensions of *Individualism* and *Masculinity*, i. e. the *professionalism model*, Soeters and Recht’s results show a discrepancy between the Netherlands and Germany<sup>18</sup>.

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<sup>17</sup> We are using the version of the improved ‘Values Survey Module’, Hofstede developed in 1982.

<sup>18</sup> Soeters/Recht (1998: 175).

Figure 2: Professionalism Model – Military Academies Study




This diagram shows how the responses of the officer candidates in the countries examined can be attributed to different cultural contexts. The countries that scored highest in the values of Masculinity and Individualism, were the North European countries Denmark and Norway, and the North American countries USA and Canada. As such, they are considered to be countries whose orientation towards the military is as a mere occupation. Results from the Belgian, Italian, and German officer candidates in the ‘C’ quadrant support the interpretation of those armed forces as proximate to a traditional institution, while the results of the candidates from the Netherlands present a mixed characterisation, distinguishing them in this survey from their German counterparts by a significantly pronounced individualism. Finally, the results of the German and Dutch candidates showed them to be less materially oriented than the other respondents from other countries.

The study on military academies concerning the *co-ordination model* reflects the Latin European countries (France, Spain and Italy, and Belgium) in the ‘A’ quadrant, as representative of ‘bureaucracy’. While the results for the ‘C’ quadrant reflect a low level of acceptance



of hierarchy and an openness to uncertainty. As representatives of their organisations, the German and Dutch officer candidates' results showed mixed types, with the Germans tending towards risk-avoidance while acting in ways that are less dependent on hierarchies.

Figure 3: Co-ordination Model – Military Academies Study



The results of this survey allow us to make some tentative typologies of the German and Dutch candidates. The Dutch officer candidates' results reflect participation in a post-materialistic, venturesome and individualist culture, whereas those of their German counterparts reflect an orientation towards a vocational model; that is, they seem to act more independently of authority than the Dutch, despite the results' suggestion that they also tend to shun risks. The high indices in the results for *Power Distance* for the Dutch cadets, might be explained by the special conditions at the Dutch military academy in Breda, Moelker (2000) describes as a *total institution* (Goffman 1961).

Soeters & Recht's typology of their survey highlights the differences between the German and Dutch military cultures. In short, because of the different understandings that each of the militaries has of its occu-

pation and its function, the development of a common organisational culture within HQ 1 (GE/NL) Corps seems problematic.

#### 4.2.2. Study of 1 (GE/NL) Corps


Our results, however, display a different picture. To be sure, this is a consequence of the fact that the population interviewed in the common German-Dutch study was different than that interviewed by Soeters/Recht (1998). While in our survey 654 Dutch soldiers and 836 German soldiers participated in the first phase in August/September 1995, there were 739 Dutch and 566 Germans during the second phase in Summer/Fall 1997. In the third phase (Summer 2000), 336 Dutch and 775 German soldiers participated<sup>19</sup>.

The survey suggests that German and Dutch soldiers in the common corps are very similar to each other in two of the four characteristics as described above. The dimensions of the *professionalism model* (Masculinity and Individuality), however, demonstrate consistent differences, although the results of the year 2000 phase of the survey reflect a slight convergence of the German soldiers' results with those of the Dutch soldiers with respect to the *Individuality* dimension.

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<sup>19</sup> The Dutch samples of the year 1995, 1997, and 2000 reflected ratios of rank and file soldiers at 27, 27, and 11 per cent, non-commissioned officers 47, 46, and 48 per cent, commissioned officers 26, 27, and 41 per cent. For the German samples, these were 53, 50, and 49 per cent rank and file soldiers; 31, 29, and 30 per cent non-commissioned officers and 16, 21, and 21 per cent commissioned officers. From among the German samples, 14, 17, and 17 per cent (from the first, second, and third phases of the survey, respectively) were members of the integrated headquarters, this ratio in the Dutch sample were 22, 16, and 39 per cent. The education-level of soldiers were similar in both samples, with 39, 41, and 33 per cent of the German soldiers and 38, 40, and 44 per cent of the Dutch soldiers having completed their high school (or equivalent) certificate. Due to the suspension of conscription in the Netherlands, the 1997 sample did not include any draftees whilst their ratio comprised 36 per cent of the 1995 sample. As for the German soldiers, this ratio was 47, 44, and 36 per cent of the soldiers.

Figure 4: Professionalism Model – GE/NL Corps Study



The application of the *professionalism model* places the Dutch soldiers in the 'B' quadrant, which is also where they were in the military academy study. Thus, the results for the Dutch soldiers reflect a mixed type in the *professionalism model*, oriented towards a high degree of individuality and a low degree of masculinity. The German soldiers are to be found in the 'D' quadrant. Their results also reflect a mixed type, but contrary to the results of the Dutch soldiers, they show higher indices for the *Masculinity* dimension and lower indices for the dimension of *Individuality*. Nonetheless, it has to be said that the difference between the results for the German and those of the Dutch soldiers is not inordinately high.

The scores of the indices for the dimension of *Individuality* for the Dutch soldiers are consistently much higher than for those of the Germans across all three samples. This also holds true for Hofstede's study and Hoppe's study of the civil world, where the Dutch personnel obtains higher results for *Individuality* than their German colleagues. The opposite of this is true for the indices of *Masculinity* in all four studies, where the scores of the Germans are constantly higher than those of the Dutch. Within the framework of the *professionalism mo-*

*del*, the differing results generated along the dimensions of *Individuality* and *Masculinity* also reflect a differing sense that German and Dutch soldiers have, with respect to what they think about the role of individuals within organisations (Hofstede 1997: 140).

Table 1: Dimensions of the professionalism model

*Individualism*<sup>20</sup> in the Hofstede Study (1980), the Hoppe Study (1990), the Military Academies Study (1996), and the 1 (GE/NL) Corps Study (2003)

	Hofstede	Hoppe	Academies	1 (GE/NL) Corps				
				1995	1997	2000	2000+	2000++
1. Netherlands	80	78	52	72	66	74	74	74
2. Germany	67	62	37	16	26	40	39	32

*Masculinity* in the Hofstede Study (1980), the Hoppe Study (1990), the Military Academies Study (1996), and the 1 (GE/NL) Corps Study (2003)


	Hofstede	Hoppe	Academies	1 (GE/NL) Corps				
				1995	1997	2000	2000+	2000++
1. Netherlands	14	-21	-42	-9	-8	-9	-16	-16
2. Germany	66	-2	-11	17	2	15	9	26

Note: + Member of the integrated 1 (GE/NL) Corps HQ since 1997 or earlier  
 ++ Member of the integrated 1 (GE/NL) Corps HQ since 1998 or later

<sup>20</sup> The scoring guide for the 1982 values survey module contains an approximation formula, in which the *Individualism* and the *Masculinity* index can be computed by an algorithm from the mean scores of four questions on work goals respectively. The formula was developed by Hofstede (1980) for the IBM study, such that each of the questions would contribute equally to the final index, and that the indices would range from around 0 for the country with the weakest characteristics of the dimension to around 100 for the country with the strongest. Later studies – such as ours – produced scores that had negative indices.

For the dimensions of the *co-ordination model*, the Dutch and German soldiers are both to be found in the ‘C’ quadrant. This reflects a weakly pronounced bureaucracy type.

Figure 5: Co-ordination Model – GE/NL Corps Study



With regard to the dimensions that reflect the co-ordination of action, our results diverged from those of Soeters/Recht’s Military Academies Study. In our study, the German soldiers and the Dutch soldiers belong in the ‘C’ quadrant; that is, the results of both nations show nearly the same low indices for the two dimensions. In the Academies Study however, they were found to belong in quadrant ‘D’ and ‘B’ respectively.

Compared with the Military Academies Study, the German indices for *Power Distance* remain, on average, the same in our study. Compared to the studies of Hofstede and Hoppe, the indices of our surveys on the Bundeswehr soldiers clearly present a different picture for the German military world, where the scores reflecting *Power Distance* are much higher. The results of our study for the Dutch soldiers show lower indices, which are only slightly above the scores of the Hofstede Study on civilians.

Our results along the dimension of *Uncertainty Avoidance* show a comparatively low distribution for both nations. While, in the Military Academies Study, the index for this dimension was already low for the Dutch, our findings reflect that it is also low for the German soldiers within 1 (GE/NL) Corps. Furthermore, the indices for both militaries are lower than those of the studies in the civil world<sup>21</sup>.

Table 2: Dimensions of the co-ordination model

*Power Distance*<sup>22</sup> in the Hofstede Study (1980), the Hoppe Study (1990), the Military Academies Study (1996), and the 1 (GE/NL) Corps Study (2003)

	Hofstede	Hoppe	Academies	1 (GE/NL) Corps				
				1995	1997	2000	2000+	2000++
1. Netherlands	38	- 1	96	46	44	30	12	21
2. Germany	35	8	63	62	64	66	38	30

<sup>21</sup> The presumption of a ‘conscript effect’ – this dimension includes questioning regarding the ‘intention to stay for how many more years’ – cannot be used to explain this result, even though their short period of stay in the military might suggest otherwise. To the contrary, our results showed that since this score remained constant for the Dutch soldiers in the last two samples even after the suspension of conscription in the Netherlands, a ‘conscript effect’ was not detected.

<sup>22</sup> The formula developed for the *Power Distance* and *Uncertainty Avoidance* index uses an algorithm (adding or subtracting the three mean- or percentage-scores after multiplying each with a fixed number, and finally adding another fixed number).

*Uncertainty Avoidance* in the Hofstede Study (1980), the Hoppe Study (1990), the Military Academies Study (1996), and the 1 (GE/NL) Corps Study (2003)

	Hofstede	Hoppe	Academies	1 (GE/NL) Corps				
				1995	1997	2000	2000+	2000++
1. Netherlands	53	14	44	13	16	12	4	0
2. Germany	65	37	75	16	23	20	36	25

Note: + Member of the integrated 1 (GE/NL) Corps HQ since 1997 or earlier  
 ++ Member of the integrated staff 1 (GE/NL) Corps HQ since 1998 or later

According to Hofstede, *Power Distance* and *Uncertainty Avoidance* affect our thinking about organisations (Hofstede 1997: 140). We can conclude from our surveys that the Dutch and German soldiers share the cultural norms that shed light on those structures of decision-making, and on which rules and procedures are to be followed in order to obtain desired goals. Thus, within military culture, Germany and the Netherlands represent the *network* type although, as was argued above, armies have an immanent tendency to bureaucratisation. The network type distinguishes itself from the bureaucratic type by its horizontal hierarchy, its emphasis on function and communication, and its openness to change. Since *networks* are considered to be appropriate forms of organisation where new tasks are carried out through co-operation of action, this result supports the possibility of a positive outcome of the German-Dutch multinational military co-operation.

These findings lead to the conclusion that a nation's *values* are highly stable, whereas Moelker & Soeters' analysis<sup>23</sup> shows that *attitudes* towards the other are subject to change. The survey could not, however, prove that contact between soldiers of the two nations led to a convergence in *values*<sup>24</sup>. Five years after the inauguration of 1 (GE/NL) Corps, the indices for the culture dimensions remained

<sup>23</sup> See chapter 1 in this book.

<sup>24</sup> One exception to this is the tendency that the German soldiers do approach their Dutch comrades in terms of the cultural norms defining *Individualism*.

nearly the same for both the German and Dutch soldiers whether they serve and work in the combined headquarters or whether they serve in the troops, where bi-national contacts occur less frequently.

Thus, we can state that the principal preconditions for the development of a common organisational culture for the corps are given by the two dimensions of the *co-ordination model*, where German and Dutch soldiers are representatives of what's only a very weak bureaucracy type, while differences remain concerning the dimensions of *Individualism* and *Masculinity* (dimensions of the professionalism model).

According to Hofstede, the cultural norms forming the dimensions *Power Distance* and *Uncertainty Avoidance* (co-ordination model) strongly affect our thinking about power and about rules or procedures in organisations. Differences in *Uncertainty Avoidance* represent a serious problem in international mergers since, as a result of those differences, it becomes difficult to hold the organisation together (Hofstede 1997: 145). Therefore, for 1 (GE/NL) Corps it is quite significant that, in terms of these dimensions, our results show quite similar values for both German and Dutch soldiers.

At the same time, it would appear that the attitudes towards human interaction within organisations, ones that are measured by the two dimensions of the professionalism model, are not exactly the same among German and Dutch soldiers. The dichotomization for the *Masculinity* dimension of Germany and the Netherlands is indicative of this difference, although the gap between the indices for the German and the Dutch soldiers is not that wide. The importance of having good working relations with your comrades and your superior, and to have employment security (*Femininity*) is more significant for the Dutch soldiers than it is for their German counterparts.

With respect to the dimension *Individualism vs. Collectivism*, the gap between the German and the Dutch results is still quite wide. It would seem that the German soldiers have a pronouncedly collectivistic culture compared to the Dutch soldiers, who show indices nearly as high as in the civilian business sector. With the last sample (Summer 2000), we found that the index for *Individualism* among the Ger-



man soldiers reached its relatively highest level. This upward tendency may reflect German and Dutch soldiers' evaluation of personal time, freedom and challenge, all of which are represented by the *Individualism* dimension. The range of scores for the German soldiers on the *Individualism* dimension increased to the Dutch soldiers' range, while the scores for the Dutch soldiers remained stable. In general, the extent of cultural homogeneity and heterogeneity at the inauguration of 1 (GE/NL) Corps in 1995 hardly diminished during the five first years of existence of the corps.

This study showed the cultural background of the soldiers of 1 (GE/NL) Corps as we measured it using the Hofstede dimensions. These *values*, ones that are responsible for the national macro culture, will have a significant influence on the micro level of the organisational culture of 1 (GE/NL) Corps. The underlying national *values* determine the meaning of members' *practices* in organisations. Those *practices* (i. e. symbols, heroes, and rituals) are the manifestations of an organisational culture (Hofstede 1997: 181). Further research with a focus on the organisational culture in national and multinational military units is needed in order to be able to evaluate the chances for a transnational European military.

## **5 A multinational military culture and military sociology**

An earlier study on 1 (GE/NL) Corps showed a rather poor acceptance of the corps among its soldiers. This is most likely due to the fact that almost the only collective *symbols* of 1 (GE/NL) Corps are the integration of the two headquarters and the symbol of the common unit crest<sup>25</sup>. Soldiers in the troops of 1 (GE/NL) Corps scarcely recognise that they belong to a large, multinational unit. This might be due to the fact that there are few common *practices*, and few collectively shared *symbols*. This could be changed through the development of more communal exercises and training that emphasise the group's cohesion at the bi-national level. A deeper personal integration should also be taken into consideration. For this purpose, German and Dutch soldiers should live in common barracks thus creating more natural, everyday

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<sup>25</sup> See Klein et al. (1999: 120f.).

meeting places. A change in relations of national subordination would not be necessary in such barracks. In any case, common Dutch-German barracks would be a powerful symbol of the spirit of *integrated multinationality*<sup>26</sup>.

The similarities of the Dutch and German soldiers reveal that the essential elements for a common military culture are already present, even though they rank behind national differences. These national differences will no doubt take long to overcome, as the primacy of national belonging is embedded in a more decisive context<sup>27</sup>. Nevertheless, there are ways to facilitate a blurring of boundaries where the multinationality of military organisations is at stake. In order to create a common multinational military culture, the connection of soldiers to multinational defined armed forces should be strengthened in favour of a border-crossing European military identity. This would enable a common and effective army in the framework of European integration and unification on the basis of already existing common ideals.

As useful as Hofstede's analysis proves to be on a macro-cultural view, the weaknesses of his approach become obvious in the light of the increasing heterogeneity of societies world wide and the question about the connection between national culture, collective identity, and the individual personality. As Friedman (1994: 41) writes, the post-modern situation is shaped at the cultural level on the one side by phenomenons of the process of globalisation, but at the other side characterised by 'dehomogenization', 'creolisation', and 'balkanisation' within the nation state. It seems important to keep this in mind when working with Hofstede's approach. The phenomenon of collective, cultural and social identity becomes virulent, in cases where identity becomes challenged, or endangered. This may happen because of different types of critical incidents or fundamental changes in life. Intercultural contacts and communicative acts of persons, who identify each other as different from one another via cultural notions represent such situations. This means that there is no equilibrium or empirical zero, but research on collective, cultural and social identity is a-

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<sup>26</sup> See also Klein et al. (1999: 122).

<sup>27</sup> See Gellner (1999: 19).

bout continuing processes of construction and reconstruction while coping with critical phases and changes. In 'post-modern' societies it is not identity, that is getting lost, but rather the traditional idea of the notion, which holds, that an inner coherence of identity develops only through a rigid system of *norms and orientations*. The theoretical accuracy of the notion of collective, cultural and social identities in their networks and relations of social structures remains blurry.

What Hofstede called the 'programming of the mind' might, in an elaborated thoughtful form, be represented by Bourdieus concept of the *habitus*. Furthermore, this construct offers a theoretical link between the macrostructure and the microstructure of 'the social'. The *habitus* is a theoretical construct, but at the same time it shows empirically detectable forms of manifestation. In *Bourdieu's theory of praxis* the central notion is the *habitus*, which he understands practically and theoretically as an instance of mediation between social position on the one hand and actions, preferences, tastes, ways of cognition and decisions of individuals on the other hand. In this sense it might be possible to imagine 'collective identity' as a crossing of the individual and collective level of behaviour and experience. To speak about the *habitus of a class or a culture*, in the sense of cultural competence acquired in a homogeneous group, means we have to keep in mind, that interpersonal relations are never merely the relation of one individual to another individual, and that the truth of an interaction is never to be found in itself alone. Therefore, further research on military culture should take society, social behaviour, and social identity into consideration, which would allow for a better understanding of the schemes for the (re-)production of actions and the practical sense for differences. Hence, the interactions between social structures, culture, and profession will have to receive much more attention in further military sociological research.



## **Putting the Collaboration to the Test, Münster and Kabul**

*Joseph Soeters and René Moelker*

The following chapter was originally written as part of a *liber amicorum* in honour of Paul Klein on the occasion of his upcoming retirement. However, it is well in place in this research report as it presents an update on the research findings. With ISAF-Afghanistan in 2003, the Dutch-German collaboration is put to the test for real and the test proved to be a difficult one. Collaboration within the headquarters in Münster appeared to be different from the collaboration at troop level in Kabul. This chapter discusses many possible explanations for the problems soldiers were confronted with and concludes with important lessons learned.

### **1 Introduction**

In 1996 the Dutch academic René Olie published a book about mergers between Dutch and German companies. One of the theses put forward in his work was formulated as follows: ‘For 90 per cent, Germans and Dutch are alike and for 10 per cent, they are different; all attention is devoted to those 10 per cent’ (Olie 1996). In the GLOBE-project, focussing on cultural practices and leadership patterns all over the world, Germany, Switzerland, Austria and the Netherlands are grouped together in the Germanic cluster (Szabo et al. 2002). Apparently, the Germans and the Dutch should be able to work together. They are indeed working together, not only in business, but also in the military.

The First German-Netherlands Corps was inaugurated in 1995. Since then, the name of the Corps is abbreviated as 1 (GE/NL) Corps. The start of bi-national co-operation within this Corps was slow, but integration gradually deepened and 1 (GE/NL) Corps has conducted operations in various parts of the world. Three consecutive studies in 1995, 1997, and 2000 were set up to monitor the developments regarding integration. These studies were a joint project of the Royal Nether-

lands Military Academy and the Bundeswehr Institute for Social Sciences. The studies have clearly demonstrated that this military merger process has been fairly successful: HQ 1 (GE/NL) Corps was awarded the status of 'NATO High Readiness Forces Headquarters' and the first combined deployment in Kosovo in 1999 was rated favourably by external examiners as well as the German and Dutch military themselves. Although the 1997 survey showed a drop in mutual appreciation, the results of 2000 demonstrated that the Germans and the Dutch really like working together, both in the peacetime HQ and during deployment.

However, everything changes and nothing will ever remain the same. After 2000, the Corps HQ has somewhat lost its bi-national character because about 15 per cent of the HQ slots have been manned by personnel from other NATO Member States. This development is related to the new NATO status of 1 (GE/NL) Corps. In addition, 1 (GE/NL) Corps was selected to command the ISAF mission in the Kabul-area as of February 2003. Never before had 1 (GE/NL) Corps been challenged to perform to the 'max', but at that moment 1 (GE/NL) Corps was expected to do just that. But what are the experiences with respect to the new developments? This chapter aims to shed some light on this question by exploring recent experiences in both HQ 1 (GE/NL) Corps and the Kabul area. The following section focuses on the situation within HQ 1 (GE/NL) Corps based on interviews with 25 officers. Since, at least in the Dutch press, there was mention of some friction between the Germans and the Dutch in Kabul, the remaining part of this chapter will deal with the experiences gained in Afghanistan. We will rely on interviews conducted and reports drawn up by an evaluation unit of the Royal Netherlands Army.

Temperatures in Kabul are usually high, operational conditions are difficult and smooth co-operation between the two partners cannot be taken for granted. Hence, the title of our contribution.

## 2 Recent developments within Headquarters 1 (GE/NL) Corps in Münster

In May 2003, we were granted permission to visit Headquarters 1 (GE/NL) Corps and conducted several interviews with German, Dutch and ‘international’ officers who had recently joined the Corps; among the latter were officers from Norway and the United Kingdom. Interestingly enough, only 75 per cent of the full working force was present at that moment. The other 25 per cent of the personnel were in HQ ISAF in Kabul. Obviously, this situation dominated the conversations we had. More than once, interviews were interrupted by phone calls from Kabul and sometimes we received ‘real-time’ comments from HQ ISAF on the topics we were discussing with their colleagues in Münster. So, sometimes we were – unexpectedly – talking with people in Kabul and Münster at the same time.

Nearly all people we spoke to said they loved working (and living) in Münster. They agreed that co-operation between the Germans and the Dutch is developing smoothly and that it had indeed become much better, more concrete and more operational than it ever was before. There was a remarkable consensus on this. Especially those who had been working at HQ 1 (GE/NL) Corps since its inauguration testified that progress in this co-operation cannot be denied. *‘The co-operation between the Germans and the Dutch is clearly OK’*, as one of the officers said. As such, the positive results of our 2000 survey were confirmed and continue to exist in the current situation.

Most of the interviewees stated that the increasing multinational character is advantageous to the further development of the co-operation. This is understandable. Bi-national collaboration can easily lead to some kind of polarisation: *‘this is not a matter of being German or Dutch, it is a matter of being only two’*. According to a number of interviewees, more nationalities will suppress this tendency, however weak this tendency in itself may be<sup>1</sup>. Bringing in other nationalities will, for instance, contribute to the use of English within HQ

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<sup>1</sup> There was mention of some struggle between the Germans and the Dutch about some issues concerning the deployment in Kabul. These issues were the duration of the deployment period and the composition of the staff in Afghanistan. It should be stressed though, that these debates were going on not only between but also within the two national contingents.

1 (GE/NL) Corps. In addition, it will help to develop continuously shifting coalitions in the decision-making process, which may be advantageous to the flexibility of the organisation (e. g. Volberda 1999). Finally, it will prevent people from playing the '*national card*' for their own individual purposes.

Despite the continuously improving collaboration, some – occasionally well-known – cultural differences between the Germans and the Dutch have come to the fore in the interviews. Obviously, these are the 10 per cent René Olie referred to. The Dutch tend to say that the Germans are more inclined to follow procedures, to be more formal and to rely on paper work more often. This is likely to make them act more slowly, but – as nearly everyone agrees – the quality of the German efforts and the results of their work are outstanding. The Dutch act in a more improvised manner confirmed by others. As one German officer said: '*The Dutch are not as tight as the Germans; they are more open-minded and relaxed, but on the other hand this may lead to a certain lack of respect and to too much discussion on their part.*' And he continues: '*sometimes the Dutch cross the border between being relaxed and being disrespectful*'. Overall however, German and Dutch interviewees have seen a certain convergence in working styles develop over the years. This convergence relates to finding a new balance between procedural working and improvisation and between a hierarchy-driven and a self-steering way of acting.

The interviews with the 'outsiders' from Norway and the United Kingdom underline the mutual impressions. The Dutch are considered to be '*friendly, informal and laid-back*' as well as '*arguing, disagreeing and discussing even after a decision was made*'. In this description one can recognise the tendency among the Dutch to strive for consensus in decision-making on the basis of mutual consultation (e. g. Herrlitz 1996; van Iterson 2000). The Germans are perceived as being '*polite, working by the book and giving the impression as if they are constantly giving orders*'. Besides, '*they work and work and work (...)*'.

Although happy in Münster, the officers from Norway and the United Kingdom were not all that satisfied about working at Headquarters 1 (GE/NL) Corps. The opportunities to socialise were deemed not to



be very good since the Germans simply live at home with their families and the Dutch tend to isolate themselves in a special Dutch canteen<sup>2</sup>. The 'international officers' felt the bi-national atmosphere still dominated the working climate within the HQ. They mentioned the competition between the two partners coming along with that and sometimes they simply felt neglected, e. g. only two flags were flying at the ceremony on the occasion of the departure to Kabul.

In two ways, there are concerns about the deployment of half of the HQ's working force to Kabul. Firstly, a number of officers expressed their worries about the atmosphere that may develop once the 'Kabulians' have returned to the HQ. They fear that a new sort of rivalry may now occur between the people who have experienced the '*real thing*' during deployment and those who had to stay at '*home*', doing work as usual. Secondly, they have heard of problems arising between the Germans and the Dutch in Kabul, not so much within HQ ISAF, but in the compound where the operational troops are located. They fear that this may affect future collaboration in Münster. They are worried about the idea that events in Kabul will have a negative impact on the future atmosphere in Münster. What, if anything, is happening in Kabul with respect to the co-operation between the Germans and the Dutch?

### **3 German-Dutch collaboration in Camp Warehouse**

The ISAF operation in the Kabul area began early in 2002. The aim of the operation is to restore public order and to improve safety in the larger Kabul area. In general, the mission is intended to help create the conditions to reconstruct Afghan society. The ISAF troops were and still are scheduled to leave the country as soon as nationwide elections to install a legitimate Afghan government have been held. As it is still unclear when this will be realised; no end date of the mission has been fixed yet. At the start, the British led ISAF. Once they departed, the Turks took over command, which they handed over to 1 (GE/NL) Corps on 10 February 2003 (Soeters et al. 2003b). In August 2003, the

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<sup>2</sup> However, this Dutch canteen is open to all ranks and some of the other nationalities (especially the Italians and the Spanish frequently pay a visit to this bar).

command was handed over to NATO and to the Canadian armed forces specifically.

In terms of manpower, materiel as well as financial means, the Germans brought enormous resources into the area from the start of the ISAF operation. Within the Kabul Multinational Brigade, their presence was and is overwhelming. It is therefore hardly surprising that the Germans and the Dutch decided, in good harmony, that the Germans would take the lead once command of the ISAF mission would be handed over to 1 (GE/NL) Corps. The Germans were to be responsible for all logistic affairs, including transport. The command centre of the operation was located in Potsdam, Germany. However, both the Germans and the Dutch were to have the final responsibility for the entire operation.

In the period from February 2003 to August 2003, some 630 troops were working for HQ ISAF as command, staff and support personnel in the HQ ISAF-building called Sports Club Kabul. Of those troops 35 per cent were German and 25 per cent were Dutch. The other 40 per cent of the slots were manned by servicemen from 18 other countries; some of them (like Finland and Sweden) contributing 20 to 30 servicemen and some of them (like Croatia and Denmark) only contributing one or two servicemen. The 380 German and Dutch servicemen all came from HQ 1 (GE/NL) Corps in Münster (Germany) and its Communication and Information Systems Battalion in Eibergen (The Netherlands).

The Kabul Multinational Brigade (KMNB) resided in Camp Warehouse, the other camp, from the start of the operation in 2002. Camp Warehouse accommodates some 2300 troops. Another 850 KMNB troops were housed at other locations (Kabul International Airport mainly). The KMNB troops actually did the real work: patrolling the area 7 days a week, 24-hours-a-day, manning check points, demining areas, reconstructing roads, escorting specific transports and so on. Most of the operational troops at Camp Warehouse were Germans (1400 roughly). Little over 300 Dutch servicemen were staying there as well. About 20 nationalities, including, for instance, Spanish and Italian troops, were working and living there. The Dutch troops in this Camp mainly comprised units of the Air Mobile Brigade (specialised

infantry troops), augmented by special forces, engineers and support staff personnel. Germany posted Airborne and Mountain Troops to the Camp, which also were augmented by engineer and logistics personnel. The HQ of the Brigade was also located at Camp Warehouse and was predominantly manned by Germans (approximately 170 German against 17 Dutch soldiers). The total number of personnel at HQ KMNB amounted to 230.

In January 2003, an article was published in several Dutch newspapers. This article came as a shock<sup>3</sup>. It said that collaboration between the Germans and the Dutch in Kabul was deteriorating rapidly and actually had not been positive at all from the day the operation had begun. Because people, at that time, were not working together in HQ ISAF yet, the article was obviously referring to the situation in Camp Warehouse. It was unclear, however, what was really happening over there.

In the remaining part of this chapter we will describe and analyse events that took place at Camp Warehouse. We focus on relations between troops within this camp. In an other publication we will also pay attention to the interaction between ISAF troops and the local population (Soeters et al. 2003b). Our analysis is based on interviews conducted with participants of the first rotation. In addition, we were able to make use of debriefing reports related to the next four Dutch ISAF rotations (based on 99 interviews). These reports were made available by the evaluation unit of the Royal Netherlands Army. One specific caveat should be mentioned. Because all respondents were Dutch, findings will necessarily be 'orange-coloured'. We will try to take this into account when analysing and interpreting the results. Besides, it has to be stressed again that the following does not refer to HQ ISAF. We had planned to join the evaluation unit on a trip to Kabul in order to study the situation within HQ ISAF, but because safety was rapidly diminishing in that area, we were not allowed to go there.

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<sup>3</sup> An article in the Dutch newspaper 'Brabants Dagblad' of January 11, 2003 announced in capital letters that 'Afghans are not the problem, Germans are'. Fortunately, other articles were published as well. An article in the newspaper 'de Volkskrant' of February 11, 2003 made it clear that the Dutch agreed that saying 'Sie' made sense implying that collaboration between the Germans and the Dutch in Münster and Potsdam in particular was developing smoothly and that both Dutch and German commanders were satisfied with the results of integration.

So what was the nature of the friction between the Germans and the Dutch in Camp Warehouse? First of all, it needs to be said that the Dutch were encamped in tents in a corner of Camp Warehouse. The tents were positioned closely together and therefore available space was limited. Actually, the whole camp was densely populated. The Dutch infantry troops generally stayed in their own 'quarters' and went to the Dutch mess after working hours. The tendency among Dutch servicemen to isolate themselves has also been observed in other peacekeeping missions, particularly in Bosnia (e. g. Soeters et al. 2003b; Sion 2004). The interaction of the Dutch – for working purposes as well as socially – therefore was predominantly national instead of bi-national or multinational; this may come across as a bit strange since Camp Warehouse housed a multinational brigade. Nevertheless, this was the situation at hand and, being aware of this situation, is important to understand the nature of the problems in German-Dutch interaction.

To start with, the Dutch military were complaining about the many '*strange*' priorities set by the Germans. Their complaints especially referred to logistics and to the supply of goods in particular: '*beer and candy bars are arriving here earlier than concertina barbed wire and ammunition*' and '*the Germans are not capable of delivering our personal weapons immediately after we have arrived in the area of operation*'. The handling of mail ('*too late*'), the repair of telephones ('*not often enough*'), the pace at which German engineers carried out repairs in the camp ('*too slow*'), the preparation of the food in the German kitchen ('*not tasty enough*'): those were all issues that were not dealt with sufficiently in the eyes of the Dutch troops in Camp Warehouse.

In addition to disappointment about goods being late, a general uneasiness developed as a consequence of the fact that it simply was unclear when goods were to arrive. So, the level of information was deemed insufficient. The way in which the Dutch ventilate their grievances is not always very polite in the eyes of others. In a plenary meeting with the German Brigadier General, a Dutch corporal bluntly asked when required ammunition was to be delivered. The tone of his statement apparently '*crossed the border between being relaxed and being disrespectful*': the meeting was closed immediately, leaving

everybody in disarray. This incident was raised by the Dutch interviewees, not only to describe the logistic problems, but also to give an impression of the friction they experienced when approaching German officers.

As to the delivery of goods, the Dutch felt they were not treated in the same manner as they sensed the Germans dealt with their own personnel. If one may say so, the Dutch felt somewhat neglected, also perhaps – and this is particularly noteworthy – by their own Dutch staff and command personnel. We will turn to this particular aspect later on.

There was disagreement about operational issues as well. The Dutch considered themselves to be more experienced in peacekeeping than the Germans. As a consequence, they criticised the Germans in command for not having developed sufficient security measures with respect to the extraction plan, the entrance policies, the presence of locals within the camp, the guarding of the camp, and the medical coordination in case of incidents. The Dutch were unhappy with the decision taken by the German commanders that only infantry troops were to be assigned guard duty. They were particularly dissatisfied with this decision because nearly all Dutch servicemen in the camp belonged to the infantry. That is why they felt they were charged with this task disproportionately more often than the other contingents.

There was even more discontent among the Dutch infantry troops. They did not really understand why German housing facilities were better than theirs (prefabs instead of tents), why the Dutch had to move more often than others and why German allowances exceeded those laid down in Dutch financial arrangements. Most of all, they had difficulties understanding that other nationalities (headed by the Germans) were permitted to drink alcohol ad libitum, i. e. without any formal restraints.

The latter point sharply contrasts with the so-called 2-can rule in the Dutch army limiting the ration of alcohol to little more than half a litre of beer per person every 24 hours. The Dutch soldiers of the first rotation – i. e. those we talked to – were highly critical of the relatively high number of intoxicated German servicemen after hours causing all kinds of annoyances at night (noise, hanging about the camp). They qualified this as unprofessional, as, by the way, was done by the Turkish ISAF soldiers as well (Soeters et al. 2003b). In reports on the rotations to follow, no information about such incidents was revealed, so it is possible that the number of drinking incidents had reduced. However, the diverging (enforcement of) alcohol regulations within the camp were constant source of irritation<sup>4</sup>.

In general, the Dutch infantry troops seem to resent the dominating role of the Germans in the camp; viciously, they sometimes refer to the *KGB*, the *Kabul German Brigade* instead of the Kabul Multinational Brigade. Less maliciously, they speak about the mission as a '*German Game*'. Not all Germans are the same, though. The collaboration with the German Mountain troops is perceived as much easier and more relaxed than with the airborne troops.

The Dutch infantry troops did not only experience problems with the Germans. There also was friction with the personnel of their own support unit, with the Dutch personnel within HQ KMNB and with the Dutch special forces (who were considered to be '*arrogant*'). Contrary to this, the Dutch military personnel within HQ KMNB stated that the Dutch infantry troops '*keep on whining all the time*' and '*that they (the officers in particular) should use the proper channels, if they have a problem*'. And finally, '*the Dutch troops should leave their bar every once and a while (and join the others) (...)*'.

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<sup>4</sup> Formally, the Germans endorsed the 2-can rule as well, but the enforcement of this rule among the Germans was less strict.

## 4 Explanations

The situation in and around Camp Warehouse is not easy to deal with. The operations in the area of responsibility were difficult, ambiguous, stressful and sometimes life-threatening. Compared with the number of people who had to live there, Camp Warehouse was relatively small and people have to accept orders from, to work with and to socialise with people who do not speak their mother tongue and hence lack the intimacy one has with people who do. This is the background of the friction that arose in Camp Warehouse between Dutch and German military personnel. Further elaboration on this general explanation can be realised on the basis of various contributions from the social sciences. We will try to do this distinguishing four elements: strategy, structure, culture and process. We are aware that these elements are interconnected; the distinction therefore is only for simplicity's sake.

### *Strategy*

The Germans played the dominating role in KMNB; they invested more resources in the Kabul operation than other countries, the Netherlands in particular. This had its impact on the Dutch. Playing a minor role on a larger stage is generally not something the Dutch are comfortable with. The Dutch have a collective identity emphasising independence, individualism and sometimes even (moral and economic) superiority (e. g. Zahn 1984; van Iterson 2000). One may call this the '*KLM-syndrome*'. The Dutch national airline company, KLM (*Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij* = Royal Dutch Airlines), obviously is too small to survive the current global business competition. The decline of other national commercial airlines, like the Belgian Sabena and Swissair, has clearly demonstrated this economic inevitability. Hence, KLM is feverishly looking for a partner to merge with. Self-evident merger partners from neighbouring countries such as the airlines Air France, British Airways and Lufthansa, however, are continuously rejected for the simple reason that KLM would become the smaller party in the new organisation having less than equal decision-making rights. This is a bridge too far for the proud 'Flying Dutchmen' (who pride themselves on being the first commercial airline in the world ...). The Dutch government decided not to participate in

ISAF on the same scale as the Germans; this strategic decision simply infected the Dutch ‘self-image’ of independence<sup>5</sup>.

In addition, strategic decisions by the Dutch government and military top-brass pertaining to financial allowances, housing facilities and alcohol policies were not been rated favourably by the Dutch troops. In all these aspects, the Dutch felt deprived compared to the military of other countries, in particular the Germans. *Relative deprivation* is a well-known phenomenon in the military (Merton 1968). Since the Second World War, this phenomenon has been analysed profoundly in a series of studies on the ‘American Soldier’ (Stouffer et al. 1949). The main issue is that people may feel deprived because they take the situation of people with whom they are in direct social interaction as a base for self-reference and self-evaluation; sometimes the frame of reference is also yielded by social categories of people with whom the individual has no direct sustained social relations (Merton 1968: 281–288). This referencing leads to frustration, dissatisfaction and even anger if the outcome of the evaluation process is negatively valued. The impact of strategic decision-making – through feelings of relative deprivation among the Dutch – made itself felt quite clearly in Camp Warehouse. This impact was felt even more because the explanation of these strategic decisions was not satisfactory in the eyes of the Dutch servicemen.

### *Structure*

Three aspects should be considered here. First, the Dutch perceived a loss of control because the Germans were responsible for all logistic matters. In general, people do not like to be dependent on others for essential things in (working) life, such as – in the case of the military – their personal weapon, safety equipment and personal belongings (mail). Nowadays, tasks in organisations are nearly always designed in such a way that employees can control their own situation as much as possible. It helps them feel at ease and it keeps them motivated. Obviously, this rule was not applied in the design of the task structure within the German-Dutch contribution to the KMNB.

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<sup>5</sup> That an equal balance of power also is a sensitive issue in German-Dutch business mergers, is aptly described in Olie (1996).



Second, all kinds of social mechanisms occur if the distribution of participating categories is highly skewed; this is a basic insight stemming from sociology (Kanter 1977: 206–242). One of the major effects is that the dominating culture, i. e. the culture of those who are in the majority quantitatively, will be exaggerated. This will lead to asserted group solidarity and re-affirmed, shared in-group understandings. In the presence of minorities, the majority culture will be underlined rather than undermined. As a consequence, the minority tends to be neglected, if not isolated; and if the majority does not isolate the minority, the minority may isolate itself (like the Dutch infantry troops did). This is not to blame the Germans, but if such social dynamics occur in many majority-minority relations, why not at Camp Warehouse? One could recognise this in some expressions during the interviews we conducted with German officers indicating that *‘the Dutch sometimes make a spoilt impression’*. Whether or not this is true, is not the issue here. The point is that, in the interaction between a majority and a minority, culture patterns occur that may result in the exaggeration of the dominant culture and the (self-elected) isolation of the minority.

Third, the space available in the camp was limited. Many people were working and living in the same, small place. To put it differently: the population density in the camp was high. High population density may lead to the so-called ‘crowding effect’, which is a well-known concept in social psychology (e. g. Werner and Altman 1996) meaning that people may perceive crowding and density as problematic when they experience more contact with other people than is desired. Density as such is not the problem, but it may develop into one. This may happen by force of circumstances like:

- a) When people feel they have to compete with others for scarce resources,
- b) when people feel they are being blocked in the attainment of their goals,
- c) when people are annoyed by noise and visual distractions, and
- d) when people feel compelled to moderate their behaviour to accommodate others.

It does not require much imaginative talent to translate this list of socio-psychological conditions into events occurring continuously at Camp Warehouse. That this may lead to frustration, negative attitudes and – again – self-elected isolation is not hard to imagine either. It should be added that the labour division in the camp was set up according to national lines, hence making ‘deep integration’ at the operational level – one of the prime objectives of 1 (GE/NL) Corps – in Kabul impossible. ‘Deep integration’ – joint patrols for instance – could possibly have prevented several of the problematic interaction patterns<sup>6</sup> mentioned above.

### *Culture*

Military organisations are known for their strong cultures (Soeters et al. 2003a). Especially the culture of military units in action and even more in elite units (Winslow 1999), is considered to be strong, cohesive and inner-directed. In general, the climate within those units is virile and competitive, based on a ‘can-do’ mentality. The military culture – again more among elite units like airborne troops – is full of ‘us-and-them’ classifications: ‘them’ being the enemy, the locals outside, the politicians, the NGO personnel, but also the people from the staff and the headquarters as well as the foreign soldiers one has to work with. At best, the ‘others’ (‘them’) are indifferent to the members of the units; in worse cases, the ‘others’ are treated in a hostile way by the soldiers in such units. The commitment to ‘us’ (being the mates, including the commanders of the units) is total; the solidarity, the bonding with one another is high. Those who violate the unit’s practices and opinions are seriously punished by others inside the unit. A characteristic feature is that ranks are closed in times of trouble. If inappropriate behaviour were to occur within the unit – which is not unlikely to happen in such closed groups –, the group members do not discuss this openly. In such cases, codes of silence are invoked. Within such units, groups can easily develop their own values, beliefs and ideologies that may have little or nothing to do with the official military culture.

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<sup>6</sup> One example of ‘deep integration’ occurred when the German battalion commander handed over his responsibility to the Dutch company commander when he was on leave.

Given the fact that the Dutch as well as the German troops at Camp Warehouse were predominantly airborne and airmobile units – hence elite units –, it is not difficult to understand that these culture-related processes occurred on both sides of the German-Dutch co-operation in Camp Warehouse. Knowing this, it is no surprise that friction neither occurred among military personnel of the staff units nor in the collaboration between the Dutch troops and the German Mountain Units who entered the scene in the course of 2003. Apparently, the subculture in the German Mountain Units is less closed, less ‘elite-ish’ and less indifferent towards others<sup>7</sup>.

One specific issue concerning the role of officers should be mentioned here. From the interviews as well as the evaluation reports we had the impression that officers of the Dutch airmobile units usually sided with their soldiers. Hence, they generally seemed to agree with their soldiers’ criticism of the Germans. This is fully in accordance with the military unit culture we described. The position of officers, however, can also shift in the opposite direction. In a study on Anglo-Dutch collaboration in Cyprus (Soeters et al. 2000), we observed that Dutch soldiers were criticising some of their platoon and group leaders for behaving in a way that was too ‘British’. Coincidentally, this was also an airmobile unit. Given the small number of observations, we can neither indicate which behaviour was prevailing in Kabul nor indicate which behaviour was dominant in Cyprus. What we can say, however, is that the role of the junior officers and NCOs is critical in maintaining the unit’s morale as well as in maintaining good relationships with other units participating in the mission. Their behaviour looks like walking a tightrope, neither bending to the one nor to the other side. In multinational military missions one definitely needs tightrope walkers.

### *Process*

Of course, many of the aforementioned issues are also process-related. But here, we would like to point at three additional social mechanisms. The first point relates to the problem of *raising false expectations*. Surprisingly, we discovered that the soldiers had been told to

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<sup>7</sup> We do not have specific information on the differences between the airborne troops and the mountain units.

prepare themselves for real battle-like operations. Apparently, the politicians and the military planners had expected warlike scenarios, which explains the fact that both the Germans and the Dutch deployed elite units. The consequence of this was that many felt 'disappointed' about the actual nature of the work (social patrolling, guard duty). It has been observed earlier, also in Bosnia, that military organisations still have problems in adequately preparing their units for the situations in which they may find themselves (Sion 2004). Besides, the units felt ill-prepared with respect to the issue of working and living in a multinational environment.

In order to prepare as realistically as possible, the Dutch units scheduled to be deployed were trained by units that had already served in Kabul. This seems a wise approach because it narrows the gap between practice and theory. Nonetheless, this approach contains some problems as well. In unclear, ambiguous and crisis situations, people need to attribute their *own meaning* to what is happening and to what they are doing in the circumstances of that moment (Weick 1988). Once opinions have been formed and corresponding action has been taken, people tend to get *committed* to these views, explanations and actions. The consequence of this is that explanations and views tend to *persist* and that they are *transformed into assumptions taken for granted*. Delay in the transport of Dutch mail to and from Kabul will certainly have occurred; this may have been the case once, twice or perhaps three times. But once the Dutch interpreted such an event as a deliberate German action, the story seems to persist forever. This reminds us of a story told by one of the previous commanders of the Royal Netherlands Military Academy, who never got tired of telling people that the civilian teachers at the academy did not know that officer cadets were only allowed to go home during the weekends. In fact, many years before, a civilian lecturer had indeed conveyed the impression of not knowing this. During the regime of this commander of the Royal Netherlands Military Academy, however, the story was always told in such a way that none of the civilians were aware of the most elementary aspects of academy life.

Finally, we need to keep in mind that the Kabul operation really was dangerous. During the period under study, there were several missile attacks against the compound as well as assaults involving the use of

grenades and other small explosives. These caused casualties and severe injuries among the Western troops. Although talking to Dutch soldiers does not indicate that they are seized by panic in such events, they surely felt threatened. Their worries about operational issues mostly referred to safety policies. Recent socio-psychological studies demonstrated that people realising the fragility of life tends to *enhance stereotypical thinking*. This implies that they focus their frustration on out-groups, they cling to values that are essential to their own common identity and world view, and they tend to reject people who are different (Schimel et al. 1999). All this will lead to an increment of rivalries between groups as soon as one has become aware of one's own mortality. Again, it does not require too much imaginative talent to connect these patterns to the events that occurred at Camp Warehouse.

## **5 Conclusions and recommendations**

The history of 1 (GE/NL) Corps has shown a steady progress towards continuous improvement of co-operation and integration. Of course there have been occasional hiccups, but the general tendency was positive on the whole (see respective report). Suddenly, this picture was disturbed, not in Münster but in Kabul. In some articles published by the press, the general public in the Netherlands could read about friction between the German and the Dutch soldiers in Kabul. We hope this chapter has helped to decipher what really happened in and around Camp Warehouse (see also Soeters et al. 2003). We are convinced that, when dealing with such culture-related issues, one should neither exaggerate any (potential) problems nor try to sweep them under the carpet. One should find a middle way between two extremes. This is a recommendation for researchers in the field as much as it is for commanders working in a multinational environment. We hope that this chapter is in line with this recommendation.

In this final section, we do not aim at providing a full list of practical do's and don'ts to improve German-Dutch collaboration or even multinational military co-operation in general. Such hints and tips have been listed excellently elsewhere, for instance in the reports drafted by

the Evaluation Agency of the Royal Netherlands Army. We would like to suggest three points for further reflection, though.

Firstly, some issues clearly belong to the level of strategic (political and military) decision-making. The Dutch soldiers felt somewhat frustrated by their lower allowances, their modest housing facilities and – perhaps most of all – by the different alcohol regulations in the camp. Besides, they experienced a loss of control with respect to the transport of elementary goods. These feelings, stemming from comparing one's own situation with that of others, are sincere and potentially very intense. Clearly, local commanders cannot deal with these issues, and therefore the political and/or the military strategic leadership should take its/their responsibility and adapt their normal policies to what seems to be appropriate in a specific situation. It is not advisable that one partner should accommodate to the other; finding a fair equilibrium would probably be better. This could imply, for instance, that the Dutch in Kabul should be allowed to drink 3 instead of 2 cans of beer a day, providing the German soldiers were restricted to that number as well. However, if the situation should become more dangerous, a more restrictive alcohol policy could be enforced. In addition to this, it seems to be the responsibility of strategic leadership to insist on implementing forms of 'deep integration' at the operational level.

Second, the role of NCOs and junior commanders is of critical importance and difficult at the same time. Of course, it's their obligation to take care of their personnel, to take their side when required and to create cohesion within the unit. But the stronger the cohesion within the unit, the less the unit is directed to the outside world; even if the outside world consists of colleagues in the same camp, doing the same type of work and sharing the same conditions of life. Hence, there is a rather problematic side of unit cohesion and the responsible commanders should therefore be made aware of this. Junior commanders should not always take the side of their personnel, nor should they always take the side of their senior commanders, irrespective of the nationality of these commanders. In this respect, 'either ... or' thinking should disappear from commanders' minds. In addition, (junior) commanders should be trained to deal with problems in a serious and thoughtful manner restraining negative emotions, – especially if these are directed against foreign soldiers. This is an important task for lecturers, instructors and coaches of newly trained commanders, not only in the Netherlands but all over the (military) world.

Our final point refers to the preparation of missions. A returning point of criticism in evaluations of peace support operations is that servicemen are trained to expect something different than they actually experience. Sometimes this cannot be prevented, for instance if conditions are unclear, vague and potentially very dangerous. But if this preparation is the consequence of a persistent national and 'green' line of thought among the military, then it is time to take a careful look at these preparation programs. This is not the same as saying that a national and 'green' line of thought is wrong, but it should be realised that it is neither sufficient nor closely suits many peace support operations.

If this article has contributed to start considering the aforementioned points of reflection, it has fulfilled its intention. We are convinced that the problems in the heat of Kabul do not need to be more than an exception to the general positive development that is taking place within 1 (GE/NL) Corps.

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## Conclusions

*René Moelker and Joseph Soeters*

### 1 Answering research questions

In chapter one, six research questions were presented. In the chapters that followed these questions were answered. Studying processes of collaboration between the military from two countries is challenging. Easy answers are not always available and the subject matter is complex. What is more, the longitudinal study of collaboration proves that change processes never end. Even if at one point in time, satisfactory results are obtained, there is no guarantee that future results will be comparable or better. This research proves at least one thing. To improve multinational collaboration, continuous efforts are required. The research also proves that the efforts put into improving the collaboration are worthwhile. We know this from the answers to the research questions.

(1) First of all we asked whether service with First German-Netherlands Corps influenced the understanding of the other nation and its soldiers. In many ways understanding was improved by serving together in one corps. From chapter three we learnt that, over time, serving together has a positive influence on the attitude towards a common corps. In the course of five years, the Dutch changed most in their attitudes, whereas the Germans remained stable (at a high level of sympathetic attitude towards working together). In 2000, most soldiers supported the statement that working together would reduce prejudices towards the other country. The amount of trust in soldiers of the other nation coming to the rescue when in a tight position is very high. Dutch officers especially, strongly believe that their German comrades would come to their aid. Experiences in Kosovo, where Germans and Dutch collaborated in a real deployment situation, improved mutual understanding to a high degree. The only downside concerns Dutch rank and file. Also with respect to other topics, they were the most negative, showed little changes in a positive direction and were no advocates of collaboration. The attitudes of the Dutch

rank and file level are even somewhat disquieting. We will try to interpret this finding later.

(2) Do increased contacts cause liking? That, in fact, is the bottom line when we asked whether the contact frequency influences soldiers from the respective other nation on attitudes, opinions and prejudices? Based on the findings from chapters two and five, a straightforward 'yes' cannot be given. Yes, it is true that there is a correlation between interaction and people liking each other better, but what is it that makes people interact in the first place? Maybe it is because they had more positive attitudes to each other from the start? Chapter five demonstrates that interaction after hours (for example, inviting a colleague of an other nationality to your home or private quarters) is more common when one has chosen voluntarily to work in an integrated binational headquarters and when one wants to learn the other's language. Proficiency in the other language is also important, but not as important as the above-mentioned variables.

Increasing the contact frequency does not change the image of the other nation. As was illustrated in chapter two, increased contacts may even confirm a pre-existing image. As people tend to conform to the self-fulfilling prophecy, there is also some truth in the images. Germans believe the Dutch to be more sociable, more easygoing and looser regarding the interpretation of regulations. The Dutch believe the Germans to be stricter, very reliable and more formal. Among the Germans, these images remain stable over time. Both nations perceive the other nation's soldiers as professional and competent. Over time, the Dutch have developed a more positive image of the Germans. Even though contact does not change the national image, contact may help people in dealing with cultural differences. Knowledge of differences may help in understanding each other better.

Increasing the contact frequency does seem to cause Germans and Dutch to like each other more. Answers to the question 'how sympathetic are the Germans respectively the Dutch to you?' evolved in a U-shaped fashion. This was called the acculturation curve. High expectations in 1995 caused 42 per cent of the soldiers to express sympathetic feelings towards personnel of the other nationality. In 1997, this percentage remained stable among the Germans (41 per cent), but

it fell sharply among the Dutch. In the year 2000, the U-curve goes in the upward direction. 55 per cent of the soldiers expressed sympathetic feelings towards the other nation's soldiers.

The number of contacts, contacts after hours and the nation to which the soldiers belonged, correlate with sympathetic feelings. This proves the contact hypothesis but also points to national differences. The Germans like the Dutch more than the Dutch like the Germans. Dutch rank and file soldiers showing least favourable attitudes, mainly causes this difference. Dutch soldiers at NCO or Officer level do not differ much from their German counterparts and express mutual sympathetic feelings (NCOs more often express neutral attitudes but are certainly not negative).

The answer to the research question is complicated by the fact that the changes in the wider Dutch society could also have influenced the results. The positive change for Dutch military in and outside the integrated headquarters could easily be a reflection of this change in Dutch society at large (see Oudenhoven 2000b).

(3) The third research question ventures into the issue of co-operation and acceptance of 1 (GE/NL) Corps. Do possibly existing national prejudices and stereotypes influence the co-operation within the corps and the evaluation of the soldiers from the partner army, and are there any changes over the course of time?

Prejudices and stereotypes may well exist among Dutch rank and file. But as they do not within the other ranks, it was concluded in chapter two that it is better to refer to them as national images. The images of the other nations have certainly not developed into stereotypes and prejudices and they are not associated with the aura of negativity that normally accompanies stereotypes. Based on these findings, we can conclude that stereotypes and/or prejudices have not had a negative influence on co-operation. Three quarters of the Dutch and German soldiers in the year 2000 evaluate the collaboration between the soldiers from the two nations as 'positive' or even 'very positive' (chapter four). Evaluations have improved over time. The same number of positive answers was given to the question about whether Dutch and German soldiers within 1 (GE/NL) Corps are partners with equal

rights. All soldiers, German and Dutch, evaluate the Germans as slightly dominant. A majority within almost all ranks preferred mixed units. This result, of course, reinforces the argument for integration. Again, Dutch rank and file are the exception to the general findings. The Dutch rank and file tend to be more negative when evaluating the co-operation. They also judge the Germans to be more dominant than the NCOs or officers do.

(4) Next is the question whether the different structures (conscript army versus volunteer force; open or closed structures regarding female enlistment) influence the co-operation in the corps, particularly within the mixed headquarters? In 1996 the Netherlands Armed Forces restructured into an all-volunteer force. The Netherlands have largely opened their armed forces to women while, at the time of the survey, the German side knew servicewomen only in the medical services and in musical bands.

Approximately one fifth to one quarter expected difficulties from the transition towards an all-volunteer force in the integrated headquarters in 1997 (chapter seven). But three years later, the number of Germans perceiving difficulties decreased significantly while the Dutch perceived more difficulties having to deal with German conscripts. But the majority within the integrated headquarters experienced no difficulties arising from differences in the two systems (perceiving no difficulties among Germans 68 per cent, among the Dutch 65 per cent). Again, Dutch rank and file expected more difficulties in co-operating with conscripts than other rank categories. In comparison to other ranks, German officers are very much in favour of keeping the conscription system (73 per cent in 2000). Lower ranks and Dutch military from all ranks are more divided on this question. Circa 38 per cent of the Dutch in 2000 stated that the Germans should follow and change into an all-volunteer force. About the same percentage stated the opposite. Circa 50 per cent of German NCOs and rank and file in 2000 was in favour of an all-volunteer force. 33 per cent of German rank and file and 44 per cent of the NCOs wanted to keep conscription.

In 2000, general experiences with servicewomen were very good or good. Only a minority of less than 10 per cent of respondents reported bad experiences. In total 50 per cent of all soldiers was in favour of

opening up all slots to women. Depending on the rank, percentages in favour of 'all slots open' varied from 38 per cent (Dutch NCOs) to 64 per cent (Dutch officers). Percentages for other categories lie somewhere in between (for instance, German officers 44 per cent). Circa one third of soldiers did not want women to serve in combat units. Less than 10 per cent wanted women only in musical bands and medical units. Only small minorities (less than 10 per cent) were totally opposed to women serving in the armed forces.

In both international and national headquarters, the majority of German and Dutch military personnel supported the position that all slots in the armed forces should be open to women. Nearly half of the interviewed German soldiers shared this opinion. Although two thirds of the soldiers from the Netherlands had good experiences with women in the armed forces, more than half of them (52 per cent) did not approve of women in combat slots.

(5) Contact usually improves mutual understanding. Affiliations enhance contact by promoting joined activities such as common exercises, invitations to ceremonies, sports and social events. Do these affiliations of German and Dutch military units improve mutual understanding? Affiliations do not constitute a universal remedy that increases the sympathy for the soldiers and the people of the neighbouring country in general, but nevertheless, they contribute to a better mutual understanding since they offer many situations to become better acquainted with the national particularities of the other party concerned (chapter eight). Thus, contingent prejudices can be adjusted through personal experience, which eventually may lead to their reduction or even their dismantling.

Based on findings from the 1997 survey, it had already been proposed to go further on the way once taken (Klein/Rosendahl Huber/Frantz 1999: 46). The 2000 results only can affirm this recommendation. But the results also point to the fact that still not nearly enough soldiers are being reached by the activities under the umbrella of the affiliations.

(6) The sixth question ‘Does a specific feeling of identity beyond the nation – such as a transnational organisational culture and the attitude towards integration of the European military – grow in the corps over the years?’ was answered by analysing differences in cultures (chapter nine) as well as by ascertaining the attitudes towards integration of the European military (chapter six).

Hofstede distinguishes four cultural dimensions:

- power distance;
- uncertainty avoidance;
- individualism versus collectivism;
- masculinity versus femininity.

The scores on the dimension individuality are consistently higher over time for the Dutch soldiers, whereas Germans score constantly higher on masculinity. But it has to be said that the differences between the results for the German and Dutch soldiers on this dimension are not extraordinarily large. Over time, the German scores on individuality show a slight convergence towards the Dutch.

The dimensions of power distance and uncertainty avoidance are both aspects of a bureaucratic culture. High scores indicate a high level of bureaucratic culture. In the case of the Netherlands and Germany it can be concluded that their culture is quite similar, both nations share a weakly pronounced bureaucratic culture. Both countries score relatively low on power distance (this means that both countries are relatively egalitarian) and uncertainty avoidance. The developments over time are stable, meaning that there was little change. Germany and the Netherlands represent a network type of culture. In the network type, new tasks are carried out through co-operation. Essential elements for a common military culture are already present within 1 (GE/NL) Corps.

A military culture that is already shared to some extent appears to be a prerequisite for the integration of the European armed forces. The attitudes of the soldiers towards this kind of integration are favourable. In 2000, 52 per cent of Germans and 42 per cent of the Dutch

soldiers showed positive attitudes towards a common European army (chapter six). Only 20 per cent of the Germans and 27 per cent of the Dutch showed negative attitudes towards a common European army. However, there is a diminishing faith in 1 (GE/NL) Corps as a first step towards this common European army. Maybe the soldiers feel that a bi-national organisation is probably lacking the multinational qualifications necessary for a truly common European army. It is possible that five years of experience with 1 (GE/NL) Corps encouraged realism concerning the possibilities and impossibilities of this kind of bilateral collaboration. In short: attitudes towards integration are positive but at the same time positivism is tempered by realism. However, rapid change dominates the question of integration. Attitudes might have already changed in light of these changes. One of the major changes is that, as of recent, the Münster headquarters has attained multi-national high readiness status and soldiers from other European countries have joined the headquarters in Münster. In future, the Münster Headquarters will be one of the high readiness headquarters to lead a European Rapid Reaction Force. Also, the international collaboration in Kabul might have been of influence on attitudes towards further integration (see chapter 10 and the section below).

## **2 The findings interpreted**

In this research, Dutch rank and file soldiers are the atypical category. In whatever kind of analysis they are always the most negative of all categories. They like the Germans least and have low expectations concerning future collaboration. Moreover when collaboration is put to practice as it was in Camp Warehouse in Kabul/ISAF it will probably be this category that is least enthusiastic about collaborating with the Germans. There are many reasons that explain the situation as Soeters and Moelker noted in chapter eleven. To reprise only a few of the reasons mentioned: the precondition of equality is disrespected as can be seen from the imbalance regarding the numerical presence of Dutch and German soldiers; Germans are the better accommodated; there are different rules, for instance, regarding the use of alcohol; the Germans are not only in the lead but they are very much in control of everything which affronts the expertise the Dutch think to have gained from previous deployments; rank and file soldiers have the least expe-



rience with affiliations, joint exercises and friendly exchanges of informalities during social events. Many more reasons can be added. (chapter 10)

Soldiers in the integrated headquarters in Eibergen and Münster are working there mostly on a voluntary basis, want to learn the other nation's language and are mostly proficient in English, which explains why co-operation in the integrated headquarters is very successful and unproblematic. Soldiers working in integrated headquarters are also more likely to be higher ranked soldiers than soldiers in the troops. And this again correlates with proficiency at English making the argument almost circular.

Let us return to the general interpretation of our findings and integrate the lessons learned from Münster/Eibergen and Kabul. Whereas (a) the *values and cultural images that form part of the cultural nucleus* of a nation remain highly stable, (b) the *attitudes* towards the other nation are subject to change.

- (a) Dutch and German cultures are like and unlike. The resemblance is preponderant (perhaps 90 per cent is alike as René Olie claims, 1996) and of such a nature that we concluded that both share a network type of culture. But none of the soldiers of both nations would be prepared to give up cultural peculiarities. The nations want to hold on to their respective values, norms and cultural identities. That is not to say that they do not appreciate the other's culture. On the contrary, exactly the fact that the other culture *is* different makes it attractive and likeable. The soldiers in integrated headquarters mostly participate in cultural events of both countries (and, for instance, the Germans participate in Remembrance Days whereas the Dutch celebrate 'Labour Day' just as they do 'Sinterklaas').
- (b) These attitudes are much more changeable than the cultural characteristics of the nations. Attitudes influencing collaboration between German and Dutch soldiers are evolving in a positive direction. The Germans and the Dutch within the integrated headquarters are growing towards each other. They are growing in mutual understanding.

This is an important conclusion based on empirical findings, but how is it to be understood? How can we interpret these facts so that they become meaningful? Nahavandi and Malekzadeh (1988) offer a practical framework for interpretation.

Table 1: Patterns of intercultural interaction (source Nahavandi/ Malekzadeh 1988)

		Wish to keep own culture (values)	
		Yes	No
Attractiveness of the other culture (attitude)	Yes	Integration	Assimilation
	No	Separation	Deculturation

The theory on intercultural interaction discusses several paths towards integration.

Three strategies in particular are distinguished to have two differing parties work and live together (it goes without saying that ‘deculturation’ is not even considered an option, it would imply both nations to give up their cultures). The first strategy is *assimilation*; this implies that one party – often the smaller one – should become similar to and internalise the culture of the other group. This strategy generally seems not to be working very well in the military, since most national armed forces (including the Dutch and the Germans) are proud of themselves and are not likely to hand over their collective identity. One might see patterns of assimilation occurring in the air forces, where, due to the overwhelming US technology, most Western air forces gradually become ‘americanised’. In the army, however, this strategy is unlikely to be successful. Assimilation does not seem to be the most suitable road towards integration for the army.

The other two strategies may be more successful in the armies. One is the *separation* strategy; the other the *integration* approach. Separation occurs, when every national contingent has to deal with its own lines of command, gets its own area of responsibility as well as its own housing facilities in its own camp. It is too difficult given the short time span in the preparation stage to change the attitudes by making the other culture more attractive. This strategy was chosen by the

Dutch for the Iraq-operation in 2003. Also in the SFOR-mission in Bosnia this line of organising is followed. Actually, this strategy is the most commonly used approach in multinational peacekeeping operations.

The integration approach, on the other hand, really tries to get people from different nationalities working and living together, which happens rather successfully in multinational headquarters. According to this approach, working and living conditions are shared, and the lines of command are fully international. In the case of 1 (GE/NL) Corps there is a clear desire to keep the uniqueness of the own national cultures and national values. Both the Germans and the Dutch value their own cultures highly. On the other side, the findings point out to the fact that on the attitude level mutual understanding, respect and sympathy are growing. The other culture is perceived as attractive and this attractiveness is an attitude that can be influenced even more. Indeed, the attitude level has changed over the five years we accompanied the corps with research. Even the Dutch have put aside their initial hesitations and acknowledge the attractiveness of the other nation's culture. In the scheme of Nahavandi and Malekzadeh this can only be understood as the integration of two cultures into one new transnational organisational culture.

Both approaches, separation and integration, seem to work. The separation strategy generally seems to be easier to reach positive results with. Integration comes with problems related to differences in formal regulations, sanctions, responsibilities, styles of leadership and the like. That is no reason not to strive for that approach, though. All such issues can be dealt with. However, we believe that in Camp Warehouse the chosen strategy was 'stuck in the middle', hence creating problems that probably would not have occurred if either one of the aforementioned approaches had been pursued.

### 3 Pursuing integration

Much has already been done and more can be done in the future to pursue the strategy of integration. Based on the research findings, the following ten recommendations have been formulated that could further the strategy of integration. One should/could:

1. try to respect the other culture and value systems by not wanting to change it;
2. at the same time promote attitude change. It is easier to change attitudes than the core values of a culture and the results are visible within a few months. Work on attitude change by promoting the attractiveness of the other culture;
3. especially put effort in reaching the rank and file level, because there is much to gain from attitude change at this level (certainly in the Netherlands);
4. promote common practices, collectively shared symbols and traditions;
5. promote on-duty as well as off-duty contacts between the military;
6. promote and stimulate affiliations between twin companies ('Partnerschaften');
7. continue the policy of having integrated headquarter elements being commanded by Dutch and German commanders (rotation system);
8. experiment with deeper integration on a scale wider than the integrated headquarters (for example during exercises, maybe during deployments or by establishing joint barracks during deployments);
9. make use of positive cultural images to stress the similarities between cultures even more; professionalism is an example of a shared positive image that could further unity;

10. never forget to meet Allport's (1954) conditions for successful collaboration:

- common goals,
- equal status,
- personal contacts on a day-to-day basis,
- integration supported by authorities.

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## Appendix 1: Tables

Table A: Contact with German/Dutch soldiers

	<b>1997</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>Total</b>
Very many contacts	7 %	11 %	9 %
Many contacts	15 %	22 %	19 %
Not many contacts	44 %	38 %	41 %
No contact at all	34 %	29 %	31 %
N	940	1490	2430
Total	100 %	100 %	100 %

Sign. Chi-sq: P = .000

Table B: Contact with German resp. Dutch military broken down by rank

<b>Year</b>		<b>Rank &amp; file</b>	<b>NCO</b>	<b>CO</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Sign. Chi-sq</b>
1997	Very many contacts	3 %	7 %	15 %	7 %	**
	Many contacts	4 %	16 %	28 %	15 %	
	Not many contacts	38 %	46 %	47 %	44 %	
	No contact at all	55 %	31 %	10 %	34 %	
	N	301	377	220	898	
		100,0 %	100 %	100 %	100 %	
2000	Very many contacts	6 %	10 %	16 %	11 %	**
	Many contacts	10 %	26 %	29 %	22 %	
	Not many contacts	22 %	45 %	46 %	39 %	
	No contact at all	62 %	19 %	9 %	28 %	
	N	411	575	432	1418	
		100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %	

\*\* = Sign. Chi-sq: P. < .01

Table C: If you have been deployed, did you work together with German resp. Dutch soldiers?

		Frequency	Valid per cent
Valid	Yes	257	17
	No	1252	83
	Total	1509	100

Table D: Items and Indices included in Individualism/Collectivism and Masculinity/Femininity

	1995		1997		2000	
	Nether-lands N=654	Ger-many N=836	Nether-lands N=739	Ger-many N=566	Nether-lands N=336	Ger-many N=775
Importance of having sufficient time left for personal or family life (1 = of utmost importance; 5 = of very little or no importance)	1.84	1.79	1.90	2.02 *	1.77	1.94 ***
Importance of good physical working conditions	2.19	2.09 *	2.20	2.19	2.20	2.06 **
Importance of working with people who cooperate well	1.88	1.70 ***	1.85	1.19	1.77	1.81
Importance of living in a desirable area	1.60	1.94 ***	1.72	2.17	1.55	2.16 ***
Importance of security of employment	1.98	1.70 ***	2.02	1.79 ***	2.29	1.87 ***
Importance of high earnings	2.57	2.13 ***	2.48	2.39	2.57	2.27 ***
Importance of advancement to higher level jobs	2.34	1.82 ***	2.27	1.98 ***	2.30	1.96 ***

Notes: T-test on each factor for each year between the two nations (p ≤ 0.05 => \*; p ≤ 0.01 p => \*\*; p ≤ 0.001 => \*\*\*)

Table E: Items and Indices for Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance/Ambiguity Tolerance

	1995		1997		2000	
	Netherlands	Germany	Netherlands	Germany	Netherlands	Germany
Preferred managerial style (1 = autocratic, 4 = democratic)	3.03	2.83 ***	2.96	2.71 ***	2.86	2.71 ***
Perceived managerial style (1 = autocratic, 4 = democratic)	2.74	2.47 ***	2.97	2.51 ***	2.84	2.39 ***
Employees are afraid to disagree (1 = never, 5 = very frequently)+	2.91	2.95	2.98	3.25 ***	2.94	2.96
Stress at work (1 = never, 5 = always)+	3.73	3.25 ***	3.69	2.94 ***	3.69	3.26 ***
Rules should not be broken (1 = strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree)	3.36	2.91 ***	3.18	2.89 ***	3.20	2.76 ***
Intention to stay (1 = less than 2 years, 3 = more than 5 years)	1.67	2.67 ***	2.86	2.90	2.42	1.94 ***

Notes: T-test on each factor for each year between the two nations ( $p \leq 0.05 \Rightarrow *$ ;  $p \leq 0.01 \Rightarrow **$ ;  $p \leq 0.001 \Rightarrow ***$ ); +Score is reversed in computing the Hofstede-indices





## Appendix 2: Questionnaire used in 2000

Remark: In the original questionnaires written in the respective native tongues questions are constantly mirrored. In this translation this was not always possible.

1. Most units of the Netherlands Army/German Army are part of the first German/Netherlands Corps, 1 (GE/NL) Corps. This holds true also for your present unit. In what period have you yourself been stationed within 1 (GE/NL) Corps?  
Since 30-08-1995 ..... 1  
I belonged to the preparation party ..... 2  
I joined the Corps in 1996 ..... 3  
I joined the Corps in 1997 ..... 4  
I joined the Corps in 1998 ..... 5  
I joined the Corps in 1999 ..... 6  
I joined the Corps in 2000 ..... 7
  
2. In your opinion, do the Dutch and the Germans play a role of equal importance within 1 (GE/NL) Corps?  
Yes, the Germans and the Dutch in the Corps are approximately of equal importance  
<continue with question 4> ..... 1  
No, the Germans and the Dutch in the Corps are not equally important  
<continue with question 3> ..... 2
  
3. Who plays the most important role within 1 (GE/NL) Corps?  
The Dutch ..... 1  
The Germans ..... 2  
Don't know ..... 3

4. What is your attitude towards the fact that you form a part of a common 1 (GE/NL) Corps together with the Germans/Dutch?
- Very positive ..... 1  
 Positive ..... 2  
 Neutral ..... 3  
 Negative..... 4  
 Very negative..... 5
5. Did you personally take action to join 1 (GE/NL) Corps and/or have you registered as a volunteer for 1 (GE/NL) Corps?
- Yes <continue with question 6> ..... 1  
 No <continue with question 7>..... 2  
 Does not apply <continue with question 7> ..... 3
6. If you have chosen yourself for a posting at a bi-national staff, what were your motivations?
- <choose one number for each statement>
- 1 = does apply  
 2 = does apply to a lesser degree  
 3 = does not apply
- To learn about the Germans more..... 1 – 2 – 3  
 To learn/ameliorate knowledge of German language ..... 1 – 2 – 3  
 To learn/ameliorate knowledge of English language..... 1 – 2 – 3  
 To contribute to the unification of Europe..... 1 – 2 – 3  
 To belong to a special military unit ..... 1 – 2 – 3  
 To be posted in the neighbourhood of Münster or Eibergen ..... 1 – 2 – 3  
 To continue living in my present residence/town ..... 1 – 2 – 3  
 To better career opportunities ..... 1 – 2 – 3  
 To acquire financial compensation ..... 1 – 2 – 3  
 Inquisitiveness ..... 1 – 2 – 3
7. During your years of service, how many contacts did you have with the German/Dutch soldiers till now?
- Very many contacts ..... 1  
 Many contacts..... 2  
 Few contacts ..... 3  
 No contacts <continue with question 9>..... 4

8. If you have had previous contacts with German/Dutch soldiers, when did you have these contacts ? More answers possible

- During office hours/daily service in barracks.....
- During manoeuvres .....
- At meetings/seminars .....
- At meetings of the affiliation (Patenschaft).....
- At mutual visits of the troops .....
- During deployment in foreign countries.....

9. At this moment, how well are you informed about life and work in the German/Dutch Army?

- I am well-informed..... 1
- I am not so well informed..... 2
- I am hardly informed..... 3
- I don't have the faintest idea..... 0

10. In your opinion, compared to the Netherlands/Germany how do superiors interact with subordinates in the German/Dutch army?

- More formal and stricter than in my country..... 1
- Approximately the same..... 2
- More relaxed and warmly than in my own country..... 3
- Do not know ..... 0

11. Hereafter follow several statements in which the Dutch army is compared to the German army. Please indicate to which degree you agree with the statements. Use the following answering categories and fill in the number of your choice in the appropriate place.

- 1 = agree totally
- 2 = agree
- 3 = neutral
- 4 = disagree
- 5 = disagree totally
- 0 = I could not answer this one

The central issue is the image that you personally have of the armies from both countries

	GE Army 1-5	NL Army 1-5
The accommodation is good	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The food is good	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
There are plenty of opportunities to spend leisure time usefully	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The salary of the long-term and the short-term soldiers is in agreement with the work they are doing	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
One has to work overtime too often	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
In relation to the character of the work, the amount of days of leave is sufficient	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The soldiers are highly motivated	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The soldiers interact comradely	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
There are large differences between the ranks (rank and file, NCOs, officers).	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The soldiers trust their superiors	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
There are ample possibilities to practise sports	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The soldiers have been trained well militarily	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Thanks to practical exercises the soldiers are prepared for deployment	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The soldiers are very disciplined	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
There are ample opportunities to obtain civilian scholarly credentials	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The soldiers are deployable for operations	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The equipment is good	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The work climate is good	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Leadership is based on acting independently	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Leadership is based on mutual trust	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The soldiers are proud of their armed forces	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The army takes well care for its personnel	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The army is a flexible organisation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The army is well able to collaborate with other nationalities	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The physical condition of the soldiers is good	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
There is too much bureaucracy in the army	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

12. The following characteristics may or may not be applicable to Dutch soldiers. Mark each characteristic with a number from one to ten to indicate the degree to which the characteristic is typical for Dutch soldiers. When you do not have an opinion you can leave the box open.

- Courageous.....
- Reliable.....
- Spineless.....
- Tough .....
- Sense of duty .....
- Comradely .....
- High-spirited.....
- Reckless.....
- Prepared.....
- Stiff/surlly.....
- Industrious.....
- Sociable .....
- Independent .....
- Competent .....

13. The following characteristics may or may not be applicable to German Soldiers. Mark each characteristic with a number from one to ten to indicate the degree to which the characteristic is typical for German soldiers. When you do not have an opinion you can leave the box open.

- Courageous.....
- Reliable.....
- Spineless.....
- Tough .....
- Sense of duty .....
- Comradely .....
- High-spirited.....
- Reckless.....
- Prepared.....
- Stiff/surlly.....
- Industrious.....
- Sociable .....
- Independent .....
- Competent .....

14. If you could choose (and if the possibility would exist in the 1 [GE/NL] Corps), which of the following units would you prefer to work in? (question has to be mirrored for German soldiers)
- In a mixed German-Dutch unit ..... 1
  - In an entirely Dutch unit, but with German soldiers in the same barracks ..... 2
  - In a completely Dutch unit, in a barrack with only Dutch ..... 3
15. In which country are you posted at this very moment?
- In Germany ..... 1
  - In the Netherlands ..... 2
16. How do you rate your knowledge of the German/Dutch language?
- I speak German/Dutch very well ..... 1
  - I can make myself understood ..... 2
  - I know a few German/Dutch words ..... 3
  - I do not speak German/Dutch at all ..... 4
17. In the mixed German-Dutch units and in the integrated headquarters at Corps level the English language is used. How do you rate your knowledge of the English language?
- I speak English very well ..... 1
  - I can make myself understood ..... 2
  - I know a few English words ..... 3
  - I do not speak English at all ..... 4
18. Would you like to learn German/Dutch, or to improve your German/Dutch?
- Yes ..... 1
  - No ..... 2

19. Would you like to learn English, or to improve your English?
- Yes..... 1  
 No ..... 2
20. If it is possible to learn German/Dutch or English, or to improve your knowledge of these languages, would you be willing to do so in your leisure time, for instance taking a course outside office hours?
- Yes..... 1  
 No ..... 2  
 Does not apply..... 3
21. If you are not posted in Germany at the moment, have you been in Germany in the past as a soldier (on official duty, exercise, posting) once or several times?
- Yes, all in all longer than six months ..... 1  
 Yes, all in all two to five months ..... 2  
 Yes, all in all shorter than one month ..... 3  
 No, never ..... 4  
 Does not apply..... 5
22. Did you ever work together with German/Dutch soldiers?
- Yes..... 1  
 No <continue with question 24> ..... 2
23. If you have worked together with German/Dutch soldiers: what were your experiences regarding the collaboration?
- Very positive ..... 1  
 Positive ..... 2  
 Neutral ..... 3  
 Negative ..... 4  
 Very negative ..... 5
24. Did you in the past work together with German/Dutch civilians? (for instance for your work)
- Yes..... 1  
 No <continue with question 26> ..... 2



25. If you have worked with German civilians, how did you experience the collaboration?
- Very positive ..... 1  
 Positive ..... 2  
 Neutral ..... 3  
 Negative..... 4  
 Very negative..... 5
26. Do you have German/Dutch friends, acquaintances or relatives?
- Yes ..... 1  
 No <continue with question 28>..... 2
27. If you have German relatives, who are they?  
 <more answers possible>
- Father ..... 1  
 Mother ..... 2  
 Other relatives ..... 3
28. If you have spoken to Germans/Dutch, what language did you mostly use?
- German ..... 1  
 Dutch ..... 2  
 English ..... 3  
 Other language..... 4  
 Does not apply, never spoken to Germans/Dutch..... 5
29. During your service within 1 (GE/NL) Corps, did you participate in an inaugural or information meeting of the Corps?
- Yes ..... 1  
 No ..... 2
30. Do you think it to be useful to keep such meetings regularly?
- Yes ..... 1  
 No ..... 2

31. Do you think that the collaboration of German and Dutch soldiers in one unit could lessen prejudice towards the other country?
- Yes, it could lessen prejudices very strongly..... 1  
 Yes, it could lessen some of the prejudices ..... 2  
 No, it won't change a thing ..... 3  
 No, it will reinforce prejudices ..... 4
32. In your opinion, did the collaboration between the German and the Dutch soldiers within 1 (GE/NL) Corps already lead to the lessening of the prejudices towards Germany/Netherlands and the Germans/the Dutch?
- Yes, the German-Dutch collaboration has led to a lot less prejudice ..... 1  
 Yes, the German-Dutch collaboration has led to a little less prejudice .. 2  
 No, the German-Dutch collaboration has changed nothing ..... 3  
 No, the German-Dutch collaboration has reinforced the prejudices..... 4
33. A few years ago the Dutch, German, Belgian and English units formed the Multinational Division (Central). Dutch and German units formed the German-Netherlands Corps. If you could choose between a posting within 1 (GE/NL) Corps or with the Multinational Division (Central), or with a completely Dutch/German unit, ... what would you choose?
- The German-Netherlands Corps ..... 1  
 Another bi- or multinational unit (like the Eurocorps, or the Multinational Division (central) ..... 2  
 A completely Dutch/German unit..... 3  
 I have no preference ..... 4
34. Did you already participate in a deployment to a foreign country?
- Yes..... 1  
 No <continue with question 37> ..... 2
35. If you were already deployed, did you collaborate with the Germans/Dutch?
- Yes..... 1  
 No <continue with question 37> ..... 2

36. If you collaborated with the Germans/Dutch during deployment ... what were your experiences?
- Very positive ..... 1  
 Positive ..... 2  
 Neutral ..... 3  
 Negative..... 4  
 Very negative..... 5
37. How sympathetic do you find the Germans/Dutch?
- Very sympathetic ..... 1  
 Sympathetic ..... 2  
 Neutral ..... 3  
 Not sympathetic ..... 4  
 Not at all sympathetic ..... 5
38. How do the most Dutchmen/Germans regard the Germans/Dutch?
- Very positive ..... 1  
 Positive ..... 2  
 Neutral ..... 3  
 Negative..... 4  
 Very negative..... 5
39. Suppose that during a real military operation a German and a Dutch platoon are deployed next to each other. And suppose the Dutch platoon is attacked. Do you think that the German platoon will come to aid the Dutch platoon if circumstances allow? (question has to be mirrored for the German questionnaire)
- I am convinced they would come to aid the Dutch..... 1  
 I think it very probable ..... 2  
 I do not think it very probable ..... 3  
 It seems improbable..... 4  
 No opinion ..... 0

40. Between a number of European countries the customs have been abolished. What is your opinion about this topic?

- Very positive ..... 1
- Positive ..... 2
- Neutral ..... 3
- Negative ..... 4
- Very negative ..... 5
- No opinion ..... 0

41. What is your opinion on the introduction of the Euro as a common European currency?

- Very positive ..... 1
- Positive ..... 2
- Neutral ..... 3
- Negative ..... 4
- Very negative ..... 5
- No opinion ..... 0

42. What is your opinion on the idea of one European army?

- Very positive ..... 1
- Positive ..... 2
- Neutral ..... 3
- Negative ..... 4
- Very negative ..... 5
- No opinion ..... 0

43. Do you think that 1 (GE/NL) Corps is a step towards the formation of one European army?

- Yes, I think so ..... 1
- No, I don't think so ..... 2
- No opinion ..... 0

44. In your opinion, how does the German/Dutch population think about the German Army (die Bundeswehr)?
- Very positive ..... 1  
 Positive ..... 2  
 Neutral ..... 3  
 Negative..... 4  
 Very negative..... 5  
 No opinion ..... 0
45. In your opinion, how does the Dutch population think about the Dutch army?
- Very positive ..... 1  
 Positive ..... 2  
 Neutral ..... 3  
 Negative..... 4  
 Very negative..... 5  
 No opinion ..... 0
46. How do you regard the Dutch army yourself?
- Very positive ..... 1  
 Positive ..... 2  
 Neutral ..... 3  
 Negative..... 4  
 Very negative..... 5  
 No opinion ..... 0
47. How do you regard the German army yourself?
- Very positive ..... 1  
 Positive ..... 2  
 Neutral ..... 3  
 Negative..... 4  
 Very negative..... 5  
 No opinion ..... 0

48. The Royal Netherlands Army suspended conscription in August 1996. The German Army still employs conscripts. Given your experiences, does this difference give rise to problems in the collaboration between Dutch and German soldiers?
- Yes..... 1  
 No ..... 2  
 Don't know..... 3
49. Is it your opinion that in Germany conscription should remain in existence or do you think that an all-volunteer force is the best solution?
- Retain conscription..... 1  
 All-volunteer army is the best solution..... 2  
 No opinion..... 0
50. In August 1996 the last conscripts have left the Royal Netherlands army. Since that moment on only volunteers are doing service. What is your opinion regarding the Royal Netherlands army as an all-volunteer army?
- Very positive ..... 1  
 Positive ..... 2  
 Neutral ..... 3  
 Negative ..... 4  
 Very negative ..... 5  
 No opinion..... 0
51. Does your unit have an affiliation with a German/Dutch unit?
- Yes..... 1  
 No <continue with question 55> ..... 2  
 Don't know <continue with question 55> ..... 3
52. If your unit has an affiliation with a German/Dutch unit, have you been into contact with German/Dutch soldiers because of this affiliation?
- Yes..... 1  
 No <continue with question 55> ..... 2  
 Does not apply..... 3

53. If, in the context of the affiliation with a German/Dutch unit, you have been in contact with German/Dutch soldiers, what was your experience?
- Very positive ..... 1  
 Positive ..... 2  
 Neutral ..... 3  
 Negative..... 4  
 Very negative..... 5  
 No opinion ..... 0
54. In which activities of the affiliation did you participate (more answers are possible)
- Joint duty in the barracks..... 1  
 Joint exercises..... 2  
 Sports meeting ..... 3  
 Festivities..... 4  
 Communal meetings, seminars ..... 5  
 Visits to the barrack of the affiliated unit ..... 6  
 Other activity (please describe ..... ) ..... 7
55. Did you have contact with Germans/Dutch in your leisure time?
- Yes, often..... 1  
 Yes, on one occasion ..... 2  
 No ..... 3
56. Did you invite one or more German/Dutch soldiers at your home or in your own quarters?
- Yes, often..... 1  
 Yes, on one occasion ..... 2  
 No ..... 3

57. Imagine yourself in an ideal job – for the moment do not think about your present job –, how important do you think the following aspects of an ideal job are?

- 1 = most important
- 2 = very important
- 3 = reasonably important
- 4 = of little importance
- 5 = unimportant

<choose one number>

- Enough time for private or family life ..... 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5
- Good work conditions (Ventilation), lights, space, etc. ... 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5
- A good working relation with direct superior ..... 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5
- Secure employment ..... 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5
- Colleagues that work well together ..... 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5
- To be consulted by your chef in his/her decisions ..... 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5
- Possibilities for advancement ..... 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5
- Adventurous work ..... 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5
- Have the opportunity to earn much ..... 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5
- To live in an environment where you and your family  
feel at home ..... 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5

58. How important are the following issues in your personal life?

- a. To be stable and solid as a person ..... 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5
- b. Frugality ..... 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5
- c. Perseverance ..... 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5
- d. Respect for tradition ..... 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5

59. How often do you feel nervous or tense at work?

- Never ..... 1
- Seldom ..... 2
- Sometimes ..... 3
- Most of the times ..... 4
- Always ..... 5



60. How often do you experience that people disagree with their superior, but do not dare say so to him/her?

- Never..... 1
- Seldom..... 2
- Sometimes ..... 3
- Most of the times ..... 4
- Always..... 5

61. How long do you think to continue working with the Royal Netherlands army/German army?

- At most 2 years..... 1
- Between 2 and 5 years ..... 2
- Longer than 5 years ..... 3

62. To which degree do you agree with the following statements?

- 1 = agree totally
- 2 = agree
- 3 = don't know
- 4 = disagree
- 5 = disagree totally

<choose one number>

- a. Most people are trustworthy.....1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
- b. It is possible to be a good superior without having an exact answer to all possible work related questions of your subordinates.....1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
- c. An organisational structure wherein some subordinates have two superiors, should be avoided at all costs.....1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
- d. Competition between employees is mostly more harmful than it does good.....1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
- e. Company rules are there to be followed, even if an employee thinks that it is in the interest of the organisation to break the rules .....1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
- f. If people fail in life it is often their own fault .....1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5

63. The following descriptions refer to four types of superiors/managers. Please read these descriptions first.

**Superior 1:** Is, in general, quick in decision-making and communicates the decisions clearly and plainly to the employees. Expects them to carry out the decisions loyally and without trouble.

**Superior 2:** Is, in general, quick in decision-making, but tries to explain them first of all totally to his/her employees before continuing. Gives the reasons for the decisions and answers any questions.

**Superior 3:** Consults, in general, his/her employees before taking a decision. Listens to their advice, weighs pros and cons, and then announces the decision. Expects everyone – even those who were of a different opinion – to carry out the decision loyally.

**Superior 4:** In general, organises a meeting with all employees first before taking a decision. Explains the problem to the group and encourages discussion. Accepts the opinion of the majority as the decision.

a. Which type of superior would you prefer to work for? (one answer only)

- Superior 1..... 1
- Superior 2..... 2
- Superior 3..... 3
- Superior 4..... 4

b. Which of these four types of superior resembles your own superior most? (one answer only)

- Superior 1..... 1
- Superior 2..... 2
- Superior 3..... 3
- Superior 4..... 4
- He/she resembles non of the four types ..... 5

64. Women are allowed in most branches in the Royal Netherlands army. In the Bundeswehr they are only allowed in the Medical Services and Military Music Branch. What is your opinion?
- All branches should be open to women ..... 1
  - Women should not be allowed to serve in combat units..... 2
  - Women should only serve with Medical services and Military music ... 3
  - Women do not belong in the armed forces ..... 4
65. Did you work with female soldiers before?
- Yes ..... 1
  - No ..... 2
66. If you have worked with female soldiers, what were your experiences?
- Very good ..... 1
  - Good ..... 2
  - Not good/not bad ..... 3
  - Bad..... 4
  - Very bad ..... 5
67. What is your age?
- ..... years
68. Are you?
- Male ..... 1
  - Female ..... 2
69. How long have you been a soldier?
- Shorter than 12 months ..... 1
  - 1 to 2 years..... 2
  - 3 to 5 years..... 3
  - 6 to 10 years..... 4
  - Longer than 10 years ..... 5

70. How many months have you worked with your present unit?
- Shorter than 4 months..... 1
  - 4 to 12 months ..... 2
  - 13 to 24 months ..... 3
  - 25 to 60 months ..... 4
  - Longer than 60 months ..... 5
71. Under what kind of contract do you serve?
- Dutch questionnaire
- Contract soldier (shorter than 3 years)..... 1
  - Contract soldier (longer than 3 years) ..... 2
  - Contract soldier (extended, second contract)..... 3
  - Life-time employment ..... 4
- German questionnaire
- Conscript (10 months) ..... 1
  - Conscript (12–23 months) ..... 2
  - Contract soldier ..... 3
  - Life-time employment ..... 4
72. Your rank is?
- Soldier ..... 1
  - Corporal..... 2
  - NCO ..... 3
  - Subaltern officer or captain ..... 4
  - Officer (major and higher)..... 5
73. Which Branch?
- Combat units..... 1
  - Combat support units..... 2
  - Signals (Führungstruppen) ..... 3
  - Medical and Supply (Versorgungstruppen)..... 4

74. If you are a contract soldier, would you be willing to extend your contract?
- Yes..... 1  
 No ..... 2  
 Does not apply, have life-time employment ..... 3
75. Would you have worked in the army if there had not been conscription?
- Yes..... 1  
 No ..... 2
76. If you are a contract soldier, would you have been a contract soldier if you could not have joined 1 (GE/NL) Corps?
- Yes..... 1  
 No ..... 2  
 Does not apply, I already served before 1 (GE/NL) Corps was established ..... 3
77. What is the highest education that you graduated from?
- Elementary school ..... 1  
 High school (4 years)..... 2  
 Preparatory higher vocational/scientific training (5–6 years)..... 3  
 Higher vocational/University..... 4
78. How many years of scholarly training did you have?
- .....
79. Are there soldiers under your command?
- Yes..... 1  
 No ..... 2
80. Do you work within a headquarters?  
 <referred is to headquarters at battalion level or above>
- Yes, in a bi-national integrated headquarters..... 1  
 Yes, in a national headquarters ..... 2  
 No, do not work in a headquarters ..... 3

80. All in all, are you satisfied with your work?
- Satisfied ..... 1
  - Reasonably ..... 2
  - Moderately..... 3
  - Not satisfied..... 4
81. In which country were you born?
- In the Netherlands/in Germany..... 1
  - In a different country ..... 2
  - Which country? ..... 3
83. If you are posted in Germany/Netherlands, has your family moved with you or are they still living in Germany/Netherlands.
- Family lives in the Netherlands ..... 1
  - Family lives in Germany ..... 2
  - I live alone..... 3
84. 1 (GE/NL) Corps was inaugurated in August 1995. To which issues should be given more attention by management to improve the future collaboration between German and Dutch soldiers?
- .....
- .....
85. What is your opinion regarding the following statement “in comparison to other European NATO countries the collaboration with the Germans/ Dutch is extremely good from a military perspective”.
- Agree totally ..... 1
  - Agree ..... 2
  - Neutral ..... 3
  - Disagree..... 4
  - Disagree totally..... 5
  - Don't know/no opinion..... 0

86. Did your experiences with 1 (GE/NL) Corps change your attitude towards Germany and the Germans/the Netherlands and the Dutch?

- My attitude has changed to the positive..... 1
- My attitude did not change ..... 2
- My attitude has changed to the negative..... 3
- Don't know ..... 0

87. Some time ago Dutch politicians proposed to disband 1 (GE/NL) Corps. What is your opinion about this proposal?

- 1 (GE/NL) Corps should stay ..... 1
- 1 (GE/NL) Corps should be disbanded..... 2
- Indifferent ..... 3

88. It is possible that certain things you find of importance were not discussed in this questionnaire. If so, please state them below. We are interested in your personal comments.

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