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**"THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER"  
A REASSESSMENT OF A CLASSIC**

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## I.

Every army has a unique history and organizational structure. It carries out its special tasks within a distinctive national security policy and a particular military strategy. This on its own makes it difficult to apply general hypotheses relating to the military profession which have been formulated against the background of US American experience, to conditions in another army. To avoid this difficulty, analysis can be carried out at a high level of abstraction but this creates additional problems when this gives rise to an incomprehensive or arbitrary analysis.

In applying the four now classic hypotheses formulated by Morris Janowitz (1960) to a study of the contemporary *Bundeswehr*, it is accordingly necessary to bear in mind the problematic nature of comparing the incomparable. In contrast to the American army, the *Bundeswehr* is still a conscriptive force, the peacetime strength of which soon totals circa 370,000 men.

## II.

Approximately 170,000 officers and non-commissioned officers, serve as career soldiers or have enlisted for a tour of duty lasting between two to twelve years. Some 150,000 conscripts report annually to the barracks for a period of mandatory military service that currently lasts twelve months. All "indirect" military tasks in the *Bundeswehr*, such as those of administration, are handled by nearly 186,000 civilian employees. Accordingly a today evaluation of the applicability of the Janowitz hypotheses to a study of the *Bundeswehr* has to take into account the effect of these differences. Even so, analysis can be carried out and the purpose of this paper is to examine critically the continuing applicability of these hypotheses as they were originally formulated. A study of the US military in the late 1950s and early 1960s thus is contrasted with a study of West German armed forces in the 1980s.

### **1. Changing Organizational Authority**

in an inquiry conducted in the 1970s into the basis of organizational authority, 50.2 per cent of the 258 questioned captains and lieutenants of the *Bundeswehr* responded by arguing that they led their units "co-operatively" (Klein et al. 1975). Such statistics first raise the question of the frame of reference. Is fifty per cent a lot or a little? Was the percentage greater or smaller than that of five years earlier - assuming that the key word "cooperatively" had retained the same connotation throughout this period. A further problem arises from the very term, "cooperatively". The percentage results in the case presented are based on self-evaluation. Since a consensus exists neither within society in general or within a specific military context as to what constitutes co-operative leadership behaviour and what does not, it can be argued that the inquiry is little more than a problem of semantics. Nevertheless, what does emerge from this particular

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analysis is that military commanders apparently differ from their subordinates in self-esteeming their behaviour. This is so, even if their range of behaviour, which encompasses at least in theory a continuum from the extremely authoritarian to the extremely cooperative, is not fulfilled in daily practice. This can be readily rationalised. The behavioural extreme located near the co-operative pole of the scale may be impossible to achieve because of the way in which the hierarchical structure of armed forces organization is oriented towards the efficient conduct of war. At the other extreme, however, that which can be described as absolute obedience and rigid discipline, contradicts the conventional norms of a democratic society. Indeed, in order to prevent the blind obedience of unfortunately recent history, the *Bundeswehr* has been subordinated to a "primacy of politics". Here a highly sophisticated concept in the form of "Innere Führung" has been developed to counterbalance the functional needs of the military with the norms of a democratic society.

Observable leadership behaviour, therefore, can be located in the middle of this continuum with a relatively narrow and scattered range of variables. Indicators revealing this more co-operative model of behaviour, dominate in the verbal usage of the commanders and those commanded, as well as in actual leadership practice. For example, only 22.5 per cent of the 453 questioned respondents from army combat companies were of the opinion that the relationship between the company commander and the detachment was "poor" or "very poor". The analogous relationship to non-commissioned officers, was described by only 16.3 per cent as being "poor" or "very poor" (Klein and Lippert 1989).

It is possible to identify many reasons for these and similar results. References can often be found in the literature to the "technicalization" of the armies as the impetus for the change in styles of leadership in the direction of co-operation and an accompanying loss of authority of the superiors (Ganser 1981). Because the mastery of complex systems of weaponry or machinery is contingent on the expertise of those using them, the commander of a military unit is more or less dependent on his "specialists". The willing acceptance of concepts of behaviour geared exclusively towards teamwork are readily accepted by such commanders. The authority of the military leader in this situation is proven by his ability to motivate his subordinates through his acceptance of their individual characteristics. Authority cannot be upheld through technical competence alone, nor can it be upheld through the mastery of the few skills common to all soldiers, such as tactical behaviour. Where it is necessary to report to formal authority, the might position of the military superior is not realistic in such a situation, since such a type of authority would be unacceptable from the start.

However, it would not be correct to attribute the preference for co-operative forms of behaviour solely or primarily to "technicalization". Two reasons can be put forward to reject this conclusion. Firstly, the technicalization of the military is not a new phenomenon. Stated simply, armed forces from a historical standpoint were always highly developed with regard to their technical ability. This contrasts markedly with the technicalization of the rest of society. Societies have always invested vast resources in their armies in order to demonstrate symbolically their own value to critics and supporters both inside and outside

society (Lippert 1986). Moreover, in the types of troops that were "technical" from the very beginning, such as the artillery or the pioneers, it was always necessary to motivate not the individual soldier but entire groups of specialized soldiers who were mutually dependent in their functions. Secondly, technicalization does not necessarily mean a loss of authority at the higher hierarchical levels. Only recently, the use of highly sophisticated electronic procedures in decision-making and in the development of weapon systems have evolved a de facto revitalization of quasi-pre-industrial structures of organization. This use of electronic weapons and instruments limits itself to "triggering the effect", that is to pushing the button. A defect in a technical system is only repairable, if at all, by a specialist behind the lines. This development gives rise to a marked and significant dichotomization of organizational structures and values in the armed forces: troops with nearly archaic combat tasks are confronted with technically, logistically and administratively specialized troops and staffs whose work differs little if at all from that of industrial occupations. The professional training of soldiers, however, does not take this into account. Training is usually based on the assumption that a uniform field of activity -"armed forces" - exists; the effect of this is that later on, soldiers are very much affected by the phenomenon of alienation when they encounter a daily routine which does not fit with the notion of a homogeneous military (Ganser 1981).

Up to this point, only the internal values and norms of the armed forces have been commented upon. The effect of societal change, especially value change, on the culture of military organization has not been considered. Conscript forces such as the *Bundeswehr*, , are especially affected by this since they permanently regenerate themselves through the recruitment annually of nearly half their manpower strength. These recruits report quarterly, bring with them into the military their civil value concepts. It is unanimously agreed in relevant analyses that this value change takes place today both rapidly and intensively. Three reasons for this are put forward. According to these, the value change is seen as:

- (1) the result of a new understanding of the quality of life that accompanies or, more specifically is conditioned by, long phases of economically favourable times (Inglehart 1979);
- (2) the result of a decline in established values or a change in individual relationships to these values;
- (3) the outcome of experiencing unsolved or unsolvable economic and sociopolitical questions (e.g. resource shortages or ecologic catastrophes). In this situation, conscripts can be identified as the "symptom carriers of certain problematical phenomena of societal change".

In any event, it is concluded although all three explanations are valid or might be applicable in varying degrees as a partial explanation of change, so called 'postmaterial' values have, as a result of value change, come to the fore. Such values are oriented especially towards human need rather than economic or material ones. Some examples of this orientation include: solidarity, self-

fulfilment, social justice, as well as community, quality of life, communication and creativity.

This change is often combined with a rediscovery of old values, although these are given a new meaning. One example of this is the term "comradeship". Originally used to describe a defensive alliance against enemy threats, as well as against an excessive use by the military hierarchy of repression, today it serves to express the wish amongst so many soldiers, for the furtherance of a sense of community in a conventional social framework. Comradeship serves, then, as the countermodel to socially experiences of anomia and individual alienation. In this situation, those in higher ranks are expressly excluded from developing a sense of comradeship with conscripts.

A devaluation of the traditional concepts often corresponds with the revaluation of "postmaterial" values. This, for example, is true for terms such as "affluence", "profit", "economic growth", "standard-of-living" or "competition". If one assumes that the described postmaterialistic view of the world is typical of the so-called "alternative culture", it can then be said that today's youth is divided roughly into two equally large "camps" (Sinus 1983). Approximately 50 per cent belong to the alternative movement (adherents and potential sympathizers). The other half, consisting of the "indifferent", the "uncomprehending" and the "rejecting", may be considered to adhere rather to the concept of a conventional life style. As early as 1980, a socio-cultural analytical typology of students came to the conclusion that approximately 12 per cent were part of the alternative culture, 36 per cent found themselves between the cultures, a further 33 per cent integrated into the existing system but viewed it critically, while another fifteen per cent remained indifferent to the existing order. Only five per cent could be said to support the prevailing conditions (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 1980).

A further topically relevant study came to the following conclusion:

"The young, especially those between 14 and 17 years of age, are much more receptive than adults to ideas of alternative lifestyles, to models that free them from conventional constraints and pressures to perform and consume and that propagate a 'natural' life" (Pratz 1982).

Irrespective of the fact that it is difficult to imagine a "postmaterialistic" *Bundeswehr* - the constitution would probably not allow this - it is to be expected, in the light of knowledge about value change, that a rather detached attitude towards the *Bundeswehr* and official national security policy is to be found among those who have undergone the change. Empirical findings confirm this. According to these, 12 per cent of the 14-to-17-year-olds claim to belong to the peace movement, 70 per cent sympathize with it, 17 per cent have little sympathy for it or reject it (Sinus 1982). Thirteen per cent of the girls between the ages of 15 and 19, the most important reference group for young soldiers, count themselves among those in the movement, two-thirds (67 per cent) are interested or sympathize with it, and only ten per cent are disinterested (Brigitte 1982). These results refer to the peace movement. However, not all of the numerous factions within it necessarily oppose the *Bundeswehr* and established national security policy. That the distance is still a considerable one, is proven

in a public opinion poll among 16-to-25-year-old West German citizens. This analyses the reactions of "hardcore" supporters of conventional norms and supporters of the alternative model, to a question inquiring into the "importance" of the *Bundeswehr*. According to this poll, about 72 per cent of the supporters of the conventional outlook consider the *Bundeswehr* to be important/very important. This result is with the expectations of conventional public opinion findings. Among the representatives of the alternative concept, the respective percentage is only thirty-eight (Kohr and Raeder 1983). Linked to this value change and intricately interwoven with it, is the proposition that the perceptions of national security policy and military strategy in society have changed. Out of the once non-critical acceptance of the policies of deterrence and forward defense has developed a highly differentiated perception. This includes a partial rejection among career servicemen of these policies. The change in public opinion is to a large part conditioned by a contradiction in national security policy which the peace movement first brought to public attention. This is the discrepancy between official rhetorics, stating that nuclear weapons are still political weapons and, as such, not completely deployable, and the daily deployment plans of these weapons by the military within the framework of an international rapid deployment force.

In addition, the peace movement's contribution to the debate has drawn attention to the link between the *Bundeswehr* on the one hand and final effects of modern weaponry, also the so-called conventional, on the other.

Since Hiroshima and indirectly since Chernobyl, this debate has firmly established in the general public's consciousness. With these changes of perception, a delegitimization firstly of national security policy and military strategy and then of the entire military has occurred. The image of the enemy, especially among the young, has consequently shifted. The enemy is no more a personalized adversary, such as "the Russian", but risks of "modernization" in general (e.g. hunger, migrations, dying forests).

For this generation, the professional soldier is considered to be the visible representative of a delegitimized policy. Simplified, this evokes two alternative reactions from the soldiers: on the one hand they seek to become inconspicuous by adopting a pronounced civilian set of behavioural attitudes and opinions thereby "filling" in with the mores of civilian society. On the other hand, these soldiers exhibit a pronounced rejection of that society, its attitudes and opinions, by over-identifying with the prevailing values (Wachtler 1986).

In estimating the effect of this shift in the image of the enemy it must be remembered that the political instrumentalization of a historically rooted "fear of the East", was an important reason for justifying politically both the reintroduction of conscription in 1956 and the development of the *Bundeswehr*. It also served as an important argument for permanently ensuring combat readiness. Among the effects, two matter most. The first is that the social identity and social status of soldiers is no longer reinforced through an outside threat. The second is derived from this, in that the threats of today are much too amorphous (and simultaneously too complete) to encourage society's willingness to trust the military leadership with the reduction of these threats.

Taken together, both consequences mean the loss of prestige as well as a loss of authority for the military (Vogt 1983). Therefore, it will increasingly be the task of the military to explain the prevailing military strategy as well as its own existence not only to society but also to its own recruits.

The consequences of this situation in terms of the behaviour of military leaders is clear. Delegitimization cannot be compensated for either by authoritarian behaviour or by an intensified daily generation of combat readiness. And it must remain questionable whether the attitudinal change that has already occurred among conscripts, younger professional and limited-term servicemen can be countered. The basis consensus of society in regard to organizational authority is itself too extensive for this.

## **2. Narrowing Skill Differential Between Military and Civilian Elites**

This thesis 'of the "Narrowing Skill Differential" assumes that there were, or are, fundamental differences between the military profession and civilian ones. Within this premise, a debate has been touched upon in Germany that is as old as the Bundeswehr and is long from being over. on the surface, the basis of this discussion is the ideologically outdated question as to whether the profession of soldiering is a profession sui generis (Zimmer 1987, Kiessling 1987). Underlying this, is concealed a debate over the current social role and status of soldiers. The reference point for this is usually German military history, in which during various epochs the soldier enjoyed an especially high social position. If one accepts the "sui-generis-thesis", then any discussion about the similarities of civilian and military elites can actually apply only to the willingness of civilians to respect distinctive military values, concepts and norms. However, if one is of the view that the military profession is a profession like any other, then it obtains its importance not regardless of the manifold and different functions that the soldier has to perform in his profession, but in addition to and in them. Basically, it is then a matter of discovering the specific mixture of abilities and skills that together make up the military profession. The thesis of "Narrowing Skill Differential" must then be based, above all, on a comparison of patterns of qualifications with those of civilian professions. With a more precise analysis, similarities would turn up especially in terms of technical skills and expertise (Vogt 1987). organizational capabilities and the leading and motivating of colleagues would also be points of reference for a comparison. One remaining difference would be that of the "management of violence" assigned to the soldier by society's division of labour. Such an analysis would certainly arrive at conclusions similar to those derived from occupational analyses that have been conducted in other armies.

However, such a consideration remains superficial. There is a particularity about the professional soldier of the Bundeswehr which must qualify any linear application of this thesis of "Narrowing Skill Differential". This special aspect refers to the fact that Bundeswehr soldiers belong also to the ranks of professional civil servants. From this particular context at least two more extensive consequences can be derived.

- (1) The professional Bundeswehr soldier, officer and NCO enters a lifelong association with his employer - the state. This is, improper behaviour aside, not terminable by the state. An important consequence results from this.- thanks to this personal security, the professional soldier must not permanently ask himself whether his qualifications are marketable, that is whether they are usable for civilian employment. Correspondingly, neither the attainment of, or aspiration for, desired civilian qualifications parallel to military training, nor the following of structural changes in the marketplace, play a large role in the corps of professional servicemen. By the same token, military work procedures and techniques need not be compared for efficiency as do similar civilian positions. The effect of this autism is that innovations quickly adopted in the civilian workworld due to the pressure of rationalization, are only gradually incorporated into the military. A further structurally impeding factor affects this: as opposed to industrial work, military work lacks production purposes. It is therefore highly abstract. Since nothing is produced except "security", the soldier has few chances to identify with the concrete results of his work. Accordingly, it is almost inevitable that the professional soldier is evaluated on criteria other than industrial ones (Ellwein and Zoll 1973).
  
- (2) The state has the absolute monopoly of demand for military manpower. For the professional soldier, a change of employer would mean a change of career. It needs to be added that in Germany no civilian "strategic community" worth mentioning has been trained outside of the military. Professional soldiers who terminate their contractual obligations early, have hardly a chance to utilize their military expertise as a consultant. The occasional case in which retired soldiers have been integrated into industry after completing their military service applies solely to representation or lobbying activities.

The practically complete disposal of the state over soldiers, due to the monopoly of demand, has essentially two consequences: firstly, the state and not the demands of the market-place, determines the selection criteria and the content of professional military training. Originally it was the state's intention to create the most balanced union possible between its own interests, its intentions in terms of military strategy and national security policy and the general well-being. Even if the military today has developed, on its own, a concept of general well-being and attempts to operationalize this, it has not yet been able due to the primacy of politics to achieve this. For the soldier, the state's authority in this context means that he is being constantly confronted with political impositions. Should these apply to a national security policy or to a military strategy that is being controversially debated in society or is rejected by the majority, then it can easily happen that the soldier finds himself torn between allegiance and loyalty, on the one hand, and detachment and criticism on the other. This dilemma is, of critical importance because the current military strategy of deterrence is only credible if the military elite itself is convinced of it and is prepared to practice it.



Additionally, in the case of the *Bundeswehr*, it would be most suitable to situate the two opposing models of military socialization, namely "institution" and "occupation" as formulated by Charles Moskos (1982), on this demarcation line between loyalty and detachment. Both the dichotomization of loyal and detached professional soldiers and the loss of expertise, induced by the state monopolized determination of training in view of a rapid, technical development within society, had a deprofessionalizing effect. The academic study introduced into officer training early in the 1970s was an attempt at a new professionalization. However, the delegitimization that had already come about could not be compensated by the reform in education and training.

The second consequence for the state's monopoly of demand relates to the state's duty to provide its soldiers with a special status in exchange for the allegiance demanded of them. This is not restricted simply to sufficient pay or the provision of everything necessary to practice their profession. This also includes the right to debate the justification of the existence of the military and comment upon its social legitimation. A public that for a long time was little or not interested, accepted the respective arguments put forward and without question. This changed with the emergence of the peace movement. Since then, the solutions for reducing risks and threats offered by the military are no longer accepted by the public without contradiction. The mistrust that has evolved is not limited to the methodological-operative aspects of the military profession.

### **3. Shift of Officer Recruitment**

In 1930, two-thirds of the officers were recruited from officer families or civil servant households (Bald 1977, Lau 1988). This one-sided recruitment of new generations guaranteed that military socialization could smoothly append itself to that of the familial. Origins from "desired social circles" also contributed to the guarantee of political homogeneity in the officer corps. Other lifestyles and modes of thinking such as those of white-collar employees, workers or farmers, remained for the most part unfamiliar to the military elite. The lack of understanding for democratic ideas the converse to concepts of an authoritarian state attachment by the German Officer Corps, has been tragically confirmed in the course of recent history.

Compared with this, the social composition of the officer corps in the *Bundeswehr* underwent a radical change. Although sons of civil servants (42 per cent) dominated the recruiting pattern for professional officers in the initial years of the *Bundeswehr* until 1970, a third of the officers had a white-collar employee or a worker for father.

In the period towards the end of the 1960s, this classical recruiting pattern came to an end. Among the general population, the profession of a military officer possessed a low social status. In the light of economic prosperity, sons of civil servants became increasingly interested in other professions. In addition to the professionalization aspect mentioned above, the establishment of an obligatory university education for officer candidates was justified as a means of

increasing the attractiveness of the profession. That this goal could indeed be realized, was soon proven by the increased number of applicants. Whereas in the past the Bundeswehr had been forced to accept nearly every applicant, it could now be selective. Other social groups also felt that the offer of free university education upon a twelve-year enlistment was attractive. As a result, fewer than a third of the fathers of the students at the Bundeswehr universities in 1987 were civil servants. However, the sons of white-collar employees, and farmers together accounted for more than half (57 per cent). The social composition of the officer recruits had also been "normalized" insofar as it now essentially reflected that of the student body at civilian universities (Lippert and Zabel 1977). This similarity was derived from a common basic motivation. A study on this found that three fourths of the students at the Bundeswehr universities considered their choice of profession as a chance to escape the parental milieu and to improve socially their lot as compared to the preceding generation (Bonnemann et al. 1984). Seen historically, this "normalization" or, if one prefers, "civilianization" of social origins meant the end of two especially German traditions. The proportion of the aristocracy in the officer corps, which around 1895 still totalled 44 per cent and in 1932 still reached 24 per cent fell drastically in the *Bundeswehr*. Among the *Bundeswehr* generals in 1972, only seven per cent bore aristocratic names. Estimates based on the younger members of the officer corps of the *Bundeswehr* suggest that less than one per cent are aristocratic. According to this, the aristocracy of the officer corps, no longer plays a role in it today (Bald 1982).

The rate of self-recruitment developed similarly. In 1930, in accordance with contemporary practice in which sons whose fathers were already serving the government became officers, 55 per cent came from military homes. This high proportion of military sons changed however during the Second World War. Due to the great need for replacements generated by the war and the National Socialists' mistrust of the established bourgeoisie, the rate of self-recruitment sank to 29 per cent by 1944. This number fell even further in the *Bundeswehr*; however, it must be noted that between 1945 and 1954 the continuity was interrupted by the fact that during these years the Federal Republic maintained no armed forces. At any rate, 19 per cent of the officers with the rank of captain in 1974 still had fathers who had been professional soldiers in the *Wehrmacht*. In 1973, the year the *Bundeswehr* universities opened, the proportion of military offspring among the initial classes of officer candidates had been reduced to seven per cent. This rate of self-recruitment is notably less than that for several civilian professions, such as doctors or Protestant clergymen (Lippert and Zabel 1977).

It can be deduced from the determined orientation of advancement among students at the two universities, that more extrinsic motivations dominate in making a career choice. A relevant study in which the students of the Federal Armed Forces University in Hamburg participated, found that roughly half of all the students questioned were primarily interested in an academic degree and therefore were willing to put up with military service for a limited period. The other half were primarily interested in a military career and viewed their studies with varying degrees of importance from rejection to acceptance an integral step in achieving this desired career (Bonnemann et al. 1984). From this

experience, one can assume that the half who become limited-term soldiers because of the free education they received will leave the Bundeswehr once their twelve-year obligation has been fulfilled in order to enter a civilian career. Moreover, those who have completed their studies in the military and who have leadership experience as a platoon leader or company commander following their years at university, receive very attractive employment offers from civilian industry (Klein 1987).

Once these more civilian-oriented officers have left the service, the opening up, or civilianization, of the military profession achieved by university education is essentially lost. In order to explain this further, it must be recognized that before entering the armed services, applicants are given an aptitude test in which personality characteristics, such as a sense of responsibility and above all value commitment, are important selection criteria. These are in addition to cognitive and physical characteristics (Kliem 1983). Thanks to this value-based selection, it is ensured that all officers, including those with an interest in an inexpensive education, have a rather positive attitude towards state and society from the onset. Careful selection on the basis of attitudes and values can thus compensate for the lack of recruitment from once desired social groups.

Just how the recruitment pattern will affect the armed forces in the future, despite all that has been presented, remains to be seen. It could essentially depend on whether the delegitimization and "demystification" (M. Weber) of the military continues and how the military itself reacts to this. A reactive closing-of-the-ranks against this, could entirely offset any proposal for the greater civilianization of the profession.

#### **4. Significance of Career Patterns**

On the surface, a military career in the Bundeswehr is - also a series of successfully completed steps, similar to other armies, "which alternate between command and staff assignments plus successful course completion at service schools" (Janowitz 1960, XXXII). Due to a lack of empirical evidence it is not possible for the outside observer to comment extensively on the factors either advancing or hindering a career. The criteria adopted by Selection Boards for promotion to the top positions of colonels and generals are not disclosed anywhere; ex-post-factum analysis of biographies reveals little current information because although in such works the various *assignments are* indeed listed, no information is given as to how these came about.

It can only be presumed in the absence of empirical evidence that a successful career profile combines several general service arrangements and particular political tasks or activities. Furthermore it can be assumed that the significance or involvement in politics can only be evaluated on a case by case basis and that generalizations are impossible.

Despite this situation, which is in the end unsatisfactory for analysis, two statements can be made within the scope of this negative response. These refer to the *conditions of* the framework within which a military career occurs

and which limits it. Ignoring these proves at best not to promote the career of the individual involved; usually it damages it.

The first is concerned with the above-mentioned similarity of the status of the professional soldier to that of a civil servant. An alliance arises from this status, that is, a *willingness to* identify with the service and with the state (Ellwein and Zoll 1973). This allegiance is also interpreted as reflecting the soldier's duty to remain politically neutral, at least while on duty. Soldiers who have received, as citizens a political mandate, for example, at the community level, are correspondingly expected to exercise this in their freetime, that is to be granted a leave-of absence from the service, or to retire from it altogether.

In light of specific German experience, as in the Weimar Republic, a specific military ethic in the form of the "Innere Fuehrung" was propagated in the Bundeswehr from the very beginning. This was designed to prevent the evolvement of a professionalism of the *Huntington type*, which proceeds from the assumption of a politically neutral and thereby arbitrarily implementable professional officer corps.

"Innere Fuehrung" is "an ideology, which purposively states that democratic values must be central in the motivation and functioning of the military" (Scheelen 1982). Despite all of the difficulties involved in operationalizing such an ethic in daily professional practice, it has indeed been integrated to the point that obvious breaches of it mean the abrupt end of a career. In addition, the Defense Commissioner (*Der Wehrbeauftragte*) of the German parliament, the *Bundestag*, supervises the compliance of "Innere Fuehrung" as a separate parliamentary control-institution.

The second factor to be mentioned concerns professional expertise. What is meant, is, above all, the mastery of the military corps. In addition, expertise refers to the prevailing military strategy and hence to the "paradoxical" situation of soldiering in today's Europe. This recognizes that the soldier must practice something daily which is not allowed to occur, because everything which this practice is meant to protect would thereby more than less be destroyed. This paradox cannot be resolved as long as there are mass demolition weapons - and this invention will remain.» In order to maintain the professional identity at least within the organization, guidelines on how to think and speak about it must be found. Only certain specific strategies and war scenarios should be allowed to be contemplated. Subconventional guerilla warfare or the most of the so-called strategic sets of alternatives are nearly taboo (Teitler 1977, Lippert 1986 a).

However, this political mental ban specifically contradicts the changes in the societal function that the military has undergone in recent years and which will indeed lead to a new political determination of the military. In the place of the symbolization of national integrity and sovereignty, another symbolic function is increasingly arising (Lippert 1986 b). This is derived from the repeatedly porported, exclusively political character of modern weapons. These are also a political medium of *communication*. The armed forces are thereby attributed "policy making function". In other words: also minimal deterrence with the

conscious risk of self-destruction symbolizes the fundamental incompatibility of antagonistic, irreconcilable ideas; henceforth, these have the effect of providing objectives and purpose within society. The professional soldier contributes to this so that risks and threats do not escalate into armed conflicts. However, this relatively new political function of the military profession has not yet been institutionalized in a way that military careers would be derivable from it. It must remain open as to what form this might take. The imaginable spectrum ranges from a new type of international constabularism to a nuclear pacifism that is currently difficult to conceive.

### III.

Conclusion: A new ethic for the military profession ?

In conclusion, it becomes clear in attempting to evaluate the current ranking of the four theses for the Bundeswehr that they still possess a special importance in describing the civilian-military relations insofar as they address the socially most important aspects of the military career. In view of the completely different qualities of the force potential available to the state, it also becomes clear that they apply more to epiphenomena. The conventional military is not prepared in its methodological-operative aspects, in its professional self-image, or in its professional ethic to manage this final force and minimize the possible consequences of a deployment of modern weapons (Schmidt-Eenboom 1988). Similarly, society for its part, has not yet come to combine its conventional concepts of the military with the actual potential of destruction now available to the armed forces. It is slowly beginning to become clear that the use of modern weapons in Central Europe would mean a break in the generational chain and thereby the end of society. The gap arising between the possible consequences of the use of armed forces on the one hand and societal concepts of the current function of the military on the other has, not only reduced to a considerable extent the general credibility of the military but has also led, to insecurity among professional soldiers. Beyond this it appears that the professional soldiers are not aware of their comprehensive responsibility and are not being prepared to assume it. The imbalance that emerges for the management of finality refers to a demand which would place the control of civilian atomic enemy in the hands of a nuclear "priesthood". It is therefore at least to be suggested that a new military ethic urgently needs to be developed. The proposals formulated to date for this are purely idyllic, not least because they cannot be freed from the standard schema of thought.

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