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**PUBLIC OPINION ON SECURITY POLICY AND ARMED FORCES –
ANALYSES AND DATA FROM EIGHT COUNTRIES**

edited by
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PREFACE

It has often been deplored in the past, that the social sciences have only marginally concerned themselves with the subject of "security policy and the armed forces". In the last few years, however, a remarkable change seems to take place. In June 1981 the International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP) held its Fourth Annual Scientific Meeting, in which the now published papers were presented and discussed, and during which the preliminary workshop took place. If one regards the programs of the first three conferences, one sees that the topic "security policy and the armed forces" found only marginal consideration, whereas the fourth conference was dominated by such themes.

This development, it seems to me, is not by chance. In the first place, it is being recognized more and more that this topic is a vital one, in the literal sense of the word, and that the social sciences are of special importance here, because the aspects of security are increasingly a problem not of objective statements, but rather of assessments and opinions. Secondly, it appears that the ISPP with its broad interdisciplinary experience would be especially suited to tackle these topics, which greatly transcend the boundaries of the traditional scientific "division of labor". Therefore, the Fourth Annual Scientific Meeting of the ISPP offered a good chance to discuss these international problems with respect to security policy and the armed forces. In the preliminary workshop the attempt was made to deal with the questions of the attitudes of the population towards security policy and the armed forces and the socialization effects of military organization in detail. The international forum, however, not only demonstrated possibilities for an appropriate treatment of these

questions, but also called for a willingness to address those problems consciously, that result from an interdisciplinary and internationally comparative approach. The extent to which we could fulfill these requirements can only partly be seen in the contributions presented; to do that completely, it would be necessary to render an account of the entire course of the discussions during the convention.

The present publication concentrates itself mainly upon the written records of the discussions, which in part were more a collection of data, and do not yet demonstrate the internationally comparative relationships evidenced during the discussions. Purely descriptive papers were included, due to the fact that so far, empirical material is already somewhat of a rarity in the fields examined here. The subtitle of this volume "Analyses and Data from Eight Countries" signifies recognition of these circumstances.

Detlev Baehren, who helped prepare and coordinate the scientific meeting as workshop secretary, has taken it upon himself to introduce the available data, and a structure for the publication. At this point I wish to repeat the feeling of gratitude that the conference participants have already expressed to him.

The papers collected here comprise only a part of the contributions presented at the Mannheimer Workshop. The other part will appear in German in the Westdeutscher Verlag entitled "Sicherheit und Militär" and will essentially compile those papers that deal with the origins of, and changes in attitudes and opinions in the armed forces and in the society.

The SOWI begins a new series of publications with this volume: The International Forum. In this series, those results of international discussions will be recorded, in which the SOWI's participation was of central significance with respect to organization and/or content.

Munich, April 1982

Prof. Dr. Ralf Zoll

INTRODUCTION*

The following introductory remarks should be understood as an attempt at giving some hints on some characteristics of the papers presented here and not as an abstract connecting the individual papers.

The volume starts with the, as far as I know, first attempt of analyzing in more detail the civil-military relationship in Italy under perspective of the social sciences.

H.E. Radbruch's contribution on Italy is particularly interesting on an international level of comparison, because only since the beginning of the '70s efforts have been made under the pressure of the overall societal development to integrate the Armed Forces in the process of general social change. In this context, the primary concern focusses on the relationships towards unions, professional self-perception and self-esteem as well as on the relation with the public. The latter is characterized, according to Radbruch, up to this time by the specifics of the Italian political culture, which in particular shows a nearly unlimited public disinterest in questions concerning national security and particularly the Armed Forces. The Italian public is generally more interested in everyday-problems like unemployment, changes of price index etc. than in questions dealing with more global issues. In addition to this there is the feature of a person-oriented society where the structure of personal relations traditionally dominates over institutional influence.

For a long period, the Army was able to develop in splendid isolation of a traditionalistic kind. Toward the end of the sixties the military could no longer exclude itself from social change. Further-

*) Translation: D.-L. Baehren, Vera von Wühlisch

more, the military contributed to social change by functioning as the "nation's school" for coming generations in accordance with or under the commission of state and society, and thus diminished illiteracy or semi-illiteracy to a large extent. This process is finished by now and the military is confronted with civilian and material claims and the norms of the society.

The existing unions, as well, are proof of increased political awareness and activity, which is particularly noticeable within the group of NCOs with regard to their engagement for better living conditions. The three Italian unions are different from their pendants in many West European countries and in Scandinavia, which primarily plead for the soldiers' rights in that they are more interested in direct participation in the general political discussion or even decision-making in the state.

With this in mind, the numerous veterans' associations provide an opposite effect by stressing traditional values and nostalgic patriotism.

Public opinion with its prevailing disinterest in the military is caught in the following vicious circle: Lack of information on military matters because of low interest within the population leads to even less interest because of the low availability of information. Recently, a trend has developed, especially in the mass media, to abandon the traditional behavior pattern and to show more interest in defense and military-related issues. This development is backed up by the military's measures to give up self-protective attitudes, i.e. exaggerated classification etc., and to integrate public reaction in its considerations.

In general, there is still less interest in the military in Italy than in other countries of the West, according to Radbruch.

France shows similar insufficient public discussion, as P. Saint-Macary points out. More intensive public debates have only taken place in connection with the issues of nuclear weapons. Here, two public groupings are to be differentiated analytically. On the one hand, there is the vast majority of the population which can be characterized as a contradictory and incoherent opinion cluster including especially a deeply rooted fear of nuclear weapons. This group advocates national defense and shows trust in the Armed Forces, but at the same time rejects the threat or the implementation of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, there is a small enlightened group of well informed citizens with "instrumental" opinions. These persons are able to discuss nuclear issues coherently. The obvious interdependencies of these two opinion areas have not reduced the irrationalities of public discussion. Saint-Macary sees possibilities for a solution of this dilemma not so much through improving the general level of information, but rather through changes on a long term basis by integrating the question more intensively into the general educational process.

Israel has experienced such educational socialization effects because of it has been a frontier state over decades, which is not the case for most other states. The contribution of M. Lissak deals not with attitudes of the population, but with the linkages between defense establishment and mass media. In order to describe the institutional mechanisms for the transfer of information between the military and the civilian sector, Lissak refers to five criteria relating to the actual encounter situations of officers and journalists, the representatives of these two sectors: The level of institutionalization of the encounters, the status of the interacting parties, the

nature of the rules of the game, the degree of control each representative is subjected to, and finally the controversy of public or non-public (i.e. military) discussion on national security and related issues.

In Israel's case one can find a relatively high level of institutionalization of interactions between representatives of the Ministry of Defense and the press and the changing forms of formal and informal encounters. In addition, efforts can be observed to execute a certain control over the contacts, particularly by the Ministry of Defense. This is expressed through the monopoly which the military claims in discussing issues of strategy, organization, or even budget and this provokes growing critique by the press.

As for the encounter modes, they are essentially determined by the position of social power and social prestige of the interacting partners. Furthermore, they can be characterized as situations full of competition and conflict originating in contrasting professional interests, and which are mainly characterized by an unstable mixture of cooperative and competitive relations within the basic rules of the game.

In comparison, it should be noted that the extent and contents of public discussion in Israel has become essentially more intense and more open than could be expected from the institutional and personal interrelations. Keeping in mind the military-industrial-complex, the Israeli situation has been namely characterized uncontradictedly as military-mass media-complex.

Where the Israeli situation is marked by war experience of the last years, the West European states are marked through welfare-economy. Terms like defense, military, and service are rated relatively low on the value scale. This is true also in the case of Switzerland, although one could have expected limited effects of this kind because of the militia model in practice. The principle of voluntary participation, which functions as the basis of the cadre system in which officers and non-commissioned officers are trained and educated, is increasingly undermined by aversion of the younger generation to assume leadership functions, according to recent survey data between 1970 and 1980. This trend is to be explained by a change in orientation towards the military, which can also be observed in other industrialized countries and which is closely connected with modernization variables such as education, urbanization, and age.

A corresponding shift in the value system is the outcome of this development from traditionalistic values like patriotism, discipline, and obedience, prevailing in the older generation with a generally lower educational level (mainly in rural areas), to modern values such as tolerance, partnership, and equal treatment prevailing in the younger generation with a higher level of education (mainly in urban areas). On the other hand, the change in orientation towards the military is determined by a process of deviation from a more affective orientation to a more instrumental and profit-oriented perspective. This decentralized value orientation of the public, also called secularization process by Haltiner, shows that the military is losing its significance as reference group. Nevertheless, the military is still rated high in Swiss society, over 80 % of the population express fundamental consent to the Army.

At any rate, there is the possibility of a widening gap of conformity between citizens with a higher and those with a lower level of education. This gap would not only include negative effects for relationship between military superiors and subordinates, but for the more extensive military-civilian relations as well.

In his contribution about the Netherlands W. Scheelen's central aspect of public opinion towards the Armed Forces focusses on the identity problem of modern armies. Scheelen holds that the crisis on the one hand is determined by the fully changed role of today's military profession. This shift centers around the political function of war prevention and the connected responsibility for national security, which is shared with the politicians. On the other hand, the army's new function as a political instrument for peace keeping, opposed to its traditionally autonomous role regarding to warfare, has created an identity crisis for the population vis-a-vis the Armed Forces. The reason for this lies in the contradiction between acceptance of the military and emotional resistance against its potential implementation. This opinion cluster is clearly shown by the following data: 71 % of the population agree that the professional soldier has to be ready to fulfill any given order in order to keep the armed forces functioning; but 54 % want to see nuclear weapons removed from the Netherlands.

The open discussion on problems concerning security and the Armed Forces in the Netherlands is reinforced by military unions, ten of which exist momentarily in the military organization with about 67 000 active members.

All in all, according to Scheelen, the value standards of society are becoming increasingly valid within the Dutch Armed Forces as

well. This is particularly evident though the trend among soldiers to look at their profession as just another job.

The situation in Belgium is characterized by two peculiarities. First, there is the "two-tier"-system existing since 1974. It includes volunteers and enlisted soldiers doing their duty in functionally separate areas. Second, the analysis of attitudes of military personnel contains reference to the concept of the "military mind", which implies, according to Abrahamsson, the following crucial attitudes: nationalism, pessimistic beliefs of human nature, pessimistic estimates on the probability of war, political conservatism, and authoritarianism.

Ph. Manigart could not find fundamental differences between civilian and military opinions on the basis of his survey data. The examined NCOs and draftees do not in their opinion profile allow for the conclusion that they form a structuralized and homogeneous group with a separate military ethos, even though they are to a small extent opposed to communism and prone to favor power and force more than the civilian citizens. This means considerable limitation of influence in the socialization process of the Belgian military. Furthermore, there is another interesting result focussing on ethnography: The Dutch-speaking population, both military and civilian, tend to be less pro-military than the French-speaking part of the Belgians.

Certainly, the affinity of civilian and military attitudes on an ideological level does not imply a civilian-military relationship without any problems. Particularly the low prestige of the military within society is frustrating for many soldiers. The negative image could by no means be called hostile, it simply is indifferent.

Manigart includes that the process of civilianization has come a long way in Belgium. Especially among volunteers the military duty is considered to be just another job as in the Netherlands.

Public Opinion in Scandinavia is covered by two contributions from Sweden (Törnqvist) and Denmark (Borup-Nielson).

Törnqvist's study deals with attitudes towards international relations and towards the population's willingness to defend itself. The latter seems to be unchanged, a fact even more remarkable because a generally lower feeling of well being has been recorded for Swedish society. In the other opinion area striking changes have taken place: The international situation has been felt to be increasingly threatened by the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan (35 % in 1980 opposed to 19 % in 1976); the evaluation of the probability of a war before the year 2000 shows a similarly grown fear of threat (36 % believe in the possibility of a third world war in 1980 as opposed to 21 % in 1979).

Borup-Nielson's study analyzes attitudes of the Danish population towards the national defense concept. Here, too, one can find an increase in the survey data between 1975 and 1980, especially among those questions concerning the raise of defense expenditures and the necessity of military forces for Denmark: The increase of positive answers amounted to 20 % in 1980. In this particular field we can see an augmented sensibility for security related issues. This can only be fully understood within the shifts of international affairs.

**PUBLIC OPINION ON SECURITY POLICY AND
ARMED FORCES IN ITALY**

by

Hans E. Radbruch

PUBLIC OPINION ON SECURITY POLICY
AND ARMED FORCES IN ITALY

One of the most striking features of Italian public opinion is the fact that security policy as well as the Armed Forces are on the fringes of the general interest. To illustrate this phenomenon one need only compare the rather intensive ongoing public debate about the stationing of Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) in almost all the other concerned European countries and its almost complete absence in Italy. Despite some fierce parliamentary and public debates, only rarely have issues of foreign policy, security policy and the role of the Armed Forces for their implementation dominated the national scene. To assess the full impact of this situation one has to take into account that the decision was taken by a minority government against the major opposition party, in a country which has a reputation for unstable governments where the problem of 'governabilità' (governability) constitutes one of the major features of the public debate.

The public image of the Italian Republic is determined by traditional political and social values going back to the Risorgimento (Italian unification), traditional catholic values and the reminder of the Resistance movement in World War II. The structure of this common heritage tends to emphasize traditional more conservative perceptions and approaches which are, moreover, reinforced by the specific features of Italian society which, notwithstanding social change, is still an organic, person-oriented society where the fabric of personal relations is dominant (1). Accordingly the practice of Italian politics is based on compromise, tactical adjustments and continuous balancing acts between divergent and contrasting practical and ideological exigencies of the different "separated social entities" (2).

More global issues like foreign policy and security policy are less perceptible to such an approach. Public interest therefore finds it difficult to focus on them other than occasionally where they transpire within the usual framework, or more concretely when f.i. scandals draw the attention to the misuse of personal power.

Any analysis of Italian social or political phenomena would be void if it did not at least draw the attention to the North-South problem. The gap between the industrialized North and the Mediterranean South is deeper than it appears from the outside because it does not only imply different stages of economic development but also different attitudes and different behavioural patterns (3). After World War II the influence of the South in Italian politics has been significantly greater than the influence of the North (4). Southern conservatism has contributed to the lack of public perception for alternatives to traditional approaches and policies, as well as for qualitative changes in the political and social environment. This statement applies to the whole political spectrum. The Socialist Party (PSI) f.i. did not realise, earlier than 1975, that it "lacked a coherent foreign policy perspective as all its interest focused on domestic policy" (5).

The cultural variety of Italy is one of the country's most striking features. As a consequence society looks like an overlapping patchwork which does not fit into the normal clear-cut definitions and pattern. This variety constitutes also the base of the absolute absence of social dialectics: there is no dialectical process between intellectuals and politicians, between university and administration, between the media and government, between government and opposition, between the ethics of law and the ethics of politics. The lack of dialectics reaches its peak where the military is concerned. Residue of a decaying sacredness? Persecution mania of the military? Incompetence and incapacity of the non-military? Desire of the political class to cover its incompetence together with antiquated systems of management? Interests of the opposition not to raise the problems? (6).

Finally, it should not be forgotten that personal influence in Italy still outweighs institutional influence. It might be worthwhile f.i. to examine whether the rather late reception of the qualitative change in the nature of war after Hiroshima could eventually be attributed to the influence of Benedetto Croce (7) and his statement that "as the souls are disturbed by a recent great invention ... they seek consolidation in the old motto: ceci tua cela, the war destroys the war - the means invented by science make war impossible, because giving to man the power to destroy mankind they force him finally to keep peace. Alas, how faulty are the syllogisms derived from the crazy anxiety of the immortals; war will never be abolished because it is the core of reality ..." (8).

From the Resistance to the Re-establishment of the Armed Forces

After the Armistice of 1943 first units of the regular Italian Armed Forces were reconstructed in the "liberated" South while a popular guerrilla war developed in the Northern German occupied regions. Members and units of the regular army also participated in the Resistance movement. The extent of this participation is still a political issue. While in the official view the contribution was significant (9), radical critics from the Left try to minimize the number of regular soldiers involved; specifically they question the motivation: in their view the participation of the regular army in the Resistance had a "deliberate . . . reactionary and monarchist optic"(10).

When the war ended the country was faced with grave economic problems, which were aggravated by the political chaos which had been bridged only superficially by the experience of common goals and commonality during the Resistance. For some time Italy was on the brink of civil war. In this situation defence matters could only be of little interest to the Italian people. In 1947 defence did not even rank among the most urgent problems. Even in 1952 defence problems were not seen as being very urgent (11).

Table I - Most Urgent Problems (March 1952)

Unemployment	58
Price Control	28
Rents & Housing	25
Tax Reform	14
Social Security	13
Land Reform	12
Elimination of Analfabetism	11
Reform of Bureaucracy	10
Defence/Rearmament	10
No answer	9

It is in this context that the fierce political debate whether Italy should join the North Atlantic Treaty (12) was neither reflected in public opinion nor did they really raise public interest or stimulate a debate outside political circles and, of course, the media.

Table II (13) - Do You Think That Italy Should Join an Alliance With Other European States?

	<u>Italy</u>	<u>North</u>	<u>Centre</u>	<u>South</u>	<u>Islands</u>
In favour	46	50	43	42	38
Against	15	14	13	16	19
Other answers	2	3	2	2	2
Do not know	37	33	42	40	41

Table III (13) - Do You Think That Italy Should Join an Alliance with Other European States?

	<u>Favourable</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Other Answers</u>	<u>Do Not Know</u>
Professionals, business & landowners	67	14	2	17
Employees	61	23	3	13
Artisans, skilled labour	52	20	3	25
Farmers	50	12	2	36
Housewives, pensioners	43	10	3	44
Industrial labour	34	20	1	45
Farm labour	29	18	3	50
<hr/>				
Communists (PCI)	30	34	1	35
Socialists (PSI)	39	32	1	28
Republicans (PRI)	61	16	2	21
Christian Democrats (DC)	53	6	3	38
Liberals (PLI)	70	8	3	19
Rightist Parties	42	29	6	23
No Party Preference	22	6	2	70

Whatever configuration of these figures one tries to interpret, one fact is evident and cannot be disputed: about one-third of the Italian population was not aware of or interested in the issue. The influence of the usually applied variables from level of education to party affiliation is normal; the regional distribution is much more levelled than one would expect. It can be assumed that the "do not know's" reflect more disinterest than indecision. This assumption is substantiated by the political situation in which the poll was taken. The Left opposition parties had denounced NATO as an "alliance for war" (14), they claimed that "industrialists" were forcing NATO on the country while the workers were against NATO (15) and Nenni, the undisputed charismatic leader of the PSI, had ended his final statement in Parliament before the vote was taken with the words: "The fight against the Atlantic Pact will not end but begin with the vote. We shall do everything to make the execution of the Pact impossible" (16).

If one compares the data with those referring to events of equal broad public exposures the assumption becomes even more valid. An opinion poll on the upcoming referendum for a change of the abortion laws gives the following overall figures (17):

Table IV - Abortion Referendum (1981)

	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>
In favour	60	57	63
Against	33	36	30
Do Not Know	7	7	7

These data reflect much more the normal distribution of opinion in Italy and therefore reinforce the fact that security policy and the armed forces are less vital than many other problems in the eyes of the Italian public.

Italy's choice for NATO also conditioned the structure of the Armed Forces after World War II as it demanded to base them on the old professional cadres and not on the guerrilla experience. The latter decision would have made a Swiss-model neutrality feasible. Domestic and Security concerns did overlap in this choice. A militia system "would have presented enormous dangers - objectively present in the social structure of the country - to public order" (18). Besides

Italy's geo-strategic position allowed no disarmed neutrality and an armed neutrality was not feasible because of the country's economic conditions. The objectivity of this situation was very much underlined by the supporters of NATO in the public debate to indicate the inevitability of the choice and therefore its apolitical character.

The Years of Social Isolation

About 1960 the re-construction of the Italian Armed Forces had been finished. Old traditions prevailed, the most obvious example being the military disciplinary code (19), where simply the words "Kingdom of Italy" were changed to "Republic of Italy" in the old code introduced during the fascist era. There was little discussion among the public. On the contrary the Armed Forces played their traditional role as a legitimate instrument of the State which was presented when the State needed representation. Already in 1948 on the first "Day of the Republic" military parades were the highlight of the national festivities (20).

Issues of international and security policy did likewise not find much interest. (see Table V).

Table V - (21) Can the Two Blocs (NATO & the Warsaw Pact) Co-exist for a Long Time Without Coming to an Open Conflict?

(April 1953)	<u>Italy</u>	<u>PCI</u>	<u>PSI</u>	<u>DC</u>	<u>MSI</u> (Right)
Can co-exist for a long time	36	28	55	35	22
Can not co-exist	29	33	24	22	51
Do not know	31	33	25	39	24
Other answers	3	6	2	4	2
No answer	1	--	--	--	1

The figures do not only indicate the lack of concern; the almost equal distribution over the whole political spectrum indicates the lack of interest of the major opposition. The deviation in the case of the PSI and MSI just define the extremes and can easily be explained. The role of the political opposition will be dealt with later in this paper.

The internal structure of the Armed Forces developed quite unnoticed. Article 52 of the Italian Constitution states that the "Constitution and the activities of the Armed Forces should be moulded in the democratic spirit of the Republic". The Constitution also is the basis for the draft and it has - like in many other countries - provisions which take care of the specific requirements of the military organisation. But discussion of these provisions was about the last time that Parliament seriously dealt with defence issues. Neither the annual approval of the defence budget nor an occasional parliamentary committee investigating some scandal had a direct impact on the Armed Forces.

The tendency to rely on traditional norms and the tendency to over-emphasize professional exclusiveness and self-containment did have specific repercussions on the internal structure of the Armed Forces. While norms of military discipline which, in substance, regulate the social structure of the military in most comparable Western European democratic nations are based on law and, therefore, are not only based on a democratic consensus but are also potentially open to public discussion, in Italy the disciplinary regulations were based on decree. This excluded the general public from participation in the debate about the structure of one of the foremost instruments of the State.

The Time of Change

The overall situation changed during the 60's. But not because of a different attitude of public or a growing interest in security issues and the Armed Forces, only as a consequence of the involvement of parts of the military hierarchy in political manoeuvres. In 1967 the Weekly News Magazine "L'Espresso" published a dossier in which the Chief of the Army Staff and former Commandant of the Carabinieri, General De Lorenzo, was accused of having contemplated in 1964 to use one of the many governmental crises to overthrow parliamentary government and to install an emergency government of military men and technicians, backed by the then President of the Republic (22). The full truth of the accusations has never been proven but there remained enough doubts to make the public suspect the democratic reliability of the Armed Forces, especially as these suspicions were reinforced by scandals involving the national (military) intelligence institutions such as SIFAR (Servizio Informazioni Forze Armate) and SID (Servizio Informazioni Difesa) and by the fact that some high-ranking officers joined the neo-fascist MSI; after retirement two of them (De Lorenzo and Miceli) were even elected to Parliament for that Party.

The Armed Forces could no longer resist public pressure especially since this pressure, for the first time, was not only external but also internal. Since the early 70's there is growing pressure for participation in the choice and management of social and national goals. The discovery of the referendum as one means to participate directly in political decisions is one of the most striking examples of this tendency.

The thrust for more participation necessarily raised after some time the issue of participatory democracy against hierarchical military structures. This issue, other than in countries with a different history or a different social system, had never been raised and discussed in Italy because - other than for the already mentioned reasons - the traditional social structure overlaying the democratic political structure had been and still is largely hierarchical.

Criticism within the Armed Forces comes from two groups: the draftees and the NCOs, particularly the latter with technical qualifications. More specifically two developments had a decisive impact on the Armed Forces: the rising level of education and the trend to unionize. Since the unification of Italy, the military was asked by State and society to perform as the "School of the Nation". As such it has contributed to the process of formal education, specifically in fighting illiteracy or semi-literacy (see Table VI), and in the promotion of technical education, it has served as a melting pot of the nation by mixing young people from widely divergent regions socially and culturally and has significantly contributed to civic education.

Table VI - Percentage of Illiteracy (23)

(male population only)

1871 - 61.8	1931 - 17.4	1971 - 4.0
1901 - 42.5	1951 - 10.5	
1921 - 24.4	1961 - 6.6	

Today there is very little space left in the military for the role of the "School of the Nation". Accordingly, the number of draftees who needed to complete and have completed their formal education or their technical/occupational training in the Armed Forces has dropped significantly in the 60's and is still dropping (see Tables VII & VIII).

Table VII - Occupational Certification of Draftees (24)

<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
97.758	99.584	92.938	97.411	78.312

Table VIII - Formal Educational Certification of Draftees (25)

	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
Elementary School Certificate	5.429	5.331	5.175	4.638	2.491
High School Certificate	3.350	3.326	4.285	4.130	4.354

The figures themselves indicate the higher educational level of the draftees. While the need for remedial courses for the completion of elementary education is dropping, that for a more advanced education is increasing. This reflects the overall national development (see Table IX) which has seen a revolutionary extension of education.

Table IX - Population over the Age of 6 According to Education Qualifications (26)

	<u>1951</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1971</u>
University degree (MA equivalent)	422.324	603.205	883.188
Diploma (professional qual.) BA equiv.	1.379.811	1.983.816	3.363.969
High School certificate	2.514.474	4.375.023	7.151.289
Elementary School certificate	12.946.463	19.303.509	21.586.160
Elementary School without degree	19.581.558	15.598.367	13.239.519
Illiterates	5.456.005	3.796.834	2.547.217
TOTAL	<u>42.300.635</u>	<u>45.615.754</u>	<u>48.771.342</u>

Even more than the increase in the overall level of education did the increase in higher education (see Table X) have an impact on the Armed Forces. For the first time in Italian history a significant number of university students and graduates entered the barracks as draftees.

Table X - University Students and Graduates (27)

1871	-	10.958	-	0.6 *
1901	-	26.301	-	1.0
1921	-	44.481	-	1.3
1931	-	47.614	-	1.3
1951	-	226.543	-	5.5
1961	-	287.975	-	7.1
1971	-	759.872	-	18.6

* (percentage of age group 20-24 years)

The Italian military today is therefore faced with a completely changed profile of the draftees. Today the majority consists either of students or university graduates or qualified young industrial blue collar workers who have gained their formative education in the large complexes of modern industry "where the individual is no longer a passive number but an informed and active participant in the labour process, sensitive to the problems of the community in which he works" (28).

In this context the growing political weight and growing militancy of organized labour have an indirect impact on the military. Italian trade unions still think and act in the context of class warfare and many of the draftees have been and are militant unionists. They therefore think and tend to act in the categories of class warfare and to take the military establishment as the class enemy. In February 1979 in a public discussion in Venice a draftee could state, without being refuted: "I think a fundamental element is missing (in the military) - a coordination with class struggle. (For army reform) the working class is the fundamental axis and point of reference. Our State is a democratic Republic, republican and free. We shall fight together to improve the conditions". (29).

Already in 1968 the protest was organized when drafted students founded a movement "Workers in Uniform (Proletaria in Divisa) (30). About the same time discontent within the ranks of the NCO found a first outlet in a periodical The Democratic Soldier (Il Militare Democratico) (31) and finally it came to public demonstrations of NCOs who demanded the application of all constitutional rights for the military, as well as an improvement of social conditions such as pay increases, housing and less transfers (32).

All these developments, with respect to the military, provoked a deep crisis of confidence for society. The image of the Armed Forces had so much deteriorated that in 1970 the 17-20 year old population rated the military the most repressive and authoritarian institution in the country (33). Despite direct repercussions on recruitment and retention, the military hierarchy did not think that it needed to heed even the most moderate suggestion from the public.

The initiatives came from the political side. As discussion of military problems involved society at large, the new inner structure of the Armed Forces had to be based on a broad political consensus. For the first time in Italian history the disciplinary code was based on law, not on regulation (34).

The new law re-asserts the constitutional rights of the soldier thereby applying the concept of "citizen in uniform".

To allow for greater participation of soldiers and to avoid military unions, a system of military representation was established whereby soldiers of all categories were allowed to discuss problems of everyday life and propose adjustments to social change. As in the Armed Forces of other nations, a sharp line is drawn to avoid interference with operations and training.

The first elections for the military were held last spring. Participation was very high. As the councils have just started working, it is too early to evaluate results. Italy has tried its own innovative approach to solving the problem of integrating the military and society by establishing a participatory structure which is open to social change without interfering with the finality of the Armed Forces (35).

The Attitude of the Political Parties

When public opinion began to focus on the Armed Forces the political parties finally began to notice the problem as a general one which needed conceptual and not the usual hotchpotch answers. At the beginning there were lamentations. "There are few areas like this (organisation of Armed Forces) which have been more neglected in political thinking and not conceived to be one of the most relevant and most urgent problems, especially in view of the opening gap between the youth and the image of the Armed Forces" (36). This statement from the first conference the DC held in January 1976 on problems of the Armed Forces is matched by an analogous one from the first conference of the PCI held in the same month. "Critical analysis must admit that the Left was late in responding to and in formulating a common programme for a confrontation with which to defend the national, patriotic and popular values repressed in the Armed Forces by the reactionary conduct of the Atlantic governments" (37).

The new interest of the political parties is almost entirely directed towards the implementation of Public Law 382 and eventually the seeking of solutions for some of the most pressing social problems of the military. The departure for change is technical and not political. Typical for this approach is the answer of the present Minister of Defence, the Socialist L. Lagorio, to the questions what the specific socialist aims - above the national and governmental aims - in the field of defense are: "(a) efficiency (because it is a necessary principle of economy and good government); (b) improvement of the military conditions, as well within the military organisation as in the country; and (c) more internal democracy" (38).

Over the last years a consensus between all major parties has developed, which has been the basis for defence and military planning. The core of the consensus is more efficiency, with very little discussion in the public and the Parliament. In 1975 and 1976 major modernisation plans, the so-called "Leggi promozionali", were approved. The laws are based on an integrated planning even if they were discussed and enacted on a service basis (39). Training and education for regular personnel has been considerably increased in length and content (40) so that by now soldiers have become the most qualified public servants. It was an Alpini Colonel who, after the earthquake in Southern Italy, installed in the Treasury

an evaluation system for the damages inventing a specific economic system (41). Efficiency has indeed become the key word for the emerging new image of the Italian military.

Even the major opposition party, the PCI, does not advance an alternative policy. Since Chile the PCI has been very careful not to antagonize the military hierarchy. The party did take part in the discussion of the new internal order of the military structure but was very careful not to be involved directly in extra-parliamentary efforts (42). In the eyes of the PCI the reforms are a success which has to be watched closely and to be protected against reactionaries; the focus is on implementation, management and improvement of social conditions and not on political change(43).

The absence of the political issues is even more evident in the case of the greater issues of security policy. Italy was the first country to accept the double decision of NATO from December 1979 on the stationing of LRINF. The PCI contested the decision of the Italian Government and asked for negotiations before deciding on the stationing but it obviously did not think it opportune to develop the issue into a public campaign. This attitude is nothing else but a consequence of the new policy of the PCI in respect to NATO and a rather conservative analysis of the military balance (44).

The only party which, from time to time, contests the general consensus is the Radical Party (Partito Radicale - PR) which sees itself as the proponent of direct democracy, of the handicapped and of alternative policies. In the field of security policy they feature a more general approach by f.i. suggesting cuts in defence spending to fight hunger in the Third World. In accordance with their political philosophy the Radicals are making frequent use of the instrument of referenda. In 1980 they gathered the necessary signatures for the 10 referenda (about 600,000), one of these dealing with a military matter: the Military Courts of Justice. In substance they ask to transform the military courts into courts for military offences, and to so substitute military judges by civilian judges who are completely independent from the military organisation (45).

Out of the 10 referenda 5 were ruled to be unconstitutional, the one on the Military Courts of Justice was admitted but it is interesting to note that probably it will not be put to the voters. The political parties, including the PR,

found a compromise in Parliament; the law was changed. Only the time factor - the law still has to be approved by the Senate - might be an obstacle to this quite traditional solution. After what has been said up to now, it is no wonder that only on an issue which involved the military could a political compromise be found.

Conscientious Objection

Part of the general reform package was Public Law 722 which was enacted in December 1972 and amended in May 1974, which established for Conscientious Objectors the option of a substitute for military service. The Law still is not completely implemented owing to administrative difficulties. The number of Conscientious Objectors who have applied for exemption under this Law is insignificant even if one takes the missing infrastructure into account.

Table XI - Situation of Conscientious Objectors (46) (12 Dec-1972 - 31 Dec. 1976)

Total requests for exemptions	1625
Requests granted	1171
Requests rejected (unfounded or too late)	55
Requests under examination	399

Jehovah Witness (not under the provisions of Public Law 722)

Total	699
Exempt	441
Under examination	104
Rejected	154

TOTAL CASES OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS - 2324

There has been very little echo in the public with regard to the new Law. The cases of rejection are obviously quietly accepted. Conscientious Objection has never been a political issue neither is the implementation of the Law.

Trade Unions and the Military

Unionization is one of the dominant features of Italian politics today. The political thrust of the Federation of Trade Unions (CGL/CISL/UIL) and the political as well as the social belligerence of the many autonomous unions have an impact on the openness of society for military trade unions. Specifically under a consensus which centers on more efficiency, unionization of the military is one of the most sensitive political issues in Italy today. While the military is denied the right to strike by the Constitution (Article 40), it is not quite clear whether it can be excluded from the constitutional guaranteed right to join a trade union. The ban to form "professional association in form of a trade union or to join other trade unions" is based on law(47)not on the Constitution. Nevertheless the law is based on a general political consensus specifically of the political parties of the so-called Arco Costituzionale, that is, those who once formed the majority in the Constitutional Assembly which drafted and underwrote the Constitution (PLI, PRI, PSDI, DC, PSI, PCI). The motives for this consensus are divergent. While the Centre parties are more concerned with professional standards, the Left fear that unionization will lead to an all volunteer army which they want to avoid for obvious political reasons under all circumstances. One of the more generally accepted reasons is the common conviction that Italian trade unions are different from those in other Western industrialised countries as they participate directly in the general political discussion and even decision-making. Therefore "the experiences with military unionization in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries are of a fundamentally different nature from the praxis of unionism in Italy. Those unions do nothing else but emphasize the rights of the soldiers" (48).

Notwithstanding the law the first military unions have been founded in Italy. To avoid friction their officers are usually civilians or retired officers. Members sometime refer to their Constitutional Rights for justification (Article 39 of the Italian Constitution).Up to now the following three unions have been established (49):

- SINAM (Sindacato Nazionale Autonomo dei Militari)
(Membership - approximately 20,000)
- ANUA (Associazione Nazionale Unitaria Aeronautica)
(Membership - approximately 3,500)
- EDILMIL (originally founded as a construction cooperative for soldiers)
(membership - unknown)

The Italian MOD has found a low key approach to the problem. Pretending that the overwhelming majority of members is retired, it does not grant recognition but it does not refuse to deal with them on a case by case basis (50). In reverse the unions have been accused by more militant elements of the NCOs to be nothing else but tools of the military hierarchy (51).

The ambiguity of the situation and the sensitivity of the subject have kept the issue out of the political debate. The Federation is not interested in access to the barracks. It knows from experience that military unions by definition of the law would have to be autonomous unions as it happened in the case of the recent de-militarization of the police. Nobody wants to upset a delicate political and social balance.

The Veterans

One of the great national events that find media coverage throughout the country is the annual meeting (raduno) of the Alpini which draws crowds from all over the countries. People will undergo considerable efforts in order to attend. It is an absolutely unpolitical spectacle but it does have political significance as it points to another dimension of the public image of the military. The numerous associations (see Table XII) of veterans see themselves as still part of the military - in auxiliary positions, in reserve position, or at least as supporters of military values. From their point of view it is legitimate to say that "it is not true that the Armed Forces are isolated from the national context, at least if the individual soldier himself does not want to be isolated" (52).

Table XII - (see following page)

Table XII - List of Patriotic Institutions subsidized by the MOD (53)

- Associazione Nazionale Combattenti e Reduci (1918) (ANCR)
- Associazione Nazionale Ex-Internati (ANEI)
- Associazione Nazionale Famiglie Caduti e Dispersi in Guerra (ANFCDG)
- Associazione Nazionale Famiglie Italiane dei Martiri Caduti per la Libertà della Patria (ANFIM)
- Associazione Nazionale Famiglie Caduti e Martiri dell'Aeronautica (ANFCMA)
- Associazione Nazionale Mutilati e Invalidi di Guerra (1917) (ANNIG)
- Associazione Nazionale Partigiani d'Italia (ANPI)
- Associazione Nazionale Reduci Prigionia, Internamento e Guerra di Liberazione (ANRP)
- Associazione Nazionale Tubercolotici di Guerra e per Cause di Guerra (ANTG)
- Associazione Nazionale Volontari di Guerra (1923)
- Ente Edilizio per i Mutilati e Invalidi di Guerra
- Ente Nazionale Assistenza per gli Orfani ed i Figli dei Militari della Guardia di Finanza
- Gruppo delle Medaglie d'Oro al Valor Militare d'Italia (1916)
- Lega Navale Italiana
- Opera Nazionale Assistenza all'Italia Redenta (ONAIR)
- Opera Nazionale per gli Orfani dei Militari dell'Arma dei Carabinieri (ONOMAC)
- Opera Nazionale Invalidi di Guerra (ONIG)
- Opera Nazionale Orfani di Guerra (ONOG)
- Opera Nazionale Combattenti (1917) (ONC)
- Opera Nazionale per i Figli degli Aviatori (ONFA)
- Opera Nazionale Assistenza agli Orfani di Guerra Anormali Psicici
- Opera Nazionale Assistenza ai Profughi Giuliani e Dalmati
- Istituto "A. Doria" per gli Orfani dei Marinai Morti in Guerra
- Istituto del Nastro Azzurro fra Combattenti Decorati al Valor Militare
- Unione Nazionale Orfani di Guerra (UNOG)
- Unione Nazionale Ufficiali in Congedo d'Italia (1926) (UNOCI)
- Associazione Nazionale Veterani e Reduci Garibaldini
- Società MS Reduci Garibaldini "G. Garibaldi"
- Associazione Nazionale Alpini (1919) (ANA)
- Associazione Nazionale Arma Aeronautica
- Associazione Nazionale Arma di Artiglieria
- Associazione Nazionale Arma di Cavalleria (ANAC)
- Associazione Nazionale Arditi d'Italia (ANAI)
- Associazione Nazionale Automobilisti in Congedo
- Associazione Nazionale Bersaglieri (ANB)
- Associazione Nazionale Cappellani Militari in Congedo
- Associazione Nazionale Carabinieri (1928) (ANC)
- Associazione Nazionale Carristi d'Italia (ANCI)
- Associazione Nazionale del Fante (1929) (ANF)
- Associazione Nazionale Finanziari in Congedo
- Associazione Nazionale Genieri e Trasmettitori d'Italia
- Associazione Nazionale Granatieri di Sardegna
- Associazione Nazionale Martiri d'Italia (ANMI)
- Associazione Nazionale Paracadutisti (ANP)
- Associazione Nazionale Sanità Militare Italiana
- Associazione Nazionale Ufficiali Provenienti dal Servizio Attivo (1948) (ANUPEA)

These Institutions play an important role as transmission belts between the Armed Forces and the public. In all countries it would be difficult to quantify this influence; in Italy it is impossible. It is beyond the scope of this paper to outline their juridical and institutional basis; it must suffice to mention that they are deeply entangled in the administrative and welfare network of State and society. Their influence therefore far exceeds that of similar associations in other countries.

These Institutions are not directly taking part in the rare public debate on security policy and the Armed Forces. Their indirect influence, however, should not be neglected as their influence in local and regional politics is substantially and indirectly projected onto the national scene. Their philosophy is based on a mixture of nostalgia, material interest and patriotic sentiment; they therefore tend to reinforce more traditional values and structures.

Public Opinion Makers and Defense

In 1970 an inquiry (54) about information on security policy in the Italian press confirmed the situation already described: defence matters are only on the fringe of public interest. There were only a few dissenting voices, one - interestingly enough - belonging to A. Boldrini MP (PCI) who obviously viewed the problems from a "managerial" and not from a "control" point of view. The fault is primarily attributed to the Armed Forces themselves as their tendency to classify almost any and/or all information makes it impossible to deal with military subjects adequately. As decisions are usually on a restricted basis public debate cannot ensue. The little information available has to be found in foreign publications. Legislative norms and a restricting administrative praxis limit the flow of information to an extent that makes it impossible to deal seriously with the subject matter. In consequence no specialized critical analytical expertise has developed and the media lost interest (55). In the broader context of the general constraints - historical tradition, the specific Italian political geography and the lack of critical values - the problem had developed into the classic vicious circle: there is a lack of information on defence because no one is interested in defence problems and, at the same time, no one is interested in such subjects because of the lack of information (56).

It is a safe assumption - even without reference to more recent data - to say that the vicious circle has been broken during the last seven or eight years. The process was closely linked to the political and social discontent within the Armed Forces and re-assertion of public control by the Parliament. Critical, even radical militant, analysis of the social structure of the Armed Forces (57) was matched by the need of the political forces to find a material basis for political and parliamentary discussions (58). Legislative norms, as well as administrative praxis, have become less rigid and, as professional efficiency and managerial techniques are conquering the Armed Forces, traditional self-protective attitudes lose ground. Moreover, the political development over the last years, specifically the overall consensus on NATO and on the new disciplinary means, is bridging the gaps between the Left and the Right, the North and the South.

The most evident expression has been the establishment of ISTRID (Istituto Studi e Ricerche Difesa) which was set up by a group of "specialists of various political groups (including the PCI) for the study of security policy and defence planning" (59). ISTRID is primarily intended as a forum for public debate on a national basis and has no research capacity of its own but does have funds to commission research projects. It has held or is planning to hold conferences on such a wide range of subjects as: defence planning in the context of security policy, détente and disarmament, defence expenditures, scientific research and defence, and the democratization of the Armed Forces. These conferences usually receive a rather high media exposure. In this context it might be worthwhile to note that the Italian Senate which has recently introduced an informal information forum on topics of vital interests did choose "The Military Balance and Arms Control" as a subject. Foreign experts (Christoph Bertram and Lawrence Martin) had to be invited.

Nevertheless Italian expertise is building up. The Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) f.i. has added Maurizio Cremasco, a security specialist, to its permanent research staff. IPCPEC and CEFIS are creating expertise of their own.

Finally the media too have discovered the subject. The great dailies are developing their own defence expertise (60). Coverage in the weekly news magazines has increased significantly (61), and the political TV magazines no longer avoid defence issues (62). This is only a beginning but it shows a growing interest, a new awareness and a change from traditional behavioural patterns.

The Military and Public Opinion

The traditional approach of the Italian military had been complete disregard for public opinion. It had not only been the overreliance on secrecy that had made it almost impossible to analyse or discuss publicly defence because of lack of information but also the self-contained attitude of the military organisation. This situation is slowly changing.

The first breakthrough, which signalled a new approach, was the publication of the Defence White Book in 1977, which is published with the intention of presenting the Armed Forces as they are, without disguise and apology, in their moral and material aspects, in organisation and structure, in the broad range of their problems and prospectives; it is hoped that from this presentation observations, comments and suggestions will stem for the continuation of a dialogue with public opinion" (63). The White Book itself does not contain any direct reference to public opinion or public relations activities and distribution was not as widespread as in other countries, f.i. the Federal Republic of Germany, nor does it have the same political weight, nevertheless it did break the vicious circle which had entangled the discussion of defence matters.

Transparency of the Armed Forces and their mission and of the security policy of the nation by now have become part of the policy guidelines of the Ministry of Defence. The evolving new professional image of the military is no longer that of a "caserne soldier" but that of "a manager" who has international contacts, knows the political basis of defence decisions and appreciates the relationships between political choices and professional values. The military, therefore, is encouraged to seek contact with the public. "Among others, doing this they contribute to reassure public opinion and our country of their full adherence to the principles of our democratic Constitution" (64).

An analysis of the new approach has to be very carefully done. Between intention and implementation there is often a wide gap and even more so in Italy. Steps are very much controlled. Public appearances are limited to the hierarchy and only granted on special occasions. The most spectacular events in this respect took place early this year when two generals were interviewed on TV for the first time in Italy. The media have subsequently judged these interviews as a personal success of the interviewed; the press echo constituted an additional success, particularly as even the more Left-oriented papers were very positive. This positive

echo was generally taken as a sign of the popularity of the Armed Forces and of the general approval of their transmitted image, which was exactly that of managerial efficiency (65).

Generally it can be said that the Italian MOD is starting to use public opinion deliberately. Studies of the CASD (Centro Alti Studi Difesa), the Italian Defence College, are presented if they seem to have political dimensions (66). Most remarkable is the fact that, for the first time, the Armed Forces have commissioned a quantitative analytical study on the high job dissatisfaction in some rank levels as more and more NCOs and, in some cases, even officers leave the Armed Forces to work in industry. This phenomenon naturally concerns the more technical services, the Air Force and the Navy, rather than the Army. Out of a full complement of 1,800 officer pilots the Air Force has lost 350 in the last years, corresponding to a five-year output of the training process. The Navy loses 70-80 officers each year and 150 to 160 NCOs. These officers are usually of the rank of Lieutenant (s.g.) or Lieutenant Commander. The NCOs are highly qualified technical specialists (67). Besides the loss of training investment, this has led to severe gaps in certain areas with severe repercussions for operational readiness. Because of the lack of pilots the Air Force, for instance, has only 37 flying wings instead of the 40 foreseen in NATO planning (68). It is in this context that the need for rational planning is evident as it is obvious that isolation in the changed social situation can no longer be upheld.

Conclusions

The specifics of the Italian political culture have, until recently, conditioned an almost absolute public disinterest in security policy and the Armed Forces. After the initial choice for the Western Alliance issues of security policy were neglected in the political debate, the Armed Forces lived in splendid self-isolation. This, in turn, led to a lack of expertise.

The ensuing vicious circle was broken only recently when public opinion became aware of the internal problems of the Armed Forces and the military realized that it needed a new self-understanding and a new image to be able to fulfill its mission. First, very cautious steps were initiated which have resulted in a new awareness for defence issues. Nevertheless, the level of interest is still much lower than in most of the other industrialized Western nations.

FOOTNOTES

- (1) S. ACQUAVIVA & M. SANTUCCIO : Social Structure in Italy and Crisis of a System; Martin Robertson Ltd. London 1976.
- (2) E. FORCELLA, in F. De Benedetti (ed) : Il potere militare in Italia; Bari 1971, p. XI.
- (3) S. ACQUAVIVA & M. SANTUCCIO : Social Structure in Italy and Crisis of a System; Martin Robertson Ltd. London 1976.
- (4) A. CARBONARA : Bureaucratic Attitudes in a Changing Society; in M.B. Kincey (ed) Social Stratification and Development in the Mediterranean Basin, pp 239-251.
- (5) Interview with J. SANTORO from the Istituto per la Cooperazione Internazionale Politica, Economica e Culturale (IPIPEC) which was founded as a forum to stimulate thought and exchange experience in this field. The Communist Party (PCI) had already founded the CEFIS earlier for the same purpose.
- (6) M. BOWNANI : Problemi militari, classe politica e opinione pubblica; in Rassegna Italiana di Sociologia, No.4, 1971, p.690.
- (7) see FORCELLA, op. cit, p. X.
- (8) B. GROCE : Scritti e discorsi politici; Vol. II, Bari 1963, p. 194
- (9) L. LAGORIO (Minister of Defence, PSI), in Quadrante, Rivista delle Forze Armate Italiane, No.6/7, April 1980, p.11.
- (10) G. MASSOBERIO : Bianco, rosso e grigioverde: strutture e ideologia delle Forze Armate Italiane; Verona 1974, p.60.
- (11) P.L. FEGIZ : Il volto sconosciuto dell'Italia; Milano 1956, p.559.
- (12) Il Patto Atlantico al Parlamento Italiano; Rome 1949
- (13) P.L. FEGIZ, op. cit, p.687.
- (14) Il Patto Atlantico; op. cit., p.359.
- (15) ibid, p. 363.
- (16) ibid, p. 431.
- (17) Panorama, No. 786, 11 May 1981, p. 57.
- (18) E. GERQUETTI : Le Forze Armate Italiane dal 1945 al 1975: Strutture e dottrina; Milano 1975, p. 69
- (19) Regolamento di Discipline Militare
- (20) E. GERQUETTI, op. cit., p. 55

- (21) P.L. FEGIZ : op. cit., p. 689.
- (22) A. RIZZO : L'Alternativa in Uniforme : Technica e Ideologia del Potere Militare; Milano 1973, p. 194.
- (23) Istituto Centrale di Statistica (ISTAT) Sommario di Statistiche Storiche dell'Italia 1861-1975; Rome 1976, p.14.
- (24) Libro Bianco della Difesa (Defence White Book) Rome, MOD, 1977, p.237.
- (25) *ibid*
- (26) ISTAT, Sommario, op. cit., p. 14.
- (27) ISTAT, Sommario, op. cit., p.57.
- (28) General E. RAMBALDI, Chief of Staff Italian Army, in Rivista Militare, Jan/Feb 1978, pp.2-6.
- (29) Comune di Venezia - Assessorato Affari Istituzionale, Democrazia e Partecipazione nelle Caserme, Venezia 1979, p.70.
- (30) U. LUCAS : L'Istituzione Armata; Torino 1977, p. 20.
- (31) *ibid*, p. 74.
- (32) M. MEDAIL : Sotto le Stallette; Torino 1977, p. 25.
- (33) Doxa/Shell Inquiry, quoted from De Benedetti, op. cit. p.263.
- (34) Public Law 382 : Norme di Principio sulla Disciplina Militare (11 July 78); for details see Hans E. RADBRUCH : Social Change in the Italian Military; paper prepared for the IUS Conference, Chicago 1980.
- (35) H.E. RADBRUCH, op. cit., and Alain SOBARA : Les Forces Armées Italiennes: la Représentation Collective; unpublished paper CERSA Toulouse 1980.
- (36) F. D'ONOFRIO, in Le Forze Armate nella Società Democratica; Atti del Seminario di Studi, Roma 1976, p.15.
- (37) A. BOLDRINI : La rappresentanza democratica nelle Forze Armate; Documento di studio elaborato nel Gennaio 1976 dai rappresentanti del PCI nelle Commissioni Parlamentari della Difesa, p. VIII.
- (38) L. LAGORIO : Le Forze Armate nella Società Italiana, in Mondoperaio, No.4, April 1981, p.6.
- (39) Libro Bianco, op. cit., p.284.
- (40) *ibid*, p. 189.

- (41) Inquiry : General Manager, in *Il Mondo*, No.18, May 1981, p.26.
- (42) SORBARA, op. cit., p.7.
- (43) See specifically the proceedings of the Communist National Convention on Military Policy 1979, published in A. D'ALESSIO and U. PECCHIOLO : *La Riforma Democratica delle Forze Armate*, Rome 1979.
- (44) A. BOLDRINI and E. CERQUETTI in a discussion on TV Rome (Radical Party's TV station) came out very strongly against unilateral disarmament as that might endanger peace.
- (45) The history and the pro and con arguments can be found in : *Guida ai Referenda*, supplement *l'Europeo*, 4 May 1981, p.64.
- (46) *Libro Bianco*, op. cit., p. 216.
- (47) Public Law 382.
- (48) Statement of the Italian Government in the Senate quoted from: Fernando PINTO - *Forze Armate e Costituzione*, Torino 1977, p.25.
- (49) The figures have been supplied by EUROMIL, a European Federation of Military Associations and Unions. All three organisations are members of EUROMIL. The figures are based on self-assessment.
- (50) See the exchange of letters between the Minister of Defence and the Secretary General of SINAM in *Il Giornale dei Militari*, No.17, 27 April 77.
- (51) *Il Militare Democratico*, No.1, July 1975.
- (52) R. VILLA in *Le Forze Armate nella Società Democratica*, op. cit., p.80.
- (53) U. LUCAS, op.cit., p. 124.
- (54) A questionnaire was sent to about 100 journalists, politicians (members of defence committees) and a group of students and historians of military problems. 45 answered the questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire and a review of the research were published in: M. BONNANI, op. cit., pp.690-722.
- (55) *Ibid*, p. 695.
- (56) *Ibid*, p. 719.
- (57) G. MASSOERIO, op. cit.; and U. LUCAS, op. cit.
- (58) E. CERQUETTI, op. cit.; A. D'ALESSIO, op. cit; DE BENEDETTI, op. cit.; *Le Forze Armate nella Società Democratica*, op. cit.
- (59) *Quadrante*, No. 6/7, 1980.

- (60) A good example is La Repubblica which deals, at least once a week, with a defence issue on a broad conceptual basis. In most cases it is drawing on the expertise of international research institutions (IISS, Brookings, Rand, Hudson and Hoover Institutes, etc.)
- (61) Panorama and L'Espresso specifically belong to the best sources on the development of the Armed Forces; f.i. concrete example see. G. ROSSI and L. SCHEGGI, General Manager, in Il Mondo, No.18, 1 May 1981, pp.26-33.
- (62) One of the ^{best} examples of a well-researched analytical features on the reform of the Italian Military was RAI 2 Dossier, Cittadino Militare, 25 May 1980.
- (63) Libro Bianco della Difesa, op. cit., p.3.
- (64) L. LAGORIO, Mondoperaio, op. cit., p.8.
- (65) Falaschi, i Generali in Tivvù in Il Ponte, No.2, 28 Feb. 1981, pp.119-122.
- (66) Most recent example is a Press Conference (Feb. 81) at which a CASD study was presented, examining the possibility to open the military to female soldiers.
- (67) Corriere della Sera, No.4 (3 Feb. 1980) and No. 5 (4 Feb. 1980).
- (68) Il Mondo, op. cit., p. 32

L'OPINION PUBLIQUE, LA DEFENSE ET LES FORCES

ARMEES - LE CAS DE LA FRANCE (1975 - 1980)

by

Pierre Saint Macary

L'opinion publique, la défense et les forces armées

Un panorama de l'opinion publique française vis-à-vis de la défense et des forces armées ne peut, au premier niveau de présentation, qu'être très contrasté. Apparemment des phénomènes antinomiques existent en même temps : une certaine désaffection de la jeunesse masculine se traduisant essentiellement par les réticences ou le refus devant les obligations légales du service national - le service militaire -, une acceptation du nucléaire stratégique dans de si nombreux cercles de l'opinion qu'on a pu parler d'un oecuménisme militaire, la persistance des querelles entre atlantistes et gaullistes, le refus viscéral du nucléaire apocalyptique dans la plus grande partie de la population non-avertie, l'apparition récente d'une mode des abris anti-nucléaires allant même jusqu'à une vraie campagne de promotion commerciale, l'acceptation par le Parlement d'une augmentation progressive du budget militaire depuis 1976 jusqu'à atteindre, en 1980, 16,88 % du budget national et 3,67 % du produit intérieur brut marchand², le rappel régulier et devenu quasi incantatoire des termes de la dissuasion selon le Général de Gaulle, la perution d'ouvrages répudiant "la bataille" et d'autres l'admettant implicitement ou explicitement, la querelle sous-jacente de l'armée de métier et de l'armée de conscription - et aussi l'évocation curieuse de toutes les questions de défense - Kolwezi tenant autant de place que les questions nucléaires - dans la campagne présidentielle de 1981. L'"autonomie de décision" se substitue peu à peu à l'"indépendance", la Défense cesse de se voir accolée l'épithète de Nationale mais la contestation ouverte dans les casernes ne s'est pas renouvelée depuis 1975 et l'arme à rayonnement renforcé est devenu un sujet de discussion depuis qu'il a été annoncé que la France se donnerait le moyen de la fabriquer si besoin était...

1. Une page entière dans le Figaro du mercredi 20 mai 1981 (p. 13) sous le titre : "Séismes, radiations, guerre atomique - "Paradium", l'arche de Noé de l'ère nucléaire (comprenant : une photo d'Hiroshima, un bilan des abris nucléaires dans divers pays d'Europe et en URSS, une description de l'abri familial - cylindrique semi enterré...), pour le prix d'une voiture de luxe (?...?).

2. et mieux encore, respectivement 17,9 % et 3,85 % en 1981 selon les prévisions.

Après avoir été inhibée par l'autorité souveraine du Général de Gaulle, l'opinion se préoccupe à nouveau de défense bien que la simple appréhension des problèmes militaires soit devenue de plus en plus difficile.

D'abord, s'agit-il réellement et seulement de problèmes militaires ? Bien des discussions s'élargissent aux aspects globaux de la défense pour s'égarer ou se dissoudre dans les aspects démographiques, énergétiques, financiers... Ensuite, la position nouvelle de la France, puissance moyenne et non plus grande puissance à part entière comme elle l'était au siècle précédent et au début du XXe siècle, déconcerte une opinion très largement conditionnée par le passé historique. Enfin, le choix stratégique, celui de la dissuasion par suffisance des moyens nucléaires, reste étranger à la quasi-totalité des Français avertis ou non et, peut-on dire paradoxalement, d'autant plus étranger que le public est plus averti - ou croit l'être - des questions militaires. Tout Français mâle à une expérience et un avis souvent péremptoire sur la chose militaire qu'il "connaît" de par son passage sous les drapeaux, fut-ce fugitivement et marginalement au cours d'un service militaire dans le Service de Santé ou la Trésorerie aux Armées...

Tout Français, aussi, et c'est plus sérieux, sait ce qu'est une invasion et la défense du sol est considérée comme fondamentale, une défense par menace (irréelle) et non par un dispositif marqué sur le terrain, est ressentie, viscéralement le plus souvent, comme ne "couvrant pas le risque"... Sans évoquer le prix toujours excessif des primes d'assurance avant l'accident...

Pourtant, le poids du passé, les difficultés intrinsèques d'une stratégie d'interdiction, le contexte international, l'évolution des techniques d'armement ne pèsent pas du même poids sur l'ensemble de l'opinion.

De façon peut-être un peu trop schématique, on peut admettre que l'opinion du simple citoyen et en particulier celle des femmes reste très déconcertée, mal informée et réagissent plus à des stéréotypes qu'à des motifs dûment analysés et pesés. Et ceci n'a guère varié au cours des dernières années depuis la disparition du "père"¹, prenant pour la nation qui s'en remettait à lui les dispositions qu'il estimait saines et judicieuses.

1. Il s'agit évidemment du Général de Gaulle, à partir de 1958 jusqu'en 1969.

Au contraire, la modification est très sensible dans les cercles d'une opinion qu'on pourrait qualifier assez banalement d'éclairée et qui, elle, dans les dernières années de la décennie, se préoccupe infiniment plus de la défense que précédemment. Dans l'ordre politique en particulier, la discussion est ouverte sinon toujours pertinente, l'information est plus nourrie elle circule mieux, elle provoque des prises de position qui sont moins teintées d'a priori, idéologiques ou autres.

On essaiera donc de montrer dans une première partie, surtout à l'aide de résultats de sondages, que le désarroi de l'opinion publique moyenne reste très sensible. Puis dans une seconde partie de marquer combien le débat s'est ouvert et enrichi dans les cercles plus responsables des partis, des grands moyens d'information et du Parlement.

I - UN DESARROI DURABLE DE L'OPINION DU GRAND PUBLIC

A notre connaissance, l'opinion du grand public sur les problèmes de défense n'a pas fait l'objet d'études systématiques et approfondies bien que cette opinion soit souvent évoquée et invoquée à l'appui des thèses les plus diverses. Elle n'apparaît dans les débats de la place publique ou des enceintes parlementaires, que sous la forme d'analyses simplistes, voire caricaturales qui se contentent de reprendre, à l'état brut ou presque, les résultats de sondages d'opinion. Il s'agit, le plus généralement de tableaux de pourcentages des réponses à des questionnaires fermés. Si des ventilations par tranches d'âge, type d'habitat (rural ou urbain), groupes socio-professionnels, etc..., sont le plus souvent effectuées, l'ensemble des questions ne sont à peu près jamais mises en perspective les unes par rapport aux autres (dans le but, par exemple, de constituer des échelles d'attitudes organisées à partir d'hypothèses préalables). Il s'agit donc plutôt d'une forme d'impressionnisme corroboré de façon erratique sur certains points particuliers par des éclairages successifs à des intervalles de durées inégales.

L'élément dominant paraît être l'impact du nucléaire. Ressenti comme foncièrement destructrice, polluante, grosse de menaces directes et instantanées aussi bien qu'indirectes et différées (effets des radiations, radio-activité induite, ...), l'arme nucléaire est marginalisée sinon refusée comme élément significatif d'un système de défense.

La nécessité d'une défense nationale reste reconnue très majoritairement. L'existence de forces armées est sujette à des jugements plus nuancés mais reste généralement admise avec des pourcentages de faveur variables surtout avec les classes d'âge. Par contre, l'existence d'un arsenal nucléaire, la menace de son emploi (même brandie comme moyen de dissuader un ou des agresseurs éventuels), la probabilité même très lointaine (après une escalade de menaces et de contre-menaces) de mise en œuvre

d'un tel armement sont rejetées presque sans examen. Elles déclenchent semble-t-il, une crainte d'autant plus grande que l'exiguité du territoire national ne paraît laisser à personne une chance de sortir vivant d'un "échange" de "frappes" nucléaires. Même en tenant compte des simplifications abusives et des exagérations du vocabulaire, il semble, à travers toutes les enquêtes qualitatives ou quantitatives, que la phénomènes inhibe tous les autres réflexes de défense.

Les résultats du sondage IFOP/LE POINT du 27 mai 1980 peuvent être retenus à titre d'exemple. Etablis à partir de 997 interviews effectués entre le 8 et le 17 mai 1980 auprès d'un échantillon de la population française âgée de 15 ans et plus, ils font bien apparaître l'acuité de la résistance au nucléaire.

A la question centrale "êtes-vous partisan que, dans le cas où la France serait sur le point d'être envahie, le Président de la République menace¹ d'employer l'arme nucléaire française avec le risque d'avoir à l'utiliser réellement ? 13 % seulement restent indifférents, 58 % sont opposés et donc 29 % seulement admettent le jeu des menaces et contre-menaces qui constituent l'essence de la dissuasion².

Si le Président décidait d'exercer cette menace (nucléaire), il serait approuvé par 12 % seulement, désapprouvé par 65 % dont 38 % avec des manifestations violentes, 23 % refusant de se prononcer sur une telle éventualité.

Le recul devant le nucléaire est net : l'éventualité de l'emploi de l'arme nucléaire (hypothèse plus sévère que le jeu des menaces et contre-menaces) est rejetée, *par principe*¹, par 72 % et moins de 10 % restent alors indiffé-

1. C'est nous qui soulignons.

2. On peut signaler que dans le cas où c'est la République Fédérale d'Allemagne qui serait sur le point d'être envahie 17 % ne se prononcent pas, 14 % sont partisans de faire jouer la menace de l'armement nucléaire français et 69 % sont contre.

rents. Position d'ailleurs tout-à-fait cohérente avec la conviction affichée par le même pourcentage de 72 % qu'il ne serait pas possible, en cas d'attaque nucléaire de la France de "s'en tirer"...

Le nucléaire étant plus ou moins inconsciemment confisqué, l'attitude du grand public vis-à-vis des autres formes de l'appareil militaire reste tributaire de mécanismes d'un tout autre type et parmi lesquels le poids de l'histoire et l'impact du service militaire sont parmi les plus marquants.

Le poids de l'histoire se manifeste par deux pulsions antinomiques, jamais très ouvertement affichées, mais dont on peut retrouver facilement la trace.

La France unitaire s'est faite par la guerre, elle a trouvé sa réalité moderne dans les conflits de la Révolution et de l'Empire, elle a connu une grande guerre européenne et deux guerres mondiales sur son propre sol. Les Français restent donc implicitement persuadés de la nécessité d'une défense militaire, garante de l'indépendance, essentiellement territoriale. Donc toutes les couches de la population (en proportions variables évidemment selon les âges) et, surtout tous les partis politiques restent partisans de l'existence d'une "Armée" (avec un A majuscule et au singulier - ce qui n'est que peu en rapport avec la structure réelle de forces armées modernes, diversifiées, agissant dans les trois éléments, etc...). La crise au cours de laquelle l'Armée de terre a pu paraître être mise en question, par le biais de la contestation interne¹, a suscité une réaction quasi-unanime, des partis politiques tout spécialement, montrant que les Armées représentent un facteur profond d'identification.

1. Et même si les faits invoqués n'ont finalement pas été aussi graves et profonds qu'on avait pu le croire initialement.

Si l'"Armée" est une des institutions dans laquelle la nation a confiance¹, sans doute parce qu'elle ne pose plus de questions sur le plan de la politique intérieure², elle est aussi très sévèrement scrutée, quant à ses capacités propres et quant à la valeur de ses composantes³. Ici c'est un autre héritage

1. 68 % des hommes et 61 % des femmes ont "plutôt confiance" d'après un sondage Nouvel Observateur-SDFRES du 6/12 février 1981.
2. les armées sont "légalistes", a-t-on coutume de déclarer.
3. Le même sondage Nouvel Observateur-SDFRES indique que les officiers jouissent d'une confiance nettement moins marquée que l'institution.

Les officiers vous inspirent-ils	Plutôt confiance	Plutôt pas confiance	non réponse
TOTAL %	50	26	24
<u>SEX</u>			
Homme %	53	29	18
Femme %	48	23	29
<u>AGE</u>			
18 à 24 ans %	43	44	23
25 à 34 ans %	39	36	25
35 à 49 ans %	54	22	24
50 à 64 ans %	54	18	28
65 ans et plus %	62	13	25
<u>CATEGORIE PROFESSIONNELLE DU CHEF DE FAMILLE</u>			
Agriculteur, salarié agricole %	58	24	18
Petit commerçant, artisan ... %	56	15	29
Cadre supérieur, profession libérale, industriel, gros commerçant %	43	32	25
Cadre moyen, employé %	43	36	21
Ouvrier %	47	28	25
Inactif, retraité %	50	16	24
<u>PREFERENCE PARTISANE</u>			
Parti communiste %	41	38	21
Parti socialiste %	43	34	23
UDF %	64	11	25
RPR %	69	15	16
<u>SECTEUR D'ACTIVITE DE LA PERSONNE INTERROGEE</u>			
Travaille à son compte %	53	24	23
Salarié du secteur privé %	47	31	22
Salarié du secteur public ... %	38	44	18

qui pèse, celui des défaites. Les déroutes de 1870 et 1940 sont mal compensées par la dispendieuse victoire de 1918 et par la participation minoritaire (à base de volontaires à peu près uniquement) aux succès de 1945 : armée (de Terre) insuffisante en nombres par rapport à ses grandes devancières ; Marine en mal de tonnage ; armée de l'Air encore plus ou moins frappée du discrédit de 1940. Dans les milieux où les Armées sont le mieux admises elles ne sont pas toujours trouvées être au bon niveau ; dans les cercles où la critique est plus vive, elles ne sont pas considérées comme capables de "gagner la guerre" voire de "se défendre" tout court.

Cette crainte est d'ailleurs assez largement irrationnelle et procède de la référence, constante bien qu'inarticulée, à la loi du nombre. La toute puissance supposée de l'appareil militaire soviétique a quelque chose à voir avec le mythe du rouleau compresseur russe et surtout avec les chocs du front de l'Est de 1941-45 où d'innombrables divisions allemandes, invincibles en 1940, ont finalement succombé sous les coups des "fronts" d'Ukraine, de Biélorussie ou d'ailleurs. De la même façon, les flottes navales et aériennes des Etats-Unis, victorieuses du Japon et présentes depuis 30 ans sur (presque) toutes les mers du globe, représentent un potentiel chiffrable auprès duquel les autres flottes occidentales sont à peine significatives. Et sans arme nucléaire, tous ces bilans ne sont évidemment pas faux.

Il faut souligner que la distance à laquelle le monde politique, mais aussi dans bien des cas le monde militaire, se tient de l'armement nucléaire ne fait que pérenniser cette perception des rapports de puissance. Position de doute ne signifie pas, pour autant, position de démission.

L'horreur de la guerre est certes un facteur dominant. A juste titre, semble-t-il, dans la formulation de l'alternative posée par l'IFOP, et que 14 % seulement récuse :

- la guerre c'est trop horrible et tout doit être sacrifié à la paix : 64 %,
- mieux vaut prendre le risque d'une guerre que celui d'un assujettissement à une puissance étrangère : 22 %.

Mais parallèlement, il ne s'agit pas de subir et les réponses sont, là, sans ambage.

Si l'URSS exigeait pour le prix de la paix que l'Europe accepte d'être militairement neutralisée et coupe toute alliance avec les Etats-Unis, la France devrait refuser répondent 55 % alors que 28 % ne se prononcent pas et que 17 % seulement acceptent le "diktat".

Et presque aussi nettement: si le territoire français était occupé par une armée étrangère, 22 % entreraient dans la clandestinité pour faire de la résistance, 17 % feraient de la désobéissance passive, 30 % se réfugieraient dans l'attantisme, 12 % ne se prononcent pas, et 9 % s'expatrieraient...

La défense de la liberté vaut qu'on se batte dans un conflit militaire pour 79 %, la défense du territoire pour 72 % et la préservation des intérêts économiques vitaux du pays pour 59 %¹.

Et conséquence logique, 10 % souhaitent voir augmenter le budget de la défense, 50 % le maintenir à son niveau actuel, 15 % restent indifférents et un quart seulement souhaitent le voir diminuer (25 %).

Pour reprendre les termes d'un débat toujours présent dans les cercles français : "l'esprit de défense" n'est pas mort. La connaissance des armées, des systèmes d'armes n'est pas négligeable non plus et il est permis de se demander si cette connaissance augmente ou diminue la portée du "doute" sur les capacités réelles du système français face aux colosses militaires de l'Est et de l'Ouest.

Le "discours" de la hiérarchie militaire et des échelons le plus souvent en contact avec les milieux civils insiste beaucoup plus sur les forces conventionnelles, leurs équipements, leur articulation, leurs capacités de choc ou de résistance, leur niveau d'entraînement que sur leur place dans une conception générale de la défense. Réflexe corporatiste au premier degré, sans doute, mais de façon plus sérieuse, nécessité technique évidente : il est impossible de créer, entraîner, chercher à aguerrir des forces pour la "non-bataille". Les militaires raisonnent donc nécessairement en "battle power" et se réfèrent implicitement à la loi du nombre pondérée par les performances des matériels en cause. Ils admettent donc implicitement d'en appeler à la "dimension" dont l'histoire vécue a suffisamment imprégné les esprits.

1. En ce qui concerne la défense de l'Europe occidentale il y a presque égalité : 41 % pour et 42 % contre.

A l'hypothèque de la dimension, bien imparfaitement compensée par le jeu des alliances¹, s'ajoute l'hypothèque de la conscription. Peut-être est-il d'ailleurs excessif de parler d'entrée de jeu d'une hypothèque... Mais le fait est là, le service militaire obligatoire (pour les garçons) colore la perception du plus grand nombre. En dépit de toutes les précautions, il reste assez sensiblement inégalitaire soit parce qu'il n'est pas universel, soit parce qu'il est effectué dans des conditions très variables. L'appelé bénéficiant d'une affectation rapprochée (par exemple parce qu'il est marié), servant au sein de l'armée de l'Air dans son métier civil (conducteur de poids lourds...) a une tout autre vue du service et des armées que l'agriculteur affecté aux Forces Françaises d'Allemagne dans une unité d'infanterie comme tireur au fusil mitrailleur. Dépaysement, éloignement des cellules familiales de la vie quotidienne (famille, sports...), déplacements pendulaires une semaine sur deux, activités opérationnelles extérieures avec matériel limitées aux séjours dans les grands camps, composent un tableau où, même en abstrayant tout postulat politique, l'appréciation du système est fondamentalement différente. Comme elle le sera, d'une tout autre façon, dans un régiment de parachutistes où la rigueur de l'entraînement induit psychologie et comportement spécifiques².

La paix maintenue entre les deux grands et la guerre froide aboutissant à la détente, elle-même mise en cause par l'affaire d'Afghanistan ; la décolonisation achevée et les armées de Terre et de l'Air rentrées dans leurs casernes et sur leurs bases aériennes, la Marine Nationale, grand service public et armée de Mer tout à la fois, le nucléaire devenu habituel après une décennie d'existence, les menaces directes s'atténuant alors que les menaces indirectes s'amplifient moins contre le territoire que contre la faculté même d'y

1. A ce titre, le retrait de l'OTAN, distinct du maintien dans l'Alliance Atlantique, n'est pas non plus de nature à simplifier les problèmes de compréhension.

2. Cf. le témoignage du Sergent X, communiste et sous-officier de réserve au 1er RCP... (Le Monde du 27 décembre 1979).

vivre à l'heure industrielle avancée... Le tableau du monde et le monde des Français sont, à la fois, assez rassurants pour que la prime de la liberté soit payée par tous en rechignant quelque peu (surtout quand il s'agit de l'impôt du temps) et assez inquiétants pour qu'on ne baisse pas la garde : ni neutralisme, ni désarmement unilatéral, ni "impasse" sur l'un des systèmes de forcés.

Placée devant des problèmes qui la dépassent, tentant d'exorciser l'Apocalypse, l'opinion commune reste héritière du passé : il faut bien se défendre ! et en même temps perplexe devant le présent et l'avenir : comment se défendre ? ou, au minimum, rester soi-même.

II - UNE MINORITE DE MIEUX EN MIEUX INFORMEE

Elément essentiel du "domaine réservé" du Général de Gaulle, Chef du Gouvernement puis Président de la Ve République, la Défense - dans sa conception, son organisation et sa conduite - est restée, pendant plus de quinze ans (1960-1974), une sorte d'absolu de la politique française. Comme si elle provenait de quelque révélation divine tombée de l'empyrée, elle était sujette à révérence (souvent excessive) de la part des tenants du pouvoir charismatique et à la réprobation systématique ou, au minimum, à la réticence marquée de toutes les autres familles politiques. Les affirmations de principe à la limite de l'incantation s'opposaient aux excommunications péremptoires que ce soit au nom de l'atlantisme, clef de voûte du monde occidental, ou de la défense de la paix, sous la bannière du socialisme scientifique et soviétique... Les exposés clairs des faits, les démonstrations probantes, les contestations motivées, les évaluations honnêtes des coûts, des délais et des performances, ne furent jamais présentées, les discussions "cartes sur table" n'eurent jamais lieu. Les données budgétaires escamotées par les uns étaient, en conséquence, suspectées par les autres. Les systèmes d'armes, pourtant, voyaient le jour successivement (1964, le mirage IV et la bombe A, 1972, les silos d'Albion, 1971-74 les tout premiers SNLE) mais dans le scepticisme des militaires qui n'y étaient pas directement impliqués, c'est-à-dire l'immense majorité jusqu'en 1971-72, et sous le sarcasme voire l'invective des hommes politiques de l'opposition. Le parti du général, sous ses dénominations successives d'UDR ou d'UNR, approuvait cette politique mais était bien loin d'en faire une des pièces maîtresses de sa doctrine et un des facteurs déterminants de son audience. Et sauf le "parti américain", personne ne trouvait à y redire.

En 1980, tout a changé. Depuis plusieurs années la montée des problèmes de défense à la première page des journaux a été évidente et de plus en plus tangible. Les chiffres ne sont plus secrets ou soigneusement embrouillés, les nombres des armes et des vecteurs sont "affichés", les coûts sont soumis à des évaluations contradictoires, les commissions parlementaires, par exemple, ne sont plus de simples rhapsodes des thèmes connus mais examinent et décortiquent les plans, prolongent les investigations et les études. Un cercle, encore bien restreint, de "stratèges" ou d'experts s'est créé. Le débat est sur la place publique. Sa complexité, ses difficultés propres ne sont plus esquivées. Les partis politiques, eux-mêmes, ont maintenant leurs instances de réflexion et de proposition sur les problèmes de défense, leurs porte-paroles, et les partis d'opposition leur ministre de la défense du "shadow cabinet"...

Michel DOBRY situe très clairement cette évolution :

" Un indice de cet intérêt nous est fourni par sa cristallisation institutionnelle dans les structures des partis. Si le Parti Socialiste a connu depuis 1972 la croissance de l'activité et des effectifs de sa commission de Défense Nationale, si le RPR et le Parti Communiste disposaient déjà d'embryons de structures spécialisées, le CDS et le Parti Républicain ne les ont vus apparaître que dans le courant de 1977. Ainsi la réunion constitutive de la Commission de Défense du CDS s'est tenue le 8 juillet 1977. Elle est animée par le Vice Amiral (CR) DELAHOUSSE. Le Parti Républicain a également constitué, sous l'impulsion de M. H. de CHARETTE, un "groupe d'experts" chargé de conduire sa réflexion en matière de défense nationale"2.

C'est dans l'appareil du Parti Socialiste (PS) que la prise en compte des questions de Défense est la plus étalée dans le temps.

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1. L'exposé des motifs de la loi de programmation 1976-1981 n° 76-531 adoptée le 19 juin 1976 définit la doctrine officielle.
 2. M. DOBRY, assistant à l'Université Jean Moulin (Lyon III), les partis et la défense. in : ARES, 1977, Défense et Sécurité, p. 228, note n° 2. Rappelons les dénominations des partis politiques français : Rassemblement pour la République (RPR), gaulliste, Jacques CHIRAC - Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF), giscardiens comprenant le Parti Républicain (PR) et le Centre des Démocrates Sociaux (CDS) (J. LECAMJET), - Parti Socialiste (PS), F. MITTERAND - Parti Communiste Français (PCF), Georges MARCHAIS.

Créé au Congrès d'Épinay (1971) à partir de divers éléments de la gauche non-communiste fédérée par F. MITTERAND (de l'ancienne SFIO à une partie du Parti Socialiste Unifié (PSU)), le PS, au Congrès de Suresnes en 1972, dans ses instances dirigeantes aborde les questions de Défense : la position est encore marquée de pacifisme et d'atlantisme ; le refus de prendre acte du fait nucléaire français alors que les deux premiers sous-marins nucléaires sont en service est étrangement irréaliste même s'il s'accompagne, en cas d'arrivée au pouvoir, du projet de seulement "interrompre la construction de la force de frappe¹" et non de la mettre à la casse... Mais très rapidement le débat s'ouvre et s'approfondit et au sein de la Commission de Défense Nationale, créée à ce moment, s'amorce une réflexion beaucoup plus sérieuse. Charles HERNU devient le spécialiste accrédité et il portera les résultats de ces travaux devant l'opinion dans son ouvrage "Soldat Citoyen" de 1975, en particulier au chapitre V "naissance d'une nouvelle pensée militaire" - on devrait ajouter : au sein du PS ...².

A travers les négociations du Programme Commun de la gauche puis dans les controverses qui ont suivi son abandon après la rupture de septembre 1977, le PS a progressivement mis au point une doctrine fondée sur des études sérieuses, prenant position sur les problèmes réels et ne procédant plus des "vieux tropismes sociaux démocrates"³. L'éventualité de l'accès au pouvoir et donc d'avoir à répondre à des situations réelles en fonction d'une ligne politique générale a amené le PS à concevoir que :

- a) il ne peut y avoir de transition au socialisme sans indépendance nationale ;
- b) la dissuasion est le seul choix pour une puissance moyenne si elle ne veut pas être entraînée dans un conflit sur le champ de bataille européen ;

1. On peut rétrospectivement constater également l'inadaptation du vocabulaire.

2. HERNU (Charles).- Soldat Citoyen.- Paris : Flammarion, 1975.- (Collection Le Poing et la Rose).

3. L'expression est de Jean BERDUD, chargé de cours à l'Université des Sciences Sociales de Grenoble, in le Parti Socialiste et le Service National, ARES, Défense et Sécurité, 1977, p. 9.

c) le facteur nucléaire est au premier rang des facteurs de dissuasion mais le phénomène est plus global et implique une capacité de dissuasion populaire.

La position ainsi affichée (cf. en particulier le rapport HERNU de novembre 1976 sur la sécurité de la France) s'accompagne, évidemment, de nombreux attendus sur le désarmement, sur l'organisation des forces, sur les formes du service militaire, etc... Mais il est indiscutable que jusqu'à l'élection présidentielle de 1981, le PS maintiendra les grandes lignes de programme au prix, parfois, de réelles difficultés avec certains de ses "courants".

Fondant sa position sur des études techniques, sur des débats longs et difficiles où les divergences ont été patiemment réduites pour aboutir à une ligne de gouvernement crédible, la démarche du PS s'est prolongée pendant plus de sept ans et elle est toujours active.

Le Parti Communiste Français (PCF), au contraire, a fait son "aggiornamento" rapidement et sans détour mais nettement plus tardivement. Bien que les considérations idéologiques n'y soient évidemment pas étrangères, il est intéressant de noter qu'ici aussi l'adoption de nouvelles positions s'est effectuée à partir d'une analyse serrée des faits et dans le souci de coller au concret.

Au premier chef sont évoquées la dégradation des forces conventionnelles et la nécessité de rester hors de l'OTAN (sans quitter l'Alliance Atlantique...) ; l'adoption de la dissuasion comme principe stratégique va alors de soi, à condition qu'elle soit "tous azimuts" et n'implique pas seulement des frappes "anti-cités" ; ces positions déterminent des mesures concrètes telles que la poursuite du programme nucléaire jusqu'au sixième SNLE (1980), la recherche de l'indépendance des systèmes de surveillance et de détection et aussi la collégialité de "la décision" nucléaire... Toutes prises de position, il faut bien le remarquer, cohérentes et réalistes, homogènes à la perspective choisie et dûment justifiées sur les points délicats (collégialité, anti-cité, désarmement, etc...).

1. La publication de la revue "Armée Nouvelle" en témoigne.

Marquée par le rapport de J. KANAPA (11 mai 1977) puis surtout par la réponse de Louis BAILLOT en tant que responsable des problèmes de défense au PCF lors des auditions des responsables pour la défense des grands partis organisées par le Comité National de liaison Défense Armée Nation (publiée dans le bulletin Défense Armée Nation (DAN) n° 7 de juillet-septembre 1977), la position sur les problèmes de défense fait, depuis cette date, partis de la panoplie doctrinale de parti "responsable" que le PCF a tenu à se donner. Plus, le PCF s'est doté d'un moyen d'information spécialisé la "Correspondance Armée Nation" créée en 1975 et dont le numéro du 28 avril 1981 publie un bilan intitulé "un septennat d'action du PCF pour la Défense Nationale et l'armée française" - ce qui est assez nouveau on en conviendra. Le bilan fait apparaître aussi bien les modifications de la position du PCF sur la politique de Défense, sur la stratégie (la bombe à neutrons par exemple) que les propositions de lois ou revendications de type plus classique sur les plans de charges des arsenaux et l'inévitable service militaire - à l'exclusion de toute action de contestation.

Les partis, dits de la majorité présidentielle depuis 1974, qui se sont longtemps comportés comme des inconditionnels de la doctrine stratégique et du système militaire définis par le Général de Gaulle, ont, peu à peu et relativement tardivement, été amenés à s'exprimer plus explicitement sur les problèmes de défense.

C'est bien évidemment parce que les positions se sont diversifiées entre les différents partis - ou plus exactement parce que les réticences laissées inexprimées vis-à-vis du Général de Gaulle et de Georges Pompidou se sont peu à peu manifestées - que la contestation des uns a contraint les autres à une défense et illustration de la doctrine officielle. Un débat s'est donc instauré, débat où les véritables problèmes sont encore parfois occultés (par exemple celui des capacités de pénétration des vecteurs nucléaires dans l'espace de l'adversaire potentiel) et qui s'attache surtout aux aspects d'exécution de la politique militaire (en particulier et comme on peut s'y attendre, au problème de la conscription) ; les grandes orientations géo-stratégiques sont moins abordées ou ne le sont que par le biais budgétaire ou par celui de la conception et de l'exécution des plans d'équipement.

Ainsi, par exemple, le Centre des Démocrates Sociaux (CDS) (Centristes rattachés au Giscardisme en 1974) et appartenant à l'Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF) aux côtés du PR, parti du Président de la République a-t-il fait dériver l'option centrale de la dissuasion nucléaire du faible au fort - tout en paraissant l'admettre sans discussion - vers celle d'une "défense crédible" où il est question de "stratégie de l'avant", de "créneau à tenir"... afin de compléter, prolonger etc... la dissuasion alors qu'il s'agit en fait d'une stratégie acceptant l'éventualité d'engagement direct non nucléaire...

Les arrières pensées atlantistes, européennes, sont alors suffisamment évidentes pour susciter les soupçons assez justifiés du RPR en tant que parti héritier de la doctrine gaullienne... Et l'ouvrage "Une politique de défense pour la France" du RPR répond à "l'autre solution" du CDS, tandis que le PR expose "une politique de défense pour la France".

Moins que de présenter le détail des oppositions des uns aux autres qui n'ont pas, comme socialistes et communistes, changé fondamentalement d'avis, il est intéressant pour le propos qui nous occupe ici de constater que le niveau d'information s'est élevé, que les questions sont évoquées publiquement et contradictoirement, qu'elles font l'objet de publications importantes (dont on trouvera un index en annexe), que les articles de revue se multiplient, que des numéros spéciaux sont consacrés à la défense (cf. Paradoxes, mai 1980)¹, que s'ouvrent même de véritables polémiques.

La plus spectaculaire de celles-ci est née à l'été 1979 de la publication d'un double article du général G. BUIS et d'Alexandre SANGUINETTI, tous deux gaullistes historiques, dans le Nouvel Observateur, hebdomadaire de la gauche non-communiste. La perspective d'une participation de la République Fédérale d'Allemagne aux charges financières de l'arsenal nucléaire français a paru si incongrue, sous de telles plumes, que l'ensemble des observateurs et spécialistes de tous bords a réagi abondamment sinon toujours avec pertinence. Venant également au moment de la discussion de la nouvelle loi de programmation cette effervescence a eu pour séquelle plus ou moins directe, le colloque des 12/13 juin 1980 organisé par les anciens élèves de l'Ecole

¹ "La politique militaire de la France" actes d'un colloque tenu sous la présidence de Michel Onbré.

Nationale d'Administration (ENA) avec une participation pléthorique, venue de tous les horizons politiques et sans nul doute jamais réunie auparavant sur un tel sujet¹.

Par ailleurs, on constate la croissance en nombre des enseignements dits de défense dans maintes universités. Bien que très disparates, ces cours magistraux et séminaires traduisent une émergence des questions de défense (pour ne pas dire militaires) dans un des milieux jusqu'ici les plus réfractaires : l'Université.

Autant d'indices qui confirment l'existence d'une opinion éclairée - cadres des partis, presse, haute administration, université même - de plus en plus intéressée par les questions de défense et dans un esprit dégagé de la vieille antinomie militarisme/anti militarisme, de plus en plus exactement informée même si les approximations restent fréquentes et si les "discours" gardent encore les traces d'idéologies contradictoires. Les efforts pédagogiques des maîtres en la matière qu'ont été de diverses manières Raymond ARON (Penser la Guerre), Pierre GALLOIS (Stratégie de l'Âge nucléaire), Lucien POIRIER (des Stratégies nucléaires) ont semble-t-il porté quelques fruits en dépit de l'aridité du sujet et des blocages psychologiques provoqués par le nucléaire. Peu à peu l'opinion éclairée est venue au contact des techniciens, des experts, des stratèges ou des philosophes de la guerre (Alain GLUCKSMANN, par exemple) qui eux-mêmes s'expriment avec plus de clarté, plus de vigueur, plus d'indépendance.

Dans ce mouvement d'éveil il faut évoquer ici la place et la fonction du Service chargé de l'Information au Ministère des Armées, Service dont le titre même est symptomatique. En effet, il est à la fois d'information avec la connotation d'objectivité et d'impartialité que suggère ce vocable et de relations publiques des Armées (SIRPA). Or, les "relations publiques" dans leur définition la plus classique sont, elles, au minimum, chargées d'améliorer l'image de marque de l'institution, de l'organisation ou de l'entreprise qui les met en oeuvre.

ASSOCIATION DES ANCIENS ELEVES DE L'ECOLE NORMALE D'ADMINISTRATION.
La France face au danger de guerre. - Paris : Association des anciens élèves de l'École normale d'administration, 1980. - (2vol.).

L'information militaire officielle s'est faite plus active, plus dynamique au cours des dix années écoulées, plus organisée, plus systématique surtout, sans pourtant se distinguer clairement des relations publiques. Toutes les publications, en particulier (qui sont spécifiquement des moyens d'information), juxtaposant des articles relevant des deux disciplines. En fait, l'orientation générale qui n'a en soi rien de condamnable est "ad majorem gloriam exercituum"... en insistant d'ailleurs beaucoup plus sur les aspects techniques, modernes et actifs des différentes composantes des forces et des soutiens que sur les données théoriques, géo-politiques ou stratégiques.

Le rôle de présentation et de discussion courtoise des conceptions générales de la défense et de l'emploi des forces est laissé à l'officiuse revue "Défense Nationale" qui équilibre les exposés de la ligne gouvernementale la plus orthodoxe (discours du Président, du Premier Ministre, des hautes autorités militaires) par des tribunes où tout extrémisme est banni.

Non moins officiel mais considérablement plus averti que dans le passé apparaît le dernier cercle de l'opinion éclairée : celui des parlementaires.

Les rapporteurs des grandes commissions ont traditionnellement toujours joué un rôle important et, au cours de cette période, les noms de Joël LE THEULE¹, de Jacques CRESSARD, d'Arthur PAECHT s'imposent immédiatement. Mais au-delà des rapports pour avis du budget annuel ou des lois programmes qui restent des documents de base pour toute étude ouverte sérieuse, un type de documents jusqu'alors de qualité inégale s'impose peu à peu et démontre la valeur de l'information des parlementaires : ce sont les rapports d'information rédigés par des sous-commissions ad hoc choisies dans les grandes commissions.

Le rapport d'information présenté par M. Raymond TOURRAIN, député², au nom de la Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces armées de l'Assemblée Nationale est un exemple particulièrement probant du niveau et de la qualité atteints. Etabli en six mois environ (la décision de l'Assemblée est du

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1. Devenu Ministre de la Défense en novembre 1980 et disparu début 1981.
 2. RPR du Doubs, première circonscription de Besançon.

22 novembre 1979 et la publication annexée au procès-verbal de la séance du 22 mai 1980¹⁾, ce rapport portant "sur l'état et la modernisation des forces nucléaires françaises" donne sur les prises de position officielles, sur la conception et la réalisation des matériels, sur les coûts, sur les problèmes posés par une politique militaire nucléaire, un ensemble d'informations précises, clairement exposées, n'évitant aucun problème, pas même ceux concernant la pénétration qui sont évidemment décisifs dans le calcul stratégique. En particulier, sont rassemblées en vue d'utiles confrontations les indications portant sur les arsenaux des deux Grands ou encore les données relatives aux délais de constructions des matériels ou aux délais de résolution de problèmes décisifs (détection par exemple). Les développements sur le "couplage" entre les armes tactiques et les armes stratégiques - autre exemple, sont clairs et situent nettement des différences entre certains "discours" (américains) et les comportements prévisibles. De même, si le nombre optimum des armes tactiques (300 à 400) est indiqué sans réticence par contre l'importance du facteur d'incertitude quant à l'emploi est très justement et exactement rappelé à partir d'une citation du Général BEAUFRE.

Il resterait évidemment à apprécier si ces moyens d'information de bonne qualité - et de meilleure qualité en tout cas que précédemment trouvant l'audience qu'ils méritent, s'ils éclairent et infléchissent les choix. C'est là une toute autre perspective sur laquelle nous essaierons de revenir en conclusion.

1. Dans un domaine différent mais d'une qualité équivalente et ayant suscité un intérêt égal sinon supérieur, on peut citer le rapport d'information présenté au nom de trois commissions du Sénat (Affaires économiques et du Plan, Affaires étrangères et Défense, Affaires sociales) par Edgar PISANI, C. BEAUPETIT, L. BOYER, J. CHAUMONT, R. LAUCOURNET et M. PREVOTEAU sur les "Perspectives des équilibres extérieurs de la France dans le nouvel environnement mondial" (n° 38 (1980-1981) annexe au procès-verbal de la séance du 16 octobre 1980. Tome I, tableau des perspectives internationales. Tome II, évolution récente du commerce extérieur de la France. Tome III, les échanges d'"invisibles". Paris, Imprimerie du Sénat.

CONCLUSION

La présente contribution a un statut scientifique incertain, au mieux c'est un ensemble d'hypothèses qui demanderaient des vérifications. Elle est également partielle, les questions classiques sur les problèmes d'opinion n'y sont pas abordées ou le sont très grossièrement. Ainsi en est-il de la segmentation de l'opinion qui est abusivement réduite à deux ensembles ; les mécanismes de diffusion et le rôle des relais, par exemple, sont très peu évoqués et mériteraient eux aussi de plus amples développements.

En guise de conclusion, on voudrait retenir une interrogation sur les moyens employés et leurs effets et une constatation portant sur le fond du problème.

L'interrogation devrait conduire à une réflexion sur le rôle et les limites de l'information en matière de défense, spécialement quand le nucléaire est en jeu.

On a retenu l'existence de deux ensembles dans l'opinion globale, disons par convention de langage : le cercle de l'opinion éclairée et celui de l'opinion générale.

Le cercle de l'opinion générale est caractérisé, nous l'avons vu, par l'irrationalité et l'affectivité, par des prises de position quelque fois contradictoires, par un certain refus de la clarté et le recours permanent à des stéréotypes : refus de la bombe, mythe de la paix universelle, crainte viscérale de l'invasion, etc...

La large fraction de la population française qui le compose et donc sujette à des comportements fluctuants au gré de la conjoncture et sensibles au sensationnel plus qu'au rationnel, à des basculements sans nuance de la passivité à l'agressivité, ... à des mouvements qui peuvent échapper à ceux qui les ont déclenchés.

Le cercle éclairé, au contraire, se distingue par le niveau élevé (ou en cours d'amélioration) de la prise de conscience. Partant de connaissances de plus en plus étendues et diversifiées, c'est une opinion "instrumentale" c'est-à-dire susceptible d'induire des comportements logiques ou, mieux, cohérents avec les prémisses retenues.

Ces deux cercles ne sont pas isolés l'un de l'autre par un rideau de fer. Ils ont des franges communes, des points ou des zones de contact, ils s'influencent l'un l'autre. Et la question intéressante est de savoir si l'opinion éclairée peut influencer l'opinion générale sans déclencher d'effet pervers.

L'examen des problèmes posés par la menace de l'Est vis-à-vis de l'Ouest permet de poser quelques jalons : il est pratiquement acquis maintenant que le ralliement des états-major politiques et d'un certain nombre de relais d'opinion a été obtenu par une action d'information, comprenant en particulier des visites des diverses composantes de la Force de dissuasion. L'appréciation des risques encourus, sur laquelle certains cercles insistent très fortement, reste évidemment ce qu'elle est mais les avis sur la politique définie pour y répondre s'appuient sur la réalité constatée des capacités de dissuasion. Le débat ne reste plus au niveau de l'imaginaire : la menace nucléaire brandie prend une crédibilité, l'ensemble des dispositions prises et prévues deviennent acceptables. La démarche globale est devenue logique, raisonnable et rationnelle. Il n'est pas évident qu'un niveau équivalent d'information appliqué à l'opinion générale y trouverait les mêmes échos. La

crainte du nucléaire pourrait alors y jouer un double rôle; soit de faire tout refuser en bloc, soit, si elle est partiellement surmontée, de faire monter les enchères de la protection civile et de la politique de sauvegarde de la population. Phénomène dont nous avons, d'entrée, signalé l'émergence encore limitée au publicitaire mais qui est peut-être annonciatrice d'une demande beaucoup plus insistante; demande qui, au niveau gouvernemental, pourrait remettre en question l'équilibre de l'ensemble des systèmes par le biais des coûts relatifs.

La dissuasion s'est exercée presque clandestinement pendant un temps, parce qu'en fait elle était du domaine du seul Général de Gaulle: il y a peut-être une limite à sa publicité possible¹. Trop d'information peut ici amener soit l'effet pervers maximum de la démobilisation soit l'effet ambivalent de la multiplication des dispositifs de sauvegarde.

On peut penser que, en ce qui concerne le deuxième grand volet des conflits, le Nord-Sud (s'opposant à l'Est-Ouest), les interactions des deux cercles de l'opinion présentent moins de risques de dérapage.

Dans ce cas, la situation est plus facile à appréhender; l'action est concevable en termes réels et pourrait-on dire classiques (à l'inverse des irréalités de la menace nucléaire). En effet, les actions du Nord (industrialisé) vis-à-vis du Sud (en cours de développement) sont soit de type économique-culturel (assistance, coopération, transfert de technologie...), soit du type interventions de police², opérations qui elles-mêmes doivent être envisagées avec précaution³ car elles modifieraient peu ou prou l'équilibre Est-Ouest et auraient alors un autre type d'effet pervers.

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1. sans parler de la multiplication des pôles nucléaires qui modifie les conditions du "jeu".
 2. "la canonnière", non plus pour dominer des territoires mais pour dénouer des crises qui ne peuvent se résoudre localement.
 3. dans un cadre international (ONU, OUA, etc...) ou à tout le moins multinational; le cas de Kolwezi se situant très exactement à la marge du possible...

Les effets de l'information, les interractions entre les deux cercles sont donc très largement différenciées selon les domaines, et il pourrait être utile de définir une catégorisation des problèmes en fonction du degré d'information, de publicité qu'il convient de leur appliquer. Ce qui amènerait tout naturellement à se poser des problèmes de déontologie politique qui ne sont pas de notre propos ici mais qu'il ne faut pas non plus esquiver sous peine de mettre en cause les fondements mêmes de la démocratie.

Au-delà des problèmes que pose l'information sur les problèmes de défense¹, il faut bien faire une constatation qui porte sur le fond du problème, c'est-à-dire sur la façon dont l'ensemble de la population française se situe vis-à-vis de sa propre défense, ou mieux de la pérennité de son existence dans le contexte international et dans la situation spécifique d'une puissance moyenne dotée d'un armement nucléaire. Les incertitudes des uns, les positions évolutives des autres, les affirmations plus ou moins péremptoires de certains sont, à notre sens, toutes sous-tendues par une position commune, à peu près jamais formulée, restée latente derrière tous les discours. On peut la résumer en une seule phrase sans doute un peu trop lourde de sens pour pouvoir en saisir toutes les implications au premier abord : les moyens de puissance (la capacité de dissuasion) qui assurent l'"autonomie de décision" du chef de l'Etat représentant la nation² ne sont pas considérés, par l'ensemble de la population, comme couvrant, en toute certitude, le risque toujours présent de l'invasion.

Cette formulation permet de retrouver les divers ingrédients évoqués précédemment :

- le poids de l'histoire ressenti de façon différente dans l'un ou l'autre cercle ; le cercle éclairé apprécie plus exactement le contexte international présent et futur ; le cercle de l'opinion générale est plus livré aux craintes héritées du passé ;

1. le terme n'est employé que par commodité bien qu'il recouvre bien mal le marchandage... il vaudrait bien mieux dire les problèmes de souveraineté et de conflictuelle.

2. "le prince" - au sens de Machiavel.

- la virtualité de la dissuasion est appréhendée avec quelque difficulté et quelque retard par l'opinion éclairée ; elle est pour l'opinion générale impossible à associer, en relation de cause à effet, avec la parade à l'invasion ; pour les uns la menace préventive est une réalité sans doute difficile à manier ; pour les autres c'est un mythe, à tout coup inopérant...

On peut également reformuler l'interrogation des paragraphes précédents par rapport à la dualité constatée : la dissuasion peut-elle être en quelque manière clandestine par rapport à l'opinion nationale ? Oui, sans inconvénient, tant que le chef charismatique existe puisqu'il protège de tous les dangers par des voies et moyens qui sont de sa responsabilité. Non, quand la puissance tutélaire s'efface. Mais alors le jeu devenant plus public, exposé à la face de l'opinion, la crédibilité fondée sur l'existence des moyens et la résolution du chef de l'Etat (qui sont pris en compte par l'opinion éclairée) est-elle suffisantes pour provoquer l'adhésion massive sinon totale du second cercle de l'opinion ? En un mot, peut-on démarginer la dissuasion nucléaire sans courir le risque de la faire remettre en cause ?

Ou encore de façon encore plus politique : l'autonomie de décision peut-elle ou doit-elle rester le fait du prince et d'un cercle restreint ou peut-elle et doit-elle devenir le fait de la nation - au risque que celle-ci la refuse totalement ou la mette en question dans certaines circonstances ? Avant même de parler de dissuasion populaire, il faudrait donc s'interroger sur la possibilité psychologique et politique d'une dissuasion nationale...

A ce niveau de réflexion, une seconde constatation s'impose : il ne peut s'agir seulement d'information. Les limites de l'information sont évidentes sur le court et le moyen terme ; sur d'aussi graves sujets, les opinions évoluent peu à brève échéance, les pesanteurs sociologiques et historiques sont difficiles à alléger. Sur le long terme au contraire, l'évolution est certaine mais elle se fonde beaucoup plus sur l'éducation et l'apprentissage que sur l'information fugace et contingente. Ainsi peut-on constater que le langage nucléaire

entre les états-nations s'est modifié au cours des ans, ainsi peut-on mesurer dans les sondages que les avis sur la défense se modifient au fil des tranches d'âge et toujours dans le même sens¹.

C'est en novembre 1959 que le Général de Gaulle prononçait le discours de l'École de Guerre qui annonçait la nouvelle ère de la défense française ; vingt et un ans, une génération, un délai suffisant pour forger les armes ; vingt et un ans, un délai trop court pour que l'opinion entière sache à quoi s'en tenir sur le rôle de ces armes dans la sauvegarde de la communauté et des individus.

1. du fur et à mesure, en France, que le Service militaire s'éloigne...

**PUBLIC OPINION, DEFENSE AND ARMED FORCES
IN FRANCE (1975 - 1980)**

by

Pierre Saint Macary

When applied to the French case, the question discussed in Part One of the Workshop can be reformulated as follows : what are the attitudes of the population towards security policy and armed forces, and has public opinion varied over time ?

The point we would like to make is that French public opinion changed rather considerably between 1960-68 and the late 70's - However, the change did not affect public opinion as a whole, but only part of it : the classic distinction between general opinion and informed opinion seems to be of particular relevance here.

The basic hypothesis offered in this paper is that while the former has for the whole of that period and to this day remained concerned and confused over security, the latter, which has increased in number, appears to have become better and better acquainted with military policy and defense-related problems.

First, as far as general opinion is concerned, the all-important factor is the impact of nuclear weapons, the very idea of which has always been resisted, and even rejected as a significant element of an effective defense system.

In that respect, the results of an opinion poll taken in May 1980 are of demonstrative value, even if only two questions are selected¹

1. More information is to be found in the full-length (French) version of the paper, pp. 4 to 9.

Question 1 - If France was on the point of being invaded, would you favour a threat by the President to make use of the French nuclear capability, at the risk of actually having to use it ?

13 % of the respondents did not know
58 % were opposed
28 % accepted the game of threats and counter-threats

Question 2 - Would you favour the actual use of nuclear weapons ?
(a more drastic assumption)

72 % of the respondents rejected the prospect "as a matter of principle", while less than 10 % did not know.

Now if Frenchmen fear nuclear war, they are not altogether for peace at all costs, as the answers to three other questions in the same poll show :

Question 1 - If the Soviet Union's price for peace was a militarily neutralized Europe and the breaking off of the alliance with the United States...

52 % of the respondents think France should refuse
28 % don't know
17 % only would accept the "Diktat"

Question 2 - If French territory was occupied by a hostile foreign army...

22 % of Frenchmen would go underground
17 % would opt for civil disobedience
30 % would wait and see
9 % would go abroad
and 12 % don't know

Question 3 - When asked what they think is worth fighting for militarily...

- 79 % of the respondents mentioned "Freedom"
- 72 % "defense of the national territory"
- 59 % "protection of the country's vital economic interests"
- 41 % "Europe" (but 42 % thought it not worth defending in a military conflict)

To put it bluntly, it seems that general public opinion is faced here with problems that are clearly beyond its understanding (especially the concept of "unequal deterrence" in which the weaker nation can successfully "oppose" the stronger one). While there are desperate attempts to exorcize the prospect of a nuclear Armageddon, Frenchmen are still very much influenced by history (fear of invasion). The most widespread attitude is : the country should be defended, or at a minimum, should retain its national identity ; but how can we possibly manage it in a age of nuclear weapons ?

Informed opinions circles stand in marked contrast to this picture of continuity. Indeed, as far as elites are concerned, the last decade has witnessed a sharp evolution.

Under Gen. de Gaulle (1958-69), and to a lesser degree under G. Pompidou (1969-74), defense was not regarded as a matter for debate. It was a policy area reserved by general consent for the charismatic authority of a father-figure President. Everybody else, Cabinet, Parliament, Higher Civil Service, opinion-leaders, followed suit, however uneasily.

Under Giscard d'Estaing, on the other hand, security and defense-related problems caused great interest in some important quarters, particularly within the major political parties, in the universities and in Parliament.

With regard to politicians, the first to take the plunge were the Socialists, following Charles Hernu's lead (He is now Minister of Defense). However the change in attitudes did not pass without heated internal debates (the pacifist element is still strong within the party) and progress was slow.

Next were the Communists (in their case, progress was rather abrupt : 1977-78) who now have a consistent program, including a nuclear weapon doctrine of their own and the continuation of French participation in the North Atlantic Alliance.

Last but not least, the parties of the former ruling coalition have recently shown signs of renewed interest in defense matters : the hard-line Gaullists, who would feel very strongly about any deviation from the General's policy of national independence, and some of Giscard's own followers, who would favour a return to the military side of NATO, or even integrated European forces, and a French participation in a "forward battle" (even if the official discourse dutifully pays lip-service to the national deterrent...).

In the early 1980's, every political group has its experts in military affairs and defense issues, with special committees and subcommittees, and often special (monthly or quarterly) publications, such as the Socialist Armée Nouvelle, or the Communist Correspondance Armée Nation.

In the universities, which for ethical reasons, had long remained indifferent or even hostile to the military, a significant change for the better has also been taking place in the last 5 years : a number of courses on defense and security problems, as distinct from international relations and military history courses, have been introduced (the field is approached from a variety of angles : law, economics, etc...). Today the number of such courses is 25 or so, and is on the increase.

In Parliament, and without a doubt this has to do with the progress made in the political parties, the quality of debates and studies is much higher than it was, say, 10 years ago. The Defense Committee and its subcommittees are working harder and harder, in close cooperation with military officials, and produce far more reliable reports and advice than was the case previously. The TOURRAIN Report (May 1980), which is largely quoted in the full-length (French) version of the paper (its table of contents is reproduced in full) bears witness to the high standards of the work done.

As a result of those changes in informed circles, the debate on defense matters has been more intense, more sophisticated and more precise, especially as regards appropriations. All this has materialized in the form of a large number of books, monthly and quarterly reviews, and articles in dailies and weeklies of all political persuasions. Likewise, conventions symposia and seminars are organized almost every month on the subject.

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CONCLUSION

In the light of the recent developments, one solution to the problem of attitudes towards the military and public opinion as regards security issues would be to widen the circle of informed opinion by increasing the amount of factual information released through the media. But the question then arises whether that is possible without bringing about "perverse effects" ?

On such matters as nuclear weapons and nuclear energy, a lot more is involved than plain factual information : if the general public is to be made aware of the realities of the situation we find ourselves in, educational institutions have a very important contribution to make.

But, supposing educators are willing to cooperate in this effort, educational processes are time-consuming : hardly 20 years have elapsed since the creation of the French nuclear strike force, and that is certainly too short a time for the purpose of changing the attitudes and viewpoints of the majority of the population at large.

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DOCUMENTATION

In the brief bibliographic guide appended to the full-length (French) version of the paper, the entries are limited to general background data and the major items in the last five year's output.

EXCLUDED are :

- the daily newspaper Le Monde (in which articles of special interest by editor André Fontaine, or Defense correspondent Jacques Isnard, together with the free opinions of politicians and military officials, frequently appear) ;
- the 3 national weekly newsmagazines, Le Point, L'Express, and Le Nouvel Observateur which feature major articles on security matters at irregular intervals ;
- the official publications of the Military Establishment : Armées d'Aujourd'hui (inter service), Terre-Air-Mer (Inter-Service), Terre Information (Army), Air Actualités (Air-Force), Cols Bleus, La Nouvelle Revue Maritime (Navy), La Revue Historique, etc...

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- . the newly-created series published by Berger-Levrault (a long-established publisher of military material), called Stratégies,
- . The Cahiers published by the Fondation pour les Etudes de Défense (18 of them appeared between 1976 and 1980) as part of another new series : Les Sept Epées (the Seven Swords).

- N° 1 - L'Effort de défense de quelques grandes puissances - Paul-Marie de la GORFF
- N° 2 - L'Epreuve de force - Xavier SALLANTIN
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**THE ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCES AND THE MASS MEDIA:
STRUCTURAL LINKAGES AND CONFLICTS**

by

Moshe Lissak

THE IDF AND THE MASS MEDIA:
STRUCTURAL LINKAGES AND CONFLICTS

This paper describes and analyses several aspects characterizing the linkages and interactions between the defense establishment and the mass communications media. The nature of what might be called the Israeli Military-Media Complex affects Israeli public opinion on a wide range of issues in the spheres of defense and foreign policy. This complex is manipulated by various institutional mechanisms. Some of the causes for the tensions which rise between the representatives of the military and media are: the relatively swift transition from a state of non-belligerency to a state of emergency or war, structural factors and the absence of tradition and clear-cut behavioral norms in this field.

It is only natural that issues of security and foreign policy should gain salience in Israeli public opinion, whatever its particular nuance, and that the leadership in the political and defence spheres should devote special efforts to ensure a national consensus as wide as possible, on the basic issues pertaining to Israel's security. Among these issues are the maintenance of secure and defensible borders; the inevitability of a preventive war in case of a severe and direct threat to the country's borders; the necessity of allocating a large part of the national budget to defense and compulsory military service for men and women (with the exception of certain groups).¹

In reality, a general consensus on all these issues or even on most of them has never been achieved. Moreover, over the years, a series of ups and downs and a broadening and narrowing of the national consensus on certain issues, can be observed. We will not attempt to explain the causes of this phenomenon, but

will confine ourselves to stating that these fluctuations in public opinion are related to the fact that in times of war or severe border-conflicts, the range of national consensus is broadened, while during periods of non-belligerency and especially when international pressure is exerted on the Israeli government to propose and implement short term or long term solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict, differences of opinion are accentuated and the basis of the national consensus is narrowed. Thus, for example, Israeli public opinion has been split on the major issue of recent Israeli politics--the future of the West Bank. Since 1967 opinion polls have indicated that 40% -60% of Israelis have favored returning parts of the West Bank to Jordan. However, there was almost a complete rejection by all the respondents to the idea of establishing a new Arab state between Israel and Jordan².

Over the years, various institutional mechanisms for the transfer of information and its absorption between the military and the civilian establishments have been forged. However, as is usually the case with attempts at forging institutional mechanisms and encounter situations, problems of role-definitions, division of labour and norms of actions are created, along with various other tensions. Israeli society has developed a large number of institutional mechanisms enabling contacts and encounters between members of the defense (IDF and the Ministry of Defense) and civilians occupying positions in different institutional spheres³. The differences between the various encounter situations in the Military-Media Complex are considerable--both with regard to the identities of the participants, the extent of regularity, frequency and institutionalization, as well as the issues discussed and the rules of the game governing these encounters.

In this paper I deal with one kind of encounter situation: namely, meetings and interactions between representatives of the defense establishment and professionals in the field of mass-communications, who are regarded as influential in shaping public opinion in the spheres of defense and foreign policy. Among these professionals, the correspondents and commentators specializing in the activities of the military occupy a central position. For this purpose, a special office--the office of the "IDF spokesman" was established, and at a later stage, a similar office was established at the Ministry of Defense as well. In addition, there exists a joint forum of the editors of the Israeli daily press and the senior representatives of the defense establishment. Before commencing our analysis of the nature of the interaction between the two parties, we will provide some details concerning the formal status of the military correspondents and the committee of editors as well as that of the spokesman for the defense establishment.

The majority of the fifteen Israeli dailies employ military correspondents in charge of collecting and publishing information (subject to the rules of the military censor) concerning events in the military sphere and the various branches of the Ministry of Defense. These military correspondents are organized in a separate unit within the Israeli Press Association. The military correspondent, in contrast to his colleagues specializing in other areas, is subject to two different authorities. On the one hand, most of them serve in the reserves in the press liaison unit of the office of the IDF spokesman. The latter grants the correspondent his license and is entitled to cancel, if the correspondent breaks the military rules. On the other hand, they are also members of the editorial boards of their respective newspapers, and, as such, are

subject to the professional ethics of the press, prevailing in any open democratic society. This dual loyalty does not affect military commentators, as they are usually senior military officers whose role as commentators is temporary and casual.

In addition to the military correspondents, another forum, that of "the committee of editors of the daily press" exists; its members meet from time to time, with the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense and senior officers such as the Head of Intelligence, on the initiative of either party. This institution dates back to the British Mandate, when its role was to co-ordinate the propaganda offensive against the Mandatory Government. After the foundation of the State, Israel's first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, strove to forge the editors' committee into an instrument through which selective information would be passed on to the public. The means of achieving this was to supply background information on various events concerned with defense, while requesting the editors not to publish all the details and in some cases, to abstain from publication altogether, in the interests of security. In other words, in exchange for secret information the editors were expected to impose censorship on themselves. In case of a breach of confidence, military censorship could always be applied. This forum has been in operation for several decades, but recently its importance has decreased and its meetings have become less frequent. Besides the above mentioned committee, several daily papers, arrange annual or bi-annual symposia, usually on the eve of Independence Day or the New Year, in which members of the editorial board and senior military officers, in active service or in the reserves, participate. From time to time interviews with the Minister of Defense, the Chief of Staff, or the Head of the

Military Intelligence are conducted, especially in the wake of events of special importance, in Israel or in the region.

The organizational framework of the defense establishment (the Ministry of Defense and the IDF) in respect to contact with the mass-media is more complex. In the centre of this framework is the office of the IDF spokesman, which has undergone several changes in its structure, functions and the authorities to which it was subjected. Some of the most relevant changes are the following: The functions of "spokesman for the IDF" was created in the course of the War of Liberation in 1948, even before the Ministry of Defense was established. Naturally, the place of the spokesman for the military was in the military, and he was subject to the authority of the Chief of the Intelligence Branch. This historical precedent has influenced the conception of the role and authority of the IDF spokesman to this very day. When the Ministry of Defense was established, a small department for public relations was formed. Its official functions were the following:

- a. to promote "the contacts between the defense establishment and the civilian population in the country, and the Jews in the diaspora"
- b. to conduct propanganda campaigns by means of public committees
- c. to instruct the populace on matter of defense and security⁴

The activities of the department were to be conducted by means of establishing contacts "with various organizational frameworks in the country, labour organizations, professional associations, youth, women, students," etc. Time slots on the "Voice of Israel" were also made available to the department.⁵

Despite the wide scope of its stated aims, the department was regarded as less important than the office of the spokesman for the IDF, a fact which manifested itself in the smaller number of its employees and in its status and prestige within the defense establishment. The IDF spokesman exclusively represented the two heads of the defense establishment--the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff. The importance of the office of the IDF spokesman has even increased in the course of the years. In 1957 most of the functions of the Department of Public Relations in the Ministry of Defense, were transferred to the office of the IDF spokesman, including dealings with local military correspondents, assistance to foreign correspondents in Israel and the arrangement of tours and visits for correspondents and public personages. The Department of Public Relations remained in charge of complaints by civilians against members of the defense establishment, both military and non-military.⁶

With time the activities of the office of the IDF spokesman became institutionalized and widened in scope. It now contains two major branches⁷:

1. Public Relations
2. Contacts with the Press

The branch of public relations arranges for visits of civilians to military installations, organizes lectures by military officers and officials of the Ministry of Defense, produces photographs and films and releases them to the press, radio and television in Israel and to foreign correspondents⁸.

Over the years, relations between the IDF spokesman and the civilian client system have been ridden with conflicts and tensions. The strongest criticism was expressed against the policy of publication adopted by the spokesman. This policy was implemented by a body called "the publication group" after receiving instructions from higher authorities. Members of this group are usually the IDF

spokesman, the department heads, representatives of the the Field Security Branch and sometimes a representative of the military censor, the official in charge of civilian complaints against the defense establishment, a representative of "Galei Zahal" (the military broadcasting network) and a representative of "Bamahane" (the official weekly paper of the IDF)⁹. The publications group is not entitled to shape policy, but only to translate it into operative rules and standards¹⁰. The participation of the representatives of the IDF weekly and the broadcasting network is intentional, as these two institutions serve as exclusive vehicles for the transfer of messages from the defense establishment to the civilian population, both in the realm of information (military events for instance) and in the educational-normative realm.

The "Galei Zahal" broadcasting network started as a small radio station which devoted most of its time to music and to reportage of events in the military, and over the years developed into the most popular radio network in Israel, especially among the younger generation. The commander of Galei Zahal is subject to the Chief Education Officer in the IDF and many of the editors and broadcasters are civilians.

The weekly "Bamahane" caters to soldiers and to civilians as well. In addition to this publications, other, mainly monthlies, are published. They cater to smaller sectors of the military or civilians population (such as reserve officers). Bamahane, like Galei Zahal, covers a wide range of topics: information directly concerning soldiers in military service (for instance on rights and duties), commentaries on central events in Israel and the world, and short stories--both original and translation¹¹. The paper sold 70,000 copies in 1975. At least one third are distributed among civilians. The editorial board of the weekly is a unit subject to the authority of the Chief Educational

Officer. The editorial staff, including the chief editor, are all civilians employed by the army. The publication of material concerning the military is subject to the approval of the IDF spokesman as well as that of the Chief Educational Officer¹².

So far, we have discussed some formal aspects of the institutional mechanisms of the defense establishment on the one hand, and the civilian sectors concerned with shaping public opinion on issues of foreign policy and defense on the other. The description contains some indications of the potential of conflict between the two sectors. In order to understand these mechanisms, their methods of operations will be briefly described. A constructive way of doing this, both from a theoretical and an empirical point of view, is to regard these mechanisms as encounter points between the two sectors in which interactions develop that are governed by a considerable amount of binding behavioural norms. Nevertheless, despite the institutional and normative common denominator, variations in the encounter points are quite common. In order to describe the different shades of these points or linkages, we propose the following operative criteria¹³.

How well-institutionalized is the encounter?

The distinction here is between permanent (or semi-temporary) goal-oriented frameworks, bound by rules and regulations on the one hand, and ad-hoc frameworks with no definite goals or legal basis on the other. Various combinations are also found, such as: long-term operation of frameworks not incorporated in any legal context, but governed by rules of the game more or less accepted by both parties.

2. The status of the interacting parties

The distinction proposed here is between the different frameworks according to the symmetry or a-symmetry of the power and prestige relations between the two interacting parties.

3. The nature of the rules of the game

These rules are liable to be competitive or even conflictive under certain conditions. Under other conditions they could be of a cooperative or consensual nature.

4. To what extent are the representatives of each party controlled.

The possible variations are many, if we attempt to grade the extent of control. There are states of encounter in which both parties apply firm control over their representatives. Other states emerge when only one of the parties is anxious to exercise control over the contacts. A third possibility is that both parties see no moral or practical reasons for subjecting the contact and encounters between the parties to any kind of control.

5. To what extent is there agreement with regard to the "departmental" or "sectorial" affiliation of the issue which is the subject of the encounter

States of encounter can be identified according to their belonging or not belonging exclusively to the military or to the civilian domains. However, in the absence of clear-cut definitions regarding the division of spheres of activity between the defense establishment and the civilian system, differences of opinion concerning the sectorial affiliation and the responsibility and authority with regard to various spheres of activity are apt to occur at times.

According to these criteria, what is then the nature of the states of encounter between the representatives of the defense establishment and the representatives of the mass-media, and how do they affect public opinion on issues of security?

The high level of institutionalization of the encounters is manifested in two interrelated indicators: procedures and frameworks. As shown above, in Israel encounters are of different degrees of regularity and frequency; the most conspicuous among them being the plenum of the editors' committee¹⁴, and the frequent contacts between the office of the IDF spokesman and correspondents. These contacts and interrelations are conducted according to procedures which have been worked out in the course of the years--part of them based on the law and part on written and oral agreements between the representatives of both parties. The legal basis of the entire system of relations is the "Defense Regulations for Periods of Emergency" which provides the legitimation for the activities of the military censor. These regulations contain several rules granting extensive power to the censor with regard to the publication of information on matters of security and other information which are regarded as having a potential effect on the morale of the military and the civilian population. Thus, one of the rules states that the military censor, appointed by the Minister of Defense¹⁵, is entitled to forbid publication in general, or in special cases, of any information which could affect the country's security, its defense, or its public order¹⁶. According to the law, the censor is entitled "to request a priori censorship of any type of information or any piece of information according to his judgement. A newspaper is forbidden to inform its readers that any part of its material was censored, or print it in a way that indicates that the censor has intervened". Sanctions for breach of these regulations are strict¹⁷. The law does not permit appeals against the censor's

decision, but, as will be shown below, the defense establishment does permit discussions with the censor, usually post-factum. On the other hand, the procedures governing the actions of the office of the IDF spokesman in his dealings with the press in general and the military correspondents in particular, are not based on the law, but on the orders of the General Staff. The spokesman's role as interpreted by the chief of staff and by the officer occupying the role of spokesman at a certain period is of major importance. It thus seems that the extent of institutionalization of the procedures and the nature of the frameworks in which the encounters with correspondents and other civilians take place, change from time to time, or are interpreted differently, according to the inclinations of the Chief of Staff or the IDF spokesman. An example of this are the changes introduced every few years in the regulation governing interviews with members of the defense establishment, without first obtaining permission from the army spokesman, quite independently of the censor's decision. The significance of these changes, the nature of the rules of the game, and the status of the parties in the interaction will be discussed below.

The lack of continuity in some aspects of the IDF spokesman's policy was often the subject of criticism in the mass media. The demand for a rational and integrated conception caused the IDF spokesman to seek the advice of members of the academia specializing in the area of mass-communications with the aim of constructing a logical system of information and commentary on current events based on the analysis of opinion polls and on the content-analysis of press reports¹⁸. The developments of such a system will probably require the intensification of contacts with representatives of the press and experts on public opinion and communication.

A lower level of institutionalization characterizes the meetings between

the editors' committee and the leaders of the defense establishment. Despite the importance of these meetings for shaping public opinions on the issues of defense and foreign policy, the procedures with regard to the content and frequency of these meetings are not fixed. That is, they are not based on regulations, but rather on custom in which improvisation plays a major role.

The desire to institutionalize the encounter points in some cases, and the avoidance of doing so in other cases, reflects, among other things, the conceptions of the status of the parties in the interaction. In some of these encounters, especially in the past, the disparity in the conception of the status and role of the other party was conspicuous. For example, the regulations of the censor and the demand to submit the questions asked in press interviews to the IDF spokesman in advance in order to obtain his confirmation, actually reflected his senior status¹⁹. The senior status of the IDF spokesman is especially conspicuous in the light of the fact that the professional esteem enjoyed by them as communicators is usually rather low. All the spokesmen who have occupied this position till now, and many of the members of their staff, were not professional journalists. This fact, according to the opinion of those involved in the interaction, tends to increase the lack of confidence in their professional skill in handling communication issues. However, so far, there have been almost now signs of any lack of confidence regarding the contents of the IDF spokesman's information.

The level of credibility of the military information sources has always been very high among all segments of the population. For example, in February-March, 1970, (in the midst of the Attrition War between Israel-Egypt), 96% of the respondents in a representative sample of 1,768 men and women, confirmed that they had confidence in the official military information. The most

reliable media were the radio and television. The various dailies were considered less reliable sources.

The objective inferiority of the military correspondents has a formal basis as well. Almost all of them belong to the unit of the IDF spokesman during their reserve duty and thus are subject to his military authority²¹. The restrictions on the collection of material and its publication during the period of military service are definitely stricter than at times of inactive duty. In spite of the fact that the scope of activity of the military correspondent is greater in periods of inactive duty, his administrative dependence on the defense establishment is still considerable, as all his activities depend on the validity of his authorization as military correspondent. The annulment of this authorization could greatly jeopardize his possibilities of doing professional work²². Nevertheless, such dependence in a small country such as Israel, in which the extent of social segregation of the different elites is small, is not absolute. There are a number of possibilities of collecting information, even without official authorization, on the basis of informal contacts with key personages in the defense establishment. It should be noted that the extensive network of contacts, and the tendency of key-personages in various public spheres to disregard the rules and develop close contacts with the people of the mass media, somewhat neutralise the laws and regulations. Moreover, the leadership of the defense establishment has actually contributed to the neutralization of the laws by its readiness to meet with the committee of editors of the daily press to report on events and comment on various developments on the borders of the country and in the area in general. These meetings enhance the prestige of the civilian participants by being admitted into the secret affairs in exchange for a commitment to exercise self-censorship. In this respect their position is more convenient than that of the military correspondents. The

latter are subject to conflicting pressures--of publishing according to the IDF norms or according to their professional consciences and/or editors demands.

The above description indicates the basic rules of the game in most of these encounters. Along side with the national consensus and the community of interests and goals on the national-patriotic level, the relations on the professional level, between the army personnel and the representatives of the mass media are competitive and sometimes conflictive. The journalists and reporters in the radio and television networks are interested in providing the public with a clear and objective picture of the state of affairs in all the areas of defense. Therefore, the professional journalistic considerations are often in conflict with the norms of secrecy of the defense establishment. Moreover, sometimes, albeit rarely, the two parties suspect that purely professional considerations are not the only ones that govern their interrelations. The unstable mixture of cooperative and competitive relations works by means of positive and negative sanctions mainly available to the defense establishment. Thus, for example, the national broadcasting network received special privileges as long as it agreed to submit questions posed to the members of the defense establishment to the IDF spokesman for approval prior to asking them. The television and radio networks were granted priority in interviews with senior officers, direct contacts with the military commands, and even permission to join in military actions across the borders²³. When the directorate of the television network cancelled its obligation to submit questions for approval, de facto, it was again subjected to restrictions, among them the obligation of having officers join the television reporters²⁴. An even stronger sanction is available to the defense establishment: that of cancelling the authorization of the military correspondents²⁵.

This does not mean that sanctions, even the milder ones, are imposed regularly. This is characteristic mainly of periods of non-belligerency. An examination of the connection between the rise in the tensions in the area of security and the level of criticism of the press shows that "in conditions of high tension and as long as the balance of successful and unsuccessful actions on the part of the government is mainly positive, the public, at least in the short range, is inclined to support the government, a fact manifested both in the attitudes and in the behavior of all sectors of the public. As for the press, as a result of the tension, critical tendencies in reference to the government are subdued, especially in the area of defense. At such a time, the press has almost no influence on the extent of public support of the government²⁶".

The increase in the amount of competition and conflict between contrasting professional considerations, especially in times of non-belligerency, obliges both parties, but especially the defense establishment, to exercise a fair amount of control on the contacts between them. This refers mainly to various prohibitions imposed by the defense establishment on its members in their contacts with representatives of the mass media, and occasionally also on contacts with public figures, such as politicians. The typical means of control are: interviews with senior officers require a special permit from the military spokesman as well as the participation of one of his representatives at the time of the interview and during the reading of the report afterwards²⁷. The same applies to the collection of information in military camps or to participation in military actions.

Without a comparative perspective in relation to the state of affairs in other democracies, it is difficult to evaluate the severity of these means of

control. We also do not possess clear-cut evidence regarding the extent to which they are put into practice. At any rate, this phenomenon should be regarded in the light of the high degree of exposure of the defense establishment, and especially the military on the social level. The absence of a distinct military ethos, the existence of a large reserve corps, a large part of which maintains daily contacts with the personnel of the standing army, and Israel's small size which makes it possible for a large part of those on active duty to maintain almost daily contacts with their families and friends, are among the social factors contributing to close social relations between military personnel and civilians. The military correspondents can, if they so desire, "exploit" this in order to supplement their information and to present more complete reports to the Israeli public. After all, there is no fundamental disparity of views between the defense establishment and the media in their conception of the defense needs of the population *vis-a-vis* an antagonistic environment, i.e. daily acts of terror and a war every few years. The argument usually, though not always, centers around different professional orientations whose proponents desire the good of the same public.

One of the most conspicuous manifestations of this disparity is the existence of differing conceptions with regard to the connections between various spheres of activity and the issue of security, especially its covert aspects, and the extent of information which should be permitted to circulate. The main spheres under scrutiny are the following: first--the conditions of the individual soldier; second--activities of military personnel in the occupied territories; third--organization and budget, and to a certain extent also strategic issues. While the predominant tendency in the IDF has always been to define these spheres as belonging to the domain of security, and therefore not

open to public scrutiny, the media, especially since 1973, are no longer willing to accept, without reservation, the military's immunity against criticisms on these issues. The media is certainly no longer willing to tolerate the monopoly which the military demands for itself in discussing issues of strategy or even of organization and budget.

In this article some of the characteristics of the interrelations between the defense establishment and the communications media have been discussed. Both parties play a major role in shaping public opinion in Israel in matters concerning war and peace. Our approach to the issue was an analysis of the encounter situations between the representatives of the two sectors at a certain section of the borderline separating them. The institutionalized frameworks constitute institutional mechanisms created to deal with the interrelations between members of the press and those of the defense establishment. We have discussed the structural characteristics of these encounter situations; the status of the officers and the correspondents; the rules of the game prevailing in these situations; the degree of control and the arguments relating to the question of which spheres of activity should be included in the domain of security and therefore not be subject to public discussion.

The existence of a basic military-media complex in Israel is one of the major conclusions that one may draw from the data presented and even more so from other sources. Any "complex" of this kind, with the military being one of its components presents a reason for concern in a democratic society. The concern focuses mainly on the danger of the boundaries between the military and the civilians becoming blurred and obscured. A possible result of this is the erosion in the principle subordination of the military elite to its civilian political leadership.

This and other concerns were often voiced, especially in the United States, with regard to the Military-Industrial Complex. Although we deal with a different kind of complex, still we believe that the basic questions and concerns are valid. At this stage of the research, it is difficult to draw a definite conclusion with regard to the positive or negative aspects of a military-media complex in Israel. However, one may infer that one of the most positive developments that has occurred in the last decade is that the defense establishment has become more open to criticism, investigation and objective evaluation.

Paradoxically, it was this very trend which brought about a certain sharpening of the contrast between the professional attitude of the military personnel on the one hand and that of the press representatives on the other.

The military-media complex has its pitfalls as well. One of them was the manipulation, intentionally or not, of public opinion by the defense establishment through the mass media. It has occurred in Israel in certain circumstances. A prominent example is the "conception" which evolved before the "Yom Kippur War", that there was a low probability of war with the Arab states. This frame of mind was certainly forged in various contacts the military correspondents had with senior officers on active duty.

The analysis of the encounter situations between members of the mass media and the representatives of the defense establishment, in charge of information and comments, is related to one of the central theoretical and empirical issues which claims the attention of researchers in the field of interrelations between the military and civilian society--namely the issue of defining the boundaries between the defense establishment and the various civilian sectors. Luckham's proposal to differentiate between integral, permeable and fragmented boundaries

is a major contribution to the discussion. He proposes to use two indicators in order to distinguish between different types of boundaries. The first one--the extent of control of the military establishment on the contacts of its personnel with the non-military environment. The second--the extent to which the distinction between the goals and frameworks of the military sector and the civilian sector is blurred²⁸.

The problem is that such indicators are usually appropriate only for the most extreme situations, namely when the boundaries are either very integral or very permeable. The distinguishing power of these indicators decreases as the boundaries become more fragmented, and this is, after all, the most common situation. The many variations of fragmented boundaries between the two sectors require the use of more refined indicators in order to identify the differences between different military systems all belonging to the category of "fragmented boundaries". This shows the need for a more systematic analysis of the means of control employed by the military over its environment. In other words, it is important to identify the differences between military systems in their policy with regard to the boundaries of the system, i.e., the extent of the use of force, visual and other symbols, to create a sense of distance and difference; shaping a distinct military ideology, etc.

For all this, the analysis of encounter situations between the defense system and various civilian sectors, appears to be an important addition, because, in real life, movement across institutional boundaries brings people together in specific encounter situations. Without considering esoteric situations, most of the encounters, especially those entailing the movement of military personnel subject to a rigid hierarchy, usually take place in more or less institutionalized situations. Obviously, the abstract boundaries between

the two sectors are full of encounter situations, and their nature and frequency enables us to understand the essential nature of these boundaries and the extent to which this nature is actually realized in practice.

To sum up, we tried to present some aspects of encounter situations between representatives of the media and representatives of the defense establishment, the latter being in charge of dissemination of information to those who create public opinion on the issues of security and foreign policy. We are certain that the collection of additional information could help a great deal to create a typology of recognized linkages which would be characteristic of different kinds of societies. The following information would be pertinent: The identity of the parties to the encounter, the extent of the encounter's institutionalization, the differential status of the parties, the rules of the game, the extent of consensus among the parties, and the extent of control over the contacts. The above information would be especially useful in understanding the linkages in societies where the boundaries between the defense establishment and the civilian sections are fragmented.

NOTES

1. As for the different groups receiving total or partial exemptions, see: Baruch Kimmerling, "Determination of the Boundaries and Frameworks of Conscription: Two Dimensions of Civil-Military Relations in Israel", Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. XIV, No. 1, 1979, pp. 27-29.
2. The Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, Newsletter, No. 45, August, 1977, p. 9; No. 46, January, 1978, p. 9
3. About the nature of the encounter situations between the two sectors in Israel, see: M. Lissak, "The Defense Establishment and the Society in Israel: Boundaries and Institutional Linkages", paper prepared for the IUS Conference, Chicago, October, 1980.
4. Israel Government Yearbook, 1950, p. 67; Government Yearbook, 1953, p. 49 (Hebrew)
5. Israel, Government Yearbook, 1950, p. 67 (Hebrew)
6. Israel, Government Yearbook, 1959, p.146 (Hebrew)
7. In the IDF Spokesman's office there were in the past other branches as well, such as : the branch for military attachees which was removed from the jurisdiction of the office.
8. Zeev Schiff, "The IDF spokesman declares", Journalists' Yearbook, 1969, pp. 203-209 (Hebrew)

9. Zeev Schiff, "Severe Treatment of the Military Correspondents", Journalists' Yearbook, 1972, pp. 46-60. (Hebrew) On the "publication group" see also Eitan Haber, "The Complex and Subtle Relations between IDF and the Mass Media", Yedioth Achronot, 29.4.77 (Hebrew)
10. On the restricted power of the IDF spokesman to decide on policy issues, see: Z. Schiff, "Who needs the IDF spokesman?", Ha'aretz, 12.7.77. (Hebrew)
11. A survey of the distribution of space in the weekly in 1975 shows that 50% were devoted to the IDF and Israeli Security. Other topics covered were: The Middle East-18%; Armies in other countries-3%; Israeli national consciousness-18%. All topics which could be defined as belonging to the proper sphere of the paper took up 76% of its space, while the remainder was devoted to other topics (General Information, Entertainment, etc), see Joseph Eshkol, "Changes in the Israeli Military Press?", Journalists' Yearbook, 1975, p. 163.
12. Ibid, p. 168
13. See: Lissak, "The Defense Establishment and the Society in Israel: Boundaries and Institutional Linkages", Op. Cit.,
14. There are also sub-committees, such as: the sub-committee in charge of arbitration between the Military Censor and the Military Correspondents guilty of breaking the rules of the censor.
15. This rank at present is Brigadier General.

16. Reuven Kahane and Shlomit Knaan, "The Conduct of the Press in States of Tension in the Area of Security and Its Effect on the Support Given to the Government by the Public", L. Eshkol Institute for Research in the Economics, Society and Policy in Israel, Hebrew University of Jerusalem,
17. Ibid. p. 29-30
18. Bamahane, 15.2.80
19. At a certain time, the IDF spokesman was in charge of field security in the IDF as well, a fact which enhanced his power and responsibility with regard to the provisions of information to military personnel and civilians, see: Journalists' Yearbook, 1970, p. 55
20. The Israel Institute of Applied Social Science Research, Newsletter, No. 25, July, 1970, p.9.
21. Journalists not functioning as military correspondents are subject to strict restrictions, by order of the Chief of Staff, with regard to writing or publishing on subjects connected with the Military, see, ibid., pp. 55.
22. In the last 30 years, only 3 cases are known of an authorization of a military correspondent to be annuled
23. It is important to note that rough competition exists between the broadcasting networks Kol Israel and Galei Zahal. This, however, does not center around the availability of information about the defense establishment. The competition between the two networks increases the more Galei Zahal becomes oriented to a civilian audience. This is the reason for recurrent demands on the part of Kol Israel to limit the activities of

Galei Zahal, or even to close it down altogether. Kol Israel claims that the competition is not on equal terms. The officer in charge of Galei Zahal enjoys extensive powers in recruiting broadcasters, journalists and artists on reserve duty in the Department of the Chief Educational Officer. Besides, as the commander of Galei Zahal is not subject to the authority of the Director General of the Israeli Broadcasting Service, he is more free to devise programs of a civilian nature, according to his inclination. See Gideon Alon, "The official in charge of the radio network in the Israeli Broadcasting Corporation, questions the right of Galei Zahal to exist", Ha'aretz, 31.8.72.

24. Nahman Shai, "Survey of Military Subjects by a television broadcaster", Journalists' Yearbook, 1976, p.188. As a result of the Television's refusal to submit its material for checking (with the IDF spokesman) in advance, an incident concerning the Chief of Staff, who was about to be interviewed on Independence Day, occurred. The directorate of the television refused to submit the questions to the Minister of Defense in advance, and the interview was cancelled. As a result, the Chief of Staff employed sanctions against the television, see: E. Haber, "The complex and subtle relations between the IDF and the mass media", Yedioth Aharonot, 29.4.77.
25. Ibid. In the past, a certain weekly was prohibited in the military camps, because of the criticism against the defense establishment voiced by it.
26. Kahane and Knaan, p. 105.
27. Haber, see above

28. A.R. Luckman, "A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations",
Government and Opposition, Vol. 6, (Winter): pp. 5-35.

**VOLUNTARY MILITARY CAREER IN A TIME OF
CHANGING VALUES**

The Case of Switzerland

by

Karl Haltiner

1. Introduction

Compared with the conscription armies in Western industrial nations, the Swiss militia model is insofar an exception as officers and NCOs have the same militia status as the soldiers have. In return, the cadre corps has to do several times more training and active service, mainly on a voluntary basis. It is clear that not only a qualitatively eminent cadre corps, but the continuance of the militia model as a whole can only be guaranteed to the extent to which enough volunteers willing to participate in the cadre corps as officers or NCOs can be found also in the future. Already the loss of centrality of the military in the value priorities of the Swiss population, caused by modernization, and not only the fact that the armed forces are increasingly more often questioned, would affect the Swiss militia model in its structure much faster and more persistently than any other army system. In this paper, the augmenting unwillingness to assume leadership functions, which has been observed since the 1970's, as well as its quality as an indicator for a value change will be investigated. Data from a representative survey carried out in 1976 will be used. Furthermore, possible consequences for the structure of the militia model and its social close attachment are to be described.

2. Socio-Structural Prerequisites for the Militia System

In Switzerland, there is not only compulsory military service for all male citizens, but the military law can compel any able drafted man to take over a certain military rank which he has to earn by attending the necessary schools.¹ Usually, the needs for the military cadre corps could be met without coercion. For an officer's career, the demand traditionally exceeded the supply, and it was thus possible to select the candidates carefully according to their school education and personal performance. The reasons for a careerist's willingness to participate have never been thoroughly investigated in Switzerland though. But there is no doubt that, since the military has always been highly valued, an officer's position means more social prestige. The reciprocal favoritism of military and civil cadre positions accounts for a candidate's engagement. The great personal investment in time spent in the military, connected with temporary renunciation of a civilian occupation and a partial reduction in income, result in a gain in social status and future career opportunities outside of the military. If asked whether one would encourage a good friend to become an officer, 85% of those questioned in 1976 in a survey on value and value changes among the Swiss population (MEYER 1976) still answered yes. A further illustration of the high valuation of a military cadre position is that political parties, on their election posters, often mention the military rank of their candidates as a reference. Furthermore, a military cadre position is highly valued in Swiss enterprises as well as in the administration and may facilitate professional promotion (WALLACH 1966). The military therefore performs the function of a vertical mobility channel. Partly because of the increased requirements for mastery of military technology, the army, in its selection policy, prefers that the applicants for the cadre corps and officers' positions be better educated (see table 1).

Table 1: Professions of the Applicants for Officers' and NCOs' Positions (in %)

	Applicants for					
	Officers' Positions				NCOs' Positions	
	1979 ¹	1976 ¹	1965 ²	1964 ²	1979 ¹	1976 ¹
University graduates/ students	50.1	44.4	27.7	35.5	24.5	22.8
Teachers	4.4	4.3	3.3	9.0	2.5	2.3
Technical professions	14.1	17.5	30.5	24.3	18.6	19.0
Civil servants	3.5	3.0	1.8	7.7	4.5	4.6
Clerks	14.8	16.9	18.2	6.0	15.5	16.0
Artists, liberal arts	0.6	-	0.2	0.5	0.8	1.0
Tradesmen	11.2	12.6	17.8	16.4	29.1	29.5
Farmers	0.9	1.2	0.2	1.0	3.0	2.6
Workers	0.4	0.1	0.3	0.5	1.5	2.2


Source: 1 Data supplied by the Federal Military Department
2 H. Kurz, 1968

In the officers' schools, the share of university graduates and students increased from one third in 1964 to almost half in 1979 whereas the share of technical professions and tradesmen declined continuously. University graduates and teachers are increasingly more likely to be proposed for an officer's career than tradesmen, farmers or workers. Since the civil career follows similar patterns, a certain identity between the civil and military elite is the obvious consequence.¹

In the Swiss militia system, the officers and NCOs basically accomplish two tasks: they are not only military leaders but also trainers on all levels and particularly in recruit schools. There is only a small corps of professional officers and NCOs who is responsible for the training of the militia cadre corps and the supervision of the training in recruit schools. The training standard and the military motivation, i.e. the efficiency of the system as a whole, depend therefore to a major degree on the quality and engagement of the militia cadre corps. The voluntariness and maximum use of the civil leadership and training potential are more than just the result of an exceptional socio-historical citizen tradition though: they

represent the socio-structural prerequisites for the Swiss militia system. These two elements make sure that a potential professionalization of the cadre corps is not necessary in the near future. Coercion is no alternative over the long term: Lacking or bad motivation of an involuntary cadre corps as well as insufficient utilization of the civil training potential would have a strongly eroding effect on the system's efficiency. Its consequence would be an increased decay of the army's image. Value centrality of the armed forces in the Swiss society, civil prestige of a military career and voluntary engagement are therefore crucial for the militia system and depend on each other. A graphic shows these interdependences in the form of a model:

Figure 1: Socio-Structural Prerequisites for the Militia Army



The model very clearly shows that the loosening of traditional obligations and/or a new orientation towards one's profession, civil career or leisure time due to modernization might already lead to a structural crisis by the way of career renunciation. Open questioning of compulsory military service is not even necessary!

3. The Willingness to Assume Leadership Functions 1970 - 1980

Indeed, reports from military schools and courses of the early 70's abound in complaints about, to some extent, considerable difficulties to recruit NCOs for further training and the declining interest in officers' careers. Alarmed by the soldiers' unwillingness to rise to higher ranks, the Military Administration proceeded to grasp the numbers of those unwilling to participate for the first time in 1973. The aggregated percentage for the period between 1973 and 1978 can be found in table 2:

Table 2: Refusals to Undergo Further Training 1973-1978 (Percentage)

Year (sp= spring recruit school s = summer recruit school)	"Involuntarily" Compelled			Voluntarily Proposed, "After Persuasion"		
	Lieu- tenants	Ser- geants	Corporals	Lieu- tenants	Ser- geants	Corporals
1973 sp	1.4	0.7	34.7			
1973 s	0.6	-	28.5	(Category "Voluntarily Pro-		
1974 sp	0.4	-	33.2	posed" Not Investigated		
1974 s	1.1	-	23.6	until 1975)		
1975 sp	0.3	-	10.1	0.4	0.5	23.4
1975 s	0.7	-	10.0	0.7	0.3	20.3
1976 sp	(Category "Involuntarily			0.9	0.5	40.0
1976 s	Compelled" No Longer			0.9	0.4	30.0
1977 sp	Investigated after 1976)			0.5	-	33.3
1977 s				0.4	0.9	30.2
1978 sp				0.7	0.6	36.2
1978 s				0.5	0.2	29.3

Source: Summary of reports from schools and courses, Federal Military Department (may only be used with special permission)

The full extent of the unwillingness of the earlier years and the moment when it actually started are not known because there is not any statistical material available. But we can start from the principle that even before the needs for NCOs could not be met without persuading potential candidates. The fact that we do not find any noteworthy complaints in military reports or the media before the end of the 60's, permits us to conclude that the reference to open coercion due to obstinate refusals is a phenomenon of the late 60's and the early 70's and appeared for the first time in this way. It especially came true as far as the declining interest in officers' careers and the coercion on this level were concerned.

Table 2 shows:

- A considerable gap of volunteers for the period between 1973 and 1978 on the level of NCO₁, a small gap on the level of officers and an inconsiderable gap on the level of higher NCOs (sergeants and similar ranks). During these years, roughly one third of all NCOs had risen involuntarily or only conditionally voluntarily to this rank.
- A decline of the absolute unwillingness in the years after 1973 while the portion of conditional voluntariness remained unchanged until 1978.

The refusals occur in all branches of the service without a clear trend standing out over the years. An infantry recruit school established a record in 1974 when 105 (91%) of 115 recruits proposed to assume the function of a NCO had to be compelled to do so. Also traditionally renowned arms of the service, such as tank corps or the artillery, often had high coercion rates. For the period after 1978, there are no statistical reports available. Verbal judgements in school reports of 1979 give an uneven, but partly more optimistical picture. Nevertheless also in 1981, a high officer alluded to the still existing "problem of cadre renewal" in his area.¹

In order not to arouse the impression that the problem of cadre recruiting is an isolated phenomenon, it is important to refer to some other significant aspects of the civil and military relationship in the 70's.

- Also in other areas of the militia system, relying on voluntariness, a similar attitude can be observed: In the voluntary women's formations, registrations have continuously sunk since the early 60's. This trend fell off a bit from 1971 to 1979 in the Women's Auxiliary Service, but not in the Red Cross Service (HALTINER/MEYER 1980).
- Since the early 70's, a certain restlessness has affected the military climate: the number of conscientious objectors rose until 1974, a growing number of draftees avoided military service for psychological or doubtful medical reasons, service conditions were openly criticized, and the resistance against the extension of garrison towns and rifle-ranges grew.
- The growing number of conscientious objectors gave rise to a political initiative calling for a reduction of compulsory military service and the possibility of an alternate civil service. It was rejected by a plebiscite in 1977. There were considerable differences in the voters' attitudes along the dimensions age, community size and education. If only the 20-39 year olds had gone to the ballot box, the traditional duty of compulsory military service would not include all male citizens in Switzerland anymore.¹

4. Changing Attitudes Towards the Military and the Civil Prestige of a Military Career

With regard to the retrogressive "unwillingness" to assume a military cadre position, leading politicians and the mass media have interpreted the phenomenon as the attitude of a spoiled young generation or as an antimilitaristic "fashion". They claim that the

end of the saturated years and the economical recession have helped the "healthy nucleus" of the young generation to become again aware of their military and civic duties. Indeed, with the increased competition on the job market since 1975,¹ a candidate's military rank has no doubt gained in importance when he is applying for a job and has thus made it more attractive for him. But according to our opinion, it is not merely a surface phenomenon if we look at it carefully. The observed want of cadre rather fits into a wider range of already mentioned observations (p. 7) and coincides with the results of an investigation on value and value changes among the Swiss population carried out in 1976 (MEYER 1976).² These point to the fact that the declining willingness to participate, in the sense of the described circular model (see figure 1), rather indicates an increasing loss of centrality of the military in the value order, connected with a new orientation towards the civil status of a military career. It thus means deep-rooted change and not just a passing change in attitude of the time. To be sure and in particular, the results of the investigation, which we cannot mention individually, show that the army's necessity to exist is hardly doubted (94% of those questioned approve of it)³, but that some kind of secularization takes place in the attitude towards the military though. It is manifested in the shifting from the traditional relationship, which is coming to light by assigning a positive and central role to the institution for the Swiss society as a whole, to a more instrumental view of the military as being a "necessary evil". On the whole, the two attitudes of traditional and instrumental valuation more or less balance each other (49% to 45%)⁴, but they are closely connected to the respondents' age: The instrumental attitude continuously rises with decreasing age, and the traditional attitude declines at the moment and is approved by one third only in the youngest age-group. There are similar correlations as far as the respondents' education and community size are concerned (see table 3):

The traditional centrality is approved the most by the least-educated respondents from rural areas whereas the majority of the more highly-educated respondents, independent of where they live, show an instrumental orientation towards the military (see table 3):

Table 3: Attitude Towards the Military (Percentage of Those Approving the Statements)

		Community Size								
		"Military Is Central for Swiss Society"			"Military Is a Necessary Evil"			"Military Should Be Done Away With"		
		Small	Medium	City ¹	Small	Medium	City ¹	Small	Medium	City ¹
<u>Edu- cation Level</u>	low	61	54	34	36	39	61	3	7	5
	medium	51	47	35	43	48	53	6	6	12
	high	28	35	22	67	56	64	5	9	15
N	=	511	293	81	390	291	147	42	41	30
Sign. level		(1%)	(5%)	(-)	(1%)	(5%)	(-)	(1%)	(5%)	(-)

¹ = more than 100'000 inhabitants

Source: Survey "Value and Value Orders Among the Swiss Population", 1976

In other words: The army's centrality as a social reference for the identity of the individual citizen declines with decreasing age, increasing urbanization and education. The approval of the military as "central for the Swiss society" marks the status-quo-orientation whereas the instrumental attitude towards the military indicates a loss of centrality of the military in the value priorities. Referring to the circular model (see fig. 1) again, we can expect that the social value estimation of a military career declines with an increasing instrumental attitude towards the military. An indicator of the prestige of a military career is the question asked in the 1976 survey whether one would encourage a good friend to go through the training to become an officer.¹ As mentioned before, the question was

highly approved (85%) as a whole. But the approval depends again on the age (Gamma 0.33, significance level 1%). If we control the respondents' age, it becomes apparent (see table 4) that the age determines the attitude towards a military career only for those who have an instrumental orientation, whereas the age does not count for those who assign a traditional central social role to the military. In other words: The younger a respondent is, the more strongly an instrumental perception of the military determines his encouragement for a military career in a negative sense. The presumption that a change in the attitude towards the army would influence the valuation of civil prestige of a military career apparently proves true.

Table 4: Positive Recommendation for an Officer's Career
(Percentage)

	Age		
	20-29 years	30-39 years	40 y. and more
<u>Attitude</u> - traditional ("central")	92	93	95
<u>Towards</u> - instrumental ("evil")	65	77	86
<u>Military</u> - to do away with military	27*	52*	32*
N	169	260	860
Sign. level	(1%)	(1%)	(1%)

* absolute frequencies comparatively small

Source: Survey "Value and Value Orders Among the Swiss Population", 1976

A trivariate analysis of the variables age and education as well as age and community size, with reference to a positive attitude towards a military career, confirms and supplements this state of affairs (table 5): The variation in the attitudes towards a military career essentially follows the same pattern as that in the basic attitude towards the military as a whole. The refusal of a military career rises with an increasing education and urbanization level and with decreasing age. In the youngest age-group, the 20-29 year olds, only 46%

of the most highly-educated segment recommended an officer's career! In the same age-group and in urban areas only 44% of the respondents viewed an officer's career as something positive. Education as well as community size have comparatively more influence on the willingness for approval in the youngest age-group than in the two other ones. (The argumentation is here impaired by an insufficient significance level, i.e. over 5% error probability.) In view of the great relative differences between the most highly-educated and the most highly-urbanized segment respectively and the next lower one within the youngest age-group (25% and 26% difference respectively) one can actually speak of refusal for the urbanized and most highly-educated young generation. This finding could very well be used to explain the really observed rising unwillingness to assume leadership functions in the 70's!

Table 5: Positive Recommendation for an Officer's Career
(Percentage)

<u>Education Level</u>	<u>Age-Groups</u>		
	<u>20-29 years</u>	<u>30-39 years</u>	<u>40 years and more</u>
low	76	87	90
medium	71	83	89
high	46	78	90
N =	175	262	870
Sign. level	(1%)	(-)	(-)
<hr/>			
<u>Community Size</u>	<u>Age-Groups</u>		
small village/country	74	88	90
small, medium-sized towns	70	77	90
city (more than 100'000 inhabitants)	44	83	88
N =	175	263	871
Sign. level	(1%)	(1%)	(-)

Source: Survey "Value and Value Orders Among the Swiss Population", 1976

It is quite in line with an increasing instrumental basic attitude, if the utility-oriented aspects gain in importance in the valuation of a military career, whereas the traditional prestige-oriented aspects lose in weight as motivators. That military leadership experience is at least valued to be useful beyond the basic attitude towards the military is shown by the fact that even half of the army opponents in the 30-39 age-group (see table 4) recommend an officer's career. In the 1976 survey, the respondents had to give reasons for their recommendations. Table 6 reproduces the portion of traditional against instrumental reasoning, according to age and education groups. Instrumental reasons prevail with all respondents, independent of age. Certainly, the portion rises for the more highly-educated segment, mostly in the youngest age-group. On the other hand, the share of traditional reasons stating values such as "patriotism" or "pride" declines with decreasing age, independent of education. The portion of traditional arguments is about double the size in the oldest age-group than in the youngest one. This points at least to the fact that a positive attitude towards an officer's career is not incompatible with an instrumental view of the military, even if utility-oriented, genuinely functional points of view are more important as motivators than prestige-oriented aspects in such a case.

Table 6: Reasons for a Positive Recommendation for an Officer's Career (Percentage)

Education Level	Age					
	20-29 years		30-39 years		40 years and more	
	trad. r.*	instr. r.+	trad. r.*	instr. r.+	trad. r.*	instr. r.+
low	13	132	28	132	27	127
medium	12	142	17	148	30	145
high	15	180	14	162	25	140

(multiple responses)

* traditional reasons: "patriotism", "pride", "the army needs the cadre corps", "for the thing itself"

+ instrumental reasons: "contact with people in better positions", "more professional opportunities", "useful civil leadership experience"

Source: Suvey "Value and Value Orders Among the Swiss Population", 1976

On the whole, the survey data as well as the behavioral indicators show that the motivation crisis in the military to be observed in the 70's could only conditionally be explained by an increase of an antimilitaristic orientation within the younger age-groups. It is better to speak of a de- than of an anti-militarization on the level of value priorities. This is clearly revealed by the fact that the refusals to assume leadership functions cannot only be observed in the non-combatant troops such as the medical and the air-raid precaution's service where there is traditionally the highest share of those who did not dare to refuse service altogether. All branches of service are more or less equally concerned. A lot of indications point to the participation crisis as being part of a trend in which traditional action patterns and sense orientations lose their relevance as a whole, and not only with reference to the military. We tried to show this in another paper (HALTINER/MEYER 1978). The same is revealed by the reasons why soldiers refused a military career. Unfortunately, the reasons given were only verbally summarized in the military school and course reports.¹ In the annual reports from 1973 to 1978, a group of motives which could be labeled "priority of private interests" dominates in its weight. On the other hand, arguments which can be subsummarized in the category "negative attitude towards the military" only come afterwards. This rating not only proves the demonstrated re-valuation of the military as being a reference group for one's own social position. Beyond that, it points to a shifting of involvement priorities, due to modernization, from a more public- and conformity-oriented to an individualistic, even partially privatistic interest-orientation. This finding completely coincides with results of current youth surveys in Switzerland which show that "social prestige", "leadership responsibility", "promotion opportunities" generally, and for the more highly-educated young people in particular, are more often questioned, and that especially young people tend to re-valuate the sense of leisure time, profession and work (MEYER 1981 and MEYER, HALTINER, HOFER et al 1982).²

5. Conclusions

On the basis of survey data, we have tried to show that the unwillingness to assume leadership functions which has been observed since the 70's has to be correlated to a change in orientation towards the army. Methodically and incontestably, change can only be proved by data which are comparable over a longer period of time. Plausibility criteria such as:

- a) the consistently high correlations between the "modernization variables" education and community size in all questions concerning the military in survey data as well as in the actual voting behavior regarding military matters (e.g. civil alternate service),
- b) the similarity of the Swiss development with trends in other industrial nations (see Inglehart 1976, Harries-Jenkins G. and van Doorn J. (ed.) 1976, Kelleher 1978; and the debate about the crisis of mass armies, van Doorn 1975)
- c) the coincidence between the survey data and the actually shown unwillingness to assume military leadership functions

make the thesis conclusive that military refusal indicates change over the long term. The difficulties in recruiting cadre corps can therefore not merely be valued as a passing phenomenon. On the contrary, we must take it into account since it will occur intensely also in the future - with its consequences corresponding to the militia system. Especially if we have to allow for the most highly-educated young generation tending to a comparatively stronger military minimalism than other groups do - a fact that is shown by our data material - the Swiss militia system will be affected twice as hard. It not only has to be prepared for a general unwillingness of the young generation to assume leadership functions, but it would be short of exactly that rising generation who would contribute essentially to the fact that the military mastery of technology also in the future can be guaranteed on a militia basis. Pressed by the decreasing interest to go through officer's training

of the most highly-educated young generation on the one hand, and the militarily necessary want of cadre on the other would therefore not only compel the army to more coercion, but it might also have to adapt its demands on aptitude and general education to the less qualified applicants. This would open a military career to those willing to rise who could not be considered before because they lacked the necessary qualifications. We can find remarks and observations in the available reports of military schools and courses 1973-1978 which point to such an emergency selection procedure at least in the early 70's. The increasing estrangement of the more highly-educated young generation from the traditionally high military engagement of the civil elite runs the possibility of splitting the military and civil elite. Under the condition of a compulsory service for everybody, the share of civilly highly-qualified soldiers on the one side and civilly less qualified military superiors on the other side would grow. The existent and latent frustration potential could increasingly convert into tensions between superiors and subordinates. The possible consequences for the society as a whole are: slow deterioration of the civil and military relationship, a growing distance between the armed forces and the society and - as a feed-back according to our model (see figure 1) - an increased devaluation of the voluntary military engagement. Over the long term: Lack of cadre corps and increased social and political pressure for partial professionalization of certain military branches.

FOOTNOTES

- p. 3: 1 Military Organization, article 10
- p. 4: 1 According to a study carried out in 1972 (KLOETI 1972), two thirds of all higher civil servants in the Federal Administration had the rank of an officer. This ratio remained unchanged in 1938, 1955 and 1969. Between 40% and 50% had the rank of a captain or more. According to a further, but not representative study (HOLLENSTEIN 1979), 90% of the 54 top managers in the private industry who were covered by the survey belonged to the officers' corps, half of them were ranked higher than major. A survey on 253 parliamentarians and other top politicians carried out in 1978 (KRIESI 1979) shows that 46% of them belong to the officers' corps and 37% even have a rank higher than captain. The share of officers among the entire population is 6% according to the Federal Administration (cit. KRIESI, p. 533).
- p. 7: 1 Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 4 May 1981
- p. 8: 1 Swiss Society for Practical Social Research, VOX-analysis of the federal elections of 4 December 1977.
- p. 9: 1 Since 1975, the resistance against a military cadre position has increasingly more often been based on the fear to lose a civil job.
- 2 Representative study of 1872 Swiss male and female citizens of over twenty years of age in all parts of Switzerland. Random sample. Financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation.
- 3 The survey of 1976 confirms herewith polls carried out in 1970 (WEHRWILLE) with 86% and of 1980 (WEHRWILLE) with 88% approval for the army's necessity to exist.
- 4 The question was: Today, there are several opinions on the importance of the military for Switzerland. I am going to state three of them. Please tell me which one you would approve the most:
- The military plays a central role in the Swiss society, and this is good so.
 - The military is a necessary evil.
 - The military could be done away with.
 - Do not know.
 - No answer.

- p. 10: 1 The question was: A good young friend is to go through the officer's training. He asks for your advice whether he should do so or not. What would you recommend him?
- I would recommend him to accept.
 - I would recommend him to reject.
 - Do not know.
 - No answer.

- p. 14: 1 As an example, statements in the category of "further training" of reports in military schools and courses 1973/I are given:

Reasons for refusal (no distinction between those who have been proposed voluntarily and those who have been proposed involuntarily):

First mentioned:

- financial reasons/difficulties, insufficient wage compensation
- loss of time (studies, professional training)

Further reasons:

- professional problems (own business, no aid - particularly for farmers)
- family reasons (for the married ones)
- utility questioned
- not convinced by one's own leadership qualifications
- inability
- antipathy towards the military
- senselessness of the army
- laziness
- moral reasons (army is not compatible with religious or personal philosophy of life)
- sports
- no interest
- negative attitude
- tiredness of service

- 2 The results are taken from a representative study among young people (20 years of age) and a survey among recruits (also 20 years of age).

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ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY IN THE NETHERLANDS

by

Willem Scheelen

ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY IN THE NETHERLANDS.

Towards the end of 1971 the Board of the "Stichting Volk en Verdediging" (Foundation "People and Defence") in the Netherlands assigned a group of social scientists and historians to study "Bottlenecks in the relation between the people and the armed forces".

Events preceding the formation of this committee gave sufficient cause to such an assignment. Not only inside political circles, but even more so outside, rather fierce differences of opinion existed at that time.

They concerned issues like :

- NATO-membership of the Netherlands; the amount of defence-expenditure; the balance of terror between East and West and the role of nuclear weapons in it; but also :
- the rights of conscripts (f.e. in relation to their hair-do) and the activities of their union (the VVDM).

The armed forces seemed to be object of polarization on a much bigger scale than ever before since World War II.

In order to reach a carefully balanced judgement as to the backgrounds, nature and contents of the growing criticism of the armed forces, and so to surpass a mere impressionistic analysis, the committee opted for research.

The approach has been twofold. In 1972 a number of hearings (depth-interviews) took place (of 2 or 3 hours each). Representatives of a large selection of military and non-military organizations and associations, were given the opportunity to express their feelings about military defence and the armed forces. The results of these hearings served to lay the basis for a survey among a representative sample, carried out in May/June 1974, to trace the views of the Dutch population (of 18 years and over) concerning defence and the military, within the framework of international politics.

A report, accompanied with two annexes, which has been published in November 1977 1), covers the results of this opinion and attitude research-project.

From the beginning, the committee was convinced that a clear distinction should be made between views concerning the legitimacy (the why), respective the mode of existence (the how) of the armed forces.

How the relationship between the two should be seen, was less clear. The question was whether criticism of the mode of existence leads toward doubt about the legitimacy (the right to exist) of the armed forces, or vice versa, or whether there is no relation at all. Especially this uncertainty made the committee decide to carry out the survey, at the end of which they had to conclude that attitudes in the field of the mode of existence of the armed forces appear not to lie in line with attitudes on the level of the legitimacy thereof.

According to the committee, here lies the crux of the bottlenecks in the relationship between the people and the armed forces.

Many people do not have a clearcut, all-embracing, vision of the armed forces, within which one could say: this or that are the objectives of the military, therefore the armed forces should be organized so and so. One could label this as the identity-problem of the armed forces. Several points of view can be distinguished in the discussion about that identity. They can be described by means of the combined attitude-typology.

In so doing, people with a military vision (indulgent as to the legitimacy, conservative as to the mode of existence) and people with an anti-military vision (rejecting the legitimacy, radical as to the mode of existence) are opponents. These two groups recognize and acknowledge each other and as such have no difficulties among them.

These antipoles do find it difficult however to understand supporters of the so-called "civilian" vision (pragmatically inclined as to the legitimacy, tolerant as to the mode of existence of the armed forces. *)

Both sides, the "military" **) as well as the "anti-military" look upon the "civilian" vision as a combination of incompatible matters.

Interesting cause of these differences of opinion about the identity of the armed forces is - according to the committee - that, stronger than ever, the main objective of the military is a preventive one.

The warfare-task has faded into the background.

To keep both sides of the medal in view at the same time is not easy, neither for the public in general, nor for the interested part thereof.

Only the planning of a consistent defence-policy which strikes the imagination, wherein legitimacy and mode of existence of the armed forces are in line, seems to be the task for the policy-makers so they may counter the bottlenecks in the relationship between the people and the armed forces.

*) This is the most typical combination which can be indicated as a "civilian" vision, but there are more.

**) The "military" vision is not exclusively restricted to the military. There are servicemen with a "civilian" vision, and civilians with a "military" vision.

In this paper we will try to give first a historical dimension to the matter of the identity problem of to-days armed forces. Then in the second part we will turn to recent research on armed forces and society in the Netherlands in order to see whether the same identity problem is still valid as an explanatory factor today.

I. The function of the armed forces.

The function of the armed forces has not always been the same. We will not go back too far in history, but we do establish that in the past centuries a constant change in the function of the armed forces has taken place.

This was inherent to the political and sociological changes in Europe during the last centuries.

When in the 18th century the national states were established and consolidated, the army was an instrument in the hands of the sovereign, to be used in the first place against the pretensions of feudal lords, but also as an outward demonstration of power.

The army was a symbol of sovereign power. It consisted of mercenaries. This was decisive for the organization of the army. To advance in closed ranks a.o. had the function to frustrate frequently occurring desertion. The limited cavalry also had the task to keep the forces together.

In order to prevent the plague of plundering, depot-provisions were indicated, which limited the army's mobility.

The nature of these armies also decided the sort of warfare.

Mercenary troops were expensive and the sovereign as well as the soldiers themselves had little interest in bloody battles.

Warfare was therefore strictly regulated.

After the first breakthrough the garrison of a besieged town was as yet allowed to retreat fully armed, with drums beating and colours flying.

Warcampaigns in those days were strategic manoeuvres of one another circling armies who seldom really battled. (The battle of Blenheim rather was an unfortunate coincidence than wilful intention of Marlborough).

Towards the end of the 18th century Europe was fairly shaken up by the French revolution. This affected the absolute authority of the sovereigns and the citizens are getting bigger influence in state-affairs. With that, the population also gets more responsibility with respect to war and peace. Mercenary troops under the leadership of the aristocracy make room for a national army and conscription. As a result military strategy is no longer an isolated hobby of sovereigns, but affair of the population. The armies are becoming more massive; the war more ideologic, more emotional. Not only the prestige of the sovereign is at stake, but also the weal and woe of an entire population. Limits as the the action of armies disappear. The risk of desertion declines. More spread and mobile action becomes possible.

Before that one could speak of limited wars, from now on we enter the age of absolute war.

The enemy is no longer the also hired army of the rival sovereign, but is the hostile national army as representative of a hostile nation. Destruction of or victory over such an army becomes the objective.

This development escalates in the beginning of our century towards total warfare. The objective is no longer the hostile army; it is the hostile society, made out as utterly objectionable and therefore to be destroyed.

In this development we also see a slow but sure disestablishment of politics and strategy. At first a sheer instrument in the hands of the sovereign, the handling and leading of massive armies gradually becomes such a specialized business that a more strict separation in competence between politicians and the military becomes apparent. In short : peace is for the politicians; war for the military.

Once a war has broken out, the politicians withdraw and leave what has to be done to the specialists : the military. Understandable that this has furthered the isolation of the armed forces. In peacetime they had no function, therefore no prestige either.

During the second world-war however, we already see that politics resume its grip on the army, also in wartime Churchill directly intervenes in the conduct of war. On the other hand, the prestige of military leaders leads towards attachment of political functions : MacArthur in Japan, Mountbatten in India, Eisenhower in the USA.

The introduction of nuclear weapons makes politics resume its full grip on the armed forces. War has indeed become too dangerous to leave warfare to the generals. For that matter, after the second world-war peace- and war-time are no longer separated. The cold war is a period of semi-war, semi-peace. The army has acquired a political function : to deter war and to maintain peace.

Earlier we saw that the outward appearance and the function of war are dependent of certain social and political developments. The origin of the national state and the institution of the absolute sovereign bring along the development of instrumental mercenary troops.

The wars had a restricted nature. The disappearance of the absolute dynasty and the growth of the influence of the citizens does not lead towards mitigation of warfare; on the contrary, the wars become more vehement, more ideologic. Entire nations and societies finally face each other, bent on each others destruction.

When the nuclear weapon becomes available, this a.o. leads towards a sort of reflection, the politicians resume their grip on the armed forces.

It is a complex of political, technical and organizational developments which again and again change the function of the armed forces vis-a-vis society.

More control of the population on the government (democratisation) does not lead towards less violent wars; on the contrary.

It does lead however towards subordination of the armed forces to the democratically chosen state-authority.

A problem thereby is that under the present circumstances one has to make credible preparations for the execution of a task (warfare) which - if it comes to that - means the failure of that same task (peace-keeping).

The present-day armed forces also have a political mission (peace-keeping through deterrence) for which - historically and traditionally - they are not prepared.

The identity-crisis and the discussion about the mode of existence of the armed forces are a direct result thereof. 2)

II. Identity-problems of the armed forces in Dutch public opinion.

Here follows a specific recording of the Dutch situation in the preceding perspective.

Dutch history did not contribute much to military tradition.

Roughly speaking one could say that the armed forces were considered an expensive necessary evil.

As far as the Netherlands were a seafaring nation, the necessity of a naval force was easily demonstrated. For the land-forces they confided in necessary troops whose absence was preferred to their presence. The conscript-system, introduced during the French domination, enjoyed a continuous impopularity.

During and after the second world-war (as after each war) a more positive appreciation of the military trade develops.

As for now public opinion still shows that people do indeed consider the armed forces in the abstract as a necessity, but also that this does not mean that people are equally positive about the way in which armed forces present themselves.

"The opinions of the Dutch on defence matters are not controlled by one single attitude. On the contrary, a distinction had to be made between two different spheres of attitudes, i.e. between reaction to the legitimacy of the armed forces and to the way those forces actually function.

The difference means that the "why" and the "how" of the military organization are clearly two separate questions to be asked about this organization." 3)

An explanation for this can also be found in the identity-crisis of the armed forces. In the situation before the second world-war one could still speak of a clearly defined province where the military profession was autonomous. At present much of this autonomy has been affected; from both sides :

- From within. Warfare is no longer the exclusive domain of the military leaders.

In the present situation the armed forces also have the political function of war-prevention.

In former days "politics" and "military trade" were separated provinces; nowadays they often confluence. As Janowitz says : "The adequacy of forces for strategic deterrence and the conditions for atomic inspection and control have come to be posed as scientific questions over which the military have no monopoly of professional expertise." 4)

- From without. The image of the professional soldier as Huntington sketches in his "Soldiers and the state" 5) has gradually become socially unacceptable. His expertise has been affected in a rapidly changing and technological world; he has to share his "responsibility for the military security" with the politicians, whereas the "corporate character of officership", and the existence of "autonomous social units" gradually become undesirable.

In the past, the population had a more or less defined image of how a war would look like, and which capacities and qualities were necessary in order to function in such circumstances. In the nuclear age the image of a future war becomes vague and is often repressed as "thinking about the unthinkable". The image we then repeatedly meet in public opinion-polls is that of a population who - in theory - is positive about the existence of an army, but, confronted with the possible consequences thereof, f.e. with the means modern forces have at their disposal, they start back. Even the military themselves have a confused image. In these days a soldier is supposed to prepare himself in a credible way for a task which, once executed, means the failure of his mission. His role as "peace-keeper by deterrence" has to be combined with his capacity and will to launch means of which he knows they can be disastrous. He is no longer allowed to be a "war-wager" but his new role of "political instrument to maintain peace" is not inborn.

Whereas the Federal Republic of Germany has chosen for the "Staatsbürger in Uniform", the Dutch soldier still hovers between "citizen" and "professional".

Nuclear weapons.

The following can be illustrated on the basis of the discussion about nuclear weapons which at present is a central theme in Dutch politics. The proposition that "The armed forces are an absolute necessity" meets with 71% of "agreement" or "total agreement". 6)

That this does not yet leads towards acceptance of the means the armed forces handle, is shown by the results of another survey in which 54% wanted to remove the nuclear weapons from the Netherlands. Research in 1980 has also covered the way of thinking about professional soldiers and about nuclear weapons. 7) 71% of the respondents agreed that "the army can only function when professional soldiers are prepared to execute every task they are given". (13% disagreed).

This again fosters the supposition that a general acceptance of the armed forces as an institution and the position of the soldiers therein, does not yet lead towards an unanimous result when people are questioned about the means of violence that same institution handles, and about the attitude of the soldier opposite those means. Opposite this obvious public opinion-differentiation it is naturally interesting to know how soldiers, especially officers, think about the execution of their profession.

Research-data are not available, c.q. not yet released. Under the influence however of a often vehement social discussion about nuclear armament, a movement has arisen - also among professional officers - which is alarmed at the possession and possible use of nuclear weapons.

The Minister of Defence has declared that he does not want to get away from an internal discussion about nuclear weapons, but those who refuse nuclear weapon-tasks have no other choice than to send in their resignation.

Conscription.

Another still topical problem in the relation people - armed forces in the Netherlands is conscription.

The Netherlands law of conscription is based upon the articles 194 and 195 of our constitution which stipulate that every able Dutchman is obliged to cooperate in maintaining the independence of the state and in defending its territory.

The constitution further stipulates that there are armed forces for the protection of the state, which forces will consist of volunteers and conscripts.

The law of conscription raises problems in so far as it deals with the principal of general conscription for all able young men, whereas the armed forces yearly need only one third of them. This means that one third of each annual class of young men is forced - often against their will - to fulfill military service whereas two third of them stay out.

This embarrassing situation is of long standing already. Since the midsixties, however, complaints about this unequal burdensharing were voiced rather more frequently. The conscripts that were drafted could well argue that, compared to 65% of their agegroup, they were seriously disadvantaged. They had to serve for at least 14 months, in this way losing valuable time as regards finding a job or starting some form of higher education.

Now, on the one hand, much has already been done by the government to improve the remuneration of the conscripts as well as their working/living conditions.

On the other hand, however, nothing has been done about the 35 - 65% ratio, while in a technically highly advanced military organization, the conscripts' motivation will be negatively influenced by the tendency to assign to them the simpler jobs. As time is lacking to train them for the complex ones, they will have to contend themselves with the less challenging and attractive tasks.

In this way, quite a number of relatively highly educated conscripts will be confronted with jobs that are definitely below their competence and interest level. 8)

In 1975 the Minister of Defence installed a State Commission charged with answering the question : "Will conscription have to be abolished ?".

The commission did not reach an unanimous conclusion and in February 1980 the Minister of Defence voiced his doubts as to the possibility of recruiting the adequate number of qualified volunteers, as well as to the costs of an All Volunteer Force.

National samples have shown that a vast majority of the Dutch population considers the existence of the armed forces a necessity and also recognizes the right of the government to impose conscription. Nevertheless people criticize the way conscription is being executed as well as the actual functioning thereof. There also is a growing doubt about the efficiency of conscription.

According to research, performed in 1974 and 1976, a majority of the population tends towards preference for a professional army as compared to a conscript-army. 9)

Opposite that tendency stands that a social science research project, studying the attitudes of officers of the 1st Army Corps found that 56% opposed the idea of an All Volunteer Army. Within the combat units of the Army Corps, no less than 67% opposed abolishing conscription. Evidently, a well trained and motivated conscript soldier was rated higher than a volunteer. 10)

This naturally brings along the question of conscientious objectors. Although the number of conscientious objectors (just as in other countries) has increased (in 1979 : 3091 requests = 2,5% of the total of registered conscripts) and we cannot conclude an identity-crisis, it is interesting to look at public opinion opposite this category. In view of the topical problem that at the moment there are also conscientious objectors in the Netherlands who also refuse to perform substitute service (total objectors) SVV has recently proposed a number of statements to the population. 11)

Proposition A : To be accepted as a conscientious objector should not be made too easy.

Proposition B : It is quite right that a boy who has conscientious objections has to perform substitute service.

Proposition C : It is not right that boys who refuse military as well as substitute service, are being condemned to imprisonment.

	A	B	C	
Total agreement	37	39	14	
Agreement	35	37	27	
No agreement nor disagreement	8	6	12	
Disagreement	9	9	26	
Total disagreement	8	5	14	
No judgement	3	4	7	
	100%	100%	100%	(N=994)

A substantial majority of the Dutch population agrees that conscientious objection "should not be made too easy" as well as the principle that a conscientious objector to military service should perform some or other substitute service (72% resp. 76%). A strong discord however exists about the correctness of the consequence for boys who refuse military as well as substitute service : imprisonment; 40% agrees, 41% disagrees with that consequence. The dilemma is clear. People dismiss "total objection" but also refuse to regard them as criminals.

Besides, when the conscription-problem is considered in relation to the nuclear weapon-discussion, 53% of the population judges that "conscripts should be allowed to refuse to stand guard over nuclear weapons". At the same time a vast majority (82%) concludes that it is impossible to allow conscripts to decide for themselves which tasks they are willing or not willing to perform. Again a sign that people in the abstract tend to keep the traditional image of the military apparatus upright, but confronted with the problem of the present means (nuclear weapons), people show much more nuance in their opinion.

Women in the armed forces.

Since 1944 women participate in the Netherlands armed forces. Their number however remained limited to about 900, less than 1% of the military personnel.

As a result of the Treaty of New York of 31 March 1953 concerning the political rights of women, that came into operation in the Netherlands on 28 October 1971, and of the Law concerning equal treatment of men and women of 1 March 1980, the policy of the Ministry of Defence is also directed at permitting women volunteers in the armed forces, on the same footing as men, also in so-called combat-functions.

The problems concerning the integration of women in the armed forces are holding the attention of those directly involved as well as of the mass media for quite some time now.

Still missing was the insight in the opinion of the Dutch population. This gap has now been filled by a survey of November 1979. 12)

Not surprisingly, the Dutch population is divided about full integration of women in the armed forces. When asked if women should be considered for combat-assignments the scales (opinion) are tipping to the negative side. When asked about the expected performance of women in combat-assignments only a small majority has a positive view. Most of the respondents consider military assignments unfeminine.

There is a rather distinct correlation between these opinions : people who consider military assignments not unfeminine and think that women will perform just as well as men, also tend to say that women should be considered for combat-assignments.

A great deal of consensus of opinion about the way male soldiers will react when female colleagues should perform their duties just as well as men : almost 2/3 of the Dutch people believe that the male soldier will find it difficult to accept this.

The idea of general conscription for boys and girls can count on more supporters than opponents.

The way of thinking about women in combat-assignments correlates with the opinion about the role of women in society : those who believe that equality in position for men and women is possible, also believe that women should be considered for combat-assignments. Ideas about legitimacy and mode of existence of the armed forces do not coincide with opinions about women in combat-assignments.

Men and women do not differ of opinion about women in combat-assignments, young and old people do. Younger people are distinctly more positive in this respect. People who only finished primary school have a more negative opinion about women in combat-assignments than those with more education.

CDA-supporters are more negative than the supporters of PvdA, D'66 and VVD. The electorates of the latter three political parties are much of the same opinion when they express their beliefs about women in combat-assignments. The division of opinion among the Dutch population is the same as among the supporters of these parties.

Unionism.

The first association of soldiers already dates from the end of the 19th century.

At present there are about ten such associations, among them two associations of conscripts.

System of group-representation in the armed forces of the Netherlands
(from "The Dutch Armed Forces in the 1980's", Den Helder, 1980).

Organization	Abbreviation	Year of foundation	Membership (1-1-1980)	
			active	total in service
1. Association of naval officers	VMO	1947 3)	1502	3100
2. Association of officers of the Royal Neth. Army and Royal Neth. Air Force	NOV 1)	1977	3145	3067
3. Royal association of Neth. reserve-officers	KVNRO	1917	225	2251
4. Association to protect and support the interests of naval and former naval personnel not holding an officer's rank	VBZ	1901	12794	15110
5. Association of the military police	MARVER	1907	4550	4902
6. Federation of general christian organizations for the military	FACOM 2)	1979	11100	12800
7. Royal association of NCO's "Ons Belang"	OB	1898	6974	8951
8. National corporals association	LKV	1965	5342	5642
9. General association of Neth. soldiers	AVNM	1972	5100 4)	5100
10. Association of conscripts	VVDM	1966	16000 4)	16000

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- 1) The NOV is a fusion of the Association of officers of the army and the air-force (1910) and the General Association of Christian Officers founded in 1971 as a fusion of the National Christian Officers Association (1900) and the General Roman Catholic Officers Association (1919).
 - 2) The FACOM is a Federation of the Christian Association of Military Personnel (1902) and the Roman Catholic Association of Military Personnel under the rank of second lieutenant "St. Martinus" (1911).
 - 3) In 1883 the Naval Association has been founded, in 1918 followed by the General Association of Naval Officers. Both joined the VMO in 1947.
 - 4) Approximately.

The associations are mostly categorally divided along the line : corporals - nco's - officers. A rather new phenomenon from the sixties is the association of conscripts.

The associations of officers - nco's often have a somewhat schizophrenic appearance. For a long time they considered themselves - with a few exceptions - more as a class-organization than as a trade-union in the modern sense of the word. Even nowadays their statute is based on a two-sided objective : to look after the interest of the members of the association as well as to take care of a good defence of the realm.

This conception resulted on the one hand in reluctance to join trade-unions or federations of trade-unions, on the other hand the need of trade-unionism to intervene in a political matter of such a sensitive nature as military defence, was not great. This situation has been set going in the last 15 years.

The VVDM (see 10) is an example of how, by way of unorthodox means, via actions and sheer looking after their own interests, improvements for its members could quickly be reached by such an association. The VVDM has certainly been also an example for other military associations.

Ever increasing these associations began to realize that discord among themselves, via a dividing-line of religion, ranks and force, wasn't a characteristic of strength. A process of fusions and co-operation has been set going. More and more the aspect of looking after the interests of the soldiers has been put in the forefront; the two-sided objective is not by accident mostly honoured by the officers-associations.

One could enter into a discussion whether the developments in the military associations are mostly a shift from "profession" to "occupation". A fact is that, surely in the Netherlands, there is a trend among soldiers to look upon their profession as "just another job".

This trend can certainly lead towards identity-problems. An interesting phenomenon is therefore that, whereas other associations maintain their traditionally high grade of organization of 80%, the conscript-organizations have to deal with a stiff drop in membership.

Among the first years of the seventies about 27.000 conscripts had been organized in the Conscript Union, that is more than 65% of all conscripts, compared to 16.000, which is only 40% of all conscripts at January 1st, 1980.

An explanation cannot easily be found. One could say however with some certainty that in the Netherlands - also because of the activism of the conscripts - armed forces have been established who are strongly connected with standards and values in its surrounding society.

People abroad often thought that behaviour and outward appearance of the Dutch conscripts could be considered as evidence that the Dutch forces could no longer function as they ought to.

The contrary has been proven during large international manoeuvres. In the Netherlands as well it is recognized that one has to draw lines with democratization of the armed forces, lines which ly in the functioning of the forces.

The Dutch associations of conscripts did as yet never turn against the functioning of the forces as such. Should they cross that line - maybe the present action against the performing of nuclear tasks is an example - then it will be a crisis in their existence.

Final notes.

A Dutch research-project, closed in 1977, revealed that there existed no relation between the way in which respondents looked upon the legitimacy of a military force and their attitude towards its mode of existence.

From this datum the research-workers thought to have to conclude an identity-crisis with regard to the armed forces.

Next we introduced a historical dimension by describing how the function of the armed forces in society and its relation with politics repeatedly changes. The possibilities of the armed forces are decisive for the sort of warfare, which in its turn, influences the relation between the forces and politics. We then see that after the second world-war the armed forces are getting the function of a political instrument that - by means of a credible deterrence - acquires the task of peace-keeping.

Is it possible that the soldier in this situation can maintain the position of a "professional" which Huntington attached to him? Isn't he automatically entering an identity-crisis when he is preparing himself for something which - once executed - can lead towards disaster? The image of a soldier - also among the population - is that of a "war-farer".

His new role of peace-keeper, the guardian of the paradox of deterrence, is not measured for him; neither traditionally, nor in public opinion. This identity-crisis in which the soldier finds himself as well as the identity-problems with which the population has to cope with regard to the armed forces, we have tried to illustrate by means of the scarce research which has been done in the Netherlands with regard to the relation armed forces - society.

We have thereby chosen a few themes which are topical in the Netherlands at this moment and in which the Netherlands differ from other countries: the problem of nuclear weapons; the problems of conscription and conscientious objectors; the position of women in the armed forces and the military trade-unionism.

Military-sociological research in the Netherlands is still in its infancy. Within the armed forces research is regularly done, but not systematically and not scientifically manageable (often not public). The universities do have branches which occupy themselves with the science of war and peace, but for serious sociological research they have either no interest or they are denied admission to the military apparatus.

There further exists the Foundation Society and Armed Forces (SVV) which tries to do some research with a modest budget and only one scientific worker.

This Foundation, the former Foundation People and Defence, celebrates its 20th anniversary in 1982. It is planning an international military-sociological congress during which the problematics of "The officer, professional or citizen" will be the main theme. In doing so we do hope to throw more light upon the identity-problematics of the military profession.

The Hague, May 1981.

NOTES

- 1) Prof. dr. J.S.van Hessen c.s., "Analyserapport Kneelpunten in de verhouding Volk - Krijgsmacht", ("Bottlenecks in the relation between the people and the armed forces"), The Hague 1977.
- 2) On development of the military profession and on the problem of identity or legitimacy-crisis see also
 - Dr. G.Teitler, "De wording van het professionele officierscorps", Rotterdam 1974,
 - Jacq. van Doorn, "The military and the crisis of legitimacy" in Harris/Jenkins/v.Doorn (ed.) "The military and the problem of legitimacy", London 1976.
- 3) Frits Th.Olivier and Ger Teitler, "The Dutch armed forces in the 1980's", Den Helder (the Netherlands), 1980.
- 4) Morris Janowitz, "The professional soldier", Glencoe, 1960, p. 420.
- 5) Samuel P.Huntington, "The soldier and the State", Cambridge, Mass., 1957.
- 6), 12) Public opinion and women in the armed forces", SVV, The Hague, 1980.
- 7), 11) Kontaktbulletin SVV, February 1981 : "De publieke opinie over het weigeren van dienst" ("The public opinion on (conscientious) objectors").
- 8), 12) Olivier/Teitler, "The Dutch armed forces in the 1980's", p. 14/15.
 - 9) "Verplicht of vrijwillig dienen" (rapport) ("Compulsory or voluntary military service"), The Hague, 1977, p. 26, report of a state commission.
 - 10) "Bedreigde gevechtskracht" (Opinion of officers 1e Army Corps Royal Netherlands Army),The Hague, 1976.
 - 11) See 7).
 - 12) See 6).

**CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN BELGIUM:
MILITARY AND CIVILIAN OPINIONS ABOUT SECURITY-
RELATED ISSUES**

by

Philippe Manigart

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN BELGIUM:

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN OPINIONS ABOUT SECURITY-RELATED ISSUES

INTRODUCTION

Following the general trend in Western advanced industrial nations toward smaller and more professional armed forces (Janowitz, 1971, 1975a, Harries-Jenkins, 1973; Van Doorn, 1973), the Belgian military has in recent years moved away from its traditional conscription format. In 1974 indeed, the Belgian government decided to abandon the mixed system and to adopt a "two-tier" one for its armed forces. A "two-tier system" is a system in which volunteers and conscripts coexist but, unlike in the mixed system, these two groups are functionally differentiated (Kelleher, 1978). In the case of Belgium, it was planned that the operational forces, i.e. the forces under NATO command, would be manned exclusively by volunteers. The role of the short-term (6 months) conscript force would have been limited to territorial and civilian defense and it would have served as a sort of ready reserve. Although the reform of the Belgian armed forces, known as the professionalization plan, is not yet completed, and perhaps never will be, the ratio of volunteers to conscripts has sharply increased since the implementation of the plan. In 1979, 68 % of the Belgian armed forces were volunteers, compared to 54.4 % in 1973. (1)

The implementation of the professionalization plan has raised several objections and problems. Some questions were concerned with the costs of such a reform, others with whether a sufficient number of quality personnel could be recruited. Another important issue however has not been raised: the issue of the legitimacy of the armed forces under a two-tier system. The legitimacy of the armed forces of democratic nations rests on many factors (Moskos, 1973; Janowitz, 1975b; Harries-Jenkins and Van Doorn, 1976; Bachman et al., 1977). Among these factors, two seem particularly important: the social and ideological representativeness of the military. A military with strong elements of social and ideological unrepresentativeness could indeed lose part of its support and prestige among the public, adding a new issue of political controversy in the society and ultimately, perhaps, precipitating a crisis of legitimacy of the armed forces.

The topic of this paper will be restricted to the issue of the ideological representativeness of the Belgian armed forces. The specific question to be addressed will be: are the military and the nation convergent or divergent at the ideological level?

The attitudes of military personnel have generally been seen as being quite homogeneous. For several authors indeed, from the right as well as from the left (see, for example, Huntington, 1957; Mills, 1956), there is such a thing as a "military mind". Abrahamsson (1972: 76) has defined the military mind - or more generally the professional mind - as "a set of relevant attitudes, U, V, W, ..., Z, on which members of the profession have, on the average, more extreme (...) positions than members of any other identifiable occupational group, or of the total population." For him (1972: 78) this set of relevant attitudes may be defined as : " 1) Nationalism, 2) pessimistic beliefs on human nature, 3) alarmism (i.e. "pessimistic" estimates on the probability of war), 4) political conservatism, and 5) authoritarianism."

The literature on the military mind has dealt mainly with the officer corps and has emphasized four processes of homogenization (Abrahamsson, 1972: 72-75) : 1) self-selection through interest or motivation, 2) screening procedures used by the armed forces, 3) continuous selection within the profession, and 4) professional socialization and training. However, it should be noted that, on the one hand, the emphasis on the most professional segment of the military, i.e. the officer corps, has perhaps tended to exaggerate the importance of these homogenization processes, particularly the process of professional socialization, in the military as a whole. On the other hand, the literature has tended to attach too much importance on organizational variables (professionalization level, socialization, selection) and to neglect the crucial role of environmental variables (technology and culture in particular). Yet modern organizational theory (cf : Thompson, 1967; Aldrich, 1979) has taught us to analyze organizations as open systems, i.e. systems which are interdependent with their environment, and thus to be aware of the role of exogeneous variables. The action of environmental variables is especially evident in the case of modern military organizations. For example, it is as a result of technological and cultural change that the military organizations of advanced industrial nations have, to a great extent, gradually lost their structural characteristics that differentiated them from civilian bureaucratic organizations (Janowitz, 1971).

In Belgium, this civilianization process seems to be far more advanced than in other countries (Manigart, 1981). For example, at the enlisted-level, the Belgian military is now almost completely occupationalized. By occupationalization it is meant that the military is less and less viewed as a calling and more and more as "just another job" (Moskos, 1977a and b; Harries-Jenkins, 1977). Among the numerous indicators of such an evolution, one

can cite : the recognition of unionism in the military - since 1975 - and the alignment of the work week on the civilian sector (40 hours/week). This civilianization process has the result of eroding traditional military values and one would thus expect that the ideological differences between soldiers and civilians would tend to diminish. In other words, one can wonder to what extent Belgian soldiers still form an homogeneous group structured around a pro-military ideology and sharply divergent from the civilian society. We will try to answer this question using data from two surveys, one conducted for the "Groupes d'Etudes Stratégiques" in 1976 among a representative sample of the Belgian population ⁽²⁾ and the other conducted by the "Centre de Sociologie de la Guerre" in 1980 among a representative sample of NCO's and enlisted men of the Belgian Army, Air Force, and Navy.

SURVEY SAMPLES AND DESIGNS AND METHODOLOGY

For the civilian sample (1976), the method of quota sampling was used. The resulting sample size was 1201 ⁽³⁾.

For the military sample, the method of self-administered questionnaires was chosen. Two different sample designs were used, with the constraint that the overall sampling fraction be the same, 1:13. For the Air Force and Navy, simple stratified probability samples were used. The stratifying variables were rank and language. Because the Army is by far the largest service (67 % of the Belgian armed forces) and because its units are more widely scattered in and out of the country than those of the other two services, it was decided to use a stratified two-stages probability sample of Army bases. The first stage consisted in the random selection of 22 Army bases out of a total of 77. The selection was made so that the probability of selection would be proportional to size. The second stage consisted of the random selection of individuals within the selected Army bases. The 2508 respondents represent a 64 % response rate. The non-responses were primarily due to administrative problems, such as transfer, retirement, or leave, rather than refusals. The resulting sample of 2508 respondents was found to be representative of the parent population on a number of variables for which data were available (rank, language, service, age).

The following analysis will consist of a comparison of the opinions of military personnel and civilians on security-related issues. These

questions dealt with two of the five dimensions of the military mind as defined by Abrahamsson : alarmism and conservatism. However, one must note that the four years separating the two surveys pose a serious methodological problem. During these four years indeed, the international situation has radically evolved (Afghanistan, Iran, etc) - and so have the attitudes of the Western public (the public has become significantly more suspicious of the Soviet Union). It follows that it is very difficult to validly compare the results of the two surveys. Will the possible differences between the two surveys be evidence of the existence of what Bachman et al (1977) call a "separate military ethos" among soldiers, or will they not just be the result of the evolution of the international situation? If indeed, on the one hand, the possible differences between the two samples will not be easily interpretable, the assumption adopted here is that, on the other hand, an absence of difference will be considered as evidence of a convergence between civilians and soldiers.

FINDINGS

Table I : "Are you interested by international politics?"

	Civilians (1976)	Soldiers (1980)
A lot	8.9 %	10.9 %
Quite a bit	22.9	31.2
A little	40.6	35.7
Not at all	<u>27.6</u>	<u>22.2</u>
	100 %	100 %
N	1117	2497

Before actually comparing the opinions of civilians and soldiers on security-related issues, it appears appropriate to begin the analysis with a question measuring the interest of both groups toward international politics in order to see whether both groups are about equally interested by these problems. As table I indicates, both groups are about equally interested by international relations issues : the percentages of people who are not interested at all are indeed 27.6 % in the case of the civilian sample and 22.2 % in the case of the military sample. For both samples, interest increases with educational level and age. Among civilians, women are far less interested than men : 34.5 % of the women said that they were not interested at all versus 20.5 % of the men. Among soldiers, NCO's tend to be more interested

than enlisted men : 11.8 % of the NCO's versus 30.5 % of the enlisted men declared that they were not interested at all.

Table 2 : "Do you think that the communist ideology is a threat for the Western World ?"

	Civilians (1976)	Soldiers (1980)
Yes	43.7 %	51.3 %
No	28.9	24
Don't know	<u>27.4</u>	<u>24.7</u>
	100 %	100 %
N	1200	2488

Question 2 can be viewed as an indicator of an anti-communist attitude. Anticommunism is one aspect of the political conservatism dimension of the military mind. As one can see, both civilians and soldiers are rather fearful of the communist ideology : 60.2 % and 68.1 % of the civilians and soldiers who have an opinion think that the communist ideology is a threat to the Western world. Although soldiers seem to be a little more anti-communist than civilians, the difference is not excessively large (approximately 8 %), especially in the light of the new international situation.

Interestingly enough, there is no statistically significant relationship between rank and fear of the communist ideology. Thus contrary to findings of previous surveys in several nations, Belgian NCO's do not appear to be more anticommunist than enlisted personnel. On the other hand, career-oriented personnel is significantly more anticommunist than non career-oriented personnel (70 % versus 63.8 % respectively) ⁽⁴⁾, confirming studies by Bachman et al (1977), among others, who found that, in modern military organizations, the horizontal differentiation between career-oriented and non-career-oriented personnel tended to become more important. Older, less educated people in both samples tend to be more anticommunist, although the differences are never very large. Farmers - and sons of farmers for soldiers - also tend to be more anticommunist than other occupational groups. Not surprisingly, among civilians - the question was not asked to soldiers - leftist-oriented people are less anticommunist than others : 49.3 % of them think that the communist ideology is a threat versus 59.9 % of centrists and 68 % of rightists. Women are also significantly more anticommunist than men (64.5 % versus 56.3 %). It will be noted that the opinions of soldiers are far from being totally homogeneous : there are several sources of variations,

many of them identical to those found within the civilian sample (age, education, for example). This could suggest that the homogenization processes thought to be at work in the military are not sufficient to erase the differences resulting from different social origins and prior experiences.

A survey made for the "Centre d'Etudes de Défense" in 1980 (see Levy, 1981) allows us to test, in a limited way, the hypothesis of a change in the opinions of the Belgian public concerning the international situation. It was hypothesized that the Western public, as a result of Afghanistan particularly, had become more suspicious of the goals of Soviet policy and more pessimistic concerning East-West relations. The 1980 civilian survey included a limited replication of the 1976 survey : two questions asked in 1976 were asked again in 1980. One dealt with the probability of several kinds of armed conflicts in the next 10 years and the other with NATO. Table 3 presents the results to these two questions. (5)

Table 3 : Evolution of the public opinion between 1976 and 1980

"Do you think that, within the next 10 years, the following possible armed conflicts are :

	USA-USSR		NATO-WARSAW	
	1976	1980	1976	1980
Very likely	3.7 %	20.7 %	2.1 %	13.3 %
Quite likely	7.2	24.1	4.8	17.8
Likely	14.4	22.4	12.9	24.4
Not likely	38.9	17.9	47.0	25.2
Not likely at all	<u>35.8</u>	<u>14.9</u>	<u>33.2</u>	<u>19.3</u>
	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %
N	1029*	1610	1000**	1574

* In 1976, 172 respondents, or 14.3 % of the valid answers (N=1200), didn't know. In 1980, this option did not exist anymore.
 ** Idem : 200 respondents, or 27.7 % of the valid answers (N=1200), didn't know

"Every political and military alliance has advantages as well as disadvantages. In the present or likely European context, would you say :

	1976	1980
Belgium draws more advantages than disadvantages from NATO	39.3 %	36.6 %
Belgium draws more disadvantages than advantages from NATO	19.9	25.3
Don't know	<u>40.8</u>	<u>38.1</u>
	100 %	100 %
N	1199	1739

As one can see from the first part of table 3, the Belgian public has become dramatically more pessimistic about the probability of a conflict between East and West : in 1976, only 25.3 % of the respondents thought that a conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union was probable (very, quite likely, and likely) versus 67.2 % in 1980. The same increase in alarmism occurs in the case of a conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact : from 19.8 % to 55.5 %. It is interesting to remark that the Belgian public does not seem to automatically associate a conflict between the two superpowers with a conflict between the two alliances. It would indeed appear that the respondents believe that the probability of a conflict between the two superpowers is greater than the probability of a conflict between the two alliances. In other words, they seem to think that the United States and the Soviet Union could possibly confront each other - supposedly outside Europe - without their allies being drawn into the conflict.

The results to this question would thus tend to support our hypothesis of a public opinion shift toward a more hawkish attitude, resulting from the new international situation. If it was the case, then the differences between the 1976 civilian sample and the 1980 military sample could be explained by the changed international context and not as a result of the existence of a separate military ethos among soldiers. If it is indeed quite likely that at least part of the differences between the two groups can be explained by the changed international context, answers to the second question tell us that it would be erroneous to postulate a consistent hawkish attitude among Belgians. If our hypothesis of a more hawkish attitude among the public was indeed true, one would have expected an increase in pro-NATO sentiments. Such is not the case. Although the percentage difference between 1976 and 1980 among those who thought NATO had more advantages than disadvantages is barely significant, it becomes much larger when one excludes those who do not have an opinion (- 7.2 % between 1976 and 1980).

Thus while it is quite clear that people have become more suspicious of the Soviet Union and more pessimistic about the possibility of war, it apparently does not mean that they have become more pro-NATO. The change of the public mood appears thus at best ambivalent and, on the basis of these limited evidences, it seems unwarranted to conclude that Belgians have become more hawkish. The fact that they tend to be less pro-Nato could even be interpreted as an indication of a growing "neutralist" attitude in Belgium.

The following questions deal with the alarmist dimension of the military mind, through the opinions of soldiers and civilians about the importance of power in international relations, the necessity of maintaining strong military forces, and the likelihood of war.

The theme of the likelihood of war has already been treated for the civilian sample. Although one does not have identical questions, it is nevertheless possible to compare the two groups through very similar questions. Table 4 presents the answers to a question on the likelihood of war in Europe asked to military personnel.

Table 4 : "Do you think that, within the next 10 years, a war in Europe is :"

Very likely	17.9 %
Likely	29.3
Not very likely	35.9
Impossible	2.7
Don't know	14.4
	100.2 %
N	2485

As one can see from a comparison of table 3 -1980- and 4, civilians would tend to be a little more alarmist than soldiers. To the extent that a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact can be equated to a war in Europe, it appears that civilians are more numerous than soldiers (55.5 % versus 47 %) (6) to think a conflict possible.

Table 5 : "Do you think that the following two alliances contribute to better preserve peace ?"

	NATO		WARSAW PACT	
	Civilians	Soldiers	Civilians	Soldiers
Yes	76.7 %	72.9 %	65 %	32.5%
No	11.2	7.9	19.5	33.6
Don't know	12.1	19.2	15.5	33.9
	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %
N	1199	2190	1197	2487

As one can see from table 5, the proportion of undecided people tends to be higher for the Warsaw Pact than for NATO - particularly in the case of the military sample (33.9 % versus 19.2 %). It certainly reflects the lack of transparency of the Warsaw Pact countries and the lack of information about them. Quite logically, the respondents -both civilian and military - tend to trust NATO more than the Warsaw Pact. The trend is

especially strong in the case of the military sample : only 7.9 % of the soldiers think that NATO makes peace less likely, while the corresponding figure for the Warsaw Pact is 33.6 %. One will note that the opinions of soldiers on the Warsaw Pact are almost equally divided. But the more important finding is that, contrary to our expectations, military people are not more pro-NATO than civilians : it would even tend to be the contrary, although the difference is barely significant. For the Warsaw Pact however, the difference is more important and goes in the expected direction: 65 % of the civilians thought that the Warsaw Pact contributed to preserve peace, a difference of 32.5 % with the military sample. Thus it would appear that soldiers are more hostile to the Warsaw Pact than civilians. But these results should be interpreted with caution : it is indeed possible that a nonnegligible part of the difference can be attributed to the new perception of Soviet strategy and goals ("imperialism"), perception which was not yet very widespread in 1976, the period of the heyday of detente.

French-speaking respondents - both civilian and military - tend to trust both NATO and the Warsaw Pact more than Dutch-speaking people. Confidence toward both alliances would also tend to slightly increase with age. Within the military sample, NCO's and career-oriented personnel tend to trust both alliances more than enlisted men and non-career-oriented personnel. Finally, Air Force personnel tends to be less hostile toward the Warsaw Pact (39.7 % believe that the Warsaw Pact contributes to better preserve peace) than personnel of the other two services.

Table 6 : "Do you think that the peace-time military forces of the USA and of the USSR are justified ?"

	USA		USSR	
	Civilians	Soldiers	Civilians	Soldiers
Yes	46 %	63.9 %	42.5 %	45.4 %
No	35.4	16.7	38.4	28.6
Don't know	<u>18.6</u>	<u>19.4</u>	<u>19.1</u>	<u>26.0</u>
	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %
N	1200	2483	1199	2484

Concerning the question of the justification of American troops, the difference between the two samples is evident, with military personnel clearly on the pro-military side of the scale : 64 % of the soldiers indeed think that American troops are justified versus only 46 % of the civilians,

a difference of 18 %. Concerning the justification of Soviet troops however, the difference between the two groups is not really significant : in both groups people are less numerous to believe Soviet forces justified. It is however interesting to note that there is a high positive relationship between responses to the two questions ($r = .634$ and $.614$ for the military and civilian samples respectively), i.e. a positive answer for the American troops tend to go together with a positive answer for the Soviet troops. This could perhaps be interpreted as an indication of the acceptance of the balance of power doctrine.

French-speaking respondents - both civilian and military - tend to be more favorable to the maintenance of the existing military forces of both countries than Dutch-speaking respondents. Younger people tend to be more skeptical concerning American and Soviet troops. Within the civilian sample, quite predictably, leftists are more skeptical concerning American troops - but also of Soviet troops - than centrists and rightists. Within the military sample, career-oriented people are more favorable to the maintenance of the existing military forces of both countries, than non-career oriented people.

Table 7 : " Do you think that the US and Soviet military forces are able to launch big military operations in Europe ?"

	USA		USSR	
	Civilians	Soldiers	Civilians	Soldiers
Yes	51.4 %	71.7 %	58.3 %	75.5 %
No	24.4	13.2	17.7	7.2
Don't know	<u>24.2</u>	<u>15.1</u>	<u>24.0</u>	<u>17.3</u>
	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %
N	1198	2488	1199	2486

Military men appear to be significantly more confident in the military capabilities of both countries than civilians : there is indeed a difference of about 20 % between the two groups. They also tend to rank both countries equally in terms of their military capabilities.⁽⁷⁾ Thus contrary to what one would have expected and in spite of the greater coverage by the media of the threat posed by the Soviet Union in recent years, soldiers are apparently not convinced of the military superiority of the Soviet Union relative to the United States. If both linguistic groups tend to have roughly the same opinion on the operational capabilities of the American forces, they differ in their evaluation of the Soviet forces : French-speaking respondents - especially among soldiers - tend to be more numerous

than Dutch-speaking respondents to think that the Soviet Union is able to launch important military operations in Europe (for soldiers, the percentages are 83.6 % and 68.2 % respectively);

The last two questions were asked only to military men. They are included in the analysis because they provide a useful insight of the feelings of military men concerning their status in Belgian society. They deal with the level of defense spendings and with the public image of the military.

Table 8 : "Do you think that Belgium is spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on : the military and defense ? "

	French-speaking	Dutch-speaking
A lot too much	3.4 %	3.1 %
Too much	3.7	6.9
About right	14.4	---
Too little	32.2	38.7
A lot too little	42.8	38.9
Don't know	3.5	12.4
	100 %	100 %
N	1073	1384

Because of typographical errors (the category "about right" had been unvoluntarily omitted in the Dutch questionnaires), it is impossible to present the global results for this question. Nevertheless there is no doubt that most of the respondents think that Belgium is spending too little or a lot too little for defense (75 % of the French-speaking respondents and 77.6 % of the Dutch-speaking respondents). It is probably the principal issue about which military and civilian people hold radically different views.⁽⁸⁾ Evidently it should not be surprising that military men believe that Belgium is spending too little for defense. First, it is common knowledge that given the present military system - 2/3 of volunteers - the defense budget is too small.⁽⁹⁾ For example, at the time of the survey, the Belgian high command had just announced that, because of a lack of resources, training in the three services would have to be drastically reduced. Secondly, soldiers are directly affected in their life style by the size of the defense budget (personnel outlays) and so they merely react as every pressure group would react. Thirdly, it is interesting to note that soldiers not only think, as expected, that Belgium is spending too little

on defense and crime control ⁽¹⁰⁾, but also on welfare, education, health, environment. Thus contrary to findings in the United States where respondents tend to choose either social or order-related spendings, at the exclusion of the other, the Belgian findings reflect a desire of more government intervention and a widespread acceptance - by civilians and soldiers alike - of the welfare state. In other words, it seems that the difference between civilians and soldiers on the size of the defense budget does not reflect deep-seated ideological differences (left/right or social/order) but merely different occupational concerns.

Table 9 : "In your opinion, how does the Belgian public regard the military ?"

Very favorably	2.3 %
Mostly favorably	25.1
Mostly unfavorably	56.3
Very unfavorably	16.3
	<u>100 %</u>
N	2486

Answers to the last question point to perhaps the most sensitive problem in civil-military relations in Belgium: the widespread feeling of frustration shared by military personnel. As table 9 shows, soldiers in their overwhelming majority (72.6 %) think that the Belgian public views them mostly or very unfavorably. They are thus well aware of the lack of prestige of the military in Belgium. This awareness is particularly widespread among NCO's : only 14.7 % of the NCO's think the Belgian public views the military favorably versus 37.2 % of the enlisted men. This feeling of frustration increases with age ($r = .158$). It is also interesting to note that there is a negative relationship between satisfaction with training level - i.e. whether the respondents think they are sufficiently trained to be able to fulfill their mission efficiently - and public image of the military as perceived by the respondents : those who think they are not sufficiently trained tend to think that the Belgian public views the military unfavorably ($r = -.128$). It would be tempting to consider the poor training and preparedness of the Belgian armed forces as one of the causes of their low prestige.

But another - more fundamental - cause of the low prestige of the military is, according to Van Corp (1969 : 152-54), the fact that a significant proportion of the public believes that the military no longer plays a vital role in the defense of the nation and that it is unable to play any role whatsoever in NATO. For example, in the 1980 civilian survey

referred above, when asked whether it was possible to defend Belgium against a military threat, ⁽¹¹⁾ only 18.5 % of the respondents answered yes - 60.6 % answered no and 20.9 % had no opinion. Furthermore for 41.5 % of the respondents what was done in Belgium for defense was useless - 30.9 % thought it was useful, 27.7 % did not know.

In other words., these various results reflect a relative isolation of the military from Belgian society and this isolation clearly seems to be more the result of the civilian view of the military than of organizational and ideological characteristics of the Belgian military.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The main finding of the comparison of civilian and military opinions on security-related issues is that, although there exist some differences between the two groups, on the basis of the available data, by and large, soldiers do not radically differ from civilians. Except in the case of defense spendings indeed, the differences found between the two groups were never very important. Moreover they did not always go in the same direction. If, on the one hand, NCO's and enlisted men seem to be a little more anticommunist, more convinced of the importance of power in international relations and of the maintenance of strong military forces than civilians, on the other hand, they are not more pessimistic about the likelihood of war and not more pro-NATO than civilians. In other words, the available evidence is at best mixed and does not allow us to conclude that Belgian NCO's and enlisted men as a whole constitute a structured and homogeneous group with a separate military ethos. It suggests that with the advent of a more professional force, there apparently has been no increased divergence between the military and the civilian population at the ideological level.

Another interesting finding is that the variations observed among civilians - due to age, educational level, and language principally - can also be observed among soldiers. It would tend to suggest that the homogenization processes - especially socialization - have at best a very limited influence. The military experience does not eliminate attitudinal differences resulting from different social and cohort experiences. Among these variations one is particularly noteworthy : variations along linguistic

lines. Our data confirm that Dutch-speaking people - both military and civilian - tend to be systematically less pro-military than French-speaking people (see Van Gorp, 1969).

Among soldiers, if on the one hand, career-oriented men tend indeed to be somewhat more pro-military than non-career-oriented personnel, on the other hand, NCO's are not systematically more pro-military than enlisted men. This would seem to confirm the fact that the horizontal differentiation between career and noncareer personnel has perhaps become more important than the vertical differentiation - at least when only NCO's and enlisted men are considered. The results would indeed have been surely different had officers been included in the analysis. Secondly, like in several other countries, Air Force personnel tends to be somewhat more civilianized than others, especially Army personnel.

If ideologically the Belgian military - at the NCO's and enlisted level - does not appear to be grossly unrepresentative of the civilian society, it does not mean that there is no problem concerning civil-military relations in Belgium. The potential problem comes from the sentiment of incomprehension and even alienation shared by soldiers. They think - quite correctly - that the public views them unfavorably. This negative image of the military among the public could, in the long-term, erode the legitimacy of the Belgian armed forces. The public view of the military is indeed a key variable in civil-military relations and a favorable image of the military among the public is necessary for the maintenance of the legitimacy of the armed forces (see Harries-Jenkins and Van Doorn, 1976). To quote Segal (1976: 218) : "If the public opinion is favorable to the military, the boundary [between the military and the civilian society] is viewed as a bridge; if hostile, a wall is a more suitable metaphor." But if it is true that the Belgian public views the military quite unfavorably, there does not seem to be any hostility toward it : for example, only a minority of Belgians wants the suppression of the armed forces (Levy, 1981). The best characterization of the public attitude toward the military seems thus to be indifference.

To conclude, in Belgium, on the basis of obviously limited evidence, it appears that, within the military, the civilianization process far outweighs the effects of the homogeneization processes and that, as a

result, ideological differences between soldiers and civilians seem to have largely disappeared, if they ever existed. Finally, although the prestige of the military is very low among the public, civilians are not hostile to the military. Thus in terms of public image of the armed forces, there do not seem to exist serious legitimacy problems - at least for the time being. However one should be aware of the fact that the low prestige of the armed forces has certainly a negative impact on recruitment.

NOTES

- 1) Source : Annuaire Statistique MDN n° 15, 1974-1980. For a more detailed description of the professionalization plan, see Manigart (1981).
- 2) The data were made available by the Belgian Archives for Social Sciences of the University of Louvain.
- 3) For more details about the sample design, see Levy (1979).
- 4) When dealing with subgroups differences, the percentages and other measures are based on the number of respondents who had an opinion. People who did not express an opinion are considered as missing, unless otherwise mentioned.
- 5) Concerning the first question, only two types of armed conflicts are presented here. These were thought to be the most relevant to the present discussion. The other types of conflicts listed in the questionnaire dealt with various kinds of conflicts in the Third World.
- 6) The choices given to the respondents were not the same in the two surveys. For the civilians, very likely, quite likely, and likely were grouped together. For the soldiers, very likely and likely.
- 7) When one considers only people who have an opinion however, one finds that they tend to be more convinced of the Soviet supremacy : 91.3 % of the soldiers who have an opinion think that the Soviet Union is able to launch important military operations versus 84.5 % for the United States.
- 8) A survey conducted in 1980 by the INUSOP among young people between 17 and 23 years old indicated that at the question "If the government should make budget cuts, what would it have to reduce first ?" (followed a list of seven possible choices), 46 % of the respondents answered "military spendings" as their first choice - by far the greatest percentage. Inversely when asked to choose among 17 goals for the next 10 years, only 3.6 % cited the item "to strenghten the armed forces" as their first choice.
- 9) In 1978, Belgium was spending 3.5 % of its GNP for defense and its defense budget represented only 7.1 % of the total national budget.
- 10) Table 8 gives only the answers to one item. The actual question include a list of 7 items. The 6 others were : health, education, fighting crime, unemployment, environment, welfare.
- 11) 63.3 % of the respondents thought that Belgium could be militarily threatened and for 45.6 % of them, the threat came from the USSR.

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**ATTITUDES OF THE DANISH POPULATION TOWARDS
THE DEFENCE CONCEPT — MAY 1975 TO MAY 1980**

by

Steen Borup-Nielsen

Introduction.

During the autumn of 1972 regular measurements of the attitudes among private soldiers (conscripts and regulars) were started. Measurements are a means of systematic collection of information about the personnel's concept of its working conditions.

In 1977 the measurement system was thoroughly revised. The major changes were partly a revision of the questionnaire and partly the fact that from now on all personnel of the units would participate and fill in the questionnaire. Now, the personnel's attitudes to seven different subjects are registered through the questionnaire containing 60 questions; the answers are computed by the Armed Forces' Centre for Leadership whereupon the results are returned to the units in order to be utilized there.

Thus, the measurements are first and foremost intended as a means of leadership and co-operation in the individual units. This idea is reflected in the majority of the seven areas of attitudes: Job, Working Conditions among Colleagues, Immediate Superior, Leadership, Military Training, The System of Co-operation, and finally The Defence Concept.

In addition, total results are compiled for each Service of the Armed Forces.

All along it has been a generally occurring feature that the conscripts expressed a more positive attitude shortly after their call-up as opposed to shortly before their demobilization. However, the attitude towards the defence concept has been an exception from this general rule throughout.

Apparently, no major changes in their attitudes towards the defence concept take place from the beginning to the end of the call-up. Since it appears that the individual's attitude to this subject is so well founded that it is not even influenced by the experiences of national service, it seems of interest to investigate the attitude of the total population towards the defence concept. This short paper gives the result of such four nationwide surveys.

Methods.

Two authorities - The Statistical Office of Denmark and The Social Research Institute - regularly carry through so-called omnibus-investigations. These investigations comprise a personal interview with a representative section of the Danish population above 15 years of age. It is possible for other institutions to add questions of their own to these investigations.

The omnibus-investigations of May 1975, October 1976, October 1978 and May 1980 took up the seven questions about the defence concept which had been used in the above mentioned attitude measurements since 1972 (see appendix 1).

The four investigations counted 3756, 3950, 3891 and 1951 respondents and their answers have been computed in exactly the same way as the ordinary measurements of attitudes. This presentation will refrain from giving a detailed description of the computing method; however, it should be mentioned that a respondent's answers to the seven questions are reduced to one figure between 0 and 10. If the respondent answers negatively to all questions (i.e. uses answer option no 4) he is given a '0'. If all answers have been positive (answer option no.1) the respondent is given the figure '10'.

Results.

The average attitude of the total Danish population towards the defence concept was as follows:

May 1975	4.68
Oct 1976	5.09
Oct 1978	5.33
May 1980	5.95

There has thus been a steady rise in results through the five years period. Especially the rise in the last two investigations is remarkable.

The following table no.1 gives an idea of how the total result reflects the answers to each of the seven questions.

Table 1. Percent of positive answers (answer option no.1 and 2).

Question	MAY 75	OCT 76	OCT 78	MAY 80
1. Armed Forces be of use	23.7	26.2	29.7	34.3
2. Population's support	81.6	83.5	85.0	82.8
3. Preservation of peace	53.1	56.9	59.9	63.8
4. Desirable to maintain defence	68.8	74.7	77.4	78.3
5. Open discussion	49.9	49.1	49.4	50.3
6. Spend more money	10.3	14.9	17.5	30.3
7. Necessary in order to be heard	39.2	45.0	44.9	57.3

Questions 2 and 5 which only indirectly involve the respondent's attitude to the defence concept, receive almost unchanged answers throughout the period. The remaining five questions showed approximately the same rise in number of positive answers up till October 1978. From then on, questions 6 and 7 experience a drastic rise so that these two questions receive 20% more positive answers in 1980 than in 1975. As for questions 1, 3 and 4 the rise has been approximately 10% over the five year period we are dealing with.

We have sufficient biographic data about each respondent at our disposal to make it possible for us to compare different groups of the population. Table no.2 shows that the total rise in the attitude of the population is a resultant of a positive development in all groups of the population.

What concerns the tabulation according to the family's gross income it should be noted that the limits between the income brackets have not been regulated according to the index of living costs. This results in a considerable shifting of the distribution of respondents in relation to income groups. For example, in 1975 8% of the respondents belonged to the lowest income cohort, whereas in 1980 there was a percentage of less than 1 in this group.

Corrected Differences.

As already mentioned, table no.2 illustrates the specific attitude to the defence concept as expressed by the various groups of the population.

For example, it can be seen that the married respondents are above average (6.17) whilst the unmarried respondents are well below average (5.51). One might get the impression that being married in itself has a positive influence on a man's attitude towards the defence concept.

This would be jumping to a rash conclusion since the two groups (married/unmarried) are composed differently in relation to other characteristics so that it may be these differences that are more or less responsible for those differences in attitudes that are ascertained between the two groups.

There is proportionally a greater number of young persons among the unmarried, and since young people are less positive towards the Armed Forces than their elders, it may be that the apparent difference between married and unmarried persons is a mere mirroring of differences between age cohorts. If, for example, we take the age cohort 15-30 years the difference between married and unmarried would be considerably less than for married/unmarried groups as such; similar considerations would apply to persons above 30 years of age.

We have managed to do away with this bias. The last column in table 2 gives the differences in attitude among groups of respondents after there has been made a correction for a possible uneven composition concerning other personal data. This, for example, is the case if we take a group of married and unmarried respondents who are otherwise equal concerning other variables, i.e. age, sex, etc. Here the unmarried respondents would, by and large, have an attitude which is 0.10 more positive than the married respondents (+ 0.08 and % 0.02). This result is quite contrary to the first impression one gets from the uncorrected figures.

These corrections enable us to observe each single factor's influence isolated from other factors.

Apart from the underestimation of the attitude of the unmarried, the school cohorts 9th and 10th grade, high school as well as university students are also underestimated, since these groups have many young respondents.

On the other hand, the group of farmers is overestimated since this group is 1.22 above the average, while the result after correction is only 0.35 above average. In this case it is particularly the geographic habitation and age in combination which lead to overestimation.

Table 2. Results for various groups of the population.

Number in % May 80		Average attitude				Corrected difference May 1980
		May 1975	Oct 1976	Oct 1978	May 1980	
	<u>TOTAL</u>	4.68	5.09	5.33	5.95	
	<u>Sex</u>					
49	females	4.59	4.80	5.19	5.83	-0.10
51	males	4.77	5.36	5.45	6.07	0.10
	<u>Age</u>					
8	15 - 19 years	4.11	4.97	5.33	5.77	-0.17
10	20 - 24 years	3.85	4.47	4.55	5.24	-0.45
21	25 - 34 years	4.47	4.81	4.98	5.25	-0.65
16	35 - 44 years	5.13	5.12	5.60	6.29	0.30
14	45 - 54 years	4.87	5.49	5.61	6.44	0.33
14	55 - 64 years	4.66	5.16	5.42	6.19	0.14
17	65 years	5.14	5.43	5.63	6.42	0.50
	<u>Marital status</u>					
7	Separated or divorced	4.04	4.55	4.70	5.64	-0.17
65	Married or widow	4.85	5.20	5.43	6.17	-0.02
28	Unmarried	4.36	4.92	5.21	5.51	0.08
	<u>Residence, Geographical</u>					
15	Metropolitan area	4.06	4.49	4.85	5.30	-0.47
12	Suburbs of the metropol	4.23	4.79	4.72	5.86	-0.11
19	Towns with more than 2000 inhabitants East Denmark	4.73	4.97	5.30	5.57	-0.35
25	Towns with more than 2000 inhabitants Jutland	4.69	5.28	5.26	6.01	0.05
4	Towns, 200-2000 inhabitants, East Denmark	4.58	5.26	5.53	6.10	0.04
9	Towns, 200-2000 inhabitants, Jutland	5.20	5.41	5.65	6.35	0.33
6	Rural districts, East Denmark	5.09	5.34	5.95	6.74	0.65
10	Rural districts, Jutland	5.57	5.61	5.92	6.72	0.65

Table 2. Continued

Number in % May 80		Average attitude				Corrected differences May 1980
		May 1975	Oct 1976	Oct 1978	May 1980	
	<u>Education</u>					
4	Pupil	3.46	4.88	5.10	5.97	-0.11
44	7th grade or less	4.81	5.19	5.41	6.32	0.02
"	8th grade	4.46	4.89	5.55	6.39	0.56
13	9th or 10th grade	4.80	4.93	5.24	5.84	0.45
2	Technical school	4.03	5.57	4.98	6.78	1.00
2	High school ./.. ex.	2.68	4.14	5.95	5.19	-0.22
3	Middle school	4.67	5.13	5.37	6.78	0.58
19	"Realeksamen"	4.90	5.29	5.34	5.45	-0.39
7	High school	4.06	4.34	4.42	4.42	-0.85
1	Other (foreign)	5.70	5.22	5.77	8.00	0.20
	<u>Occupation</u>					
3	Student	2.89	3.86	4.23	3.79	-1.44
9	Skilled worker	4.33	4.83	4.94	5.65	-0.51
4	Pupil	3.46	4.88	5.10	5.97	0.22
13	Non-skilled worker	4.52	4.96	5.16	6.07	-0.15
20	Retired	4.83	5.26	5.46	6.35	0.41
2	Assisting Spouse	5.04	5.67	6.05	6.20	0.20
4	Farmer	5.90	6.36	6.67	7.17	0.35
30	Civil servant	4.86	5.10	5.36	5.76	0.02
4	Independant	5.20	5.63	5.63	6.65	0.43
8	Housewife	4.93	4.84	5.49	6.29	0.27
3	Unemployed	4.08	4.47	4.91	4.60	-1.21
	<u>Gross income of the family</u>					
1	0-20000 kr.	4.06	4.74	4.15	7.73	1.65
6	20000-40000 kr.	4.56	5.07	5.20	5.61	-0.58
7	40000-60000 kr.	4.72	5.11	5.28	5.53	-0.81
6	60000-80000 kr.	4.73	5.05	5.30	6.06	-0.05
8	80000-100000 kr.	4.84	5.09	4.99	5.65	-0.30
22	100000-150000 kr.	4.70	5.10	5.31	6.06	0.17
34	150000 kr.	5.16	5.59	5.57	5.97	0.22
16	No information	4.76	5.05	5.61	6.12	-0.03

Appendix 1.

The Objectives of National Defence.

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Do you believe, that the Danish Armed Forces would be of any use in the event of an enemy attack? | 1. Yes, definitely.
2. Yes, to a certain extent.
3. No, hardly at all.
4. No, not at all. |
| 2. Do you feel, that the people would support the Armed Forces in the event of war? | 1. Yes, definitely.
2. Yes, to a certain ext.
3. No, hardly at all.
4. No, not at all. |
| 3. Do you think, that the Danish Armed Forces will be capable of contributing toward the preservation of peace for Denmark? | 1. Yes, definitely.
2. Yes, to a certain ext.
3. No, hardly at all.
4. No, not at all. |
| 4. Do you deem it desirable that we maintain a defence capability? | 1. Yes, definitely.
2. Yes, to a certain ext.
3. No, hardly required.
4. No, not at all. |
| 5. Do you think, that the people would support the cause of national defence better if discussion about its aims and tasks were made more free and open? | 1. Yes, definitely.
2. Yes, to a certain ext.
3. No, hardly probable.
4. No, not at all. |
| 6. Do you think, that more money should be spent on defence purposes than is the case to-day? | 1. Yes, definitely.
2. Yes, to a certain ext.
3. No, hardly at all.
4. No, not at all. |
| 7. Do you deem it necessary for Denmark to possess military forces in order to be heard in international affairs? | 1. Yes, definitely.
2. Yes, to a certain ext.
3. No, hardly at all.
4. No, not at all. |

**SECURITY POLICY AND ARMED FORCES IN SWEDEN IN
FALL 1980 – EXCERPTS OF AN OPINION STUDY**

by Kurt Törnqvist

Edition by

Detlev-Lothar Baehren

1. Goal and data of the study

1.1. Goal of the study

Duty of the department for psychological defense (Beredskapsnämnden, BN) is among others the "study of the development of Swedish opinion". For this purpose the department has carried out annual opinion researches since 1965. Before that similar studies were accomplished by different institutions in irregular intervals. The first quantitative examination was done in connection with the study of psychological defense in 1952.

In fall a new study in the series of annual opinion research mentioned above was carried out. The field research and the data processing was taken care of by the Swedish Institute for Opinion Research (Sifo).

The interviews were done by normal interviewers of the Sifo in two so-called vekkobussar between 27/8 and 2/9 and between 10/9 and 16/9 1980.

For several years we have centered our research on questions taken from the following five opinion areas:

1. attitude towards society,
2. attitude towards parties and politicians,
3. attitude towards mass media,
4. attitude towards international relations,
5. attitude towards defense

The questions posed in 1980 are the same as in the previous year with one exception. The new question that was asked last year concerning the citizens' optimism resp. pessimism with regards to their evaluation of the future was replaced by a former question focussing on their confidence in Sweden's future.

In spring 1980 the BN conducted a separate study of popular attitudes towards the international situation and towards defense. As for these attitudes, the results are compared both to those of the 1979 and 1980 studies.

13. Change and stability in opinion

The fall 1980 research results show that noticeable opinion changes happened within the past year in the four areas covered by our study, which are the attitude towards society, towards mass media, towards the international situation and towards a future war.

As far as the interest in security policy is concerned as well as the attitude towards defense, disarmament and information for the individual in wartime, the opinion shows a striking stability in the past year and did not change noticeably.

13.1. Contentment with society is not widely - held

All three variables used by us for measuring the citizens' feeling of well - being and their contentment with society distinctly show a falling tendency.

Table 1: Public opinion on life in Sweden 1974 - 1980

Question: Do you think living conditions in Sweden are good or bad?

year	living conditions in Sweden are			
	very good %	quite good %	quite or very bad %	don't know %
1974	60	39	1	0
1975	68	31	1	0
1976	67	32	1	1
1977	57	40	2	1
1978	60	37	1	1
1979	58	41	2	1
1980	50	48	3	1

The high contentment with living in Sweden has dropped from 60 % in 1978 and 56 % in 1979 to 50 % in 1980, which is the lowest rate noted since 1974 when the studies began.

The extent to which society should be changed is an opinion that has also proven a negative tendency.

Table 3: Public opinion on the need of social changes 1973 - 1980

year	Swedish society				
	all in all is good	should be changed here and there	should be changed a lot	should be changed totally	don't know
	%	%	%	%	%
1973	23	59	16	2	0
1974	22	57	17	2	1
1975	32	54	14	0	1
1976	30	57	12	1	1
1977	23	64	19	1	3
1978	25	56	16	1	2
1979	17	61	20	1	1
1980	15	58	24	1	1

In 1980 only 15 % as compared to 25 % in 1978 believe that society is o.k. all in all. At the same time the dissatisfaction with society has spread. The portion of the population believing that society should be changed a lot has increased from 16 % in 1978 to 24 % in 1980.

Likewise the trust in Sweden's future has decreased.

Table 4: Popular trust in Sweden's future 1974 - 1980

year	very large	quite large	quite or very little or no trust	don't know
	%	%	%	%
1974	28	61	8	3
1975	23	64	9	4
1976	27	60	8	5
1977	15	64	15	6
1978	18	64	11	7
1980	11	57	24	8

Those who have very large trust in Sweden's future represent only 11 % of the population this year opposed to 18 % in 1978. Simultaneously, those who report low confidence increased from 11 % to 24 %.

The study does not give a reason for this decline in feeling of well-being within society and for the decrease of trust in the future. Regarding this point, we can only speculate. Here the assumption seems to be appropriate that the deteriorated condition of the state budget and the increase of economic problems for the citizens have caused this negative change in attitudes.

13.2. Renewed disappearance of trust in parties and politicians

We can see that the disappearance of trust in parties and politicians since the start of the research in 1968 was stopped in 1979. Now the decline has started again with reinforced speed. The part of the population which shows a very low confidence in parties and politicians has strikingly grown from 26 % in 1979 to 38 % this year.

Table 7: Percentage of partisans with very low confidence in parties and politicians.

year	political sympathies					all people questioned %
	M %	FP %	C %	S %	VBK %	
1968	19	19	21	14	13	17
1973	22	24	23	12	30	19
1976	23	25	27	15	39	23
1978	26	25	22	26	35	27
1979	28	28	25	22	27	28
1980	40	22	30	37	40	38

In this case, too, there is no answer to the question why the quantity of distrust grew so strongly. Its cause probably is the same as for the stated decline in the feeling of well-being within society, i.e. the increase of economic problems for the citizens due to the deteriorated state of political economics.

13.3. Greater credibility of radio broadcasting, greater reliability of television

Our research of the public opinion on the credibility and reliability of mass media has shown some interesting changes.

Table 8: Credibility of different mass media

	BN-study and time				
	1969 %	1973 %	1978 %	1979 %	1980 %
radio	24	44	31	31	41
television	55	36	38	40	40
newspapers	3	--	--	--	--
morning press	--	12	18	17	12
evening press	--	2	1	1	1
loss of data, don't know	18	6	16	14	11
sum	100	100	104	103	105

Concerning the credibility of mass media, radio comes close to the level of television this year. The credibility of television has stayed the same. Simultaneously, the morning press experienced a certain disappearance of trust.

As for reliability, the change proceeded in the opposite direction.

Table 10: Public evaluation of the low reliability of different mass media 1969 - 1980

year	radio	television	morning press and others	evening press	don't know
	%	%	%	%	%
1969 SIFO	—	—	25	56	9-13
1971 SIFO	—	—	30	62	7-10
1973 SIFO	12	18	44	74	3-5
1973 BN	12	16	43	74	3-5
1974 SIFO	10	17	39	73	4-6
1976 SIFO	11	18	28	71	5-9
1978 BN	18	29	42	73	4-8
1979 BN	17	23	35	59	5-12
1980 BN	16	19	38	67	4-8

This year people believed that the reliability of television increased up to the level of radio which passed as being the most reliable to that point. With regards to the evening press the people asked held the view that the reliability of the morning press, however, stayed the same.

13.4. Experiencing the increasing threat to world peace

The public attitudes towards the super-powers were studied by two questions posed. One question asked to which extent people believe these powers to be a threat to world peace.

Table 12: Opinions on foreign policy of the Soviet Union

(modified)

statement	1973	1976	1978	1979	1980	1980
The USSR enacts a policy which is a constant threat to world peace	16	19	29	23	36	35

According to the study a larger part of the population thinks the Soviet Union enacts a policy continuously menacing the peace. This change took place in fall 1979 and in spring 1980 and was already mentioned in our opinion research report of spring 1980. The change is probably connected with the invasion of Afghanistan. With regards to this the attitudes have not changed during the last six months.

Opposed to this, the foreign policy of the super-powers is not considered to be a threat to the security of Sweden.

Table 13: Opinions on the policies of the USA and the Soviet Union towards Sweden

Question: With regards to the relationship of the USSR and the US towards Sweden to what extent do you think is Sweden threatened by these countries?

USA	1973 %	1976 %	1979 %	1980 %	1980 %
Is a threat to Sweden	3	2	2	1	3
unfriendly, but not a direct threat	47	15	7	6	7
no enmity	34	54	45	46	49
friendly	11	23	39	38	34
don't know	5	6	8	10	7
sum percent	100	100	100	100	100
Soviet union					
Is a threat to Sweden	4	6	10	8	12
unfriendly, but not a direct threat	15	21	24	25	24
no enmity	57	55	42	46	45
friendly	18	12	15	10	11
don't know	6	6	9	11	4
sum percent	100	100	100	100	100

The anxiety about the political world situation has increased from fall 1979 to spring 1980 and stabilized then.

Table 14: Anxiety felt about the political world situation 1976 - 1980

anxiety felt	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1980
	%	%	%	%	%	%
very large	14	14	18	8	20	16
quite large	42	45	47	43	51	52
quite small	27	23	21	28	17	23
very small	6	6	4	11	4	7
none	6	8	5	7	4	-
don't know	4	6	4	3	3	3

The experiencing of the risk of war grew during the first six months in 1980, too.

Table 15: Risk felt for a conflict on a greater scale in Europe 1965 - 1980

Question: In your opinion how great do you think the danger is that political unrest in the world will turn into a conflict on a greater scale in which Europe will be involved?

year	risk felt to be very great or quite great	very or quite small or none	don't know
	%	%	%
1965	47	49	5
1966	40	37	22
1967	49	39	12
1972	37	54	9
1973	51	45	8
1974	37	56	7
1975	43	50	6
1976	38	52	10
1977	38	47	14
1978	44	49	7
1979	39	52	9
1980 V	53	41	7
1980 H	54	42	5

At the same time a larger part of the population saw only a slight chance of staying neutral in an overall conflict in Europe.

Table 16: Evaluation of Sweden's possibilities of staying neutral in an overall conflict in Europe

Question: In case of a European involvement in such an overall conflict how great do you think Sweden's possibilities are of staying neutral?

year	possibilities evaluated as being		
	very or quite large %	very or quite small or none %	don't know %
1952	27	61	12
1956	30	58	12
1957	29	63	8
1965	38	58	4
1966	30	52	17
1968	27	68	5
1972	28	64	9
1974	32	60	9
1975	36	59	5
1976	26	64	8
1977	23	68	8
1978	24	68	8
1979	24	69	7
1980 V	25	67	8
1980 H	20	75	5

13.5. Unchanged will to defend despite lower feeling of well-being within society

The general opinion was held that better feelings of well-being within society would improve the peoples' readiness for the defense of society. This is correct as well, if one examines, for instance, the correlation between the view of social changes and our index of the will to defend. However, the correlation is so complicated that the will to defend was not influenced by the stated decline of the feeling of well-being.

Table 29: Index of the general will to defend 1975 - 1980

year	means points	Index
1975	8.04	100
1976	7.79	97
1977	7.70	96
1978	7.78	97
1979	7.97	99
1980	7.89	98

Simultaneously, one has to consider that the will to defend often is connected with the individual experience of political unrest and of the danger of war. The expected increase of the will to defend was not observed despite the increasing experience of political unrest and risk of war. One possible explanation for this could be the fact that the decreasing feeling of well-being within society counteracts the will to defend.

Our assumption is that these factors, both the decreasing feeling of well-being within society and the increasing experience of war risk and political tension exclude each other, thus leaving the will to defend unchanged.

13.6. The probability of a war before the year 2000 is increasingly assumed

Another expression of the growing political tension and the experience of war risk is mediated by our study of the individual evaluation on the probability of a war before the year 2000.

Table 37: Supposed possibility of a third world war before the year 2000

Question: Do you think that there will be a third world war before the year 2000?

year	very likely %	quite likely %	quite unlikely %	very unlikely %	don't know %	total answers %
1979	4	17	32	31	16	1003
	21		63			
1980	9	27	30	18	16	1007
	36		48			

Especially striking was the increase of opinion that a third world war was probable and the fact that Sweden would be attacked.

Table 35: Supposed probability of an attack on Sweden

Question: Do you think that Sweden will be attacked by a foreign power before the year 2000?

year	very likely %	quite likely %	quite unlikely %	very unlikely %	don't know %	total answers %
1979	4	10	34	34	18	1003
	14		68			
1980	5	24	34	22	16	1007
	29		56			

Generally there is the opinion that the probability of a nuclear attack on Sweden has increased only marginally.

Table 36: Supposed probability of a nuclear attack on Sweden before the year 2000

Question: Do you think that Sweden will run the risk of a nuclear attack before the year 2000?

year	very likely %	quite likely %	quite unlikely %	very unlikely %	don't know %	total answers %
1979	2	6	31	44	17	1003
	8		75			
1980	3	11	35	35	18	1007
	14		70			

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