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Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr

ALLIED PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT

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PREFACE

As the research design for the international comparative project "The Political Implications of Shifts in the Strategic Balance: The Case of Western Europe" was being discussed in 1977, it was clear to the participating scientists that this project was intended to be one of considerable practical political significance. At that point, however, the extent was not foreseen to which questions of national security, peace politics and the legitimation of armed services would emerge as central issues, especially in countries where up until this time such questions had hardly been an issue. Today the results (of this project) can explain why considerable conflict was also to break out in the western alliance. The development was self-evident; that is, it was to be anticipated considering the difference between public debate and public discussion in the participating countries. Why this occurred to such a limited degree is to be explained by the fact that first of all a completely insufficient public discussion concerning the issue of security and defense existed in the Federal Republic, and furthermore that the need to legitimize these policy areas as well as the changes in political outlook, especially among the more involved segments of the population, were extremely underestimated.

Differences in the political conceptions and interests of the allied countries, as have become obvious in recent years, were already reflected in the preparation phase of this international comparative project. Not that the eventual divergence of political orientation or the participating research teams would have hindered the research process, but due to varying conditions and availability of the materials, which in turn can be evaluated as an indicator of differences in the political cultures, a common approach was difficult to develop. If one establishes a narrow set of criteria, these efforts are bound to fail. We will further substantiate this evaluation later. First, however, the original approach should be recalled once more.

The starting-point was to entail a closer examination of current research in relation to the formation of national security decision-making. According to the predominate opinion, the content of national security policy was largely a question of strategic balance. Simultaneously, it was presumed that a small functional elite predominately shaped national security policy.

After extensive discussion in the international research team, it was proposed that the research be restricted to the subjective moment, to the evaluation of security policy problems in regards to aspects of content, personnel, finances and time. The necessary restriction of the analysis to specific aspects of the national security policy decision-making process and its defining quantity determined four elements of research:

1. Determinantes of theoretical framework for national security policy decision-making. (Basis for interpretation and range of research results).
2. Analysis of the content of national security policy and its evaluations for the years 1967 - 1977 in
 - a) the mass media such as television and newspapers
 - b) the publications and literature of the field
 - c) parliamentary debates
3. Analysis of the knowledge and opinions of the population concerning questions of security and national security policy.
4. Identification of the functional elite in national security matters and an analysis of their opinions in regards to the following:
 - a) the originator of national security policy,
 - b) the content of current national security policy,
 - c) the national security policy decision-making process, especially the non-decision-making process,
 - d) the estimation and assessment of problem areas of security policy, including future developments.

The empirical research was first begun on the work designated under point No. 2, and was intended to be followed in steps by work on the points. A code index for the content analysis developed by an American research team could be applied with only slight modifications. It became quickly obvious through the attempt to select the material to be examined in the concrete empirical work, that vast qualitative and quantitative differences existed between the participating countries. Already at this point in the research it was discovered, that the media, which contained material of national

security content, offered no comparative basis for quantitative analysis. In addition, the quantitative content analysis for the country with the largest number of Recording Units, that is the Federal Republic, produced so few varying results concerning content quality, that the quantitative distribution said more about the structure of national security policy in the public arena, than about the questioned contents.

As a result of this finding, the objective of executing a narrowly defined comparative analysis of four countries according to the planned research program was abandoned. In the end, the research program was divided into two coordinated and somewhat complementary designs. The American team, as the initiator of the project, conducted further research on the aspects of point No. 2 at a more qualitative level of international comparison. The presented report discloses the results of this work. The German team concentrated its efforts on quantitative content analysis, which was of relatively little explanatory value compared to the empirical efforts expended, especially in regards to point No. 3 of the research plan. The results of this work have been published recently in various places (i.e. the series of reports by the SOWI, vol. 26 or Ralf Zoll (ed.): Security and the Military — Origins, Structure and Change of Opinion in the Military and Society. Results and Analysis Approach in International Comparison (Sicherheit und Militär — Genese, Struktur und Wandel von Meinungsbildern in Militär und Gesellschaft. Ergebnisse und Analyseansätze im internationalen Vergleich), Opladen 1982) and have also been partially added to this volume as documents.

Joe Coffey and his associates are to be thanked by the research teams from the participating countries, for making a comparative analysis at all possible, even if it is of a more qualitative form. With the presentation of this final report, the SOWI would also like to add its thanks to the American colleagues for their understanding, energy and congenial cooperation. We have all profited from this project, not in the least via the learning process, which accompanies the imminent difficulties always coupled with international comparative research.

Munich, Autumn 1982

Dr. Ralf Zoll
Director and Professor
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(SOWI)

PREFACE OF THE AUTHORS

"Perceptions are so much more important than truth"

Mr. Richard Ferris
Chairman of the Board, United Airlines
Remarks at a Conference in Leadership
held at the
University of Pittsburgh
May 22, 1979

Like coming events, that statement by Mr. Ferris cast its shadow before, in that even before the words were uttered we were acting on them. The incentive to action was not a specific incident but rather a culmination of "happenings": statements about the confidence of allies in US policy, and so on. Since many of these declarations referred to Western Europe, since many of our professional interests centered there, and since we had there friends and potential collaborators, it is understandable that we chose to study American, British, French and West German (i.e. Allied) Perceptions of Threat and their implications: for security, for foreign policy, for arms control and for a host of other areas.

The initial research design was developed by Dr. J. I. Coffey, Distinguished Service Professor of Public and International Affairs, at that time Director of the Center for International Security Studies of the University of Pittsburgh. It was reviewed by a number of distinguished European scholars (who also provided advice on sources of information, questions to be asked and other important topics):

Dr. Martin Edmonds, Senior Lecturer,
University of Lancaster, Lancaster, England;

Dr. Jean Klein, Senior Research Associate,
Institut Francais des Relations Internationales,
Paris, France;

Dr. Richard Little, currently Lecturer at the University
of London, England;

Prof. Dr. Ralf Zoll, Director,
Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr,
Munich, FRG.

And it was revised as a result of a pilot study carried out by Dr. Constance Rea, at that time a Research Associate in the Center for International Security Studies (CISS).

The subsequent research on West German perceptions was carried out by Dr. Mathias Schönborn and Major (later Lt. Col.) Tjarck Rössler, of SOWI; that on American, British and French perceptions was organized and supervised by Mr. Alan Dieter, also of CISS. The initial report was largely drafted by Mr. Dieter and Dr. Charles Pirtle, Assistant to the Director of CISS, and subsequent versions (of which there were many!) by Mr. Dieter and Dr. Coffey. Ms. Marian Russ typed the first draft and Mrs. Henrietta Moss and Mrs. Gertrude Whitman successive revisions. And somewhere between the initial and subsequent drafts, the report was reviewed not only by our European associates but also by Dr. Kenneth Adler, Chief, Western Branch, European Division, Office of Research, International Communication Agency.

We should also like to acknowledge the contribution of Colonel Frederick Giessler, USAF, Office of Net Assessment, Department of Defense, who gave advice when it was needed, encouragement when it was lacking and money when no one else had any. To him, as to the others named, our thanks, "and to all a Good Night."

Pittsburgh, PA
30 June 1982

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this research is to code and analyze the perceptions of selected public elites¹ in the United States, Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the security of Western Europe, threats to that security, and trends in the military balance between East and West. We chose to focus our research upon elite perceptions of European security for four reasons:

First, because perceptions (i.e., subjective assessments of reality) enter into every aspect of security, from estimates of the effectiveness of weapons through assessments of military capabilities to judgments concerning an adversary's resolve, interest, intent, propensity to run risks, etc., and ultimately to beliefs as to whether one's country is "secure". As Harold and Margaret Sprout pointed out long ago, the "subjective environment" is the one in which we operate --and hence the one whose boundaries we must map.

¹For the purposes of this research, public elites are loosely defined as those individuals who take part in the policy process or who influence either the development of perceptions, the formulation of policy preferences, or both. Using this yardstick, our analysis focuses upon the perceptions of subsets of public elites directly concerned with security issues; major political leaders, in and out of power; key officials in foreign and defense ministries; chairmen and minority leaders of legislative committees on defense and foreign affairs; spokesmen for pressure groups concerned with foreign affairs and security policy; officers of the armed forces; academicians studying defense policy; defense analysts; and journalists writing on international security. While we recognize that the weight of influence exerted on the policy process by each of the elite groups varies across both issues and countries, our research makes no effort to differentiate among elites by rank or status. Since our research is concerned with ascertaining perceptions of threat and security rather than with "policy outputs", and since we are primarily concerned with the degrees of congruence in elite perceptions within and across countries, elite perceptions are assigned equal weight in our analysis.

Second, because the security of Western Europe has been a prime concern of both the countries of the region and of the United States for over thirty years: more time, effort, money and thought have been devoted to that issue than to any other. Despite this, there are both questions as to whether Western Europe is secure and differences of opinion as to what is needed to make it so, differences which are frequently reflected in disputes over defense policy, over military programs and over the conduct of foreign affairs by the members of the Western Alliance. It seemed to us when we started this research, as it does now, that an assessment of the perceptions held within key countries of the Alliance might help explain these differences and point the way to more widely accepted--and perhaps more effective--defense policy.

Third, because even in the democratic systems that prevail in the four countries we studied public elites exercise enormous influence, especially in areas such as defense and foreign policy. These elites not only define issues, propose policies and formulate programs but also help shape public opinion with respect to issues, policies and programs. And although this is an interactive process, we believe we are justified in arguing that an analysis of elite perceptions will tell us more about policy preferences and potential policy outcomes than will an analysis of public opinion--even though neither will provide all the answers an analyst or an official might desire.

Fourth, and fortunately for those attempting to map "reality", because empirical research has demonstrated that perceptions can be ascertained from statements, speeches, testimony and other elite articulations

with a reasonable degree of accuracy. Both the models and the tools for perceptual analysis are available, and they have been tested for a large number of case studies and across a number of issue areas. Our research is intended to be both an application of, and an addition to, this body of research.²

Although there are a number of areas on which perceptual analysis could profitably focus, we chose, for the reasons already given, to look at perceptions of the security of Western Europe. More specifically, we chose to:

- a. Ascertain the perceptions of selected public elites in Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States,
- b. With respect to whether Western Europe is secure against a series of political, economic and/or military threats³,
- c. To see whether and to what extent judgements about military capabilities affect perceptions of threat,
- d. As distinct from assessments of political behavior by potential adversaries and
- e. To relate b, c and d to the "world view" of the elite(s), so far as practicable.

This we sought to do through thematic content analysis of key speeches by political leaders, major debates in legislative chambers, selected newspaper pieces and articles in professional journals within the US, the UK, France and the FRG for the years 1971, 1975 and 1979⁴. In the chapters that follow, elite

²Those studies most directly relevant to our research will be summarized and identified in chapters 3-6 of this report.

³As used here, the term, "threat" refers to "the (potential) outcome of A's activities as perceived (or imagined) by B". David A. Baldwin, "Thinking About Threats," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 15, No. 1 (March 1971), p. 72.

⁴As indicated in Chapter 2, Methodology, and reflected in Chapter 6 and Appendix C, the West German study differed somewhat from the other three with respect to sources used, number of questions asked and the period covered, as well as in a more extensive comparison of public and elite opinion.

perceptions of threat and security are examined on a country-by-country basis (Chapters 3-6), as well as collectively (Chapter 7), while Chapter 8 records our findings. These chapters are preceded by a discussion of the methodology employed in the analysis (Chapter 2), to which we will next turn.

CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGY

A. BACKGROUND

The methodology employed in a given research effort is critical to the objective study of the subject under focus. Thus, the research design should be structured so as to enable the researcher to answer pertinent research questions as validly, objectively, accurately and economically as possible.¹ With these criteria in mind, the methodology chosen for Project APT (Allied Perceptions of Threat) was thematic content analysis.

Content analysis is a technique for studying and analyzing communications in a systematic, objective and quantitative manner.² It enables the researcher to make replicable and valid inferences about the general context of the subject matter in a given data base. This methodology was chosen for four principal reasons.³

First, content analysis is an unobtrusive technique. It allows the researcher to examine data without introducing error into his examination as a result of subject reaction to the testing method. (Techniques that are susceptible to this type of induced error are experiments, interviews, questionnaires and projective tests.⁴)

Second, content analysis can utilize unstructured material. This is

¹Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research, 2nd Ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1973), p. 301.

²Ibid., p. 525.

³Klaus Krippendorff, Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology, Volume 5: The SAGE Comtext Series, (Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc., 1980), pp. 21, 29-31.

⁴Ibid., p. 29.

important in the analysis of perceptions, in that the researcher can only examine public statements of the elites under study, which obviously were not developed for the purpose of facilitating scientific inquiry.

Third, content analysis is context sensitive. This permits the researcher to keep sight of the idiosyncratic and situational features from which the perceptual data are drawn. While it is easier to analyze categorized data, the textual nuances inherent in the data itself could be lost if only a pre-categorized and rigid form of analysis is utilized.

Finally, content analysis can handle large volumes of data. Thus, the previously recorded articles, speeches, etc., of the subject(s) under study may be utilized as a reservoir of information about perceptions.

This does not mean that content analysis is the "be-all and end-all" of any study of perceptions. For one thing the speech, article or statement of an individual may be occasion-specific or directed toward a particular audience, and therefore not a "true" reflection of perspectives. For another even the most careful analysis involves some interpretations of meaning and some judgements concerning context; few authors are obliging enough to phrase their sentences to fit the questions of concern to the investigator(s). In the ideal research project, content analysis would be only one of several techniques used to ascertain perceptions -- but this is not an ideal world. Considering the time and resources available, content analysis seems a reasonable first approximation to the ideal, which should also prove useful in and of itself.

B. RESEARCH DESIGN

This is, however, true only if the methodology employed provides reasonably reliable answers to the questions asked and a reasonably valid basis for the inferences which must be drawn from those answers. This we attempted to do by utilizing two separate techniques: primary coding and thematic analysis.

1. Primary Coding. This technique was utilized in order to compare American and Western European elite perceptions on a number of salient issues across time. Basically, it involved:

a) Identifying a number of threats to European security which seemed, on the basis of preliminary examination, to be salient, important and relevant to policy-makers;

b) Devising a set of questions which could both ascertain and record the perceptions of elites concerning these issues. (For example, one question asked was whether or not "According to the author, is Western Europe presently deemed secure against a nuclear strike by the USSR (Variable 7)?" After a thorough reading of the text, the coder marked the appropriate response from among the structured list of alternatives: yes, no, uncertain, or no reference.)⁵

⁵For a complete list of questions and responses used in our three-country study see the Revised Codebook, Appendix A, Volume II. This codebook was divided into eight major sections:

- I. Information about the Source;
- II. Threats to European Security;
- III. a. Factors Affecting European Security: Military/Political;
b. Factors Affecting European Security: Salience of Overall Threat;
- IV. Perceptions of the Military Balance;
- V. a. The "World View" of the Author: Factors Influencing National Behavior;
b. The "World View" of the Author: East-West Relations;
- VI. Policy Preferences.

All the questions we asked were also asked by our West German collaborators, but they asked additional ones. Moreover, they placed somewhat greater emphasis on newspapers and magazines than we did, covered a somewhat different time period and utilized a different method of selecting "units of analysis". For a summary of their approach see the Introduction of Chapter 6; for a full discussion, see Appendix C, Vol. II.

c) Applying these questions to a number of government documents, legislative debates, important speeches and/or relevant articles appearing in a number of magazines, journals and (to a limited degree, newspapers). (See Table 2.1, Sources for the Study)⁶.

d) Selecting from each source a "unit of analysis", which in most cases was a speech, article or policy statement.⁷ (For the American, British and French portions of the study, which dealt only with selected years, this resulted in a total of 569 units, distributed as shown on Table 2.2. For the separate study conducted by SOWI (Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr) there were 1,665 units, including two not identified by year, as shown on Table 2.3).

⁶These were selected on two bases: the extent to which they provided vehicles for a range of public elites and the extent to which they emphasized security issues, i.e., whether they were, from our perspective, "content-rich". They varied significantly across countries, especially in the case of the Federal Republic of Germany; however, in each instance our European collaborators agreed that these were the best available sources.

⁷In the case of legislative debates, the "unit of analysis" was a minimum of five lines by a given speaker on a given subject covered by one or more of our questions; if he said more, he was still counted only once and if he said less he was not counted at all -- on the ground that a single interjection gave little basis for assessing perceptions.

TABLE 2.1

SOURCES FOR THE STUDY

SOURCE TYPE	International (2)	US (32)	Britain (18)	France (16)	FRG (24)
Magazines/ Newspapers**		Newsweek Time US News and World Report	Economist (The)Listener (The)Spectator	Le Figaro Le Monde Le Nouvell Observateur	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Frankfurter Rundschau Der Spiegel Süddeutsche Zeitung Die Welt Die Zeit
Academic, Pro- fessional and Military Journals	NATO's Fifteen Nations NATO Review	Air Force Air University Review Armed Forces Journal International Army Atlantic Community Quarterly Foreign Affairs Foreign Policy International Security International Security Review International Studies Quarterly Military Review National War College Review Navy Orbis Parameters Policy Papers in Inter- national Affairs (Univ. of Southern Calif.) Policy Review Policy Studies Journal Sea Power Strategic Review US Naval Institute Proceedings	Army Quarterly and Defense Journal Astra Conflict Studies Defense Attache European Review International Affairs Royal United Service Institute Journal Survival World Survey World Today	Contrepoint Defense Nationale Est et Ouest Politique Étrangers Politique Inter- nationale Preuves Revue Française de Science Politique Revue Militaire Générale Revue Politique et Parlementaire Stratégique	Aussenpolitik Aus. Politik und Zeit- gesichte Beiträge zur Konflikt- forschung Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik Europa-Archiv Leviathan Politische Vierteljah- resschrift Sicherheitspolitik heute Truppenpraxis Wehrkunde/Europäische Wehrkunde Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau Zeitschrift für Politik

(Continued...)

(Continued)

Source Type	International(2)	US (32)	Britain (18)	France (16)	FRG (24)
Academic, Professional and Military Journals		Washington Quarterly Working Papers of the Woodrow Wilson Center (Washington, D. C.) World Politics			
Government Publications		Congressional Record Department of State: Bulletin Newsletter Vital Speeches of the Day Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense ... (Title varies by Year)	Parliamentary Debates, Commons (Hansard) Parliamentary Debates, Lords (Hansard) Foreign Broadcast Information Service	Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise: Debats Parlementaires: Assemblee Nationale Debats Parlementaires: Senat Foreign Broadcast Information Service	Bulletin der Bundesregierung Bundestagsprotokolle
Party Periodicals					Liberal Die Neue Gesellschaft Die Politische Meinung Politische Studien

TABLE 2.2

DISTRIBUTION OF UNITS OF ANALYSIS BY YEAR IN THREE COUNTRIES⁸

Country	1971		1975		1979		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
United States	78	.348	48	.214	98	.438	224	.394
Great Britian	55	.285	75	.389	63	.326	193	.339
France	49	.322	56	.368	47	.309	152	.267
TOTAL	182	.320	179	.315	203	.366	569	

⁸A total of 621 units were recorded, of which 569 were by American, British and French nationals and 52 were by nationals of other European states.

TABLE 2.3
DISTRIBUTION OF UNITS OF ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, BY YEAR

Country	1968		1969		1970		1971		1972		1973		1974		1975		1976		1977		
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	
Federal Republic of Germany	168	10.1	144	8.7	172	10.3	144	8.7	116	7.0	165	9.9	172	10.3	151	9.1	145	8.7	186	17.2	
TOTAL																					1663* 100.0

*Two (2) units of analysis out of the total of 1665 were not identified by year.

e) Training, testing and re-training a team of five coders, two of whom were fluent in both French and English. Each coder was required not only to answer all the questions in the Revised Codebook but also to provide a supporting citation for each answer and to write an abstract of the unit.⁹ After some difficulty we obtained a composite inter-coder reliability, after adjusting for all chance and expected matches, of .805, with a 95% confidence interval of .7637-.8401.¹⁰ This was rechecked during the course of the coding.

2. Secondary Coding. The second technique employed was the examination of the principal themes of each unit of analysis as summarized in the abstracts generated under the Primary Coding.¹¹ No prior categorization was applied, so that the "natural" groupings which eventually resulted grew out of the compilation of these themes. Recording of the themes was performed by a single coder (not among the primary coders) with a thorough background in international affairs and security matters. Since each theme was defined as a core idea

⁹For details, see the Coder's Guide, Appendix B, Volume II.

¹⁰An adjusted reliability of .8521 resulted from post-research weighting of the reliability scores by the actual number of articles coded, which varied with the coder.

¹¹While the use of abstracts rather than the texts themselves might result in some lost data from omissions by the primary coders, constraints on time and resources made the use of abstracts a necessary compromise. Also, checks were made by comparing some of coders' abstracts with test abstracts completed by the principal research staff and with the articles themselves.

around which supporting material clustered, more than one theme was normally contained in each article. Themes were distinguished from each other on conceptual grounds and were propositional in nature.¹²

While the primary coding, using the structured codebook, provided extremely useful results by itself, we felt that the secondary coding would complement and complete the study by identifying the context in which the issue was discussed. Loss of context could bias possible primary coding results, for without contextual analysis it was impossible to determine whether the recorded response was a core theme or simply supporting material. For example, a primary coding might indicate that the author feels that the conventional balance is adverse to the West, but it would lose the fact that his "balance" statement came within the context of the need for greater standardization and interoperability of NATO equipment in order to rectify this perceived military imbalance. Thus, the fact that the author addressed an intra-alliance issue and only provided a balance response as supporting material would be lost.

In general, five major thematic groupings emerged: external threats; intra-alliance issues; domestic concerns; national military-security concerns, and concerns about US security guarantees to Western Europe.

External threat themes focused upon the nature of the military balance, strategic competition, threats to geographic regions, etc. These threats emanated principally (though not exclusively) from the Soviet Union.

¹²For example: The Soviet military buildup endangers West European security; the Soviet Union's strategy is to threaten NATO's economic lifelines; defense spending is too low; etc.

The intra-alliance themes were concerned with relationships and issues within the NATO alliance that occur as a by-product of alliance membership and of the dynamic processes of coping with multinational organizational management. These themes were threat-related in that the "external threat" from the USSR provided a catalyst for such issues as defense burden-sharing and military doctrine, but the intra-alliance themes were also threat-managing in such areas as detente and arms control.

The third thematic group concentrated upon the effects of domestic affairs on the ability to meet security requirements, either within the framework of the alliance or on a national basis. These issues were essentially economic and socio-political in nature.

National-military security themes related to specific national defense issues such as levels of defense spending, formulation of policies based upon national perspectives and extra-alliance military concerns.

Finally, concerns about US security guarantees revolved around issues such as the nature of the American commitment, reliability of the strategic nuclear umbrella, etc.

3. Comparability. A final phase of Project APT aimed at comparing the results of our findings with those obtained from other relevant research. The purpose of this task was to determine the degree to which our findings were consistent with other studies employing different research methodologies, utilizing different data bases and/or drawing from a different population. While we were primarily concerned with the degree of comparability between our findings and those of other data-based, elite analyses, we were also interested in the degree to which our findings compared with public opinion

on select security issues. Although it is generally recognized that public opinion does not affect policy as directly as does elite opinion, since elites in general are both more influential and more active politically, it is nevertheless true that public attitudes can influence policy outcomes. As Mahoney and Mundy have noted in this regard:

While simple one-to-one correlations between the distribution of public views and the shape taken by national policies are unlikely, more subtle (and complex) relationships are likely and indeed probable. In democracies, public views help to define the menu of options available to decision-makers. Elected officials are unlikely to totally ignore this menu nor the expressed preferences of the public for certain items on it.¹³

The problem with comparisons of different elite and public opinion analyses however, is that the data are seldom comparable across time. Such was the case for our study, where elite data aggregated by years had to be compared with the results of public opinion surveys conducted at discrete moments in time, many of which did not correspond with the temporal framework of our analysis. Moreover, the questions posed in public opinion surveys were rarely the ones asked in our analysis of elite perceptions, and vice versa. Consequently, the number of issues for which meaningful comparisons could be made was generally a small sub-set of the total issues covered by public opinion polls and by our aggregate elite analyses.

4. Analysis of Data. Analysis concerns the processes of identification and representation of patterns derived from data that are "note-worthy, statistically significant or otherwise accounting for or descriptive of the content analysis results",¹⁴ The methods of analysis are dictated by the nature of the research question, the research design and the data base. In Project APT, two techniques were utilized to analyze the data base developed from our primary coding: frequency count and cross-tabulation.

¹³Robert B. Mahoney, Jr. and Alicia Mundy, Western European Perceptions of Arms Control/National Security Issues, CACI, Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, March 1980, Los Angeles, CA., p. 6-1.

¹⁴Krippendorff, op. cit., p.55.

Frequency calculations provided the bulk of the primary and secondary analysis. The changes in frequency distribution by country and over time were observed, with emphasis upon descriptive rather than statistical analysis. In some cases, net percentages were utilized to highlight frequency changes (i.e., the difference between "positive" and "negative" responses to questions). For example, in the question: "Is Europe presently deemed secure against a nuclear strike by the USSR (Variable 7)?"¹⁵, the number of those answering "No" was subtracted from the number answering "Yes" in order to determine the net perceptions of all elites answering this question.

Since, however, responses could include "Uncertain" or "No Effect", as well as "Yes" or "No", it was necessary to go a step further in deriving net perceptions. This we did judgementally by assigning negative values to those responses when the question dealt with the state of security; for example, in Variable 7, cited above, those uncertain as to whether Western Europe was secure against a nuclear strike were grouped with those answering "No". Conversely, when the question dealt with the existence of a threat, those who did not acknowledge the existence of a threat were grouped with those answering "yes".¹⁵

The principal difficulty encountered in the data analysis was that of treating the large volume of "no response" codings deriving from the fact many units of analysis contained answers to only a few of our many questions. This is not to say that the "no response" category provided no insights; on the contrary, it gave valuable information as to what was or was not salient to a given

¹⁵It should be noted that while we believe that it is useful to include the "uncertain" and "no effect" categories, the magnitude and direction of trends uncovered by this research would be the same without their inclusion.

member of our public elites as well as to the elite groups in the aggregate.

However, the number of "no responses" did cause problems in the tests of association between variables, the cross-tabulations. There are five basic conditions that must be met for a simple cross-tabulation test on association:

1. The sample observations must be independent;
2. The data must be representative of the population;
3. The data should be expressed in original units, not in ratio form;
4. The sample should contain at least 50 observations;
5. There should be no less than five observations per cell.¹⁵

When trying to establish temporal comparisons by country, the APT data could meet each criterion, but only if "no responses" were included. The inclusion of this category, however, would dramatically skew the statistical significance, invalidating the tests of association because the "no responses" of each variable would "match" with each other, giving a false impression of significant association. If the "no responses" were excluded, then the temporal/national framework did not satisfy requirements 4 and 5. Thus the research team had to either relax the requirements or make only limited, qualitative assessments based upon the joint frequencies of the cross-tabulations. We chose to do the latter, providing descriptive inputs into the analysis of each country sector.

¹⁶Derived from Dick A. Leabo, Basic Statistics, 5th Ed. (Homework, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1976), pp. 579-580.

C. PRESENTATION OF ANALYSIS

The presentation of the results of this analysis is contained in Chapters 3-6. Each chapter will provide source data and background information. The first substantive section, "Major Themes", contains the results of the secondary coding, which examined the principal themes generated by American, British and French (but not German) authors. The second section contains the results of our Primary Coding, presented in a sequential manner, following the major sections of the Revised Codebook--again, with variations in the case of the chapter on the FRG.¹⁷ Finally, the results of each country analysis are compared with the findings of other research efforts in the field.

¹⁷There is also one minor deviation from the sequence of questions, in that Section IV, Perceptions of the Military Balance, was moved to follow Section IIIA, Perceptions of Military Contributions to Security, in order to facilitate comparison between these two closely-related areas.

CHAPTER 3

AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT AND SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

The American component of this project consists of 224 cases, or 39.4 percent of the total cases analyzed (see Table 2.2, p. 2:7). As shown in Table 3.1, government officials and political leaders constituted almost half (48.7 percent) of the American cases over the three time periods. As a percentage of each time slice, this elite group fell from nearly 63 percent in 1971 to 40 percent in 1979. Academicians/defense analysts/journalists, the next highest professional grouping, represented 28.1 percent of the American sample. Whereas the political elite grouping declined, this element rose from 21 percent in 1971 to nearly 37 percent in 1979. Correspondingly, the percentage of American military elites rose from 10.3 percent in 1971 to 21.4 percent in 1979 for an overall average of 17.4 percent. Finally, 5.8 percent of the sample fell into a no reference or "other" category.¹ As a group, nearly 80 percent of the Americans were on active service in their principal professions, with only 7.1 percent retired. The remaining 12.8 percent were not referenced (Table 3.2).

The deviance of the sample percentages is interesting in that, with few exceptions, the same sources of data were used. It appears that European issues became increasingly salient among the academic and military elites as time progressed, while government elites became increasingly interested in security issues that were not directly applicable to the scope of this project. (For example, in

¹The "no reference" category consists of elites for which no information was provided by the source material; the "other" category refers to elite groups such as business or labor leaders.

TABLE 3.1:
PRINCIPLE PROFESSIONS OF US ELITES

Professional Group	1971	1975	1979	Total
Government Official / Political Leader	49 (.628)	21 (.438)	39 (.398)	109 (.487)
Academician/Journalist/ Defense Analyst	16 (.205)	11 (.229)	36 (.367)	63 (.281)
Military	8 (.103)	10 (.208)	21 (.214)	39 (.174)
Other	0 (-)	2 (.042)	1 (.01)	3 (.013)
No Reference	5 (.064)	4 (.083)	1 (.01)	10 (.045)
Total	78	48	98	224

TABLE 3.2:
STATUS OF US ELITES

	1971	1975	1979	Total
Active	61 (.782)	32 (.667)	84 (.857)	177 (.790)
Retired	4 (.051)	6 (.125)	6 (.061)	16 (.071)
No Reference	13 (.167)	10 (.209)	8 (.082)	31 (.138)
Total	78	48	98	224

1979 the Congress of the United States spent considerable time discussing the SALT II treaty, which in the main did not directly relate to European security.)

A. MAJOR THEMES

The American elites whose utterances we analyzed made 448 references to European-related security issues within the three years covered by this project. These clustered around 67 themes, of which 22 related to the external threat from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact; 32 related to intra-alliance issues; 3 to domestic concerns; 8 to national military security issues; and 2 to concerns about American security guarantees to Western Europe.² Table 3.3 shows the distribution of thematic references by categories over time.

1. External Threats. American concerns about threats to European security from the Soviet Union and her allies were clustered into 22 identifiable themes (see Table 3.4), nine of which appeared in each time period while 13 appeared in only one or two periods. These nine recurrent themes were principally related to the growth of Soviet military and naval power, to the consequent changes in the military balance and its subcomponents and to the persistence of the Soviet political-military challenge--though there were both variations in the emphasis on these themes and some rather surprising differences in emphasis among them.

Within this block of themes, nearly 37 percent of the total references (165) were to potential military threats. Two things stand out particularly, one being the relatively small but constant concern with the conventional military (and naval) balance, the other being the marked upsurge of references in 1979 to the threats resulting from shifts in the strategic and theater nuclear balances.³

²For definitions of these thematic categories see the discussion in Chapter

³Regrettably a number of sources referred only to "the Soviet military build-up", without differentiating between nuclear and non-nuclear, or among ground, sea and air forces; hence, we cannot draw the kinds of distinctions we would like concerning changes in perceptions of threat circa 1979.

TABLE 3.3:
US THEMATIC REFERENCES

Group	1971	1975	1979	Total
External Threats	.272 (43)	.393 (35)	.433 (87)	(.368) 165
Inter-Alliance Issues	.481 (76)	.427 (38)	.478 (96)	(.469) 210
Domestic Concerns	.057 (9)	- (-)	.010 (2)	(.025) 11
National Military Security Concerns	.082 (13)	.157 (14)	.025 (5)	(.071) 32
US Security Guarantees	.108 (17)	.022 (2)	.055 (11)	(.067) 30
TOTAL	N=158 (.353)	N=89 (.199)	N=201 (.445)	N=448

TABLE 3.4:
US PRIMARY THREAT THEMES.

THEMES	1971 N(%)	1975 N(%)	1979 N(%)	Total N(%)
Soviet Political Pressure Backed by the Threat of Force	<u>7 (.163)</u>	0 (-)	<u>2 (.023)</u>	<u>9 (.075)</u>
Conventional Military Balance*	<u>7 (.163)</u>	<u>6 (.171)</u>	<u>7 (.06)</u>	<u>20 (.124)</u>
Strategic Balance*	<u>5 (.116)</u>	<u>6 (.171)</u>	<u>13 (.140)</u>	<u>24 (.165)</u>
Soviet Military Buildup*	<u>5 (.116)</u>	<u>2 (.057)</u>	<u>17 (.195)</u>	<u>24 (.165)</u>
Soviet Political/Military Threat*	<u>5 (.116)</u>	<u>4 (.114)</u>	<u>8 (.092)</u>	<u>17 (.105)</u>
Soviet Naval Buildup*	<u>3 (.07)</u>	<u>2 (.057)</u>	<u>5 (.057)</u>	<u>10 (.064)</u>
Exaggeration of Soviet Threat*	2 (.047)	4 (.114)	2 (.023)	8 (.048)
Soviet Grand Strategy	2 (.047)	0 (-)	1 (.011)	3 (.018)
Role of Soviet Forces in East Europe	2 (.047)	0 (-)	0 (-)	2 (.012)
Theater/Regional Nuclear Balance*	1 (.023)	1 (.029)	<u>11 (.126)</u>	13 (.079)
Overall Military Balance*	1 (.023)	1 (.029)	2 (.023)	4 (.024)
Soviet Threat to Economic Lifelines*	<u>1 (.023)</u>	<u>1 (.029)</u>	<u>3 (.034)</u>	<u>5 (.033)</u>
Soviet Manipulation of Arms Control	1 (.023)	0 (-)	1 (.011)	2 (.012)
Soviet Foreign Policy	1 (.023)	1 (.029)	0 (-)	2 (.012)

....Continued...

 Underlined data are discussed in the text

* Theme appears in each time slice

TABLE 3.4 (Cont.)

THESES	1971 N(Z)	1975 N(Z)	1979 N(Z)	Total N(Z)
Soviet Manipulation of Détente	0 (-)	3 (.086)	0 (-)	3 (.018)
Soviet Military Doctrine	0 (-)	3 (.036)	3 (.034)	6 (.036)
NATO Southern Flank	<u>0 (-)</u>	<u>1 (.029)</u>	<u>5 (.057)</u>	<u>6 (.036)</u>
NATO Northern Flank	0 (-)	0 (-)	2 (.023)	2 (.012)
Expansion of Soviet Threat Beyond Europe	0 (-)	0 (-)	2 (.023)	2 (.012)
Soviet Chemical Warfare	0 (-)	0 (-)	1 (.011)	1 (.006)
US/Soviet Power Balance	0 (-)	0 (-)	1 (.011)	1 (.006)
Soviet Defense Spending	0 (-)	0 (-)	1 (.011)	1 (.006)
	N=43	N=35	N=87	N=165

Underlined data are discussed in the text

Conversely 1975 (a year when detente was still flourishing) saw both a relative and an absolute drop in concerns about military matters, leaving one to wonder whether the upswing in 1979 was due to the Soviet build-up per se or to a change in the political climate, such as had already taken place prior to the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan.

Of the non-military themes only two are worth noting. One, which should come as no surprise, is the emphasis placed on Soviet politico-military threats, either of a specific nature (the Soviets will use force if the West ignores controls over traffic to West Berlin) or of a general one, i.e., growing Soviet military strength will generate increasing Soviet political influence. The one which is surprising is the comparative lack of concern about the threat to Western economic lifelines; even in 1979, after the indirect Soviet intervention in Angola, Ethiopia and South Yemen, the upheaval in Iran and the extension of the Soviet naval presence to Southeast Asia, there were only three references out of 87 to this specific threat, plus two of a more general nature.⁴

2. Intra-Alliance Issues. The 32 intra-alliance themes (see Table 3.5) mentioned by American elites came from 210 thematic references (46.9 percent of the total). Of these themes, only a few were "hardy perennials": defense burden-sharing, military doctrine and (if all types are aggregated) arms control. Not unexpectedly, there was a cluster of concerns in 1971 over the related issues of burden-sharing, mutual and balanced force reductions and military doctrine and another cluster in 1979 on burden-sharing, military doctrine and SALT - suggesting that major shifts in arms control policy impact on a number of issue areas. The year 1979 also saw a turn of attention to weapons technology, modernization and interoperability--the first two undoubtedly related to the debates on theater nuclear forces as well as to those on SALT. The only real surprise in the clustering of themes is that they didn't easily cluster: during a decade when

⁴The five references to "threats to NATO's southern flank" dealt with the Greek-Turkish imbroglio and the resultant weakness in the Allied Command in Southern Europe.

the Alliance undertook a number of new initiatives (such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Defense Improvement Program) and/or confronted a number of new problems (such as how to issue access to oil) the bulk of our sources dealt with other -- and perhaps lesser -- issues.

However, in the broadest terms three clusters appeared over the course of the project: 1. detente/arms control; 2. alliance cohesion/management; and, 3. doctrine/ weapons technology. While detente and arms control issues, i.e. SALT, MBFR, CSCE, etc., were an important segment of the American elite view, it was replaced by doctrine and weapons technology in 1975 and 1979 as the second largest group behind alliance cohesion/management issues. Moreover, these concerns became increasingly focussed on "military-oriented" issues such as standardization/interoperability, defense burden-sharing and force modernization programs. Thus, it appeared that American elites were interested more in military/defense approaches to threat management rather than in tension reduction through negotiations with the Soviets.

3. Domestic Concerns. Domestic concerns, as they impact upon American perceptions of threats to European security, fell into only three major themes: economic constraints, political constraints, and national lack of will (See Table 3.6). As a group, these themes were the least discussed, accounting for only 5.7 percent of the total themes in 1971, no references in 1975, and only 1 percent in 1979. No one can say much about their implications; not only is the sample too small but the relationship (save for the period of the 1971 recession) is too remote.

4. National Military - Security Concerns. Regrettably, the same is also true of those references, in speeches or articles dealing primarily with European security, whether concerns about security. Even granting that we did not, for example, cover the extensive literature on SALT, or the debate on the All-Volunteer Forces, one would have expected more on the overall defense problems facing the United States. This was not the case -- though coverage of the election year of 1980 might have yielded different results.

TABLE 3.5:
US INTRA-ALLIANCE THEMES

THEMES	1971 N(%)	1975 N(%)	1979 N(%)	Total N(%)
Defense Burden Sharing*	<u>15 (.197)</u>	<u>3 (.079)</u>	<u>4 (.042)</u>	<u>22 (.105)</u>
Arms Control: MBFR	<u>12 (.158)</u>	<u>0 (-)</u>	<u>2 (.02)</u>	<u>14 (.067)</u>
Alliance Cohesion*	<u>10 (.132)</u>	<u>3 (.079)</u>	<u>6 (.063)</u>	<u>19 (.090)</u>
US/NATO Military Doctrine*	<u>7 (.092)</u>	<u>14 (.363)</u>	<u>10 (.193)</u>	<u>31 (.149)</u>
Arms Control: SALT	5 (.066)	0 (-)	18 (.188)	23 (.110)
Détente*	5 (.066)	2 (.053)	3 (.031)	10 (.048)
Escalation and Deterrence*	5 (.066)	1 (.026)	1 (.01)	7 (.033)
European Defense Force	2 (.026)	0 (-)	0 (-)	2 (.009)
European Political/ Military Integration	2 (.026)	0 (-)	0 (-)	2 (.009)
NATO C ³ Problems	2 (.026)	1 (.026)	0 (-)	3 (.014)
Economic Interdependence of NATO	2 (.026)	1 (.026)	0 (-)	3 (.014)
Arms Control: General	<u>1 (.013)</u>	<u>0 (-)</u>	<u>2 (.02)</u>	<u>3 (.014)</u>
Standardization and Interoperability*	<u>1 (.013)</u>	<u>5 (.132)</u>	<u>6 (.063)</u>	<u>12 (.125)</u>
NATO Modernization*	<u>1 (.013)</u>	<u>1 (.013)</u>	<u>12 (.125)</u>	<u>14 (.067)</u>
Weapons Technology*	<u>1 (.013)</u>	<u>2 (.053)</u>	<u>7 (.075)</u>	<u>10 (.048)</u>
British/French Nuclear Deterrent	1 (.013)	0 (-)	0 (-)	1 (.005)
Economic and Domestic Problems in NATO	1 (.013)	1 (.026)	0 (-)	2 (.009)
Alliance Credibility	1 (.013)	0 (-)	0 (-)	1 (.005)
Cooperative R & D Efforts	1 (.013)	0 (-)	0 (-)	1 (.005)

...Continued...

TABLE 3.5 (Cont.)

THEMES	1971 N(%)	1975 N(%)	1979 N(%)	Total N(%)
Ostpolitik	1 (.013)	0 (-)	0 (-)	1 (.005)
Alliance Management	0 (-)	2 (.053)	4 (.042)	6 (.029)
CSCE	0 (-)	1 (.026)	0 (-)	1 (.005)
Cost Effective Defense Spending	0 (-)	1 (.026)	0 (-)	1 (.005)
Need for US/NATO Military Buildup	0 (-)	0 (-)	3 (.031)	3 (.014)
NATO Willpower	0 (-)	0 (-)	2 (.02)	2 (.009)
NATO Long Term Defense Planning	0 (-)	0 (-)	1 (.01)	1 (.005)
US/NATO Policy Towards East Europe	0 (-)	0 (-)	1 (.01)	1 (.005)
European Political/ Military Cooperation	0 (-)	0 (-)	1 (.01)	1 (.005)
Reaffirmation of NATO's Goals	0 (-)	0 (-)	1 (.01)	1 (.005)
European Participation in Arms Control	0 (-)	0 (-)	1 (.01)	1 (.005)
Utility of Force	0 (-)	0 (-)	1 (.01)	1 (.005)
Danger of an Arms Race	0 (-)	0 (-)	1 (.01)	1 (.005)
	N=76	N=38	N=96	N=210

* Appears in each time slice

TABLE 3.6: US DOMESTIC CONCERNS

THEMES	1971 N(%)	1975 N(%)	1979 N(%)
1. Domestic Concerns: Economic	8 (.89)	0 (-)	0 (-)
2. Domestic Concerns: Political	1 (.11)	0 (-)	1 (.5)
3. National Lack of Will	0 (-)	0 (-)	1 (.5)
	N=9	-	N=2

TABLE 3.7:

US NATIONAL MILITARY/SECURITY CONCERNS

THEMES	1971 N(%)	1975 N(%)	1979 N(%)
1.. US Foreign Policy	4 (.308)	1 (.071)	0 (-)
2. American Interests in Europe	3 (.231)	0 (-)	0 (-)
3. Defense Spending:			
Too Low*	2 (.154)	5 (.357)	3 (.6)
Too High	2 (.154)	2 (.143)	0 (-)
4. US-Soviet Relations	1 (.077)	0 (-)	0 (-)
5. US Defense Policy	1 (.077)	0 (-)	0 (-)
6. Need for US Military Buildup	0 (-)	3 (.214)	1 (.2)
7. US World Leadership	0 (-)	2 (.143)	1 (.2)
8. Loss of American Prestige	0 (-)	1 (.071)	0 (-)
	N=13	N=14	N=5

*Theme present in all years

5. Concerns About US Security Guarantees. Generally, Americans did not address the issue of the continuance of US security assurances to Europe. In no year did references to this theme exceed 11 percent of total US thematic references (see Table 3.3) with the absolute number of references rather small in every year (see Table 3.8).

In 1971 all 17 responses were directly related to the debate on the Mansfield Amendment, which raised the prospect of sizeable US troop withdrawals--and thereby generated doubts about the durability of the American defense commitment. The concerns expressed in 1971 had, by 1979, shifted to more specific fears over the possible decoupling of US strategic forces from the defense of Europe. The authors indicated that American nuclear guarantees were unreliable, as the shifting military balance put into question the logic of an American strategic nuclear response to a Soviet/WTO military assault against Western Europe. Thus by 1979, more Americans (albeit still only a small number) had begun to mirror the concerns expressed earlier by West European (especially French) sources.

TABLE 3.8: CONCERNS ABOUT US SECURITY GUARANTEES

Themes	1971 N(%)	1975 N(%)	1979 N(%)
1. US Security Guarantee*	17 (100.)	2 (100.)	2 (.182)
2. Decoupling of US Strategic Forces	0 (-)	0 (-)	9 (.818)
	N=17	N=2	N=11

— Underlined data are discussed in the text

* Theme present in all three years

6. Summary. The themes stressed by our sample American elites in the years 1971, '75 and '79 give clear evidence of some significant shifts in the salience of (and the meaning attached to) the Soviet military build-up, especially to the changes in the strategic and theater nuclear balances. Along with these went a growing doubt about the effectiveness of the strategic nuclear guarantee and an increasing emphasis on regional counters to regional threats: NATO modernization, improvements in standardization and interoperability, and so on. Although arms control was frequently discussed, it was apparently not seen as a substitute for these Western military responses: CSCE and MBFR together were mentioned only three times after 1971. Thus the general trend emerging from this thematic analyses of American sources parallels almost exactly what one might have expected in advance.

There are, however, a number of surprises. One, as already noted, is the lack of concern about access to oil and about other economic threats to European security. Another is that concern about Soviet political pressures, general or specific, did not increase proportionately with worries about shifts in the military balance; whether this is a survivor of detente, the result of "lag time" in recording reactions, or evidence of increased skepticism about the political utility of force in the nuclear age we cannot tell--though someone should certainly try to find out.

B. PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT AND SECURITY

1. Threats to European Security (Revised Codebook, Section II). As discussed in the INTRODUCTION (Ch. I), Project APT attempts to ascertain two sets of perceptions: those of Soviet/WTO military capabilities and those of Soviet/WTO intentions with respect to the use of those capabilities. (To put it another way, we want to find out whether and to what extent perceptions of both friendly and adversary military power influence judgments about adversary behavior.) Perceptions of intent -- i.e., "will he?" rather than "can he?" -- were ascertained using the ten variables in Section II of the Codebook, half of which focused upon perceptions of "present" intent and half upon perceptions of future intent.⁵ Unfortunately, only four variables concerned with "the present" provided any meaningful answers about perceptions of threats to European security (see Table 3.9); not enough authors speculated about the future for us to compare their projections with reality.

The first impression one receives from the coding of responses is that most people did not respond: even in 1979, the "year of greatest threat", from 58% to 85% of the sources consulted said nothing about military, political and/or economic threats. The second impression is that among the minorities responding, there has been some loss of assurance, in that the percentage indicating uncertainty, or definitely stating that Western Europe was not secure, increased over time--again, with the single exception of Variable 11: Political Pressures Backed by the Threat of Force. These changes can be seen more readily if one looks at Table 3.10, Net Perceptions of Threats to European Security and at Figure 3.1, which presents the same data in graphic form.

⁵The "present" refers to perceptions of intent at the time the statements were made.

TABLE 3.9:

THREATS TO EUROPEAN SECURITY

Q: According to the author, is Western Europe deemed secure against:

A) Var. 07: A Nuclear Strike by the USSR

	1971	1975	1979
1. Yes	.154	.250	.133
2. No	.051	.021	.133
3/4 Uncertain	.013	.021	.133
5. No Reference	.782	.708	.602
	N=78	N=48	N=98

B) Var. 09: A Warsaw Pact Attack with Conventional Forces

	1971	1975	1979
1. Yes	.103	.167	.243
2. No	.077	.104	.122
3/4 Uncertain	.073	.105	.153
5. No Reference	.744	.625	.582
	N=78	N=48	N=98

C) Var. 11: Soviet/Warsaw Pact Political Pressures Backed by Threat of Force

	1971	1975	1979
1. Yes	.051	.104	.051
2. No	.115	.063	.112
3/4 Uncertain	.051	.021	.031
5. No Reference	.782	.813	.806
	N=78	N=48	N=98

... Continued ...

TABLE 3.9 (Cont.)

D) Var. 15: Threats Against Economic Viability and/or
Political Independence

	1971	1975	1979
1. Yes	.026	-	.010
2. No	.090	.125	.093
3/4 Uncertain	.013	.042	.052
5. No Reference	.872	.833	.845
	N=78	N=48	N=98

TABLE 3.10:
NET PERCEPTIONS OF THREATS TO EUROPEAN SECURITY*

Q: Is Western Europe deemed secure against:

Var. 07: A Nuclear Strike by the U.S.S.R.

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Yes	.154	.250	.133
(-) No/Uncertain	.064	.042	.266
	.090	.208	-.133

Var. 09: A Warsaw Pact Attack with Conventional Forces

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Yes	.103	.167	.143
(-) No/Uncertain	.155	.209	.275
	-.052	-.042	-.132

Var. 11: Soviet/Warsaw Pact Political Pressures
Backed by Threat of Force

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Yes	.051	.104	.051
(-) No/Uncertain	.166	.084	.143
	-.115	.020	-.092

Var. 15: Threats Against Economic Viability and/or
Political Independence


	1971	1975	1979
(+) Yes	.026	.000	.010
(-) No/Uncertain	.103	.167	.145
	-.077	-.167	-.135

/continued/

Table 3.10 (Continued)

*As discussed in Chapter 2, "net perceptions" were derived by subtracting from the number of positive responses the number of negative and uncertain references -- on the ground that both of the latter reflected a lack of confidence in the security of Western Europe.

FIGURE 3.1:
NET PERCEPTIONS OF THREATS TO EUROPEAN SECURITY



The most marked change was with respect to the likelihood of nuclear war, which went from roughly +10 to -13 on a scale of + 100 to - 100, a change which was probably attributable both to perceptions of the actual improvements in Soviet theater nuclear forces (for which see Table 3.12) and to the lengthy debate over the implications for "decoupling", leading to the "dual-track" decision (on theater nuclear force modernization and arms control) of December, 1979. Lesser shifts in the same direction also occurred with respect to conventional attack and other threats (see Figure 3.1), with only concern about political pressures moving slightly in the other direction.

Here, as in the thematic analysis, the trend from 1971-1979 could have been foreseen; the most interesting question is: what caused the 1975 drop-off in perceptions of threat in three of the four categories? Although no certain answer can be given, either with respect to the trend or to the observation, in the next three sections we will examine several possible causes: changed perceptions of Soviet and US military capabilities, the modernization program of the Western Alliance and Soviet behavior.

2. Military/Political Factors Affecting European Security (Revised Codebook, Sections III and IV).

A. Military Factors. This section deals with capabilities of the various components of the military balance, i.e., with strategic nuclear, theater nuclear and conventional forces. In contrast to section 1, above, which dealt with intent, we are focusing here upon the perceptions of the capabilities of US/NATO and Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces; i.e., we are asking "can he?" rather than "will he?"

Regrettably, few of our sources discussed both the contribution of conventional and nuclear forces to the security of Europe and the actual size and strength of those forces -- much less their "net capabilities". We were, therefore, forced to ask two separate sets of questions. The first set (for which see Section III of the Revised Codebook) dealt with the importance attached to each component of the forces of each alliance, the second set (Section IV) with the actual balance between components and, overall, between the two alliances.

1. Perceptions of Military Contributions for Security (Revised Codebook, Section III)
As stated above, our questions under this heading were aimed at ascertaining whether particular types of forces posed a threat to Western Europe or constituted a bulwark to European security. In this context, increases in concern could derive from a heightened threat (e.g., larger Soviet/WTO forces) or a lower barrier, i.e., weaker US/NATO forces, relatively or absolutely. (It could, of course, also derive from other factors, such as a change in the political climate, but these have been left for subsequent analysis.) Thus, Tables 3.11 A and 3.11B are in effect reverse images, not mirror images, but the results are the same: in both cases an increase in concern means just that.

As we look at whether force capabilities affect perceptions of security, it is apparent that most respondents deemed this a non-question; in no event did over 50% of our sources talk about this and in some instances, for some years, over 90% ignored the matter. There was, however, an increasing tendency, over time, for more people to comment on military capabilities and to show increasing concern about them. Of particular note are:

a) The marked changes in the extent to which Soviet strategic nuclear forces are deemed to affect adversely West European security: from - 15.4 points in 1971 to -43.9 in 1979. (See Table 3.12: Net Perceptions of Military Factors Affecting European Security.)

b) The apparent loss of confidence in the "shield" afforded by US strategic nuclear forces, with a drop of 26.2 points over the same period. Even more importantly, in 1979 three out of 10 sources, and three out of five respondents, thought that the state of these forces gave cause for concern about the security of Western Europe. (See Table 3.11, Military Factors Affecting European Security.)

c) A similar rise in concerns about both (the strength of) Soviet theater/regional forces and (the weakness of) similar US/NATO forces --though the former vastly overshadows the latter, to which there are only 10 references out of 98. (Ibid.)

d) A virtual doubling, within the period 1975-79, of concerns about Soviet/WTO conventional capabilities.⁶

⁶Although there was some shift downward in estimates of the contribution of US conventional forces it was not as great. This held true despite the fact that 1975 was an anomalous year as far as US capabilities are concerned, with net positive perspectives in every component. This may be traceable to the codings of Congressional elites, who indicated a general satisfaction with the current (1975) posture, though the reasons for their optimism are unclear. It is interesting to note, however, that within the US external threat themes, there was a decrease in 1975 in those expressing concern about the Soviet military build-up and an increase in those believing that the Soviet threat was exaggerated (See Table 3.4.), both of which approximated in magnitude the shift to net positive perceptions of the capabilities of US theater/regional nuclear forces and conventional forces (Var. 22 and 27, Table 3.11.)

TABLE 3:11

MILITARY FACTORS AFFECTING EUROPEAN SECURITY

Q: How do the following factors influence concerns about threats to European security:

A) Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact:

Var. 21: Capabilities of Soviet strategic nuclear forces

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.154	.213	.398
2. No Effect	.013	.043	.041
3. Decrease	.013	-	-
4. No Response	.821	.745	.561
	N=78	N=48	N=98

Var. 33: Capabilities of Soviet theater/regional nuclear forces

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.052	.083	.337
2. No Effect	-	.021	.010
3. Decrease	-	-	.010
4. No Response	.948	.896	.643
	N=78	N=48	N=98

Var. 28: Capabilities of Soviet/Warsaw Pact conventional forces

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.256	.229	.469
2. No Effect	-	.021	-
3. Decrease	.026	.021	.010
4. No Response	.718	.729	.520
	N=78	N=48	N=98

TABLE 3.11 (Cont.)

B) U.S./NATO:

Var. 17: Capabilities of US strategic nuclear forces

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.090	.063	.096
2. No Effect	.026	.104	.051
3. Decrease	.134	.188	.133
4. No Response	.731	.646	.510
	N=78	N=48	N=98

Var. 22: Capabilities of US/NATO theater/regional nuclear forces

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.-	.027	.111
2. No Effect	.013	.027	.032
3. Decrease	.064	.080	.016
4. No Response	.923	.857	.841
	N=78	N=48	N=98

Var. 27: Capabilities of US/NATO conventional forces

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.128	.188	.194
2. No Effect	.038	.042	.051
3. Decrease	.090	.271	.112
4. No Response	.744	.500	.643
	N=78	N=48	N=98

TABLE 3.12:

NET PERCEPTIONS OF MILITARY FACTORS
AFFECTING EUROPEAN SECURITY*

Q: How do the following factors influence concerns about threats to European security:

A) Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact

Var. 21: Capabilities of Soviet strategic nuclear forces

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease	1.3	0.0	0.0
(-) Increase/No Effect	16.7	25.8	43.0
	-15.4	-25.8	-43.0

Var. 33: Capabilities of Soviet theater/regional forces

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease	0.0	0.0	1.0
(-) Increase/No Effect	5.2	10.4	34.7
	-5.2	-10.4	-33.7

Var. 28: Capabilities of Soviet/Warsaw Pact conventional forces

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease	2.6	2.1	1.0
(-) Increase/No Effect	25.6	25.0	46.9
	-23.0	-22.9	-45.9

(...Continued...)

*In this case, for the reasons discussed in Chapter 2, components that had "no effect" on concerns about European security were deemed not reassuring and were counted as negative.

TABLE 3.12 (Cont.)

B) US/NATO

Var. 17: Capabilities of US strategic nuclear forces

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease	15.4	18.8	13.3
(-) Increase/No Effect	11.6	16.7	35.7
	3.8	2.1	-22.4

Var. 22: Capabilities of US theater/regional nuclear forces

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease	6.4	18.8	9.2
(-) Increase/No Effect	1.3	8.4	15.3
	5.1	10.4	-6.1

Var. 27: Capabilities of US/NATO conventional forces

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease	9.0	27.1	11.2
(-) Increase/No Effect	16.6	23.0	24.5
	-7.6	4.1	-13.3

2. Perceptions of the Military Balance. (Revised Codebook, Section IV)

Like Section III of this Codebook, this section examined both the (then) current circumstances and a perceived future environment. As was the case in Section III, American authors dealt primarily with the "present". Moreover, of the 10 variables in this section, only four generated a sufficient number of responses to be seriously considered.

One of the most important variables, Var. 44 dealt with the strategic balance between the US and USSR, with between 40 percent (1971) and 60 percent (1979) of the coded references touching on this variable.⁷ (See Table 3.13). In each year, most responses described the strategic military balance as roughly equal. However, attitudes as to the meaning and effects of parity were not uniform. Many considered "essential equivalence" as a desirable and thus a positive state. Many considered parity as a disastrous situation when viewed in the totality of the military environment (i.e., in conjunction with the theater nuclear and conventional situations). Finally, a small minority, who deemed strategic superiority essential, found parity to be an evil in and of itself.

Responses dealing with the balance of theater/regional nuclear forces, Var. 45, also increased, by 20% from 1971 to 1979. As might be expected, most of the increased responses indicated that the theater/regional nuclear balance was shifting adversely to the West -- a view also reflected in the thematic perceptions of threat, in Table 3.4.

⁷This high level of response corresponded to a similarly high level of themes concerning shifts in the strategic balance, one of the two largest groups of themes (see Table 3.4).

TABLE 3.13:

US PERCEPTIONS OF THE MILITARY BALANCE

Q: Indicate the perceptions of the military balance held by the author concerning:

Var. 44: The Current Strategic Balance Between the US and USSR

	1971	1975	1979
1. Adverse to West	.091	.125	.133
2. Roughly equal	.299	.354	.469
3. Favorable to West	.026	.042	.031
4. No Reference	.584	.479	.367
	N=78	N=48	N=98

Var. 45: The Current Balance of Theater/Regional Nuclear Forces Between NATO and the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact

	1971	1975	1979
1. Adverse	.038	.042	.188
2. Equal	.013	.063	.052
3. Favorable	-	.021	.010
4. No Reference	.949	.875	.750
	N=78	N=48	N=98

Var. 47: The Current Balance of Conventional Forces Between NATO and the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact

	1971	1975	1979
1. Adverse	.244	.271	.375
2. Equal	.128	.229	.031
3. Favorable	.013	.021	.031
4. No Reference	.615	.479	.563
	N=78	N=48	N=98

(...Continued...)

TABLE 3.13 (Cont.)

Var. 48: The Overall Balance Between NATO and the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact*

	1971	1975	1979
1. Adverse	.026	.085	.175
2. Equal	.115	.149	.206
3. Favorable	.026	.	.021
4. No Reference	.833	.766	.598
	N=78	N=48	N=98

*Note that this variable is not the sum of the preceding three but is independent of them -- at least as far as data generation is concerned.

Furthermore, perceptions that the conventional military balance was shifting adversely is demonstrated by responses to Var. 47, particularly from 1975 to 1979. And finally, perceptions of the overall military balance, Var. 48, mirrored the earlier variables in that the total volume of responses increased considerably from 1971 to 1979, with a large growth in references to the overall balance being either essentially equal or adverse to the West.

Unfortunately, Var. 48 is independent of the preceding three and hence it is not possible to correlate findings with respect to the three components and those for the overall military balance. An (utterly unsupported) scanning of the respective numbers and percentages of responses might lead one to infer that the strategic balance weighed more heavily in 1971 and 1975 than in 1979, with the conventional balance assuming greater significance in that year, which saw a (relative) decline in strategic nuclear capabilities; if so, this simply reflects conventional wisdom. The "joker" in the already stacked deck is the theater nuclear balance, which by 1979 was also perceived to be heavily adverse -- though by fewer respondents. That the enhanced saliency of TNF impacted disproportionately on perceptions of the overall balance is a probable surmise -- but only a surmise.

It is, moreover, called into question by the fact that the importance attached to the capabilities of US/NATO and Soviet TNF (as reflected in Table 3.12) is lower than the importance attached to strategic nuclear and conventional capabilities, as measured by volume of references. Thus, one cannot say with any confidence that Americans deemed theater nuclear forces, despite their increasing salience, as all that significant among the military factors affecting European security.

B. Political Factors. (Revised Codebook, Section III)

As suggested on several previous occasions, military factors are not the only ones affecting perceptions of security -- nor even estimates of the military balance. Three important questions in the Revised Codebook addressed these significant political variables: Western European and American willingness to devote resources to defense and US willingness (guarantees) to help defend Western Europe.

As shown by Table 3.14, Var. 37 was referenced in nearly 56 percent of the cases in 1971, a volume of responses which centered around the Mansfield Amendment and its attendant issues. By 1975 and 1979, however, a decrease of approximately one-quarter in responses occurred, as the salience of the issue receded. Interestingly enough, Var. 38, US willingness to devote resources to defense, had fewer responses than Var. 37 in 1971, but more later on, as the size of US defense budgets became a perennial campaign issue.

The pattern of net perceptions for Variables 37 and 38 (see Table 3.15) follows a trend nearly opposite from almost all previous ones; whereas most indicated increasing net perceptions of insecurity over time, Variables 37 and 38 went from net negative perceptions in 1971 and 1975 to net positive perceptions in 1979. The apparent catalyst for this dramatic shift was the commitment by the United States and its NATO allies to a Long Term Defense Program, coupled with pledges from each state to seek a 3% per annum real increase in defense expenditures. The long-term impact of this commitment is uncertain. It is impossible to tell just yet whether the optimism over defense spending will be bolstered by the fulfillment of pledges or shattered by broken promises. More importantly, these perceptions of willingness to spend money appear to have had little effect upon perceptions of threat in general -- which, as illustrated in Sections III A-1 and III B-1, seem to be growing.

TABLE 3.14

POLITICAL FACTORS AFFECTING EUROPEAN SECURITY

Q: How do the following factors influence concerns about threats to European security:

Var. 37: West European Willingness to Devote Resources to Defense

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.282	.167	.102
2. No Effect	.026	-	.031
3. Decrease	.256	.104	.143
4. No Response	.436	.729	.724
	N=78	N=48	N=98

Var. 38: US Willingness to Devote Resources to Defense

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.179	.191	.175
2. No Effect	.051	.043	.010
3. Decrease	.141	.128	.278
4. No Response	.629	.638	.536
	N=78	N=48	N=98

Var. 39: US Willingness to Help Defend Western Europe

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.117	.167	.144
2. No Effect	.039	-	.021
3. Decrease	.403	.292	.239
4. No Response	.442	.542	.546
	N=78	N=48	N=98

TABLE 3.15:

NET PERCEPTIONS OF POLITICAL FACTORS AFFECTING
EUROPEAN SECURITY*

Q: How do the following factors influence concerns about threats to European security:

Var. 37: West European Willingness to Devote Resources to Defense

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease	25.6	10.4	14.3
(-) Increase/No Effect	30.8	16.7	13.3
	- 5.2	- 6.3	1.0

Var. 38: US Willingness to Devote Resources to Defense

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease	14.1	12.8	27.8
(-) Increase/No Effect	23.0	23.4	18.5
	- 8.9	-10.6	9.3

Var. 39: US Willingness to Help Defend Western Europe

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease	40.3	29.2	28.9
(-) Increase/No Effect	15.6	16.7	16.3
	24.7	12.5	12.6

* As was true of Table 3.12, responses of "no effect" were deemed "not reassuring", and classified as having a negative impact on perceptions of security.

Conversely, beliefs that US willingness to defend Western Europe enhanced security dropped from a high of 40% in 1971 to around 30% in 1975 and 1979. The 1971 high is somewhat surprising, since this was the year of the Mansfield Amendment, which aroused all sorts of other concerns, and may constitute an aberration. Nevertheless, on the face of it, net positive perceptions declined-- even though not as much as we would have expected from the much more precipitous decline in assessments of the military balance in general and of US strategic nuclear capabilities in particular.

C. Factors Affecting Perspectives

This again raises questions about intervening variables, which can modify the impact of changes in military capabilities on perceptions of threat and of security. Although there are an almost infinite number of such modifiers, ranging from concepts of deterrence through commitments to social programs, we have limited our analysis to two which seem particularly important. The first of these, salience of the threat, we chose for the obvious reason that people who are persuaded that the intentions of an adversary are not malign will interpret his defense programs differently from those who are persuaded otherwise; the second, world view of the author, we selected for an equally obvious reason: those who believe that force is a major and useable instrument of policy will attach more importance to military capabilities than those who do not. In both instances we hoped to obtain some insights into the nature and intensity of possible modifiers even though we could not directly apply these to judgements about capabilities, threats and security, for the simple reason that authors were seldom obliging enough to make known all their premises.

1. Salience of the Overall Threat (Revised Codebook, Section III B). In this section we attempted to ascertain the effect on perceptions of threat of

Soviet behavior in a number of areas. Of the four variables in this section, only three were addressed with any consistency: Var. 40 - Mutual (Balanced) Force Reductions, M(B)FR; Var. 41 - Detente in General; and Var. 43 - Soviet Military Build-up/Modernization Programs (see Table 3.16).

Soviet behavior regarding M(B)FR generated a fairly large (39 percent) response in 1971, a result, again, of the debate on the Mansfield Amendment with which M(B)FR was associated. However, as the negotiations dragged on, the total number of responses to Var. 40 dropped considerably in 1975 and 1979, as did the positive responses. Nevertheless, as shown in Table 3.16 net percentages remained positive, suggesting that the continuation of the negotiations ameliorated perceptions of threat.

Responses to Var. 41, Soviet behavior regarding detente, were low, with an anomalous rise in 1975. Those respondents who viewed Soviet detente policy as enhancing concerns about European security (presumably by undermining alliance solidarity) remained generally constant over the three periods; those who viewed Soviet behavior as not affecting or decreasing concerns were slightly more euphoric in 1975, perhaps as a result of the Helsinki Agreement. The net perceptions follow the general trend toward enhanced perception of threat, despite the "blip" in 1975.

TABLE 3.16

FACTORS AFFECTING PERCEPTIONS: SALIENCE OF
THE OVERALL THREAT

Q: How is the salience of the overall threat affected by Soviet behavior regarding:

A) Var. 40: M(B)FR

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.104	.042	.041
2. No Effect	.091	.083	.071
3. Decrease	.195	.063	.020
4. No Reference	.610	.813	.867
	N=78	N=48	N=98

B) Var. 41: Detente in General

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.141	.167	.153
2. No Effect	.090	.146	.051
3. Decrease	.051	.104	.071
4. No Reference	.718	.583	.724
	N=78	N=48	N=98

C) Var. 43: Soviet Military Buildup/Modernization Programs

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.385	.396	.643
2. No Effect	.013	.083	.041
3. Decrease	.013	-	.010
4. No Reference	.590	.521	.306
	N=78	N=48	N=98

TABLE 3.17

NET PERCEPTIONS OF THE SALIENCE OF THE
OVERALL THREAT

Q: How is the salience of the overall threat affected by
Soviet behavior regarding:

Var. 40: M(B)FR

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease/No Effect	28.6	14.6	9.1
(-) Increase	10.4	4.2	4.1
	18.2	10.4	5.0

Var. 41: Detente in General

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease/No Effect	14.1	25.0	12.2
(-) Increase	14.1	16.7	15.3
	0.0	8.3	- 3.1

Var. 43: Soviet Military Buildup/Modernization

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease/No Effect	2.6	8.3	5.1
(-) Increase	38.5	39.6	64.3
	-35.9	-31.3	-59.2

Concerns about the buildup of Soviet military forces (recorded earlier in Sections III A1 and III B1) were reflected in the considerable number of responses to Var. 43 which reached nearly 70 percent of the coded cases in 1979. These responses showed a rather high perception of threat, rising from roughly 40% in 1971 and 1975 to over 60% in 1979. The pattern of net responses followed the general trend of increasing threat perceptions but was so much more negative as to suggest that this modifier far overshadowed in importance Soviet political behavior in the two key areas we examined. (In other words, by 1979, if not earlier, American authors saw capabilities as more reflective of intent than was behavior -- a point worth noting.)

2. World View of the Author (Revised Codebook, Section V-6).

As indicated previously, we also attempted to ascertain the importance attached to capabilities by looking at the importance our elites attached to five factors generally believed to affect national behavior: force, economic strength, ideology, political goals and political ties. While we were able to determine the relative importance (and ranking) attached to these variables, we were unable, due to problems identified in Chapter 2, to statistically measure associations between variables. In general, Americans either considered a given variable as important or they did not reference it at all. In no case did more than 13 percent of the responses indicate either a "neutral" or "unimportant" position (see Table 3.18). The rankings, by period, of "important" references to each variable (Table 3.19) demonstrated consistency among American elite perceptions; no variable moved more than one rank in either direction.

TABLE 3.18:

FACTORS INFLUENCING PERCEPTIONS:
WORLD VIEW OF AUTHOR

Q: Indicate the relative importance attached to the following factors, which can influence the ways in which states relate to, and behave toward one another:

Var. 54: Force

	1971	1975	1979
1. Unimportant	-	-	-
2. Neutral	.130	.104	-
3. Important	.545	.604	.634
4. No Reference	.325	.292	.316
	N=78	N=48	N=98

Var. 55: Economic Strength

	1971	1975	1979
1. Unimportant	.013	-	.010
2. Neutral	.064	.021	-
3. Important	.397	.293	.337
4. No Reference	.526	.681	.653
	N=78	N=48	N=98

Var. 56: Ideology

	1971	1975	1979
1. Unimportant	-	-	.010
2. Neutral	.013	.042	-
3. Important	.192	.208	.144
4. No Reference	.795	.750	.845
	N=78	N=48	N=98

(...Continued...)

TABLE 3.18 (Cont.)

Var. 57: Political Goals (i.e., national objectives)

	1971	1975	1979
1. Unimportant	-	-	.010
2. Neutral	.064	.021	.010
3. Important	.474	.438	.333
4. No Reference	.462	.542	.646
	N=78	N=48	N=98

Var. 58: Political Ties

	1971	1975	1979
1. Unimportant	.051	.021	.010
2. Neutral	.038	.064	.021
3. Important	.551	.574	.526
4. No Reference	.359	.340	.443
	N=78	N=48	N=98

TABLE 3.19:

WORLD VIEW VARIABLES RANKED BY PERCEIVED IMPORTANCE

1971	1975	1979
Political Ties	Force	Force
Force	Political Ties	Political Ties
Political Goals	Political Goals	Economic Strength
Economic Strength	Economic Strength	Political Goals
Ideology	Ideology	Ideology

As might be expected of those speaking about or writing on security issues in the source materials utilized, force was viewed as the determinant of national behavior -- and presumably, therefore as the prime instrument of foreign policy. (See Figure 3.2) Conversely, ideology ranked lowest as a causative factor, suggesting that these US elites (unlike others, including President Reagan and Secretary of State Haig) did not see "communism" as a major influence in US - Soviet relations. However, political ties (meaning, in this context, relations between the United States and its European allies) were regarded as highly important and hence are likely to influence beliefs about the validity of the US guarantee, the desirability of ameliorating threats to European security and so on. (Whether West Europeans see things the same way is perhaps another question.)

3. Views on East-West Relations (Revised Codebook Section V-B).

American elites perceived the state of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States (Var. 59) as increasingly hostile, with no respondent in 1979 calling the two countries "friendly". (See Table 3.20). This, coupled with perspectives of shifts in the military balance and beliefs in the utility of force, would explain the strong and continuing elite and public support for US defense programs.

Conversely, overall relations between East and West (Var. 60) were viewed as essentially neutral in character. The divergent trends between these two variables may reflect the growing differences in policy on detente and perceptions of its utility between the European allies and the United States. If so, and if these differences are borne out in the study of West European attitudes, one may expect corresponding divergences both in perceptions of threat and (other factors aside) in willingness to devote resources to defense.

FIGURE 3.2:
WORLD VIEW OF AUTHOR:
PERCENTAGE OF "IMPORTANT" RESPONSES




TABLE 3.20:

FACTORS AFFECTING PERCEPTIONS:
VIEWS ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Q: Indicate how the author assess:

Var. 59: Current Relations Between the Soviet Union and the United States

	1971	1975	1979
1. Hostile	.090	.128	.153
2. Neutral	.154	.149	.112
3. Friendly	.077	.064	-
4. No Reference	.679	.660	.735
	N=78	N=48	N=98

Var. 60: Current Relations, Overall, Between Eastern Europe/USSR
and Western Europe/US

	1971	1975	1979
1. Hostile	.065	.149	.051
2. Neutral	.104	.106	.143
3. Friendly	.065	.021	.010
4. No Reference	.766	.723	.796
	N=78	N=48	N=98

4. Policy Preferences (Revised Codebook, Section VI)

Our efforts to ascertain whether or not US elites advocated a course of action (policy preference) to remedy perceived threats to European security were primarily experimental in the sense that they were directed toward future research, i.e., at answering such questions as:

1. How have policy preferences changed over time?;
2. How are policy preferences affected by perceptions of threat and security?;
3. How are policy preferences affected by different sources and types of threat?;
4. Will only perceptions of military threats to security link with preferences for improved defense postures or will perceptions of political threats induce similar policy preferences?;
5. Do perceptions of political-economic threats correlate with preferences for static or lower defense postures?, and
6. How do policy preferences change with changes in an adversary's force posture?

They do, however, have relevance here, in that if national or functional elites have different policy preferences one may expect acrimony rather than harmony in the formulation of alliance security policy.

As shown by Table 3.21, the percentage of American elites who affirmed a preference for a particular type of policy rose from 48.7 percent in 1971 to 60.8 percent in 1979. This increase correlated with a major increase in military solutions to European security problems. In 1971, for example, American elites who indicated a policy preference split almost evenly among military/defense, political/economic and mixed solutions. But by 1979 political/economic solutions fell dramatically, while recommendations for new or enlarged military programs rose correspondingly. This change appears to have paralleled the

TABLE 3.21:

POLICY PREFERENCES

Q: Indicate whether or not the author advocates a course of action (i.e., policy preference) that should be undertaken to improve the security of Western Europe:

Var. 61: Policy Preferences

	1971	1975	1979
Yes	.487	.574	.608
No	.513	.426	.392
	N=78	N=48	N=98

Q: If the author advocates a policy preference, is it:

	1971	1975	1979
Military/Defense	.324	.462	.542
Political/Economic	.351	.192	.136
Mixed	.324	.346	.322
	N=37	N=26	N=59

general trend toward increased concerns about military threats to European security and to reflect the belief in the importance and utility of force as an instrument of policy--at least among Americans.

C. COMPARABILITY OF FINDINGS

Not surprisingly, our efforts to locate studies of US elite perceptions of Western European security against which to compare the results of our research proved to be rather fruitless. American scholars and their financial benefactors, it would seem, are more concerned about the perceptions of Allies than they are about those of US elites. At least this would appear to be the case for the types of issues and questions addressed in our research. Generally speaking, those studies that are available concern themselves more with broad foreign policy issues than with the "nuts and bolts" of European security and the military balance.

The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations' report on American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy 1979⁸, for example, is concerned with a broader and more abstract set of questions than those covered in our research. This study, which bases its findings upon personal interviews with 1,546 American men and women from all walks of life and telephone interviews with 366 "leaders" from the Carter Administration, Congress, international business, labor, the media, academia, etc., deals with such issues as the US role in the world, foreign policy goals for the United States, US response to crisis situations, and perceptions of US vital interests. In general, the results of this study cannot be compared against our findings and vice versa -- we simply asked different questions. In two cases, however, the CCFR study does provide insights into issues addressed by our research.

First, the CCFR Report found that 50 percent of the American public interviewed believed that defending our allies' security was a "very important"

⁸Results reported in John E. Rieley, "The American Mood: A Foreign Policy of Self-Interest", Foreign Policy, No. 34 (Spring 1979), pp. 74-86. This article also compares the results of the 1979 study with those obtained in a 1974 survey by the CCFR, as well as with other comparable survey results.

foreign policy goal for the US while 35 percent thought that this goal was "somewhat important"; only seven percent thought that this was not an important US foreign policy goal; and five percent were not sure. Of the American leaders who were interviewed, however, 77 percent thought that the defense of US allies was a major foreign policy goal; 21 percent thought that it was somewhat important; and only one percent thought that it was not important. (One percent wasn't sure.)⁹ While this goal was perceived to be the seventh most important foreign policy goal in terms of US public opinion, it ranked third in importance among US leaders (behind securing adequate supplies of energy and worldwide arms control).¹⁰ It is also significant to note that the CCFR study found that 54 percent of the US public interviewed felt that the US should send troops if the Soviets invaded Western Europe, while 92 percent of the US leaders expressed this opinion.¹¹ Finally, the CCFR Report shows that a high (although mixed) percentage of the US public believes that the US has vital interests at stake in West Germany, Great Britain and France, as shown in Table 3.22.¹²

⁹Ibid., p. 78.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid., p. 81.

¹²Ibid., p. 83.

Table 3.22

US HAS VITAL STAKE IN:	PUBLIC			LEADERS		
	DOES	DOWNS NOT	DON'T KNOW	DOES	DOWNS NOT	DON'T KNOW
West Germany	69%	15%	16%	98%	1%	1%
Great Britain	66	20	14	94	5	1
France	54	30	16	90	10	-

These results of the CCFR study concerning US defense commitments to Western Europe (although their questions were not framed in these terms) parallel our findings on the question of US willingness to defend Western Europe (Var. 39). As will be recalled, net perceptions on this issue were positive in all three years, with 28.9 percent of US elites perceiving the US defense commitment as a factor decreasing concerns about threats to European security in 1979 (Tables 3.14 and 3.15). While the percentage of US elites who addressed this issue was in the range of 45-56 percent for all three years, the percentage of those who held negative perceptions on this issue was never higher than 16.7 percent (1975).¹³ Both the results of the CCFR study and our findings, therefore, would tend to support the position that US elites (and the public at large) have a relatively high level of confidence in the US defense commitment to Western Europe.

¹³While US government officials and political leaders were somewhat more optimistic concerning this issue than US elites as a whole, they were noticeably less so in 1979 (by 22.7 percentage points) than they were in 1975. Net perceptions of US government officials and political leaders on the relation between US willingness to help defend Western Europe (Var. 39) and European security were:

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease	.479	.429	.308
(-) Increase/No Effect	.105	.048	.154
Net Perception	.374	.381	.154

The second finding of the CCFR study that has a common point of reference with our analysis involves the issue of defense spending. Their study found that 16 percent of their total sample believed that the US was spending too much on defense (32 percent in 1974); 45 percent thought that the level of spending was about right (47 percent in 1974); and 32 percent thought that the level of spending was too low (13 percent in 1974).¹⁴ If one focuses just upon the results of our thematic analysis, it can be seen that this was not a major issue discussed by US elites in any of our three time periods (see Table 3.7). In those cases where the theme of US defense spending was the major issue, however, the majority of the elites who responded viewed US defense spending as being too low in both 1975 and 1979 (a tie in 1971). That concern over this issue may be decreasing, however, is indicated by an examination of Tables 3.14 and 3.15. While net perceptions of US willingness to devote resources to defense were negative in both 1971 and 1975, they were positive in 1979 (+9.3 percent). This is doubly significant since not only was the level of "no references" to this variable the lowest in all three years, but the percentage of elites who held positive views about this issue was the highest for all three years (27.8 percent). Therefore, while we cannot make one-for-one comparisons, our findings hint at a decreasing concern over the adequacy of defense spending (at least so far as this affects European security), while the CCFR findings reflect increasing concern, on the basis of the US budget alone. While neither result rules out the other, neither do they reinforce one another.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 80.

Similar to the CCFR study is the survey conducted by the International Management and Development Institute and the Council on Foreign Relations on New Directions in U.S. Foreign Policy.¹⁵ This study, which presents the results of a survey conducted among almost 800 members of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Corporation Service and Associates of the Institute, covers 17 major foreign policy issues affecting the US role in global affairs. Among the findings of this study which bear upon our research are:

1. Building strong defense and economic relations with major allies (i.e., Europe) was the second highest foreign policy objective (behind the objective of formulating a viable energy policy), with 61 percent of those surveyed listing this objective as the highest US priority and only three percent listing it as the lowest.¹⁶
2. Strengthening US military/defense capabilities was the fifth highest US foreign policy objective, with 48 percent giving it the highest priority and nine percent the lowest.¹⁷
3. 56 percent of those surveyed agreed fully with the proposition that the US should spend whatever is necessary to achieve and/or maintain conventional and nuclear parity with the Soviet Union, while 29 percent partially agreed and 3 percent were in complete disagreement. (Only eleven percent fully agreed that the US should attempt to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union, however.) In terms of the US defense budget, 63 percent of those surveyed disagreed totally with the proposition that the budget should be substantially reduced

¹⁵Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1981.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 2 (survey results).

¹⁷Ibid.

(3 percent were in full agreement with this proposition, and 22 percent were in partial agreement.)

4. In terms of defense relations with Europe, 72 percent fully agreed that the US should work for a more equitable distribution of defense costs among allies; 24 percent partially agreed with this proposition; and 1 percent fully disagreed.¹⁸ In addition, 60 percent of those surveyed were in full agreement that the US should better coordinate with its allies policies on detente, on arms control, and on relations vis-a-vis the Soviet Union (33 percent partially agreed and 1 percent was in complete disagreement).¹⁹

Although enlightening, these findings cannot be directly linked to the results of our primary coding. Aside from their tie-in with our thematic analysis (especially intra-alliance issues), therefore, comparisons between the findings of our respective studies are meaningless. As a contribution to knowledge about US perceptions of West European security and the military balance, the 1981 study by the Council on Foreign Relations (New York) provides fewer insights than the CCFR study of 1979.

A third source of data against which our findings can be "compared" are public opinion surveys compiled by the US Department of State (Bureau of Public Affairs). As was the case for the CCFR studies, however, these surveys provide few direct points of comparison with the questions raised in our research. The major exceptions to this statement are surveys of US public opinion concerning US willingness to defend allies and the US-Soviet military balance.

¹⁸ ibid., p. 4 (survey results)

¹⁹ ibid., p. 5 (survey results)

Table 3.23 presents the results of public opinion polls conducted by Potomac Associates on the question of the public's willingness to "come to the defense of its major European allies if any of them are attacked by the Soviet Union". As this table shows, there has been a constant increase in the percentage of those who favor defending major European allies, from 48 percent in 1975 to 74 percent in 1980. Our research, however, indicates that American elites are less inclined to believe that the United States will provide support than American opinion suggests. Tables 3.14 and 3.15 show that in 1975 and 1979 (the two years for which we have comparable data) the percentage of elites who held positive perceptions of US willingness to defend Western Europe remained virtually constant (29.2 and 28.9 percent respectively). To state that our findings either conflict with, or are supported by, the public opinion data, however, would be to create false impressions. The public opinion polls ask a question about whether or not the respondents are "willing to defend Western Europe"; our question asks whether this willingness decreases or increases concerns about the security of Western Europe. While there is certainly some linkages between the respective findings, it is hardly ironclad. What is significant, however, is that the results are positive for all years in both studies, as was also the case for CCFR study discussed above.

A second area in which the findings of US public opinion surveys relate to the results of our analysis is that of perceptions of the US-USSR military balance. As shown in Table 3.24, the latest poll showed that 57 percent of the American public perceived the Soviet Union to be stronger than the US. 28 percent perceived the balance to be roughly equal, and only six percent perceived the US to be "stronger" than the Soviet Union. Generally speaking, public opinion polls taken between December 1976 and July 1980 show that perceptions of Soviet advantage have increased by 30 percentage points (from 27 to 57 percent), while perceptions of a US edge have decreased by 15 percentage

points (from 21 to 6 percent). Similarly, the percentage of those perceiving the balance to be "roughly equal" decreased from 43 percent in 1976 to 28 percent in mid-1980. While we coded for East/West overall military strength, not the US-Soviet balance, it is clear from an examination of Table 3.13 that American elites, by and large, share the perceptions of the general public.

TABLE 3.23
US PUBLIC'S WILLINGNESS TO DEFEND ALLIES²⁰

DATE OF POLL	HELP DEFEND MAJOR EUROPEAN ALLIES		
	FAVOR	OPPOSE	DON'T KNOW
July 1980	74%	19%	7%
February 1980	70	17	13
September 1979	64	26	10
April 1978	62	26	12
May 1976	56	27	17
August 1975	48	34	18

In conclusion, while we were unable to locate a large number of studies against which to compare our findings, those that we did locate support the results of our analysis on a number of points. Given the great diversity in the nature of the questions asked, as well as in the method of presenting the results, this in and of itself is a significant finding.

²⁰ How Americans Perceive NATO and the NATO Countries, Department of State Briefing Paper, November 25, 1980, p.1.

TABLE 3.24

US PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE
US-USSR MILITARY BALANCE

POLL/DATE	US-USSR MILITARY BALANCE			
	US STRONGER	USSR STRONGER	ABOUT EQUAL	NOT SURE
NBC: July 8-9, 1980 ^a	6%	57%	28%	9%
NBC: Jan 29-30, 1980 ^a	12	47	32	9
HARRIS: Oct. 1979 ^b	14	40	42	4
NBC: April, 1979 ^b	17	37	39	7
HARRIS: April, 1979 ^b	15	30	51	4
HARRIS: July, 1978 ^b	18	31	43	8
HARRIS: December, 1976 ^c	21	27	43	9

SOURCES: ^aMajority of Americans Now See Soviets as Stronger Than U.S., Department of State Briefing Memorandum, August 6, 1980, p. 1.

^bAttitude Toward Defense Spending and U.S. vs. Soviet Military Strength, Department of State Briefing Memorandum, February 11, 1980, p. 4.

^cAvailable in both sources.

D. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH ON US ELITES

As we look at American perceptions of threats to European security during the 1970s, a number of points stand out:

1. US elites devoted increasing attention to the growth of the Soviet armed forces (especially the strategic nuclear and theater/regional nuclear components) and to consequent shifts in the military balance, with a particular upsurge in references to nuclear forces in 1979. (See Table 3.4) They did not, however, say very much about Soviet/WTO military operations; in fact, the threat which received most attention was that of politico-military pressures, with a total of 26 references out of 165. Conversely; there were almost no references to the threat to Western economic lifelines; even in 1979 only three respondents out of 87 mentioned this at all.
2. In terms of intra-alliance issues, there was a corresponding shift from discussion of political matters such as alliance cohesion and arms control to military ones, such as weapons technology, force modernization and interoperability of equipment; in fact the major single theme, having to do with US/NATO military doctrine, took a sharp upturn during the latter half of the period -- as did, in another context, references to the "decoupling" of the US strategic nuclear deterrent. (See Tables 3.5 and 3.8)
3. As we probed more deeply into perceptions, utilizing the specific questions listed in the Revised Codebook, it became apparent that US elites deemed Western Europe less secure at the end of the decade than at the beginning against nuclear strikes (whether by strategic or theater/regional forces), conventional attacks, etc. (See Table 3.10) There are, however, a number of internal

differences worth noting:

- a) The largest increase in perceptions of insecurity was with respect to a nuclear strike by the USSR, where there was a drop from + 9.0% in 1971 to -13.3% in 1979 -- accompanied, as noted previously, by increased concern about "decoupling."
 - b) Conversely, concern about political pressure backed by the threat of force diminished slightly from 1971 to 1979 -- despite the perceived growth of Soviet military capabilities;
 - c) In every case except threats to economic viability and/or political independence (variable 15), perceptions of threat declined between 1971 and 1975, only to rise again in 1979 to levels near to or greater than those of 1971.²¹
4. When we looked at the reasons for this, the first and foremost seemed to be a perception that the threat posed by Soviet/WTO forces had doubled or trebled between 1975 and 1979, while the contribution to security of US/NATO forces had diminished. (See Table 3.12) More specifically, the contributions to security of US strategic nuclear forces in that time frame had dropped by almost 25%, those of regional/theater nuclear forces by about 16% and those of conventional forces by almost 18%.²²

²¹The anomaly with respect to this variable is inexplicable since concern about political pressures fell off in 1975 and there was only one reference in that year to any economic threat. (Again, see Table 3.4.)

²²If one uses 1971 as a base year, the decline would be less for conventional and theater/regional nuclear forces (whose contributions were seen as greater in 1975 than in 1971) and slightly more for strategic nuclear forces, for reasons unknown.

5. These changes in perceptions of increased threat and/or diminished security were paralleled by shifts in perceptions of the military balance -- though with some significant divergences (for which see Table 3.13).

a) The increase in adverse perceptions of the strategic balance was less than the increase in the number calling that balance "relatively equal", especially in 1979.²³

b) The balance of theater/regional nuclear forces was increasingly perceived as adverse in both absolute and relative terms; by 1979 about 20% of the respondents so categorized it, compared to approximately 4% in earlier years.

c) The conventional balance had all along been perceived as adverse, with the percentage of those so evaluating it never falling below 24% and the percentage of those calling it "equal" or "favorable" dropping over time -- except, once again, between 1971 and 1975,

d) The overall balance also shifted adversely to the West, though not as much as the theater/regional nuclear or conventional force balances. If one lumps "equal" and "favorable" together, which is not unreasonable, perceptions of the overall military balance remained "positive", as did those of the strategic nuclear balance. Although the overall balance is not the sum of all its parts, these positive correlations suggest the great influence of strategic nuclear capabilities on assessments of the military balance. By 1979, however, conventional and theater nuclear capabilities, especially the latter,

²³ If one regards "relatively equal" as a desirable state, as some do, then the overall shift is favorable to the West; if one deems parity undesirable, as others do, the shift may be unfavorable. Regretfully, we were not able to re-examine the coding sheets to see which view commanded the most adherents.

had seemingly begun to weigh more heavily in the scale, at least to judge from the fact that positive net perceptions of the overall balance went down, while those of the strategic balance went up.

6. As one compares changes in the implications for security attributed to various kinds of forces with perceptions of the military balance, it seems that the former do not shift correspondingly with the latter. Although direct comparisons are not possible, it would appear that:
 - a) The importance attached to the (augmented) capabilities of Soviet SNF and the (relatively diminished) capabilities of US SNF grew more rapidly than did estimates of changes in the strategic balance.
 - b) While the conventional forces of both alliances were seen as having a major (negative) impact on the security of Western Europe, this was much less than adverse estimates of the conventional balance would lead one to anticipate.
 - c) Conversely, the perceptions of the threat posed by theater/regional nuclear forces seemed greater than the shift in capabilities would warrant -- even though the latter were also adverse.
7. Concern about threats to security may have been mitigated by the perceptions of (slightly greater) willingness on the part of the United States and its allies to devote resources to defense and by a continued (though declining) belief that the US will help defend Western Europe. (Table 3.14) It may also have been reduced by the fact that Soviet

political behavior in the areas examined seemingly had little or no effect on the salience of the threat -- i.e., the Soviets did not appear threatening (Table 3.15).

8. If so, this is somewhat surprising since, as noted earlier, the Soviet arms build-up contributed significantly both to actual insecurity and to a heightened sense of threat, and force was viewed generally as the most important instrument of policy. (Table 3.19). Furthermore, relations between the US and the USSR were seen as increasingly hostile, with no respondent in 1979 describing them as friendly. Hence, we are somewhat at a loss to explain why perceptions of threat did not shift further and faster than perceptions of changes in the military balance, rather than lagging behind.
9. This is particularly true since the policy preferences (preferred courses of action) of US elites increasingly fell into the military/defense category, at the expense of the political/economic one. Thus, US elites tended to respond to what they perceived to be a growing military threat with military measures, such as higher defense budgets, more modern weapons, greater cost/effectiveness in equipping NATO troops, etc.
10. Although the data is not refined enough to positively support this point, it seems that good political relations diminish not only perceptions of threat but also estimates of adversary military capabilities; in almost no other way can one account for the changes in 1975 (See especially, Table 3.16). If this finding applied also to Soviet perceptions, which we have no way of knowing, it would support the positions of those advocating arms control for its political as well as its military effects, eschewing "linkage" in favor of unilateral initiatives, etc.

As it is, it seems to be more of a prescription for Soviet behavior than a guideline for Western policy -- but it is a point worth noting.

11. Finally, to repeat the conclusions from Section C, COMPARABILITY OF FINDINGS, while we were unable to locate a large number of studies against which to compare our findings, those that we did locate support the results of our analysis on a number of points. Given the great diversity in the nature of the questions asked, as well as in the method of presenting the results, this in and of itself is a significant finding.

CHAPTER 4

BRITISH PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT AND SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

The British component of this project accounted for slightly more than one-third (33.9 percent) of the total cases coded: 193 out of 569 (see Table 2.2). As shown in Table 4.1, over half of our sources were government officials and political leaders,¹ a percentage distribution that varied by only \pm 4 percent over the three time periods coded for this project. The second largest elite grouping--academicians/defense analysts/journalists--accounted for 24.4 percent of the total British cases. Of the remainder, military officers accounted for 7.8 percent and 11.3 percent consisted of either "other" or "unreferenced" public elites.² As a group, 85 percent of the British elites coded were on active service in their principal profession, 1.6 percent were retired, and 13.5 percent were not referenced (see Table 4.2).

¹For our definitions of elite groups see the Coder's Guide, Appendix B, pp. 342-343.

²"Other" elites refer to business leaders, labor leaders, etc.; "unreferenced" elites are those for which no information was provided in the coded material.

TABLE 4.1. PRINCIPAL PROFESSION OF BRITISH NATIONALS.

PRINCIPAL PROFESSION	1971		1975		1979		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
	1. Government Official/ Political Leader	31	.564	44	.587	34	.540	109
2. Academician/Defense Analyst/Journalist	11	.200	20	.267	16	.254	47	.244
3. Military Officer	5	.091	6	.080	4	.063	15	.078
4. Other	0	-	0	-	1	.016	1	.005
5. No Reference	8	.145	5	.067	8	.127	21	.109
TOTAL	55	.285	75	.389	63	.326	193	100.

TABLE 4.2. STATUS OF BRITISH ELITES

STATUS	1971		1975		1979		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
	Active	45	.816	63	.907	51	.810	164
Retired	3	.055	0	-	0	-	3	.016
No Reference	7	.127	7	.093	12	.190	26	.135
TOTAL	55	.285	75	.389	63	.326	193	100.

A. MAJOR THEMES

These British elites discussed a total of 60 major themes (444 thematic references), 18 of which were related to external threats from the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact; 32 to intra-alliance issues; three were concerned with domestic issues; five were national military security issues; and two were related to British concerns about US security guarantees and commitments to the defense of Western Europe.³ Table 4.3 shows the distribution of thematic references over time.

1. External Threat Themes. As shown in Table 4.3, 42.8 percent (190) of all thematic references were to threats from the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact. Although this percentage varied from a low of 39.3 percent in 1971 to a high of 44.7 percent in 1975, threat themes received the highest percentage of references in each of the three time periods. Of the eighteen primary threat themes discussed, eleven were common to each time period (see Table 4.4).

In general, British commentaries on external threats showed the same concerns as did American ones: with the changes in the overall military balance and its components and with the consequent likelihood of political - military pressures and threats. Unlike their US counterparts, however, British elites showed a relatively high and constant concern for these matters; in fact, if there were a "year of greatest threat", it would be 1975, not 1979.

Within this overall similarity of attitudes there are, however, a number of differences, with the British showing:

³For descriptions of, and illustrations of, our categories of themes, see Chapter 2: Methodology.

TABLE 4.3. BRITISH THEMATIC REFERENCES

THEMATIC CATEGORIES	1971		1975		1979		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
A. External Threats	44	.393	80	.447	66	.431	190	.428
B. Intra-Alliance Issues	42	.375	62	.346	60	.392	164	.369
C. Domestic Concerns	7	.063	10	.056	4	.026	21	.047
D. National Military Security Concerns	11	.098	22	.123	15	.098	48	.108
E. US Security Guarantees	8	.071	5	.028	8	.052	21	.047
TOTAL	112	.252	179	.403	153	.345	444	100.

TABLE 4.4
BRITISH EXTERNAL THREAT THEMES

THEME	THEMATIC REFERENCES							
	1971		1975		1979		TOTALS	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1. Soviet Naval Buildup	9	.235	15	.183	5	.077	29	.153
2. Conventional Military Balance	7	.159	11	.138	7	.106	25	.132
3. Overall Military Balance	6	.136	6	.075	3	.121	20	.105
4. Soviet Threat to Economic Lifelines	4	.091	2	.088	3	.045	14	.074
5. Exaggeration of Soviet Threat	4	.091	4	.053	6	.091	14	.074
6. Soviet political pressure backed by the threat of force.	3	.068	3	.038	3	.045	9	.047
7. Strategic Balance	3	.068	3	.053	5	.091	11	.063
8. Soviet Military Doctrine	2	.045	0	-	1	.015	3	.016
9. Soviet Political Threats Outside NATO	2	.045	3	.038	3	.045	8	.042
10. Soviet Military Buildup	1	.023	6	.075	2	.034	9	.047
11. Soviet Political/Military Threat	1	.023	11	.138	3	.045	15	.079
12. Internal Subversion	1	.023	2	.025	1	.015	4	.021
13. Soviet Political/Military Constraints	1	.023	1	.013	0	-	2	.011
14. Threat to NATO flanks	0	-	4	.050	0	-	4	.021
15. Theater Regional Balance	0	-	2	.025	11	.167	13	.068
16. Soviet Manipulation of Arms Control	0	-	1	.013	5	.076	6	.032
17. Soviet Foreign Policy	0	-	1	.013	1	.015	2	.011
18. Soviet Grand Strategy	0	-	0	-	1	.015	1	.005
TOTALS	44	.232	80	.421	66	.347	190	100.

Underlined data are discussed in the text

* Common to each time period

a) A small but persistent view that the Soviet threat was exaggerated;

b) A sharp rise in 1979 in concerns about the theater/regional nuclear balance, which was apparently related to the Soviet deployment of the SS-20, the Backfire bomber and other Eurostrategic weapons systems, as well as to the debate on the neutron bomb;

c) A much higher level of concern with the Soviet naval build-up, triggered in part by the British withdrawal from "East of Suez" (which finally took effect in 1971) and in part by enhanced Soviet naval activities, not only in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean but in the North Atlantic, for which the British have a major responsibility in the event of war.

d) An almost equally high concern for Soviet threats to non-European areas, especially economic lifelines. (When the direct references to lifelines are aggregated with threats to NATO flanks, there are a total of 18 references, the fourth highest number found.)

2. Intra-Alliance Issues. The 32 intra-alliance themes produced by British elites (see Table 4.5) reflected a total of 164 thematic references (36.9 percent of the total). In 1971, 16 themes first appeared, of which only two received a volume of references greater than ten percent: detente (21.4 percent) and alliance cohesion (11.9 percent). When viewed in terms of British security concerns, these two themes represent two sides of the security coin, with detente/arms control on one side, and alliance cohesion/intra-alliance defense cooperation on the other.⁴ The high percentage of thematic references to detente, for example, is paralleled by relatively high percentages of

⁴In reality, these intra-alliance issues cannot be isolated from threat themes. While we have grouped them into discrete categories for comparative purposes, references to one issue (e.g., alliance cohesion) can often be read across to issues in a separate thematic grouping (e.g., perceptions of threat).

TABLE 4.5
BRITISH INTRA-ALLIANCE THEMES

MAJOR THEMES	THEMATIC REFERENCES						TOTALS	
	1971		1975		1979		N	%
	N	%	N	%	N	%		
1. Detente	9	.214	11	.177	9	.150	29	.177
2. Alliance Cohesion	5	.119	4	.065	3	.050	12	.073
3. Arms Control: SALT	4	.092	2	.032	12	.200	18	.113
4. Arms Control: MBFR	3	.071	3	.048	2	.033	8	.051
5. Defense Burden Sharing	3	.071	4	.065	1	.017	8	.049
6. European Defense Force	3	.071	1	.016	1	.017	5	.030
7. British Contribution to NATO	3	.071	0	-	3	.050	6	.036
8. Arms Control: General	2	.048	4	.065	2	.033	8	.049
9. Standardization and Interoperability	2	.048	9	.145	3	.050	14	.085
10. Ostpolitik	2	.048	0	-	0	-	2	.012
11. British/French Nuclear Deterrent	1	.024	0	-	3	.050	4	.024
12. NATO Mobilization and Reserves	1	.024	1	.016	1	.017	3	.018
13. Naval problems in the Mediterranean	1	.024	0	-	0	-	1	.006
14. French Foreign Policy	1	.024	1	.016	0	-	2	.012
15. European Political/Military Integration	1	.024	1	.016	0	-	2	.012
16. Divergent Perceptions Between Civilian and Military Leaders	1	.024	0	-	0	-	1	.006
17. Alliance Management	0	-	4	.065	0	-	4	.024
18. Inter-European Arms Production	0	-	3	.048	0	-	3	.018
19. NATO/US Military Doctrine	0	-	2	.032	4	.067	6	.036
20. Cost Effective Defense Spending	0	-	2	.032	1	.017	3	.018
21. CSCE	0	-	2	.032	0	-	2	.012
22. Arms Sales Competition with US	0	-	1	.016	1	.017	2	.012
23. Weapons Technology	0	-	1	.016	0	-	1	.006
24. Problems of Mediterranean NATO	0	-	1	.016	0	-	1	.006

(...continued...)

TABLE 4.5
(continued)

MAJOR THEMES	THEMATIC REFERENCES							
	1971		1975		1979		TOTALS	
	N	Z	N	Z	N	Z	N	Z
25. Problems with Iberian Peninsula	0	-	1	.016	0	-	1	.006
26. The China factor	0	-	1	.016	1	.017	2	.012
27. Eurocommunism	0	-	1	.016	0	-	1	.006
28. Escalation and Deterrence	0	-	1	.016	0	-	1	.006
29. The Threat of Accidental War.	0	-	1	.016	0	-	1	.006
30. West European Involvement in Arms Control	0	-	0	-	1	.017	1	.006
31. The German Problem in Europe	0	-	0	-	1	.017	1	.006
32. Problems of US Reinforcement.	0	-	0	-	1	.017	1	.006
TOTALS	42	.256	62	.378	60	.366	164	100.

*Common to each time period.

references to the issues of SALT, MBFR, arms control in general, and Ostpolitik, which taken together, amounted to 47.6 percent of all references. The second major cluster of concerns -- alliance cohesion/intra-alliance defense cooperation -- received 38 percent of the thematic references.

Although there was some realignment in the rank-ordering of themes in 1975, the major concerns continued to be focused around detente/arms control (with a total of 35.4 percent of the references) and alliance cohesion/intra-alliance defense cooperation issues, with 42.9%. While 1979 saw continued emphasis on detente and arms control (thanks largely to SALT, with 20% of all citations) alliance cohesion and intra-alliance cooperation on standardization and interoperability were replaced as major areas of concern by a new cluster of themes which focused upon doctrinal issues.⁵ Specifically, two themes which had received only minimal references in 1975, and no references in 1971, received a combined total of 21.7 percent of the total references in 1979: weapons technology (15 percent), which was primarily concerned with Precision Guided Munitions and theater nuclear weapons, as well as with the issue of the replacement of the British Polaris Fleet; and NATO/US military doctrine (6.7 percent), which was primarily concerned with the relationship between conventional and nuclear forces, deterrence and the defense of Western Europe. Related to these issues was a discussion of the British/French nuclear deterrent, especially the deterrent role of the British nuclear submarine fleet.

In general, it may be said that the British elites we coded were:

⁵This decline may be explained by the fact that such focal concerns as the F-16, AWACS, Leopard II, etc., programs had been resolved by 1979.

- a) Greatly interested in detente and arms control, of all kinds;
- b) Heavily involved in intra-alliance affairs, both at politico - military and military - technical levels;
- c) In 1979, increasingly concerned with the implications of the new technology, both for their own forces and for NATO as a whole -- and seemingly for arms control as well as for military capabilities.

Thus British responses to perceived threats apparently were multi-faceted rather than singular.

3. Domestic Concerns. Domestic concerns, as they impact upon British perceptions of European interests and security, fell into only three major thematic categories: lack of national will; economic constraints; and political constraints (see Table 4.6). Only 21 references were coded for these three themes in total. No clear trend emerged, and no real judgment can be made concerning domestic concerns.

4. National Military/Security Concerns. British elites discussed five categories of national military/security concerns (Table 4.7) which accounted for 10.5 percent of total thematic references (Table 4.3). Of the five themes in this category, only one appeared in all three years: defense spending. Viewed in aggregate terms, there were 25 references to defense spending being too low, (more than half of them in 1975) and 13 references to it being too high. On this limited basis we can only note that the issue is a significant one without being able to say whether there was a correlation in 1975 between high perceptions of threat and (comparatively) numerous complaints about the level of defense spending or whether this latter reflected other (and perhaps more political) interests.

TABLE 4.6
BRITISH DOMESTIC CONCERNS

MAJOR THEMES	THEMATIC REFERENCES							
	1971		1975		1979		TOTALS	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1. Lack of National Will	3	.429	3	.300	1	.250	7	.333
2. Domestic Concerns: Economic	2	.286	4	.400	1	.250	7	.333
3. Domestic Concerns: Political	2	.286	3	.300	2	.500	7	.333
TOTALS	7	.333	10	.476	4	.190	21	100.

TABLE 4.7
BRITISH NATIONAL MILITARY/SECURITY CONCERNS

MAJOR THEMES	THEMATIC REFERENCES							
	1971		1975		1979		TOTALS	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1. British Interests Outside UK/EO	4	.364	1	.045	0	-	5	.104
2. Defense Spending: *	4	.364	14	.636	2	.092	16	.328
Too Low	2	.182	7	.318	1	.045	10	.208
Too High	2	.182	7	.318	1	.045	10	.208
3. British Slavery	1	.091	0	-	0	-	1	.021
4. Civilian Home Defense	0	-	0	-	3	.200	3	.062
5. British Defense Policy	0	-	0	-	1	.067	1	.021
TOTALS	11	.229	22	.458	15	.313	48	100.

* Underlined data are discussed in the text

* Denominator to each time period

5. Concerns About US Security Guarantees. Concerns about US security guarantees and/or "decoupling" did not emerge as a major issue during any of the three time periods; there were only 21 thematic references to this issue in toto, with eight recorded in 1971, five in 1975, and eight in 1979 (see Table 4.8).⁶

TABLE 4.8

BRITISH CONCERNS ABOUT US SECURITY GUARANTEES

CONCERN	THEMATIC REFERENCES							
	1971		1975		1979		TOTALS	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1. US Security Guarantees	8	100	5	100	4	50	17	810
2. Decoupling of US Strategic Forces	0	-	0	-	4	100	4	100
TOTALS	8	381	5	238	8	301	21	100

6. Summary. Thematic references provide one insight into the major security issues of concern to British public elites, especially in terms of their relative rankings and intensity over time. It is noteworthy, therefore, that external threat themes were the largest single category for each of the three time periods. Within this category, emphasis shifted from the Soviet naval buildup, which dominated concerns in 1971 and 1975, to the theater regional balance, in 1979. This

⁶

The relatively few specific references to this issue is probably due to its implicit treatment in other thematic issues, e.g., SALT, arms control, and detente.

concern about security was also evident in the analysis of intra-alliance themes, where doctrinal and military-technical issues became increasingly important in 1979 as compared to either 1971 or 1975 -- though they never outstripped political concerns. Also noteworthy was the fact that spending was the largest single item of concern among national military/security issues, with those viewing defense spending as being below that required outnumbering those who viewed it as being too high by a margin of two to one. In terms of British domestic concerns or those about US security guarantees, our thematic analysis indicates that these are not issues which are very salient among British elites -- at least those appearing in print -- or for which any clear trends could be uncovered.

B. PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT AND SECURITY.

1. Threats to European Security (Revised Codebook, Section II). As already noted, the ten variables in Section II of the Codebook focus upon perceptions of "intent" rather than "capability," and are directed at perceptions of both present and future intent.⁷ Of these variables, only the four concerned with "the present" provided any meaningful answers about perceptions of threats to European security (see Table 4.9). Based upon the results of our coding, it would appear that British public elites are less concerned with future threats in a specific or predictive sense than they are with the present situation as they perceive it to be. (In no case, for example, did the level of references to "future threats" exceed 18.2 percent in any single year.) Neither, it would appear, are British elites overly concerned about the present or future threat of internal subversion supported by the Soviet Union (Variables 13 and 14), since references to this particular concern never exceeded 15 percent of the total sample in any single year.

As an examination of Table 4.9 will show, the majority of the British elites coded did not discuss threats at all. Even in the case of Variable 07 ("A Nuclear Strike by the USSR"), less than 50 percent of the 193 respondents addressed this threat. Nor was there great concern about a Warsaw Pact conventional attack, about political pressures backed by the threat of force, or about threats against economic viability and/or political independence, which fewer than 40 percent of the British elites even mentioned.

In those instances where these issues were addressed in significant numbers, however, two distinct patterns emerged. If attention is focused

⁷See Chapter 3, p. 34.

TABLE 4.9

THREATS TO EUROPEAN SECURITY

Q: According to the Author, is Western Europe deemed secure against:

A) A Nuclear Strike by the USSR (var. 87)

	1971	1975	1979
1. Yes	.382	.200	.302
2. No	.055	-	.079
3/4. Uncertain	.018	.040	.073
5. No Reference	.545	.760	.540
	N=55	N=75	N=63

B) A Warsaw Pact Attack with Conventional Forces (var. 89)

	1971	1975	1979
1. Yes	.291	.260	.302
2. No	.127	.093	.079
3/4. Uncertain	.072	.080	.111
5. No Reference	.509	.547	.508
	N=55	N=75	N=63

C) Soviet/Warsaw Pact Political Pressures Backed by Threat of Force (var. 11)

	1971	1975	1979
1. Yes	.018	.013	.032
2. No	.127	.292	.161
3/4. Uncertain	-	.027	.064
5. No Reference	.855	.667	.742
	N=55	N=75	N=63

D) Threat Against Economic Viability and/or Political Independence (var. 15)

	1971	1975	1979
1. Yes	.071	.040	.016
2. No	.182	.253	.063
3/4. Uncertain	.072	.080	.064
5. No Reference	.655	.627	.857
	N=55	N=75	N=63

upon net perceptions of threat (Table 4.10), it can be concluded that Western Europe is perceived to be secure against both a nuclear strike by the USSR (Var. 07) and a Warsaw Pact attack with conventional forces (Var. 09). As Figure 4.1 makes clear, the ratio of those who perceived Western Europe to be secure against these threats to those who were either uncertain or expressed a negative view was always positive. Moreover, although annual fluctuations in these perceptions are evident in the case of Variable 07, especially between 1971 and 1975, the ratio remained essentially constant over the three years in the case of Variable 09.

In the case of Variables 11 ("Soviet/Warsaw Pact Political Pressure Backed by the Threat of Force") and 15 ("Threats Against Economic Viability and/or Political Independence"), however, a completely different pattern emerges. First, net perceptions for these threats were negative (i.e., not secure) for all three years (see Figure 4.1), indicating that while British elites do not envisage a Soviet attack against Europe, indirect threats from the Soviet Union (e.g., arms sales, oil price manipulations, increased activity at or near major maritime chokepoints, etc.), are perceived as not only possible but as a present reality. Second, the trend lines for both of these variables show a reversal in perceptions between 1971 and 1979, with 1975 the period of greatest threat.⁸ (This pattern also emerges from an examination of the thematic references to external threats summarized in Table 4.5 above. In particular, there was a noticeable increase in references to Soviet threats to economic lifelines and to Soviet political/military threats, both of which are issues directly

⁸This increase in negative perceptions in 1975 coincided with Soviet involvement in Africa, an area of considerable British awareness and concern.

TABLE 4.10
NET PERCEPTIONS OF THREATS TO EUROPEAN SECURITY*

Q: Is Western Europe deemed secure against:

A) A Nuclear Strike by the USSR (var. 07)

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Yes	.382	.200	.302
(-) No/Uncertain	.073	.040	.158
	.309	.160	.144

B) A Warsaw Pact Attack With Conventional Forces (var. 09)

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Yes	.291	.280	.302
(-) No/Uncertain	.199	.173	.190
	.092	.107	.112

C) Soviet/Warsaw Pact Political Pressure Backed by Threat of Force (var. 11)


	1971	1975	1979
(+) Yes	.018	.013	.032
(-) No/Uncertain	.127	.320	.225
	-.109	-.307	-.193

D) Threats Against Economic Viability and/or Political Independence (var. 15)

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Yes	.091	.040	.016
(-) No/Uncertain	.254	.333	.127
	-.163	-.293	-.111

*As discussed in Chapter 2, "net perceptions" were derived by subtracting from the number of positive responses the number of negative and uncertain references -- on the ground that both of the latter reflected a lack of confidence in the security of Western Europe.

FIGURE 4.1
NET PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT TO EUROPEAN SECURITY



related to variables 11 and 15.) By 1979, perceptions of these threats had essentially returned to their 1971 levels, perhaps because events in (pre-Afghanistan) Asia and Africa were not as salient, perhaps because attention had shifted to issues related to the theater regional balance.

2. Military/Political Factors Affecting European Security: (Revised Codebook, Sections III and IV)

A. Military Factors

1. Perceptions of Military Contributions to Security (Revised Codebook, Section IIIA)

As mentioned earlier, the military factors discussed in this section deal with the contribution to deterrence of the various functional components of US/NATO and Soviet/WTO armed forces, i.e., with the extent to which specific military capabilities influence perceptions of threat. As shown in Table 4.11, this question was not addressed by the vast majority of British elites coded for this project. With the exception of Variable 27 ("Capabilities of US/NATO Conventional Forces"), however, the saliency of these issues increased over time, as measured by the decreasing percentage of non-responses.

Not surprisingly, Soviet strategic nuclear, theater-regional, and conventional force capabilities produced net perceptions of increased threats to the security of Western Europe, which grew from 1971 to 1979. This was particularly notable in the case of strategic nuclear and theater nuclear forces, especially for the period 1975-1979. Apparently the rapid build-up and modernization of Soviet military forces, though it took place "across the board," was seen as impacting more largely on nuclear components than on conventional ones.

Increasing concerns about the threats arising out of enhanced Soviet/Warsaw Pact military capabilities were paralleled by growing concerns about the off-setting capabilities of US strategic and theater-nuclear forces (see Table 4.11, Section B). While there was a net positive perception of the contribution to security of US strategic nuclear forces in 1971, there was a net negative perception in 1979, and the same was true of US theater/regional nuclear forces. Only in the case of US/NATO conventional forces did the trend line of net perceptions indicate that concerns were decreasing (a finding buttressed by the diminishing number of references to such forces in Table 4.11), but even here net perceptions remained in the negative for all three years. (See Table 4.12) Interestingly enough, however, the net negative percentages of all three components were still quite small, which may help explain why the British did not feel all that threatened, as reported in Section B.1.

2. Perceptions of the Military Balance (Revised Codebook, Section IV). Of the nine variables in Section IV of the Codebook dealing with perceptions of the military balance (Variables 44-53), only four received a sufficiently high level of responses to be considered in this analysis. As was the case in Section II, only those variables dealing with the perceptions of the "present" military balance were referenced with any degree of consistency; those variables concerned with the "future" balance were either not referenced at all or, with one exception, were referenced by fewer than ten percent of the elites coded in any single year. (In the case of Variable 49, "The Future Strategic Balance Between the US and USSR," 11.1 percent of the elites coded in 1979 believed that the future balance

TABLE 4.11

MILITARY FACTORS AFFECTING EUROPEAN SECURITY

Q: How do the following factors influence concerns about threats to European Security:

A) Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact:

Var. 21: Capabilities of Soviet Strategic Nuclear Forces

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.074	.067	.254
2. No effect	-	-	-
3. Decrease	-	-	-
4. No Reference	.926	.933	.746
	N=55	N=75	N=63

Var. 33: Capabilities of Soviet Theater/Regional Nuclear Forces

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.018	.013	.290
2. No effect	-	-	-
3. Decrease	-	.013	-
4. No Reference	.982	.973	.710
	N=55	N=75	N=63

Var. 28: Capabilities of Soviet/Warsaw Pact Conventional Forces

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.182	.200	.254
2. No effect	.018	.027	.016
3. Decrease	.036	.040	.016
4. No Reference	.764	.733	.714
	N=55	N=75	N=63

TABLE 4.11 (Cont.)

B) US/NATO

Var. 17: Capabilities of US Strategic Nuclear Forces

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.018	.040	.159
2. No effect	.036	.027	.032
3. Decrease	.109	.013	.063
4. No Reference	.836	.920	.746
	N=55	N=75	N=63

Var. 22: Capabilities of US/NATO Theater/Regional Nuclear Forces

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	..	.027	.111
2. No effect	.019	.027	.032
3. Decrease	.056	.080	.015
4. No Reference	.926	.867	.841
	N= 55	N=75	N=63

Var. 27: Capabilities of US/NATO Conventional Forces.

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.218	.240	.143
2. No effect	.073	..	.016
3. Decrease	.127	.133	.095
4. No Reference	.582	.627	.746
	N=55	N=75	N=63

TABLE 4.12

NET PERCEPTIONS OF MILITARY FACTORS AFFECTING
EUROPEAN SECURITY*

Q: How do the following factors influence concerns about threats to European security:

A) SOVIET UNION/WARSAW PACT

1. Var 21: Capabilities of Soviet Strategic Nuclear Forces

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease	-	-	-
(-) Increase/No Effect	.074	.067	.254
	-.074	-.067	-.254

2. Var 33: Capabilities of Soviet Theater/Regional Nuclear Forces

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease	-	.013	-
(-) Increase/No Effect	.081	.013	.290
	-.018	0	-.290

3. Var 28: Capabilities of Soviet/Warsaw Pact Conventional Forces

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease	.036	.040	.016
(-) Increase/No Effect	.200	.227	.270
	-.164	-.187	-.254

* In this case, for the reasons discussed in Chapter 2, components that had "no effect" on concerns about European security were deemed not reassuring and were counted as negative.

TABLE 4.12 (Cont.)

B) US/NATO

Var. 17: Capabilities of US Strategic Nuclear Forces

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease	.109	.013	.063
(-) Increase/No Effect	.054	.067	.191
	.055	-.054	-.128

Var 22: Capabilities of US Theater/Regional Nuclear Forces

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease	.056	.080	.016
(-) Increase/No Effect	.019	.054	.143
	.037	.026	-.127

Var. 27: Capabilities of US/NATO Conventional Forces

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease	.127	.133	.095
(-) Increase/No Effect	.291	.240	.159
	-.164	-.107	-.064

would be adverse to the West---which says something about perceptions of this vital area.)

Table 4.13 presents the results of British perceptions of the military balance for variables 44,45,47 and 48. Two trends are common to each of these four variables: they have become increasingly salient since 1971, as measured by the decreasing percentage of no references, and the percentage of respondents who perceive the balance to be adverse to the West increased for all variables between 1971 and 1979.⁹ In fact, only in the case of the current strategic balance between the US and the USSR did the percentage of British elites who perceived the balance to be "roughly equal" exceed the percentage who perceived the balance as being adverse to the West. (Furthermore, many of those who perceived the strategic balance to be roughly equal viewed a state of parity as an evil in itself, especially when viewed in relation to the theater, conventional, and overall military balances; hence, this outcome is not necessarily reassuring.)

It should be noted that judgements about the overall military balance were less unfavorable than those about theater/regional, conventional and tactical nuclear forces. Although perceptions of the overall balance are not the sum of perceptions of the various components, but are arrived at independently, it would seem that judgements concerning the strategic nuclear balance may have exercised a disproportionate impact, since in no other way can we account

⁹Although Variable 46, "The Current Balance of Tactical Nuclear Forces between NATO and the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact", had so few references (14.3% in the best year) that we did not feel we could treat it comparably, the trend was the same, with 12.9% in 1979 deeming the balance adverse to the West.

TABLE 4.13
PERCEPTIONS OF THE MILITARY BALANCE

Q: What are the perceptions of the military balance held by the author concerning:

A) Var. 44: The Current Strategic Balance Between the US and the USSR.

	1971	1975	1979
1. Adverse to West	.018	.067	.143
2. Roughly equal	.127	.133	.270
3. Favorable to West	.036	.040	-
4. No Reference	.818	.760	.587
	N=55	N=75	N=63

B) Var. 45: The Current Balance of Theater/Regional Forces Between NATO and the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact

	1971	1975	1979
1. Adverse to West	.036	.173	.226
2. Roughly equal	.055	-	.032
3. Favorable to West	-	-	.016
4. No Reference	.909	.827	.726
	N=55	N=75	N=63

C) Var. 47: The Current Balance of Conventional Forces Between NATO and the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact

	1971	1975	1979
1. Adverse to West	.273	.413	.397
2. Roughly equal	.018	-	.016
3. Favorable to West	.036	.013	.048
4. No Reference	.673	.573	.540
	N=55	N=75	N=63

(...Continued...)

TABLE 4.13 (Cont.)

PERCEPTIONS OF THE MILITARY BALANCE

D) Var. 48: The Overall Balance between US/NATO and Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact*

	1971	1975	1979
1. Adverse to West	.036	.080	.143
2. Roughly equal	.055	.067	.048
3. Favorable to West	-	-	.095
4. No Reference	.909	.853	.714
	N=55	N=75	N=63

*Note that this variable is not the sum of the preceding three but is independent of them -- at least as far as data generation is concerned.

for the outcome. This highlights the importance West Europeans attach to the strategic deterrent, especially since no British respondent in 1979 deemed the US ahead of the USSR. (See Table 4.13)

B. Political Factors. Table 4.14 shows in tabular form British elite perceptions of three important political variables that affect perceptions of security: West European willingness to devote resources to defense (Variable 37); US willingness to devote resources to defense (Variable 38); and US willingness to defend Western Europe (Variable 39).

A high percentage of British elites addressed the issue of West European willingness to devote resources to defense, with most of the respondents suggesting that the (presumably poor) record in this area increased perceptions of threat; in fact, net perceptions were negative for all three years (Table 4.15). (Although we are unable to measure this relationship statistically, the decreased concern expressed in 1979, compared to 1975, is probably due to the long-term defense program established by NATO in 1977.)

The high percentage of references to variable 37 contrasts sharply with the low level of references to the issue of US willingness to devote resources to defense (variable 38). On the average, only 11 percent of the elites coded reflected any concerns about this issue and they wavered back and forth as to its consequences. Somewhat more dealt with the issue of US willingness to defend Western Europe (variable 39), but, as shown on Table 4.14, were almost evenly divided in their assessments of the implications. If one considers both this and the fact that roughly 70% did not respond at all it would seem that British elites had a fair degree of confidence in the US guarantee -- which, given their views about shifts in the military balance, is somewhat surprising.

TABLE 4.14

POLITICAL FACTORS AFFECTING EUROPEAN SECURITY

Q: How do the following factors influence concerns about threats to European Security:

Var. 37: West European Willingness to Devote Resources to Defense

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.327	.413	.349
2. No Effect	.036	.147	.063
3. Decrease	.127	.093	.111
4. No Reference	.509	.347	.476
	N=55	N=75	N=63

Var. 38: US Willingness to Devote Resources to Defense

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.036	.027	.111
2. No Effect	.073	.013	-
3. Decrease	-	.040	.032
4. No Reference	.891	.920	.857
	N=55	N=75	N=63

Var. 39: US Willingness to Defend Western Europe

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.200	.095	.159
2. No Effect	.036	.014	-
3. Decrease	.255	.196	.111
4. No Reference	.509	.784	.730
	N=55	N=75	N=63

TABLE 4.15

NET PERCEPTIONS OF POLITICAL FACTORS AFFECTING
EUROPEAN SECURITY

Q: How do the following factors influence concerns about threats to European security:

Var. 37: West European Willingness to Devote Resources to Defense

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease	.127	.093	.111
(-) Increase/No Effect	.363	.560	.412
	-.236	-.467	-.301

Var. 38: US Willingness to Devote Resources to Defense

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease	-	.040	.032
(-) Increase/No Effect	.109	.040	.111
	-.109	.000	-.079

Var. 39: US Willingness to Defend Western Europe

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease	.255	.108	.111
(-) Increase/No Effect	.236	.109	.159
	.019	-.001	-.048

C. Factors Affecting Perceptions

1. Saliency of the Overall Threat (Revised Codebook, Section III B).

One possibility is that British elites do not worry much about the US "nuclear guarantee" because they do not believe they will ever have to invoke it. Although this is impossible to prove, there is some evidence that it may be so in British responses to questions about the saliency of the threat.

Of the four questions asked, one (Variable 42, about Soviet negotiating positions on theater/regional nuclear forces) produced almost no responses - which is rather strange considering the concern expressed in 1979 about the growth of those forces. Two questions, on M(B)FR and detente in general, registered either neutral or slightly positive perceptions in all three time periods, suggesting that Soviet political behavior was such as to not increase perceptions of threat. (Table 4.17).

The fourth, the effects of the Soviet military build-up, produced a markedly different effect. First of all, references to this topic increased by some 44% between 1971 and 1979 (see Table 4.16). Secondly, there was a dramatic increase in perceptions of threat between 1971 and 1979. (Over 68 percent of the cases coded indicated an increased concern over Soviet military buildup/modernization programs in 1979, compared to 20 percent who expressed this concern in 1971.) Thirdly, this increased concern resulted in a 52.2 percent negative shift in the perceptions of British elites with respect to this issue, the single most dramatic shift in British perceptions for any variable coded over the three years included in this study. This negative trend, which conforms to the changes in British

TABLE 4:16

FACTORS AFFECTING PERCEPTIONS: SALIENCE OF
THE OVERALL THREAT

Q: How is the salience of the overall threat affected by
Soviet behavior regarding:

Var. 40: M(B)FR

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.073	.053	.143
2. No Effect	.036	.147	.111
3. Decrease	.073	.027	.032
4. No Reference	.818	.773	.714
	N=55	N=75	N=63

Var. 41: Detente in General

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.164	.164	.139
2. No Effect	.055	.123	.065
3. Decrease	.182	.055	.113
4. No Reference	.600	.658	.694
	N=55	N=75	N=63

Var. 43: Soviet Military Buildup/Modernization Programs

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.200	.520	.683
2. No Effect	.055	.013	.016
3. Decrease	—	—	—
4. No Reference	.745	.467	.302
	N=55	N=75	N=63

TABLE 4.17

NET PERCEPTIONS: SALIENCE OF
THE OVERALL THREAT

Q: How is the salience of the overall threat affected by
Soviet behavior regarding:

Var 40: M(B)FR

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease/No Effect	.109	.174	.143
(-) Increase	.073	.053	.143
	.036	.121	.000

Var 41: Detente in General

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease/No Effect	.237	.178	.178
(-) Increase	.154	.164	.139
	.073	.014	.039

Var 43: Soviet Military Buildup/Modernization

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease/No Effect	.055	.013	.016
(-) Increase	.200	.520	.683
	-.145	-.507	-.667

perceptions of Soviet/Warsaw Pact military capabilities summarized in Table 4.12 above, indicates again how heavily and how directly adversary defense programs, whatever their rationale or their intent, impact on perceptions of threat.

2. World View of the Author (Revised Codebook, Section VA)

In this section, we attempted to ascertain the importance British elites attached to five variables generally believed to affect national behavior -- for which see Table 4.18. Although we were unable, for the reasons described previously, to statistically measure associations between variables, we did determine their relative importance and rank ordering.

Although the percentage of British elites talking about each of these variables was roughly comparable to that of American elites, their treatment of them was markedly different. For one thing, the British drew fewer distinctions; i.e., more of them labelled these factors as "unimportant" or "neutral" than did their American counterparts, who tended either to categorize them as "important" or to ignore them. (See Table 3.18). For another the British attached greatest importance not to force but to "political ties", which given their dependence on external support, is understandable.¹⁰ For a third, references to

¹⁰Unfortunately, we have no clear sense of what British elites meant by "political ties", which could range from the "special relationship" with the United States to the loose association with other members of the Commonwealth. This kind of information may be retrievable from the source material but our sieve was too coarse to catch it.

TABLE 4.18

FACTORS INFLUENCING PERCEPTIONS:
WORLD VIEW OF AUTHORS

Indicate the relative importance attached to the following factors, which can influence the ways in which states relate to, and behave toward, one another:

Var. 54: Force

	1971	1975	1979
1. Unimportant	.018	.027	.032
2. Neutral	.182	.160	.113
3. Important	.509	.480	.435
4. No Reference	.291	.333	.419
	N=55	N=75	N=63

Var 55: Economic Strength

	1971	1975	1979
1. Unimportant	-	-	-
2. Neutral	.055	.133	-
3. Important	.291	.293	.333
4. No Reference	.655	.573	.667
	N=55	N=75	N=63

Var. 56: Ideology

	1971	1975	1979
1. Unimportant	.109	.027	.016
2. Neutral	.036	-	-
3. Important	.164	.267	.294
4. No Reference	.764	.707	.790
	N=55	N=75	N=63

(...Continued...)

TABLE 4.18 : (Cont.)

Var. 57: Political Goals

	1971	1975	1979
1. Unimportant	.109	.147	.048
2. Neutral	.073	.107	.016
3. Important	.455	.267	.226
4. No Reference	.364	.480	.710
	N=55	N=75	N=63

Var. 58: Political Ties

	1971	1975	1979
1. Unimportant	-	.013	-
2. Neutral	.091	.080	.048
3. Important	.636	.547	.444
4. No Reference	.273	.360	.508
	N=55	N=75	N=63

TABLE 4.19


WORLD VIEW VARIABLES RANKED BY PERCEIVED IMPORTANCE

1971	1975	1979
Political ties	Political ties	Political ties
Force	Force	Force
Political goals	Economic strength	Economic strength
Economic strength	Political goals	Political goals
Ideology	Ideology	Ideology

} (tie)

FIGURE 4.2

WORLD VIEW OF AUTHOR: PERCENTAGE OF "IMPORTANT" RESPONSES



"force", "political ties", and "political goals", went down substantially over time, without a corresponding pick-up in comments on either "ideology" or "economic strength". And, although the latter trend, given the dismal state of the British economy over the whole period, may have been the European equivalent of "whistling Dixie", we are at a loss to explain the other changes in the frequency of references.¹¹

3. Views on East-West Relations (Revised Codebook, Section VB).

Only a small percentage of British elites addressed the issue of current relations between the Soviet Union and the United States (Variable 59) in any of the three years covered by this project (see Table 4.20). Of those who did, a shift can be observed between 1971-1975, when a majority of those referring to this issue viewed relations as either neutral or friendly, and 1979, where all of the respondents perceived relations between the US and the Soviet Union to be hostile. While the number of responses to this issue is too low to place any statistical significance on this shift, it is supported by the trends in British perceptions of overall East-West relations (Variable 60): the percentage of those who perceived relations to be hostile increased by 10.9 percentage points between 1971 and 1979 while the percentage of those who perceived relations as neutral or friendly decreased by 28.9 percentage points over this time period (Table 4.20). More noteworthy is that these trends did not change in 1975, the year of the Helsinki Agreement and of

¹¹There was a slight increase in the number of respondents deeming "economic strength" important (for which see Figure 4.2) but both this curve and the one indicating number of references were essentially flat, despite events such as the oil embargo of 1973, a marked cut-back in defense expenditures in 1974-75, and so on.

TABLE 4.20

FACTORS AFFECTING PERCEPTIONS:
VIEWS OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Indicate how the author assesses:

A) Var. 59: Current Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States

	1971	1975	1979
1. Hostile	-	.040	.079
2. Neutral	.073	.013	-
3. Friendly	.055	.067	-
4. No Reference	.873	.880	.921
	N=55	N=75	N=63

B) Var. 60: Current Relations, Overall, Between Eastern Europe/USSR
and Western Europe/US

	1971	1975	1979
1. Hostile	.145	.160	.254
2. Neutral	.327	.133	.095
3. Friendly	.073	.027	.016
4. No Reference	.455	.680	.635
	N=55	N=75	N=63

diminished concern about most forms of threat (for which see Figure 4.1). Although any attempted explanation can only be speculative, it may be that Soviet behavior outside Europe (as in Angola and in the Horn of Africa) impacted more heavily on perceptions than did events in Europe.

4. Policy Preferences (Revised Codebook, Section VI). Nearly half of our British respondents had policy preferences (i.e., suggestions as to how to cope with threats to security) and the percentage making suggestions went up from 1971 to 1979 (Table 4.21). While the largest percentage in all three years favored military/defense options, that percentage steadily (if slightly) declined, and the number of "mixed" responses rose. This could reflect an increased interest in arms control, which is a prominent intra-alliance theme (see Table 4.5), even if not a pre-eminent British policy. Alternatively, it could reflect the increased attention paid to military-technical problems with political overtones, such as weapons technology, intra-European arms production, etc. The increased emphasis over time on political/economic solutions to security problems correlates with the number of references to detente in intra-alliance themes and the continuing attention paid to alliance cohesion, alliance management, and so on, reflecting their increased salience. In sum, the increased perceptions of Soviet/WTO military threats, backed by enhanced military capabilities, did not generate a proportionate increase in predilections for military/defense responses but did correlate with rises in political/economic and "mixed" responses. Although any

TABLE 4.21

POLICY PREFERENCES

Indicate whether or not the author advocates a course of action (i.e., a policy preference) that should be undertaken to improve the security of Western Europe:

Var. G1: Policy Preferences

	1971	1975	1979
Yes	.455	.347	.540
No	.545	.653	.460
	N=55	N=75	N=63

If the author advocates a policy, is it:

	1971	1975	1979
Military/Defense	.520	.500	.441
Political/Economic	.280	.154	.206
Mixed	.200	.346	.353
	N=25	N=26	N=34

explanation can only be speculative, it may be that the authors had a keener awareness of British economic weakness and a greater recognition of the limits to British military power than they explicitly acknowledged, and hence opted increasingly for "non-military" solutions to military problems.

C. COMPARABILITY OF FINDINGS

As was the case for the American study, our efforts to locate comparable aggregate analyses of British perceptions of security proved disappointing. Of the studies located which focused upon elite perceptions, two based their findings upon interviews and one utilized content analysis. Of the two studies which base their findings upon elite interviews, only one falls within the temporal framework of our Project: a report by Donald Brennan based upon a series of interviews conducted in Europe between March 2 and April 5, 1972.¹² Although this report summarizes responses to 20 questions by 59 European elites, the results are presented in such a fashion as to preclude direct comparative analysis of the findings.

First, Brennan's overall conclusions are not disaggregated by national source. Consequently, it is impossible to isolate the input of British perceptions into such general conclusions as:

"If all Western forces (including U.S. strategic nuclear) are included, most Europeans feel that Soviet-NATO military forces are in a rough overall balance. However, they also perceive

(A) increasing Soviet superiority in general-purpose forces in Central Europe

(B) particular weakness on the NATO "flanks" (especially the southern one)

(C) a potentially threatening Soviet naval buildup and are somewhat more apprehensive about Soviet threat potential than 2 years ago. (or than in the us)"¹³

¹²Donald G. Brennan. Some European Elite Perceptions of Selected Security Issues (Briefing Charts). Final Report. HI-2255-RR (Croton-on-Hudson, NY: Hudson Institute, May 29, 1975.

¹³Ibid., p. 10.

This is unfortunate, since the results of our analysis of British perceptions for 1975 do not support Brennan's conclusion that military forces "are in rough overall balance" (see Table 4.13) nor his judgement that Europeans (or at least the British) "are more apprehensive about Soviet threat potential than two years ago" -- for which see Figure 4.1.

Second, since Brennan does not present any numerical breakdowns of his findings, either by responses or by country, it is impossible to make direct comparisons with our research. Rather than presenting his findings in statistical form, Brennan gives a summary conclusion for each question; followed by a few selected quotes. Aside from his general conclusions, therefore, the only "data points" in Brennan's study are a handful of fragmentary quotes -- hardly the basis for a statistical comparison of findings. Furthermore, the questions asked are, with two exceptions, either directed at different concerns than we examined or are so general as not to be directly comparable to our questions. The two exceptions are a question concerning views of the overall relationship of Soviet to Western military forces (of all kinds), for which there were no relevant British sources listed, and a question concerning views of long-term American resolve, will and determination. To this last question, Brennan answers that "There is a high confidence that the U.S. will not abandon Europe, mainly stemming from a belief that Europe is too important to the U.S." If, however, one focuses upon the British responses to this question, that Brennan supplies, his conclusion appears to be at variance with the perceptions of his interviewers:

"General view is that long-term U.S. resolve is slackening... compare waning U.S. support for S.E. Asia" (Crozier)

"I think the (European) Community is over-optimistic. 'America's defense is Europe's defense' is a naive but common view" (Gray)

"Obviously rather pessimistic after Saigon and, more important, the U.S. reaction to it" (Martin)¹⁴

The results of our analysis indicated that there was a shift toward the negative in British perceptions of US willingness to defend Western Europe in 1975 (see Tables 4.14 and 4.15). In short, in the one area in which we could directly compare results, ours differed from those of Dr. Brennan.

Many of the same problems also hold for the second of the studies based upon elite interviews: the Report of a House Committee on Foreign Affairs Staff Mission to NATO conducted during January 2-18, 1980.¹⁵ Unlike the Brennan study, this report presents its conclusions within a country-specific framework, thereby facilitating the comparison of findings. Unfortunately, however, the report, which bases its findings upon interviews conducted with British officials in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, as well as with professional staff members of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), is totally narrative in content and provides no data on the numbers of British elites holding a particular viewpoint. Furthermore, only four security issues are discussed: NATO as an instrument of defense and detente; arms control; defense cooperation; and IISS assessments of the military balance in Europe.

The Study Mission's report consists primarily of a number of brief observations, rather than detailed explications, of British elite perceptions of Europe security. We are told, for example, that British officials:

- 1) strongly support the TNF decision as ultimately one which "couples" rather than "decouples" theater nuclear systems to U.S. central strategic systems by increasing the options available to the U.S. President in the event of war in Europe;

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵NATO and Western Security in the 1980's: The European Perception. Report of Staff Mission to Seven NATO Countries and Austria, January 2-18, 1980, to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, April 9, 1980 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1980).

- 2) are more skeptical of arms control than perhaps in any other Western European country (although they support SALT II, as well as understand the political requirements in the U.S. to defer a Senate vote on ratification);
- 3) perceive future arms control negotiations on TNF as important, because they are important to other allies and are perceived as contributing to Alliance-wide security;
- 4) are committed to the principles of standardization within NATO and defense cooperation with the U.S.;
- 5) regard the LTDP (Long-Term Defense Program) as an important NATO commitment demonstrating political resolve and providing important priorities for NATO's conventional defense; and
- 6) are committed to the NATO-wide objective of a 3 percent real annual increase in defense spending.¹⁶

These observations can be neither supported nor refuted by the results of our primary analysis, since these issues are not addressed by our Codebook. However, our analysis of intra-alliance themes in Section A-2 would tend to support the fourth finding and undercut the second -- though admittedly this analysis covers all British elites, not just those of officials. In three other cases, however, conclusions reached by the Study Mission are addressed by our analysis.

First, the Report states that British officials view NATO "as essentially a political alliance which enables both European defense and East-West detente to continue."¹⁷ Although none of our questions was directly comparable, we did find that "political ties" (of which the Western Alliance is certainly one) was the factor believed to have the greatest

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 19-20.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 19.

influence on (i.e., set the context of) national behavior in each of the three years covered by our project (see Table 4.19), with 44.5 percent of those coded in 1979 viewing it as an important factor and none viewing it as unimportant (see Table 4.18).¹⁸

Second, the Study Mission concluded that British officials "continue to regard the US security guarantee to Western Europe as viable and credible."¹⁹ Our findings do not support this judgement, in that over half of our respondents in 1979 thought otherwise; however, our sample (N=17) was so small that categorical conclusions are impossible.

Third, the House Committee on Foreign Relations Report states that British officials are supportive of M(B)FR but pessimistic about the prospects for progress in the negotiations.²⁰ This is so, the report concludes, because these officials see Soviet objectives in M(B)FR as centered principally on preserving Warsaw Pact advantages in manpower and in some types of equipment. Our findings would tend to support the claim that British officials are "skeptical" about M(B)FR, since 14.3 percent of all elites coded in 1979 (17.6 percent of the government officials and political leaders) perceived Soviet behavior in the

¹⁸ If one focuses just upon British government officials and political leaders, the figures are even higher. As in the case of the total British sample, this elite grouping ranked "political ties" as the most important factor in all three years, with 71, 59.1 and 50 percent ranking it as important in 1971, 1975 and 1979 respectively. The 1979 totals, furthermore, represented 100 percent of those referencing this issue (i.e., the 50% of the elites who referred to this issue in 1979 all deemed it important).

¹⁹ NATO and Western Security in the 1980's, p. 19.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 10.

M(B)FR negotiations as increasing the saliency of the overall threat.

(Table 4.16).

In addition to presenting conclusions based upon interviews with British officials, the Report also presents the views of IISS staff members concerning the military balance in Europe. Two observations concerning their views in this regard are especially noteworthy. First, the Report states that "IISS staff described the theater nuclear balance in Europe as relatively stable (i.e., balanced) at the present time, but becoming relatively unstable in the near future."²¹ The results of our analysis indicate that this perception is not shared by British elites as a whole. In fact, 22.6 percent of the elites coded in 1979 perceived the current balance of theater/regional forces between NATO and the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact as adverse to the West; only 3.2 percent perceived it as being favorable to the West (Table 4.13). This discrepancy may stem from significant differences in the size and the composition of the IISS staff, which is more likely than British elites in general to base their calculations upon quantitative (hard data) and qualitative comparisons.²²

The second noteworthy point deriving from the IISS interviews is that "IISS staff regarded NATO's present conventional defenses as sufficient to deter attack and defend existing territory if dynamic procurement policies are pursued."²³ As our analysis shows, the perception that NATO is secure against a conventional attack is generally shared by British elites. (Of those elites coded for 1979, for example, 30.2 percent believed that Western

²¹Ibid., p. 23.

²²On this point see Brennan, *op. cit.*, pp. 10 and 14-15. Also see Robert Mahoney, Jr., and Alicia Mundy, Western European Perceptions of Arms Control/National Security Issues. A paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles, March, 1980, pp. 4-2, and 4-3.

²³NATO and Western Security in the 1980's, p. 23.

Europe was secure against a Warsaw Pact attack with conventional forces, while only 7.9 percent believed that Western Europe was not secure (Table 4.9.) The reason for this may, however, be very different, in that there is increasing concern about the contribution to deterrence of NATO conventional forces (Table 4.11), even though the conventional balance is viewed as slightly less unfavorable than in the past (Table 4.13); instead, heavier reliance seems to be placed on the strategic nuclear deterrent than on other elements of the armed forces.

The third study of elite perceptions against which our findings are compared is the project conducted for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency by CACI, Inc-Federal, under the direction of Robert Mahoney.²⁴ While both of our studies conduct content analysis of European elite perceptions, the CACI study differs from ours in a number of significant respects. First, it uses Janis and Fadner's coefficient of imbalance, which generates net aggregate coefficients (the statistic varies from +1.00 to -1.00) of favorable to unfavorable statements, (e.g., secure vs not secure), rather than tabular data.²⁵ Consequently, our respective findings are comparable only in terms of the general trend of perceptions, i.e., whether they are negative or positive. Second, the sections of the CACI study with which we are primarily concerned deal with the perceptions of government leaders and utilize only one source of elite data: Keesing's Contemporary Archives. Only by keeping these fundamental methodological differences in mind is it possible to make general comparisons between the findings of the two studies.

²⁴Mahoney and Mundy, Western European Perceptions of Arms Control/National Security Issues.


²⁵For a discussion of this methodology see Ibid., pp. 3-2 to 3-7.

Three principal themes are examined in the CACI study: tension (defined in terms of elite expectations of interbloc conflict), Western European security (involving elite assessments of security having to do with their own nation and region), and the balance of power (defined in order of battle terms, i.e., militarily). In terms of perceptions of the balance of power, Mahoney and Mundy note that "order of battle oriented assessments of the balance are not common in Keesing's. Indeed, the frequencies are so low as to make aggregate time series analyses questionable."²⁶ Consequently, data are not presented for this theme. Time series trends for the other two themes are presented, however, based upon data calculated for the time period of 1947-1978 -- from which we have selected for comparison, only those segments covering the period 1970-1978, which more or less matches ours. As shown in Figure 4.3, perceptions of both tension and security were found to be in the "negative zone" in 1978, i.e., there is less perceived security and more tension than in other years. Although it is impossible to compare our findings with those of Mahoney and Mundy on a item-by-item basis, since the themes of "tension" and "security" aggregate into two categories many of the variables in our Codebook, this particular conclusion conforms to ours (Table 4.12) though we disagree over the situation in the mid-70's, as shown by Figure 4.1.

The findings based upon the analysis of elite perceptions are paralleled in large measure by general public opinion, at least as such opinion is gauged by public opinion polls. For illustrative purposes, we have selected four issues covered by public opinion surveys which relate in a broad sense with the content

²⁶Ibid., p. 94.

FIGURE 4.3
PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY AND TENSION



Source: Mahoney & Mundy, Western European Perceptions of Arms Control/ National Security Issues, pp. 4-5 and 4-7. Note: Scale estimated from original.

of our primary coding: US versus USSR military strength; US versus USSR nuclear military strength; NATO versus Warsaw Pact military strength; and confidence in US defense commitments.

Table 4.22 presents the findings of public opinion surveys conducted between 1969-1977 on the question of British perceptions of US versus USSR military strength. As shown in this table, the percentage of those who perceived the US to be ahead decreased from 41 percent in August, 1969, to 10 percent in March, 1977. Conversely, the percentage of those who perceived the USSR to be ahead increased by 20 percent during this time period -- from 30 to 50 percent. Much the same picture is shown by Table 4.23, which summarizes the results of public opinion surveys on this same question between July 1971 and July 1977. (To be precise, the percentage of those who perceived the US being ahead decreased from 39 percent in 1971 to 18 percent in 1977, while the percentage of those who perceived the USSR to be ahead increased from 32 to 54 percent.) Although the results of our elite analysis are not nearly as one-sided as the public opinion surveys, since the largest percentage of elites coded in 1979 perceived the balance to be roughly equal, there was a definite shift over time in beliefs that the strategic balance is adverse to the West (Table 4.13). Furthermore, we found that Soviet nuclear forces were increasingly seen by British elites as threatening European security; in fact, the percentage of those holding that view rose from 7.4 in 1971 to 25.4 in 1979 (Table 4.11).

British public perceptions of NATO versus Warsaw Pact military strength have also undergone a negative shift, as shown in Table 4.24. Between 1977 and 1979, for example, the percentage of those who perceived NATO to be ahead decreased from 17 to 12 percent; those who perceived the Warsaw Pact to be ahead,

on the other hand, increased from 49 to 64 percent. These perceptions correspond to a high degree with those of British elites. Our findings show, for example, that negative perceptions of the NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance increased between 1971 and 1979 (Table 4.13) and that these are more or less directly reflected in British elite perceptions of threats to Western security. (Table 4.11 and 4.12).

Finally, it should be noted that while British public perceptions of the US-Soviet military balance and the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance have become increasingly negative, a high degree of confidence continues to be placed in the US defense commitments to Western Europe. As shown in Table 4.25, over 70 percent of all those surveyed in 1980 placed either a "considerable/fair" or "great" deal of confidence in the US defense commitment, compared to 67 percent who viewed the US in this light during 1968--and 82% in 1972! Our elites were somewhat more cautious, with just over half of those responding in the three time periods indicating that US willingness to defend Western Europe ameliorated their concerns about security (see Table 4.14) and they likewise registered declining confidence in the effects of that willingness on perceived threats.²⁷

In conclusion, while our findings are not consistent with all of the findings in other elite analyses and public opinion surveys, there is a high degree of congruence in the most important trends. This is especially true with respect to trends in perceptions of the overall and strategic military balances. Even if this congruence is the result of the "law of benevolently countervailing errors", it is nevertheless significant, given the great diversity in research methodologies, sample sizes, temporal frameworks, the questions asked, and the target populations involved.

²⁷Strictly speaking, our question is not directly comparable with those asked in the several British polls, but "confidence in the commitment" is implicit in the question.

TABLE 4.22:
BRITISH PERCEPTIONS OF
US VS. USSR MILITARY STRENGTH

Date of Poll	US Ahead	USSR Ahead	Neither (Vol.)/ Equal	Other	No Opinion
1969: July	35%	31%	13%	-	20%
August	41	30	12	-	16
Oct-Nov	33	34	13	-	20
1972: January	28	49	-	13	8
Mar-Apr	29	45	-	15	10
1977: March	10	50	19	-	22

SOURCE: Alvin Richmond, West European Attitudes Toward Security Issues, Paper prepared for presentation at the 1980 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles, March 18-22, Table 8 (1977 and 1969);

U.S. Information Agency, Office of Research and Assessment, U.S. Standing in Britain Between the President's China and USSR Visits, R-40-72, September 5, 1972, p. 24 (1972 data).

TABLE 4.23:
BRITISH PERCEPTIONS OF
US VS. USSR NUCLEAR MILITARY STRENGTH

Date of Poll	US Ahead	USSR Ahead	Equal	No Opinion
1971: July	39%	32%	8% ^a	20% ^b
1972: March	21	23	47	9
June	29	19	27	5
1977: March	19	34	29	18
July	18	54	19	9

^a volunteered

^b Does not include 1% for China and 2% for others.

SOURCE: U.S. Information Agency, Office of Research and Assessment. West European Public Opinion on Issues of Relevance to U.S. Interests. R-33-71, Washington, D.C., December 28, 1971, p. 8. (1971 data); and

Richmond, op. cit., Table 10.

TABLE 4.24:

BRITISH PERCEPTIONS OF
NATO VS. WARSAW PACT MILITARY STRENGTH

Date of Poll	NATO Ahead	WTO Ahead	Equal	No Opinion
1977: March	17	49	23	11
1978: March	11	59	22	9
1979: May	12	64	3	21

SOURCE: Richman, op.cit., Table 9.

TABLE 4.25:

BRITISH CONFIDENCE IN
US DEFENSE COMMITMENT

Date of Poll	Great	Considerable/ Fair Amount	Not very much/little	None/ very little	Don't Know
1968: Spring	39	28	10	4	19
1972: March	31	51	11	5	3
1974: Oct-Nov	51	33	9	2	5
1975: May-Apr.	22	41	22	7	8
1978: March-Apr.	35	38	17	3	8
1979: July	34	34	22	6	4
1980: March-Apr.	34	37	17	7	5

SOURCE: Richman, op.cit., Table 15 (1968-1979); USICA, West European Attitudes Toward Soviet Actions in Afghanistan and Other Security Issues, May 12, 1980, p. 5.

D. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH ON BRITISH ELITES

In summarizing the results of our research on British elite perceptions of threats to European security in the 1970s (as covered by our three time intervals) the following points are the most noteworthy:

1. In all three periods, British elites paid more attention to external threats than to any other category of themes, with 1975, to judge from the number and percentage of references, "the year of greatest threat." (See Table 4.3) Within this category, emphasis shifted from the Soviet naval build-up, which dominated concerns in 1971 and 1975, to the theater/regional nuclear balance, in 1979. (Overall, however, concern about Soviet naval forces was the largest single theme, as shown on Table 4.4).
2. Increasing concerns over security were also evident in intra-alliance relations, where military issues in general (even though still secondary to political ones) received much greater attention in 1979 than in 1971 or 1975, and in national military/security concerns, where references to defense spending were four times as large as all other references combined. (Moreover, those who deemed defense spending too low outnumbered by two to one those who considered it too high.) These concerns were not, however, matched by concerns about the US security guarantee and/or "decoupling," which remained both steady and low -- a factor to be considered in assessing the British sense of security.
3. As a matter of fact, British elites were relatively unconcerned about direct threats to European security, as distinct from those implicit in the shifting military balance; as shown on Table 4.9, the majority made no reference at all to any threat. And those who did respond were more concerned about political pressures backed by the threat of force

and about threats to economic viability and/or political independence than about conventional attacks or strikes by nuclear forces -- though uncertainty over the latter was increasing. (See Table 4.10) And here again, as far as indirect and/or extra-European measures were concerned, 1975 was the "year of greatest threat". (Figure 4.1)

4. This assessment corresponds to some extent with British perceptions of the contributions of various types of forces to security; for example, significant increases in concerns about Soviet strategic and theater/regional nuclear forces were coupled with an erosion of confidence in the protection afforded by comparable US/NATO forces, both of which indicators changed rapidly in 1979.²⁸ However, even in this year only about a quarter of the respondents even mentioned the impact of these forces on security, which reinforces the earlier finding that the British were relatively unconcerned about force postures in or affecting Western Europe.
5. At first glance this is somewhat surprising, in that the percentage of respondents who perceive the military balance to be adverse has increased between 1971 and 1979; in fact, in the latter year, strategic nuclear forces constituted the only one of the three components for which "favorable" or "roughly equal" estimates were higher than adverse ones. (See Table 4.13) When, however, British elites assessed the overall military balance, "favorable" or "equal" and "adverse" estimates were exactly matched.²⁹ Although this judgement is independent of that about force components, it does suggest two things:

²⁸ While net perceptions of the threat posed by Soviet/WTO conventional forces increased steadily during this period, so did confidence in the contributions to security of US/NATO conventional forces -- though this never moved into the positive side of the scale.

²⁹ This year was the only one in which any respondents gave a rating of "favorable" to the overall balance.

- a) That the British sense of security against direct assault may derive in part from this perception of the overall balance;
 - b) That the (relatively favorable) strategic balance must weigh more heavily than the (more adverse) balances between the theater/regional nuclear and conventional forces of both sides.
6. As far as other factors which could affect perceptions of security are concerned:
- a) British elites have major concerns about the consequences of West European (un)willingness to devote resources to defense but lesser ones about American willingness and about the readiness of the United States to come to the defense of Western Europe.
(Table 4.15)
 - b) Although the Soviet military build-up and force modernization gives cause for worry, Soviet political behavior, with respect to detente in general and M(B)FR in particular, does not -- though it is not regarded all that highly. (Table 4.16)
 - c) British elites believe that "political ties" have a (somewhat) greater effect on national behavior than force (Table 4.19), a belief which may both be necessitated by their dependence on more powerful allies for security and be influential in molding their perceptions of security.³⁰

³⁰ Interestingly enough, the number of references to force, political ties and, even more, political goals dropped considerably between 1971 and 1979, without any corresponding increase in the importance attached to economic strength and ideology. Does this reflect a new isolationism, a time of drift or a search for other instruments of policy more suited to British hands?

d) Although relatively few respondents even mentioned East-West relations, the percentage viewing these as "hostile", rather than "neutral" or "friendly" went up ³¹ -- qs, to a lesser degree, did the percentage of those similarly describing US-Soviet relations.

7. Earlier questions about the meaning of British perceptions of threat and security, of the military balance and of the importance of force as an instrument of national policy are to some extent answered when one looks at British policy preferences; despite perceptions of a military situation which was worsening over time, slightly fewer elites opted for military/defense courses of action while increasing percentages favored political/economic choices or mixed ones, i.e. those which, like the "dual-track" decision, featured both weapons modernization and arms control. (Table 4.21)
8. This "partial answer" is, however, just that; it ratifies rather than resolves some of the apparent inconsistencies in British perceptions. It does not, for example, explain why the British felt reasonably secure against direct attack by Soviet/WTO forces but vulnerable to political pressures backed by the threat of force. Nor does it give any clue as to why the British felt more threatened in 1975 than before or after; to say that this was because Soviet policy on detente was perceived more negatively than in 1971, or that East-West relations worsened over the intervening years, is simply to shift the question, not to provide an answer. For this, as for other answers, one must look to more extensive research and deeper analysis than has been possible so far.

³¹ This is the exact opposite of US elites, who see relations between East and West as "neutral."

9. Unfortunately, the research done by others, on which we have reported in Section C, COMPARABILITY OF FINDINGS, does not provide the insights we need; indeed in a few instances it clouded issues rather than illuminated them. There is, however, a high degree of congruence between our study and others with respect to the most important trends in British perceptions, especially those relating to the military balances. This gives us some hope that we may yet be able to draw supportable inferences concerning the reasons for some of our findings.

CHAPTERS 5 - 8

CHAPTER 5

FRENCH PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT AND SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

The third group of national elites examined was the French, whose 152 source documents are approximately 24.5 percent of the total sample. As shown in Table 5.1, the distribution of cases between the three time periods was generally consistent; 49 in 1971, 56 in 1975 and 47 in 1979. Nearly 56 percent of the French sources were government officials and political leaders, with another 29.6 percent academicians, journalists and defense analysts.¹ Only 9.3 percent of the total French cases were military elites. The remaining 9.8 percent were either "other" or not referenced.² Unlike the American and British cases, the yearly distribution of elites was not very consistent, with a fairly large standard deviation in the academic/defense analyst/journalist percentages.

¹For our definitions of elite groups see the Coder's Guide, Appendix 2, pp. 342-343.

²As noted previously, "other" elites refers to business leaders, labor leaders, etc., "unreferenced" elites are those for which no information was provided in the coded material.

TABLE 5.1:
PRINCIPAL PROFESSION OF
FRENCH NATIONALS

Principal Profession	1971		1975		1979		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1. Govt. Official/ Political Leader	31	.633	29	.518	25	.532	85	.559
2. Academician/Defense Analyst/Journalist	8	.163	24	.429	13	.277	45	.296
3. Military Officer	3	.061	1	.018	4	.085	8	.053
4. Other	0	-	1	.018	2	.043	3	.02
5. No Reference	7	.143	1	.018	3	.064	11	.072
TOTAL	49	.322	56	.368	47	.309	152	100.

TABLE 5.2:

STATUS OF FRENCH ELITES

Status	1971		1975		1979		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Active	35	.714	31	.554	37	.787	103	.678
Retired	1	.020	2	.036	3	.064	6	.039
No Reference	13	.265	23	.410	7	.149	43	.283
TOTAL	49	.322	56	.368	47	.309	152	100.

A. MAJOR THEMES

French elites discussed 94 discrete themes (to which there were 385 thematic references) within the three periods of the project. Of these, 26 were related to the external threat from the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact; 50 were intra-alliance issues; 3 were domestic themes; 11 were national military-security issues; and 4 were related to concerns about American security guarantees to Western Europe. (See Table 5.3). The total number of themes is very large (half again as high as for the US and the UK), which seemingly reflects both the wider range of interests of French authors and the more specific form of their propositions.

Themes relating to external threats rose from 14.5 percent of the total in 1971 to 28.4 percent in 1979. However, even at their highest they fell far behind the discussion of intra-alliance issues, which registered an overall percentage of 53 percent of all themes. (Indeed, except for 1979, references to national military-security concerns were as high as those to external threats.) Domestic concerns, as they relate to European threats and security, were only 4.7 percent of the total sample, decreasing constantly over time, and references to the reliability of American security guarantees to Western Europe were almost as few in number--though these did increase in 1979. Thus, French sources attached different importance to some clusters of issues than did British and American elites.

1. External Threats. French concerns about the primary threats to European security were manifest in 26 major themes, only 4 of which appeared in each of the longitudinal slices. It is apparent from Table 5.4 that French authors did not focus upon a small number of salient themes, but rather covered a wide range of diverse topics, none of which had more than 9 references. Even if one aggregates

TABLE 5.3:
FRENCH THEMATIC REFERENCES

Thematic Categories	1971		1975		1979		Total	
	N	Z	N	Z	N	Z	N	Z
A. External Threats	17	.145	19	.151	40	.284	76	.197
B. Intra-Alliance Issues	63	.534	78	.619	63	.447	204	.530
C. Domestic Concerns	8	.068	6	.048	4	.028	18	.047
D. National Military Security Issues	18	.153	18	.143	19	.135	55	.143
E. US Security Guarantees	12	.103	5	.040	15	.106	32	.083
TOTAL	118	.306	126	.327	141	.366	385	100.

themes into clusters, there are only 33 references to military buildups and balances, 20 of which appear in 1979. Nor was there as much attention paid to the conventional balance, the Soviet naval build-up or even to theater/regional nuclear forces, elements which figured largely in US and British themes. The next largest cluster of themes (with a total of nine references) was to Soviet political/military pressure; from then on one rarely got more than two or three references to any particular theme.

Two items may be of interest here. The first is that there was no concern expressed over threats to "economic lifelines" or to areas containing vital resources. The second is that although a vast majority of French elites considered the Soviet Union to be the primary threat, 12.5 percent of the themes for 1979 indicated French concern about US/NATO threats to European security. The elites voicing these concerns, principally communist or socialist political leaders in the National Assembly, stated that France must be aware of the Soviet/American domination of European affairs and that US programs for military modernization (especially of theater nuclear forces) were attempts to control Western Europe. Thus, some American activities were seen as inherently destabilizing and threatening to French independence.

2. Intra-Alliance Issues. The 50 intra-alliance themes produced by French authors (see Table 5.5) derived from 204 thematic references. Like the external threat themes, only a very small number of themes (9 percent) appeared consistently in each year. However, French elites, though addressing a myriad of unique themes, appeared to concentrate on a number of consistent thematic groupings.

The largest single reference was to detente, though attention to this issue reached its peak in 1975. The next largest was to economics and security, with most

TABLE 5.4:

EXTERNAL THREAT THEMES: FRENCH SOURCES

THEMES	THEMATIC REFERENCES							
	1971		1975		1979		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1. Soviet threat to NATO flanks	4	.235	2	.105	0	-	6	.079
2. Conventional balance	<u>2</u>	<u>.118</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>.053</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>.05</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>.066</u>
3. Soviet political pressure backed by the threat of force	2	.118	<u>2</u>	<u>.105</u>	<u>0</u>	-	<u>4</u>	<u>.053</u>
4. Soviet military/political pressure	2	.118	<u>2</u>	<u>.105</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>.025</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>.066</u>
5. Soviet naval buildup	<u>2</u>	<u>.118</u>	<u>0</u>	-	<u>0</u>	-	<u>2</u>	<u>.026</u>
6. Soviet geopolitical strategy	1	.059	1	.053	2	.05	4	.053
7. Theater/regional nuclear forces	1	.059	<u>0</u>	-	<u>2</u>	<u>.05</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>.039</u>
8. Geopolitical structure of power	1	.059	1	.053	1	.025	3	.039
9. Strategic balance	1	.059	0	-	<u>7</u>	<u>.125</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>.105</u>
10. Chinese threat to Asia	1	.059	0	-	0	-	1	.013
11. Soviet military buildup	<u>0</u>	-	<u>4</u>	<u>.210</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>.125</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>.118</u>
12. Overall military balance	<u>0</u>	-	<u>2</u>	<u>.105</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>.100</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>.079</u>
13. Exaggeration of Soviet threat	0	-	2	.105	1	.025	3	.039

(...Continued...)

Underlined data are discussed in the text

* Themes present in each year

TABLE 5.4 (Cont'd)

THEMES	THEMATIC REFERENCES							
	1971		1975		1979		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
14. Soviet military compensates for other weaknesses	0	-	1	.053	0	-	1	.013
15. Soviet manipulation of detente/arms control for military buildup	0	-	1	.053	1	.025	2	.026
16. East/West tensions generate arms race	0	-	0	-	3	.075	3	.039
17. US/NATO arms race increases risk of war	0	-	0	-	2	.050	2	.036
18. Soviet idiosyncratic variables the causes of imperialistic policy	0	-	0	-	1	.025	1	.013
19. Domination of Europe by USSR/GS	0	-	0	-	1	.025	1	.013
20. "Grey area" weapons problems	0	-	0	-	1	.025	1	.013
21. Changes in weapons technology increases insecurity	0	-	0	-	1	.025	1	.013
22. Soviet capability for surprise conventional attack	0	-	0	-	1	.025	1	.013
23. External factors in European security	0	-	0	-	1	.025	1	.013
24. Nuclear Weapons in Germany increase risks of war	0	-	0	-	1	.025	1	.013
25. US threat to Europe/France	0	-	0	-	1	.025	1	.013
26. Soviet military doctrine	0	-	0	-	1	.025	1	.013
TOTAL	17	.224	19	.250	40	.526	76	100.

* Appeared in each year.

references appearing in 1971 - the year of the Mansfield Amendment and of pointed questions about the size of West European contributions to defense. By 1979, however, economics and security was a non-issue and there were only three references to detente, presumably reflecting the disillusionment that set in during the late 70's.

If, on the other hand, one groups themes into clusters, then other important issues emerge: arms control, in all its various forms; US/NATO military doctrine, especially with respect to deterrence; and, above, all European integration and/or cooperation in both defense and other areas. These emphases are quite understandable; for example, the French have been engaged for fifteen years in a debate over military strategy and doctrine, with particular respect to the role of the force de frappe.

Where this leaves one, however, is at a loss, since the diffusion of themes is so pronounced, and the clusters of themes so multi-variable, that it is hard to assess the implications. A few, do, however, emerge:

1) Whereas in 1971 and 1975 most French themes centered around non-military issues (69.8 and 75.4 percent respectively), by 1979 this was completely reversed, with nearly 72.7% of all references being to military issues; this clearly points up the new situation created, even for an "independent" France, by the Soviet military build-up and the actual and proposed NATO responses, notably with respect to the modernization of theater nuclear forces.³

³This was particularly marked with respect to two sub-areas:

- a) Discussions of deterrence, NATO military doctrine, etc., which rose to 27% in 1979, over twice the level of any prior year;
- b) Military modernization, including not only TNF but conventional weaponry, and not only the military/technical but the political - military aspects -- such as the opposition to TNF in West Germany. This entirely new cluster of themes accounted for 14% of all references in 1979.

2) Arms control, which had for years been a subject discussed rarely, and then usually with contempt, accounted for 30.9% of the references in 1979. Part of this may reflect the continuing debate over SALT and the emerging debate over TNF, but some derived from new French initiatives, as in the proposal for conventional arms reductions "from the Urals to the Atlantic". (Whether, as one of our collaborators observed, this attention indicates real interest in arms control, or is simply a way of avoiding arms control measures distasteful to the French, is perhaps another question.)

3) By 1975, French sources had clearly come to prefer a European community modeled after de Gaulle's "union des patries" (union of fatherlands) to one based on the creation of a supra-national structure. By 1979, the number of references had dropped from its high of 25.3% (in 1971) to 11.1% and barely a quarter of these any longer espoused European political integration. Thus, whether because a consensus had emerged or because French attention was directed from political issues to military ones, "community" was not nearly as much of an issue as in the past.

4) Finally, we have negative evidence (in the form of a virtual absence of comment) that our French elites were not concerned about threats to economic lifelines or access to raw materials. To the extent that international economic issues were deemed relevant to the various groupings of which France is a member (the Atlantic Alliance, the European Community, etc.) these focused on foreign aid, the new international economic order and interdependence, rather than upon defense of the Middle East or Soviet encroachments in Africa. If this is representative of current French thinking (and there are some indications that it is, under President Mitterand) then neither the United States nor the United Kingdom may

TABLE 5.5:
INTRA-ALLIANCE ISSUES: FRENCH SOURCES

THEMES	THEMATIC REFERENCES							
	1971		1975		1979		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1. Economics and security	12	.106	7	.096	3	-	19	.093
2. European political/military integration	7	.111	1	.013	2	.032	10	.049
3. Arms Control: MBFR	6	.095	1	.013	2	.032	9	.044
4. Detente	5	.079	15	.192	3	.048	23	.113
5. US/NATO Military Doctrine	4	.063	1	.013	6	.095	11	.054
6. European independence and co-operation	4	.063	4	.041	3	-	11	.059
7. European defense cooperation/perspective	4	.063	4	.051	4	.063	12	.059
8. Deterrence	3	.063	6	.077	2	.032	11	.054
9. British/French nuclear forces as a deterrent	2	.032	0	-	1	.016	3	.015
10. Arms Control: SALT	2	.032	2	.026	8	.127	12	.059
11. Security and international cooperation	2	.032	4	.051	0	-	6	.029
12. Foreign aid and cooperation	2	.032	0	-	0	-	2	.010
13. CSCE	2	.032	0	-	0	-	2	.010

(Continued...)

TABLE 5.5 (Cont.)

THEMES	THEMATIC REFERENCES							
	1971		1975		1979		Total	
	N	Z	N	Z	N	Z	N	Z
14. Soviet lead in European security talks	1	.016	0	-	0	-	1	.005
15. Standardization/interoperability	1	.016	0	-	0	-	1	.005
16. NATO-wide domestic/economic constraints on defense	1	.016	1	.013	0	-	2	.010
17. French/German political/military cooperation	1	.016	1	.013	0	-	2	.010
18. Arms Control: General	1	.016	2	.026	3	.048	6	.029
19. Relationship between politics/force	1	.016	0	-	0	-	1	.005
20. Defense burden sharing	1	.016	0	-	0	-	1	.005
21. French/European involvement in arms control/SALT	1	.016	1	.013	2	.032	4	.020
22. European political/military cooperation	0	-	3	.038	1	.016	4	.020
23. Cultural exchanges between East and West	0	-	3	.038	0	-	3	.015
24. Regional/global interdependence	0	-	3	.038	1	.016	4	.020

(Continued...)

TABLE 5.5 (Cont.)

THEMES	THEMATIC REFERENCES							
	1971		1975		1979		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
25. French/NATO relations	0	-	2	.026	1	.016	3	.015
26. Deterrence as affected by new conventional technology	0	-	2	.026	0	-	2	.010
27. Third World/NIEO	0	-	2	.026	0	-	2	.010
28. Elements of national power	0	-	1	.013	0	-	1	.005
29. Need for ideological cooperation to reduce East/West tension	0	-	1	.013	1	.016	2	.010
30. Need for French/US cooperation in the Mediterranean	0	-	1	.013	0	-	1	.005
31. European states as conflict mediators	0	-	1	.013	0	-	1	.005
32. Technological threat to strategic stability	0	-	1	.013	1	.016	2	.010
33. Nuclear proliferation	0	-	1	.013	0	-	1	.005
34. Threats to economic lifelines	0	-	1	.013	0	-	1	.005
35. Superpower influence in Europe due to lack of self-determination	0	-	1	.013	0	-	1	.005
36. Need for European collective will	0	-	1	.013	0	-	1	.005

(Continued...)

TABLE 5.5 (Cont.)

THEMES	THEMATIC REFERENCES							
	1971		1975		1979		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
37. Limited war/crisis as actions of deterrence	0	-	1	.013	0	-	1	.005
38. French desire for disarmament	0	-	1	.013	1	.016	2	.010
39. Threat from escalation of local conflicts	0	-	1	.013	0	-	1	.005
40. West/global economic crisis	0	-	1	.013	3	.048	4	.020
41. Modernize NATO TIF	0	-	1	.013	3	.048	4	.020
42. SALT: sanctuarization of US/USSR	0	-	0	-	4	.063	4	.020
43. Europe as battleground for superpowers	0	-	0	-	3	.048	3	.015
44. Parity and symmetric force reduction	0	-	0	-	2	.032	2	.010
45. French: stay out of SALT	0	-	0	-	1	.016	1	.005
46. US/French foreign policy divergence	0	-	0	-	1	.016	1	.005
47. German policy toward TIF	0	-	0	-	1	.016	1	.005
48. TIF modernization as a threat to detente	0	-	0	-	1	.016	1	.005

(Continued...)

TABLE 5.5 (Cont.)

THEMES	THEMATIC REFERENCES							
	1971		1975		1979		Total	
	N	Z	N	Z	N	Z	N	Z
49. US/USSR pressing allies for conventional build-up	0	-	0	-	1	.016	1	.005
50. NATO political trends: centrifugal/centripetal	<u>0</u>	-	<u>0</u>	-	<u>1</u>	<u>.016</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>.005</u>
TOTAL	63	.309	78	.382	63	.309	204	100.

— Underlined data are discussed in the text
 * Themes present in each year

expect much sympathy for its more conflict-oriented concerns and policy preferences in the Third World.

3. Domestic Concerns. Domestic concerns, as they impact upon French perceptions of threat and security, fell into only three major themes: French cultural/social/linguistic independence; the fear of the loss of sovereignty to supranational and/or superpower domination; and "national will" as the basis of the state. As a group, these themes accounted for only 6.8 percent of the themes in 1971, 4.8 percent in 1975 and 2.8 percent in 1971 and were thus the least discussed of the principal thematic groupings. (See Table 5.6) But though the total references are small, they may be significant, as they express very different concerns from those of American or British elites, even with respect to the manifestations of concern over "national will".

4. National Military-Security Concerns. As shown in Table 5.7, the national military security concerns of French elites fell into 11 different themes, only three of which were consistently discussed across each time period: the independent French defense policy, French foreign policy, and French nuclear forces as instruments of independence and deterrence. As a block, National Military-Security issues represented a fairly consistent share of all French themes, with an average of 14.3 percent.

TABLE 5.6:
FRENCH DOMESTIC CONCERNS

THEMES	THEMATIC REFERENCES							
	1971		1975		1979		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1. French Cultural/ Social/language Independence	7	.875	2	.333	0	-	9	.500
2. Fear of Loss of Sovereignty	1	.125	2	.333	0	-	3	.167
3. National Will	0	-	2	.333	4	100.	6	.333
TOTAL	8	.444	6	.333	4	.222	18	100.

The three consistent themes accounted for between 61.1 percent and 79 percent of the thematic references in any given year, with the others both scattered and scant. Substantively, a virtue was made of the fact that France did not rely on other states to help defend her interests, but pursued an independent defense (and foreign) policy. Very closely related to this theme were references to the fact that the French Force Nucleaire Stratégique provided an independent deterrent cover for France and independent leverage in foreign policy. Thus, themes in this area were extraordinarily consistent with long-held and deeply felt French views and with official French policy. (Moreover, one gets very different impressions of French concerns about national military - security issues than one does of American and British concerns.)

5. US Security Guarantees. Of the 385 thematic references produced by French authors, 32 (8.3 percent) were related to the nature of US security guarantees to Western Europe, subdivided into four primary themes. The first, and by far the largest, was that of the nature and (un)reliability of the American security guarantee (Table 5.8). The second largest theme centered on the problems resulting from the decoupling of US strategic forces from Western European defense.⁴ French elites indicated that American promises to utilize strategic nuclear forces in the defense of Western Europe were unreliable due to increased Soviet military capabilities, which put into question the logic of

⁴While decoupling as a principal theme of French articles was seen infrequently, it appeared consistently as supporting material in a large portion of French elite articulations. In addition to concerns about the inadequacy of the US strategic nuclear force, the French evidenced a desire to avoid emphasizing equilibrium among theater nuclear forces in Europe as a substitute for a suitable strategic balance or looking to the use of those forces in lieu of a strategic response to Soviet aggression.

TABLE 5.7:
FRENCH NATIONAL MILITARY SECURITY CONCERNS

THEMES	THEMATIC REFERENCES							
	1971		1975		1979		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1. French independent defense policy *	<u>5</u>	<u>.278</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>.500</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>.210</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>.327</u>
2. French foreign policy *	<u>4</u>	<u>.222</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>.222</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>.053</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>.164</u>
3. Algerian problem	3	.167	0	-	0	-	3	.055
4. French nuclear forces and independence/deterrence *	<u>2</u>	<u>.111</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>.167</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>.526</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>.255</u>
5. French cannot rely on either superpower	1	.056	0	-	0	-	1	.018
6. Utility of NATO for France	1	.056	0	-	0	-	1	.018
7. Attack on French support for the US	1	.056	0	-	0	-	1	.018
8. French naval policy	1	.056	0	-	0	-	1	.018
9. Defense spending: too little	0	-	2	.111	3	.158	5	.091
10. French security policy: detente/deterrence	0	-	0	-	1	.053	1	.018
11. Military as instrument of policy	0	-	0	-	1	.053	1	.018
TOTAL	18	.327	18	.327	19	.345	55	100.

Underlined data are discussed in the text

* Theme appears in each year

TABLE 5.8:
FRENCH CONCERNS ABOUT
US SECURITY GUARANTEES

THEMES	THEMATIC REFERENCES							
	1971		1978		1979		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1. US Security Guarantee	<u>10</u>	<u>.674</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>.600</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>.600</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>.689</u>
2. US Troop Withdrawal	1	.093	0	-	0	-	1	.031
3. Decoupling of US Strategic Forces	<u>1</u>	<u>.313</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>.200</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>.400</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>.250</u>
4. Decline of US Power	0	-	1	.200	0	-	1	.031
TOTAL	12	.375	5	.156	15	.469	32	100.

— Underlined data are discussed in the text
* Theme present in all years

such a response--in short, that de Gaulle had been right, if perhaps premature. The final two issues were minor, in that few references were generated and they only appeared in a single year.

6. Summary. The thematic references of French elites over the three years indicate a marked increase in military-related concerns. External threat issues became increasingly salient by 1979, nearly doubling in volume from 1971/1975. Moreover, the internal distribution of intra-alliance issues shifted from non-military subjects in 1971/75 to ones concerned with military-defense issues in 1979, when these accounted for 72% of the responses. Furthermore, there appeared to be a considerable linkage between the themes articulated in discussions of domestic issues, national-military security issues and the US security guarantee and those in the first two groupings. French desires for the maintenance of an independent voice in foreign affairs were accompanied and supported by measures for the creation and deployment of a separate nuclear force. The necessity for this force flowed logically both from these desires and from perceptions of American strategic unreliability. The increasing volume of references to these issues, resulting from a mutual reinforcement of views, was further increased by mounting concerns about Soviet military growth and other threat issues. At the same time, fears lest Western reactions to shifts in the military balance either create new instabilities or adversely affect French interests resulted in a marked increase in attention to arms control. In general, therefore, French elites by 1979 were both more concerned about and more focused on threats to the security of Western Europe than had been true in earlier years.

B. PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT AND SECURITY

1. Threats to European Security (Revised Codebook, Section II). The variables examined in this section, like those in the American and British chapters, were concerned with elite perceptions of intent (as distinct from capability) in regard to five specific threats: a nuclear strike by the USSR, a conventional assault by the Warsaw Pact, political pressure backed by the threat of force, internal subversion and threats against economic viability and/or political independence. Moreover, each threat possibility was examined for elite perceptions of the present situation and for perceptions of intent in the future.

As with American and British elites, the French did not, by and large, discuss these threats very frequently. However, responses to five variables (see Table 5.9) were important enough to analyze. (Unlike the Americans and the British, French elites did concern themselves with one future threat: the likelihood of a nuclear strike by the USSR: Var. 08). Though large fractions of the French cases did not refer to a particular threat, it is apparent that, in general, the issues coded did become more important as time progressed. This followed the pattern discovered in the thematic references--for which see Table 5.5.

In general, there was a perceptual shift toward insecurity; for example, the percentage of those voicing concerns about a possible nuclear strike rose by 23 points between 1971 (when no one seemed worried) and 1979, when more felt insecure than secure. Moreover, as shown in Table 5.10, French elites at each successive time period foresaw a future at least as pessimistic as the present. (Vars. 07 and 08). On a closer examination, one can also see that after

TABLE 5.9:

THREATS TO EUROPEAN SECURITY

Q: According to the Author, is Western Europe deemed secure against:

A) A Nuclear Strike by the USSR (Var. 07)

	1971	1975	1979
1. Yes	.122	-	.087
2. No	-	.018	.109
3/4 Uncertain	-	.018	.130
5. No Reference	.878	.964	.674
	N=49	N=56	N=47

B) A Nuclear Strike by the USSR in the Future (Var. 08)

	1971	1975	1979
1. Yes	-	-	.064
2. No	-	.018	.085
3/4 Uncertain	.020	.018	.192
5. No Reference	.980	.964	.660
	N=49	N=56	N=47

C) A Warsaw Pact Attack with Conventional Forces (Var. 09)

	1971	1975	1979
1. Yes	.082	.018	.022
2. No	.061	.018	.043
3/4 Uncertain	.040	.036	.043
5. No Reference	.816	.929	.891
	N=49	N=56	N=47

D) Soviet/Warsaw Pact Political Pressures Backed by Threat of Force (Var. 11)

	1971	1975	1979
1. Yes	.082	-	-
2. No	.020	.073	.021
3/4 Uncertain	-	.036	.021
5. No Reference	.898	.891	.957
	N=49	N=56	N=47

Cont....

TABLE 5.9 (Cont.)

C) Threats Against Economic Viability and/or Political Independence (Var. 15):

	1971	1975	1979
1. Yes	.020	.018	.021
2. No	.041	.054	.085
3/4 Uncertain	.020	.054	.021
5. No Reference	.918	.875	.872
	N=49	N=56	N=47

TABLE 5.10:
NET PERCEPTIONS OF
THREATS TO EUROPEAN SECURITY

Q: Is Western Europe deemed secure against:

A) A Nuclear Strike by the USSR (Var. #7):

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Yes	.122	-	.087
(-) No/Uncertain	-	.036	.239
	.122	-.036	-.152

B) A Nuclear Strike by the USSR in the Future (Var. #8):

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Yes	-	-	.064
(-) No/Uncertain	.020	.036	.277
	-.020	-.036	-.213

C) A Warsaw Pact Attack with Conventional Forces (Var. #9):

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Yes	.082	.018	.022
(-) No/Uncertain	.101	.054	.086
	-.019	-.036	-.064

D) Soviet/Warsaw Pact Political Pressure Backed by Threat of Force (Var 11):

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Yes	.082	-	-
(-) No/Uncertain	.020	.109	.042
	.062	-.109	-.042

E) Threats Against Economic Viability and/or Political Independence
(Var 15):

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Yes	.020	.018	.021
(-) No/Uncertain	.061	.108	.106
	-.041	-.090	-.085

As discussed in Chapter 2, "net perceptions" were derived by subtracting from the number of positive responses the number of negative and uncertain references-- on the ground that both of the latter reflected a lack of confidence in the security of Western Europe.

1971 each successive "present" response was even more negative than the "future" expectations of the prior time period. For example, in 1971, the net future expectation was -2 percent, yet in the next "present" period, 1975, perceptions were -3.6 percent. Even more striking is the change from 1975, where the "future" expectation was -3.6 percent, to the "present" responses in 1979 of -15.2 percent.

French elites registered a similar (though smaller) shift toward increased concern about security against a conventional attack (Var. 09). But both Variables 11 and 15 reached their lowest points in 1975, followed by slight upswings. (See Figure 5.1). It is possible that these changes fall within the limits of uncertainty about coding, for they do not seem to correspond with other trends observed so far. In fact, the most significant thing about French perceptions of threat is that three of them have remained virtually flat and two have changed only marginally during a period when much more significant changes in perceptions of capabilities took place. (See Section 2 A, below.)

2. Military/Political Factors Affecting European Security (Revised Codebook, Sections III and IV).

A. Military Factors. This section deals primarily with the various elements of the armed forces of NATO and the WTO, both as discrete entities and as components of the military balance. And, as before, we have asked two sets of questions about these forces, one concerning their importance to security and one their perceived capabilities.

1. Perceptions of Military Contributions to Security (Revised Codebook, Section III).

As Table 5.11 indicates, the majority of authors did not refer to these particular issues. As with Section II variables, however, the percentage of non-response generally drops appreciably from 1971 to 1979,

FIGURE 5.1:
NET PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT TO EUROPEAN SECURITY




TABLE 5.11:
MILITARY FACTORS AFFECTING EUROPEAN SECURITY

Q: How do the following factors influence concerns about threats to European Security:

A) Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact:

Var. 21: Capabilities of Soviet Strategic Nuclear Forces

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.102	.054	.298
2. No Effect	.020	.018	-
3. Decrease	.020	.018	-
4. No Reference	.857	.911	.702
	N=49	N=56	N=47

Var. 33: Capabilities of Soviet Theater/Regional Nuclear Forces

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.082	.018	.500
2. No Effect	.-	-	.022
3. Decrease	.-	-	.022
4. No Reference	.918	.982	.457
	N=49	N=56	N=47

Var. 28: Capabilities of Soviet/Warsaw Pact Conventional Forces

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.122	.125	.191
2. No Effect	.020	.018	.021
3. Decrease	-	.018	.021
4. No Reference	.857	.859	.787
	N=49	N=56	N=47

B) U.S./NATO

Var. 17: Capabilities of US Strategic Nuclear Forces

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.061	.036	.234
2. No Effect	.041	-	-
3. Decrease	.163	.018	.064
4. No Reference	.735	.946	.702
	N=49	N=56	N=47

Var. 22: Capabilities of US/NATO Theater/Regional Nuclear Forces

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.102	-	.085
2. No Effect	-	-	-
3. Decrease	-	-	.021
4. No Reference	.898	100.	.894
	N=49	N=56	N=47

Var. 29: Capabilities of British/French Theater/Regional Nuclear Forces

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.041	.054	.043
2. No Effect	.041	.018	.021
3. Decrease	.163	.196	.213
4. No Reference	.755	.732	.723
	N=49	N=56	N=47

Var. 27: Capabilities of US/NATO Conventional Forces

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.082	.125	.106
2. No Effect	.020	.018	.021
3. Decrease	.020	.018	-
4. No Reference	.878	.839	.872
	N=49	N=56	N=47

TABLE 5.12:
NET PERCEPTIONS OF MILITARY FACTORS
AFFECTING EUROPEAN SECURITY*

Q: How do the following factors influence concerns
about threats to European security:

A) Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact

Var. 21: Capabilities of Soviet Strategic Nuclear Forces

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease	.020	.018	--
(-) Increase/No Effect	.122	.072	.298
	-.102	-.054	-.298

Var. 33: Capabilities of Soviet Theater/Regional Nuclear Forces

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease	--	--	.022
(-) Increase/No Effect	.082	.018	.522
	-.082	-.018	-.500

Var. 34: Capabilities of Soviet Theater/Regional Nuclear Forces
and the likelihood of Nuclear Strike by the USSR

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease	--	--	--
(-) Increase	.041	--	.348
	-.041	--	-.348

Var. 28: Capabilities of Soviet/Warsaw Pact Conventional Forces

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease	--	.018	--
(-) Increase	.142	.143	.212
	-.142	-.125	-.212

(Continued...)

TABLE 5.12. (Cont'd)

B) US/NATO

Var. 17: Capabilities of US Strategic Nuclear Forces

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease	.163	.018	.064
(-) Increase/No Effect	.102	.036	.234
	.061	-.018	-.170

Var. 22: Capabilities of US/NATO Theater/Regional Nuclear Forces

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease	-	-	.021
(-) Increase/No Effect	.105	-	.085
	-.102	-	-.064

Var. 29: Capabilities of British/French Theater/Regional Nuclear Forces

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease	.163	.196	.213
(-) Increase/No Effect	.082	.072	.064
	.081	.124	.149

Var. 27: Capabilities of US/NATO Conventional Forces

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease	.020	.018	-
(-) Increase/No Effect	.102	.143	.127
	-.082	-.125	-.127

In this case, for the reasons discussed in Chapter 2, components that had "no effect" on concerns about European security were deemed not reassuring and were counted as negative.

indicating the increased salience of these issues, particularly of the significance of Soviet theater/regional nuclear forces.

As one would expect, Soviet strategic nuclear, theater/regional nuclear, and conventional forces generated not perceptions of increased threat, with a marked shift registered between 1971 and 1979. (See Table 5.12). The largest increase in French concerns about security occurred with respect to Var. 33, capabilities of Soviet theater/regional nuclear forces, with nearly 42 percent more of the elites indicating concern in 1979 than in 1971. Moreover, these capabilities were directly tied to increased fears of a nuclear strike by the USSR (Var. 34) which registered an increase in net negative perceptions of 30.7 percentage points from 1971 to 1979.⁵ Finally, net concerns about the threat posed by Soviet/Warsaw Pact conventional force capabilities increased by 7.0 percentage points from 1971 to 1979, a comparatively small figure.

Increasing concerns about threats to the security of Western Europe due to Soviet/Warsaw Pact military capabilities were mirrored by increasing concerns about the lack of US/NATO military capabilities (See Table 5.12, Section B). French concerns about the (lack of) capabilities of US strategic nuclear

⁵French elites were the only ones to talk about the separate threat of a theater nuclear war, which is what this question is all about. This is noteworthy in two respects:

- a) It is one of the contingencies against which the independent nuclear deterrent is supposed to be a safeguard.
- b) It indicates great fear of "decoupling" (a fear which is borne out in the thematic analyses) which in turn suggests that the French rely more heavily on the US strategic deterrent than their rhetoric would lead one to believe."

forces resulted in a shift of 23.1 percentage points, from a positive net perception of 6.1 percent in 1971 to a -17.0 percent in 1979 (Var. 17).⁶

Concerns about US/NATO conventional forces (Var. 27) rose slightly but no pattern could be discerned for perceptions of US/NATO theater/regional nuclear forces (Var. 22). If one had to draw an inference from these trends, it would be that US strategic nuclear capabilities markedly influence French perceptions of security, whereas other types of forces do not.

This judgement is to some extent buttressed by the importance attached to British and French theater/regional nuclear forces, which of course have strategic missions, i.e., are targeted against the USSR. Not only were the French the only ones to make a significant number of references to these forces but the importance they attached to them increased slightly over time. Thus, these findings, like those of the previous section, reflect broad support for French military doctrine and French strategic nuclear forces.

2. Perceptions of the Military Balance (Revised Codebook, Section IV.)

The nine variables in this section were concerned with perceptions of the military balance, both in the "present" and in the "future". Only four variables received sufficient references to be examined in detail and each of these addressed "present" balances rather than "future" perceptions.

⁶ Interestingly enough, the concern in 1971 that US capabilities made war more likely may have stemmed from their strength rather than their weakness, since Table 5.17, below, shows that the strategic balance was not deemed adverse to the West, but slightly favorable. In 1975, when fewer deemed it favorable (but even fewer saw it as equal) there was little concern about the likelihood of war.

Two trends are common to each of the four variables presented in Table 5.13: increasing salience of each issue since 1971, as measured by a decreasing percentage of "no references", and an increase in those perceiving a shift in the components of the military balance adverse the West.

In the case of strategic forces, this shift was reflected mainly in two ways: by 1979 a few people began to characterize the balance as adverse to the United States and a great many more than before judged it equal.⁷ In the case of both conventional and theater nuclear forces, the main change was in the number of people who deemed the balance adverse to the West--accompanied, in the latter instance, by a marked rise in 1979 in the number of references to these forces. (Refer back to Table 5.11), where this was also true of references in 1979 to the threat posed by Soviet theater nuclear force.)

A very revealing relationship between the component balances and their composite effect appeared in Variable 48 dealing with the overall balance between the NATO alliance and the Warsaw Pact. From 1971 to 1979 there was an increase in those deeming the balance adverse which roughly paralleled similar judgements with respect to theater nuclear and conventional forces.

Conversely, those assessing the overall balance as "roughly equal" exceeded the percentages for these two types of forces but fall far behind those for strategic nuclear forces.⁸ Even though, as we have noted previously, judgements on the overall balance are independent of judgements concerning the component forces, in this instance theater nuclear and conventional forces could

⁷As noted previously, "parity" is not always deemed desirable, especially when viewed in conjunction with other components of the balance.

⁸The "favorable" balance does not seem to correlate with anything.

TABLE 5.13

PERCEPTIONS OF THE MILITARY BALANCE

Q: What are the perceptions of the military balance held by each author concerning:

Var. 44: The Current Strategic Balance Between the US and the USSR

	1971	1975	1979
1. Adverse to West	-	-	.043
2. Roughly Equal	.245	.107	.362
3. Favorable to West	.041	.036	.021
4. No Reference	.714	.857	.574
	N=49	N=56	N=47

Var. 45: The Current Balance of Theater/Regional Forces Between NATO and the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact

	1971	1975	1979
1. Adverse to West	.041	.018	.298
2. Roughly Equal	-	-	.085
3. Favorable to West	-	-	.021
4. No Reference	.959	.982	.596
	N=49	N=56	N=47

Var. 47: The Current Balance of Conventional Forces Between NATO and the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact

	1971	1975	1979
1. Adverse to West	.122	.143	.277
2. Roughly Equal	.020	-	-
3. Favorable to West	-	.036	-
4. No Reference	.857	.821	.723
	N=49	N=56	N=47

Var. 48: The Overall Balance Between US/NATO and Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact

	1971	1975	1979
1. Adverse to West	.082	.071	.213
2. Roughly Equal	.122	.054	.085
3. Favorable to West	-	.036	.043
4. No Reference	.796	.839	.660
	N=49	N=56	N=47

Note that this variable is not the sum of the preceding three but is independent of them -- at least as far as data generation is concerned.

be said to carry greater subjective weight. This is in marked contrast to British perceptions though somewhat closer, for 1979 at least, to American ones. More importantly, it seemingly contradicts the importance attached earlier to US and Soviet strategic nuclear forces (see Table 5.11)⁹.

⁹One possible explanation may be that the French (quite properly) considered their strategic nuclear forces in the overall balance and hence arrived at different conclusions than one might expect from an examination of other components.

B. Political Factors

In addition to ascertaining changes in French perceptions of the military factors affecting European security, an attempt was also made to identify perceptions of three political factors: West European willingness to devote resources to defense (Var. 37); US willingness to devote resources to defense (Var. 38); and US willingness to defend Western Europe (Var. 39). Of these variables, only Variable 39, US willingness to defend Western Europe, generated much French interest, primarily in 1971 and 1979.

As shown in Table 5.14, although those French elites who did respond seemed to indicate concern about West European and American willingness to spend money on defense, relatively few responded. Many more were concerned about the US security guarantee, a concern which increased both absolutely and relatively over time. (See Tables 5.14 and 5.15). For all three variables, however, 1975 was an "off year", in which both the percentage of respondents and the number of negative judgements fell off. For this phenomenon, which is also true of British and American perceptions, we have no explanation--though we will seek to find one before we conclude our analysis.

C. Factors Affecting Perceptions

1. Saliency of the Overall Threat (Revised Codebook, Section III B). This section considers the saliency of threats as affected by Soviet behavior regarding M(B)FR (var. 40), detente in general (var. 41), negotiating positions on theater/regional forces (var. 42), and military build-up/modernization programs (var. 43). Only variables 40, 41 and 43 were referenced with any degree of consistency, and only variable 43, Soviet build-up and modernization programs, generated an increasing level of attention. In contrast, variable 40 (M(B)FR) and 41 (detente) drew fewer

TABLE 5.14:

POLITICAL FACTORS AFFECTING EUROPEAN SECURITY

Q: How do the following factors influence concerns about threats to European security:

Var. 37: West European Willingness to Devote Resources to Defense

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.122	.107	.149
2. No Effect	.020	-	-
3. Decrease	.041	.018	.021
4. No Reference	.816	.875	.830
	N=49	N=56	N=47

Var. 38: US Willingness to Devote Resources to Defense

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.143	.036	.152
2. No Effect	-	-	-
3. Decrease	.082	.018	-
4. No Reference	.776	.946	.848
	N=49	N=56	N=47

Var. 39: US Willingness to Defend Western Europe

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.224	.214	.426
2. No Effect	.061	-	-
3. Decrease	.224	.036	.128
4. No Reference	.490	.750	.447
	N=49	N=56	N=47

TABLE 5. 15

NET PERCEPTIONS POLITICAL FACTORS AFFECTING
EUROPEAN SECURITY*

Q: How do the following factors influence concerns
about threats to European security:

Var. 37: West European Willingness to Devote Resources to Defense

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease	.041	.018	.021
(-) Increase/No Effect	.142	.107	.149
	-.101	-.089	-.128

Var. 38: US Willingness to Devote Resources to Defense

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease	.082	.018	-
(-) Increase/No Effect	.143	.036	.152
	-.061	-.018	-.152

Var. 39: ES Willingness to Defend Western Europe

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease	.224	.036	.128
(-) Increase/No Effect	.285	.214	.426
	-.061	-.178	-.298

*As was true of Table 3.12, responses of "no effect" were deemed "not reassuring", and classified as having a negative impact on perceptions of security.

responses over time as the saliency of the issue apparently decreased. (See Table 5.16).

Two interesting trends become apparent from an examination of Table 5.17 concerning net perceptions of security. First, while French authors perceived Soviet behavior regarding detente (Variable 41) as positive in all three years, a large decrease had occurred by 1979 in those expressing positive attitudes, while negative responses remained essentially the same. The result was a substantial decrease in net positive perceptions. Second, these same authors registered a major increase in concerns about the Soviet military build/up modernization programs (Var. 43), between 1971/1975 and 1979. Starting from an initial net negative position of -14.3 percent in 1971, French elite perceptions had shifted to a net negative level of -31.9 percent by 1979. Logically, one would expect French perceptions of threats to security to increase more or less directly with perceptions of enhanced Soviet capabilities. In fact, this was true only in the case of the threat of nuclear war, (as shown by comparing Table 5.16 with Tables 5.12 and 5.10) which, given the French emphasis on this issue, is perhaps understandable.

2. World View of the Author (Revised Codebook, Section V-A). All told, the five variables believed to affect the behavior of states (for which see Table 5.13) received the highest number of responses of any section of the Codebook, and far more, on a percentage basis, than came from either British or American elites. However, the level of responses uniformly declined across the variables from 1971 to 1979.

TABLE 5.16

FACTORS AFFECTING PERSPECTIONS:
SALIENCE OF THE OVERALL THREAT

Q: How is the salience of the overall threat affected by Soviet behavior regarding:

Var. 40: N(B)FR

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.102	.018	.021
2. No Effect	.020	.018	.021
3. Decrease	.082	.018	.021
4. No Reference	.796	.946	.936
	N=49	N=56	N=47

Var. 41: Detente in General

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.041	.054	.064
2. No Effect	.082	.036	.064
3. Decrease	.163	.143	.064
4. No Reference	.714	.768	.809
	N=49	N=56	N=47

Var. 43: Soviet Military Buildup/Modernization Program

	1971	1975	1979
1. Increase	.163	.179	.362
2. No Effect	-	.054	-
3. Decrease	.020	-	.043
4. No Reference	.816	.768	.596
	N=49	N=56	N=47

TABLE 5. 17

NET PERCEPTIONS: SALIENCE OF THE OVERALL THREAT

Q: How is the salience of the overall threat affected by Soviet behavior regarding:

Var. 40: M(B)FR

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease/No Effect	.102	.036	.042
(-) Increase	.102	.018	.021
	0	.018	.021

Var. 41: Detente in General

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease/No Effect	.245	.179	.128
(-) Increase	.041	.054	.064
	.204	.125	.064

Var. 43: Soviet Military Buildup/Modernization Programs

	1971	1975	1979
(+) Decrease/No Effect	.020	.054	.043
(-) Increase	.163	.179	.362
	-.143	-.125	-.319

We believe that this decline paralleled the shift in the focus of most French elites from general discussions of macrointernational relations to specific analyses of particular issues dealing with threats and security, a shift in the level of abstraction which reduced opportunities to state general world views. (It should be noted that the final levels of references approximated in volume the levels addressed throughout by British and American elites.)

Table 5.19 and Figure 5.2 indicate the rankings of the variables by levels of "important" responses and how they changed over time. Political ties received the highest percentage of "important" references for 1971 and 1975, but fell to second place in 1979. Perceptions of the utility of force moved into first place in 1979, rising from the third position in 1971 and 1975. Political goals maintained the second rank in 1971 and 1975 but declined to third position in 1979--though the variations within the first three rankings were so slight as to make these distinctions without much difference. The remaining two variables, ideology and economic strength, competed for last place throughout the period.

It is understandable that force rose from third to first position among variables influencing national behavior. This paralleled the general trend in French concerns, which were increasingly oriented toward military matters. And it accompanied the diminution in interest in political integration which was noted earlier. The only question is why economic strength was seen throughout as comparatively unimportant, when a burgeoning French economy not only generated a rising standard of living but provided the resources for expensive military and foreign aid programs.

TABLE 5.18:

WORLD VIEW OF AUTHOR:
FACTORS INFLUENCING NATIONAL BEHAVIOR

Indicate the relative importance attached to the following factors, which can influence the ways in which states relate to, and behave toward, one another:

Var. 54: Force

	1971	1975	1979
1. Unimportant	-	-	-
2. Neutral	-	-	-
3. Important	.714	.527	.489
4. No Reference	.286	.473	.511
	N=49	N=56	N=47

Var. 55: Economic Strength

	1971	1975	1979
1. Unimportant	-	-	-
2. Neutral	.020	-	.021
3. Important	.571	.473	.234
4. No Reference	.408	.527	.745
	N=49	N=56	N=47

Var. 56: Ideology

	1971	1975	1979
1. Unimportant	.041	-	.021
2. Neutral	-	-	.021
3. Important	.633	.389	.340
4. No Reference	.327	.611	.617
	N=49	N=56	N=47

Var. 57: Political Goals

	1971	1975	1979
1. Unimportant	-	-	-
2. Neutral	-	-	-
3. Important	.837	.587	.435
4. No Reference	.163	.418	.565
	N=49	N=56	N=47

(Continued...)

TABLE 5.18 (Cont.)

Var. 58: Political Ties


	1971	1975	1979
1. Unimportant	-	-	-
2. Neutral	-	-	-
3. Important	.918	.691	.468
4. No Reference	.032	.309	.532
	N=49	N=56	N=47

TABLE 5.19:

WORLD VIEW VARIABLES
RANKED BY PERCEIVED IMPORTANCE

1971	1975	1979
Political Ties	Political Ties	Force
Political Goals	Political Goals	Political Ties
Force	Force	Political Goals
Ideology	Economic Strength	Ideology
Economic Strength	Ideology	Economic Strength

FIGURE 5.2:
WORLD VIEW OF AUTHOR;
PERCENTAGE OF "IMPORTANT" RESPONSES



3. East-West Relations (Revised Codebook, Section VB).

Current relations between the United States and the Soviet Union (Variable 59) and the overall relations between East and West (Variable 60) received moderate attention, with references to both variables declining between 1971 and 1979. Of those French elites addressing the topic, most perceived the "current" relations between the United States and Soviet Union as neutral or hostile (see Table 5.20), with some decline in the former and almost no change in the latter. Perceptions of the relations between Eastern Europe/USSR and Western Europe/US (variable 60) followed basically the same pattern as that described above. Considering the extraordinary efforts made by the French governments of the time to promote good relations with the Soviet Union, and Giscard d'Estaing's professed role as a "mediator" between the US and the USSR, this is rather surprising. (It is, moreover, contrary to both US and British perceptions of East-West relations, the French relations being more hostile than the former and less so than the latter.)

4. Policy Preferences (Revised Codebook, Section VI). The final section of the Codebook asked whether an author advocated a policy to improve the security of Western Europe and, if he or she did, what that policy should be.¹⁰

As shown in Table 5.21, of those expressing a policy preference, military/defense options moved from second place in 1971 and 1975 (35.7 percent and 36.4 percent respectively) to first position in 1979 with 43.8 percent of the references. At the same time, political/economic options, which enjoyed premier position in the first two periods (with 42.9 percent and 54.5 percent respectively) fell to the third spot with only 25 percent of the references. Mixed

¹⁰ See Chapter 3, Section C-4, Page 64, for a discussion of the rationale for this section.

TABLE 5. 19

WORLD VIEW OF AUTHOR:
EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Indicate how the Author assesses:

A) Current Relations Between the Soviet Union and the United States
(Variable 59)

	1971	1975	1979
1. Hostile	.163	.143	.174
2. Neutral	.122	.125	.043
3. Friendly	.041	.036	.043
4. No Reference	.673	.696	.739
	N=49	N=56	N=47

B) Current Relations, Overall, Between Eastern Europe/USSR and
Western Europe/US (Variable 60)

	1971	1975	1979
1. Hostile	.143	.071	.174
2. Neutral	.265	.125	.043
3. Friendly	.020	-	.022
4. No Reference	.571	.804	.761
	N=49	N=56	N=47

policies, combinations of military, political and economic actions, rose from the least-advocated course to the second level in 1979, with 31.2 percent of the references.

The rise of the percentage of elites who advocated exclusively military/defense programs followed the general trend observed in other parts of the project; the only surprise is that it should have been so high in earlier years. Those espousing political/economic solutions to security problems also followed a (predictable) downward trend, despite a temporary upsurge in 1975, the "year of detente". The increase in "mixed" programs (which could include arms sales and arms control, or expanded trade with the East even while deploying TNF) probably reflects efforts to adapt old solutions to new problems and is again understandable.

TABLE 5.20

POLICY PREFERENCES

Indicate whether or not the Author advocates a course of action (i.e., a policy preference) that should be undertaken to improve the security of Western Europe:

Variable 61: Policy Preferences

	1971	1975	1979
1. Yes	.265	.214	.362
2. No	.735	.786	.638
	N=49	N=56	N=47

If the author advocates a policy, is it:

	1971	1975	1979
1. Military/Defense	.357	.354	.438
2. Political/Economic	.429	.545	.250
3. Mixed	.214	.091	.312
	N=14	N=11	N=16

C. COMPARABILITY OF FINDINGS

Only five studies were located which utilize aggregate analyses of French elite perceptions of threat and security. Two of these studies base their conclusions upon interviews, and three utilize a variant of content analysis. Of these five studies, three were used as a basis of comparison in our British case study: Donald G. Brennan's study of Some European Elite Perceptions of Selected Security Issues (Briefing Charts); ¹¹ the Report of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Staff Study Mission to Seven NATO Countries and Austria, January 2-18, 1980; ¹² and Robert B. Mahoney, Jr., and Alicia Mundy's study of Western European Perceptions of Arms Control/National Security Issues. ¹³ The two new studies are Donald C. Daniel's work on 'Défense Nationale' Perceptions of the US-Soviet Military Balances, ¹⁴ and the work by Elizabeth J. Kirk and Maria L. Longo on French and Indian Perceptions of the U.S.-Soviet Power Balance. ¹⁵ Due to the research questions asked, the methodologies employed, and the manner in which the data are tabulated and presented, few of these sources were found to provide a meaningful basis of comparison with the findings of our study.

¹¹Final Report. HI-2255-RR (Croton-on-Hudson, NY: Hudson Institute, May 29, 1975).

¹²NATO and Western Security in the 1980's: The European Perception (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1980).

¹³Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles, March, 1980.

¹⁴Report No. NPS-56D176111 prepared for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, November, 1976). For a summary of this 146 page report see Donald C. Daniel, "French Perceptions of the U.S.-Soviet Military Balances: Analysis of Défense Nationale," in Donald C. Daniel (ed.) Perceptions of the Superpower Military Balances: Considerations and Evidence. Report No. NPS 56-78-001 (Monterey, CA.: Naval Postgraduate School, February, 1978), pp. 192-226.

¹⁵Report No. M-16 (Bethesda, MD: Analytic Support Center, MATHTECH, Inc., June 12, 1979).

This is especially true for the Brennan study, which neither aggregates findings by national source nor presents data in a statistical form.¹⁶ As a result, it is impossible to isolate French perceptions on the 20 security issues raised by Brennan from those of other elites being interviewed (a total of 59, ten of them French). In fact, only one question covered by the Brennan study, for which a sufficient number of French responses are presented, can be even marginally compared with our findings: "What views are held of long-term American resolve, will, determination, etc.?"¹⁷ Based upon his findings, Brennan concludes that: "There is high confidence that the U.S. will not abandon Europe, mainly stemming from a belief that Europe is too important to the U.S."¹⁸ Nevertheless, Brennan also observes that "There is some concern over possible impairment of U.S. decision-making, e.g., from congressional assertiveness, War-Powers Act, etc."¹⁹ Brennan supported these observations by the following quotes by selected French elites:

"Depend on the moment, U.S. not static...Consider the Pueblo.
On the other hand, U.S. bombed Hanoi" (Gallois)

"Formerly, Ca. 1960[±], was a feeling that France had to provide
for its own defense, because could not count on U.S. forever.
This feeling has faded." (Morel & Gergorin)

¹⁶For a discussion of these points cf. Chapter 4, supra.

¹⁷Brennan, op. cit., footnote 1, p. 20.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid.

"U.S. reliability is not put into question as such. Credibility of U.S. nuclear deterrent sometimes doubted, but [this doubt] not accepted by everybody in France." (Pagneiz)

"We have no doubt; don't ask the question. It is a matter of life or death for the U.S." (Buis & Poirier).²⁰

The closest that our analysis comes to this question concerns French perceptions of US willingness to defend Western Europe, and how these perceptions influence French concerns about threats to European security (Var. 39). Using 1975 (the date of Brennan's study), as the year of comparison, our analysis shows that only 3.6 percent of the elites coded perceived US willingness to defend Western Europe in a positive light. Twenty-one percent, in contrast, held negative perceptions of US resolve on this issue (Table 5.14). Although 1975 is a poor year in which to make comparisons between our findings and the conclusions of Brennan's study, since 75 percent of the French cases did not reference this concern (if they had, they might all have been positive), our number of respondents (14) compares fairly well with the number of French elites interviewed by Brennan (10) during that year. The results of our analysis, therefore, do not lend support to Brennan's findings and vice versa. (In fact, our analysis found that French perceptions of US resolve have become increasingly negative since 1971: -6.1 percent in 1971 compared to -17.8 in 1975 and -29.8 in 1979.) In part, the discrepancy between the two findings may rest upon the small number of cases on which the conclusions are based; they may also result, however, from differences in perceptions as measured by interviews and content analysis.

The second study of French elite perceptions of security reviewed here, the Report of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs' Staff Mission to NATO

²⁰ Ibid.

conducted in January, 1980,²¹ also fails to provide a data base against which the findings of our study can be compared. Although this Report bases its observations upon briefings by the French Embassy Staff and meetings with officials in the French Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, Members of Parliament, and nongovernmental observers of French foreign policy, it is totally narrative in content and devoid of hard data points. Unlike the British section, furthermore, the Report presents no information on French perceptions of the military balance, either between the US and the USSR or between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In fact, the Report is more a recital of French positions on security issues than it is an analysis of their perceptions of Western European security, as the title of the Report claims. We are told, for example, that:

1. The fundamentals of French defense policy are the maintenance of an independent, national strategic deterrent and nonparticipation in the integrated NATO command structure;
2. France would, in most cases, be willing to participate in a conflict in Western Europe; however, they could not adhere to a position of automaticity of response to an attack;
3. France plans to increase defense spending by 4 percent in real terms in 1980 and implements, on a case-by-case basis, defense measures recommended in the LTDP. . France supports the objectives of the LTDP, because it helps the other Western Allies improve their defense capabilities;
4. French political and psychological requirements for independence and freedom of action are greater than any other nation in Western Europe...these requirements stem primarily from historical experiences which dictate to France the need to balance a number of challenges to her security and/or independence, be they Soviet, German, or even American;

²¹NATO and Western Security in the 1980's: The European Perception, op. cit., footnote 12, supra.

5. French officials are concerned about the consistency and resolve of U.S. policy [(for our findings on this point see Table 5.13 and the discussion above)];
6. France is skeptical toward arms control. There is less of a political necessity in France than in the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, for arms control initiatives to be part of defense decisions such as the deployment of theater nuclear weapons [France, however, is not opposed to arms control];
7. France has from the beginning had a negative attitude vis-à-vis the NSFR talks on the grounds that it could not agree to a bloc-to-bloc approach; that the zone of proposed negotiations was too narrow; and the negotiations had been launched for political rather than military security reasons;
8. With regard to nuclear systems, French officials stressed that nuclear weapons, including those considered as "theater" systems, should not be included in any disarmament conference in Europe. This conference on disarmament in Europe would limit itself to a discussion of conventional capabilities. For France, all nuclear systems are strategic, and there can be no differentiation between theater and strategic nuclear systems; and
9. France considers the standardization of alliance weapons unacceptable because it merely signifies that one country, namely, the U.S., will be selling all the weapons to alliance members.²²

With the exception of point 5, these observations can be neither supported nor refuted by reference to our findings, since these issues are not addressed, per se, by our Codebook. At best, we can only state that these concerns emerged as major ones in our thematic analysis (see Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.7); we cannot, however, pass judgement on their validity or their congruence with the results of our research.

The third study of French elite perceptions against which our findings can be "compared" is Mahoney and Mundy's research on Western European Perceptions of Arms Control/National Security Issues.²³ Since the methodology used in this


²² Ibid., pp. 50-55.

²³ Op. cit., footnote 12, supra.

study, as well as the ways in which this research project differs from ours, has already been outlined in Chapter 4 it will not be repeated here. As will be recalled, three principal themes are examined by Mahoney and Mundy: tension (defined in terms of elite expectations of interbloc conflict); Western European security (involving elite assessments of security having to do with their own nation) and the balance of power (defined in order of battle terms). Due to the fact that assessments of the balance of power resulted in frequencies too low to make aggregate time series analysis possible, Mahoney and Mundy only present time series trends for the themes of "tension" and "Western European security." Although these trends cover the period 1946-1978, our comparative analysis only focuses upon the 1971-1978 segment of the trend line. These trends are illustrated in Figure 5.3.

Although it is impossible to compare our findings with those of Mahoney and Mundy on an item-by-item basis, since their themes aggregate into two categories many of the discrete variables in our Codebook, the findings of this study present a more "positive" picture of French perceptions in 1971 and 1975 than we would conclude based upon our findings. As an examination of our data will show, French perceptions of "threats to European security" were negative for all variables in 1975 and 1979, and all except two were negative in 1971 (see Tables 5.9 and 5.10 and Figure 5.1). Since these variables are directly linked to the issue of interbloc conflict (e.g., a Warsaw Pact attack with conventional weapons and a nuclear strike by the USSR), it would appear that our analysis uncovered a greater degree of "tension" among French elites than the Mahoney and Mundy study. It should be noted, however, that our findings are based upon a small, and in some cases minuscule, number of references

FIGURE 5.3
PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY AND TENSION



Source: Mahoney & Mundy, Western European Perceptions of Arms Control/National Security Issues, pp. 4-5 and 4-7. Note: Scale estimated from original.

to threat issues in 1971 and 1975. As a result, discrepancies in our respective "trends" may be due more to differences in samples, accounting techniques, and nuances in the questions asked than to any real differences in French perceptions. Even with the distortions created by our different approaches to the subject matter, however, both of our studies indicate that French perceptions of tension and insecurity have increased since 1975. This is especially evident in our findings across a broad range of variables in 1979 (see Tables 5.9-5.17 and Figure 5.1), and in the pronounced negative shift recorded by Mahoney and Mundy in 1978 (Figure 5.3). Considering the major differences in the methodologies employed, the consistency in our "negative findings" is made even more dramatic.

The fourth study of French elite perceptions against which our findings can be weighed is Donald Daniel's work on French Perceptions of the U.S.-Soviet Military Balance derived from an analysis of Défense Nationale.²⁴ Using content analysis to code twenty years (1955-1974) of selected articles and items from Défense Nationale, Daniel sought answers to six questions: (1) What military capabilities are being compared?; (2) Whose capabilities are being compared?; (3) Which side does the author see as superior at the time of writing?; (4) Do quantitative factors play a significant role in perception?; (5) What sources are specifically acknowledged by the author as providing him with information about the balance with which he was concerned?; and (6) What recommendations does the author make in view of the state of the balance as he perceives it? Eight categories of military capabilities were coded, in turn, in terms of how they were perceived in comparative terms:

²⁴ Op. cit., footnote 14, supra.

- overall strategic nuclear capabilities
- strategic bombs and warheads
- strategic missiles (aggregate)
- ballistic-missile submarines
- strategic aviation/strategic bombers
- overall conventional or ground forces
- overall naval capabilities
- overall air capabilities

Table 5.22 presents the summary findings for these capabilities for the years 1970-1974 and 1971 (isolated for the purposes of making direct comparisons with our 1971 data, the only year in which our two studies overlap). As shown by this Table, 91 percent of the authors coded by Daniel in the 1970-1974 period perceived the current strategic balance between the US and USSR to be equal, while the other nine percent perceived the US to be ahead. All of the authors coded on the issue in 1971 (10) perceived this balance to be equal. Our findings show that of the 14 elites who referenced this issue in 1971 (28.6% of the total), ten perceived the current strategic balance between the US and USSR to be roughly equal, with two (4.1%) perceiving it as being favorable to the West (Table 5.13). While we cannot make direct comparisons between our findings and those of Daniel concerning such factors as bombs, warheads, bombers and SSBN's, they correlate closely on the overall strategic balance. Moreover, there is a high degree of consistency between our findings on French perceptions of the conventional balance and those found by Daniel. He notes, for example, that authors in Défense Nationale tended to view the conventional or ground forces balance much more in NATO-Soviet/Soviet bloc terms than in US-Soviet Union terms.²⁵ In the 1970-1974 time period, there were four references to the Soviet Union/Soviet bloc being ahead in conventional ground forces and none to NATO being ahead (there were no references to this issue recorded

²⁵Ibid., p. 219.

TABLE 5.22:
DEFENSE NATIONALE BALANCE PERCEPTIONS

BALANCE	US		SOVIET UNION		EQUAL		TOTALS	
	1970-74	1971	1970-74	1971	1970-74	1971	1970-74	1971
Strategic Nuclear	5 (9%)	0 (%)	0 (0%)	0 (%)	50 (91%)	10 (100%)	55 (100%)	10 (100%)
Strategic Bombs & Warheads	4+1* (64%)	1 (100%)	1+1 (21%)	0 (0%)	1 (14%)	0 (0%)	7 (99%)	1 (100%)
Strategic Missiles (aggregate)	6+1 (43%)	3 (50%)	6+1 (43%)	3 (50%)	2 (13%)	0 (0%)	15 (99%)	6 (100%)
Ballistic Missile Submarines	3+1 (70%)	0	1+1 (30%)	0	0 (0%)	0	5 (100%)	0
Strategic Bombers/Strategic Aviation	7 (100%)	1 (100%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	7 (100%)	1 (100%)
Conventional or Ground Forces	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Overall Naval Power	3 (50%)	1 (50%)	0 (0%)	1 (50%)	3 (50%)	0 (50%)	6 (100%)	2 (100%)
Overall Air Power	0 (0%)	0	0 (0%)	0 (100%)	1 (100%)	0	1 (100%)	0

* Split opinions

SOURCE: Daniel, "French Perceptions of the U.S.-Soviet Military Balances: Analysis of Défense Nationale," p. 209 (Table 7.4), and Daniel, Défense Nationale Perceptions of the U.S.-Soviet Military Balances, pp. 19, 33, 50, 52, 53, 64, 70, and 78. (1971 data).

for 1971).²⁶ As an examination of our Table 5.13 will show, of the 14.2 percent of French elites who referenced concerns about the current conventional balance between NATO and the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact in 1971, 12.2 percent saw it as adverse to the West and two percent saw it as roughly equal. In these two cases where variables in the two studies overlap, therefore, we find a high degree of consistency in our respective findings.

The fifth and final study of French elite perceptions against which our findings will be compared is the work of Elizabeth Kirk and Maria Longo on French and Indian Perceptions of the U.S.-Soviet Power Balance.²⁷ The writings of twenty-one select opinion-makers and three publications (Le Monde, Le Figaro, and Défense Nationale) were content-analyzed to determine their views concerning basic military balance and security questions. A total of 651 articles and speeches were coded for the period November 1, 1974 through June 30, 1978. Although a number of issues were examined by this study, to include French perceptions of US and Soviet roles in World affairs and the Weltanschauung and value structure of France, only those findings concerned specifically with the military balance were addressed by our thematic content analysis.

Kirk and Longo recorded only forty-three statements over the time period of their study which attempted to weigh the global balance in relative terms.²⁸ Of this number, over sixty percent were attributable to two individuals: Raymond Aron (20) and Jacques Vernant (7). The breakdown of their findings in terms of the categories of US superiority, Soviet superiority, and parity is presented in Table 5.23. As shown in this Table, "parity" was the most

²⁶Ibid., p. 219.

²⁷Op. cit., footnote 14, supra.

²⁸Ibid., p. 24.

frequently referenced perception (19); those who perceived either the US or the USSR as superior were almost equally divided (12 and 10 respectively). Based upon their findings, Kirk and Longo conclude that "there is agreement that overall nuclear parity has been achieved."²⁹ This statement is based upon 13 statements to that effect over the time period of their project.³⁰ Although we are unable to make direct comparisons between our findings and those of Kirk and Longo, since they do not disaggregate their findings on French perceptions of the strategic nuclear balance on a yearly basis, our overall findings are highly consistent. As an examination of our Table 5.13 will illustrate, those French elites who perceived the strategic balance between the US and USSR as equal were always in the majority of those making any reference to this matter.

The second conclusion arrived at by Kirk and Longo is that there is "recognition of the superiority of Soviet conventional forces"³¹ While we are unable to make direct comparisons of the US/USSR conventional force balance, we did find that the percentage of French elites who perceived the balance of conventional forces between NATO and the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact as being adverse to the West was always a majority of those responding (see Table 5.13). This would appear to gain support by Kirk and Longo's observation that the statements they coded "strongly indicate that the French believe that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact forces are superior to those of the West. Fifteen statements were made by 10 different authors (non-Leftist) to that effect. No statements were made which indicate perceptions of Western

²⁹ Ibid., p. 27.

³⁰ Ibid., Table 4, p. 6.

³¹ Ibid., p. 27.

TABLE 5.23:
FRENCH STATEMENTS ON RELATIVE MILITARY POWER

TIME FRAME	US SUPERIORITY	USSR SUPERIORITY	PARITY	OTHER (The balance is uncalculable)	TOTAL
1 Nov. 1974- 30 Dec. 1975	3	3	5	1	12
1 Jan. 1976- 31 Dec. 1976	5	5	8	1	19
1 Jan. 1977- 31 Dec. 1977	3	2	3	0	8
1 Jan. 1978 31 June 1978	1	0	3	0	4
TOTAL	12	10	19	2	43

SOURCE: Kirk and Longo, French and Indian Perceptions of the U.S.-Soviet Power Balance, p. 25.

superiority in the region."³² Consequently, we find no major discrepancies between the findings of our study and Kirk and Longo's with respect to French perceptions of the military balance.

The findings of the elite analyses outlined above are paralleled to a large degree by survey data on French public opinion. For illustrative purposes, we have selected four issues covered by public opinion surveys which relate in a broad sense to the content of our Codebook, and for which comparative data are available for the three West European countries included in our analysis: US versus USSR military strength; US versus USSR nuclear military strength; NATO versus Warsaw Pact military strength; confidence in US defense commitments. Of these four, however, only the second and third issues can be directly compared to variables in our Codebook; the other two must be "compared" by inference.

Table 5.24 presents the findings of public opinion surveys conducted between 1969 and 1977 on the question of French perceptions of US versus USSR military strength. As shown by this Table, the percentage of French publics who perceived the US to be ahead decreased from 39 percent in July 1969 to 16 percent in March 1977. Conversely, the percentage of those who perceived the Soviet Union to be ahead increased by ten percentage points during this time period -- from 24 to 34 percent. While our Codebook does not specifically address the issue of US-USSR military strength as an aggregate variable, it is implicit in our findings that French elites perceive a definite shift in military strength toward the Soviet Union (see Table 5.13, especially variables 47 and 48; Table 5.11); in this case, however, "hard conclusions" are suspect given the low percentage of references to military capabilities.

³² Ibid., p. 28.

TABLE 5.24:

FRENCH PERCEPTIONS OF US VERSUS
USSR MILITARY STRENGTH

DATE OF POLL	US AHEAD	USSR AHEAD	NEITHER (Vol)/EQUAL	OTHER	NO OPINION
1969: July	39%	24%	18%	-	19%
August	44	19	17	-	20
Oct-Nov	40	26	19	-	15
1972: Mar-Apr	47	28	-	10	15
1977: March	16	34	27	-	23

SOURCE: Alvin Richman, West European Attitudes Toward Security Issues. Paper prepared for presentation at the 1980 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles, March 18-22, Table 8. (1977 and 1969); U.S. Information Agency, Office of Research and Assessment. U.S. Standing in France Between the President's China and USSR Visits. R-42-72 (Washington, D.C: September 11, 1972), p. 9 (1972 data).

This is especially evident in public opinion surveys of French perceptions of US versus USSR nuclear military strength (Table 5.25). Between 1971 and 1979, the percentage of French publics who perceived the US to be ahead in nuclear military strength decreased from 43 percent to 18 percent; the percentage who perceived the Soviet Union to be ahead remained relatively the same (25 and 27 percent, respectively); and the percentage who perceived the balance to be equal increased from 11 to 47 percent. Clearly, there has been an unmistakable shift in French public opinion concerning the strategic balance. In part, our findings approximate those of French public opinion surveys. While we also found a negative shift of two points in the percentage of French elites who perceived the strategic balance between the US and Soviet Union to be favorable to the West, given the small percentage of references to this issue this finding is well within the error range of ± 5.0 percent (Table 5.13). However, we did find that, like the French public, the largest percentage of elites (36.2%) perceived the balance to be roughly equal in 1979 (an increase of almost 12 percent since 1971). Furthermore, our findings show that the capabilities of Soviet strategic nuclear forces have increased French concerns about threats to European security by 19.6 percentage points between 1971 and 1979, while perceptions of the capability of US strategic nuclear forces have suffered a negative shift of 17.3 percentage points over this time period (Table 5.11). This indirect evidence would support direct assessments of the balance.

French public perceptions of NATO versus Warsaw Pact (WTO) military strength also experienced a negative shift between 1977 and 1979, as shown in Table 5.26. Although there was a decline in this percentage of those who perceived NATO to be ahead (i.e., from 14 to 7 percent), the percentage who perceived the WTO to be ahead remained relatively stable over this time period, as

TABLE 5.25:
FRENCH PERCEPTIONS OF US VERSUS
USSR NUCLEAR MILITARY STRENGTH

DATE OF POLL	US AHEAD	USSR AHEAD	EQUAL ^a	NO OPINION
1971: July	43%	25%	11%	18% ^b
1972: June	27	13	53	7
1977: March	23	19	27	19
1979: July	18	27	47	8

a = volunteered

b = does not include 3% for PRC and 2% for others

SOURCE: Richman, op. cit., Table 10; U.S. Information Agency, Office of Research and Assessment. West European Opinion on Issues of Relevance to US Interests. R-33-71 (Washington, D.C.: December 28, 1971, p. 8 (1971 data).

did the percentage who perceived the balance to be equal. These perceptions do not match our findings. For example, we found that the largest percentage of French elites perceived the East-West balance in theater/regional forces to be adverse to the West in 1979 (29.8%), with only 8.5% perceiving the balance as equal (Table 5.13); 22.7 percent of the French elites perceived the East-West conventional balance to be adverse to the West in 1979, with none perceiving it as equal; and 21.3 percent of the French elites perceived the overall East-West balance to be adverse to the West in 1979 (8.5 percent saw it as equal, and 4.3 percent saw it as favorable to the West). These negative perceptions are also reflected in French perceptions of relative East-West military capabilities, as shown in Tables 5.11 and 5.12.

Finally, it should be noted that French publics place a relatively high degree of confidence in the US defense commitment to Western Europe. As shown in Table 5.27, 65 percent of the French people surveyed in 1980 placed either a "great" or "fair" deal of confidence in the US defense commitment, compared to 50 percent who expressed this view in 1968. (In fact, the percentage of French publics who perceived the US commitment in positive terms only went below 50 percent in one year for which data are available: 1975.) Similarly, the percentage of those who placed "no", or "very little" confidence in the US commitment exceeded ten percent in only one year: 1975. Such findings are not consistent with our findings of elite perceptions. For example, we found that the percentage of French elites having negative perceptions of the US commitment (i.e., increased concerns about threats) increased by 22.2 percent -- from 22.4 percent in 1971 to 42.6 percent in 1979 (Table 5.14). Moreover, the percentage of French elites who perceived the commitment of the US in positive terms (i.e., as decreasing concerns about threats), went down from

TABLE 5.26:
FRENCH PERCEPTIONS OF THE
EAST-WEST BALANCE

DATE OF POLL	NATO AHEAD	WTO AHEAD	EQUAL	NO OPINION
1977: March	12%	23%	45%	20%
1978: March	16	19	48	17
1979: May	7	21	48	24

SOURCE: U.S. International Communication Agency, Office of Research, French and German Perceptions of the Soviet Military Threat, M-29-79 (Washington, D.C.: August 20, 1979), p. 6.

TABLE 5.27:

FRENCH CONFIDENCE IN
US DEFENSE COMMITMENT

DATE OF POLL	GREAT	CONSIDERABLE/ FAIR AMOUNT	NOT VERY MUCH/ LITTLE	NONE/ VERY LITTLE	DON'T KNOW
1968: Spring	18%	32%	24%	6%	20%
1972: March	10	63	15	3	9
1974: Oct-Nov	31	41	9	5	14
1975: May-June	9	40	23	11	18
1978: Mar-Apr	12	41	19	6	22
1979: July	18	40	24	8	10
1980: Mar-Apr	19	46	18	5	12

SOURCE: Richman, op. cit., Table 15 (1968-1979 data); U.S. International Communication Agency, Office of Research, West European Attitudes Toward Soviet Actions in Afghanistan and Other Security Issues, M-12-80 (Washington, D.C.: May 12, 1980), p. 5.

22.4 percent in 1971 to 12.8 percent in 1979. In sum, on this question, as in others, we found the French public to be far more optimistic than the French elites whom we studied.

D. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH ON FRENCH ELITES

As one looks at the perceptions of French elites, a number of points stand out:

1. The French elites in our sample dealt with a very wide range of security issues, which made difficult the analysis (and comparison) of their interests and concerns. Nevertheless, it is possible to say that:
 - a. Fewer than 20% of all references were to external threats, with half of those appearing in 1979 (Table 3.5). Even if one aggregates themes into clusters, there are only 33 references (out of 76) to military build-ups and balances, with few of these relating to the conventional balance, the Soviet naval build-up or even to theater/regional nuclear forces. (See Table 5.4). There are no references to economic threats, a few to Soviet political pressures and, interestingly but not unexpectedly, about an equal number to the threat of US dominance -- though these came largely from Communist and Socialist members of the legislature.
 - b. Overall, intra-alliance themes received the most attention, with the largest single number focusing on detente and the next largest on economics and security -- mainly in 1971, in the context of the Mansfield Amendment. If themes are clustered, the most important issues turn out to be arms control in all its various forms; US/NATO military doctrine and European integration and/or cooperation in both military and non-military areas.

(See Table 5.5). Given the course of French policies and politics over the previous decade, these emphases are quite understandable; for example, the question of the role of the force de frappe (a hardy perennial) cuts across all these issues. Here again, a number of things stand out:

- 1) A shift over time from political to military issues; which in 1979 accounted for more than 70% of all references;
- 2) A lack of concern about threats to "economic lifelines" or the role the Western Alliance should play in insuring access to oil and other vital resources.

c. The French elites were, however, somewhat concerned about "decoupling" and the validity of US security guarantees; in consequence (and in conjunction with emphasis on an independent foreign policy) there were numerous references to the independent French nuclear force. Again, these related themes were consistent with the general lines of French policy and with what is known of French thinking.

2. Our coding of source materials indicated that French elites were not, in general, very much concerned about threats to European security; moreover, with the exception of the present or future threat of a nuclear strike (Var. 07 and 08), perceptions of threat remained virtually flat between 1971 and 1979 (Table 5.9). Even in the case of the threat of a nuclear strike, the shifts over time were marginal; however, in each time period concern about present threats exceeded the forecast for that period made four years earlier. (Table 5.10). This suggests that French perceptions supported by this threat may rise even higher in future years -- a suggestion supported by the marked increase in

1979 in thematic references to both military threats and intra-alliance military issues--including that of theater nuclear force modernization.

3. This is also supported by the increased number of references over time to both strategic nuclear and theater/regional nuclear forces, with the most significant increase coming in 1979. (Table 5.11). More importantly, these references show a marked increase in concerns about the threat posed by (growing) Soviet nuclear forces and about the decreased contribution to security of US/NATO nuclear forces. Conversely, but not unexpectedly, there was a growing belief in the contribution to security of British and French regional nuclear forces--a belief peculiar to the French.
4. Perceptions of military capabilities changed more or less in parallel with perceptions of the importance of these forces, in that:
 - a. There were more and more references to military balances;
 - b. These were increasingly seen as adverse to the West, (Table 5.12). Within this general framework, two further points stand out:
 - c. While the conventional and theater/regional nuclear balances (and specially the latter) were increasingly seen as unfavorable, the strategic balance was still considered, on balance, "roughly equal".³³
 - d. French perceptions of the overall military balance apparently attached greater weight to comparative conventional and theater/regional nuclear capabilities than to strategic nuclear forces. (This is in marked contrast to the way in which

³³Here again there are some inexplicable vagaries in 1975, with fewer references to a "roughly equal" strategic balance and a slight increase in those deeming the conventional balance favorable to the West. (Table 5.13).

American and British elites arrived at their judgements, and led to more adverse perceptions than was true in these other cases.)

5. Among the political factors affecting European security, US willingness to defend Western Europe was far and away the most important-- and the most adverse, with over 40% of the respondents in 1979 judging this to impact negatively on European security. (Table 5.14).
6. As we examine factors affecting perceptions, it seems that;
 - a. Only the Soviet military build-up/modernization program significantly affected perceptions of threat--and that adversely. (Tables 5.16 and 5.17).
 - b. French respondents paid particular attention to factors influencing national behavior, among which they initially deemed political ties and political goals the most important; by 1979, however, force had risen to first place, a change which paralleled those in the heightened perceptions of threat and the importance attached to intra-alliance military issues. (See Table 5.19 and Figure 5.2).³⁴
 - c. Both East-West relations and those between the US and the USSR were seen as virtually identical and on balance as hostile (Table 5.20). Moreover, despite persistent French efforts to promote detente, very few categorized East-West relations as "friendly"-- though perhaps a different result might have been obtained had we asked about Franco-Soviet relations.

³⁴ Somewhat surprisingly, economic strength was seen throughout as comparatively unimportant, even though a burgeoning French economy provided the resources for expensive military and foreign aid programs. Perhaps the economy was simply taken for granted.

- d. Throughout the decade, French elites indicated considerable support for military/defense policies but in 1971 and 1975 political/economic policies were deemed better suited to improve the security of Western Europe (Table 5.21). By 1979, however, these were overshadowed by preferences for military/defense and mixed policies, a trend consistent with the increasing attention paid to military issues.
7. On the whole, our study of French elite opinions produced few surprises; anyone who had followed the course of French foreign and defense policy could have predicted the results. What may be most significant is just that finding, which reflects the unique position of France within the Western Alliance and confirms the consequent differences in French attitudes, policies and priorities from those of others among the "Big Four". However, the shifts in French thinking between 1975 and 1979 may, if they continue, lead to greater congruence in perceptions and policy preferences and a consequent increase in French cooperation in military affairs.
8. With the exception of the study of elite perceptions by Donald Brennan, previously cited, our assessments correspond closely to those of other studies in those relatively few areas in which similar questions were asked. (See Section C: COMPARABILITY OF RESEARCH). This was not true of the results of public opinion polls, in that while the French people increasingly saw Soviet military power increasing, and the military balance shifting against the West, they were much less pessimistic in absolute terms than were French elites. They also seemed to place much more confidence in the US security guarantee than did French elites. Whether this is the result of differing levels of information, or reflects basic attitudinal differences we cannot, of course, say--though someone should presumably find out.

CHAPTER 6

WEST GERMAN PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT AND SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

In the original conception, all research for Project APT (Allied Perceptions of Threat) was to use the same methodologies to study the same issues. To this end, the questions to be asked were agreed upon by American, British, French and West German members of the research team, a common Codebook embodying those questions was developed, types of sources to be used in generating answers to those questions were agreed upon, etc.; the only significant difference was that the West German team was to conduct or commission public opinion polls on selected questions, a luxury denied the other teams. Due, however, to both contractual considerations and financial constraints the research on Britain, France, and the United States did not take precisely the same form as that on the Federal Republic of Germany, where more questions were asked, a longer time frame was utilized, data were generated for each year rather than for time slices within that frame, etc.¹ Although the two efforts were not, therefore, identical, enough similarity was maintained so that it is possible to compare the results obtained by the West Germans with those attained by other researchers, provided that due caution is observed in the comparisons.

The research reported on in this chapter was carried out at the Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr (SOWI) in Munich. Utilizing the sources listed in Table 6.1, SOWI generated 1665 "units of analysis" covering the years 1968-1977. As noted earlier, the types of sources used by SOWI were

¹For a report on the methodologies utilized and the research philosophy behind the West German research see Appendix C.

similar in nature to those used by the Center for International Security Studies (CISS), with the major exception of periodicals published by political parties, which existed only in the FRG. However, SOWI relied much more heavily upon newspapers to generate "units of analysis" and these constituted nearly 43 percent of the total (698 articles). Another seven percent (119 articles) came from party publications. Thus, 50 percent of all West German codings fell into categories which had no counterpart in the data on American elites and relatively little for British and French data.²

As would be expected with such reliance on newspaper articles, journalists constituted nearly 56 percent of the authors -- a far higher proportion than was true in the American, British and French studies (Table 6.2). Assuming (as SOWI did) that the "military community" consists not only of officers of the armed forces but of all those who officially and as their primary occupation deal with questions of military security policy, SOWI indicated that nearly 26 percent of all articles were authored by members of this community: defense experts, officers, government officials and politicians.³ Only about 10 percent of the articles were written by scholars, who "thus represent an author-group of only secondary importance".⁴ The remainder fell into labor, unknown, or "other" categories.

In evaluating the research, SOWI utilized aggregated results for the entire data set, not partitioning data by years, as was done in the other cases. This was the result of their belief that it was "not possible to draw any but aggregate conclusions due to the heterogeneity and exclusiveness of the

²Tjarck C. Rössler, On the Perception and Assessment of Security Policy: An Evaluation of the Political Consequences for the Federal Republic of Germany of a Shift in the Strategic Balance, Appendix C, Table 10, pp. 372-374.

³Ibid., p. 377.

⁴Ibid., p. 377.

TABLE 6.1:

WEST GERMAN SOURCES

<u>GROUP</u>	<u>PUBLICATION</u>
Daily Newspapers	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Frankfurter Rundschau Süddeutsche Zeitung Die Welt
Weekly Newsmagazines	Der Spiegel Die Zeit
Party Periodicals	Liberal Die Neue Gesellschaft Die Politische Meinung Politische Studien
Scholarly Journals	Außenpolitik Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte Beiträge zur Konfliktforschung Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik Europa-Archiv Sicherheitspolitik heute Politische Vierteljahresschrift Leviathan Zeitschrift für Politik
Military Periodicals	Wehrkunde/Europäische Wehrkunde Truppenpraxis Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau
Parliamentary Documents	Bundestagsprotokolle
Government Publications	Bulletin der Bundesregierung

different publications" within their data set.⁵ Thus, in describing the results of the SOWI project one must be aware of the differences between the West German and American efforts, in analysis as well as in collection of data.

The report which follows is an attempt at such a description, drawn from the more extensive report by Lt. Col. Rössler, which is translated and reprinted in Volume II. Every effort has been made to retain the flavor as well as the sense of the original, without interjecting the ideas or interpretations of the narrator; hence, what follows is a summation of those results obtained by SOWI which they deemed interesting and which corresponded to sections of the portion of the overall study conducted by CISS. On this basis, it is possible to obtain not only an overview of relevant data in West German perceptions but also an impression of SOWI's findings concerning "the perceived, central factors of security and security policy".⁶

⁵Ibid., p. 380.

⁶Ibid., p. 381.

TABLE 6.2:
PROFESSIONS OF WEST GERMAN AUTHORS

<u>Profession</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	
	Absolute	Relative (%)
Defense Analyst	19	1.1
Officer	65	3.9
Government Official	132	7.9
Politician	209	12.6
Labor leader	1	0.1
Scholar/Academician	174	10.5
Journalist	925	55.6
Other	15	0.9
Unknown	125	7.5
	<hr/> 1665	<hr/> 100.1

} 25.5

A. ELITE PERCEPTIONS

1. Threats to European Security.

The SOWI team first examined their data for "Threats to European Security". (See Table 6.3). Using a technique that was similar to thematic analysis, the German team identified 1006 references to threat situations that Europe could face. Of these threat references, a subtotal of 827 (82.2%) referred to one of five different specified threats: Soviet nuclear attack; Soviet/Warsaw Pact conventional attack; political pressure backed by threat of force; internal subversion; and economic threats directed at survival and/or political independence.

In looking at those specified threats, it is apparent that political pressure backed by the threat of force was the largest single category of responses (30.1 percent). However, taken together as situations involving military conflict, Soviet nuclear and conventional attacks comprise nearly 47 percent of the specified responses. Internal subversion and economic threats are not mentioned in any large numbers, representing only six and five percent of the threats respectively.

2. Perceptions of Security.

The perception that a threat existed did not necessarily correspond with a definite "feeling of insecurity".⁷ However, Table 6.4, which lists responses to a question as to whether or not Europe appeared to be "secure" in the face of the threat situations outlined earlier, indicates that with the exception of a nuclear strike by the USSR, most German respondents indicated uncertainty or gave negative answers. The percentage of respondents concerned about a particular threat varied significantly, with four-fifths of those discussing economic

⁷Rössler, op. cit., p. 384.

TABLE 6.3
THREATS TO EUROPEAN SECURITY

<u>Threat Situation</u>	Frequency of its Mention*			
	<u>Absolute</u>	<u>Relative %</u>		
		<u>N=1665</u>	<u>N'=827</u>	<u>N''=1006</u>
Soviet Nuclear Attack	161	9.7	19.5	16.0
Conventional Warsaw Pact Attack	224	13.5	27.1	22.3
Political Pressure from USSR/WTO Against Background of a Possible Military Intervention	249	14.9	30.1	24.8
Internal Subversion Supported by USSR	103	6.2	12.5	10.2
Economic Threat Directed at Economic Survival and/or Political Independence	90	5.4	10.9	8.9
<u>Sub Total</u>	<u>827</u>	<u>49.7</u>	<u>100.1</u>	<u>82.2</u>
Other Unspecified Threats	179	10.8	-	17.8
TOTAL	1006	60.5	-	100.0

Source: Rössler, op. cit., Table 13, p. 382.

* Table 6.3 provides three "Relative Frequency Columns" by which to judge the results of this tabulation: percentage of total articles, percentage of specified threat references and percentage of all threat references.

threats calling Europe insecure or potentially vulnerable, as against one-third of those talking about the threat of nuclear attack. Indeed, this pattern held for all of the responses, with concern over non-military threats (political pressure, subversion, economic threats) higher than concern over military threats, both relatively and absolutely.⁸ (See Table 6.4).

According to the SOWI team, "If a specific situation is to affect one's own security, then this threat must be aimed at a specific target. There must be a concrete threat to something and it must be perceived as such"⁹ Table 6.5 examines the frequency of responses of German elites to the targets of the perceived threats. The largest single group of responses (38 percent) indicated that the physical security of the Western Alliance was the target of Soviet threats. Another 31 percent felt that the national interests and value systems of the West were threatened.¹⁰ Only small (and fairly similar) percentages of authors felt that the interests or the security of either the United States itself or Western Europe alone were Soviet goals.

⁸ In absolute terms, both the largest number of responses and the largest number of negative or uncertain judgements were in the area of security against political pressure backed by the threat of force.

⁹ Ibid., p. 385.

¹⁰ This emphasis on values and interests as targets of Soviet threats corresponds with the emphasis on non-military threats found in Table 6.4 and especially with the concern over subversion, which is much greater than that found elsewhere, and over economic threats, which is also quite high. (Author's note).

TABLE 6.4

Question: Does Europe appear to be "secure" in the face of the following threat?

Threat	Absolute Opinion						No		Don't Know	
	Yes		Possibly		n	f (%)	n	f (%)	n	f (%)
	n	f (%)	n	f (%)						
Nuclear Attack	161	74	45.9	24	14.9	33	20.5	30	18.6	
Conventional Attack	224	56	25.0	68	30.4	66	29.5	34	15.2	
Political Pressure	249	13	5.2	127	51.0	84	33.7	25	10.0	
Internal Subversion	103	4	3.9	47	45.6	34	33.0	18	17.5	
Economic Threat	90	11	12.2	42	46.7	36	40.0	1	1.1	
Other	179	49	27.4	75	41.9	54	30.2	1	1	
TOTAL	1006									

Source: Rössler, op. cit., Table 14, p. 383.

TABLE 6.5

Question: If the behavior and policies of the USSR constitute a threat, what is it that they threaten?

<u>Threat Targets</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>f(%)</u>
Western Values	158	17.4
National Interests of		
Western Alliance	120	13.2
U.S.A.	59	6.5
West European states	32	3.5
Other states	5	0.6
Security of		
Western Alliance	344	37.9
U.S.A.	88	9.7
West European states	89	9.8
Other states	<u>13</u>	<u>1.4</u>
TOTALS	908	100.0

Source: Rössler, op. cit., Table 15, p. 386.

3. Factors Affecting European Security

As was true of other parts of the research, SOWI attempted to determine whether and how various factors affected perceptions of European security. This was done by looking at the frequency of responses to generic groups of factors, such as the importance attached to different types of forces, to military capabilities and to political support for the Western Alliance.

A. Military

1. Perceptions of the Importance of Military Forces.

West German elites who discussed the effects on security of various types of forces gave first place to US strategic nuclear forces, with 19.4% of all responses (see Table 6.6). Next, in descending order of responses, were NATO conventional forces and Warsaw Pact conventional forces. Surprisingly, Soviet strategic forces, NATO and Pact tactical nuclear forces and regional nuclear forces were rarely mentioned as factors of importance. The largest single category was the "unspecified factor".

A similar pattern can be discerned with respect to responses concerning the military balance. In Table 6.7, it can be seen that the overall military balance was deemed the most important, followed by the US-Soviet strategic balance, by the conventional balance and (at a considerable distance) by the tactical nuclear and regional nuclear balances. The order of capabilities of the several components of the armed forces paralleled that of the references to their importance in Table 6.6.

In interpreting these results, SOWI conjectured that the US strategic nuclear forces, and hence also the strategic balance, constituted the principal factors in European security. Only after these considerations are taken

TABLE 6.6
 PERCEPTIONS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF
 MILITARY FACTORS*

<u>FACTOR</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>		
	<u>Absolute</u>	<u>Relative (%)</u>	<u>Relative % (N=1665)</u>
<u>Capabilities of:</u>			
US Strategic Nuclear Forces	191	19.4	11.5
Soviet Strategic Nuclear Forces	59	6.0	3.5
NATO Tactical Nuclear Forces	51	5.2	3.1
PACT Tactical Nuclear Forces	18	1.8	1.1
NATO Conventional Forces	118	12.0	7.1
PACT Conventional Forces	110	11.2	6.6
Regional NATO Nuclear Forces	12	1.2	0.7
Regional French/UK Nuclear Forces	30	3.0	1.8
Soviet Regional Nuclear Forces	20	2.0	1.2
Other Unmentioned Military Forces	375	38.1	22.5
TOTALS	984	99.9	59.1

*Rössler, *op. cit.*, p. 388. The data in this table are taken directly from the original German text; however, the title has been changed to conform to those used in other chapters, as the questions asked were also drawn from Section III-A of the (initial) Codebook. (Author's note)

TABLE 6.7

PERCEPTIONS OF THE MILITARY BALANCE

<u>Military Balance</u>	<u>Frequencies</u>	
	<u>Absolute</u>	<u>%</u>
US-Soviet Strategic	475	33.1
NATO-WTO Tactical Nuclear	49	3.4
NATO-WTO Warsaw Pact Conventional	282	19.7
Western Alliance-USSR Regional Nuclear	12	0.8
Western Alliance-Warsaw Pact Overall	617	43.0
Totals	1435	100.0

Source: Rössler, op. cit., Table 18, p. 389.

into account do the conventional forces come into play.¹¹ However, it is at the sub-strategic level that the real threat exists: that of the "tactically conceivable war".¹² Moreover, "this explanation is supported by the conjecture that the mention of NATO's tactical nuclear weapons, also called battlefield nuclear weapons (which obviously indicates the clear possibility of conducting a war with these systems) occurs within the context of a sub-strategic threat and that they are spoken of as a "useable" instrument of military power.¹³

B. Political

1. Political Factors Affecting European Security

A primary orientation towards military-related questions can also be found in the examination of those political factors which, in the opinion of

¹¹Rössler, op. cit., P. 387.

¹²Ibid., pp. 387-388.

¹³Ibid., p. 388.

West German elites affect European security,¹⁴ (See Table 6.8). References to closer NATO military ties constituted almost one-quarter of the total. Eleven percent of the responses focused upon US and West European willingness to devote resources to defense and another 15 percent referred to US willingness to defend or help defend Europe in a conflict. Together these factors, combined with general public support for the FRG forces (all of which are committed to NATO and FRG defense programs) represented over half of all references. The largest number of non-military responses concerned the "political meshing" of the US and Europe and the "coordination of economic objectives" in the alliance. "What was remarkable was that no particular importance was attributed to political-social stability of the NATO member-states."¹⁵

2. Influences Upon Perceptions: World View of the Authors.

The manner in which an author addresses specific threat situations is affected by his "world view", the value structure through which the world is perceived and understood. While each individual has a unique cognitive view, general aggregate patterns can be discerned and are important in analyzing perceptions of threat. Thus, both SOWI and other researchers attempted to gain some insights into the views of their target elites.

Table 6.9 examines those factors that German elites perceived to be important to the general behavior of nation-states. Like their American counterparts, German authors indicated that the use of force is the principle factor influencing state behavior. National political objectives and political links (alliances)

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 389.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 390. This is particularly remarkable in view of the high percentage and relatively large number of respondents seeing Europe as vulnerable or potentially vulnerable to subversion and the belief that "Western values" was a major target of Soviet policies and behavior for which see Tables 6.4 and 6.5 (Author's note.)

were also referenced in almost as high volumes, indicating their considerable importance. Together, this tier of references, each similar in volume, constituted about 61 percent of the references. The next lower tier of references, the sense of community, economic power, ideology and economic interdependence, accounts for just under 37 percent (about 9 percent each) of the total volume.

TABLE 6.8

POLITICAL FACTORS AFFECTING EUROPEAN SECURITY

<u>FACTOR</u>	<u>FREQUENCIES</u>	
	<u>Absolute</u>	<u>Relative %</u>
W. European Willingness to Devote Resources to Defense	185	6.7
US Willingness to Devote Resources to Defense	122	4.4
US Willingness to Defend Europe	240	8.6
US Willingness to Help Defend Europe	170	6.1
Closer NATO Links	641	23.1
Coordination of Economic Objectives in the Alliance	282	10.1
Support West European Unification	236	8.5
Political-Social Stability of NATO Member States	219	7.9
Public Support for (West German) Armed Forces and Defense Programs/Concepts	125	4.5
Political Meshing of US and Europe	294	10.6
Political Meshing of US and Other Nations or Regions	76	2.7
TOTALS	2780	99.9

Source: Rüssler, op. cit., Table 19, p. 390.

TABLE 6.9

FACTORS AFFECTING PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY: WORLD VIEW OF THE AUTHOR

Question: Which factors that influence the behavior of the nation state are clearly mentioned in the article?

Factor	Frequencies	
	n	f(%)
Armed Forces/Use of Force	1258	22.7
National Political Objectives	1109	20.0
Political Links/Treaties	988	17.8
Citizens' Sense of Community	602	10.9
Economic Power	511	9.2
Ideology	475	8.6
Economic Independence	453	8.2
Cultural Ties	81	1.5
Other Factors	68	1.2
Totals	5545	100.1%

Source: Rössler, *op. cit.*, Table 16, p. 387.

3. Influences Upon Perceptions: Soviet/WTO Objectives and Behavior.

Similarly, perceptions of specific Soviet objectives and behavior link with perceptions of threat. From Table 6.10 it appears, based upon volume of responses, that patterns of Soviet behavior in reference to detente and at various arms control talks "are of overwhelming importance";¹⁶ they "are problems which transcend the great powers as they are of primary importance to the Alliance and Europe" in general.¹⁷ Moreover, Soviet actions of all types are cited far more frequently (over 67 percent of the time) than are Soviet/WTO objectives, official declarations and/or actions by other Warsaw Pact states.¹⁸

¹⁶Rössler, *op. cit.*, p. 391.

¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁸ Unfortunately the data available do not tell us specifically whether these actions leave positive or negative impressions on West German elites. Nor can one infer from the wide support within the FRG for detente, arms control, etc., that these impressions are favorable; a judgement that an important policy is not producing the desired results could lead to redoubled efforts to redeem failure. (Author's note.)

TABLE 6.10
**FACTORS AFFECTING PERCEPTIONS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY:
 SOVIET/WTO OBJECTIVES AND BEHAVIOR**

<u>FACTOR</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	
	<u>Absolute</u>	<u>Relative(%)</u>
Soviet Objectives:		
vis à vis W. Europe	242	11.6
vis à vis E. Europe	119	5.7
Official Soviet Declaration/Hints:		
vis à vis W. Europe	123	5.9
vis à vis E. Europe	35	1.7
Soviet Actions in:		
SALT	213	10.2
MBFR	194	9.3
CSCE	219	10.5
Economic agreements	78	3.7
Detente in general	473	22.7
Other questions	222	10.7
Warsaw Pact Actions in:		
MBFR	23	1.1
CSCE	38	1.8
Economic agreements	15	0.7
Detente in general	41	2.0
Other questions	<u>46</u>	<u>2.2</u>
TOTAL	2081	99.9

Source: Rössler, op. cit., Table 20, p. 391.

4. Influences Upon Perceptions: East-West Relations

Table 6.11 clearly indicates that overall East-West relations are deemed more salient (and presumably more important) by West German elites than are bilateral relations between individual members of the two alliances; even the subject of US-Soviet relations drew only a third as many comments as did aggregate ones. (Unfortunately, Lt. Colonel Rössler does not tell us the state of those relations, so that it is impossible to determine how and to what extent they modify perceptions of security).¹⁹

TABLE 6.11

East-West Relations

Question: Are East-West relations explicitly discussed as the background for the article?

<u>Relation</u>	<u>Frequencies</u>	
	<u>Absolute</u>	<u>Relative (%)</u>
1. Overall East-West Relations	771	63.1
2. US-Soviet Relations	259	21.2
3. Warsaw Pact - US Relations	5	0.4
4. Relations between individual Warsaw Pact (including USSR) states and individual other states	<u>187</u>	<u>15.3</u>
TOTALS	1221	100.0

Source: Rössler, op. cit., Table 21, P. 392.

¹⁹ Nor can we explain the fact that although an absolute majority of the references are to East-West relations, elites in the FRG attached greater importance to Soviet actions and behavior than to those of the Warsaw Pact as a whole, as shown in Table 6.10. (Author's note.)

B. PUBLIC OPINION²⁰

Although public opinion polling was not a direct part of the research on Allied Perceptions of Threat, SOWI conducted a series of surveys of the West German and American publics²¹ in which it asked questions about security very similar in nature to the questions asked, via the Codebook, of American and West European elites. To be precise, SOWI commissioned three polls, one in December 1977/January 1978 (N=1913), one in October/November 1979 (N=1866) and one in February/March 1980 (N= 599). The polls investigated four different aspects of national security: 1) perceptions of the military threat; 2) perceptions of the capability for defense against attack; 3) willingness of the public to support military defense; and 4) the esteem of the armed forces and the priority given to the political tasks needed to guarantee national security. In view of their direct linkage to our study of elite perceptions, the results of the SOWI surveys in West Germany are presented in this section.

The great majority of the German populace, over 70% in each of the three polls, perceived the threat of war to be "rather limited" (though the total number slightly decreased over time). Those answering that the threat of war in Europe is rather great increased only marginally from 1977 to 1980 (with a slight slip in 1979), from about 11% to 14%. (See Table 6.12.) Although these polls did not ask specific questions about other threats, such as those of political pressure backed by the threat of force or the cutting of economic lifelines, the 1977/78 poll did ask two open questions about what people feared most and about the likelihood of that fear materializing. Although war came first on a list

²⁰ This section is drawn from Mathias Schönborn, "Perceptions of National Security of the US and the Federal Republic of Germany: Stability and Change in Public Opinion," SOWI, 1981; reprinted as Appendix D. Unless otherwise indicated footnotes in the section will reference only verbatim passages in Dr. Schönborn's paper.

²¹ The results of the American surveys will be discussed in Chapter 8.

of 26 frightening things (with almost three-fifths of the respondents listing it as "most" or "very" frightening), fewer than one-third felt "threatened", i.e., deemed it likely of occurrence.²² Thus, these polls seemingly reinforce the findings of the more structured ones cited earlier, at least for 1977/78.

In regard to the military balance, most Germans felt either that the Warsaw Pact was superior or that a rough parity existed. Those perceiving a NATO military superiority remained fairly constant: between 12.6 and 10.4%. (See Table 6.13.) When the balance was disaggregated into six aspects: number of military personnel, quantity of weapons, quality of weapons, training of personnel, morale and combat readiness and the defense willingness of the population, the Pact was perceived superior in five of six categories in 1979 (all but quality of weapons) and four of six in 1980 (all but quality of weapons and training of personnel).²³

The most significant alterations of perceptions of military threat came from views held concerning the future development of East-West relations. Although those respondents believing that the future of East-West relations would remain unchanged were the largest category over all three polls, those believing they would turn "better" increased markedly between 1977/78 and 1979. However, in 1980 perceptions that relations would get better dropped by two-thirds, while those that they would turn worse almost trebled, from 12:8 to 34.5%.²⁴ In the words of Dr. Schönborn, "the overall balance, i.e., the sum of changes of perceptions concerning the development of East-West relations resulted in a clear increase in negative expectations."²⁵

²² Schönborn op.cit., Tables 24, 25. See also his personal evaluation on p. 421.

²³ Ibid., Table 4.

²⁴ Ibid., Table 5.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 404. This could well reflect the impact on East-West relations of the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan in December 1979, which led to Western re-cri-minations and counter-measures. Since the Soviet response was to reject all Western proposals and condemn all Western actions, it would not be unreasonable to anticipate that things would get worse. [Author's note.]

Table 6.12 PUBLIC OPINION CONCERNING THE THREAT OF WAR IN EUROPE*

Table 2
Tabelle 2
Threat of war in Europe
Kriegsgefahr in Europa

Question:
Do you believe that the threat of war in Europe between the East and the West, that is between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, is rather great or rather limited?

Frage:
Halten Sie die Gefahr, daß es in Europa zu einem Krieg zwischen Ost und West, zwischen Warschauer Pakt und NATO, für groß oder eher für gering?

Threat of war Kriegsgefahr	Population / Bevölkerung USA (in %)		Population FRG / Bevölkerung Bundesrepublik (in %)		
	Oct. 79	Dec. 77/Jan. 78	Oct./Nov. 79	Feb./March 80	
rather great eher groß	16.6	11.1	8.5	14.0	
rather limited eher gering	63.4	74.2	73.2	71.9	
don't know weiß nicht	20.0		18.1	14.0	
no answer keine Antwort		14.7	0.2	0.2	
N =	2741	1913	1866	559	

Source: German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research, Munich
Quelle: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, München

*Source: Schünborn, op.cit., Table.2.

Table 6.13 PERCEPTIONS OF THE MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN THE WARSAW PACT AND NATO*

Military balance Kräfteverhältnis	Population / Bevölkerung USA (in %)		Population FRG / Bevölkerung Bundesrepublik (in %)		
	Oct. 79	Dec. 77/Jan. 78	Oct./Nov. 79	Feb./March 80	
NATO is superior NATO ist überlegen	24.3	12.6	10.8	10.4	
FRG is superior FRG ist überlegen	20.0	34.4	42.4	38.6	
both are about equal beide sind gleich stark	34.5	30.4	31.1	36.3	
don't know weiß nicht	21.2	22.6	15.0	14.1	
no answer keine Antwort			0.8	0.5	
	N = 2741	1913	1866	559	

Table 3
Tabelle 3
Perceptions of the military balance between Warsaw Pact - NATO
Einschätzungen des Kräfteverhältnisses zwischen Warschauer Pakt - NATO

Question:

If you consider the military balance between the East and the West that is, between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, which side is superior in your opinion - the NATO-countries, Warsaw Pact countries, or are both about equal?

Frage:

Wenn Sie sich für militärische Kräfteverhältnisse entscheiden: Da und West, zwischen Warschauer Pakt und NATO. Welche Seite ist in Ihrer Meinung überlegen?

Source: German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research, Munich
Quelle: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, München

*Source: Schönborn, *op.cit.*, Table 3.

According to SOWI, the second group of questions concerning "the capability for military defense...can only be estimated in the wider context of NATO."²⁶ A great majority, about 60 percent of each poll, felt that in the event of war they could rely upon NATO. An almost equal distribution of the German populace also indicated that in case of armed conflict the US would be a dependable ally. Moreover, about one third of the respondents in each poll believed definitely that the FRG and NATO could defend themselves against an [undefined] military attack. Although only about 12-13 percent felt that defense was not possible, over 40% were skeptical and uncertain about the effectiveness of a NATO/FRG defense. (Perhaps more importantly, the percentage believing in an effective defense dropped from 33.2% in December 1977/January 1978 to 32.7% in February/March 1980.)²⁷

The third bloc of questions dealt with the sensitive matter of the willingness of the German populace to conduct a military defense of their own territory under various conditions. The general question of willingness to defend the FRG was answered affirmatively by 57 percent of the respondents in 1977/78 and by 64% in 1980. However, if the defense was to be conducted primarily on German soil then those supporting it fell to between 57 and 53 percent, according to the year the poll was taken. When, however, respondents were asked about defending the FRG even if nuclear weapons must be used on German territory, those supporting a military defense under this condition fell to between 15% and 19%. Conversely, those opposing such a defense ranged between 60.5% and 71%, levels far higher than in the other two cases. "The clear majorities which came forward in the different circumstances show that people clearly take sides and very clearly so against the use of nuclear weapons."²⁸

²⁶ Ibid., p.405. For the supporting data see Tables 6 and 7.

²⁷ Ibid., Table 8.

²⁸ Ibid., p.408.

The final battery of questions evaluated West German public opinion concerning the esteem of the armed forces and the priority attached to the political task of national security. The polls indicated a very high level of esteem, with between 70 and 78% of the populace considering the armed forces as important or very important. When it came to bearing increased sacrifices, i.e., more taxes, or changing resource allocations between competing military and social programs, the German populace was far less supportive. Still, about 40 to 46% of the people would bear additional taxes and, in at least three areas of social programs-- education, environmental activities and foreign aid, they would accept cuts in spending, to be redirected toward the military. In addition, when asked to rank order six important political tasks, the West German public moved external security from rank 5 in 1979 to Rank 3 in 1980--just above strengthening the social security system.²⁹ To quote Dr. Schönborn:

In summarizing...it can be stated that a significant proportion of the German public explicitly stated a worsening of its perceptions of the state of national security. The reasons given for this, though, did not markedly trigger off a significantly high increase in perceptions of an immediate threat. It did, however, clearly have consequences especially in the political field, i.e., in the public's expectations about the future development of East-West relations and of the Atlantic relationship.³⁰

²⁹ Ibid., Table 11, p. 434.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 412

C. COMPARABILITY OF FINDINGS

As was the case with each of the previous country reports, our efforts to locate comparable analyses of German elite perceptions proved disappointing. Of the two studies located which focused upon elite perceptions, only one falls within the temporal framework of our Project: a report by Donald Brennan based upon a series of interviews conducted in Europe between March 2 and April 5, 1972.³¹ The second report summarizes a series of West European elite interviews by the Staff of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs conducted during January, 1980.³²

In the first report, although Brennan summarizes responses to 20 questions by 59 European elites, the results are presented in such a way as to preclude direct comparative analysis of the findings with our results; in that Brennan's conclusions are not disaggregated by national source. Consequently, it is impossible to isolate the input of German perceptions into such general conclusions as:

"If all Western forces (including U.S. strategic nuclear) are included, most Europeans feel that Soviet-NATO military forces are in a rough overall balance. However, they also perceive

- (A) increasing Soviet superiority in general-purpose forces in Central Europe
- (B) particular weakness on the NATO "flanks" (especially the southern one)
- (C) a potentially threatening Soviet naval buildup

and are somewhat more apprehensive about Soviet threat potential than 2 years ago (or than in the U.S.)"³³

³¹ Donald G. Brennan. Some European Elite Perceptions of Selected Security Issues (Briefing Charts). Final Report HI-2255-RR (Croton-on-Hudson, NY: Hudson Institute, May 29, 1975).

³² NATO and Western Security in the 1980's: The European Perception. Report of Staff Mission to Seven NATO Countries and Austria, January 2-18, 1980, to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, April 9, 1980 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1980).

³³ Brennan, op cit, p.10.

However, as support for his findings, Brennan does utilize selected elite statements. In discussing military threats and balances, the German reviewers stated:

"Since European security depends on U.S. power, any further shift toward the S.U. [Soviet Union] could bring down stability in Europe." (Birrenbach)³⁴

"If U.S. strategic force does not keep up with S.U. [Soviet Union] ... [it would have noticeable effects on security] (Trebesch)³⁵

Regarding those elements of the strategic forces which affect perceptions, the German reviewers indicated that:

"Small changes in numbers or quality would not affect the balance. What is important is that Western strategic forces remain a firm and credible element of our overall posture." (Leber)³⁶

"Questions of means of protection of Europe may be connected with escalation [to the use of strategic forces], but would not get clear answers as to how." (C. F. von Weizsacker)³⁷

We cannot, from the results of the SOWI study, support or contradict Brennan's conclusions. Regarding elites, all we can say is that the overall military balance and the strategic balance were more frequently referenced than other components of the military balance, and that the Germans perceived a situation of inferiority to the WTO.³⁸ (See Table 6.13)

The only other question with which we are able to make any comparisons in the Brennan study regards US security guarantees to Europe. Brennan concludes that:

"There is high confidence that the U.S. will not abandon Europe, mainly stemming from a belief that Europe is too important to the U.S."³⁹

As support, he cites these German reviewers:

"There is interdependence between U.S. will and the efforts made by Europeans." (Trebesch)

³⁴ Brennan, op cit., p.12.

³⁵ Ibid, p.31.

³⁶ Ibid, p.14.

³⁷ Ibid, p.16.

³⁸ However, the percentage seeing equality was about as large as that seeing WTO superiority.

³⁹ Brennan, op cit., p.20.

"My conviction [of continuing U.S. will] is based on the fact that security if West coincides with security of U.S." (Leber)⁴⁰

Our results would seem to conform to Brennan's conclusion. The SOWI elite report indicates that the volume of elite references to the US security guarantees is very low (Table 6.8), indicating little concern. This is supported by the public results, which indicate that over 60 percent felt that the US was a dependable ally.⁴¹

The second report concerning German elite views of European security by the staff of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, unlike the Brennan study, presents its conclusions within a country-specific framework. Although we cannot make direct comparisons with the results between it and the SOWI studies, the conclusions of the House study mission section on German elites provides valuable information and conforms very closely to our findings in Chapter 8. The study mission concluded that:

1. The NATO alliance is unique and strong. German officials viewed the Soviet challenge as an important factor contributing to NATO political cohesion. While there are no real factions within NATO, disagreement is a fact of life.
2. The Soviet military threat is recognized more for its political consequences on Western Europe than for its possible use in a military assault. Germans emphasized the need to prevent piecemeal accommodation to Soviet power: NATO must avoid borderline between detente and appeasement.
3. FRG security policy places equal emphasis on detente and defense.
4. Concerning detente, Germans do not consider it a one-way street, but rather a policy that has benefited the FRG (and the West) by reduced tensions, and increased economic/cultural contacts. However, detente policy must be "realistic" concerning Soviet power; Germans fear the "death of detente" due to US reactions and programs.
5. Similarly, arms control is an integral part of FRG foreign/security policy. It is a priority objective designed to reduce/stabilize arms levels in Europe and provide "machinery for contact" between East and West.

⁴⁰ Ibid, pp.20-21.

⁴¹ See Appendix D, Schönborn, Table 7, p.430.

6. Regarding defense, the FRG has provided its share of the defense burden. In support officials pointed to the TNF decision and the LTDP (Long Term Defense Program) as bolstering defense. However, officials emphasized that there was no link in their minds between commitment to the LTDP and the objective of a 3% annual real rise in defense spending.
7. US leadership and its security guarantees are not questioned and are assumed to be "facts of life."⁴²

While the comparability between these reports and the SOWI studies proved extremely difficult, due in part to the unique manner in which the Rössler report was presented, they did provide useful information and conformed closely with our overall sense of the situation. Moreover, the results of the SOWI public opinion polls matched closely with other similar polls, as shown in Chapter 8, Section II.

⁴² NATO and Western Security in the 1980's, op cit, pp. 20-37.

D. SUMMARY OF WEST GERMAN PERCEPTIONS

With respect to elite opinions, one could conclude that:

1. Although external military threats as a group (i.e., Soviet nuclear or WTO conventional attacks) were mentioned by nearly 47 percent of West German respondents, political pressure backed by the threat of force was cited by more than 30% of West German elites, more often than any other single external threat. In contrast, internal subversion and economic threats were discussed relatively infrequently. (See Table 6.3).
2. The perception that a threat existed did not necessarily correspond with a feeling of insecurity; in fact, a quarter of all respondents felt secure against conventional attack and almost half against a nuclear strike (Table 6.4). However, with the exception of the latter threat, a majority of the West German elites queried were either negative or uncertain that their country was secure. In absolute terms the largest number of negative or uncertain judgements was in the area of political pressure backed by the threat of force. (This seems somewhat of an anomaly, in that it is difficult to correlate feelings of relative security against the use of force with feelings of relative insecurity about the threat of force.)⁴³
3. The "clustering" of concerns about military threats was reflected in judgements about the targets of external threats, with 38% of the respondents listing "the physical security of the Western Alliance".

⁴³ This anomaly is even more striking if one considers that the public at large feels even more secure against military operations than do the elites and does not even mention "political pressures" in its open-ended category of threats. (Schönborn, op. cit., Tables 24 and 25.)

However, the very high number (and even higher percentage) of respondents who were worried about non-military threats had its counterpart in the 15% (17.4% of the total) who saw Western values as the target and the even larger number and percentage who saw the threat directed against (undefined) national --and alliance--interests.

(Table 6.5). Particularly noteworthy is the congruence between the types of threats which are most worrisome and the types of targets identified; for example, internal subversion is obviously directed against national values.

4. As one looks at military forces, it is apparent that US strategic nuclear forces received the most attention, with 19.4% of all responses, followed by NATO conventional forces and then by those of the Warsaw Pact. Surprisingly, Soviet SNF were infrequently mentioned (6% of the time) as items of importance, and the theater/regional and tactical nuclear forces of both sides were discussed even less often. (See Table 6.6.) The largest number of references (375 out of 984) was to "other military factors", presumably including morale, leadership, training, etc.--factors which also came to the fore in public opinion polls. (See Section 8: PUBLIC OPINION, or Schönborn, op. cit., Table 4.)
5. The same general pattern appeared in the number of references to military balances, in which the overall military balance led, followed by the strategic balance, the conventional balance and (at a considerable distance) by the tactical nuclear and regional nuclear balances. In interpreting these results, SOWI conjectured that:

- a. US strategic nuclear forces (and hence the strategic balance) constituted the principal factors in European security but that;
 - b. It was at the "sub-strategic level" that the real threat existed, that of a war involving conventional and/or theater/regional nuclear forces.⁴⁴
6. Perhaps some of the apparent anomalies between perceptions of threat and sense of security may be explained by the discussion of political factors affecting European security, first and foremost among which was the issue of "closer NATO links". (See Table 6.8). Together with the many references to the political meshing of the United States and Europe, coordination of economic objectives within the Atlantic Alliance, support for West European integration, and so on, this attests to the West German need for, and sense of, "belonging". And since "belonging" enhances security (at least in the minds of the public, if not in those of elites⁴⁵), involvement in NATO, in the European community, etc., many ameliorate West German perceptions of threat.
7. This inference is supported by:
- a. The (relatively) high number of respondents who judged political links and treaties influential in the behavior of

⁴⁴Rüssler, *op. cit.*, pp. 387-388. Although this is certainly one possible interpretation of the data, it is also possible to infer that the relatively few references to theater/regional nuclear forces (4.2%, taken together), coupled with the relatively high assurance that Europe is secure against a nuclear strike, meant that the threat of "sub-strategic" nuclear war had not yet permeated the minds of many West German elites. [Authors' Note]

⁴⁵Schönborn, *op. cit.*, Tables 6 and 7.

nation-states.⁴⁶

- b. The "overwhelming importance" attributed to detente and arms control,⁴⁷ which necessarily involve multi-national approaches and
 - c. The emphasis upon East-West (i.e., collective) relations rather than upon those between individual states. (See Table 6.11).
8. This does not mean that West German elites are "starry-eyed idealists"; quite the contrary. The emphasis upon collective action both in preparations for defense and in the development of policy on detente, arms control, trade and other aspects of East-West relations is accompanied by a tendency to judge the Soviets in terms of what they do, not what they say. (See Table 6.10). And although one cannot conclude that these judgements will necessarily be the same as those reached by other elites, the fact that they are based upon assessments of behavior, and acted upon in concert, gives greater hope of congruence among the policies of the several allies than might otherwise be the case.
9. The results of the opinion polls conducted more or less in parallel with the analysis of elite attitudes showed that:
- a. The people of West Germany seemingly felt even more secure against attack than did the elites, with over 70% of the respondents in each of three polls deeming the threat of war "rather limited".⁴⁸ (Table 6.12).

⁴⁶ Table 6.9. Although "force" received the most references (1258) and national objectives the second most (1109), political links was a close third, with 983 references out of 5545.

⁴⁷ Rüssler, *op. cit.*, p. 391. (See also Table 6.10).

⁴⁸ Schönborn, *op. cit.*, Table 8.

- b. As many as one third of those questioned said that, if attacked, the FRG and NATO could defend themselves -- though this percentage dropped from 38% in 1977 to 32% in 1980, and an even larger percentage were dubious about the outcome.⁴⁹
10. This feeling existed despite the fact that:
- a. Better than a third of the respondents believed the Warsaw Pact to be militarily superior to NATO, which only about 10-12% considered superior (Table 6.13), and that
 - b. The public was markedly pessimistic over the future of East-West relations, with one third estimating, in 1980, that they would continue to get worse.⁵⁰
11. Among the possible reasons for this (comparative) optimism were:
- a. The belief that NATO would be a reliable partner and the US a dependable ally, held by over 60% of those responding;⁵¹
 - b. The general willingness of the people to defend themselves if attacked--though this willingness dropped off markedly (from over 50% to under 20%) when the hypothetical use of nuclear weapons on the soil of the FRG was taken into account;
 - c. A (less general) willingness to increase taxes and/or re-allocate resources from social to defense programs.
12. As far as comparability of research is concerned, we would note that,

⁴⁹ Schönborn, *op. cit.*, Table 5.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, Table 15.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, Tables 6 and 7.

as was true for the American, British and French, we could not find other studies of elite attitudes with which to compare the SOWI study. The difficulty of the research was compounded by the unique results produced by SOWI. However, the results of the public opinion polls matched very closely with other similar polls and will be compared in Chapter 8, Section II B.

CHAPTER 7

CROSS-NATIONAL RESULTS - A SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

While, as one would expect, there are some differences between elite perceptions across our target countries, a considerable degree of parallelism existed in the major trends and results.¹ This section will focus upon those trends and results that are deemed significant and interesting, and will thus provide an overview of the principal findings of Project APT (Allied Perceptions of Threat).

¹As explained earlier in the text, strict comparability with the West German results is not possible, thus, all comparisons must be tentative and judgemental. However, when one considers all the references in the West German study (see Chapter 6) as the totality of a body of thematic references similar in nature and purpose to those in the American study, then a number of remarkable and interesting cross-national comparisons can be made, at least in terms of percentages of respondents holding similar views. Although longitudinal comparisons are not possible, aggregate results can be used to demonstrate comparability. In addition, the results of the SOWI public opinion polls will be used where applicable to provide data for cross-national comparison.

A. CROSS NATIONAL RESULTS: THREATS TO SECURITY

A considerable increase in the volume, types and salience of concerns associated with "external threat" were detected in the writings and speeches of both American and European elites. These themes, in general, focused upon comparisons of military capabilities and upon conflict situations resulting from the actions and objectives of the Soviet Union and her allies.

The percentages of annual thematic references to "external threats" give some indication of the salience attached to this body of themes in each of our target countries. As shown on Table 7.1, for the three years, Great Britain had the highest percentage of "external threat" references, followed by the United States, West Germany and France. A trend toward an increasingly yearly percentage of threat themes is clearly demonstrated on Figure 7.1 for each state except Germany, where the data was aggregated. While the percentage of British references to external threats started high in 1971, and remained high, those of the US and France showed considerable growth over the same period.


These external threat issues were primarily focused upon the military balance and the Soviet military buildup. Although each country demonstrated some diversity in the particulars, the aggregate volume of all types of themes associated with these issues proved to be remarkably consistent among the states. As shown on Table 7.2, the US, Britain and West Germany each devoted over 55 percent of all external threat references to the military balance and buildup, while France yielded about 43 percent.

EXTERNAL THREAT THEME REFERENCES

TABLE 7.1: AGGREGATE REFERENCE PERCENTAGES

US	36.8
Britain	42.8
France	19.7
Germany	27.1

FIGURE 7.1: EXTERNAL THREATS AS ANNUAL PERCENTAGE OF THEMATIC REFERENCES



SOURCE: Tables 3.3, 4.3 and 5.3.

TABLE 7.2

AGGREGATE PERCENTAGES OF EXTERNAL THREAT THEMES
CONCERNING MILITARY BALANCE AND BUILDUP ISSUES

United States	57.5
Britain	36.8
France	43.3
West Germany	55.8

Disaggregating the military balance themes into component groups demonstrated the salience that national elites attached to each of these individual components. In Table 7.3, an examination of the Aggregate Percentages table reveals that three patterns developed in the ranking of the balance components. In the first pattern, while the percentage of specific references were different, both France and West Germany produced identical rankings: 1) strategic balance; 2) overall balance; 3) conventional balance; and 4) theater nuclear balance. In the case of the US, the second pattern, the strategic and conventional balances were the most salient, followed by the theater nuclear and overall balances. However, in Great Britain, the third pattern, the strategic balance was ranked lowest (completely opposite the rankings in the other three states) while, as noted in the table, the conventional balance occupied the first position.²

²Britain's preoccupation with the conventional balance may be explained in part by the considerable attention paid by the British to naval matters (over 15 percent of all external threat themes). No other country devoted as much energy to naval issues, with only 6 percent and 3 percent respectively of US and French thematic references dealing with these problems.

While the aggregate percentages above provide informative results of rankings in general, they do not demonstrate trends over time to illustrate changes. Table 7.3 reflects the endpoint position of such shifts in the attention paid to military balances.

When the two tables are compared, it can be seen that only the rankings of France for 1979 remained identical with the aggregate rankings. For the United States, while the strategic balance remained first, the theater nuclear balance replaced the conventional component as the second most referenced issue. Similarly, though to a much greater degree, a shift occurred in Britain, with theater nuclear issues toppling conventional issues out of first place. Two principal patterns can be discerned among these states. First, the pattern of rankings for Britain and France may be more similar than first appearances would indicate. In the broadest terms, a definitional difference over what constitutes a "theater nuclear" or "strategic" force balance is part of what separates the two. The French consider their Force de Frappe as strategic in nature while the British tend to equate it and their regional forces as theater systems. Thus, somewhat of an overlap exists in "actual" rankings. The United States, on the other hand, clearly differentiates between the two types of nuclear systems, applying the "theater" rubric to all systems that are not American long-range nuclear forces, i.e., US ICBMs, heavy bombers and SLBMs.

Another interesting difference that separated European and American elite rankings of the military balance consisted in the positioning of the "overall balance." While American authors rarely touched on this, the Europeans, in every case, made the "overall balance" the second most referenced factor.

TABLE 7.3

RANKS OF THE COMPONENTS OF THE MILITARY BALANCE

Aggregate Percentages of External Threat Themes

<u>US</u>	<u>Britain</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>West Germany</u>
1. Strategic (14.5)	Conventional (13.2)	Strategic (10.5)*	Strategic (16.7)
2. Conventional (12.1)	Overall (10.5)	Overall (7.9)	Overall (14.2)
3. TNF (7.9)	TNF (6.8)	Conventional (6.6)	Conventional (11.3)
4. Overall (2.4)	Strategic (6.3)	TNF (3.9)	TNF (4.4)

1979 Percentages of External Threat Themes

<u>US</u>	<u>Britain</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>West Germany</u>
1. Strategic (14.9)	TNF (16.7)	Strategic (17.5)*	N/A
2. TNF (12.6)	Overall (12.1)	Overall (10.0)	N/A
3. Conventional (8.0)	Conventional (10.6)	Conventional (5.0)	N/A
4. Overall (2.3)	Strategic (9.1)	TNF (5.0)	N/A

*Includes references to various weapons systems, such as British and French missile submarines, that other elites place among theater nuclear forces.

N/A: not available

Although the rankings of the military balance components indicated how salient these issues were to American and European elites in terms of volumes of references, they did not reflect perceptions of the state of these balances. For these we must turn to the results of the Primary Codings (see Chapter 2). In general, it can be said that perceptions of all components of the military balance shifted toward the view that conditions were adverse to the West at worst and equal at best. Surprisingly, by 1979 the Europeans perceived the balances more pessimistically than Americans,

although US authors, in general, addressed these issues in greater numbers than did their European counterparts across each of the time periods examined in the project.³

As shown on Table 7.4, the strategic balance was perceived by American, British and French authors as essentially in a state of parity. This perception remained virtually the same from 1971 to 1979, although the issue itself became more salient as greater numbers of authors addressed it. At the same time, more elites perceived the balance as adverse, with a small decline in the relatively few authors seeing the strategic balance as favorable.

The largest growth in negative perceptions occurred concerning the balance of theater/regional nuclear forces. Although only a relative handful of authors addressed this problem in 1971 (less than 9 percent in each country), this component produced the second largest volume of adverse perceptions in 1979. Interestingly, the largest growth in elite attention and associated negative perceptions occurred in France, though Britain and the US were not far behind. Also, it appears that Britain was the first to have perceived problems in the balance, somewhere around 1975, while both the US and France did not react with similar perceptions until between 1975 and 1979.

From 1971 to 1979, the conventional balance was consistently perceived as the most adverse of any. The percentages of elites describing the balance as adverse grew by about 13 percentage points in each state over this period, while at the same time those viewing the balance as equal fell by up to 10 percent (19.8 percent from 1975), as in the case of the United States. It is interesting that

³The following analyses will exclude West German inputs, with the exception of those on the overall balance, due to the problems noted earlier with comparability of data.

TABLE 7.4

PERCEPTIONS OF THE MILITARY BALANCE

(Percentages of References)
Strategic Balance

Balance is...	1971			1975			1979		
	US	BR	FR	US	BR	FR	US	BR	FR
Adverse:	9.1	1.8	-	12.5	6.7	-	13.3	14.3	4.3
Equal:	29.9	12.7	24.5	35.4	13.3	10.7	46.9	27.0	36.2
Favorable:	2.6	3.6	4.1	4.2	4.0	3.6	3.1	--	2.1
(Totals):	(41.6)	(18.2)	(28.6)	(52.1)	(24.0)	(14.3)	(63.3)	(41.3)	(42.6)

Theater/Regional Nuclear Balance

	1971			1975			1979		
	US	BR	FR	US	BR	FR	US	BR	FR
Adverse:	3.8	3.6	4.1	4.2	17.3	1.8	18.8	22.6	29.8
Equal:	1.3	5.5	--	6.3	-	-	5.2	3.2	8.5
Favorable:	-	-	--	2.1	-	-	1.0	1.6	2.1
(Totals):	(5.1)	(9.1)	(4.1)	(12.5)	(17.3)	(1.8)	(25.0)	(27.4)	(40.4)

Conventional Balance

	1971			1975			1979		
	US	BR	FR	US	BR	FR	US	BR	FR
Adverse:	24.4	27.3	12.2	27.1	41.3	14.3	37.5	39.7	27.7
Equal:	12.8	1.8	2.0	22.9	-	-	3.1	1.6	-
Favorable:	1.3	3.6	-	2.1	1.3	3.6	3.1	4.8	-
(Totals):	(38.5)	(32.7)	(14.3)	(52.1)	(42.6)	(17.9)	(43.7)	(46.1)	(27.7)

Key: US: United States
BR: Britain
FR: France

TABLE 7.4 (Cont'd)

	<u>Overall Balance</u>								
	<u>1971</u>			<u>1975</u>			<u>1979</u>		
	<u>US</u>	<u>BR</u>	<u>FR</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>BR</u>	<u>FR</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>BR</u>	<u>FR</u>
Adverse:	2.6	3.6	8.2	8.5	8.0	7.1	17.5	14.3	21.3
Equal:	11.5	5.5	12.2	14.9	6.7	5.4	20.6	4.8	8.5
Favorable:	2.6	-	-	-	-	3.6	2.1	9.5	4.3
(Totals):	(16.7)	(9.1)	(20.4)	(23.4)	(14.7)	(17.1)	(40.2)	(28.6)	(34.0)

West German Public Opinion: Overall Balance**

	<u>Dec. 1977/Jan. 1978</u>	<u>Oct./Nov. 1979</u>	<u>Feb./Mar. 1980</u>
Warsaw Pact Superior:	34.4	42.4	38.6
Both are Equal:	30.4	31.1	36.3
NATO is Superior:	12.6	10.8	10.4
Don't Know:	22.6	15.0	14.1
No Answer:		0.8	0.5
N=:	1913	1866	559

*Source: Schönborn, op. cit. Table 3, Appendix D.

+Note: As can be seen, the German public viewed the overall balance in somewhat more favorable terms than did the elites in the United States, Britain and France. Interestingly, in the SOWI polls in 1979 of American publics, the US populace followed the same basic pattern as American elites, with most viewing the balance as equal or adverse. See Appendix D, Schönborn, op. cit. Table 3.

while the Europeans were consistently more pessimistic about the balance, the US had fairly large percentages viewing the balance as equal, percentages which increased from 1971 to 1975. However, by 1979 those viewing the balance as equal had virtually disappeared, producing a pattern remarkably similar to the European one.⁴

Perceptions of the overall balance are not made in vacuo but rather result from some composite evaluation of the strategic, theater nuclear and conventional balances. Since American authors viewed the overall balance as principally equal over all time periods, it appears that the strategic balance assumed primary importance in the authors' perceptions, as the theater nuclear and conventional balances were adverse. The British and French, however, shifted from a perception of essential parity in 1971 to one where the plurality of authors saw the overall balance as primarily adverse -- though with mixed perceptions in equality and favorability to the West. While the influence of the strategic balance on British elite perceptions still appears prominent (though less so than in the US), there is an impression that the theater/regional nuclear balance exerted a major effect on their overall military evaluations. Speculation about the French is more problematic and complex. The results suggest that the theater/regional and conventional balances affect their overall perceptions at least as heavily as the strategic. While this may seem to contradict the prominence of the strategic balance in their external threat issues (see Table 7.3), it should be noted that definitional semantics are again at work. As a matter of consistency, we coded all discussions of British and French nuclear forces as theater/regional rather

⁴ Although the West Germans did not deal separately with the conventional balance, they did ask a series of questions about numbers, weapons, morale, etc., which seemed to relate more directly to conventional forces than to nuclear ones. The German public saw the Pact as superior in five of six categories in 1979 (all but quality of weapons) and in four of six categories in 1980 (all but quality of weapons and training of personnel). Schönborn, op. cit., Table 4.

than as strategic--which is how the French perceive them. On the whole, therefore, the heavier influence of the theater/regional nuclear forces would seem to imply that perceptions of the overall balance are significantly affected by perceptions of those elements of the armed forces that are designed to operate against the home country of the respective elites.

Regarding the overall balance, SOWI public opinion polls indicated that the Germans saw the military balance between 1977 and 1980 as adverse at worst and equal at best. Although this poll tells us nothing about elite opinion in the FRG, which is unlikely to correspond on a one-to-one basis, there is some similarity between German public opinion and elite opinion in Britain, France and the United States in the same time frame; in fact, if we compare percentages of respondents in 1979, those American and British elites who said that the overall balance was adverse matched closely the figures for the German people at large -- with French elites more pessimistic than any of the other groups.

In addition to asking our sources about the various military balances, we also asked them to indicate the contribution to (or effects on) security of three force components: strategic nuclear, theater/regional nuclear, and conventional. This part of our research, which covered Britain, France and the United States, found some significant similarities in views on the importance of various types of forces.

The supposition is supported (for the Germans at least) by the SOWI results. While their report conjectured that the US strategic forces and the strategic balance constitute the principal factors in European security, the author went on to say that the "sub-strategic" theater/nuclear forces constitute the greatest threat, in that they are "useable" instruments of military power. See Chapter 6, Section A-3, p. 230.

Differences did appear in other ratings, with higher percentages of Germans (and British) than Americans classifying NATO as "superior", and somewhat smaller ones deeming the balance equal -- a judgement from which both British and French elites dissented.

Actually, we asked also about a fourth component, tactical nuclear forces, but only the French dealt with this subject in any numbers.


Figures 7.2 and 7.3 illustrate the changes in net perceptions⁸ of the impact on perceptions of threat of the capabilities of Soviet and American strategic nuclear forces. It is apparent that, as one would expect, perceptions about the Soviet strategic forces were negative for each of the three years, i.e., generated increasing concerns about security. Moreover, a sharp increase in concerns was noted between 1975 and 1979. Similarly, a general view of the growing inadequacy of US strategic forces resulted in a major change for all states from the small levels of positive perceptions (decreased concerns about security) in 1971/1975 to significant negative views by 1979. Since, in general, each elite group perceived the strategic balance as essentially equal, they obviously did not judge the importance of these forces to the balance solely on the basis of "capabilities". It is possible that some perceptual function was in play that includes other elements and/or discounts capability beyond a certain level of military effectiveness. It is also possible, as noted earlier, that "equality" has different values for different people.

The theater/regional nuclear forces of the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact and NATO followed a pattern that mirrored that of the strategic systems. On Figures 7.4 and 7.5, one can see that the capabilities of Soviet theater/regional nuclear systems were perceived as increasing concerns about European security in each period, with a major negative shift between 1975 and 1979. Although NATO theater/nuclear capabilities were seen until 1975 as enhancing security, after that period they also followed a trend showing increasing concern. However, unlike the case with strategic forces, concerns about the effect on security of NATO and Warsaw Pact theater capabilities, taken together, appear to correlate closely with perceptions of an adverse theater/regional balance. This would suggest that elites do not include other intervening factors in their composite analysis of threats to security.

⁸Net perceptions are the differences between "positive" and "negative" responses to questions. See Chapter 2: Methodology, Section 2, p. 17.

FIGURE 7.2


IMPACT OF MILITARY FACTORS ON SECURITY -
VAR. 21: CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES



SOURCE: Tables 3.12, 4.12 and 5.12.

FIGURE 7.3


IMPACT OF MILITARY FACTORS ON SECURITY -
VAR 17: CAPABILITIES OF US STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES



SOURCE: Tables 3.12, 4.12 and 5.12.

FIGURE 7.4


IMPACT OF MILITARY FACTORS ON SECURITY -
VAR 33: CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET/PACT THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES



SOURCE: Tables 3.12, 4.12 and 5.12.

FIGURE 7.5

IMPACT OF MILITARY FACTORS ON SECURITY -
VAR 22: CAPABILITIES OF NATO THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES



SOURCE: Tables 3.12, 4.12 and 5.12.


Perceptions of the impact on security of conventional forces, Figures 7.6 and 7.7, seem to follow the trend toward increasing concerns about Soviet/Pact capabilities, but are more complex in the case of NATO capabilities. British perceptions of the contributions to security of US/NATO conventional forces, though always negative, rose slightly, while those of the French and the Americans dropped a bit. The relatively small changes in elite perceptions of what allied forces contribute to security, coupled with the generally adverse assessments of the conventional balance, suggest that it is alterations in Soviet/WTO force postures that affect both these assessments and perceptions of threat -- a judgement borne out by the impact on Western opinion of Soviet programs for the modernization and buildup of their military forces, for which see Figure 7.8, below.

Hence, our research would suggest that perceptions of the various military balances are formulated in two different ways. Although we cannot say precisely what goes into the evaluative functions of each unique elite group, it would appear that the theater/regional nuclear and conventional balances are closely associated with perceptions of the respective Soviet and NATO force capabilities (particularly the former) while estimates of the strategic balance cannot be explained by just a net assessment of capabilities. Moreover, the Soviet military buildup and modernization programs, which, as shown on Figure 7.8, evoked considerable and increasing concerns (in fact, this variable registered the largest negative shifts of any in the project) seemed to have a significant association with estimates of capabilities.

Although American and European elites paid increasing attention to external threat issues, increasingly perceived military balances becoming adverse to the West and showed increasing concerns about the capabilities (and weaknesses) of Pact and NATO military forces, these factors did not in and of themselves, tell us whether Western Europe was deemed "secure"; for this we asked another set of questions.

FIGURE 7.6


IMPACT OF MILITARY FACTORS ON SECURITY -
VAR 28: CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET/WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL FORCES



SOURCE: Tables 3.12, 4.12 and 5.12.

FIGURE 7.7


IMPACT OF MILITARY FACTORS ON SECURITY -
VAR 27: CAPABILITIES OF NATO CONVENTIONAL FORCES



SOURCE: Tables 3.12, 4.12 and 5.12.

FIGURE 7.8

FACTORS AFFECTING THE SALIENCE OF THE THREAT -
VAR 43: SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP AND MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS



SOURCE: Tables 3.17, 4.17 and 5.17.


Two of these questions concerned the perceived intent of the Soviet Union to initiate military operations; specifically, to launch a nuclear attack or a conventional assault on Europe. While only the US, British and French analyses provided trend data for elites, the SOWI reports did yield comparative information on similar questions.

With respect to the likelihood of a nuclear strike, Figure 7.9, both US and French elites registered a growing sense of insecurity and uncertainty. The French showed a consistent increase in concerns from 1971 onward (when net perceptions were still positive) to 1979.⁹ However, the Americans followed a different path to the same end. From 1971 to 1975, an anomalous rise in perceptions of security occurred, followed by a dramatic drop to a negative level which by 1979 equalled that of France. Unlike the others, the British, while also registering a decline in positive net perceptions, still perceived a nuclear strike by the USSR as unlikely; thus, to them Europe seemed secure against that particular threat. More importantly, even the net negative levels of the United States and France, while significant in that the trend was towards increasing perceptions of insecurity, did not indicate an overly high level of concern about the likelihood of nuclear war. Furthermore, as can be seen on Table 7.5, this question did not appear to evoke much interest until 1979 and even then the level of responses was still less than 50 percent.

⁹ France was the only country to address the issue of security from a nuclear strike in the "future". (See Chapter 5, Section B-1 .) While volumes of responses in 1971 and 1975 were insignificant, the attention devoted to a future beyond 1979 evoked a moderately large level (34%) in the last period. Further, the net percentages indicated a belief that future security would be at best equal to the present and most likely worse. Moreover, at each successive "present" period, perceptions were more negative than the "future" expectations of prior periods. This (and other indicators) suggest that French perspectives on the Soviet threat may be coming closer to those of American elites.

FIGURE 7.9

NET PERCEPTIONS OF THE SECURITY OF EUROPE CONCERNING:
VAR 07: A NUCLEAR STRIKE BY THE USSR



SOURCE: TABLES 3.10, 4.10 and 5.10.

TABLE 7.5

PERCENTAGES OF AUTHORS ADDRESSING WHETHER
OR NOT EUROPE IS SECURE AGAINST....

Var 07: A Nuclear Strike (in the present)

	<u>1971</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1979</u>
US	21.8	29.2	39.8
Britain	45.5	24.0	46.0
France	12.2	3.6	32.6

Var 08: A Future Nuclear Strike

	<u>1971</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1979</u>
France	2.0	3.6	34.0

Var 09: A Warsaw Pact Attack With Conventional Forces

	<u>1971</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1979</u>
US	25.6	37.5	41.8
Britain	49.1	45.3	49.2
France	18.4	7.1	10.9

A similar question was asked of West German elites. Since, as noted before, the Germans utilized aggregate analysis over the period 1968-1977, it is difficult to make definitive comparisons. Even though a plurality (45.9%) indicated that Europe was secure from a Soviet nuclear attack, over 35 percent were uncertain or registered a negative response. (See Table 6.4). Thus, the net result, a positive 10 percent, seems to conform to other Allied perceptions in the pre-1979 period.


Pertaining to a conventional attack, concerns about security seemed similarly low, though for the US and France somewhat more negative than Britain. As shown on Table 7.5 (Var. 09), both the American and British elites devoted rather high levels of attention to a conventional attack. However, for Britain, as Figure 7.10 indicates, net concerns were always positive and concern decreased from 1971 to 1979. The United States on the other hand was always negative, with an increasing level of net negative perceptions by 1979 (approximately equal to that level of concerns expressed about a nuclear strike). The French, while similarly registering negative votes, did not address the issue in any meaningful volume (See Table 7.5).

The West German elites were somewhat more concerned about a conventional war than any of their Allies. While about 25 percent believed the situation to be secure, almost 60 percent were uncertain or did not feel that Europe was safe from a Pact attack. (See Table 6.4, p. 226).

The German public, however, did not seem at all concerned about the threat of war. Even though SOWI asked non-specific questions (which presumably included both conventional and nuclear threats) only about 10 to 14 percent considered the threat by the Soviet Union to be serious and a threat of war rather great. (See Tables 7.6 and 7.7). Conversely, over 70% saw either no threat or only a

FIGURE 7.10

NET PERCEPTIONS OF THE SECURITY OF EUROPE CONCERNING:
VAR 09: A WARSAW PACT ATTACK WITH CONVENTIONAL FORCES



SOURCE: Tables 3.10, 4.10 and 5.10

limited one -- even though more than 40% characterized the overall military balance as "adverse". (See Table 7.4)

Although none of the elites indicated a great concern over the likelihood of either nuclear or conventional war, the Europeans were less concerned than the Americans. It also appeared that while concerns were still low overall, the trend, with few exceptions, was definitely toward increasing perceptions of insecurity. Still, the low level of concerns about the possibility of a Soviet/Pact military assault indicates that some factors intervene between elite and public assessments of the military balance and their perceptions of the likelihood of war.

In addition to military conflict situations, we also asked questions concerning three non-military threats to European security: political pressure backed by the threat of force, internal subversion, and threats against economic viability and/or political independence.¹⁰ In each case, the Americans and the French paid relatively little attention to these issues, at least to judge by volume of references. However, the British appeared to be somewhat concerned about political pressures backed by the threat of force and economic viability/political independence in 1971 and 1975, when about one-third of the elites addressed those problems. Similarly, over 30 percent of the German responses to non-military threats to European security concerned political pressures, while the other levels were around 10 percent. (See Table 6.3).

In terms of net perceptions,¹¹ all elites saw the situations as threatening. As can be seen on Figures 7.11 and 7.12, with the exception of the American perceptions of political pressures (Var. 11) a similar pattern developed among the elites: a greater sense of threat in 1975, followed by an upswing in 1979. The inflection point in 1975 registered by American elites is difficult to explain using only the data. However, a number of events in 1974 and 1975, such as the Nixon-Kissinger

¹⁰ See Tables 3.9, 4.9 and 5.9, Variables 11-15. Note: Internal Subversion responses were almost nonexistent and thus are not shown.

¹¹ See Tables 3.10, 4.10 and 5.10, Variables 11-15.

TABLE 7.6

DEGREE OF MILITARY THREAT

Question: How serious a threat to the West do you think the Soviet Union (the East) is today - a serious threat, a threat which is not serious, or is there no such threat?

Degree of Military Threat	Population of FRG (%)	
	<u>Oct./Nov. 1979</u>	<u>Feb./Mar. 1980</u>
Threat is Serious	10.0	14.3
Not so Serious	40.9	41.7
No Threat	35.1	32.7
Don't Know	13.5	11.3
No Answer	<u>0.5</u>	<u>-</u>
N=	1866	559

TABLE 7.7

THREAT OF WAR IN EUROPE


Question: Do you believe that the threat of war in Europe between the East and West, that is between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, is rather great or limited?

Threat of War	Population of FRG (%)		
	<u>Dec./Jan. 1978</u>	<u>Oct./Nov. 1979</u>	<u>Feb./Mar. 1980</u>
Rather great	11.1	8.5	14.0
Rather Limited	74.2	73.2	71.9
Don't Know	14.7	18.1	14.0
No Answer	<u>-</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>
N=	1913	1866	559

Source: Appendix D, Schönborn, Tables 1 and 2, pp. 424-425.

FIGURE 7.11


NET PERCEPTIONS OF THE SECURITY OF EUROPE CONCERNING:
POLITICAL PRESSURE BACKED BY THREAT OF FORCE



SOURCE: Tables 3.10, 4.10 and 5.10.

FIGURE 7.12

NET PERCEPTIONS OF THE SECURITY OF EUROPE CONCERNING:
THREATS AGAINST ECONOMIC VIABILITY AND/OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE



SOURCE: Tables 3.10, 4.10 and 5.10.

trips to Moscow in June/July 1974 concerning economic cooperation and arms control and the CSCE Summit in Helsinki in July 1975, may provide clues to lessening US concerns.¹² Conversely, neither the Helsinki agreement nor particular events such as the Franco-Soviet Economic and Energy Agreement in 1974 seem to correlate with an increased perception of political threats by British and French elites or of threats to economic viability by all elites.

The West Germans were seemingly more pessimistic than others of the Allies. Although the levels of net concern expressed by the British approached -35 percent in 1975, they were only about half of the net negative perceptions of the Germans. For all three questions, including internal subversion, a net level of about -75 percent was demonstrated for the aggregate data. Even though these net levels are significant, in that almost all those who discussed the issues felt that Europe was not secure, one must be cautious and conservative in assessing a real sense of threat, as very few authors actually addressed these issues. More importantly, we have no real explanation for this interesting discrepancy.

¹²Chronology from IISS, Strategic Survey 1974 and 1975.

B. CROSS-NATIONAL RESULTS: POLITICAL FACTORS AFFECTING SECURITY.

Political factors play an important role in the determination of both the nature and the severity of perceived threats, as well as the issues concerned with managing them. Three primary clusters of intra-alliance themes were apparent from an examination of the thematic references of the American and European elites.¹³

The first block dealt with the issues of detente and arms control. These themes referenced the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), the negotiations on mutual (and balanced) force reduction (MBFR), arms control problems in general, detente in general and such issues as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), as well as other related topics. For Britain and France, these themes were the largest cluster of references over the 1971-1979 period. Nearly 43 percent of the British and 30 percent of the French aggregate themes addressed detente and arms control issues. However, in each case those elites shifted perspectives over the period we considered, from focusing mainly upon detente issues in 1971/1975 to primary consideration of arms control themes in 1979. Similarly, the American elites were interested far more in arms control than detente issues (at least in terms of thematic references). Moreover, their attention to issues saw an almost complete reversal, from emphasis on MBFR in 1971 to SALT by 1979. (It should be noted that, unlike the British and French, the Americans did not place these themes in the first rank. They were more attentive to problems of alliance cohesion/management and military doctrine/weapons technology.)

The second group of thematic clusters addressed the multitude of issues concerning alliance cohesion and management. As noted earlier, the Americans were preoccupied with these issues with, in terms of aggregate references, nearly

¹³ See Chapters 3-5, Intra-Alliance Themes, for greater detail.

50 percent focused on these intra-alliance concerns, almost double the references to detente and arms control. The types of issues referenced were mostly "military-oriented" such as standardization/interoperability, defense burden-sharing and force modernization programs (together nearly 23 percent of all references).

The British did not place as much emphasis on intra-alliance concerns in general (37.8 percent: aggregate) as Americans, nor on those specific issues of interest noted above. Similarly, French references were far more diffuse and difficult to cluster, with concerns appearing to focus on Franco-Alliance relations, the economics of defense and issues of political and economic integration/cooperation.

The third group pertained to the military issues of doctrine and weapons technology. For the Americans, these themes were the second largest category of references overall, with over 27 percent of the aggregate references. Interestingly, all elites followed a general trend of increasing attention from 1971 to 1979, with the largest single change occurring in Britain, which went from zero references in 1971/1975 to almost 22 percent in 1979. Similarly, though less dramatically, French references rose from 11 percent in 1971 to 27 percent in 1979. Thus, while on the aggregate levels the British and French percentages were only about half of the American ones, by 1979 attention to doctrinal and weapons technology issues was approaching the American levels.

In addition to these three primary thematic groups, the French considered another group to be as salient as those analyzed above: World Politics. Here, the French examined the interrelationship between economics and security, security and international cooperation, politics in national security policies and the functions and utility of force. Although interest declined from 1971 to 1979, over 14 percent of respondents still addressed these issues. The attention paid to them is important because not only France, but West Germany, gave close scrutiny to macro-political matters.

As noted many times earlier, comparisons between the American-generated data and those from SOWI is difficult and judgemental. However, in the body of references utilized by the Germans, the same clusters of issues appeared; only the specifics concerned were different. By far, surprisingly, Germans focused principally on issues in World Politics (which accounted for nearly 46% of all references) followed by detente/arms control, and political/economic "meshing" and cooperation.¹⁴ Moreover, the SOWI report indicated that Soviet behavior regarding detente and arms control was of "overwhelming importance," for these problems "transcended the great powers" to become issues of primary concern for the Alliance and Europe as a whole.¹⁵

In general, it appears that the Europeans were primarily concerned with political and political-military issues, such as detente and arms control, while the Americans focused upon "military-oriented" alliance management topics and doctrinal/weapons technology issues. The divergence would seem to suggest that Europeans and Americans were beginning to take different paths and place different emphases on methods for managing the growing military imbalances and possible conflict situations which both perceived: the United States emphasizing military preparedness while the Europeans preferred tension reduction and arms race management through negotiation with the Soviets.

Perhaps some explanation for this divergence might come from the perceptions of commitments to devote resources to defense, and the reliability of the US and NATO security arrangements, both indicators of the vitality of the Alliance in general and its willingness to match the Soviet/Pact military buildup and modernization programs.

¹⁴ See Chapter 6, Table 6.9, p. 233.

¹⁵ See Appendix C, Rössler, p. 391.


Variables 37 and 38 of the APT Primary Coding concerned West European and US willingness to devote resources to defense. As shown on Figures 7.13 and 7.14, reactions to these questions were mixed. In both cases, the American pattern was the same, with an upsurge of positive net perceptions (decreased concerns) between 1975 and 1979, while European views remained negative. However, both British and French perceptions of American willingness to allocate additional resources for defense (Figure 7.14), declined between 1975 and 1979. This finding is tempered by the fact neither Britain nor France devoted much attention to the issue of US willingness to devote resources to defense (see Table 7.8) in terms of percentages of authors referencing the question. Similarly, France did not concern itself with the issue of West European willingness either, whereas Britain and the US did. Just what would account for the upsurge of US positive net perceptions in 1979 is impossible to say with certainty, but it might be associated with the Long Term Defense Program enacted by NATO in 1977/78. (It comes too early to reflect the Carter Administration's increased defense program following the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan.)

Like the French, the West German elite references to these two questions were very low. (See Table 6.8, p. 232). Also, while the German public indicated a very high level of esteem for the task of their armed forces, when it came to bearing additional financial burdens, support dropped considerably.¹⁶ Still, between 40-46% of the people indicated a willingness to devote or divert resources to defense. Thus, one can surmise that the German public would tend to see such an action as decreasing concerns about threats to European security.

¹⁶See Chapter 6, p. 241. Strictly speaking, this question is not identical to ours, which dealt only indirectly with willingness to actually provide resources; we asked instead whether so doing would enhance European security.

FIGURE 7.13


IMPACT OF POLITICAL FACTORS ON SECURITY:
VAR 37: WEST EUROPEAN WILLINGNESS TO DEVOTE RESOURCES TO DEFENSE



SOURCE: Tables 3.15, 4.15 and 5.15.

FIGURE 7.14

IMPACT OF POLITICAL FACTORS ON SECURITY:
VAR. 38: US WILLINGNESS TO DEVOTE RESOURCES TO DEFENSE



SOURCE: Tables 3.15, 4.15 and 5.15.

TABLE 7.8

PERCENTAGES OF AUTHORS ADDRESSING...

Variable 37: West European Willingness to Devote Resources to Defense.

	<u>1971</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1979</u>
US	56.4	27.1	27.6
Britain	49.1	65.3	52.4
France	18.4	12.5	17.0

Variable 38: US Willingness to Devote Resources to Defense

	<u>1971</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1979</u>
US	37.2	36.2	46.4
Britain	10.9	8.0	14.3
France	22.4	5.4	15.2

The reliability of US security guarantees is the bedrock of the Western Alliance. Any doubts concerning American willingness to defend her European allies obviously would strain alliance cohesion and might serve as an impetus for other states to seek alternative methods of dealing with the Soviet/Pact military threat. Thus, ascertaining any differences in views about guarantees would be an important factor in evaluating perceptions of threat.

As a principal concern, i.e., thematic references, American authors did not provide more than 17 references in any year. Only two real items of interest appeared. In 1971, the Mansfield Amendment calling for US troop withdrawals from Europe was the central issue, while by 1979 attention focused upon the possibility

of the "decoupling" of US strategic forces, as increased Soviet military capabilities put into question the logic of an American strategic response to a military assault. An almost identical level of responses and pattern developed for British elites. Even the French followed the same basic trend. Thus, in the main, US security guarantees appeared to be a non-issue.

However, in terms of authors mentioning the effects on European security of the US willingness to defend Western Europe, Variable 39 of the Primary Coding, both the Americans and French produced a level of about 50 percent responses, though the British generated only about half that level. (See Table 7.9) The net responses, as shown on Figure 7.15, indicates a pattern of increasing concern generally, although the US remained positive throughout while Britain fell to marginal negative levels and France produced some rather significant negative perceptions.

The level of interest in these guarantees expressed by German elites was even below the level of the others: only about 3 percent of the total references. Moreover, the German public indicated very high levels of confidence in the US, with about 60% specifying either "very much" or "totally" confident views between Dec. 1977 and Feb./Mar. 1980.¹⁷ Again, while one cannot judge the correspondence between these public and elite views, it is probable that the German elites were more positive than the French or the British -- if not the Americans.

These results imply that while no elite group considered US security guarantees as an issue of the first order, French elites expressed considerable doubt as to their reliability, while British and US elites (especially Americans) had more faith in US willingness to defend Europe if the need arose. Furthermore, the German public indicated considerable faith in the guarantees of its American ally.

¹⁷ See Appendix D, Schönborn, *op. cit.*, Table 7, p. 430.

TABLE 7.9

PERCENTAGE OF AUTHORS ADDRESSING...

Variable 39: US Willingness to Help Defend Western Europe

	<u>1971</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1979</u>
US	55.8	45.8	45.4
Britain	49.1	21.6	27.0
France	51.0	25.0	55.3


The value structure through which the world is perceived and understood, the "World View", is important in analyzing perceptions of threat and thus provides an insight into the manner in which various elites choose to deal with security issues. While one would expect differences among our elites, there is in fact a remarkable degree of consistency in their rankings of the factors influencing the behavior of states. As can be seen from Table 7.10, force is considered the prime motivator of state behavior by the Americans, Germans and French (at least by 1979). Only the British consistently viewed Political Ties (Alliances) as the most important factor. Overall, it can be reasonably surmised that force and political goals and ties were essential elements in state behavior, with economic strength entering the picture only for the British and Americans -- and then only after 1975. (Interestingly, ideology was deemed of little importance by all.)

Perceptions of the state of relations between NATO and her member states and the Warsaw Pact/Soviet Union seemingly impact upon elite views of security.¹⁸ American elites perceived relations between the Soviet Union and the United States (Var. 59) as increasingly hostile. Conversely, overall relations between East

¹⁸See Chapters 3-5: World View: Views on East-West Relations - Variables 59-60.

FIGURE 7.15

IMPACT OF POLITICAL FACTORS ON SECURITY:
VAR 39: US WILLINGNESS TO HELP DEFEND WESTERN EUROPE



SOURCE: Tables 3.15, 4.15 and 5.15.

TABLE 7.10
 WORLD VIEW OF AUTHOR
 RANKING OF WORLD VIEW VARIABLES OF STATE BEHAVIOR
 BY PERCEIVED IMPORTANCE

<u>UNITED STATES</u>		
<u>1971</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1979</u>
Political Ties	Force	Force
Force	Political Ties	Political Ties
Political Goals	Political Goals	Economic Strength
Economic Strength	Economic Strength	Political Goals
Ideology	Ideology	Ideology
<u>BRITAIN</u>		
<u>1971</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1979</u>
Political Ties	Political Ties	Political Ties
Force	Force	Force
Political Goals	Economic Strength	Economic Strength
Economic Strength	Political Goals (Ties)	Political Goals
Ideology	Ideology	Ideology
<u>FRANCE</u>		
<u>1971</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1979</u>
Political Ties	Political Ties	Force
Political Goals	Political Goals	Political Ties
Force	Force	Political Goals
Ideology	Economic Strength	Ideology
Economic Strength	Ideology	Economic Strength

TABLE 7.10 (Cont'd)

WEST GERMANY*

Force

Political Goals

Political Ties

Economic Strength

Ideology

*Source: See Chapter 6, Table 6.9, p.233. (Only those factors compatible with Variables 54-58 of Codebook).

and West were viewed as essentially neutral in character. (Var. 60). The French and the British, however, viewed both sets of relationships as growing more "hostile" over time. It is interesting to note that the changes in the French "net" perceptions resulted from a considerable drop in those viewing the "current" relations as "neutral" while those seeing the state of affairs as "hostile" remained the same; conversely, Americans seeing a "neutral" relationship stayed essentially flat while perceptions of "hostility" rose. The British, however, were more distinct, with "hostile" perceptions growing and "neutral" and "favorable" relations falling.

The SOWI report indicates that a growing segment of the German populace expected the state of the general relationship between East and West to turn to the worse, a figure which rose from about 18 percent in 1977/78 to 36 percent in 1980. At the same time those viewing relations as unlikely to change fell from 53 percent to 43 percent. While these questions are future-oriented, one can argue that judgements about future situations are linked to judgements about present ones -- and hence are not too far from "current realities."

Therefore, it seems that a minor schism has developed between West European elites and Americans over the state of overall East-West relations. The Europeans see both these and US-Soviet relations as becoming more hostile, while the Americans perceive overall relations as neutral. While one should not make too much of this divergence, it may relate to growing differences in perceptions between the Europeans and the Americans about policy regarding detente and its utility. The US may "over-value" the importance attached to detente by West Europeans or the Europeans may feel that, in view of the poor state of East-West relations (for which the US must share responsibility with the Soviets), they must work harder at promoting detente directly and thus "balance" US policy.

CHAPTER 8

FINDINGS, INFERENCES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INTRODUCTION

So far we have simply reported on the results of our study of elite perceptions, results which may be interesting in and of themselves but which are not directly useful to, or useable by, policy-makers. In this chapter, we want to do five things which will, we hope, close that gap and make our product policy relevant:

1. Provide a theoretical overview of the ways in which perceptions are formed, influence beliefs about security and help to shape policy preferences;
2. Single out those of our findings (and those of relevant public opinion polls) which we deem most significant with particular reference to:
 - a. Perceptions of the military balance and its several components;
 - b. Concerns about threats to European security;
3. Compare perceptions of the balance with objective indicators of trends in military capabilities, in order to see whether and to what extent changes in force postures affect perceptions;
4. Discuss some of the factors which seemingly modify both perceptions of capabilities and concerns about threats;
5. On this basis, make some recommendations to those who are concerned about the perceptual implications of defense programs and their consequent impact on the policy preferences of elites in Western Europe.

I. THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

Research on international affairs has studied (in an attempt to explain) the international system and its subsystems. At the systemic level, the relation between the distribution of power and the incidence of war has been the focus of theories of bi- and multi- polarity and international stability.¹ These theories hold that national interest (defined in terms of the accretion of power) motivates state behavior. Politics becomes a struggle for power among states; conflict is the international norm, in need of control through balanced power alliances.² Fundamental to this conception of international relations is the assumption that all states act alike if faced with similar situations or stimulated by comparable events.

However, several competing paradigms exist, all of which challenge this assumption. Researchers who reject the systemic orientation suggest that a host of intervening organizational, structural, policy process, personality and economic variables influence policy choices, which cannot be explained on the basis that rational actors are engaged in the single-minded and a moral pursuit of power. These alternative paradigms all view political outcomes as the product of multiple and complex interactions between political

¹D. Dean and J. Vasquez, "From Power Politics to Issue Politics: Bipolarity and Multipolarity in Light of a New Paradigm", Western Political Quarterly 29 (March 1976) pp. 7-29; K. Deutsch and J.D. Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability", World Politics 16 (1964) pp. 390-406; Kenneth Waltz, "The Stability of the Bipolar World", Daedalus 3 (Summer 1964); Richard Rosecrance, et. al., "The Balance of Power: Theories in Search of Reality", (Ithaca: Situational Analysis Project Paper #4, Cornell University, 1972); Michael Haas, International Subsystems: Stability and Polarity, American Political Science Review 64 (March 1970) pp. 93-123.

²Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (4th ed.), (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1967.)

institutions and the environment.³

Our research was premised on this second belief that a foreign policy process model, combining elements of decisional, perceptual and image theories, provides a better basis for understanding alliance politics than simpler models.⁴ Unfortunately, the numerous studies emphasizing the influence of perceptions, cognition, and information processing on foreign policy have failed to produce a single, integrated approach to the analysis of foreign policy decision-making.⁵

In the absence of a single validated approach, we drew judiciously from a variety of competing paradigms in order to place perceptions in perspective. Figure 8.1 illustrates the three major steps in our (greatly simplified) model of the process whereby external events affect the sense of security and ultimately, impact on policy references:

1. These events (external stimuli) are interpreted in the light of an individual's "world view" and, thus modified, become "perceptions", i.e., distorted views of the "real world" -- which is never seen accurately by anyone;
2. These perceptions in turn influence the "definition of the situation" with respect to security, which is a result of interactions among:
 - a. Assessments of the military (and other) capabilities of one's self, one's friends and one's actual or potential adversaries;

³Thomas Dye, Understanding Public Policy, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 5.

⁴Oran Young, "The Perils of Odysseus: On Constructing Theories of International Relations", World Politics 24 (Spring 1972), pp. 179-204.

⁵For a recent overview of the "state of the art" see Ole Holsti, "Foreign Policy Formation Viewed Cognitively", in Robert Axelrod (ed.), Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 18-54.

- b. Images of one's allies -- particularly their strength, purpose, reliability and commonality of interests;
- c. Images of one's adversaries, to include their strength, purpose, behavior and intentions;
- d. Actual or potential threats that may be posed by adversaries, arise out of the international system and/or derive from the domestic environment.


3. The resultant sense of security or insecurity will in turn affect policy preferences -- and, ultimately, policy outcomes.⁶

Our subsequent analysis (as well as our overall research) utilizes this "model" to put our findings in context. For practical reasons, however, we will take up these findings in a different order, beginning with perceptions of capabilities and threats, continuing with a comparison of perceptual and "objective" assessments of military capabilities, looking next at the ways in which the images of allies and adversaries (as well as the "world view" itself) modify the relationship between capabilities and threats and concluding with a set of recommendations which should, if implemented, help to shape the policy preferences of elites in Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany--and, of course, in the United States.

⁶Note that we did not extend our research to cover policy outcomes, which are affected not only by competing priorities and mediating variables but also by the political structure of a particular state; in fact, it is extraordinarily difficult to trace the factors affecting policy outcomes in individual cases, much less to predict those outcomes in general. This, however, we do not view as detracting from the utility of the study, since:

- a. It is common to all efforts at analysis; and
- b. Unless one can influence policy preferences there is little possibility of influencing policy outcomes.

FIGURE 8.1
PROCESS MODEL: PERCEPTIONS, SECURITY AND POLICY OUTCOMES



II. FINDINGS

A. From the Survey of Elite Perceptions

1. In general, the salience of most military issues increased between 1971 and 1979, as did perceptions of threats to European security, adverse assessments of the military balance, and so on.⁷ This was evident both from the responses to coded questions and from the thematic analysis.
2. With respect to military capabilities:
 - a. All our elites,⁸ with the exception of the British, talked more about strategic nuclear forces than about any other component. (See Table 7.3, p. 257). Moreover, British, French and Americans all saw the strategic balance as essentially one of parity, even though they were increasingly concerned about the relative capabilities (and contributions to security) of Soviet and American SNF.
 - b. Although the salience of theater/regional nuclear forces appeared very low in 1971 and 1975, these became a major concern by 1979 in terms both of thematic references and of

⁷When evaluating these findings one must keep in mind the distinction between the salience of the issue, as measured by volume of references, and perceptions of the state of the issue, as determined by the response made. The number of references tells us whether our elites deemed an issue important, the type of response tells us how they perceived the situation, and the two together tell us whether these elites were interested but not concerned, concerned but not greatly interested or something of both. To illustrate, if 50% of our elites commented on the strategic balance and half of those judged it adverse, that would have more meaning than if only 10% commented on the balance, even if three-quarters of those responding deemed it unfavorable.

⁸No comparisons with West German elites was possible for most variables. Thus, "Europeans" refers only to British and French unless otherwise noted.

responses to Codebook variables.⁹ Furthermore, by 1979 the theater nuclear balance was perceived as very adverse by the Americans, British and French, with, interestingly, the French as the most pessimistic.¹⁰ (See Table 7.4, p. 259). These changes in capabilities led to a growing sense of insecurity, as greater emphasis was placed on the threat posed by (larger and more modern) Soviet forces and less reliance was placed on (essentially static) NATO forces.

- c. The conventional balance was consistently perceived as the most adverse of all -- a view shared by the French, even though they made only about half as many references to it as did other nationals. (See Table 7.4, p. 259.) Net perceptions of Warsaw Pact capabilities were increasingly negative and those of NATO forces "mixed".
- d. Conversely, opinions concerning the overall military balance were both more varied and more changeable, with:
 1. American elites viewing the overall balance as essentially equal throughout the period -- though by a smaller margin in 1979 than in earlier years;
 2. British and French elites shifting from a favorable judgement in 1971 to increasingly adverse ones in 1975 and 1979, with the French registering by far the larger change.

⁹See Tables 3.4, 4.4, 5.4, 3.11, 4.11 and 5.11.

¹⁰This did not hold true for the West Germans, who paid relatively little attention to the theater nuclear balance during the period 1968-1977, the time span of the SOWI study. See Tables 6.6 and 6.7, pp. 229 and 230.

(See Table 7.4, p. 259).¹¹

3. These rather negative views concerning the military balance and force capabilities did not produce comparably negative perceptions of military threats. None of the elites, including the Germans, indicated a great concern over the likelihood of war, although Americans showed somewhat more concern than Europeans. There were, however, some noteworthy differences in net perceptions:
 - a. The Americans and the French were somewhat pessimistic about the likelihood of a nuclear strike by the USSR, while both the Germans and the British were more optimistic; in fact, each indicated positive net perceptions. (See Figure 7.9, p. 273 .)
 - b. The views of these elites regarding conventional war was somewhat different, however. Again, the Americans and the French displayed some mild concern regarding the likelihood of such a war, while the British remained positive, i.e., felt "secure". However, the Germans apparently displayed a rather high level of concern, with approximately 35% net negative perceptions.¹² (See Figure 7.10, p. 276.)

¹¹West German publics, over a later and shorter time period, also deemed the Warsaw Pact superior but by varying percentages. (Table 7.4, p. 259.)

¹²This judgement must be tempered by the fact that about half of this total resulted from "uncertain" responses and that in terms of salience only about 22 percent of the elites referenced this threat.

4. Interestingly enough, threats of force and threats against economic viability and/or potential independence were deemed more likely than actual uses of force, though there were marked differences both in salience and in level of responses, as shown on Figures 7.11 and 7.12, pp. 279 and 280.
- a. American and French elites paid relatively little attention to these threats but registered moderately negative net perceptions overall;
 - b. West German references were similarly low; however, net concerns were remarkably high -- almost -75% in each case;
 - c. British elites considered these issues moderately salient (about one-third of the respondents cited them) and displayed greater concern than did either Americans or French, but less than the West Germans did.¹³
5. As one looks at political factors (which can both affect perceptions of threats and influence responses to those threats) a number of differences emerge among elites:

¹³Why concerns over these threats were not (except in the case of the British) matched by salience, we cannot say. One would expect, following the oil embargoes resulting from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, that Americans and Europeans would be more concerned with threats to economic lifelines and the pressures exerted on political choices and policy by OPEC and other organizations. Here perhaps the answer lies in the research methodology itself. While elites may indeed have been concerned about this issue, it may not have fallen into the "security basket" and was perceived more as a political-economic concern than as a military-strategic one.

- a. Americans seemingly saw the threat to Western Europe mitigated because of increasing American and West European willingness to devote resources to defense, while West Europeans (especially the British) were far more pessimistic about both developments; (Figures 7.13 and 7.14, pp. 286 and 287).
- b. Although the reliability of the US security guarantee was not an issue of the first order with any elite group, among those addressing the issue:
 1. The French expressed considerable doubt;
 2. The British were more or less neutral; and
 3. The Americans were fairly sure of their own guarantees.
(Figure 7.15, p. 291 .)¹⁴
- c. The British and French saw both US - Soviet and East-West relations becoming more hostile, whereas the Americans perceived overall relations as "neutral".¹⁵ (p. 294.)
- d. More significantly, these elites registered marked differences with respect to the impact of Soviet behavior on perceptions of threat, with:
 1. British assessments of detente remaining slightly positive, French ones dropping from moderately to slightly positive and US ones fluctuating around zero;

¹⁴German elites made almost no reference to this matter but German publics expressed very high confidence in the US guarantee. (Schönborn, *op. cit.*, Table 7, p.430.

¹⁵German publics expect current East-West relations (which they do not characterize) to change for the worse, if they change at all.

2. French assessments of the consequences of the Soviet build-up/modernization program reflected a moderate trend downward, the British reported a sharp downward trend and the Americans recorded a consistently (and increasingly) high negative trend. All, however, were in the negative category throughout--a finding which is important. (Tables 3.17, 4.17 and 5.17.)

e. Finally, though Americans, French and West Germans all listed "Force" as the most significant influence on the behavior of states (the British listed "Political Ties), there are differences both in the relative weight assigned to these variables and in the consistency of responses, with France changing only in 1979. (Table 7.10, pp. 292 and 293 ; and Figures 3.2, 4.2 and 5.2.)

6. These differences in assessments of political factors were reflected in differences over policies to be pursued, with the Americans more inclined to seek military solutions to growing Soviet/Warsaw Pact military threats than were the Europeans. This showed up in two ways:

- a. A somewhat higher percentage of US elites opted for militarily-oriented policy preferences than was true of British or French respondents, and a considerably lower percentage opted for political/economic policies (Tables 3.21, 4.21 and 5.20);
- b. British, French and West German elites considered detente and arms control issues to be the most salient¹⁶, whereas American

¹⁶Although "World View" responses were the largest category in West Germany, detente/arms control issues were next, followed by political/economic ones. See Chapter 7, p. 284.

elites focused primarily on force modernization, equipment standardization/interoperability, military doctrine and weapons technology (pp. 282 to 284).

In sum, there seems to be a schism between the US and its allies with respect to the kinds of policies best suited to enhance European security.

B. From a Comparison of Elite Attitudes and Public Opinions.

While the Allied Perceptions of Threat (APT) project did not include public opinion polling as an integral part of the research, we attempted to acquire a number of polls utilizing questions similar in nature to those we investigated. Unfortunately, as already noted in each country report (Chapters 3-6), the research was not very fruitful. Still, those polls that were obtained suggest that although distributions of responses may not have matched with those from APT, the trends most certainly did so. In this section, those results most interesting and comparable will be examined.

1. With respect to the military balance,¹⁷ the public results mirrored our elite findings in that both showed:

- a. A trend away from a strategic balance situation favorable to the US toward one either of parity or of a Soviet advantage. While our study indicated that the largest number of elites in each state perceived the strategic balance to be in a state of parity, only the German and French publics saw the balance as essentially equal; the American and the British publics felt the USSR to be ahead.

¹⁷For the strategic balance see Tables 4.23 and 5.25. For the overall balance see Tables 3.24, 4.22, 4.24, 5.26 and in Appendix D, Schönborn, Table 3. For further references see US International Communication Agency (USICA), Western Europe Attitudes Toward Soviet Actions in Afghanistan and Other Security Issues, Research Memorandum M-12-80, 12 May 1980, Tables 9-10; and USICA, French and German Perceptions of the Soviet Military Threat, Research Memorandum M-29-79, 20 August 1979, p. 6.

- b. The overall military balance to be shifting away from the West, most perceiving either Soviet/WTO superiority or, at best, parity.

In this instance the opinion polls conformed directly with APT, with British and French elites trending toward adverse findings and American elites seeing the overall balance as equal at best and adverse at worst.

2. As was true of elites, the publics seemingly did not transfer their largely negative feelings about the military balance into major concerns about the likelihood of war. By 1979, it is true, both Americans and British publics felt that the Soviet Union posed a serious, if nonspecific, threat.¹⁸ However, perceptions about the likelihood or seriousness of the threat of war remained rather low in France and Germany,¹⁹ each with about 10-15% of the responses indicating concern, and low to moderate in the US and Britain,²⁰ with about 22-24% expressing some concern.
3. The confidence of European publics in US security guarantees declined somewhat over the decade of the 1970s, but still remained rather high, with between 50-70 percent expressing great or fair level of confidence.²¹ As one would expect, Americans, at least in 1979, had somewhat more faith in their own security assurances than did Europeans.²²

¹⁸See Appendix D, Schönborn, Table 1, p. 424 and Alvin Richman, West European Attitudes Toward Security Issues, paper prepared for the 1980 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles, March 1980, Table 11.

¹⁹See USICA, M-7-78, op. cit., Table 7; and Tables 7.6 and 7.7 of the APT Chapter 7.

²⁰See USICA, M-7-78, Ibid., and Appendix D., op. cit., Tables 1 and 2.

²¹Alvin Richman, op. cit., Table 15. See also Schönborn, op. cit., Table 7.

²²Schönborn, Ibid.

Of the Europeans, the British consistently expressed the highest levels of confidence, with more registering "great" confidence rather than "fair" compared to the other states.²³ These results corresponded almost exactly with the elite findings (See pp. 288 - 289).

4. Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, European and American publics mirrored exactly our elite findings concerning the schism between the US and her European allies over the political factors influencing perceptions of threats, as well as over the issue of how to cope with these threats. In general, Europeans seemingly preferred arms control negotiations and detente as solutions to growing Soviet/Pact military threats, while Americans preferred "military-oriented" solutions, such as force build-ups and modernization.²⁴ Moreover:

- a. More West European publics than Americans believe detente has benefited the West.²⁵
- b. "It is also clear that the recent disagreements between American and West European governments on the priority of strengthening military capabilities versus arms control negotiations is mirrored in the opinions of the general public".²⁶

²³ Alvin Richman, op. cit., Table 15; USICA, M-7-78, op. cit., Table 13; USICA, M-12-80; op. cit., Table 8.

²⁴ See Chapter 8, Section I-B:10, and Kenneth Adler and Douglas Wertman, "Is NATO in Trouble?: A Survey of European Attitudes", Public Opinion, Volume 4, No. 4, August/September 1981, p. 12.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

III. SPECULATIONS ABOUT PERCEPTIONS AND SECURITY: LINKING BELIEF SYSTEMS, DEFINITIONS OF THE SITUATION AND POLICY PREFERENCES

A. INTRODUCTION

Up to this point the report has focused upon the results of elite (and public) perceptions of various "real world" situations and potential events. In this section, we will speculate upon some important factors in the formation of these perceptual views of the world.

Obviously we cannot, in view of the limited scope of our study (which is, moreover, empirical rather than theoretical) discuss all possible linkages at every stage of our model--nor would we wish to do so if we could. Instead, we will concentrate upon:

1. The association between elite perceptions and "objective" indicators of military balances, which is important if the psychological impact of defense programs is to be considered in assessing their effectiveness, as high American officials have said it is;
2. The ways in which images of friend and foe affect the translations of (perceived) capabilities into (perceived) threats, which is crucial to understanding why even those who reach the same judgments concerning military balances may hold different perspectives on the salience and severity of threats; and
3. The modifying influence of elites' world views (i.e., their values, beliefs, theories, preconceptions, etc.) and images on policy preferences, which helps to explain why even those who perceive identical threats may advocate different measures to cope with those threats.

Obviously, no elaborate quantitative methodology will be employed, as our purpose here is one of overview and speculation about possible factors and

relationships rather than in-depth analysis. However, even in this rather simplistic analysis, we must be aware of the omnipresent problems of validity and reliability. The validity problem - is that which is observed and measured the correct factor? - was "solved" by utilizing expert judgement and theoretical framework for analysis (for which see Section I, supra), this is based upon other highly regarded research in the fields of perceptions. The problem of reliability--how to obtain comparable results from successive inquiries -- was also "solved" by the use of generally accepted indicators, measurement techniques and data sources. We are aware that these solutions are not perfect, in that we have not dealt with the "objective" situations that presumably triggered these perceptions, the imprecise definitions of, and disagreements on how to measure, military indicators, possible changes in elite group compositions and even the probability of sub-elite groups with distinctive perceptual patterns. Nor are we unaware that factors other than shifts in military balances may cause changes in perceptions of those balances and/or in definitions of threat; in fact, we have noted that some such shifts, such as took place in the United States in 1975, cannot be explained by our research. Even so, we believe that the judgemental examination we will next make may shed some light on the subject of elite perceptions of security and provide some basis for decisions which take into account the political and psychological, as well as the military, consequences of policies and programs.

B. ELITE PERCEPTIONS AND CHANGES IN THE MILITARY BALANCE²⁷

Comparing elite perceptions of the military balances and objective indicators requires the researcher to select those factors most likely to be

²⁷ For a detailed analysis see Alan F. Dieter, Jr., "Elite Perceptions and Changes in the Military Balance", Appendix F.

important in the formulation of perceptions and to decide how best to measure or record these factors. To this end, we assumed that elites in general (many of whom are not trained analysts) do not consider complex or dynamic measurements of the several balances, but rather more simple indicators, such as aggregate numbers of forces or weapons, and perhaps some simple measurements of raw capabilities. Thus, no sophisticated measurements of the balances were attempted -- an a priori judgement that was borne out by our analysis.

1. After comparing perceptions of strategic nuclear capabilities (from Chapter 7, Figures 7.2 and 7.3, pp. 264 and 265) with various objective indicators (for which see Dieter, op. cit., Table F.1, Appendix F, Volume II) we concluded that most elites indeed the capabilities of strategic nuclear forces in terms of Soviet build-up and modernization programs, most particularly increases in modern delivery vehicles. It follows, therefore, that modernization of Soviet SNF is viewed as threatening (i.e., as enhancing concerns about security) while modernization of US SNF is not viewed as reassuring; in fact, during the period of most intense US modernization, perceptions of the contributions to security of American strategic nuclear forces remained essentially flat. (See Dieter, op. cit., Figure F.3, Appendix F, Volume II.)
2. From this, one might expect that perceptions of the strategic nuclear balance (i.e., of the size, composition and capabilities of US and Soviet SNF, taken together) would follow a similar pattern: remaining essentially flat from 1970-1974 and declining sharply thereafter. This was not, however, the case, as the greater number of our respondents perceived the balance as essentially equal, in all three

time periods (See Table 7.4, p. 259), a perception which corresponds most closely to numbers of SNDVs. (Dieter, op. cit., Table F.3 and Figure F.4.)

3. This suggests that elites use different standards for measuring the capabilities of strategic nuclear forces than they do in assessing the strategic balance, though whether this means that the effects of modernization are "lost in the wash", that Soviet modernization programs are seen as efforts to overtake a (continuing) American technological lead or that the publicity given to these programs has induced disproportionate changes in perceptions of their importance we do not know.
4. It is difficult to devise satisfactory indicators for theater/regional nuclear forces and even more difficult to assess their impact on perceptions. The closest correlation between perceptions of capabilities (which changed markedly in the period 1975-1979) and indicators was with the most broadly-defined indicators of all; i.e., theater nuclear forces all nuclear-capable delivery vehicles with ranges under 3500 nm., save for artillery and naval aircraft, magnified by increases in the number of modern Soviet TNF's. (See Dieter, op. cit., Table F.5.)
5. The change in perceptions of the theater/regional nuclear balance (which turned from somewhat adverse to markedly adverse between 1975 and 1975) can be explained similarly, or as reflecting the general downturn in force ratios circa 1978 (for which see Figure F.5) and/or as resulting from the publicity given to the growth of Soviet theater nuclear forces in and after 1977. There is,

however, a closer correspondence between perceptions of capabilities and perceptions of balance than was true in the case of strategic nuclear forces, which may stem from the belief that theater nuclear forces are more likely to be employed than are strategic nuclear forces--and hence that the balance is of greater moment.

6. The only static indicator of conventional capabilities that correlated at all with perceptions (which remained essentially negative and static from 1971-1975 and became even more negative thereafter) is division equivalents (see Dieter, op. cit., Table F.6)--then more largely for Americans than for British or French. We suspect that one might find a closer correlation with a cluster of indicators--but we have insufficient data for analysis. One possibility, although this is highly speculative, is that gross changes in Soviet conventional capabilities, reflecting the introduction of more, and more modern, equipment, could explain the shifts in perceptions we recorded earlier.
7. As for the conventional balance, which was universally and increasingly perceived as adverse, it would appear that:
 - a. Elite perceptions are affected primarily by numbers of major ground combat units and secondarily by the rate of introduction and numbers of the latest modern equipment (for which see Dieter, op. cit., Figure F.6 and F.7), and that
 - b. The capabilities of Soviet/Pact forces would seem to weigh more heavily in evaluation of the balance than those of NATO.

8. If one looks at the overall military balance as a composite of those described, one would expect perceptions of that balance to be adverse throughout the period, and increasingly so in the latter half. In point of fact, allied perceptions of the balance did not follow that pattern; save for the French in 1979 more elites (including West Germans) deemed the overall balance equal or favorable than characterized it as adverse (Table 7.4, pp. 259 and 260). Although we can only speculate about the reasons for this, it would appear that:
- a. In the case of American, British and French elites, perceptions of the strategic balance carried the most weight;
 - b. In the case of British and French elites, however, perceptions of (increasingly adverse) nuclear and conventional balances were reflected in increasingly adverse perceptions of the overall balance, albeit at a lower level.²⁸
9. The difference in perceptions between Americans and Europeans is an interesting find which would seem to suggest that assessments of the overall balance are significantly affected by perceptions of the element(s) of an adversary's forces most likely to affect the home territories of the respective elites:

²⁸As shown on Table 7.4, pp. 259 and 260:

- a. Though three-fourths of the American respondents judged the theater/regional balance adverse and five-sixths saw the conventional as unfavorable, only about two-fifths so characterized the overall balance;
- b. Conversely, the British and French had both somewhat more adverse perceptions of theater and regional balance circa 1979 and considerably more adverse perceptions of the overall balance, with half of the British and three-fifths of the French so describing it.

C. CAPABILITIES, IMAGES AND THREATS

The preceding analysis suggests that selective perceptions govern measurements of capabilities and assessments of balances, i.e., that one or more modifiers are interposed between the "objective" world and the subjective one. Experience suggests that this should be equally true for perceptions of threat and the report on our findings in Section II bears it out. The question addressed in this part of the report is not whether such modifiers exist but what they are and why they have the effects they seemingly do.

1. One of our most important findings was that the rather negative views of elites and publics concerning the military balance and force capabilities did not produce comparably negative perceptions of military threats. (Paragraph 3, Section II-A and Paragraph 2, Section II-B, supra.) As we look at other findings a number of possible explanations come to mind:
 - a. One is that confidence in the US security guarantee remained high, even though elites displayed less confidence in the guarantee than did publics and some elites (such as the French) less confidence than others. (Paragraph 5b, Section II-A and Paragraph 2, Section II-B, supra);
 - b. Another is that European elites did not deem Soviet behavior all that threatening--save for the program of force modernization, which was taken into account in the assessment of military capabilities--and even American elites took a largely neutral view of Soviet behavior through 1979. (Paragraph 5d, Section II-A, supra.)

- c. A third is that perceptions of an essentially "equal" strategic balance dominated other perceptions and thus mitigated concerns about the possibility of war (Paragraphs 2a and 3, Section II-A, supra)--in other words, that deterrence worked. And even the American and British publics, who deemed the strategic balance adverse, expressed only low to moderate concern about the likelihood of war. (Paragraph 2, Section II-B, supra.)

At the moment we cannot say which, if any of these suppositions is valid, only that there must be some variable intervening between assessments of capabilities and perceptions of the likelihood of conflict--and that it behooves policy-makers to find out what it is.

2. Another of our findings was that threats of force, and threats against economic viability and/or political independence, were deemed more likely than actual uses of force. (Paragraph 4, Section II-A, supra.) At first glance this would seem paradoxical, in that if one does not fear the use of force one should not be concerned about threats to employ it. Three possible explanations occur:
 - a. The concern is paradoxical, which does not make it any the less meaningful;
 - b. Its (relatively low) frequency of references derives from those (relatively few) elites who deemed war likely;
 - c. Despite the current imbalances in Soviet Pact and US/NATO capabilities the risks and dangers of war in

the nuclear age are still so great that threats are the most politically feasible uses of force--and hence the ones of greatest concern.

Regretably, we cannot say which, if any, of these influences are significant, though there are ways of finding this out.

3. Another significant finding was that while all elites saw US-Soviet relations as hostile American elites perceived East-West relations to be "neutral", whereas British and French elites (and German publics) described them as increasingly hostile (Paragraph 5c, Section II-A, supra). If one takes these findings at face value, they mean relatively little. If, however, one puts them in the context of overall policy, they can take on quite a different meaning, with Americans (implicitly) accusing Europeans of taking a different approach than that pursued by the United States and Europeans (implicitly) bemoaning a situation brought about by American moves and measures. The differences in attitudes toward detente recorded in Paragraph 4d, Section II-A, and Paragraph 4a, Section II-B, supra, suggest that this may indeed be the case and that the varying judgements concerning East-West relations reflect not only differing assessments of Soviet behavior but also uneven interests in detente.

D. IMAGES, VALUES AND POLICY PREFERENCES

Admittedly, this latter finding is highly speculative. It is, however, borne out as one looks at the policy preferences expressed by various elites.

1. As reported in Paragraph 6, Section II-D and Paragraph 4, Section II-B, supra:

- a. British, French and West German elites considered détente and arms control issues to be the most salient, whereas American elites focused primarily on force modernization, weapons technology and other military measures.
- b. A somewhat higher percentage of US elites opted for militarily-oriented policy preferences than was true of British or French respondents and a considerably lower percentage opted for political/economic policies.

Thus, the "schism" between the US and its allies may extend to policies on how to deal with the Soviets, as well as to beliefs about the effect of prior dealings.

2. This schism may result, at least in part, from the different "World Views" of elites, especially with respect to the importance and utility of force. While all elites (with the exception of the British) considered force to be the most important influence on the behavior of states:
 - a. There were differences in the relative weight assigned to this and other variables and in the consistency of responses, with French views changing only in 1979;
 - b. Only the Americans perceived force to be growing in salience from 1971-1979, while the percentage of references by Europeans fall off.²⁹

²⁹See Figures 3.2, 4.2 and 5.2. Authors' Note: Note also that references to perceptions of the importance of all factors fell from 1971-1979 for all elites with the exceptions of force for the Americans and economic strength for the British.

Although trends in European perceptions of Soviet military capabilities may ultimately affect beliefs in the utility of force, and preferences for militarily - oriented policies, as of 1979 this was not the case: neither values nor preferences had changed.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

As the final task of the APT study, we attempted to formulate some general recommendations for American policy-makers who wish to influence the perceptions of security held by European elites. Since this report comes nearly three years after the final time period examined, some of the policy recommendations may be more confirmations of present policies than revelations concerning new ones. However, we believe that the study did uncover a number of interesting results that would seem to suggest new approaches --or at least the need to examine priorities and/or emphases in current policies.

In deriving recommendations for policy resulting from elite (and public) perceptions, two distinct options are possible. First, recommendations can be constructed with the aim of altering perceptions to conform with desired policies; i.e., they can focus on information programs. Alternatively, recommendations can be centered on policies which affect origins of perceptions in an attempt to deal with root causes. We are not so naive as to believe that changes in the objective environment impact directly and proportionately on perceptions. Nor are we so persuaded of the importance of perceptions that we would recommend that decisions be made solely on the basis of their presumed psychological impact. We do, however, believe that in dealing with multiple perceptual and decisional units deeds are more important than words; accordingly, we will emphasize policy measures rather than information activities.

B. POLICIES AND PERCEPTIONS

1. As indicated in Section II-A, Paragraphs 1 and 2, both American and West European elites saw Soviet/Pact military forces as increasingly

threatening, US/NATO forces as decreasingly reassuring, and the various military balances (save for the strategic one) as increasingly adverse. If these perceptual trends continue, both the cohesion and the resilience of the Western Alliance may be put at risk; accordingly, the United States should adopt policies and support programs which could, inter alia, reverse these trends.

In our opinion, these policies and programs should, first and foremost, assure an adequate security posture for the Western allies--the subject of our study. Within this context, however, we would like to point out that different options for force build-ups and modernization, and/or different approaches to the reduction of armaments, will have very different impacts on US, West European--and Soviet perceptions. More specifically, Americans in general might find measures for force improvements reassuring, while Europeans as a whole might, conversely, find measures for arms control a more satisfactory means of coping with threats. The recommendations that follow are aimed primarily at influencing the perceptions of European elites--and publics.

2. In considering security policies and programs, US policy-makers should be aware that even though all elites considered the strategic balance to be the single most important military factor, Europeans were apparently more concerned about those forces most likely to be employed against their home territories, i.e., theater/regional nuclear forces and conventional forces. (This was also true of Americans, who focused more on strategic nuclear capabilities.) (Section III-B, Paragraphs

8 and 9.) Hence, policies and programs to reduce European perceptions of threat should deal with theater/regional nuclear and conventional capabilities, as well as (or even more than) with strategic nuclear ones.

3. In this connection, two further points should be borne in mind:
 - a. Europeans (and Americans) were more sensitive to changes in Soviet/Pact force postures and modernization programs than they were to corresponding changes in US/NATO forces and programs (Section III-B, Paragraphs 1, 4 and 6);
 - b. European elites (and publics) were (and still are) strongly supportive of detente, deemed arms control issues the most salient, and generally espoused political/economic or "mixed" solutions to military threats, including specifically negotiations on the limitation and reduction of forces. (Section II-A, Paragraph 6; Section II-B, Paragraph 4; Section III-C, Paragraph 3; and Section III-D, Paragraph 1.)

This suggests that US efforts to alter European perceptions of threat should emphasize arms reductions rather than arms build-ups, both because these are more likely to get at the sources of concern and because they better conform to European policy preferences--if not American ones.

4. Since elite perceptions of military capabilities appeared to be affected primarily by simple aggregate indicators (such as nuclear delivery vehicles and division equivalents) and secondarily by the pace and scope of Soviet/Pact modernization (Section III-B, Paragraphs 1,

4 and 6) any arms control proposals intended to influence perceptions should aim at reducing major Soviet/WTO weapons systems and formations and at limiting Soviet/Pact modernization--if necessary, at the expense of imposing similar restrictions on US/NATO forces. which did not weigh as heavily in perceptual analyses.³⁰

5. Such moves should, if successful, further reduce concerns about the likelihood of war, which (save for West German worries about the possibility of a conventional attack) were generally low. (Section II-A, Paragraph 3 and Section II-B, Paragraph 2.) Whether they will (by changing perceptions of Soviet behavior) alleviate concerns about the threat of force is more problematical since, as previously noted, these may be indissoluble residues in the minds of European elites (Section III-C, Paragraph 2). In both these instances, feelings of safety may depend upon belief in the US security guarantee, a belief which was, by 1979, somewhat mixed (Section II-A, Paragraph 5b and Section II-B, Paragraph 3).

The problem here is that there were basic differences between US elites and their European counterparts as to how best to do this. Americans, by and large, viewed the Soviet Union as hostile, considered the military threat to be the most significant one and proposed to cope with it by military measures: force build-ups, introduction of more modern weapons, etc., i.e., by affecting

³⁰Conversely, such moves, unless they achieve the sharp reductions in forces and weapons systems the current administration is seeking might adversely affect US opinions and undercut efforts to maintain support for defense programs.

(relatively) capabilities. Europeans, though equally concerned about the Soviet military threat, tended to prefer political/ economic solutions, designed to further detente and to affect intentions. (Section II-A, Paragraph 6; Section III-D, Paragraph 1.) Without presuming to judge the correctness of either position, we can say that measures designed to reduce tensions are more likely to enhance European perceptions of security than measures which perpetuate or intensify differences between East and West-- as well as to conform more closely to European policy preferences. (Section II-A, Paragraph 6b; Section II-B, Paragraph 4; and Section III-D, Paragraph 2.)

C. RESEARCH AND PERCEPTIONS

1. Despite the danger that any recommendations for research may be viewed as self-serving, we would like to point out that:
 - a. We were unable to explain the general aura of confidence in the United States circa 1975 or the sense of threat that pervaded British elites that same year--for both of which, see Figure 7.9, p. 273 .
 - b. We cannot say why the confidence of publics in the American security guarantee was higher than that of elites (Section II-A, Paragraph 5b and Section II-B, Paragraph 3), or whether this was a continuing or a transitory phenomenon;
 - c. We can only speculate as to why none of the assessments of military capabilities directly corresponded with any of the perceptions of (Section III-C, Paragraph 1) the security of Europe against armed attack--though this is a question of the highest importance to policy-makers.

d. We do not know why our respondents registered a low to moderate concern about the use of force but a moderate to high concern about the threat of force--though we recognize that alleviating the latter concern may require very different measures from assuaging the former.

2. We recommend, therefore, that the Sponsoring Agency and other interested parties:

- a. Consider the kinds of unanswered questions most likely to have significant policy implications;
- b. Explore with various research organizations the feasibility (and the cost) of obtaining answers to these questions.

To this endeavor, we will be happy to lend our support.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A:
REVISED CODERBOOK

CASE NO: _____

FILE: _____

CODER: _____

ALLIED PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT PROJECT (APT)

REVISED CODE BOOK: 14 JANUARY 1980

1.) Information About The Source:

A.) BIBLIOGRAPHIC CITATION:

(VAR 01) B.) DATE OF PUBLICATION

_____ 1.) 1971

_____ 2.) 1975

_____ 3.) 1979

(VAR 02) C.) COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OF SOURCE

_____ 1.) United States

_____ 2.) Great Britain

_____ 3.) France

_____ 4.) Other (e.g., NATO Publication)

(VAR 03) D.) NATIONALITY OF AUTHOR

_____ 1.) American

_____ 2.) British

_____ 3.) French

_____ 4.) Other

_____ 5.) No Reference

(VAR 04) E.) PRINCIPAL PROFESSION OF AUTHOR

_____ 1.) Academician

_____ 2.) Government Official

_____ 3.) Officer In Armed Forces

_____ 4.) Political Leader

_____ 5.) Journalist

_____ 6.) Defense Analyst

_____ 7.) Other

_____ 8.) No Reference

(VAR 05) F.) STATUS OF AUTHOR

(VAR 06)

Dummy Variable: Is thrust of article aimed at

- _____ 1.) On Active Service
- _____ 2.) Retired
- _____ 3.) Unknown/No Reference

- _____ 1.) The present
- _____ 2.) The present and the future

II.) Threats To European Security

According to the author, is Western Europe deemed secure against:

(VAR 07, VAR 09) A.) A NUCLEAR STRIKE BY THE USSR.

- | | |
|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| ___/___ 1.) Yes | ___/___ 4.) Indeterminate |
| ___/___ 2.) No | ___/___ 5.) No Reference |
| ___/___ 3.) Uncertain | |

CITE:

(VAR 09, VAR 10) B.) A WARSAW PACT ATTACK WITH CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

- | | |
|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| ___/___ 1.) Yes | ___/___ 4.) Indeterminate |
| ___/___ 2.) No | ___/___ 5.) No Reference |
| ___/___ 3.) Uncertain | |

CITE:

(VAR 11, VAR 12) C.) SOVIET/WARSAW PACT POLITICAL PRESSURES BACKED BY THREAT OF FORCE.

- | | |
|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| ___/___ 1.) Yes | ___/___ 4.) Indeterminate |
| ___/___ 2.) No | ___/___ 5.) No Reference |
| ___/___ 3.) Uncertain | |

CITE:

(VAR 13)
(VAR 14) D.) INTERNAL SUBVERSION SUPPORTED BY THE USSR.

- | | |
|----------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <u> / </u> 1.) Yes | <u> / </u> 4.) Indeterminate |
| <u> / </u> 2.) No | <u> / </u> 5.) No Reference |
| <u> / </u> 3.) Uncertain | |

CITE:

(VAR 15)
(VAR 16) E.) THREATS AGAINST ECONOMIC VIABILITY AND/OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE.

- | | |
|----------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <u> / </u> 1.) Yes | <u> / </u> 4.) Indeterminate |
| <u> / </u> 2.) No | <u> / </u> 5.) No Reference |
| <u> / </u> 3.) Uncertain | |

CITE: (Indicate source and nature of threat)

III A.) Factors Affecting European Security: Military/Political

Now, in the opinion of the author, do the following factors influence concerns about threats to European security:

(VAR 17) A.) CAPABILITIES OF U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES.

- | | |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| <u> / </u> 1.) Increase | <u> / </u> 3.) Decrease |
| <u> / </u> 2.) No Effect | <u> / </u> 4.) No Reference |

CITE:

If the author references concerns relating to (A) above, how does he see U.S. strategic nuclear capabilities affecting concerns about:

(VAR 18) A1.) A NUCLEAR STRIKE BY THE USSR.

- | | |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| <u> / </u> 1.) Increase | <u> / </u> 3.) Decrease |
| <u> / </u> 2.) No Effect | <u> / </u> 4.) No Reference |

(VAR 19) A2.) A SOVIET/WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL ATTACK.

- | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| _____ 1.) Increase | _____ 3.) Decrease |
| _____ 2.) No Effect | _____ 4.) No Reference |

(VAR 20) A3.) SOVIET/WARSAW PACT POLITICAL PRESSURES BACKED BY THREAT OF FORCE.

- | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| _____ 1.) Increase | _____ 3.) Decrease |
| _____ 2.) No Effect | _____ 4.) No Reference |

(VAR 21) B.) CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES.

- | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| _____ 1.) Increase | _____ 3.) Decrease |
| _____ 2.) No Effect | _____ 4.) No Reference |

CITE:

(VAR 22) C.) CAPABILITIES OF NATO TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES.

- | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| _____ 1.) Increase | _____ 3.) Decrease |
| _____ 2.) No Effect | _____ 4.) No Reference |

CITE:

If the author references concerns about (C) above, how does he see the NATO tactical nuclear capabilities affecting concerns about:

(VAR 23) C1.) A NUCLEAR STRIKE BY THE USSR.

- | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| _____ 1.) Increase | _____ 3.) Decrease |
| _____ 2.) No Effect | _____ 4.) No Reference |

(VAR 24) C2.) A SOVIET/WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL ATTACK.

- | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| _____ 1.) Increase | _____ 3.) Decrease |
| _____ 2.) No Effect | _____ 4.) No Reference |

(VAR 25) C3.) SOVIET/WARSAW PACT POLITICAL PRESSURES BACKED BY THREAT OF FORCE.

- | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| _____ 1.) Increase | _____ 3.) Decrease |
| _____ 2.) No Effect | _____ 4.) No Reference |

(VAR 26) D.) CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET/WARSAW PACT TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES.

- | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| _____ 1.) Increase | _____ 3.) Decrease |
| _____ 2.) No Effect | _____ 4.) No Reference |

CITE:

(VAR 27) E.) CAPABILITIES OF NATO CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

- | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| _____ 1.) Increase | _____ 3.) Decrease |
| _____ 2.) No Effect | _____ 4.) No Reference |

CITE:

(VAR 28) F.) CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET/WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

- | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| _____ 1.) Increase | _____ 3.) Decrease |
| _____ 2.) No Effect | _____ 4.) No Reference |

CITE:

(VAR 29) G.) CAPABILITIES OF BRITISH AND FRENCH THEATER/REGIONAL NUCLEAR FORCES.

- | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| _____ 1.) Increase | _____ 3.) Decrease |
| _____ 2.) No Effect | _____ 4.) No Reference |

CITE:

If the author references concerns about (G) above, how does he see British and French theater/regional nuclear forces affecting concerns about:

(VAR 30) G1.) A NUCLEAR STRIKE BY THE USSR.

- | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| _____ 1.) Increase | _____ 3.) Decrease |
| _____ 2.) No Effect | _____ 4.) No Reference |

(VAR 31) G2.) A SOVIET/WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL ATTACK

- | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| _____ 1.) Increase | _____ 3.) Decrease |
| _____ 2.) No Effect | _____ 4.) No Reference |

(VAR 32) G3.) SOVIET/WARSAW PACT POLITICAL PRESSURES BACKED BY THREAT OF FORCE.

- | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| _____ 1.) Increase | _____ 3.) Decrease |
| _____ 2.) No Effect | _____ 4.) No Reference |

(VAR 33) H1.) CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET THEATER/REGIONAL NUCLEAR FORCES.

- | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| _____ 1.) Increase | _____ 3.) Decrease |
| _____ 2.) No Effect | _____ 4.) No Reference |

CITE:

If the author references concerns about (H) above, how does he see Soviet theater/regional nuclear capabilities affecting concerns about:

(VAR 34) H1.) A NUCLEAR STRIKE BY THE USSR.

- | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| _____ 1.) Increase | _____ 3.) Decrease |
| _____ 2.) No Effect | _____ 4.) No Reference |

(VAR 35) H2.) A SOVIET/WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL ATTACK.

- | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| _____ 1.) Increase | _____ 3.) Decrease |
| _____ 2.) No Effect | _____ 4.) No Reference |

(VAR 36) H3.) SOVIET/WARSAW PACT POLITICAL PRESSURES BACKED BY THREAT OF FORCE.

- | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| _____ 1.) Increase | _____ 3.) Decrease |
| _____ 2.) No Effect | _____ 4.) No Reference |

(VAR 37) I.) WEST EUROPEAN WILLINGNESS TO DEVOTE RESOURCES TO DEFENSE.

- | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| _____ 1.) Increase | _____ 3.) Decrease |
| _____ 2.) No Effect | _____ 4.) No Reference |

CITE:

(VAR 38) J.) U.S. WILLINGNESS TO DEVOTE RESOURCES TO DEFENSE.

- | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| _____ 1.) Increase | _____ 3.) Decrease |
| _____ 2.) No Effect | _____ 4.) No Reference |

CITE:

(VAR 39) K.) U.S. WILLINGNESS TO HELP DEFEND WESTERN EUROPE.

- | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| _____ 1.) Increase | _____ 3.) Decrease |
| _____ 2.) No Effect | _____ 4.) No Reference |

CITE:

III B.) FACTORS AFFECTING EUROPEAN SECURITY: SALIENCE OF THE OVERALL THREAT

How is the salience of the overall threat affected by Soviet behavior regarding:

(VAR 40) A.) M(B)FR.

- | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| _____ 1.) Increase | _____ 3.) Decrease |
| _____ 2.) No Effect | _____ 4.) No Reference |

III B.) CONTINUED

CITE:

(VAR 41) B.) DETENTE IN GENERAL.

- | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| _____ 1.) Increase | _____ 3.) Decrease |
| _____ 2.) No Effect | _____ 4.) No Reference |

CITE:

(VAR 42) C.) SOVIET NEGOTIATING POSITIONS ON THEATER/REGIONAL FORCES.

- | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| _____ 1.) Increase | _____ 3.) Decrease |
| _____ 2.) No Effect | _____ 4.) No Reference |

CITE:

(VAR 43) D.) SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP/MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS.

- | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| _____ 1.) Increase | _____ 3.) Decrease |
| _____ 2.) No Effect | _____ 4.) No Reference |

CITE:

IV.) PERCEPTIONS OF THE MILITARY BALANCE

Indicate the perceptions of the military balance held by the author concerning:

(VAR 44) A.) THE CURRENT STRATEGIC BALANCE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND USSR.

- | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| _____ 1.) Adverse To West | _____ 3.) Favorable To West |
| _____ 2.) Roughly Equal | _____ 4.) No Reference |

CITE:

(VAR 45) B.) THE CURRENT BALANCE OF THEATER/REGIONAL FORCES BETWEEN NATO AND THE SOVIET UNION/WARSAW PACT.

- | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| _____ 1.) Adverse To West | _____ 3.) Favorable To West |
| _____ 2.) Roughly Equal | _____ 4.) No Reference |

CITE:

(VAR 46) C.) THE CURRENT BALANCE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES BETWEEN NATO AND THE SOVIET UNION/WARSAW PACT.

- | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| _____ 1.) Adverse To West | _____ 3.) Favorable To West |
| _____ 2.) Roughly Equal | _____ 4.) No Reference |

CITE:

(VAR 47) D.) THE CURRENT BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES BETWEEN NATO AND THE SOVIET UNION/WARSAW PACT.

- | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| _____ 1.) Adverse To West | _____ 3.) Favorable To West |
| _____ 2.) Roughly Equal | _____ 4.) No Reference |

CITE:

(VAR 48) E.) THE OVERALL MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN US/NATO AND SOVIET UNION/WARSAW PACT.

- | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| _____ 1.) Adverse To West | _____ 3.) Favorable To West |
| _____ 2.) Roughly Equal | _____ 4.) No Reference |

CITE:

(VAR 49) F.) The FUTURE STRATEGIC BALANCE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND USSR.

_____ 1.) Adverse to West	_____ 3.) Favorable to West
_____ 2.) Roughly Equal	_____ 4.) No Reference

CITE:

(VAR 50) G.) THE FUTURE BALANCE OF THEATER/REGIONAL FORCES BETWEEN NATO AND THE SOVIET UNION/WARSAW PACT.

_____ 1.) Adverse to West	_____ 3.) Favorable to West
_____ 2.) Roughly Equal	_____ 4.) No Reference

CITE:

(VAR 51) H.) THE FUTURE BALANCE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES BETWEEN NATO AND THE SOVIET UNION/WARSAW PACT.

_____ 1.) Adverse to West	_____ 3.) Favorable to West
_____ 2.) Roughly Equal	_____ 4.) No Reference

CITE:

(VAR 52) I.) THE FUTURE BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES BETWEEN NATO AND THE SOVIET UNION/WARSAW PACT.

_____ 1.) Adverse to West	_____ 3.) Favorable to West
_____ 2.) Roughly Equal	_____ 4.) No Reference

CITE:

(VAR 53) J.) THE OVERALL MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN US/NATO AND SOVIET UNION/WARSAW PACT IN THE FUTURE.

_____ 1.) Adverse to West	_____ 3.) Favorable to West
_____ 2.) Roughly Equal	_____ 4.) No Reference

CITE:

V A.) The "World View" of the Author: Factors Influencing National Behavior

Indicate the relative importance attached to the following factors, which can influence the ways in which states relate to, and behave toward, one another:

(VAR 54) A.) FORCE (i.e., military capabilities).

_____ 1.) Unimportant

_____ 3.) Important

_____ 2.) Neutral

_____ 4.) No Reference

CITE:

(VAR 55) B.) ECONOMIC STRENGTH.

_____ 1.) Unimportant

_____ 3.) Important

_____ 2.) Neutral

_____ 4.) No Reference

CITE:

(VAR 56) C.) IDEOLOGY.

_____ 1.) Unimportant

_____ 3.) Important

_____ 2.) Neutral

_____ 4.) No Reference

CITE:

(VAR 57) D.) POLITICAL GOALS (i.e., national objective).

_____ 1.) Unimportant

_____ 3.) Important

_____ 2.) Neutral

_____ 4.) No Reference

CITE:

(VAR 58) E.) POLITICAL TIES.

- | | |
|-----------------------|------------------------|
| _____ 1.) Unimportant | _____ 3.) Important |
| _____ 2.) Neutral | _____ 4.) No Reference |

CITE:

V B.) The "World View" of the Author: East-West Relations

Indicate how the author assesses:

VAR 59) A.) CURRENT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES.

- | | |
|-------------------|------------------------|
| _____ 1.) Hostile | _____ 3.) Friendly |
| _____ 2.) Neutral | _____ 4.) No Reference |

CITE:

VAR 60) B.) CURRENT RELATIONS, OVERALL, BETWEEN EASTERN EUROPE/USSR AND WESTERN EUROPE/U.S.

- | | |
|-------------------|------------------------|
| _____ 1.) Hostile | _____ 3.) Friendly |
| _____ 2.) Neutral | _____ 4.) No Reference |

CITE:

VI.) Policy Preferences

VAR 61) A.) Indicate whether or not the author advocates a course of action (i.e., policy preference) that should be undertaken to improve the security of Western Europe.

- | |
|---|
| _____ 1.) Author <u>does</u> advocate a policy. |
| _____ 2.) Author <u>does not</u> advocate a policy. |

VAR 62) A1.) If the author advocates a policy preference, is it:

- | |
|---|
| _____ 1.) Primarily military/defense oriented |
| _____ 2.) Primarily political/economic |
| _____ 3.) Mixed |

CITE:

APPENDIX B:
CODING GUIDE FOR THE REVISED CODEBOOK

ALLIED PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT PROJECT (APT)

Coding Guide for the Revised Code Book: 24 October 1979

INTRODUCTION

As part of the Allied Perceptions of Threat Project (APT), one of the research tasks is the systematic analysis of the perceptions of American and selected Western European elites concerning the state of European security and the potential and actual threats faced by the Atlantic Alliance. In order to accomplish this task, content analysis of representative and relevant speeches, articles and papers will be performed by a team of coders.

This Coding Guide is intended to aid the coding team by providing definitions of terminology utilized in the Revised Code Book and by providing specific directions and techniques to be employed for its accurate and efficient usage. This is essential if the project is to attain sufficient rigor to meet the standards of objective, systematic analysis needed in scientific research.

In order to facilitate clarity, the following structure will be utilized in explaining the Revised Code Book (RCB): first, a general description of coding methods and sections of the RCB; then a more detailed exploration of each individual section.

General Description of the RCB

The RCB is divided into eight major sections:

- I.) Information about the Source;
- II.) Threats to European Security;
- III A.) Factors Affecting European Security: Military/Political;
- III B.) Factors Affecting European Security: Salience of the Overall Threat;
- IV.) Perceptions of the Military Balance;
- V A.) The "World View" of the Author: Factors Influencing National Behavior;
- V B.) The "World View" of the Author: East-West Relations; and
- VI.) Policy Preferences.

Each of these sections plays an important role in the determination of elite perceptions of threats to European security. Thus it is essential that the coders attempt to provide codings for all questions in each section, if possible. When coding an article, it is recommended that the article be read completely before any questions in the RCB are addressed. Only explicit perceptual statements found in the article will be coded; the coder should not infer an answer based upon his perception of what the author is saying. (Exception: the coder may infer a coding if the statement to be coded is unambiguous but does not explicitly state the necessary code. For example, an author states, "the Soviet Union has the power to destroy all of the United States and Western Europe." The coder may infer that the author is discussing military power and specifically strategic nuclear power, should these assumptions conform to the general content of the article.)

With the exception of Section I: Information About the Source, each section follows the same general format: 1.) a section heading, 2.) a general sectional question (or guide), 3.) specific applications of the general question, 4.) coding categories for each specific question, 5.) a no reference code and, 6.) a citation reference. The sectional heading indicates the type of codings under that section. The general sectional question (or guide) provides the context in which the specific application questions are to be interpreted. For example, in Section IIIA: Factors Affecting European Security: Military/Political, the general question, "How in the opinion of the author, do the following factors influence concerns about threats to European security:", provides context for a specific application, A.) Capabilities of U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces. Under each of the specific applications are the coding categories and the no reference code. The coder should place a check in the blank next to the most appropriate response based upon a thorough reading of the article. The coder must either place a check in one of the coding categories or the no reference code. The no reference code is to be used when the coder determines that this specific application is not addressed by the author in the article. Finally, the citation reference is used to indicate at least one source in the article that triggered a specific code. The citation must include a page and paragraph number and the minimum amount of quote necessary to convey the idea.

I. Information about the Source

The first section provides, as its name implies, information about the source. This information is essential for the subsequent data analysis. Thus, it is imperative that the coder complete this section. The first piece of data necessary is a complete bibliographic citation to include: author, complete title, source, volume and issue number, date, page numbers. The second data piece, B.) Date of Publication, begins the first of the coding blanks. The coded articles will be either from 1971, 1975 or 1979 and should be coded appropriately.

A careful examination of the article (or source; i.e., journal, etc.) should provide information to complete the data concerning the country or origin of the source of the article, the nationality of the author, his principal profession and current status. Should information not be available readily to make such a determination the coder should check no reference. (Note: a final attempt to determine the necessary data will be made before data analysis begins utilizing other biographic sources.) The following decision rules should minimize confusion with a selection of principal profession of author:

- 1.) select the profession at time of article publication or last position held;
- 2.) academician: individual connected with a university education and/or research program;
government official: appointed or elected civilian officials connected with the executive branch;
officer in armed forces: commissioned military officer;

- political leader: an individual actively involved in the political processes of his state either within the legislative branch (whether or not part of controlling party) or outside the government, to include interest groups;
- journalist: an individual writing or reporting for any medium of mass communication;
- defense analyst: an individual involved in defense/military oriented research, outside of government, generally with some private research company;
- other: any profession not included in above (such as business or labor leader, etc.).

II.) Threats to European Security

This section is primarily concerned with various military and political threats that affect the security of Western Europe. The coding categories for this section are: 1.) Yes; 2.) No.; 3.) Uncertain; and 4.) Indeterminate. If the author feels Western Europe is secure against the specific threat (i.e., nuclear strike, etc.), then the coder codes 1.) yes; if not, the coder codes 2.) No. If the author cannot ascertain whether or not Western Europe is secure, then the coder codes 3.) Uncertain. Should the author discuss the specific threat and the security of Europe, but the coder cannot determine the author's perceptions due to contradictions and/or ambiguity, then the coder codes 4.) Indeterminate. Finally, if the threat is not addressed in the article, then the coder utilizes 5.) No Reference. Note: In this section are two variable numbers per question with each category split by a slash. If the article only addresses these in issues in the present, mark only to the left of the slash; if the article considers the future of this situation, please mark the future response to the right.

- A.) Nuclear strike: the use of nuclear weapons to destroy, defeat or punish an adversary. The attack may be all-out or limited and directed against civilian and/or military targets;
- B.) Conventional force attack: the use of general purpose air, ground and sea forces (without nuclear weapons) in either full scale or limited assaults;
- C.) Political pressures backed by threat of force: statements, demarches, demonstrations and/or maneuvers by one state aimed at deterring another from taking, or compelling it to take, a particular course of action with the implicit or explicit threat to trigger a military reaction for non-compliance;
- D.) Internal subversion: an attempt to undermine or overthrow the government of a sovereign state by propaganda, sabotage, terrorism, public demonstrations, etc.,
- E.) Economic threats: actual or possible measures, such as embargoes, denials of access to markets and/or raw material resources, refusals to trade, etc., which could jeopardize the economic viability or social/political stability, thereby causing it to alter policies and/or to compromise its political independence.

III A.) Factors Affecting European Security: Military/Political

This section is concerned with the perceptions of how military (capabilities) and political factors affect concerns about threats to European security. Coding categories are: 1.) increase; 2.) no effect; and 3.) decrease. If the author sees the specific military capability or political factor increasing concerns about European security, he codes 1.) increase; similarly, "no effect" and "decreasing" are coded in the appropriate space. Again, if the author does not address the issue, no reference is the correct code.

The following definitions should aid in coding:

- 1.) strategic nuclear forces: military systems carrying nuclear payloads capable of engaging targets at intercontinental ranges such as ICBMs, heavy bombers and submarine launched missiles;
- 2.) theater/regional nuclear forces: military systems capable of carrying nuclear payloads which generally have ranges less than approx 3500 nautical miles and are intended for employment within or adjacent to theaters of operations from which they are deployed;
- 3.) tactical nuclear forces: military systems capable of delivering nuclear payloads which have ranges generally less than 500 miles and are intended for employment within the theater of operations and generally within the depth of the combat zone around the forward edge of battle area;
- 4.) conventional forces: general purpose air, ground, and naval forces employing non-nuclear ordnance in the theater of operations.

III B.) Factors Affecting European Security: Saliency of the Overall Threat

The degree to which the author regards Soviet behavior in specific areas or issues affects his perception of the saliency of the overall threat to Western Europe. The coding categories for this section are identical to those utilized for section III A. Definitional aids are:

- A.) M(B)FR: the negotiations concerning Mutual (and Balanced) Force Reductions of military forces in Europe;
- B.) Detente: the political process of tension reduction between East and West.

IV.) Perceptions of the Military Balance

This section attempts to ascertain the views of American and Western Europe political elites concerning the state of the current military balance and its component sub-balances between the U.S./NATO, and Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact. Coding categories for this section are: 1.) Adverse to West; 2.) Roughly Equal; and 3.) Favorable to West. If the author sees the military balance as leaning toward the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact, then the coder codes 1.) Adverse to West; if the opponent forces are perceived as balanced, then the coder

codes 2.) Roughly Equal; if the balance is seen favoring the U.S./NATO then it is coded 3.) Favorable to West. The military balance thus refers to the relationship of power at the disposal of the actors.

V. A.) The "World View" of the Author: Factors Influencing National Behavior

Underlying belief systems concerning factors influencing national behavior affect the perceptual views of individuals. This section attempts to ascertain the importance attached by the author to a number of relevant concepts such as force, economic strength, etc. A three point coding category is utilized; 1.) Unimportant; 2.) Neutral; and 3.) Important. The appropriate code is checked depending upon the content of the article.

V. B.) The "World View" of the Author: East-West Relations

Another aspect of the author's belief system is his perception of the current state of relations between East and West. This relationship is coded as 1.) Hostile, 2.) Neutral or 3.) Friendly. The specific code is determined by the author's explicit reference in the article. If the author sees principally an adversary relationship then 1.) Hostile should be coded; if the relationship is one of little tension and non-power competition then 3.) Friendly should be coded; 2.) Neutral should be coded if there are elements of both hostility and friendliness or indifference.

VI.) Policy Preferences

Sometimes, when discussing a problem, an author has a policy recommendation in mind as a method for solving the problem. In this section, the coder is asked to determine whether or not the author advocates a specific or general policy preference. If it is determined that he does advocate a course of action, the coder is asked to determine its nature. Only an unambiguous, explicit policy reference should be coded (i.e., "something should be done" should not be coded.)

Conclusion

Coding for content analysis is an important, though tedious and difficult task. The coder should not take his responsibility lightly. The validity and reliability of data analysis is founded upon efficient, accurate coding of the source articles. The coder must conscientiously and meticulously code every question whether it be part of the coding categories or a no reference. Also, accurate and complete citations are essential for a successful project.

APPENDIX C:

REPORT OF THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE FOR
SOCIAL RESEARCH (GOWI): TJARCK G. RÜSSLER, "ON THE
PERCEPTION AND ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY POLICY: AN EVALUATION OF
THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY OF A
SHIFT IN THE STRATEGIC BALANCE"

ON THE PERCEPTION AND ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY POLICY:
AN EVALUATION OF THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES
FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY OF A SHIFT IN THE STRATEGIC BALANCE

by

Tjarck G. Rösler

translated by

Lawrence W. E. Lehmann

SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTLICHES INSTITUT DER BUNDESWEHR
GERMAN ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH

SOWI - München

Munich 1981

STUDY PURPOSE

In the recent past few political issues have enjoyed the prominence of those areas grouped together under the rubric Security Policy. The classical view of popular and national coexistence held that it was made possible primarily by the existence of countervailing power and the instruments of that power.¹ Conflict with an enemy was seen as a naturally occurring and unavoidable phenomenon that simply represents a more extreme version of intercourse with "others." Consequently, preparation for this conflict became a fundamental concern of the state. "if you want peace prepare for war" thus appeared to be the logically correct and politically meaningful maxim for government behavior.

Acquisition of arms was thus a natural concern of the state. The possibility that wars could (or have) begun due to mutual arms buildups was seen to be the "proper view." Peaceful coexistence of nations and states was seen only as a deceptive intermission. Only believers in fantasy and pacifists (between which there would be little difference) could dream of a world without conflict or at least without war.

Only after Hiroshima and Nagasaki did this view of war and international relations appear to be anachronistic.²

Development of a policy which will prevent self-annihilation must take into account developments in weapons technology, their possible applications and consequences. War between the nuclear powers appears to be impossible although proxy wars amongst other states are (still) possible.³ This means that due to the existence of alliances the danger of escalation cannot be excluded. Or, expressed differently, the more closely that nations ally themselves the less likely it is that "war" will appear to be the means to achieve a justifiable policy.

On the other hand the threat of (mutual) extermination gives no guarantee as to the credibility of a "non-war" situation. Confidence building measures do not come into existence by themselves. Trust is not created without a corresponding policy. Even then a policy intended to build trust enjoys no guarantee that it will be "properly" perceived and elicit the proper response.

Security against surprises thus remains a goal of government behavior in the field of foreign policy with a view to protecting the further development of its society. The government's contribution amongst other measures remains as before largely in the fields of armaments, the military, and planning military options.

This contradiction of not wanting war because it is anachronistic while continuing to arm oneself to prevent war determines at least the policies of the so-called great powers and their allies in the East-West confrontation.

The FRG which is integrated into the Western alliance by political, military and economic agreements is thus strongly affected. At the same time the awareness of many people in the FRG has been heightened: the apparent contradiction is appreciated. Even though the themes "Military" or "Bundeswehr" and all their related questions are rarely discussed (that is they have hardly been the object of major political confrontations) one still views a legitimacy crisis for defense and particularly arms policy.

Security is indeed still seen as the central objective of government behavior. However, the publicly perceived elements of security tend to be non-military in nature. Opinion polls show that military matters and "military security policy" as a whole enjoy a low priority with the majority of the population.⁴ In the public's understanding of security it is the internal political conditions which are accorded priority. Foreign policy and military matters remain in the background. Furthermore it is concluded that due to the impossibility (i.e., senselessness) of a defense which includes nuclear weapons, the NATO strategy of flexible response is not credible (aside from the deterrent dimension from which it can't be

separated) as soon as one examines NATO's ability to conduct a war. The majority of the population rejects a doctrine which results in the destruction of that which it is meant to protect.⁵

TABLE 1

The importance of selected policy issues

<u>Policy Issue</u>	<u>Mean ranking</u>
Cure unemployment	2.46
Solve energy problem	2.63
Provide Social Security	3.29
Fight crime	3.98
Provide external security	4.03
Develop the educational system	4.45

SOURCE: SOWI⁶

Notes: Sample group was a representative random sample of the FRG population over 18, N=1866, Oct. 1979. The issues were rated on a subjective scale of 1 to 6 with one being most important and six the least.

TABLE 2

Evaluation of the FRG's defense capability

Question: Let's assume that the FRG is attacked from the East. Do you believe that the Bundeswehr along with its allies could repel such an attack; do you believe it is doubtful or do you believe it could not be repelled?

<u>Defense capability</u>	<u>Percentage perception</u>
can repel	33.2
appears doubtful	34.2
cannot repel	13.3
don't know	19.3

Source: SCWI⁷

Notes: Sample group was a representative random sample of the FRG population over 13, N=1866, Oct. 1979.

TABLE 3

Evaluation of the willingness to employ nuclear weapons in the defense of FRG

Question: In the event of war NATO has, amongst other things, atomic weapons at its disposal. Are you for a military defense of the FRG even if atomic weapons must be employed on the territory of the FRG?

yes	14.6%
no	66.0%
don't know	19.4%

Source: SCWI³

Notes: Sample group was a representative random sample of the FRG population over 13, N=1836, Oct. 1979

These results are in accord with general government behavior with respect to the financing of policies. Expenditures on defense reflect their position relative to other areas of government activity. Leaving aside the question of whether or not it's possible to determine the real opinions of a population by means of questionnaires, there is a discernable tendency amongst the population to favor a policy of cuts in the area of military security policy while simultaneously increasing expenditures in other areas.⁹ Just as the state has reduced the percentage of the federal and especially total government budgets devoted to defense expenditures so too does the population accord defense and military security policy a lower priority.

TABLE 4

Defense Budget of the FRG, 1969-79

Year	GNP Million DM	Federal Budget Million DM	Defense Budget Million DM	% Fed. Budget	% GNP
1969	597700	97285	20199	20.8	3.4
1970	679000	93623	20832	22.3	3.1
1971	756000	102504	23192	22.6	3.1
1972	827000	111849	25861	23.1	3.1
1973	920100	125660	28429	22.6	3.1
1974	986900	136433	31571	23.2	3.2
1975	1032900	160079	33302	20.8	3.2
1976	1127900	166415	34627	20.8	3.1
1977	1198700	171306	34404	20.1	2.9
1978	1278300	188704	36551	19.4	2.9
1979	1367800	204600	38441	18.8	2.8

SOURCE: Federal Budget data for 1977-9¹⁰

NOTES: Data for the Defense Budget from 1974 include social services for Bundeswehr soldiers. EPL 33, Chapter 3304

TABLE 5

Defense Expenditures and their Share
of all Government Expenditures, 1969-78

Year	Government Budget (Federal, State, Local) Million DM	Defense Expenditure Including Berlin Aid Million DM	Defense Share of Gov't. Expenditures %
1969	174400	24392	14.0
1970	196200	25567	13.0
1971	226500	29060	12.8
1972	251700	33092	13.2
1973	279700	36833	13.2
1974	317600	41257	13.0
1975	359500	43763	12.2
1976	376800	45756	12.1
1977	397200	47745	12.0
1978	416900	50919	11.7

SOURCE: Federal Budget Data, Statistical Yearbooks 1977-78
Planned expenditures.¹¹

TABLE 6

Budget cuts to benefit the armed forces

Question: Given a situation where there were insufficient funds available to maintain the combat readiness of the Bundeswehr unless cuts were made in other areas, in which areas would you advocate spending cuts benefiting the armed forces?

<u>Policy Area</u>	<u>Magnitude of Cuts</u>			
	large	small	none	don't know
Health & Social Sec.	3.1	19.5	76.1	1.3
Education	7.3	32.8	58.3	1.6
For. Aid	42.2	31.7	25.2	0.9
Fight inflation and unemployment	6.7	22.7	68.6	1.3
Environmental Protection	8.2	32.3	57.4	2.0
Energy	6.2	22.3	70.5	1.0

Source: SOWI¹²

Notes: Sample group was a representative sample of the FRG population over 18, N=1836, Oct. 1979

From these results one can undeniably deduce that military security (as a contribution to and the hallmark of external security) remains within the province of government policy objectives.

At the same time it is true that the respondents accord military policy a lower priority than enjoyed by other policy areas. There is no majority consensus for larger defense expenditures. It also means that as a policy instrument the Bundeswehr (as well as external security itself) is no longer automatically legitimate.

Expressed differently, the purpose of this study was to answer the questions what is or could be understood by the term "Security Policy," whether quasi-objective changes within the context of external security have affected the understanding of the term and, if so, can one explain the apparent legitimacy problem of (military) security and defense policy in view of these findings.

ON THE INTERESTS AND MOTIVES UNDERLYING THIS STUDY

In the past few years there has been intensive debate in the FRG about the social responsibility of science. While a comprehensive presentation of the debate would be out of place here, scientific research is accordingly forced to take into account the realities of day to day political events both while choosing and examining the research topic. Results of scientific work don't "remain unto themselves". They have more or less significant effects on social reality. Research, that is science generally, must be held accountable to the society.

Consequently those who conduct social research must be conscious of this responsibility and be able to account for the further effects of their work. In particular the central questions regarding the study purpose and possible consequences of the findings must be answered. The normative aspects of conducting the study may not simply be disposed of by referring to the neutral nature of science: supposedly value-free and conducted without regard to findings or their consequences. This determination of normative position marks an important function of science and scientists within the democratic social order.

At least in theory all state activity is to be viewed as the expression of public opinion and public will. Literally everyone participates in this process by articulating their differing opinions and interests. Results of scientific research have their place as well.

In concrete terms this means that the apparent lack of public legitimation of security policy needs to be examined so that, if possible, an explanation can be found for the "semantic differences" apparent in the different understandings of the term "security policy". This would then provide the basis for establishing a "semantic consensus". If the public task of creating security policy is to be responsibly formulated it requires discussion and information.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Security, as a basic need of human existence.

Included amongst elementary human needs is the need to shape one's life so that it is secure or safe. That is, one feels or knows oneself to be secure.

Consequently security is essentially a subjective category. This subjective feeling is, none the less, not independent of objective factors (environmental factors in the widest sense). However it is the evaluation of the circumstances which determine whether or not a given situation is felt to be safe or not.

Expressed differently, security as a requirement for human existence is determined by objective factors, environmental conditions, and subjective factors, i.e., the opinions and assessments of these givens.

Security as a Basic Requirement of Organized Society

Human life is in principle a matter of living together. Creating and guaranteeing the security (physical, economic and social) of its members has been a task of all social units.¹³

In the days of small organizations such as the extended family this requirement could be acted upon and clearly, believably be made apparent to the members.

Increased collectivization and progressive de-personalization in virtually all areas of life (that is, the increasing transition to a modern mass society) has lent new meaning to the term security.

Important functions of the smaller organizations, such as the extended family, have been transferred to larger organizations up to and including the state in its capacity as a complex organization of social interests. Social and geographic mobility, increasing division of labor and alienation, the tendencies towards anonymity and bureaucracy in virtually all relationships in one's life, the transmission of crucial information and behavioral norms through the mass media, and the

extension of the knowable world onto a global scale are hallmarks of the situation.

There are fewer and fewer factors which one can experience directly. In their place we have perceptions of events and things which have been transmitted to us. Thus, security becomes ever more a matter of opinions and attitudes. It has become the product of evaluations made on the basis of abstractly acquired facts.

This means that one can no longer unequivocally identify the elements of "security". The effects felt from other areas such as social, economic and educational policy, are drawn into the construct "security," and mixed to produce the impression of being more or less "secure".

This applies not only to the beneficiaries of the various policies but also in equal measure to the decision makers; in the widest sense of the word, politicians.

The fact that the classical tools (i.e., the military and armed conflict) of implementing a guarantee of external security had acquired new meanings certainly contributed to the new formulation of the construct "security". Armed conflicts no longer serve primarily to secure the state's sovereignty, but rather threaten to exterminate humanity. For this reason the provision of "security" can no longer be understood exclusively as external security. It has become a matter of human existence.

Expressed differently; to the beneficiaries "security policy" has come to stand for the body of government actions intended to preserve the existence of state and society in the broadest sense of their meanings. Questions of external security and military policy are treated as natural, constituent parts of this policy area.

Security and Security Policy as an Object of Political Communication

This finding is, however, not itself sufficient for one to reach any conclusions about the contents of the perceived security policy. Because the

beneficiaries of policies are rarely if at all directly affected by events and facts it becomes necessary to examine the transmission mechanism through which citizens acquire their impressions of policy. In modern mass societies distribution of information has become the central process of all interactions. Communication predominantly takes the form of mass-communication. The mass-media are the decisive vehicles and brokers which constitute the link between the citizens and their extended, global environment. As a result one cannot separate the media from the political process for they are part of political conditions necessary for behavioral and attitudinal change.

Expressed differently, security policy and with it the necessary conditions for one to experience the subjective feeling of being "secure" are, to a decisive extent, transmitted and perceived through the media.

In determining which elements of security are perceived to be of importance one must find which elements are actually presented in the media and, in addition, how differently the respective technical media present the facts.

STATUS OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

Security Policy as a Research Subject.

One can conduct security (as outlined above) research using any of the following approaches: psychology, group or organizational sociology, or political science.

In this study we are interested in questions dealing with the relationship between perceptions of objective situations within the international environment and their role as factors in determining security policy. Security policy and research in that area therefore belong in the field of international relations/foreign policy. To reach useful conclusions one must first differentiate the study. With respect to level of analysis we can distinguish two large areas.¹⁴ One would be the behavior of national actors in international politics, the other would be the outcome of a policy within competing (or harmonizing) power groupings of the international political system.

With respect to the first level of analysis the relevant literature and research indicates that security policy decisions within most developed states and particularly the highly industrialized mass-societies are produced by a relatively small group of persons. This group can be referred to as a functional elite.

The central finding of research into the second complex of questions is, briefly, that international policy and foreign policy are essentially concerned with problems of a strategic military nature. Even when other elements of foreign policy are seen in the foreground, one will find that in essence the policy's central dimensions can be reduced to matters of military strategy and military policy. Only recently have a few studies attempted to overcome the separation of policies into discrete areas (e.g. internal, foreign, economic or social). Military strategy and security policy have remained a separate and, recently, secondary complex of questions.¹⁵

In summing up the status of research and knowledge in the field of inter-

national politics, the following points may be made: 1) Security policy is to be seen as a part of the foreign policy of nations groups of nations (alliances), 2) The content of this policy is almost exclusively concerned with matters of military strategy and policy, 3) Security policy as a matter of "military-strategic/military-political foreign-policy" is and area in which a narrowly defined functional elite is active.

PERCEPTION AND ASSESSMENT OF EVENTS AS A REQUIREMENT FOR POLITICAL
COMMUNICATION: STATE OF RESEARCH IN THE FIELD

Democratic societies are distinguished by the fact that government (that is, organized social) behavior is held to be and legitimized by the belief that it is the product of public opinion and public will. Policy is based upon a consensus resulting from the articulation of opinions. In other words, democratic theory holds that political communication is the necessary condition for normatively legitimate government behavior.

According to the relevant current literature, the requisites (perception and evaluation) for political communication are far from simply being determined by the actual content of policy. Rather, they are influenced by results as transmitted through intermediaries. In mass societies the channels of communication are the mass media. Perception is dependent on the size and receptiveness of the specific medium's size and receptiveness of the specific medium's audience.

Receptiveness is in turn shaped decisively by the forms and possibilities of presenting information. Complex, multifaceted questions will be presented in an abstract and formal fashion. Receptiveness will be in inverse proportion to this abstraction and formality: i.e. The more abstract, the less receptiveness. On the other hand it is also certain that an "attractive", attention grabbing presentation of processes and facts will be achieved by sacrificing structural detail.

Political communication that takes place through the media can, therefore, only reproduce a part of reality. At the same time this picture of reality is heavily influenced by this process. Exactly which picture and part of reality is depicted in the media is determined by the audience. Television and the specialist press, for instance, are influenced with respect to form content and intentions by their different audiences. The audience groups do, however, overlap and they are not unaffected by influences originating in other media to which they are exposed. An additional point of general importance is that presentation

of events in the mass-media such as television cannot be viewed or evaluated independently of the information presented in the print media. Extensive information of a complex nature is found in the print media. As such the print media provides the important starting point for choosing, presenting and evaluating events. They, therefore, serve to provide background information for the mass-media.

RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

Preliminary Hypotheses

The central hypotheses grow out of the above discussion and in particular, the relevant literature on the formulation of security policy decisions and their further transformation into practical policy within the foreign-policy machinery.

First Hypothesis

Security policy is limited both in its image and substance to "analysis of strategic military situations and evaluation of military policy options." Security policy is rarely or never viewed as a reflection of or reaction to the political consciousness of its legitimating base, the population.

Expressed differently, if security policy is only understood and evaluated as a reflection of "military strategy and policy", then the situational analyses will take place within the context of military strategy. The evaluation of military policy options will consequently incorporate the basic elements of the policy as it is communicated through the media. As a result, there will only be a marginal reflection of the population's security-oriented consciousness.

Second Hypothesis

As described above, security policy is made by a select group or functional elite. In other words, when security policy (understood as strategic military situational analyses and evaluation of military policy options) is defined and determined by a functional elite this exclusively will be reflected in the print media. Security policy articles will be aimed primarily at the functional-elite audience and as a consequence the public's reaction, which should be a constituent part of security policy, is hardly represented.

Analytic Framework

From the first hypothesis we have the assertion that the central concern of

security policy discussions (as found and presented in the various media) is the analysis and assessment of the strategic military situation.

Without completely limiting the analytic framework to East-West relations, analysis of the strategic military situation can be viewed as an analysis of the strategic balance on a global scale and the relationship of this power to the probable battle-field of Europe.

The relationship between the military capabilities of the two alliances includes the question of objective conditions and subjective evaluations as well as the question of optimal assessment.

There are two possible ways in which to approach this problem.

The first approach addresses the analysis of objective factors. The first step in this approach is to determine all of the subject areas of international discussion. The second step encompasses a compilation of all theoretically possible subject areas, while the third step involves identification of those subject areas which have actually become areas of political decision making.

This approach next examines the extent of "decision vs. non-decision" areas. The fourth step would examine setting or environment. This would examine the national and international context (foreign, economic, internal, etc. policies) which provides the concrete, objective background against which decisions are made or not made as the case may be.

The fifth step then is to determine the effect of the objective background situation on the decision-area. These effects may be temporal, spatial, or personal. In short, are structural interrelationships observable and significant and can the direction of these influences be clearly shown.

The other approach analyzes the subjective factors. The first step in this approach involves identifying those subjects of interest which are perceived to be within the environment surrounding the study's focal point. To this end the

transmitters of information, the media, must be examined for information relevant to security policy. What is of importance here is not whether all actually or theoretically possible areas of interest are depicted, but rather that information about the actually experienced situation be gathered.

The second step, which runs parallel to the first, involves evaluating the situations examined in the first step and then linking the contents to an identified (military) policy option.

From the variety of information (i.e. depiction of the situation, assessment of the situation, and the source) one can deduce which policy areas are held to be of importance.

This method encompasses a total analysis of all media: evaluation of the print media and observation of the audio-visual ones. In addition it includes a poll of two audience groups: the general population on the one hand and the decision makers and their aides (the functional elite) in the defense and foreign policy process on the other.

To be able to make statements about trends over time the study must embrace a suitably long time period. In contrast to the previously presented approach which is capable of depicting the actual situation at a given point in time, statements about longer time periods can only be made on the basis of a subjective assessment. This is because the media often display lag times in presenting political issues.

This also applies to the study of a concrete event, the manner in which it is presented, and subjective evaluations of the event. An example of this is the 1979 Afghanistan intervention and the reaction to it.

Limitations

In deciding which of the two approaches to employ in any research project there are a number of limitations which must be acknowledged.

Undoubtedly, the preferred approach would be to develop and employ both of

the above mentioned approaches. One would then be able to place objective events or structures side-by-side with the subjective perceptions and assessments of these events and structures.

This study was, however, faced with some limitations.

Comparative International Project

Results from the project outlined above which enable one to attempt explanations for the reactions elicited by a concrete occurrence are in any case of value in and of themselves. Naturally even a specific, national perception and assessment of a situation has value as information. To be able to make clear statements about a similar situation within the international system the perceptions and assessments of that situations respective national populations must be examined. One can adopt two approaches to achieve this. Either one can set up one large project to examine the differences between several countries or one may undertake a comparative international project.

This study is one of several similar (ideally they would be identical) national studies conducted by local researchers. The individual findings will then be evaluated together within the framework of a final study.

The decision to conduct such a comparative international project was an important determinant in choosing the approach employed in this study. This joint approach makes it impossible to conduct an uncompromising and personally more satisfying type of study.

While the necessary compromises are not inconsequential they are acceptable when viewed against the overall objectives. The main result is that a common approach was adopted independently of the respective individual research interests and theoretical approaches. This approach should accommodate the interests of all parties while at the same time being of scientific value. All technical terms must be compatible and as free as possible of semantic variations of interpretation resulting from different languages and cultures. Issue areas must be

relevant to each national context. That is they must actually be political issues and thus the objects of political communication. Finally both the time scale and the sample group should be identical or, at a minimum, comparable. This requirement applies irrespective of the historical, social, political, and cultural differences between the countries or study members.

The compromise was worked out with Prof. Joseph Coffey, Center for International Security Studies of the University of Pittsburgh; Prof. M. Edmonds, University of Lancaster, Great Britain; and Professor J. Klein, Centre d'Etudes des Politiques Etrangères, University of Paris I, France.

Financial, time and personnel costs

All research is additionally subject to other "non-scientific" criteria. We are talking about financial and personnel constraints as well as the time factor.

A project does not have unlimited financial resources available to it. Stated differently, one must be able to complete the project with the available resources. At the same time this must be done without having to accept serious reductions in scientific results.

The same applies to expenditures of time and personnel. Neither we nor our international partners have unlimited amounts of time or computer capacity. In this context the paper's guiding principle is of relevance: The results should not simply be a matter of historical interest by the time they are finally presented.

Research Framework, new version

To accommodate all of these constraints a more workable compromise had to be reached. This compromise was not to be achieved by neglecting one's own or the interests and frameworks of the other participants.

By examining subjective assessments of situations one will be able to determine which issue areas are perceived to be included under the rubric "security policy".

To do this the print media have been selected for examination from those media relevant to political communication. To enable one to make statements about trends over time the period from 1968-77 will be examined.

Additional research steps, in particular opinion polls of the general and expert populations, have been left to later and/or different projects.

At this point the priority objective is to determine perceptions of security policy as depicted in the print media. The examination took place on the basis of a codebook. This codebook had to address the essence of the preliminary and working hypotheses as well as provide a basis for further conclusions. In so doing the questions had to be compatible with the individual national studies such that they would provide material for an overall finding.

The actually perceived "security policy" reflects the perception of the strategic military balance and the military-political assessment of this perception. A compromise was reached with the other partners to limit the study's scope to Western Europe. The objects of analysis are to be the forms and degrees of general perceptions of the European security policy situation, the perceived military threat to Western Europe, the factors which affect European security, and the factors which function as global variables in affecting the situation.

Due to financial, time, and personnel constraint it was not possible to attempt a comprehensive examination of all the available written materials. A random sample was selected according to criteria of representativeness and reliability.

CONDUCTING THE STUDY

Questionnaire Construction

In accordance with the analytic framework outlined above a codebook was assembled to be used in evaluating the empirical material. The questions had to be, firstly, pertinent to the study's objectives, and secondly, to be compatible with the linguistic and cultural barriers inherent in such a study. The questionnaire was formulated in English (with all the drawbacks that this implied for the German material). The individual expressions were compared for general compatibility with their respective German equivalents.

The codebook is composed of five sections. The first section contains statistical background information. For example, source, date, nationality of periodical and author, author's profession etc. insofar as such information is available.

Section two contains data about the threat to European security. The form of the threat (eg. nuclear attack, political blackmail, economic pressure, etc.) as well as the "source" of it as reported in the article are to be recorded.

Section three examines in what way different objective situations are perceived to be factors affecting European security. The article will be examined to find out whether it asks a specific, and if so, then how much importance is accorded this factor's threat to security. The central group of factors examined have to do with military capabilities. This includes potential military power as well as its further effects, and the behavior of Warsaw Pact with respect to selected policy areas. The various factor groups were then further sub-divided and coded in accordance with the preliminary assumptions of the study. By creating additional categories it becomes possible to derive further information from the articles.

Section four contains information on the overall perception of the military balance. The articles are examined for their standpoints on selected questions. This is further sub-divided to determine their assessment of the past, present and

possible future situations. The questions are aimed at determining the article's assessment of the following issues: US-Soviet strategic balance, the INF balance between Nato and the Warsaw Pact, the conventional balance, the balance between the regional nuclear powers in Europe, and the overall military balance of power.

Section five contains data on the assessment of the importance of general factors affecting national policy and European security. For example: the armed forces, economic strength ideology, "community spirit", etc. Questions are also asked about: the targets against which threats are directed eg. national interest, western values, etc.; relations between members of the two alliances; and, finally, an evaluation of the overall East-West relationship.

The codebook was compiled on the basis of the preliminary hypotheses and the following considerations:

If it is true that the factors (in whatever form they are expressed) relating to "the military balance" are central to understanding and depicting "security policy" then this must be reflected in the contents of the articles.

If it is true that the assessment of these military-balance factors plays a key role in determining the normative orientation (i.e. appraisals of "security policy" and "security" as subjectively perceived through media transmission), then one must be able to find explicit assessments and appraisals of the perceived military balance within the article.

If it is true that security policy, as outlined above, is "made" by a specific functional elite then one should be able to distinguish this group within the specialist literature. In addition, material from the specialist literature must then leave traces in the mass-media possibly in the form of security policy positions advocated by the mass-media.

Preliminary Test

In order to verify the efficacy of the codebook in analyzing written works a preliminary test was undertaken. Both the content and semantic aspects of the codebook were examined using 35 articles from the specialist press. An attempt was made to avoid any articles to be included in the main study. Some recognizable weaknesses were eliminated in the definitive codebook. Other weaknesses had to be retained due to the comparative international character of the study. This will be explained in greater detail during the presentation of results.

Selection of Sources

According to the theoretical framework the complete spectrum of print media is to be examined. The transmitters of information are, the mass-media, specialist literature in the broad sense, and party and government declarations. The following individual publications were selected and arranged into groups. As was agreed the data cover the years 1968-77.

For financial reasons only a limited number of articles could be evaluated. The basic rule employed in the selection was that only signed articles would be accepted. Dispatches and unsigned commentaries were excluded.

The list of possible articles was compiled from tables of content and privately assembled lists of signed articles on "security policy". From this list random samples were taken. In the groupings daily newspapers, weekly newmagazines, party periodical, scholarly journals, and military specialist press every third article was selected. In addition all articles from 1977 were examined. Similarly, all articles from the parliamentary documents and government publications groups were used.

Data Collection

The articles were then evaluated using the codebook. That is, it was determined whether or not the article provided a response to the questions asked. The code values

TABLE 7

Publications and Group Membership

<u>Group</u>	<u>Publication</u>
Daily Newspapers	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Frankfurter Rundschau Süddeutsche Zeitung Die Welt
Weekly Newsmagazines	Der Spiegel Die Zeit
Party Periodicals	Liberal Die Neue Gesellschaft Die Politische Meinung Politische Studien
Scholarly Journals	Außenpolitik Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte Beiträge zur Konfliktforschung Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik Europa-Archiv Sicherheitspolitik heute Politische Vierteljahresschrift Leviathan Zeitschrift für Politik
Military Specialist Press	Wehrkunde/Europäische Wehrkunde Truppenpraxis Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau
Parliamentary Documents	Bundestagsprotokolle
Gov't Publications	Bulletin der Bundesregierung

were then transferred onto punch-cards for further processing.

Tests for coder reliability were made to ensure that the whole data collection procedure was dependable.

Evaluation

The material was then evaluated by computer. The SPSS program was used as it fully met the study's requirements in addition to which it was financially acceptable.

The major features of the analysis include, aside from general frequency tabulations: correlations over time of the publications with variables, groups of publications with variables and, in addition, parliamentary documents grouped according to party affiliation correlated with the variables.

Data processing work was conducted by Mr. Karl Hegner of the S.O.W.I. in Munich.

PRESENTATION OF THE FINDINGS

Preliminary Remarks

Only those results relevant to the overall project will be presented here. There will also be general data which provides information on the reliability of the findings. In addition, there will be analytical findings derived from relationships between variables. These findings will (or could) enable one to evaluate the validity of the preliminary hypotheses.

Statistical Base

1665 articles covering the years 1968-77 were evaluated. One third of all relevant articles from 1968-76 were randomly selected. All of the 1977 articles were evaluated. All of the parliamentary documents and Bulletins of the Federal Gov't from 1968-77 were evaluated. The following table contains the numbers of articles from each of the years 1968-77.

TABLE 8

Absolute and Relative Frequencies of Articles from 1968-77

<u>Year</u>	<u>Articles</u>	<u>Relative frequency in %</u>	<u>Corrected</u>
1968	168	10.1	10.1
1969	144	8.6	8.7
1970	172	10.3	10.3
1971	144	8.6	8.7
1972	116	7.0	7.0
1973	165	9.9	9.9
1974	172	10.3	10.3
1975	151	9.1	9.1
1976	145	8.7	8.7
1977	186	17.2	17.2
Unknown	2	0.1	---
	<u>1665</u>	<u>(99.9)</u>	<u>100.0</u>

There are two points of note. First, there are two undated articles which consequently were not coded. As their relative frequency (0.1% of all articles) is so small as to be negligible this missing data was left in the study. The relative-frequency distribution was corrected using the missing data adjustment. Second, the data was reasonably well distributed over time. That is, media attention to security policy has been fairly constant during the period studied.

Of the articles, 52 or 3.1% of the total are stated to be German language translations of foreign articles. In other words, this means that translations have played a minimal role in depicting the area of interest.

A similar picture is presented with respect to author nationality where 75 articles, 4.6% of the total, are clearly authored by foreigners. There were 10 French, 8 English, 28 American, and 29 "other" articles. In other words with few exceptions the articles chosen do reflect opinions of the "German scene."

The breakdown of the authors' professions permits one to draw a further conclusion.

TABLE 9

Authors' Profession

<u>Profession</u>	<u>absolute</u>	<u>frequency</u> <u>relative (%)</u>
Defense Analyst	19	1.1
Officer	35	3.9
Gov't. Official	132	7.9
Politician	209	12.6
Labor Leader	1	0.1
Scholars	174	10.5
Journalist	925	55.6
Other	15	0.9
Unknown	125	7.5
	<hr/> 1665	<hr/> 100.1 (Rounding error)

Assuming that the military community (expanded to include more than just the professional military) consists of all those who officially and as their primary occupation deal with questions of military security policy, we find that 25.5% of all articles are authored by members of this group (Defense experts, officers, gov't officials and politicians).

Scholars are represented by 10.5% of the articles and thus represent an author-group of only secondary importance. Journalists constitute 55.6% of all authors, while the professions of 7.5% of the authors were undetermined. There is only one author officially representing the unions. In other words, at least in the publications examined, this issue is virtually never officially addressed by the unions.

The bulk of the articles are by journalists. All the same, the military community contributed one quarter of the total. This distribution is not astonishing when one looks at the media examined and the distribution of articles amongst periodicals and groups of periodicals.

Nonetheless, a first, cautious return to the preliminary hypothesis is permissible. Leaving out journalists for the moment, the largest group is composed of members of the military-political functional elite. The theoretically based assumption that this group would be over represented amongst the authors is thus at least not contradicted by the data.

Both the original conjecture and the cautious conclusion above are further supported by the distribution of articles amongst the media groups. The daily newspapers and weekly newsmagazines which enjoy the largest circulation of the print media represented 58.4% of the articles. Scholarly journals had 12.9% of the total. "Official political media" such as the government "Bulletin der Bundesregierung," and proceedings of the Bundestag constitute 21.4% of the articles. If one adds to

these the publications of the three parliamentary parties then the political media provide 22.4% of the total. All the same, the military community constitutes 28.7% of the total.²⁴

The following table details the breakdown.

TABLE 10

Totals of articles broken down by publication and publication group

<u>Group</u>	<u>Publication</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	
		abs.	rel. (%)
Daily Newspaper		698	42.9
	FAZ	120	
	FR	142	
	SZ	219	
	Welt	217	
Weekly Newsmagazines		253	15.5
	Spiegel	116	
	Zeit	137	
Party Periodicals		119	7.3
	Liberal	21	
	Neue Gesell	48	
	Pol. Meinung	31	
	Pol. Studien	19	
Scholarly Journals		211	12.9
	Außenpol.	21	
	APUZ	23	
	Konfliktforschg.	15	
	Blätter	47	
	Europa-Archiv	82	
	Sicherheitspol.	11	
	Polit. VjSchr.	2	
	Leviathan	1	
ZfPol.	2		
Military Specialist Press		102	6.3
	Wehrkunde	88	
	Truppenpraxis	3	
	Wehrwiss. Roschau	11	
Political Documents			
	Bundestagsprotok.	223	13.7
	Bulletin	22	1.4
		<u>1628</u>	<u>100.0</u>

The division of articles by publication and by group roughly corresponds to the data on "primary occupations" of authors. In other words, with the exception of scholarly journals, the publication or group of publications serves as the medium of communication for the corresponding professional group. This is also true when one takes the party periodicals, military specialist press and the "political media" and views them together as the central media of the military community. Together they contain 28.7% of all articles. Other journalists and their articles which one should/could assign to this group are not even taken into account in this figure.

It is not possible to do a trend analysis from the data. The yearly average of articles doesn't permit one to derive or interpret any statement regarding changes in article content (in the sense of situational learning) over time. This is shown in Table 11.

TABLE 11

<u>Group</u>	<u>Average frequency of articles within publication</u>		
	<u># of publications</u>	<u>Absolute</u>	<u>Yearly Average</u>
Daily Newspapers	4	698	17.45
Weekly News magazines	2	253	12.65
Party Periodicals	4	119	2.97
Scholarly Journals	9	211	2.34
Military Press	3	102	3.40
Parliamentary Proceedings	1	223	22.30
Gov't. Bulletin	1	22	2.2

This limitation makes it impossible to make an analytic evaluation using objective situational factors to demonstrate, for example, that newspaper X has, due to changed military-political conditions, altered its assessment and presentation of the situation from years Y_0 to Y_1 .

With the exception of parliamentary proceedings and the gov't bulletin it is consequently impossible to analyze trends in the individual publications. In

addition it is not possible to draw any but aggregated conclusions due to the heterogeneity and exclusiveness of the different publications within the mass media.

All the same, one obvious difference may be noted. Security policy articles are over represented in the left-liberal "Süddeutsche Zeitung," (SZ) and the more right-wing "Welt" national-level daily newspapers. The leftist "Frankfurter Rundschau" (FR) and the conservative "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" (FAZ) are both less conscious of these issues.

TABLE 12

Article Frequencies within the Mass-Media

<u>Daily Newspapers</u>	<u>Absolute</u>	<u>% of all Articles (1628)</u>
FAZ	120	7.4
FR	142	8.7
SZ	219	13.5
Welt	217	13.3
<u>Weekly Newsmagazines</u>		
Spiegel	116	7.1
Zeit	137	8.4

The first two newspapers may be viewed as under-represented. The explanation for this may be that, to the FR (military) security policy is a non-issue in their political self-image. For the FAZ, it is an issue which needn't be analyzed to any great extent because it understands these issues to be a natural component of government activity. As such, it is viewed as an area of non-partisan, apolitical consensus placed above the divergent party programs and intellectual currents of the FRG. Therefore, there is no need to over-cover the issue.

As neither one of the weeklies give any more exposure to the issue there must be a more sensible and accurate interpretation. According to this view, the FR

and FAZ are viewed as representative while SZ and "Welt" over-represent the issue. Several explanations are available. The first explanation is that there is a writer within the respective periodicals who has a greater "presence" than his colleagues. The second explanation goes beyond the first. The more "rightist" "Welt" overrepresents the subject because (it would seem) its self-image is still more oriented towards the classical conception of security. As a result, external (i.e. military) security is the fundamental principal governing government behavior. This contention is very plausible when seen in the context of other political objectives advocated by this newspaper: rejection of virtually all government intervention in the areas of economic and social policy, while advocating a larger government role in maintaining social order. In the case of the SZ, its liberal tenor would appear to be determinant. This outlook views government behavior to be primarily a matter of power. As such government activity must be accompanied by a moral-critical examination. As military security policy is an area which can determine the fate of mankind, it is crucial that this field of government activity be dealt with by the newspaper.

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Results of the Basic Tabulation

With the original research framework in mind, an attempt should be made to reach a conclusion about the perceived, central factors of security/security policy.

On the basis of the basic tabulation, it is possible to obtain an overview of the data structure and the substantiveness of the findings. The first question deals with those actual circumstances which affect security (however it is defined).

In other words, it can be argued that for security policy to be effective, it must concentrate (in order of priority) on those threats actually perceived by the populace.

The perceived threats and the frequency of their mention are presented in the following table.

TABLE 13
Threats to European Security

<u>Threat Situation</u>	<u>absolute</u>	<u>Frequency of its Mention</u>		
		<u>N=1665</u>	<u>N'=827</u>	<u>N''=1006</u>
Soviet Nuclear Attack	161	9.7	19.5	16.0
Conventional Warsaw Pact Attack	224	13.5	27.1	22.3
Political Pressure from USSR/ Warspac against background of a possible military intervention	249	14.9	30.1	24.8
Internal Subversion Supported by USSR	103	6.2	12.5	10.2
Economic Threats directed at econ. survival and/or political independence	<u>90</u>	<u>5.4</u>	<u>10.9</u>	<u>8.9</u>
<u>Subtotal</u>	<u>827</u>	<u>49.7</u>	<u>100.1</u>	<u>82.2</u>
Other unspecified threats	179	10.8	---	17.8
<u>Total</u>	<u>1006</u>	<u>60.5</u>	<u>---</u>	<u>100.0</u>

The question was then narrowed to determine whether or not the perceived threats actually induced a subjective feeling of insecurity. Table 14 is a sub-table of Table 13 and shows the perceptual framework. The question is whether the perceived threat has, might have, or has not affected European security. If an article only contained a general, undifferentiated reference to the respective threat it was entered as "don't know".

TABLE 14

Discussion of Threats to European Security

Question: Does Europe appear to be "secure" in the face of the following threats?

Threat	Absolute			Opinion							
	n	n	f (%)	Yes n	f (%)	Possibly n	f (%)	No n	f (%)	Don't Know n	f (%)
Nuclear Attack	161	74	45.9	24	14.9	33	20.5	30	18.6		
Conventional Attack	224	56	25.0	68	30.4	66	29.5	34	15.2		
Political Pressure	249	13	5.2	127	51.0	84	33.7	25	10.0		
Internal Subversion	103	4	3.9	47	45.6	34	33.0	18	17.5		
Economic Threat	90	11	12.2	42	46.7	36	40.0	1	1.1		
Other	179	49	27.4	75	41.9	54	30.2	1	0.6		
Total											

1006

From the low frequency counts in the individual cells, it is apparent that only aggregated statements can be made. Consequently, attempts at explanation are limited to general statements about the data. Trend analysis is impossible due to the small n^{15} per year/cell. Nonetheless, a few important points can be made. First, 1006 of the 1665 total articles indicated the existence of a threat. This means that (assuming only one threat was mentioned per article) about 2/3 of all articles indicated a threat. However, as one can't exclude the possibility of multiple-threat articles, this conclusion is inadmissible. Consequently, one can only analyze interpretations of individual factors.

This means, for example, that the threat of Soviet nuclear attack was mentioned 161 times. In other words, 16% of the threats mentioned dealt with "nuclear attack". If one only looks at the cases where a specific threat was mentioned (627 cases) nuclear attack (161) represents 19.5% of the total. When viewed against the total number of articles examined (1665) this means that only about 10% of the articles mention nuclear attack.

Second, one can hazard the explanation that when any threat situation at all is mentioned, military aspects rank first. Visions of war (nuclear and conventional) predominate with 35.3% of all threats mentioned. Threats which are not "supported by bayonets" are rarely mentioned.

Third, perception of a threat situation does not permit one to conclude that it is accompanied by a corresponding feeling of insecurity. Additional interpretations need to be based on an examination of the opinions voiced in the articles.

Altogether, 9.5% of all articles mentioned the threat of nuclear attack. This represents 16% of all threats mentioned. Nonetheless, 45.9% of all articles mentioning a threat express the belief that Europe is not vulnerable to it. Only 20.5% view the situation as threatening, thus inducing insecurity.

Viewing these tables together one comes to a fourth conclusion: generally speaking, the articles deal with the military situation. When the military situation is discussed, it is not nuclear war, but, rather, the "traditional" forms of warfare that induce insecurity and which are viewed and assessed with ambivalence.

These tendencies are supported by the results shown in the following tables. If a specific threat situation is to affect one's own security, then this threat must be aimed at a specific target. There must be a concrete threat to something and it must be perceived as such.

Table 15 shows that the majority feel "Western security" to be the target of threat policies. Table 16 shows that amongst those factors perceived to be of great importance for one's own government, the armed forces (as the instrument of "Western security") are the most important.

TABLE 16

Factors important to the overall behavior of the gov't.

Question: Which factors that influence the behavior of the nation state are clearly mentioned in the article.

<u>Factor</u>	<u>Frequencies</u>	
	<u>N</u>	<u>f(%)</u>
Armed Forces	1258	22.7
National Political Objectives	1199	20.0
Political Links/Treaties	988	17.8
Citizens' Sense of Community	602	10.9
Economic Power	511	9.2
Ideology	475	8.6
Economic Independence	453	8.2
Cultural Ties	81	1.5
Other Factors	<u>68</u>	<u>1.2</u>
<u>Totals</u>	5545	100.1%

The importance ascribed to the various factors becomes clear when one looks at Table 17. This table gives the results of specific questions about which military factors are held to be of importance. For example, in 191 (19.4% of replies) articles, US strategic nuclear forces were felt to be factors influencing European security. In other words, this factor was explicitly mentioned in 11.5% of all articles examined. In second place are NATO's conventional capabilities. Put differently, this means that when discussing the importance of the military for European security, one first addresses the US strategic potential and only then NATO's conventional capabilities.

All of this too can be interpreted somewhat differently, however. US strategic forces can be seen as constituting a "strategic guarantee". It is on the

level below, that is the level of a "tactically conceivable war" that the real threat is perceived to be!

This explanation is supported by the conjecture that the frequent mention of NATO's tactical nuclear weapons (also called "battlefield nuclear weapons" which obviously indicates the clear possibility of conducting a war with the help of these systems) occurs within the context of a sub-strategic threat and that they are spoken of as a "usable" instrument of military power.

One gains this impression of the relative significance of strategic and conventional forces when one examines the results in Table 18 which contains explicit questions about perceptions of the military balance.

TABLE 17

Military Factors Affecting European Security

<u>Factor</u> <u>Capabilities of</u>	<u>Absolute</u>	<u>Frequency</u> <u>Relative</u>	<u>Relative % (N=1665)</u>
US Strategic Nuclear Forces	191	19.4	11.5
Soviet Strategic Nuclear Forces	59	6.0	3.5
NATO Tactical Nuclear Forces	51	5.2	3.1
Warpac Tactical Nuclear Forces	18	1.8	1.1
NATO Conventional Forces	118	12.0	7.1
WP Conventional Forces	110	11.2	6.6
Regional NATO Nuclear Forces	12	1.2	0.7
Regional French/UK Nuclear Forces	30	3.0	1.8
Soviet Regional Nuclear Forces	20	2.0	1.2
Other Unmentioned Nuclear Factors	375	38.1	22.5
Totals	984	99.9	59.1

TABLE 18

Perception of the Military Balance

<u>Military Balance</u>	<u>Frequencies</u>	
	<u>absolute</u>	<u>%</u>
US-Soviet Strategic Balance	475	33.1
NATO-WP Tactical Nuclear	49	3.4
NATO-WP Conventional	283	19.7
Western Alliance-USSR Regional Nuclear	12	0.8
Western Alliance-WP Overall Balance	<u>617</u>	<u>43.0</u>
Totals	1435	100.0

This primary orientation towards military questions, which may be seen in the context of military alliances, can also be found when examining those "political" factors seen to be important for security. If our preliminary assumptions are to be proven correct, it is necessary to find that even in the "political" arena, military/military policy aspects dominate. The overall findings are presented in Table 19.

TABLE 19
Political Factors Affecting European Security

<u>Factor</u>	<u>Frequencies</u>	
	<u>absolute</u>	<u>relative %</u>
W. European willingness to devote resources to defense	185	6.7
US Willingness to devote resources to defense	122	4.4
US Willingness to defend Europe	240	8.6
US Willingness to help defend Europe	170	6.1
Closer NATO Links	641	23.1
Coordination of Economic Objectives in the alliance	282	10.1
Support W. European Unification	236	8.5
Political-Social Stability of NATO member states	219	7.9
Public Support for Armed Forces and Defense Programs/Concepts	125	4.5
Political Meshing of US and Europe	294	10.6
Political Meshing of US and other nations or regions	75	2.7
Totals	2780	99.9

The most often cited response was "closer NATO links". Second and third places were "political meshing of US and Europe" and "coordinating economic objectives within the alliance" respectively. These themes indicate that even non-military factors are of some importance. This tendency is also shown by the relatively high frequency enjoyed by "Support W. European Unification". What was remarkable was that no particular importance was attributed to "political-social stability of the NATO member states."

Table 20 serves to explain and clarify these findings. It addresses the matter of general factors threatening European Security as they were found in the articles.

TABLE 20

Importance of other, general factors affecting European security

<u>Factor</u>	<u>Absolute</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Relative %</u>
Soviet Objectives:			
vis a vis W. Europe	242		11.6
vis a vis E. Europe	119		5.7
Official Soviet Declarations/Hints:			
vis a vis W. Europe	123		5.9
vis a vis E. Europe	35		1.7
Soviet actions in:			
SALT	213		10.2
MBFR	194		9.3
CSCE	219		10.5
Economic Agreements	78		3.7
Detente in general	473		22.7
Other questions	222		10.7
Other WP Actions in:			
MBFR	23		1.1
CSCE	38		1.8
Economic Agreements	15		.7
Detente in general	41		2.0
Other	46		2.2
Total	2081		99.9

The authors appear to feel that Soviet objectives and behavior with respect to Europe at disarmament talks and in detente as a whole are of overwhelming importance. These are problems which transcend the great powers as they are of primary importance to the alliance and Europe. In other words, the political significance of the "military" alliance lies in the fact that the policies and actions of the "opposing side" are seen to be directed at socio-political characteristics and

values common to the NATO allies. This view is reinforced when one examines the results in Table 21, which shows to what extent the background, i.e., East-West relations, appears in the articles.

TABLE 21

East-West Relations as Situational Background

Question: Are East-West relations explicitly discussed as the background for the article?

<u>Background</u>	<u>Frequencies</u>	
	<u>absolute</u>	<u>relative (%)</u>
Overall East-West Relations	771	63.1
US-Soviet Relations	259	21.2
WP-US Relations	5	0.4
Relations between individual WP (including USSR) states and individual other states.	<u>187</u>	<u>15.3</u>
Totals	1222	100.0

It would be out of place to make a final assessment and draw conclusions because more information must be derived from the data. In particular, an explicit analysis of the interrelationships between variables is needed. Nonetheless, we have arrived at a general finding.

The preliminary hypotheses were at least not contradicted. The contents of security-policy texts are indeed primarily military or military political in content.

One can't go beyond the above remarks to draw further conclusions. In particular, one can't say whether or not the present military constellations are responsible for stability or (increasing) instability; or do they promise security or increasing insecurity? This can only be determined by further research.

FOOTNOTES

¹C. Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen (Written in 1932 with a foreword and three corollaries) Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt 1963, 26-37, 45, 51, 67.

²On August 6 and August 9, 1945 the first and thus far only military use of atomic bombs took place at Hiroshima and Nagasaki respectively. Yields were circa 20 KT and the high altitude detonations largely destroyed the cities by means of shockwave, firestorm and radioactivity. The effects are still felt today.

³This is not the place to go into the Middle East conflict. Particularly the last Egyptian-Israeli War provides enough evidence to indicate that the two Great Powers played "guiding" roles in the war and, at least in the end, had a de-escalating effect. On the one hand they shipped arms and thus permitted the war to continue; on the other they stopped the advance and finally caused a pull-back beyond the canal.

⁴Most recently H.-U. KOHR, H.G. RÄDER, M. SCHÜNBORN, G. WACHTLER and R. ZOLL, Perzeption von Sicherheitspolitik vor und nach sicherheitspolitisch bedeutsamen Ereignissen: Ergebnisse empirischer Analysen zur Stabilität und Veränderung. Munich: SOWI 1980 In addition R. ZOLL, Sozialer und politischer Wandel als gesellschaftliche Bedingung und Herausforderung für die Streitkräfte, in: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (Publisher) 24. Kommandeurtagung der Bundeswehr, Bonn: BMVg/Schriftenreihe Innere Führung, H.4/1980, 39-62.

⁵On the current NATO doctrine of Flexible Response see Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (Publisher) Weißbuch 1979 Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr. Bonn: BMVg 1979, 121-130; as a complement and comprehensive overview see K.P. STRATMANN, NATO-Strategie in der Krise? Militärische Optionen von NATO und Warschauer Pakt in Mitteleuropa. Baden Baden: Nomos 1981; for particular criticism of the dilemma of linking deterrence strategy and war-fighting doctrine see, most recently, H. RATTINGER, "Strategie-Interpretationen und Rüstungskontrollkonzepte. Anmerkungen zum NATO-Doppelbeschluss", in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 28/81 7.13 1981, 21-37, pp. 23-27.

⁶J. KUHLMANN, T. RÜSSLER and R. ZOLL, "The Bundeswehr in Transition to the Next Decade," in: G. HARRIES-JENKINS (ed.), Armed Forces in Industrialized Societies: Choices for the 1980's. London: MacMillan 1982; here on social legitimization of the armed forces, Tab. 8.

⁷op. cit., (Fn.6) Tab. 5.

⁸op. cit., (Fn.6) Tab. 7.

⁹On the explanatory power of representative random samples see E. SCHEUCH, "Entwicklungsrichtungen bei der Analyse sozialwissenschaftlicher Daten," in: R. KÖNIG (Publisher), Handbuch der empirischen Sozialforschung, Vol.1. Stuttgart: Enke (3-Printing) 1973, 161-237.

¹⁰op. cit., (Fn. 6). Here Defense efforts as reflected in defense expenditures Tab. 1. (Excerpt)

¹¹op. cit., (Fn. 10) Tab. 3.

¹²Op. Cit., (Fn. 6) Tab. 10

¹³For the different forms and meanings of the term "organization" see P.M. BLAU and W.R. SCOTT, Formal Organization: A Comparative Approach N.Y. : Basic Books 1962. "Social organization" is here considered to be the natural form of human interactions while "Formal organizations" are the consciously created forms of (collective) human existence. These definitions will be employed. Complex (formal) organizations are therefore consciously constructed forms of human existence distinguished by their variety of structure, elements and relationships. For example, the state as an organization of social interests..

¹⁴J.D. SINGER, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations", in: K. KNORR (ed.), The International System. Princeton N.J. : Princeton University Press 1961, 77-92. For a differentiated view and precision in distinguishing levels compare, K. FAUPEL, Zur wissenschaftstheoretischen Grundlegung struktureller Aggregatanalysen in der quantitativen Forschung zu internationalen Systemen. Freiburg/B.: Unpublished paper 1971. In particular, on the theoretical dispute and partial reformulation 24-108, with extensive references.

¹⁵On the term "security" in research. F. X. KAUFMANN, Sicherheit als soziologisches und sozialpolitisches Problem. Stuttgart: Erke (2. Edition) 1973

¹⁶Compare with further references K. FAUPEL, "Internationale Politik und Außenpolitik: Außenpolitische Forschung als Erklärung systematischer Regelmäßigkeiten aus subnationalen Prozessen", in: E.-O. CZEMPIEL (publisher) Die Anachronistische Souveränität: Zum Verhältnis von Innen- und Außenpolitik. Köln / Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag 1969 (PVS-Sonderheft 1/69) 11-79; pp. 63, Ann. 145. In the content of the given problems, bringing the term into the field of security policy is simply an extension of the conceptualization.

¹⁷This time period came about as the first discussions for this project took place in 1976.

¹⁸See the project "Bundeswehr and Öffentliche Meinung" from S.O.W.I. as well as published fragments of the project. See R. Zoll, Op. Cit. (Fn.4) and Kohr et al., Op. Cit. (Fn.4)

¹⁹For example "Sicherheitspolitische Elite" studies by D. SCHOESSLER and E. WEEDE, University of MANNHEIM

²⁰On random sampling procedures and their limitations see E. SCHEUCH, "Auswahlverfahren in der Sozialforschung", in: R. KÖNIG, Handbuch der empirischen Sozialforschung, 3a. Stuttgart: Erke (3.) 1974, 1-96

²¹Otherwise an answer to the second of the preliminary hypotheses would be out of the question. In addition it would hardly have been possible to register and evaluate all inputs. Or it would only have been possible with a total overrepresentation of the massmedia which would have made a qualitative assessment virtually impossible.

²²S.P.S.S. = Statistical Package for the Social Sciences

²³In so far as members of parliament take a position on the subject they will be coded as "politician". This group certainly includes members of other professions including union representatives.

²⁴Missing data (37) reduced the number of articles to a total of 1628. As these articles constitute only 2.2% of the total they result in no serious reduction of explanatory power. Subsequent errors stemming from coding and data manipulation will also affect the sample population. (Original text garbled.)

²⁵This attempted explanation is supported by official statements of the Süd-deutsche Zeitung. See H. Heigert, editor-in-chief, in his obituary for C. Potyka and his understanding of a critical press in the areas of security policy and the armed forces. Appeared in SZ 7.24.1981.

APPENDIX D:

REPORT OF THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE FOR
SOCIAL RESEARCH (SOWI): MATHIAS SCHÖNBORN, "PERCEPTIONS
OF NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE U.S. AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY: STABILITY AND CHANGE IN PUBLIC OPINION".

PERCEPTIONS ON NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE U.S. AND THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY:

STABILITY AND CHANGE IN PUBLIC OPINION

(draft version)*

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* For a final version see Mathias Schönborn, "Public Opinion and Security Policy - Stability and Change in Public Perceptions in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States", SOWI, Heft 26, Munich 1981, pp. 96-183.

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+ The paper is mainly based on a report of a research team of the German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research, consisting of H.-U. KOHR, G. RÄDER, M. SCHÖNBORN, G. WACHTLER and R. ZOLL; the responsibility for this presentation is the presenter's.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Security policy and public opinion

Security would hardly become a topic of any discussion neither in a private context nor on the public political level or any other, if it were not jeopardized, if it were not connected with a perception of insecurity. Thus, using the term security inevitably bears the connotation of insecurity. Both are part of a continuum which is subject to the subjectivity of individual perception. The term security is frequently used in very different meanings.¹ On the level of the individual security is used for job security, health security, social security etc. On the state-level we find economic security, internal security, external and military security etc. For the purpose of this paper security is mainly used in the overlapping sense of national, i.e. external and military security.

In the Federal Republic of Germany security policy has for about a decade been circumscribed with a simple formula: defence + détente = security.² In our polls aspects of both of these fields of security policy have been taken into consideration. Though more recently, however, security policy is sometimes used in a very comprehensive interpretation including all political activities directed at achieving social, economic, political, and military security³, it will here be used, not the least for pragmatic reasons, in its narrower sense.

By talking about stability and change of public opinion⁴ we use the term public opinion basically in a twofold sense: First, public opinion in a democratic political system has its part in the system of checks and balances in controlling the administration.⁵ As a consequence of this role of public opinion governments either seek to be agreeing with it or to square it to its needs.⁶ Public relations departments or agencies are expected to fulfil the latter task. The agreement with the opinion of the public is considered by governments as legitimizing its own policy. Secondly public opinion is studied here as a result of political action, as the

knowledge the public has acquired on a particular subject, in this context of aspects of the situation of a country with regard to national security or of the public's esteem of the armed forces respectively.

In contrast to attitudes⁷ - which are characterized by a threefold composition of cognitive, affective and behavioural components, some stability and consistency - opinions are a form of comment on a factual situation with hardly any behavioural consequences, they are subject to easy alteration depending upon new information about the state of affairs. Opinions on national security are furthermore determined by their transcending the direct experience of every-day-life. They can only be developed with the help of intermediaries, mainly the media.

We will come back to these introductory remarks in our last part and discuss the individual perceptions of threat and insecurity in a wider sense, transcending the narrower meaning and look at the characteristics of the kind of opinions we investigate in this paper.

2. Aspects of the topic treated in and data-basis of this paper

In this paper four different aspects of the broader topic of "Public Opinion about the Military and Defence" will be discussed.

In the first part some results of three public opinion polls carried out in the Federal Republic of Germany in December 1977/January 1978 (representative sample, N = 1913), October/November 1979 (representative sample, N = 1865) and in February/March 1980 (random sample, N = 559) will be presented. It will be examined whether any shifts of public opinion concerning aspects of national security and views held on the Federal Armed Forces can be observed.

In part two the paper compares the results of two public opinion polls on the same aspects of national security carried out in autumn 1979 both in the United States (N = 2741) and the Federal Republic (N = 1865). As we have had only one poll in the United States, only a comparison of a static situation

can be made, without showing the respective trends in the change of opinions.

The third part concentrates on stability and change of individual opinion on aspects of national security in times of important international events. During the interval between the second and third wave of our polls the American hostages were taken in Teheran, Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan and NATO decided at Brussels upon the combined intention of conducting arms control talks on Theatre Nuclear Weapons (TNW) and the future deployment (starting 1983) of the TNW which from a European point of view are called Eurostrategic weapons. As data basis on individual opinion a panel (October/November 1979 - February/March 1980) was organized in the Federal Republic of Germany (N = 332). The panel has not been pre-planned in form of a successional experiment. It was only after the occurrence of the above mentioned events, which were considered relevant for the perception of national security, that the decision was made to organize a panel by requestioning in February/March 1980 a random sample drawn out of the representative sample interviewed in October/November 1979.

In the last part the paper takes into consideration aspects of personal threat-perceptions beyond the field of national security and the quality and stability of personal opinion.

3. Groups of opinions and their respective batteries of questions

The investigation of the opinions on aspects of national security in the Federal Republic of Germany or the United States respectively are structured into four groups of opinions with the following batteries of questions:

- a) perception of military threat with the following indicators:
 - perceived threat of war in Europe
 - perceived degree of military threat to the Federal Republic of Germany.
 - perception of the military balance between NATO and WTO
 - expectations about the development of the East-West relations

- b) perceptions of the capability for defence against attack with the indicators:
- perceived reliability of NATO in case of an armed conflict
 - perceived reliability of the USA in case of an armed conflict
 - expectations about the development of the Atlantic relations
 - perceived capability of the Federal Armed Forces and Allied/NATO forces to defend against a military attack
- c) indicated willingness of the public for military defence:
- indicated acceptance of a military defence of the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany in general
 - indicated acceptance of a military defence of the Federal Republic of Germany even if own territory becomes the theatre of war
 - indicated acceptance of a military defence of the Federal Republic of Germany even if nuclear weapons have to be used for this purpose on the own soil
- d) esteem of Federal Armed Forces and priority given for the political task to guarantee national security:
- perceived importance of the Armed Forces
 - priority indicated for a set of political tasks
 - indicated general readiness to pay a special tax for the maintenance of the fighting power of the Armed Forces
 - indicated readiness to accept cuts in the budgets of other political tasks in favour of the Armed Forces.

II. THE COURSE OF PUBLIC OPINION ON ASPECTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE FRG, 1977 - 1980

The following observations are based on the data of the aggregate level. Therefore only the change of the opinion-climate will be described, the rate of change of individual opinion will be examined later on.

1. Perceptions of the military threat

Asked whether they see a rather great or a rather limited threat of war in Europe between the Warsaw Pact and NATO

well over 70% in all three polls indicated to perceive a rather limited threat of war, though, however, the number has been slightly decreasing over time (see table 2). There has been a small change in the percentage of those answering that the threat of war in Europe is rather great. From the end of 1977 to autumn 1979 their proportion decreased from 11.1% to 8.5% and then went up to 14.0% in the spring of 1980.

The question whether the FRG is today militarily threatened by the East has been asked only in the last two opinion surveys; it then was answered in a similar way, though the ways to answer provided for in the questionnaire had the additional choice of indicating to perceive no threat at all, beside the two categories saying there exists a military threat and that it is either rather great or rather small. As in the above mentioned question the percentage of those perceiving a rather great military threats increased from 10.0 to 14.3, the other categories indicating a rather limited or no threat underwent - counted together - small changes only (76.0 vs. 74.4), though the number of those perceiving no threat decreased slightly from 35.1% to 32.7% (see table 1).

Within this bundle of questions on the perception of a military threat in the FRG the question on the estimation of the military balance between the East and the West, i.e. between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, is considered to be contextual insofar as it is directed at the military capabilities which are seen as background behind the perceived political and/or military threat.

Between our three polls there has been an increase of those who perceive both blocs to about equally strong, their percentage went up from 30.4% at the turn of the year 1977/78 to 36.3% in spring 1980. The group of those who supposed a military superiority of the Warsaw Pact increased clearly from 1977/78 to 1979 from 30.4% to 42.4%, but this increase was halved till the next poll in the spring of 1980 when this opinion counted for 38.6%. The increase of both these views did not have a matching equivalent in the loss of the perception that NATO is superior, which went down only slightly from 12.6% in 1977/78 over 10.8% in autumn 1979 to 10.4% in early 1980; the proportionate diminution is observed in the

percentage of those indicating "don't know" or giving no answer (see table 3).

A closer examination of the opinions held on several aspects of the military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact clearly supports the perception given concerning the military balance in general (see table 4). In five out of six aspects the Warsaw Pact was more often seen superior in autumn 1979 with a percentage between 32.0 and 60.4 versus a minority of some 19.1% down to 7.7% assuming NATO to be superior. The only aspect with a reverse relative majority situation concerns the quality of weapons where NATO is seen superior by 43.7% versus 12.0% in favour of a Warsaw Pact superiority in this respect. In the interval between autumn 1979 and spring 1980 a slight tendency can be observed in favour of the perceived superiority of the Warsaw Pact in four out of five aspects in which it had clearly be seen superior to NATO already in autumn 1979. The expectation is that the number of those seeing the East superior in respect to the number of weapons decreased but still remained on the high level of 52.1%. In the only field in which NATO has been seen relatively superior to the Warsaw Pact an increase of the proportion of those supporting this view became apparent. With respect to the generally large number seeing both blocs to be equally strong (19.6% up to 48.6% in 1979) a slight downward trend can be seen in five out of six aspects.

The most significant alterations of perceptions came forward among the views held on the future development of East-West relations (see table 5). In our first opinion-poll in 1977/78 the groups of those expecting either a tendency to the better or the worse respectively were about equally strong, with a majority of 52.8% expecting the relationship to remain unchanged. In our second opinion survey the proportion of those expecting the relationship to become better clearly went up while both other groups expecting either no change in the relationship or a change to the worse decreased equally. In the spring of 1980 in our third poll an even stronger, but reverse reaction did appear. Therefore the overall balance, i.e. the sum of changes of perceptions concerning the development of East-West-relations resulted in a clear increase of the negative expectations.

A synoptic view of changed perceptions in this group of questions bundled together in order to achieve a balanced estimation of the general trend in the perceptions of the military threat held in the FRG presents a twofold result: all perceptions concerning the military aspects of national security, i.e. the threat of war, military threats, and the military balance underwent only minor changes, which were fairly consistent in their slight tendency toward the disadvantage of the West. Significant alterations to the worse occurred only among the expectations about the political development of the East-West-relations.

2. Perceptions of the capability for defence against an armed attack

The capability for the military defence of the Federal Republic of Germany can only be estimated in the wider context of NATO, the military alliance of which both the United States and the Federal Republic are members together with others.

The data upon the estimation of the degree to which the FRG can depend upon NATO or the United States in case of an armed conflict (see table 6 and 7) and those upon the defence capability (see table 8) cannot be interpreted without taking additional precautions, as far as the 1977/78 data are concerned. In the first poll in the FRG the possibility to answer "don't know" has not been provided in the questionnaire. In order to avoid irregular interpretations we will do without the data of the first survey.

A great majority of 59.1% or 57.5% respectively bears the opinion that NATO will be a reliable alliance for the federal Republic of Germany in case of an armed conflict (see table 6). This majority decreased only marginally between autumn 1979 and spring 1980. The proportion of those being sceptical about the dependability of NATO remained unaltered at about 30.0% while the number of those avoiding a clear answer by either indicating "don't know" or by refusing to answer increased slightly. Almost the same distribution of opinions occurred when the question was directed at the reliability of the United States, the most important military ally of the Federal Republic (see table 7). Again only a

marginal shifting of data between October/November 1979 and February/March 1980 can be observed, a very limited increase of those believing very much or totally in the dependability of the United States.

The next question was more clearly taking into consideration the aspects of the military capability for defence. The share of those who estimated that the Federal Armed Forces together with their allies could successfully provide defence against an attack of the East remained unaltered at about one third whereas those who did not believe in these capabilities remained at about 13.0%. Only the proportion of the sceptics increased from 34.1% in autumn 1979 to 40.1% in the spring of 1980, simultaneously the percentage of "don't know" dropped from 13.7% to 13.8% (see table 8).

In analogy to the results of the preceding section the opinions with regard to the rather military aspects of the defence capabilities remained almost unaltered. A more clearly, though still not very strong shift occurred in the estimation of the future development of the Atlantic relationship. In this case the percentage of the minority view expecting the relations to become worse increased from 6.8% in October/November 1979 to 11.8% in February/March 1980 (see table 9).

3. Indicated willingness of the public for military defence of the own territory under specified conditions

All three polls included three questions concerning the willingness of the public for the military defence of the Federal Republic of Germany under different circumstances. These three questions, taken on average, scored the highest percentage of "don't know" and of refusals to answer (see table 15).

The most general question enquired about the willingness to militarily defend the Federal Republic against an armed attack. The proportion of those supporting the military defence remained almost unchanged between the turn of the year 1977/78 and the autumn of 1979 with about 57%, but then went up to about 64% in spring 1980, while the percentage of those being opposed to military defence in general

decreased slightly from 21.8 in 1977/78 to 19.3 in February/March 1980. The number of those being unable to decide themselves between support and opposition of military defence oscillated from 20.6% to 23.5% and down to 16.5% respectively.

For the second question directed at the willingness to support the military defence of the FRG in case of a military attack, even if the war is primarily conducted on the own territory, the already mentioned caveat about the comparability of the three polls applied again, because in the first poll again the possibility to indicate "don't know" had been omitted (see table 15, part II). Again from autumn 1979 to spring 1980 the percentage of the undecided fell from 21.5 to 16.5. Both proportions of the supporters and the opposers of military defence gained equally, but not much. But the level of support of a military defence under the mentioned circumstances was lower than in the first question, getting 49.6% in autumn 1979 and 52.6% half a year later, while the level of opposition remained almost unchanged at 29.8% and 30.9% respectively.

The third question with regard to the willingness to defend reminded those questioned that in case of war NATO also has nuclear weapons at its disposal and the question went on: "Are you for the defence of the FRG even if nuclear weapons have to be used on the soil of the FRG?" (see table 15, part III). The result concerning the proportion of those taking neither side was similar as in the case of the two related questions mentioned above, it dropped from 20.5% in 1977/78 and 20.0% in autumn 1979 to 13.8% in February/March 1980. But for those supporting or opposing military defence in case nuclear weapons were used on the own territory an almost reverse outcome can be observed. Those still supporting a military defence under these circumstances gained a share of 19.0% in 1977/78, 14.5% in 1979 and 15.2% in spring 1980, while the percentage opposing any military defence in a situation as such went up from 60.5% to 71.0%.

These results are clearly unequivocal in their proportional inversion. Apart from the very high proportion avoiding a decisive pro or con-answer - at least in the context of those

polls - it were only these three questions which attracted about every fifth person either to mark the position "don't know" or to get out of the field by avoiding to mark any of the prepared answers. The clear majorities which came forward in the different circumstances show that people clearly take sides and very clearly so against the use of nuclear weapons.

4. Esteem of the Federal Armed Forces and priority for the political task of maintaining national security

This battery of opinions contains a direct question on the opinion about the importance of the Armed Forces. The question about the readiness to pay a special tax for the maintenance of the fighting power of the Armed Forces is showing in an indirect way the esteem of the Armed Forces.

The Armed Forces in all three polls have been held in high esteem, there have been 73.6% in 1977/78, 69.8% in autumn 1979 and 78.5% in spring 1980 considering either the Armed Forces to be important or very important (see table 10).⁺ Over the years there has been a small minority position of some 6.1% to 8.4% believing the Armed Forces to be unimportant or very unimportant, and a group indicating "neither/nor" with 18.0% to 10.9%.

The esteem of the Armed Forces was indirectly studied as indicated. The particular question started by saying that the industrial societies will be confronted with economic and social problems for which to solve there are only limited financial resources available, and then asked: "Assuming that the defence capabilities of the Federal Armed Forces could only be maintained by increased financial contributions, would you, personally, be ready to pay special or increased taxes for the maintenance of the fighting power of the Federal Armed Forces?" The results show that the noncommittal general support of the Armed Forces has been much higher than the indirect support indicated by being prepared to

⁺ Here again applies the already twice mentioned special caveat about the comparability of the 1977/78 data with the rest because of the lacking provision of the answering position 'don't know'.

bear a personal material burden (see table 13). This question has only been asked in the last two of our polls and in both occasions has not been answered very differently. There have been 9.9% in October/November 1979, and slightly increased, 14.3% in February/March 1980 willing to pay a special tax ' in any case '. Those being willing to pay a special tax, but only to a limited extent, achieved an almost equal proportion in both polls with 30.7% and 32.2%. Taken together those who are more or less ready to pay a special tax achieved some 40.6% or 46.5% respectively. The share of those opposing such a tax has been almost equally strong with 39.7% or 38.1% respectively. Again a fairly large proportion marked "don't know" (19.4% versus 15.4%).

This willingness to support the Armed Forces was further examined in a different way. This time the assumption was made that the necessary financial resources for the maintenance of the fighting power of the Armed Forces would not be achieved through personal material sacrifices but through a changed resource-allocation at the cost of other political tasks. In the October/November-1979-poll there have been clear majorities against any cuts in five out of six political tasks, ranging from 57.4% up to 76.1% (see table 12). Those favouring smaller cuts ranged from 19.5% to 32.8% and, in average, an even lower percentage would accept greater cuts in other budgets. These opinions changed considerably during the winter of 1979/80 when the international events took place of which some influence was expected on the perceptions of national security. The willingness to see some smaller or greater cuts of the budgets of six other public functions went up by an average of some 12%.

These shifts in public opinion changed the majorities at the expense of two more public activities; thus there remained three political tasks with reduced majorities opposing any cuts: the percentage of those denying cuts in the field of health and social security decreased from 76.1% in autumn 1979 to 63.0% in spring 1980. The respective figures for securing the energy supply were 70.5% versus 63.7%, for anti-inflation and job-security programs 68.8% versus 58.9%. The change of majorities occurred at the expense of the educational system with a decrease from 58.3% to 43.8% and a shift from 57.4% to 39.4% against cuts in environmental activities. The least opposition stood up against cuts in

foreign aid expenditures, mere 25.2% against any cuts were scored in late 1979 and only 13.4% in February/March 1980.

On the basis of these data it is, of course, impossible to claim any causality between political and security relevant events and the shift of opinion in the direction of favouring greater financial resource allocation for the maintenance of the fighting power of the Federal Armed Forces, but some coincidence still may be stated.

This last mentioned way of questioning, however, did only allow to make observations on how vital other public functions were meant to be in case of the need to achieve the necessary financial means for defence through reductions in other spendings. A somewhat different question was directed at exploring the opinions on the priorities for six important political tasks, this time including equally among others the task to guarantee the external security of the nation (see table 11). Public opinion on the rankorder of these tasks was subject to alteration too. The most significant upward shift was observed in the mean score for external security with the result that it went up from rank five in October/November 1979 to rank three in February/March 1980. Though the relative importance attributed in public opinion to the task of guaranteeing the external security of the nation had considerably gone up, there still were two other political tasks in both polls clearly seen more important: to overcome unemployment and the solution of the energy problems coming in on the rank one and two in 1979 and in a reverse entry in the spring 1980 poll.

This last presented result puts the other results of this section in perspective. Though over time the Federal Armed Forces in public opinion had gained in importance, and though even a relative majority indicated a readiness for personal financial sacrifices in favour of the Federal Armed Forces, and though furthermore the willingness of the public to accept reductions in the spendings of other important political tasks in order to maintain the fighting power of the Federal Armed Forces increased, there were still two other political tasks which to pursue under the given conditions was clearly seen as more important.

5. Perspectives of German public opinion on national security

Very generally speaking the data on the course of public opinion on aspects of national security in the Federal Republic of Germany did more often show an only slight, though occasionally clear tendency toward a more negative perception. As it had been our hypothesis underlying the spring 1980 poll and the organization of a panel that the important events of winter 1979/80 would probably influence public opinion in this observed direction, we had added a new question in February 1980: "Has your perception of the state of national security been subject to alteration since November 1979? (see table 16). A majority of 54.9% answered with marking "no, perception has not changed". A small proportion of 5.4% indicated that its perception had been improved, but there were almost 40% saying that their opinions on the national security situation had become worse. Those who explicitly had said this, were furthermore asked about the degree of the worsening of their perceptions. There were about 40% indicating that their opinions have strongly or very strongly changed to the worse. Only 23.9% said that their perceptions had been subject to only minor or very minor changes.

It was a further interest to know what reasons would be given for the worsening of the perceptions. Again only those were asked who had explicitly indicated a worsening of their opinions. The result brought forward four main problem areas which scored a markedly higher percentage than all others which remained under 6%. Most often mentioned was Afghanistan (52.8%), followed markedly less frequently by Iran (24.8%), the Soviet Union in other contexts than Afghanistan (17.6%), and oil-and energy-problems (16.7%).

Thus actually two of the three events which had been considered as relevant for the perceptions of national security were actually mentioned as reasons. The dual decision taken in Brussels in December 1979 to modernize the Theatre Nuclear Forces (TNF), with particular emphasis on Long Range TNF (LRTNF, i.e. Pershing 2 and ground launchable cruise missiles, GLCMs) on the one side and the decision to have arms control

negotiations on LRWF on the other side, has not been mentioned in this context. This decision together with the question about the deployment of the 'Neutronbomb' (ERW - Enhanced Radiation Weapon) had triggered off a massive coverage of new weapons technology and their use in the media, which might - if some speculation is allowed here - have influenced the German public to increasingly see NATO superior with regard to the quality of weapons and to view the Warsaw Pact to be slightly less superior with regard to the quantity of weapons.

In summarizing part two of this paper it can be stated that a significant proportion of the German public explicitly stated a worsening of its perceptions of the state of national security. The reasons given for this, though, did not markedly trigger off a significantly high increase in perceptions of an immediate military threat. It did, however, clearly have consequences, especially in the political field, i.e. in the public's expectations about the future development of East-West relations and of the Atlantic relationship.

III. A COMPARISON OF PERCEPTIONS ON NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY IN AUTUMN 1979

The data-basis for this 'comparison' was established by simultaneously conducting two opinion polls with almost identical questionnaires both in the United States (October 1979) and the Federal Republic of Germany (October/November 1979). Though many of the questions were identical in both questionnaires, we do not believe that they are comparable in a stricter sense like the results of two polls from within one country. The diversity of the political cultures of the two respective countries is considered to be too significant. If, nevertheless, an attempt is made to look at the data from two polls, which were conducted at about the same time, it is done with the mere purpose to describe the differences. It is, thus, not expected that any occurring differences are attributable to different ways of looking at the events of

the real world. It may, however, be worth an effort to examine whether the public opinion of the Western countries belonging to the same military alliance, present themselves actually differently. As only one public opinion survey was carried out in the context of our project, it is impossible to show the course of American public opinion. Only if we had elaborated the changes in perceptions, it actually might have been possible to properly compare the respective changes of public opinion in both countries resulting from the stimuli of the international security environment, even if the opinions were expressed with different intensities.

1. Perceptions of the military threat

The data from the United States and the Federal Republic with regard to the perception of a military threat from the Soviet Union differ considerably. Public opinion in the United States believes the threat of war in Europe to a higher extent to be serious, with 16.6% indicating to perceive the threat of war to be rather great versus 3.5% of opinions in the FRG (see table 2).

Being asked more generally about a threat posed by the Soviet Union (the East) to the West 48.4% of the American public had the opinion that the threat is serious and further 34.0% that the Soviet Union posed a not so serious threat. Only 7.1% did not perceive such a threat (see table 1). Though the wording of this question is not strictly comparable, since the German version was slightly more specifically directed at the perception of a military threat from the East to the FRG, it still may be stated that more than a third of those asked in the FRG did not see the FRG militarily threatened by the East.

With respect to the expectations about the future development of East-West relations a similar reaction in the US can be observed. Though the proportions of those believing that the relations might become better or much better had in both countries some lead in comparison to those seeing the relations changing for the worse or greatly for the worse (U.S.: 27% versus 21.7% and FRG: 29.2% versus 13.5%), the percentage expecting a worsening relationship

was higher in the United States.

Thus we can state that public opinion in the United States tended to see the political dimension of the East-West relations and the dimensions of a general and more specific military threat posed by the East to the West in a more negative way than the public of the FRG.

Turning to the perception of the military balance a different observation can be made (see table 3). About a third of those interviewed in both countries had the opinion that NATO and the Warsaw Pact were about equally strong, but there was with 24.3% a slightly broader proportion in the U.S. perceiving NATO to be superior in comparison to those 20.0% indicating a Warsaw Pact superiority. In the FRG in contrast, the Warsaw Pact was seen superior by 42.4% versus a minority of 10.8% perceiving NATO to be superior.

This answering behaviour is partly supported by the reactions of Americans questioned about specific aspects of the military balance (see table 4).⁺⁾ While public opinion in the FRG did see NATO superior only in the aspect of weapons' quality, the U.S. public came forward with a slight relative majority seeing the willingness of the U.S. population to commit sacrifices for the defence of the country in a more favourable way. With regard to the other four aspects the relative majorities perceiving the Warsaw Pact to be stronger were clearly smaller than the respective proportions in the FRG. Though in the United States NATO in comparison to the Warsaw Pact was estimated clearly more favourable than in the Federal Republic, the threat perceptions nevertheless were manifested more strongly.

2. Perceptions of the capability for the defence against an armed attack

The capability for defence in case of an armed conflict between the East and the West, between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, must be seen in the

^{+) Here again the caveat with respect to the differing questionnaires has to be repeated; in the FRG the possibility to indicate "don't know" had not been provided.}

alliance context. It will, for the two countries to a different degree, depend upon the reliability of the alliance in general.

In both countries questions have been put with regard to the dependability of the alliance in general and with regard to the dependability of the most important ally or one of the most important allies respectively. While in the FRG about 60% come up indicating that the FRG could totally or very much rely upon NATO the respective response in the United States has with 27.5% been much less favourable (see table 6), a much greater proportion of Americans believing that the USA can only depend upon NATO to somewhat limited extent (48.0% in US versus 30.2% in the FRG) and 10.7% indicating that NATO might not at all be reliable (versus 3.6% in the FRG respectively).

The responses about the estimated dependability of one of the more or the most important ally respectively constituted similar results. In the public opinion of the FRG the U.S. were seen with about 56% as totally or very much dependable, while only 33.6% of the American public estimated the FRG to be a totally or very much dependable ally (see table 7).

On the other side the proportion of Americans believing that their own country would be a reliable partner to the allied European countries was with some 66% significantly higher.

Despite a greater share of the American public estimating NATO or the FRG as less dependable than themselves there was a tendentially greater proportion in America being more optimistic about the future development of the Atlantic relationship (see table 9).

In analogy to the first section of this part, where it was shown that the public opinion in the United States tended to see the threat posed by the Soviet Union relatively more severely and simultaneously estimating the military balance relatively more favourable to the West than the German public, we have in this section observed that again the views held in the United States with regard to the political-military environment have been less

favourable. And again, the military side of the defence capability was estimated more optimistically. While there were 33.1% in the FRG indicating their belief that the Federal Armed Forces together with their allies will be able to defend the FRG against an armed attack from the East there were 49.2% in the United States believing that the US-Forces together with their allies could fulfil this task (see table 8).

3. Indicated willingness of the public for military defence

In this section only one aspect of the three aspects treated in the corresponding section of the previous part can be described. There has been only one question in the US-questionnaire with regard to the willingness of the United States to help in cooperation with its West-European allies to defend Europe against a military attack from the East. This enquired about the willingness for defence even under the circumstance that the Soviet Union might react with a nuclear strike against U.S. territory. Almost a quarter (24.1%) of those questioned indicated that the United States should help its allies regardless of the circumstances and further 50.9% answered by marking: "Yes, the U.S. should help as long as we could reckon with the survival of the U.S." (see table 14). There was a minority of only 13.4% taking the position that the United States should not help under such circumstances.

The reaction of the German public opinion to the corresponding question has to be recalled in order to state the vast difference. A majority of 65.5% of the German public denied their willingness when asked, whether they supported a military defence of the Federal Republic, even if nuclear weapons would have to be used for this purpose on the soil of the FRG. +)

+) A topical remark may be allowed: These very different estimations of a nuclear defence in an actual war constitute the background to the present discussion about the modernizing of LRNF in Europe.

4. Esteem of the US-Armed Forces and the priority for the political task of maintaining national security

It might already be expected from the above described differences in opinion in the United States and the Federal Republic that the American public opinion attributes a considerably higher importance to the US-Armed Forces than the German opinion to the Federal Armed Forces (see table 10), though the esteem of the German Armed Forces has been fairly high already. And again, a greater proportion of the American public indicated a readiness for personal financial sacrifices to maintain the fighting power of their Armed Forces. 21.7% of the American public versus 9.9% of the German were willing to pay special or increased taxes and further 44 % in America indicated a willingness to contribute financially to a limited extent, versus 30.7% in the FRG (see table 13).

If the financial resources for the Armed Forces had to be secured by cuts in the budgets of other important political tasks, again a higher average supporting these cuts was found in the United States (see table 12).

The same basic orientation comes up in the comparison of the priorities given to six different political tasks. While the task to guarantee the external security of the nation in autumn 1979 had only got rank five in the FRG, it had achieved rank three in the United States (see table 11).

Though national security half a year later ranged on rank three too in the FRG, it still did get a lower mean score.

In summarizing this part it can be stated, that the public opinion in the United States tends to express its concern about the threat from the Soviet Union or the East in a more negative way. On the other side the confidence shown with respect to NATO's defence capability is comparatively higher as it is in the own dependability as a partner of the military alliance.

These results, in my view, as mentioned earlier, cannot strictly be compared and of course cannot, therefore, clearly be attributed to events of the inter-

national environment. They have to be seen in the light of respective historical experiences and against the background of the different political cultures, and, of course, against the different positions the two nations occupy in the international system. To try to cope with these demands is far beyond the scope of this paper.

IV. STABILITY AND CHANGE IN INDIVIDUAL OPINIONS ON NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

When the decision was made in spring 1980 to organize a panel with the aim of investigating the change of individual opinions on aspects of national security in the Federal Republic of Germany, this decision was taken because it was assumed that the massive reporting about the security relevant international events had activated opinions in this field. This assumption has mainly had a twofold basis: first, as mentioned in the introductory remarks, opinions are subject to easy alteration through new information. As particularly the events in Iran and Afghanistan had triggered off a high level of reporting in the media on the topical area of security related matters, individual opinions were permanently exposed to new information. Secondly it had been assumed that in a country where, according to the unanimous grieve of many observers, a public debate on security policy has been missing until fairly recently, and where only rudimentary elements of a politico-scientific strategic community had been developing,⁸ this massive new information would with particular intensity stimulate the development of opinions where hardly any had existed before, or that opinions, where they already existed, would be widely subject to changes.

This hypothesis about the high frequency of changes in opinions could not be confirmed by examining the data on the aggregate level only. Though, as has been shown in the second part above, the changes in the percentages of groups supporting one or another view, mostly were just slight or tendential in character.

The degree of actual change of individual opinions is superficially shown in table 18. If all changes of opinions are taken into consideration, the stability of individual opinions in the interval of about five months between our Oct./Nov. 79 and

our Feb./March 80 polls had ranged between about one and two thirds of those questioned. In what ways the changes of individual opinions occurred can be seen in tables 19 to 23 .

As has been described earlier, the percentage of those believing that a threat of war in Europe is rather great increased from 7.2% in Oct./Nov. 79 to 13.6% in Feb./March 80.⁺ In absolute frequencies the increase on the aggregate level would have been shown in a way as if there were 21 more people in spring 1980 believing the threat of war to be rather great, bringing the scored 24 from the autumn 79 poll up to some 45 in the spring of 1980 (see table 19). On the individual level, however, only 7 out of the 24 having taken this view in autumn maintained it. This means that 38 from those 45 perceiving a rather great threat of war in Europe in the spring of 1980 have held other opinions five months earlier.

Without going into describing further details it can be stated that in this case the aggregate data can reflect only marginally the actually occurring changes of individual opinions. As an examination of the other cross-tabulations shows (see tables 20 to 23), the described fairly high overall degree of changes of individual opinions is not a unique feature in our panel study.

In contrast to these observations from a panel, which was drawn as a random sample from a representative sample, stability of opinions on aspects of national security in an accidental panel set up among a German security -policy oriented elite was much higher⁹. A great majority of the studied elite considered itself to be concerned about national security related matters; some 56% professionally, another group of over 20% indicated to have this concern among other professional concerns, and some further 20% professed concern without having professional duties in this field. This elite-panel, interviewed with about one year's interval in 1976 and 1977 consisted of a number between 226 and 255, depending upon the frequency of omitting to answer some questions. In this panel survey "at least 64.8% held constant opinions, while this number went up to 91.5% for some items."¹⁰

+ The percentages drawn from the panel-data differ slightly from those of the representative survey due to the different sizes of the sample (cf. the brief description of the data-basis on p. 400 f above).

It thus can be stated that a supposedly well informed part of the public is much less likely to change opinions as easily as the generally less informed public as a whole.

V. CHARACTERISTICS OF OPINIONS ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND PERSONAL PERCEPTIONS OF DIFFERENT THREATS.

1. Characteristics of opinions on national security

Opinions, defined at the beginning of this paper as being subject to easy alteration depending upon new information about the topic of concern, are ephemeral phenomena. Due to this short lived character of opinions, which might tempt to consider them as too volatile to be worth scrutinizing, an attempt had been made to examine groups of opinions on related questions. An approach as such, it was hoped, might help to elaborate more than 'mere opinions'.

Up to this point the results presented characterized the perceptions studied as fairly subject to easy alteration and thus as representing 'mere opinions'. But it may, however, be recalled that it was considered to be beyond the character of opinions and defined trait of attitudes, to show some stability and consistency. With this in mind it seems to be worthwhile to reexamine whether the panel data could reasonably be interpreted as containing elements of stability of individual opinions. With this perspective it can be stated on the basis of the tables 19 to 22 that a high proportion (i.e. 71% to 84.1%) of those individuals supporting the majority view in autumn 1979 actually maintained their opinions in the spring of 1980. Whether the data shown in table 23, where the relative majority view was only maintained by 47.0%, might be debatable.

In the introduction it furthermore had been remarked that in the Federal Republic security policy had been presented over the years as consisting of two elements: the military aspects subsumed under the heading of defence or defence policy and secondly, the political side, being represented by détente or the policy of relaxation of tensions. With regard to these two respective aspects of security policy the changes of public opinion did show some consistency. The events in Afghanistan, Iran, and the other Soviet activities, which were mentioned as reasons for the worsening of the public's perception of the state of national security, on the one hand coincided with a significant turn to the worse of the estimation of the political

aspects of the international environment, but, however, they did not coincide on the other hand with equally strong changes to the worse in the perceptions of military threats - though the vendentially increased threat perceptions should not be denied.

The attempt to elaborate more than 'mere opinions' might thus, due to the observation of some stability of individual opinions and due to the consistency of the changes in public perceptions, be seen as partially successful.

2. Personal perceptions of threats

Perceptions of security or threats can be examined under a variety of perspectives, some of which have already been described. One other way has been to examine the degree to which terms, representing objects and situations, are estimated as being frightening. In this inquiry the terms were mentioned without putting them into the context of actual situations. Thereby an attempt was made to find out what objects or situations bear the highest threatening potential. The findings presented in table 25 show that the term 'war' had the most frightening effect on those questioned. As war is the utmost threat to national security a large section of the public is willing to personally contribute sacrifices for the maintenance of national security if needed. But if it comes to the estimation of what might constitute the most likely and most actual threat, the threat of war has not been viewed as being as acute as other threats (see table 24). As had been described already earlier, this finding is supported by the priorities attributed to six different political tasks. The maintenance of external security ranked high, but under the conditions of the time of our polls, other tasks, like solving the energy problem and overcoming unemployment and inflation, have been seen as more urgent at this stage.

In the opinion of the public, thus, nothing is seen as more threatening than war, but under the given circumstances at the times our polls were conducted, the actual likelihood of such a threat was not seen as very acute.

NOTES

- 1 F.-K. KAUFMANN: Sicherheit als soziologisches und sozial-psychologisches Problem, Stuttgart 1973²
- 2 cf. Günter WALPUSKI: Verteidigung + Entspannung = Sicherheit, Bonn 1973
- 3 cf. Gert KRILL: Die Entwicklung des Sicherheitsbegriffs, in: Beiträge zur Konfliktforschung 3/1980, pp. 33-57
cf. Ernst HUTZ: Lexikon zur Sicherheitspolitik, München 1980, see especially the terms 'Sicherheit', 'Sicherheitspolitik', pp. 235 ff
cf. Jakob SCHISSLER: Sicherheitspolitik - Verteidigungs- politik - Friedenspolitik. Ein Beitrag zum Problem von Politik und Sprache, in: Hessische Blätter für Volks- bildung 3/1979, pp. 237-242
cf. Klaus von SCHUBERT: Sicherheitspolitik, in: R. ZOLL, E. LIPPERT, T. RÜSSLER (Ed): Bundeswehr und Gesellschaft. Ein Wörterbuch, Opladen, 1977, pp. 267-280
- 4 Ralf ZOLL: Sicherheitspolitik und öffentliche Meinung in der Bundesrepublik - Erkenntnisse aus empirischen Studien, in: Ralf ZOLL (Ed): Wie integriert ist die Bundeswehr?, München 1979, pp. 166-182 gives a brief synopsis of the particular German contextual background of the term 'public opinion' ('öffentliche Meinung')
- 5 cf. Ralf Zoll: Militär und Gesellschaft in der Bundes- republik - Zum Problem der Legitimität von Streitkräften, in: Ralf ZOLL (Ed): Wie integriert ist die Bundeswehr?, München 1979, pp. 41-76
- 6 cf. Ernst-Otto ENGELHARDT: Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, in: R. ZOLL, E. LIPPERT, T. RÜSSLER (Ed): Bundeswehr und Gesell- schaft, Opladen 1977, pp. 235-238
- 7 Here I follow E. LIPPERT, K. PUZICHA: Die Bundeswehr als Objekt von Meinungen und Einstellungen, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Beilage zur Wochenzeitung 'Das Parla- ment', B 37/75, 13.9.1975, pp. 13-29
- 8 see for example: Wilfried von BRÜDOW: Militär und Politik- wissenschaft, in: liberal, vol. 18, No 1, 1976, pp. 855 ff. and

Wilfried von BREBOW: Seit der Gewöhnung. Bemerkungen über Sozialwissenschaftliche Literatur zum Thema 'Militär' in der Bundesrepublik, in: Ralf ZOLL (Ed): Wie integriert ist die Bundeswehr?, München, 1979, pp 234 - 247. and Christian POTYKA: Die vernachlässigte Öffentlichkeit, in: K.-D. SCHWARZ (Ed): Sicherheitspolitik, Bad Honnef-Erfel 1978³, pp. 539 f.

9 of Dietmar SCHÜSSLER, Erich WEDE: West German Elite Views on National Security and Foreign Policy Issues, Königstein, 1978. For the description of the 'accidental sample' of a German security policy oriented elite see pp. 9 - 16

10 For the description of stability and change of elite opinion see SCHÜSSLER / WEDE pp 69. - 71

Table 1
Table 1
Degree of military threat
Ausmaß militärischer Bedrohung*

Question: How serious a threat to the West do you think the Soviet Union (the East) is today - a serious threat, a threat which is not serious, or is there no such threat?	Frage: Was meinen Sie, wird die Bundesrepublik heutzutage militärisch vom Osten bedroht?	
	Population / Bevölkerung USA (in %) Oct. 79	Population FRG / Bevölkerung Bundesrepublik (in %) Oct./Nov. 79 Febr./March 80
Degree of military threat Ausmaß militärischer Bedrohung		
threat is serious große Bedrohung	48.4	10.0 14.3
not so serious geringe Bedrohung	34.0	40.9 41.7
no threat keine Bedrohung	7.1	35.1 32.7
don't know weiß nicht	10.6	13.5 11.3
no answer keine Antwort		0.5 —
N =	2741	1866 559

Source: German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research, Munich
Quelle: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, München

* Analogical, not identical, wording of questioning
• Analoge, nicht identische, Fragestellung

Table 2
Threat of war in Europe
Tabelle 2
Kriegsgefahr in Europa

Question:

Do you believe that the threat of war in Europe between the East and the West, that is between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, is rather great or rather limited?

Frage:

Halten Sie die Gefahr, daß es in Europa zu einem Krieg zwischen Ost und West, zwischen Warschauer Pakt und NATO kommen könnte, eher für groß oder eher für gering?

Threat of war Kriegsgefahr	Population / Bevölkerung USA (in %)	Population FRG / Bevölkerung Bundesrepublik (in %)		
	Oct. 79	Dec. 77/Jan. 78	Oct./Nov. 79	Febr./March 80
rather great eher groß	16.6	11.1	8.5	14.0
rather limited eher gering	63.4	74.2	73.2	71.9
don't know weiß nicht	20.0	14.7	18.1	14.0
no answer keine Antwort			0.2	0.2
N =	2741	1913	1866	559

Source: German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research, Munich
Quelle: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, München

Table 3
Tabelle 3
Perceptions of the military balance between Warsaw Pact - NATO
Einschätzung des Kräfteverhältnisses zwischen Warschauer Pakt - NATO

Question:

If you consider the military balance between the East and the West, that is, between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, which side is superior in your opinion - the NATO-countries, Warsaw Pact countries, or are both about equal?

Frage:

Wenn Sie an das militärische Kräfteverhältnis zwischen Ost und West, zwischen Warschauer Pakt und NATO denken, wer ist dann Ihrer Meinung nach überlegen?

Military balance Kräfteverhältnis	Population / Bevölkerung USA (in %)		Population FRG / Bevölkerung Bundesrepublik (in %)		
	Oct. 79	Dec. 77/Jan. 78	Oct./Nov. 79	Febr./March 80	
NATO is superior NATO ist überlegen	24.3	12.6	10.8	10.4	
WP is superior WP ist überlegen	20.0	34.4	42.4	38.6	
both are about equal beide sind gleich stark	34.5	30.4	31.1	36.3	
don't know weiß nicht	21.2	22.6	15.0	14.1	
no answer keine Antwort			0.8	0.5	
N =	2741	1913	1866	559	

Source: German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research, Munich
Quelle: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, München

Table 4
Tabelle 4
Specific aspects of the military balance between Warsaw Pact - NATO
Aspekte des Kräfteverhältnisses zwischen Warschauer Pakt - NATO

Question:

Will you please tell me whether you think the East or West is superior in the following categories?

Frage:

Wenn Sie einige der folgenden wichtigen Gesichtspunkte dieses Kräfteverhältnisses betrachten, was ist dann Ihre Meinung?

aspects of the military balance Aspekte des Kräfteverhältnisses	WP superior WP überlegen (in %)			both equal beide gleich (in %)			NATO superior NATO überlegen (in %)			no answer keine Antwort (in %)		D.K. N.A. (in %)
	FRG	FRG	USA	FRG	FRG	USA	FRG	FRG	USA	FRG	FRG	
	Oct./ Nov. 79	Febr./ March 80	Oct. 79	Oct./ Nov. 79	Febr./ March 80	Oct. 79	Oct./ Nov. 79	Febr./ March 80	Oct. 79	Oct./ Nov. 79	Febr./ March 80	
number of military personnel Zahl der Soldaten	60.4	64.9	45.9	29.4	26.3	12.2	7.7	7.0	15.4	2.5	1.8	26.6
quantity of weapons Zahl der Waffen	57.2	52.1	36.6	32.0	34.9	17.0	8.3	11.4	21.8	2.5	1.6	24.5
morale and combat readiness of soldiers Kampf- u. Einsatzbereitschaft der Soldaten	40.5	43.8	37.9	47.7	44.4	12.1	9.5	10.0	22.6	2.4	1.8	27.3
defense willingness of the population Opferbereitschaft der Bevölkerung	40.3	42.8	28.0	48.6	44.4	14.7	7.8	10.2	31.3	3.3	2.7	26.0
training of personnel Ausbildung der Soldaten	32.0	37.8	39.8	46.5	42.2	13.1	19.1	18.6	23.9	2.4	1.4	23.3
quality of weapons Qualität der Waffen	12.0	10.2	15.0	41.9	39.9	17.1	43.4	47.6	43.4	2.7	2.3	24.5
N =	1866	559	2741	1866	559	2741	1866	559	2741	1866	559	2741

Source: German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research, Munich
Quelle: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, München

Table 5
Tabelle 5
Expectations about the development of East-West relations
Erwartungen über die Entwicklung des Ost-West-Verhältnisses

Question:

In what way will the general relationship between the East and the West develop in the future? Will it change greatly for the worse, become worse, remain unchanged, become better or become much better?

Frage:

Wie wird sich das Ost-West-Verhältnis Ihrer Meinung nach in der Zukunft entwickeln?

Development of East - West Relations Entwicklung Ost - West	Population / Bevölkerung USA (in %)		Population FRG / Bevölkerung Bundesrepublik (in %)		
	Oct. 79	Dec. 77/Jan. 78	Oct./Nov. 79	Febr./March 80	
greatly for the worse sehr verschlechtern	1.9	1.8	0.7	1.8	1.8
worse verschlechtern	19.8	15.8	12.8	34.5	34.5
unchanged gleich bleiben	39.1	52.8	47.3	42.9	42.9
better verbessern	25.0	17.7	28.2	11.4	11.4
much better sehr verbessern	2.0	0.7	1.0	-	-
don't know weiß nicht	12.3	11.1	10.0	9.3	9.3
no answer keine Antwort			0.2	-	-
N =	2741	1913	1866	559	559

Source: German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research, Munich
Quelle: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, München

Table 6
Tabelle 6
Dependability of NATO*
Verlaß auf die NATO*

Question: The United States and Canada are allied with some West-European countries in a military alliance, called NATO or North Atlantic Treaty Organization for the purpose of a common defense. The Soviet Union and some East-European countries have a military alliance called the Warsaw Pact. In case of an armed conflict between the East and the West, to what extent - in your opinion - can we, the United States, rely upon NATO? Can we rely on NATO totally, very much, somewhat, or not at all?	Population / Bevölkerung USA (in %)		Population FRG / Bevölkerung Bundesrepublik (in %)	
	Oct. 79	Dec. 77/Jan. 78	Oct./Nov. 79	Febr./March 80
Dependability of NATO Verlaß auf NATO				
totally vollkommen	9.3	26.6	20.2	18.1
very much überwiegend	18.2	42.8	38.9	39.4
somewhat begrenzt	48.0	24.0	30.2	30.1
not at all überhaupt nicht	10.7	4.0	3.6	4.3
don't know weiß nicht	13.8		7.1	8.1
no answer keine Antwort		2.6	-	0.2
N =	2741	1913	1866	559

Frage:

Die Bundesrepublik ist mit den USA, Kanada und einigen westeuropäischen Staaten im Militärbündnis „NATO“ zur gemeinsamen Verteidigung zusammengeschlossen. Inwieweit können wir uns im Verteidigungsfall Ihrer Meinung nach auf die NATO verlassen?

Source: German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research, Munich
Quelle: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, München

- * Analogical, not identical, wording of questioning
- Analoge, nicht identische, Fragestellung

Table 7 Dependability of USA and FRG, respectively*
 Tabelle 7 Verlaß auf USA bzw. Bundesrepublik*

Question: The Federal Republic of Germany, that is, West Germany, is considered to be one of the most important allies of the United States. In case of an armed conflict between the East and the West, to what extent can we rely upon West Germany? Can we rely on West Germany totally, very much, somewhat, or not at all?	Frage: Die USA gelten als wichtigster militärischer Bündnispartner für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. In welchem Umfang können wir uns im Verteidigungsfall ihrer Meinung nach auf die USA verlassen?	Question: In case of a military attack against Western Europe, to what extent can our European allies rely upon the United States? Can they rely on us totally, very much, somewhat, or not at all?	Frage:		Frage:		Question: In case of a military attack against Western Europe, to what extent can our European allies rely upon the United States? Can they rely on us totally, very much, somewhat, or not at all?	
			Dependability of the FRG Verlaß auf Bundesrepublik		Dependability of the USA Verlaß auf USA			Dependability of the USA Verlaß auf USA
			Population / Bevölkerung USA (in %)		Population / Bevölkerung FRG / Bundesrepublik (in %)			Population / Bevölkerung USA (in %)
			Oct. 79	Oct. / Nov. 79	Febr./ März 80	Oct. 79		
totally vollkommen	12.8	23.7	20.3	20.6	34.1			
very much überwiegend	20.8	42.9	35.6	37.6	32.2			
somewhat begrenzt	40.7	26.7	32.2	31.8	21.4			
not at all überhaupt nicht	11.9	3.3	5.0	3.2	2.6			
don't know weiß nicht	13.8		6.9	6.6	9.8			
no answer keine Antwort		3.5	-	0.2				
N =	2741	1913	1866	559	2741			

Source: German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research, Munich
 Quelle: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, München

* Analogical, not identical, wording of questioning
 * Analog, nicht identische, Fragestellung

Table 8 Defense capability*
Tabelle 8 Verteidigungsfähigkeit*

Question: If there is a military attack on West Germany by the East/the Soviet Union, do you believe that the United States and her allies can defend themselves against such an attack, or are their defense capabilities questionable, or do you believe that defense against such an attack is impossible?	Population / Bevölkerung USA (in %)		Population FRG / Bevölkerung Bundesrepublik (in %)	
	Oct. 79	Dec. 77, Jan. 78	Oct. Nov. 79	Febr./March 80
can defend können abwehren	48.2	38.2	33.1	32.7
defense is questionable erscheint zweifelhaft	33.3	45.6	34.1	40.1
defense is not possible können nicht abwehren	6.0	11.6	13.8	13.4
don't know weiß nicht	12.5		18.7	13.8
no answer keine Antwort		4.6	0.3	—
N =	2741	1913	1866	559

Frage:
Nehmen wir einmal an die Bundesrepublik wird vom Osten angegriffen. Glauben Sie, daß die Bundeswehr zusammen mit ihren Verbündeten einen solchen Angriff abwehren kann, erscheint das zweifelhaft oder glauben Sie, daß der Angriff nicht abgewehrt werden kann?

Source: German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research, Munich
Quelle: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, München

- * Analogical, not identical, wording of questioning
- * Analoge, nicht identische, Fragestellung

Table 9 Expectations about the development of Atlantic relations
Tabelle 9 Erwartungen über die Entwicklung der westeuropäisch-amerikanischen Beziehungen

Question:

In what way will the relationship between West-European countries and the United States develop in the future? Do you think the relationship will become much worse, become worse, will remain unchanged, will become better, or will become much better?

Frage:

Wie wird sich das Verhältnis zwischen Westeuropa und den USA Ihrer Meinung nach in der Zukunft entwickeln?

Relationship will become Verhältnis wird sich	Population / Bevölkerung USA (in %)		Population FRG / Bevölkerung Bundesrepublik (in %)	
	Oct. 79		Oct. Nov. 79	Febr./March 80
much worse sehr schlechter	1.5		-	0.2
worse verschlechtern	12.5		6.8	11.6
remain unchanged gleichbleiben	40.9		65.5	63.3
better verbessern	28.6		16.6	15.6
much better sehr verbessern	1.8		1.4	1.8
don't know weiß nicht	14.8		9.8	7.5
N =	2741		1866	559

Source : German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research, Munich
 Quelle : Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, München

Table 10 Importance of the Armed Forces *
Tabelle 10 Bedeutung der Streitkräfte *

Question: How important do you consider the U.S. Armed Forces to be for our country at this time - very important, important, neither/nor, unimportant, or very unimportant?	Frage: Für wie wichtig halten Sie im Moment die Bundeswehr für unseren Staat?			
	Population / Bevölkerung USA (in %)		Population FRG / Bevölkerung Bundesrepublik (in %)	
Importance of the Armed Forces Bedeutung der Streitkräfte	Oct. 79	Dec. 77/Jan. 78	Oct. Nov. 79	Febr./March 80
very important sehr wichtig	58.7	21.7	24.6	33.6
important wichtig	28.3	51.9	45.2	44.9
neither / nor weder / noch	5.4	18.0	13.8	10.9
unimportant unwichtig	1.4	5.3	6.0	4.8
very unimportant sehr unwichtig	0.6	1.4	2.4	1.3
don't know weiß nicht	5.7	1.7	7.9	4.5
no answer keine Antwort		1.7	0.2	-
N =	2741	1913	1866	559

Source: German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research, Munich
Quelle: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, München

- * Analogical, not identical, wording of questioning
- * Analoge, nicht identische, Fragestellung

Table 11
Tabelle 11
Importance of selected political tasks
Wichtigkeit ausgewählter politischer Aufgabenbereiche

Question:

On this set of cards a number of political tasks are marked. Would you please choose the task which you personally consider to be the most important one and would you please give that card to me (place the number "1" on line opposite first one chosen). Would you please choose among the remaining cards and select the card which now carries the next most important political task (place the number "2" opposite this answer) and give me that card, too. Please continue this procedure until you have ordered all the cards for me.

Frage:

Hier sind Karten mit einigen politischen Aufgabenbereichen. Suchen Sie bitte zunächst die Karte heraus, auf der jener Aufgabenbereich steht, den Sie persönlich für den wichtigsten halten und geben Sie mir die Karte. Aus den verbleibenden Karten suchen Sie nun bitte den politischen Aufgabenbereich heraus, den Sie davon für den wichtigsten halten und geben Sie mir die Karte. Setzen Sie dieses Verfahren fort, bis Sie mir alle Karten gegeben haben!

political tasks	Population USA mean score Bevölkerung USA mittlerer Rangplatz	Population FRG mean score Bevölkerung Bundesrepublik mittlerer Rangplatz		politische Aufgaben- bereiche
	Oct. 79	Oct./Nov. 79	Febr./March 80	
to solve the energy problem	1.99 (1)	2.63 (2)	2.57 (1)	Lösung der Energieprobleme
to overcome unemployment	3.14 (2)	2.46 (1)	2.67 (2)	Beseitigung der Arbeitslosigkeit
to guarantee the external security of the nation	3.15 (3)	4.03 (5)	3.45 (3)	Gewährleistung der äußeren Sicherheit
to fight against crime	4.08 (4)	3.98 (4)	4.10 (5)	Bekämpfung der Kriminalität
to develop schooling and education	4.33 (5)	4.45 (6)	4.57 (6)	Entwicklung des Schul- und Bildungswesens
to strengthen and guarantee the national social security system	4.44 (6)	3.29 (3)	3.58 (4)	Gewährleistung sozialer Sicherheit
N =	2741	1866	559	

Source: German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research, Munich
Quelle: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, München

Table 12
Tabelle 12
Savings in favor of the Armed Forces
Einsparungen zugunsten der Streitkräfte

Question:

Assuming that the financial resources for the maintenance of the fighting power of the U.S. Armed Forces can only be achieved through reductions in the spendings in other areas, in what areas should the necessary cuts be made for the benefit of the Armed Forces? Would you make greater cuts, smaller cuts, or no cuts at all in the area of health and social security?

Frage:

Gesetzt den Fall, die finanziellen Mittel für die Erhaltung der Kampfkraft der Bundeswehr wären in Zukunft nur durch Einschränkungen in anderen Bereichen zu erreichen, in welchen Bereichen wählte Ihrer Meinung nach zugunsten der Streitkräfte eingespart werden?

political tasks politische Aufgaben	Population / Bevölkerung USA (in %)			Population / FG-Bevölkerung Bundesrepublik (in %)			Population / FG-Bevölkerung Bundesrepublik (in %)				
	Oct. 79			Oct./Nov. 79			Febr./March 80				
	no cuts	greater cuts	don't know	keine Einsparung	größere Einsparung	keine Antwort	keine Einsparung	größere Einsparung	keine Antwort		
health, social security Gesundheitswesen soziale Sicherung	68.9	19.8	6.6	4.7	76.1	3.1	1.3	63.9	30.6	5.5	0.9
education Bildungs- und Schulwesen	60.4	27.2	7.2	5.3	70.5	22.3	6.2	63.7	27.2	7.7	1.4
energy supply Energieversorgung	57.8	24.3	11.5	6.5	68.8	22.7	6.7	58.9	31.1	7.7	2.3
anti-inflation, anti-unemployment programs Folgebämpfung von Inflation und Arbeitslosigkeit	36.0	36.3	19.1	6.6	59.3	32.8	7.3	43.8	39.4	15.9	0.9
environment Umweltschutz	29.6	36.6	26.1	7.7	57.4	32.3	8.2	39.4	47.0	11.8	1.8
foreign aid Entwicklungshilfe	8.0	25.1	62.1	4.9	25.2	31.7	42.2	13.4	29.7	56.4	0.5
N =	2741			1866			559				

Source: German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research, Munich
Quelle: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, München

Table 13
 Special tax for the Armed Forces*
 Sonderabgabe für die Streitkräfte*

Question:	USA (in %)		FRG / Bevölkerung Bundesrepublik (in %)	
	Oct. 79	Febr./March 80	Oct./Nov. 79	Febr./March 80
In the future the industrial nations will be confronted with important problems. In general, experts tell us that there are only very limited financial resources for the solution of these problems. Assuming that the fighting power of the U.S. Armed Forces could be maintained only by increased financial contributions, would you personally be ready to pay special or increased taxes for the maintenance of the fighting power of the U.S. Armed Forces?	21.7	14.3	9.9	14.3
	yes, regardless of the circumstances in jedem Fall			
yes, but only to a limited extent in geringem Umfang	44.0	32.2	30.7	32.2
no / nein	26.6	38.1	39.7	38.1
cannot say kann ich nicht sagen	7.7	15.4	19.4	15.4
no answer keine Antwort			0.3	
N =	2741		1866	559

Frage:
 Bei der allgemeinen Lage der Industriegesellschaften kann man davon ausgehen, daß es wirtschaftliche und soziale Probleme gibt, für deren Lösung nur begrenzte finanzielle Mittel zur Verfügung stehen. Einmal angenommen, die Verteidigungsfähigkeit der Bundeswehr könnte nur durch erhöhte finanzielle Anstrengungen aufrechterhalten werden, wären Sie persönlich bereit, eine Sonderabgabe für die Erhaltung der Kampfkraft der Bundeswehr zu zahlen?

Source: German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research, Munich
 Quelle: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, München

* Analogical, not identical, wording of questioning
 • Analoge, nicht identische, Fragestellung

Table 14 Defense in case of the use of nuclear weapons*
Tabelle 14 Vertheidigung bei Atomwaffeneinsatz*

Question:		Frage:			
military defense militärische Vertheidigung	Population / Bevölkerung USA (in %)	military defense militärische Vertheidigung	Population FRG./Bevölkerung Bundesrepublik (in %)		
	Oct. 79		Dec. 77/ Jan. 78	Oct./ Nov. 79	Febr./ March 80
In case of a military attack by the East against our West-European allies, should the United States help to defend Europe against such an attack, even if the Soviet Union might react with a nuclear strike against U.S. territory?		Der NATO stehen für den Kriegsfall unter anderem auch Atomwaffen zur Verfügung. Sind Sie für eine militärische Vertheidigung der Bundesrepublik, wenn dazu auch Atomwaffen auf dem Gebiet der Bundesrepublik eingesetzt werden müssen?			
yes, the US should help its allies, regardless of the circumstances	24.1	yes / ja	19.0	14.5	15.2
yes, the US should help as long as we could reckon with the survival of the US	50.9				
no, the US should not help under such circumstances	13.4	no / nein	60.5	65.5	71.0
don't know weiß nicht	11.6	don't know weiß nicht	20.5	19.3	12.2
		no answer keine Antwort		0.7	1.6
N =	2741	N =	1913	1866	559

Source: German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research, Munich
Quelle: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, München

- * Analogical, not identical, wording of questioning
- * Analoge, nicht identische, Fragestellung

Table 15
„Verteidigungsbereitschaft“ der Bevölkerung

Table 15

Questions:

- I** Are you of the opinion, that the FRG should defend itself against a military attack on its territory with military weapons?
II Are you in every case for the defense of the FRG against a military attack, even if the war occurs primarily on the territory of the FRG?
III In case of war, NATO also has nuclear weapons at its disposal. Are you for the defense of the FRG, even if nuclear weapons have to be used on the territory of the FRG?

Fragen:

- I** Sind Sie der Ansicht, daß sich die Bundesrepublik einem militärischen Angriff auf ihr Gebiet mit Waffengewalt widersetzen sollte?
II Sind Sie in jedem Fall für eine Verteidigung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland gegen einem militärischen Angriff, auch wenn der Krieg vor allem auf dem Gebiet der Bundesrepublik ausgetragen würde?
III Der NATO stehen für den Kriegsfall unter anderem auch Atomwaffen zur Verfügung. Sind Sie für eine militärische Verteidigung der Bundesrepublik, wenn dazu auch Atomwaffen auf dem Gebiet der Bundesrepublik eingesetzt werden müßten?

Defense Verteidigung	Population FRG / Bevölkerung Bundesrepublik Deutschland (in %)											
	I general allgemein			II in case own territory becoming war-theatre auch wenn der Krieg auf eigenem Gebiet geführt wird			III in case of use of nuclear weapons on own territory auch bei Atomwaffeneinsatz auf dem Gebiet der BRGp.					
	Dec. 77/ Jan. 78	Oct./ Nov. 79	Febr./ March 80	Dec. 77/ Jan. 78	Oct./ Nov. 79	Febr./ March 80	Dec. 77/ Jan. 78	Oct./ Nov. 79	Febr./ March 80	Dec. 77/ Jan. 78	Oct./ Nov. 79	Febr./ March 80
yes / ja	57.6	57.1	64.2	56.8	49.6	52.6	19.0	14.5	15.2			
no / nein	21.8	19.5	19.3	38.5	28.9	30.9	60.5	65.5	71.0			
don't know weiß nicht	20.6	23.1	16.5		20.7	16.1	20.5	19.3	12.2			
no answer keine Antwort		0.4	-	4.7	0.8	0.4		0.7	1.6			
N =	1913	1866	559	1913	1866	559	1913	1866	559			

Source: German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research, Munich
 Quelle: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, München

Table 16 **Explicit statement about the change of security perception**

Tabelle 16 **Explizite Angabe über die Veränderung der Einschätzung der sicherheitspolitischen Lage**

Question: **Has your perception on the state of national security been subject to alteration since November 1979?**

Frage: **Hat sich an Ihrer Einschätzung der sicherheitspolitischen Lage seit November 1979 etwas geändert?**

Change of perception on state of national security Veränderung der Einschätzung der sicherheitspolitischen Lage	Population FRG / Bevölkerung Bundesrepublik in Febr./March 1980	
	%	abs.
no, has not changed nein, hat sich nicht geändert	54.9	307
yes, has been improved ja, hat sich gebessert	5.4	30
yes, has become worse ja, hat sich verschlechtert	39.7	222 *
N =		559

* Those, who explicitly said that their perception of the state of national security had changed to the worse were asked additionally:

* Denjenigen, die explizit eine Verschlechterung der Einschätzung der sicherheitspolitischen Lage angaben, wurde zusätzlich die Frage gestellt:

Question: **To what degree has your perception become worse?**

Frage: **Wie stark ist diese Verschlechterung Ihrer Meinung nach?**

degree of change Ausmaß der Verschlechterung	very minor sehr geringfügig	minor geringfügig	moderate mittel	strong stark	very strong sehr stark	no answer keine Antwort	N
Population FRG / Bevölkerung Bundesrepublik (in %)	4.5	19.4	31.5	25.7	14.9	4.1	222

Source: **German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research, Munich**
Quelle: **Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, München**

Table 17 Frequency of reasons given for the worsening of the state of national security
 Tabelle 17 Häufigkeiten der für die Verschlechterung der sicherheitspolitischen Lage genannten Gründe.

Question: Those who had explicitly stated a worsening of their perception of national security were asked:
 "What do you believe have been the reasons? "

Frage: Diejenigen, die explizit eine Verschlechterung ihrer Einschätzung der sicherheitspolitischen Lage angaben, wurden gefragt:
 „Was glauben Sie, woran das liegt? “

Reasons given for the worsening of the state of national security Gründe für die Verschlechterung der sicherheitspolitischen Lage	Population FRG / Bevölkerung Bundesrepublik in Febr./March '80 (in %)*
Afghanistan	62.2
Iran	24.8
Soviet Union (in other context than Afghanistan) Sowjetunion (in anderem Zusammenhang als mit Afghanistan)	17.6
problems in the field of Oil- and Energy supply Öl- und Energieprobleme	16.7
general situation of the world crises, tensions etc. die allgemeine Weltlage, Krisen, Spannungen	5.9
Olympic Games in Moscow and their boycott Olympiade in Moskau und ihr Boykott	5.9
Jugoslavia - Tito Jugoslawien - Tito	5.4
the East, the Eastern Bloc, Warsaw Pact, Communism der Osten, Ostblock, Warschauer Pakt, Kommunismus	5.0
USA	4.0
East-West-relations Ost-West-Verhältnis	3.2
the Middle East Nahost	1.8
detente-policy Entspannungspolitik	1.8
relations between the USSR and USA die Beziehungen zwischen UdSSR und USA	1.8
relationship between the USA and the FRG Verhältnis USA - Bundesrepublik	1.4
Asia/Asien	1.4
rest categories Restkategorien	18.0
N =	222

- Those questioned were allowed to state more than one reason
- Die Befragten konnten mehr als einen Grund angeben.

Source: German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research, Munich
 Quelle: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, München

Table 18 Stability of opinion on national security in a panel. Unchanged individual answering in two polls in Oct./Nov. 79 and Febr./March 80

Tabelle 18 Stabilität sicherheitspolitischer Meinungen in einer Panel-Befragung. Unveränderte individuelle Reaktionen in beiden Befragungswellen im Oktober/November 1979 und Februar/März 1980

short description of question * Variablen Kurzbezeichnung *	cf. Table No ... vgl. Tabelle Nr. ...	unchanged opinion unveränderte Meinungen (in %)
threat of war in Europe Kriegsgefahr in Europa	2	66.6
willingness to defend the FRG militarily: Bereitschaft zur militärischen Verteidigung der Bundesrepublik		
I in general / allgemein	15	65.7
II in case of use of nuclear weapons on own territory auch bei Atomwaffeneinsatz auf Gebiet der BRep.	15	64.2
II in case own territory becoming war theatre auch wenn der Krieg auf dem eigenen Gebiet geführt wird	15	61.4
expectations about the development of Atlantic- relations Erwartungen über die Entwicklung der Atlantischen Beziehungen	9	57.8
degree of military threat to FRG Ausmaß der militärischen Bedrohung der BRep.	1	50.3
defense capability of German and Allied Armed Forces Verteidigungsfähigkeit der Bundeswehr und NATO-Streitkräfte	8	49.7
importance of the Armed Forces in the FRG Bedeutung der Bundeswehr	10	49.4
readiness to pay special tax for the Armed Forces Bereitschaft für Sonderabgabe zugunsten der Bundeswehr	13	48.8
perception of military balance between NATO and WTO Einschätzung des militärischen Kräfteverhältnisses zwischen NATO und Warschauer Vertragsorganisation	3	47.6
dependability of USA Verlaß auf USA im Verteidigungsfall	7	42.1
dependability of NATO Verlaß auf NATO im Verteidigungsfall	6	41.0
expectations about the development of East-West relations Erwartungen über die Entwicklung des Ost-West-Verhältnisses	5	37.0
N =		332

* For the exact wording of the questions please look at the tables of which the number is indicated in the next column.

* Die wörtliche Fragestellung findet sich in den in der nächsten Spalte ausgewiesenen Tabelle.

Source: German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research, Munich

Quelle: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, München

Table 19 Stability and change of opinions on the threat of war in Europe

Tabelle 19 Stabilität und Wandel der Meinungen über die Kriegsgefahr in Europa

Question: Do you believe that the threat of war in Europe between the East and the West, that is between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, is rather great or rather limited?

Frage: Halten Sie die Gefahr, daß es in Europa zu einem Krieg zwischen Ost und West, zwischen Warschauer Pakt und NATO kommen könnte, eher für groß oder eher für gering?

The threat of war in Europe is...		February/March 1980			Total Oct/Nov '79
		Februar/März 1980			
Die Kriegsgefahr in Europa ist...		D.K./N.A.	rather limited	rather great	Gesamt Okt/Nov '79
		weiß nicht/ keine Antwort	eher gering	eher groß	
Oct./Nov. 1979	don't know/ no answer	11*	36	16	63
	weiß nicht / keine Antwort	17.5 ⁺	57.1	25.4	19.0
		33.3 ^o	14.2	35.6	
	rather limited	20	203	22	245
		8.2	82.9	9.0	73.8
	eher gering	60.6	79.9	48.9	
	rather great	2	15	7	24
		8.3	62.5	29.2	7.2
	eher groß	6.1	5.9	15.6	
Total February/March 1980		33	254	45	332
Gesamt Februar/März 1980		9.9	76.5	13.6	100.0

* absolute frequency / absolute Häufigkeit

+ row (horizontal) percentage / Zeilen (waagrechte) Prozentuierung

o column (vertical) percentage / Spalten (vertikale) Prozentuierung

Source: German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research, Munich

Quelle: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, München

Table 20 Stability and change of opinions concerning the military defence of the FRG I.

Tabelle 20 Stabilität und Wandel der Meinungen zur militärischen Verteidigung der Bundesrepublik I.

Question I: Are you of the opinion that the FRG should defend itself against a military attack on its territory with military weapons?

Frage I: Sind Sie der Ansicht, daß sich die Bundesrepublik einem militärischen Angriff auf ihr Gebiet mit Waffengewalt widersetzen sollte?

willingness to defend in general		February/March 1980			Total Oct/Nov '79	
		Februar/März 1980				
Bereitschaft zur mili- täischen Verteidigung, allgemein		D.K./N.A.	no	yes	Gesamt Okt/Nov 79	
		weiß nicht/ keine Antwort	nein	ja		
Oct./Nov. 1979	don't know/ no answer	27*	17	28	72	
		37.5 ⁺	23.6	38.9	21.7	
	weiß nicht/ keine Antwort	55.1 ^o	27.0	12.7		
	no	5	24	25	54	
		9.3	44.4	46.3	16.3	
	nein	10.2	38.1	11.4		
	yes	17	22	167	206	
		8.3	10.7	81.1	62.0	
	ja	34.7	34.9	75.9		
	Total February/March 1980		49	63	220	332
	Gesamt Februar/März 1980		14.8	19.0	66.3	100.0

* absolute frequency / absolute Häufigkeit

+ row (horizontal) percentage / Zeilen (waagrechte) Prozentuierung

o column (vertical) percentage / Spalten (vertikale) Prozentuierung

Source: German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research, Munich

Quelle: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, München

Table 21 Stability and change of opinions concerning the military defence of the FRG III.

Tabelle 21 Stabilität und Wandel der Meinungen zur militärischen Verteidigung der Bundesrepublik III.

Question III: In case of war NATO also has nuclear weapons at its disposal. Are you for the defence of the FRG, even if nuclear weapons have to be used on the territory of the FRG?

Frage III: Der NATO stehen für den Kriegsfall unter anderem auch Atomwaffen zur Verfügung. Sind Sie für eine militärische Verteidigung der Bundesrepublik, wenn dazu auch Atomwaffen auf dem Gebiet der Bundesrepublik eingesetzt werden müssen?

willingness to defend in case of use of nuclear weapons on own territory Verteidigungsbereitschaft, auch bei Atomwaffeneinsatz auf dem Gebiet der Bundesrepublik		February/March 1980 Februar/März 1980			Total Oct/Nov '79 Gesamt Okt/Nov 79
		D.K./N.A. weiß nicht/ keine Antwort	no nein	yes ja	
Oct./Nov. 1979	don't know/ no answer weiß nicht/ keine Antwort	15* 21.7 ⁺ 40.5 ^o	44 63.8 17.6	10 14.5 22.2	69 20.8
	no nein	13 5.9 35.1	185 84.1 74.0	22 10.0 48.9	220 66.3
	yes ja	9 20.9 24.3	21 48.8 8.4	13 30.2 28.9	43 13.0
	Total February/March 1980	37	250	45	332
	Gesamt Februar/März 1980	11.1	75.3	13.6	100.0

* absolute frequency / absolute Häufigkeit

+ row (horizontal) percentage / Zeilen (waagrechte) Prozentuierung

o column (vertical) percentage / Spalten (vertikale) Prozentuierung

Source: German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research, Munich

Quelle: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, München

Table 22 Stability and change of expectations about the development of Atlantic relations
 Tabelle 22 Stabilität und Wandel der Erwartungen über die Entwicklung der westeuropäisch - amerikanischen Beziehungen
 Question: In what way will the relationship between West-European countries and the United States develop in the future?
 Frage: Wie wird sich das Verhältnis zwischen Westeuropa und den USA Ihrer Meinung nach in der Zukunft entwickeln?

	The Atlantic relations will ... Die U.S.-westeuropäischen Beziehungen werden ...	February/March 1980 - Februar/März 1980					Total Gesamt Okt./Nov. 79
		D.K./N.A. W.N./K.A.	much better sehr verbessern	better verbessern	remain unchanged gleich bleiben	worse verschlechtern	
Oct./Nov. 1979	don't know/no answer weiß nicht/keine Antwort	15* 42.9* 50.00	0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0	18 51.4 8.7	2 5.7 5.4	35 10.5
	become much better sich sehr verbessern	1 33.3 3.3	1 33.3 16.7	1 33.3 1.9	0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0	3 0.9
	become better sich verbessern	3 5.1 10.0	2 3.4 33.3	21 35.6 39.6	28 47.5 13.6	5 8.5 13.5	59 17.8
	remain unchanged gleich bleiben	10 4.8 33.3	2 1.0 33.3	25 11.9 47.2	149 71.0 72.3	24 11.4 64.9	210 63.3
	become worse sich verschlechtern	1 4.0 3.3	1 4.0 16.7	6 24.0 11.3	11 44.0 5.3	6 24.0 16.2	25 7.5
	Total Febr./March 1980 Gesamt Febr./März 1980	30 9.0	6 1.8	53 16.0	206 62.0	37 11.1	332 100.0

* absolute frequency / absolute Häufigkeit
 + row (horizontal) percentage / Zeilen (waagrechte) Prozentuierung
 o column (vertical) percentage / Spalten (vertikale) Prozentuierung
 Source: German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research, Munich
 Quelle: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, München

Table 23 Stability and change of the expectations about the development of East-West relations
 Tabelle 23 Stabilität und Wandel der Einschätzungen über die Entwicklung der Ost-West Beziehungen
 Question: In what way will the general relationship between the East and the West develop in the future?
 Frage: Wie wird sich das Ost-West Verhältnis Ihrer Meinung nach in der Zukunft entwickeln?

The East-West relations will ... Die Ost-West Beziehungen werden		February/March 1980 - Februar/März 1980							Total Gesamt	
		D.K./N.A. W.N./K.A.	much better sehr verbessern	better verbessern	unchanged gleich bleiben	worse verschlechtern	much worse sehr verschlechtern	Oct./Nov. 79 Okt./Nov. 79		
don't know/no answer weiß nicht/keine Antwort	13*	0	0	9	10	0	32	9.6		
	40.6+	0.0	0.0	28.1	31.3	0.0	0.0			
become much better sich sehr verbessern	38.20	0.0	0.0	6.6	9.1	0.0	0.0	0.6		
	0	0	1	0	1	0	2			
become better sich verbessern	0.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.6		
	0.0	0.0	2.3	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.0			
become better sich verbessern	7	0	23	41	25	3	99	29.8		
	7.1	0.0	23.2	41.4	25.3	3.0	0.0			
remain unchanged gleich bleiben	20.6	0.0	53.5	30.1	22.7	33.3	0.0	44.9		
	10	0	10	70	55	4	149			
become worse sich verschlechtern	6.7	0.0	6.7	47.0	36.9	2.7	0.0	14.5		
	29.4	0.0	23.3	51.5	50.0	44.4	0.0			
become worse sich verschlechtern	4	0	9	16	17	2	48	0.6		
	8.3	0.0	18.8	33.3	35.4	4.2	0.0			
become much worse sich sehr verschlechtern	11.8	0.0	20.9	11.8	15.5	22.2	0.0	0.6		
	0	0	0	0	2	0	2			
Total Febr./March 1980 Gesamt Febr./März 1980	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	100.0		
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8	0.0	0.0			
Total Febr./March 1980 Gesamt Febr./März 1980	34	0	43	136	110	9	332	100.0		
	10.2	0.0	13.0	41.0	33.1	2.7	0.0			

* absolute frequency / absolute Häufigkeit
 + row (horizontal) percentage / Zeilen (waagrechte) Prozentuierung
 o column (vertical) percentage / Spalten (vertikale) Prozentuierung
 Source: German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research, Munich
 Quelle: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, München

Table 24
Tabelle 24

Threats to the personal situation
Bedrohungen der persönlichen Situation

Question:

Frage:

Considering your personal situation, by what do you feel threatened?

Wenn Sie jetzt an Ihre persönliche Situation denken, wovon fühlen Sie sich bedroht?

Threats to the personal situation Bedrohungen in der persönlichen Situation	Population FRG (in %) Bevölkerung Bundesrepublik (in %) Dec. 77/Jan. 78		
	yes ja	no nein	no answer keine Antwort
loosing the nearest relatives die nächsten Angehörigen zu verlieren	56.7	42.1	1.2
suffering from a serious illness/a serious accident eine schwere Krankheit/schweren Unfall zu erleiden	56.6	42.4	0.9
terrorism von Terroristen	36.0	62.6	1.4
outbreak of war von einem Kriegsausbruch	31.9	66.7	1.4
getting old vom Altwerden	20.9	78.7	0.5
becoming a victim of a violent crime Opfer eines Gewaltverbrechens zu werden	17.6	79.7	2.7
loosing the job den Arbeitsplatz zu verlieren	16.7	80.4	2.9
political over throw von einem politischen Umsturz	16.0	82.6	1.3
strike von Streiks	9.5	88.7	1.8
I feel threatened, by something else ich fühle mich von etwas anderem bedroht	8.2	87.5	4.3
I do not feel threatened ich fühle mich nicht bedroht	37.1		
N =	1913		

Source: German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research, Munich
Quelle: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, München

Table 25 Frightening objects and situations in personal perception
Tabelle 25 Furchteinflößende Dinge und Situationen in der persönlichen Wahrnehmung

Everybody knows by own experience situations and objects which frighten him to some degree. We have put together some different terms standing for such objects and situations. It may well be that one or another of these terms does not at all have a frightening effect on you. Would you please be so kind as to mark at each term whether it frightens you personally and if, to what degree.

Jeder Mensch kennt aus eigener Erfahrung Dinge und Situationen, vor denen er sich mehr oder weniger stark fürchtet. Wir haben eine ganze Reihe von unterschiedlichen Begriffen zusammengestellt, die solche Dinge und Situationen bezeichnen. Möglicherweise ist auch der eine oder andere Begriff für etwas genannt, was Ihnen selbst überhaupt keine Furcht einflößt. Benutzen Sie dazu bitte die folgende Skala: (KARTE VORLEGEN). Geben Sie bitte bei jedem Begriff anhand der Skala an, wie furchteinflößend das Angesprochene für Sie persönlich ist.

Population FRG (mean score and %)		Bevölkerung Bundesrepublik (Mittelwert und %)					Dec. 77/Jan. 78		
Rank	Terms	mean score	äußerst	sehr	ziemlich	etwas	gar nicht	keine Antwort	
Rang	Begriffe	Mittelwert	5	4	3	2	1		
1.	war Krieg	3.56	28.4	30.7	17.3	13.9	8.8	1.0	
2.	fire Feuer	3.18	15.8	30.1	22.1	18.7	12.6	0.8	
3.	destruction Zerstörung	3.11	12.0	32.7	21.2	19.8	12.8	1.6	
4.	terrorism Terror	3.08	16.2	27.1	18.5	22.7	14.2	1.4	
5.	earth quake Erdbeben	3.04	17.0	25.5	19.4	17.6	19.6	1.2	
6.	death Tod	2.82	14.7	20.9	18.2	22.2	23.2	0.8	
7.	suffering Leiden	2.82	7.7	21.3	27.0	31.3	11.8	1.0	
8.	misery Elend	2.78	5.5	24.2	26.9	27.4	15.0	1.0	
9.	pain Schmerz	2.74	5.5	19.6	28.1	34.9	11.0	0.9	
10.	snakes Schlangen	2.61	9.1	18.1	20.9	23.7	26.2	1.2	
11.	rats Ratten	2.60	12.1	19.2	16.8	19.3	31.8	0.8	
12.	deep water tiefes Wasser	2.24	6.2	16.9	13.3	20.9	41.7	1.0	
13.	high altitudes große Höhen	2.09	4.2	10.8	15.8	26.7	41.1	1.4	
14.	cañion-vulture Ausgeier	2.07	7.2	10.9	12.3	19.0	48.5	2.1	
15.	to make mistakes Fehler zu machen	1.99	0.8	5.1	15.1	49.9	25.5	0.6	
16.	to be misunderstood missverstanden zu werden	1.98	1.7	5.1	15.0	44.3	32.7	1.2	
17.	to appear to be ridiculous lächerlich zu wirken	1.96	1.1	6.3	15.8	37.1	38.5	1.2	
18.	worms/mites Würmer/Mäden	1.93	3.1	9.5	14.2	22.8	49.5	1.0	
19.	to be put in predicament in Verlegenheit zu geraten	1.93	0.8	4.3	14.5	46.8	32.1	1.5	
20.	spiders Spinnen	1.85	4.7	8.4	11.0	18.5	56.8	0.7	
21.	lightning and thunder Blitz und Donner	1.85	2.7	7.7	12.8	24.7	51.4	0.7	
22.	to become conspicuous aufzufallen	1.82	0.8	4.8	13.6	36.4	43.1	1.3	
23.	bats Fledermäuse	1.74	3.0	5.7	10.8	22.5	56.8	1.2	
24.	to be criticized kritisiert zu werden	1.73	0.5	2.2	11.4	40.7	44.1	1.2	
25.	darkness Dunkelheit	1.60	0.5	4.0	9.4	27.3	58.4	0.4	
26.	military Militär	1.54	1.4	3.6	8.8	19.0	65.7	1.5	

N = 1913

Source: German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research, Munich
 Quelle: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, München

APPENDIX E:
THE MILITARY BALANCE: 1970-1979

SOURCES USED FOR MILITARY BALANCE INDICATORS

A. For numbers of Systems

1. John M. Collins, U.S.-Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities 1960-1980, McGraw-Hill Publications Co., 1980.
2. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 1978-1979 to 1979-1980.

B. For Force Characteristics

1. John M. Collins, op cit.
2. Colin S. Gray, The Future of Land-Based Missile Forces, Adelphi Paper 140, IISS, 1977 pp. 32-36.
3. IISS, op cit.
4. Committee on Foreign Relations, The SALT II Treaty: Part I, United States Senate, 96th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 458-460.

TABLE 1:
THE STRATEGIC BALANCE

A. United States

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>SNDV</u>	<u>TW</u>	<u>RV</u>	<u>MT</u>	<u>EMT</u>	<u>K</u>
1970	2150	6786	5298	4093	4289	204
1971	2140	6862	6226	3919	4189	198
1972	2167	7409	7414	4007	4370	216
1973	2148	7724	8898	3818	4276	216
1974	2151	7997	9644	3723	4309	224
1975	2151	8162	10198	3684	4319	226
1976	2092	7599	9850	3415	4048	201
1977	2094	7716	10242	3405	4051	202
1978	2086	7671	10210	3386	4050	201
1979	2086	7665	10194	3393	4041	201

B. USSR

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>SNDV</u>	<u>TW</u>	<u>RV</u>	<u>MT</u>	<u>EMT</u>	<u>K</u>
1970	1856	7448	2276	7235	4049	27
1971	2030	8225	2450	8199	4475	29
1972	2164	8913	2584	9067	4875	31
1973	2244	9050	2664	9050	4957	32
1974	2416	9329	2836	9302	5109	32
1975	2488	9894	3328	9479	5451	46
1976	2523	10302	3827	8772	5461	61
1977	2587	10656	5137	8182	5767	85
1978	2716	13046	6698	11091	7519	129
1979	2527	11950	7687	6985	6614	151

KEY: SNDV - Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles
 TW - Throw Weight (Payload) in Thousands of lbs.
 RV - Re-entry Vehicles (Warheads)
 MT - Megatonnage (Millions of Tons of TNT explosive equivalent)
 EMT - Equivalent Megatonnage; indicator adjusts for size of bomb/target ratio - i.e., $Y^{2/3}$, where Y=yield in megatons
 K - Strategic Lethality (sum of K factors in 1000s where $K = EMT/CEP^2$).

TABLE 2:
THE THEATER/REGIONAL BALANCE

A. US/NATO

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>LRINF (RV)</u>	<u>LRINF+ (RV)</u>	<u>TNF (RV)</u>
1970	171 (294)	235 (358)	1595 (1718)
1971	228 (383)	292 (591)	1662 (1961)
1972	253 (408)	301 (888)	1649 (2236)
1973	242 (370)	290 (850)	1495 (2055)
1974	258 (386)	306 (866)	1399 (1959)
1975	274 (402)	322 (832)	1385 (1945)
1976	268 (390)	316 (870)	1405 (1959)
1977	352 (558)	400 (1038)	1564 (2202)
1978	350 (554)	398 (1034)	1411 (2047)
1979	350 (554)	398 (1034)	1283 (1919)

B. USSR/WTO

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>LRINF (RV)</u>	<u>LRINF+ (RV)</u>	<u>TNF (RV)</u>
1970	1534 (2337)	Same as	3794 (4597)
1971	1473 (2213)	LRINF	3879 (4619)
1972	1447 (2213)		3998 (4764)
1973	1437 (2193)		4013 (4769)
1974	1402 (2133)		4161 (4892)
1975	1339 (2027)		4117 (4805)
1976	1256 (1884)		3924 (4552)
1977	1107 (1632)		4064 (4583)
1978	1077 (1748)		4199 (4870)
1979	1250 (1874)		4478 (5102)

KEY: LRINF - All nuclear-capable systems in Europe and Western USSR with ranges 1000 - 3500 nautical miles.
 LRINF+ - Same as above plus U.S. Poseidon SLBM assigned to SACEUR.
 TNF - All nuclear systems with ranges less than 3500 nautical miles except artillery and naval aircraft.

TABLE 3:
THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE: Air, Ground and Naval Forces

A. US/NATO

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>DIVISION EQUIVALENTS*</u>	<u>MAIN BATTLE TANKS*</u>	<u>TACTICAL* AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT¹ CARRIERS</u>	<u>MAJOR SURFACE COMBATANTS</u>	<u>SUBMARINES</u>
1970	24	5500	2166	30	456	196
1971	24	5500	2000	29	454	188
1972	24	6000	2064	28	448	185
1973	24	6500	1890	26	436	186
1974	25	7000	2040	24	393	182
1975	27	7000	2050	25	414	194
1976	29	7000	2085	23	388	191
1977	27	7000	2350	24	388	189
1978	27	7000	2375	26	381	185
1979	27	7000	2350	26	376	192

B. USSR/WTO

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>DIVISION EQUIVALENTS*</u>	<u>MAIN BATTLE TANKS*</u>	<u>TACTICAL* AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT¹ CARRIERS</u>	<u>MAJOR SURFACE COMBATANTS</u>	<u>SUBMARINES</u>
1970	69	14000	3940	2	223	304
1971	65	16000	4180	2	231	288
1972	67	17000	4200	2	238	281
1973	68	20000	4300	2	242	279
1974	70	19000	4350	2	244	266
1975	68	19000	4025	2	250	256
1976	67	19000	4200	3	261	262
1977	70	20500	4075	3	270	264
1978	70	21100	4055	4	279	268
1979	76	20500	5200	4	279	274

*North/Central Front and Western Military Districts in USSR

¹All types: Attack, ASW, VTOL, Helicopter

APPENDIX F:
ELITE PERCEPTIONS AND CHANGES IN THE MILITARY BALANCE

ELITE PERCEPTIONS AND
CHANGES IN THE MILITARY BALANCE

BY

Alan T. Dieter, Jr.

INTRODUCTION

Comparing elite perceptions of the military balances and objective indicators requires the researcher to select those factors most likely to be important in the formulation of perceptions and to decide how best to measure or record these factors.¹ To this end, we assumed that elites in general (many of whom are not trained analysts) do not consider complex or dynamic measurements of the several balances, but rather more simple indicators, such as aggregate numbers of forces or weapons, and perhaps some simple measurements of raw capabilities. Thus, no sophisticated measurements of the balances were attempted. Moreover, this priori judgement appears to have been born out by our analysis.

1. Strategic Balance

a. Strategic Nuclear Forces

Each of the separate elite judgements about the military balances can be assumed to be affected by perceptions of the contributions to security of each of the corresponding types of military forces. Obviously, for the strategic balance the US and Soviet strategic nuclear forces are the prime determinants--even though British, French and perhaps Chinese nuclear forces may marginally affect both balances and perceptions.² Accordingly, we:

- 1) We reviewed three classes of simple indicators: a) aggregate numbers of delivery systems - strategic nuclear

¹Obviously, no elaborate quantitative methodology will be employed as our purpose is only to speculate about possible factors and interrelationships between "objective" indicators of the military balances and elite perceptions. Therefore, this analysis is only an hypothesis-forming exercise, the results of which must be considered tentative and must be rigorously tested before complete acceptance.

²As noted in Chapter 7, p. 256 this was to some extent in the case of French forces and French elites.

delivery vehicles (SNDV); b) raw capabilities - megatonnage (MT) and warheads (RV); and c) static performance indicators - strategic lethality (K).^{2,3}

2) developed a table (F.1) showing changes in both force inventories and capabilities (as reflected by our indicators) in both absolute and relative (i.e., percentage) terms;

3) Juxtaposed these with elite perceptions of changes in the contributions to security of US and Soviet forces -- for which see Chapter 8 Section II-A, and Figures 7.2 and 7.3, pp. 264 and 265.

We first looked at changes in SNDVs, only to find that gross changes in this indicator did not correlate directly with perceptions. In fact, the largest changes in numbers of Soviet SNDVs occurred between 1970 and 1975 (see Table F.1) when perceptions of change were (as shown on the lower half of Figure F.1) essentially flat, and that the considerable increase in concerns from 1975-1979 was unmatched by increases in Soviet forces. Moreover, perceptions of the contribution to security by US forces declined markedly in 1975-79, (lower half of Figure F.1) despite the fact that the number of US SNDVs was virtually constant. (Table F.1.)

²Strategic lethality, the K factor, is derived:

$K = Y^{2/3} / (CEP)^2$ where Y = yield in megatons and CEP - circular probable error in nautical miles. See Thomas A. Brown, "Missile Accuracy and Strategic Lethality", Survival, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, March-April 1976, p. 52.

³For a complete list of yearly totals and sources utilized see Appendix E.

TABLE P-1
 CHANGES IN INVENTORIES AND CAPABILITIES
 OF STRATEGIC FORCES

<u>NUMBERS OF UNITS</u>			
A.	<u>1970 - 1975</u>	<u>NET</u>	<u>%CHANGE</u>
SNDV:	US: 2150 - 2151	+ 1	--
	USSR: 1856 - 2488	+632	+34%
RV:	US: 5298 - 10198	+4900	+92%
	USSR: 2276 - 3328	+1052	+46%
MT:	US: 4093 - 3684	- 409	-10%
	USSR: 7235 - 9479	+2244	+31%
K*	US: 204 - 226	+ 22	+11%
	USSR: 27 - 46	+ 19	+70%

<u>NUMBERS OF UNITS</u>			
B.	<u>1975 - 1979</u>	<u>NET</u>	<u>%CHANGE</u>
SNDV:	US: 2151 - 2086	- 65	- 3%
	USSR: 2488 - 2527	+ 39	+ 2%
RV:	US: 10198 - 10194	- 4	--
	USSR: 3328 - 7687	+4359	+ 131%
MT:	US: 3684 - 3593	- 291	- 8%
	USSR: 9479 - 6985	-2494	- 26%
K*	US: 226 - 201	- 25	- 11%
	USSR: 47 - 151	+ 104	+ 221%

*in thousands of K units.

Key: SNDV: Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles

RV: (Re-entry vehicles) warheads

MT: Megatonnage (i.e., millions of tons of TNT explosive equivalent)

K: Strategic lethality (i.e., hard target kill capability)

Source: See Appendix E, Table 1.

We next focused upon the raw capabilities and static performance indicators which on the surface, seemed to weight more heavily in elite perceptions. For the Soviet forces, changes in warhead loadings (+237%) and strategic lethality (+459%) over the ten year period appeared to conform most closely with increases in net negative elite perceptions (lower half of (Figure F.1). However, the large increase in negative perceptions concerning the impact of US strategic capabilities after 1975 could be partially matched only with declines in US strategic lethality. Moreover, none of these "matches" were really close fits. The key to resolving this apparent contradiction to our hypothesis lay in two factors; the great concern elites expressed over the Soviet modernization and build-up programs and the apparent attention paid to some of the simple capability and performance indicators by these elites. If one considers the basic association between elite perceptions and SNDVs as affected by particular attention to "modern" Soviet SNDVs (which would have generated the changes in simple capability indicators noted above) then the correspondence between the subjective and objective views increases considerably. This is portrayed graphically in Figures F.1, F.2 and F.3 (which plot percentage shifts in net perceptions against changes in the number of SNDVs and modern SNDVs, drawn from Table F.2). These figures show that: 1) the increases in modern American SNDVs from 1970-1975 had comparatively little impact on perceptions (Figure F.2); but that 2) the increase in modern Soviet SNDVs from 1974-1979 matches closely the declines in

the perceptions of the contribution to security of US strategic nuclear forces (Figure F.3) and the increased concern manifested with respect to Soviet SNF. (Figure F.1.)

In brief, it would seem that elites judged the capabilities of strategic nuclear forces largely in terms of Soviet build-up and modernization programs, most particularly, with increases in modern delivery vehicles. It follows, therefore, that modernization of Soviet SNF is viewed as threatening (i.e., as enhancing concerns about security) while modernization of US SNF did not appear as reassuring; in fact, during the period of most intense US modernization, perceptions of the contributions to security of American strategic nuclear forces remained essentially flat. (Figure F.3).

b. The Strategic Nuclear Balance

From this, one might expect that perceptions of the strategic nuclear balance (i.e., of the size, composition and capabilities of US and Soviet SNF, taken together) would follow a similar pattern: remaining essentially flat from 1970-1974 and declining sharply thereafter. This was not, however, the case: the greater number of our respondents perceived the balance to be essentially equal, in all three of the time periods we examined. (See Table 7.4, p. 259).

In an attempt to ascertain which indicators correlated most closely with perceptions, we averaged the ratios⁴ of force

⁴Averaging totals:

\bar{X} BASE YEARS = $(X_1 + X_2 \dots X_n)/N$ where X_n = yearly ratios and N=number of years in sequence. Note: the absolute value was utilized to measure distance from the parity base line (1:1), thus these figures represent absolute distances to a fixed base.

TABLE F-2
PERCENT OF MODERN FORCES IN STRATEGIC INVENTORIES

A. UNITED STATES

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>ICBM</u>	<u>(NEW)</u> ¹	<u>SLBM</u>	<u>(NEW)</u> ²	<u>BOMBER</u>	<u>(NEW)</u> ³	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>(NEW)</u>	<u>%</u>
1970	1054	(10)	656	(16)	440	(35)	2150	(61)	2.8
1971	1054	(110)	656	(112)	430	(70)	2140	(292)	13.6
1972	1054	(210)	656	(192)	457	(67)	2167	(469)	21.6
1973	1054	(350)	656	(352)	438	(66)	2148	(763)	35.8
1974	1054	(529)	656	(384)	441	(66)	2151	(979)	45.5
1975	1054	(550)	656	(448)	441	(66)	2151	(1064)	49.5
1976	1054	(550)	656	(449)	382	(66)	2092	(1064)	50.9
1977	1054	(550)	656	(496)	384	(68)	2094	(1114)	53.2
1978	1054	(550)	656	(496)	376	(60)	2036	(1106)	53.0
1979	1054	(550)	656	(496)	376	(60)	2036	(1106)	53.0

¹Minuteman III

²Poseidon C-3

³B-111

B. SOVIET UNION

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>ICBM</u>	<u>(NEW)</u> ⁴	<u>SLEM</u>	<u>(NEW)</u> ⁵	<u>BOMBER</u>	<u>(NEW)</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>(NEW)</u>	<u>%</u>
1970	1427	(-)	289	(-)	140	(-)	1856	(-)	-
1971	1489	(-)	401	(-)	140	(-)	2030	(-)	-
1972	1527	(-)	497	(-)	140	(-)	2164	(-)	-
1973	1527	(-)	577	(-)	140	(-)	2244	(-)	-
1974	1607	(-)	669	(60)	140	(-)	2416	(60)	2.5
1975	1607	(80)	741	(132)	140	(-)	2488	(212)	8.5
1976	1557	(156)	826	(220)	140	(-)	2523	(376)	14.9
1977	1477	(270)	970	(366)	140	(-)	2587	(636)	24.6
1978	1578	(456)	998	(432)	140	(-)	2716	(838)	32.7
1979	1398	(620)	989	(461)	140	(-)	2527	(1061)	42.8


⁴SS-17, SS-18, SS-19

⁵SSN-8, SSN-17, SSN-18

SOURCES: IISS, The Military Balance, 1970-1971 to 1979-1980.


FIGURE F.1

SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES:
OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE CHANGES




SOURCE: Tables 3.12, 4.12, 5.12 and Tables 8.2 and 8.3

FIGURE F.2
US STRATEGIC FORCES: OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE
CHANGES



SOURCE: Tables 3.12, 4.12, 5.12 and Tables 8.2 and 8.3

FIGURE F.3
A CROSS COMPARISON OF OBJECTIVES
AND SUBJECTIVE CHANGES



SOURCE: Tables 3.12, 4.12, 5.12 and Tables 8.2 and 8.3

indicators by periods corresponding to our time slices and ranked in importance those factors most closely matching elite trends. It would appear that the most simple indicator, SNDVs, was the most influential factor, followed by megatonnage and warheads and lastly by strategic lethality. Further analysis would seem to suggest that the number of SNDVs carries twice the factor weight of megatonnage and warhead indicators (which tend to balance each other) and at least four times the weight of strategic lethality. (See Table F.3 and Figure F.4.)

TABLE F.3
RANKING OF INDICATORS FOR ELITE PERCEPTIONS
OF THE STRATEGIC BALANCE

<u>BALANCE RANK</u>	<u>TIME SLICES</u>		
	<u>1970 - 1975</u>	<u>1975 - 1979</u>	<u>1970 - 1979</u>
1.	SNDV (1.09)	SNDV (1.22)	SNDV (1.15)
2.	MT (2.26)	RV (2.10)	MT (2.32)
3.	RV (2.92)	MT (2.58)	RV (2.50)
4.	K (6.65)	K (2.70)	K (4.85)

Key: SNDV: strategic nuclear delivery vehicles


MT: megatonnage

RV: re-entry vehicles; warheads

K: strategic lethality

NOTE: If one were developing a "balance equation" the sign of the indicators would seem to be for the 1970-79 period: SNDV(-); MT(-); RV(+); K(+); based upon ratio advantage to either US(+) or USSR(-).

FIGURE F.4
THE STRATEGIC BALANCE



This, however, leaves us at something of a loss, as it suggests that elites use different standards for measuring the capabilities of force than they do in assessing the strategic balance. One possible explanation is that this is in fact the case, in that the effects of modernization are "lost in the wash" when elites look at the overall strategic balance. Another is that Soviet modernization programs, while causing concern about present (and future) force capabilities, are seen as efforts to catch up with the United States, whose technological pre-eminence is almost an article of faith.⁵ And a third is that the publicity given to Soviet programs in articles, speeches and statements appearing in or on Western media has induced changes in perceptions of their importance which are disproportionate to more sober (or more simplistic) analyses of capabilities when considered together. At the moment, we cannot say which, if any, of these explanations is valid; all we can say is that elites do not seem to transfer specific concerns about US and Soviet strategic force capabilities into assessments of the strategic balance.

2. The Theater/Regional Forces and Balance

a. Theater/Regional Forces

As was true of strategic forces, the respective theater/regional nuclear forces of the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact and the US/NATO both induced perceptions of increasing insecurity in American

⁵See, for example, Brennan, op. cit., p. 10, Preview of Conclusions, where he reports that "Europeans almost universally have faith in enduring (his emphasis) American technological superiority (and regard this as of major importance)".

and European elites, especially after 1975 (See Figures 7.4 and 7.5, pp. 266-267). However, objective indicators of changes in these forces, do not, for the most part, conform to changes in perceptions.

This can be seen from Table F.4 which presents three different breakouts of nuclear delivery vehicles (NDV):⁶

LRTNF (long range theater nuclear forces) comprising all forces in Europe and Western USSR with ranges from 1000-3500 nautical miles (nm);

LRTNF+ which included all the above plus the dedicated Poseidon C-3 SLBM under control of SACEUR; and

TNF (theater nuclear forces), expanded to include all nuclear-capable systems with ranges below 3500 n.m., except dual-purpose field artillery and naval aircraft.⁷

It was extremely difficult to judge which indicator most nearly corresponded to elite views. The relatively small positive changes in European perceptions of Soviet/Pact theater forces from 1971-1975 and the similar pattern for all elites expressing views about US/NATO forces (See Figures 7.4 and 7.5) would seem to suggest that either LRTNF or LRTNF+ was the basic indicator

⁶For reasons discussed in Section 1, above we decided to focus primarily upon nuclear delivery vehicles and warheads, both because of their presumed importance and also because of the difficulty in obtaining data for other indicators. On Table F.4 and Figure F.3, only figures for NDVs are shown. Warhead ratios are almost exactly the same as NDV ratios and hence are not considered further in this analysis.

⁷Field artillery and naval aircraft were excluded partly because of the paucity of thematic references and partly because of the fact that they are frequently excluded from theater nuclear counts; the artillery because relatively few of the nuclear-capable pieces have nuclear missions and the naval aircraft because they are assigned specific, and different, tasks.

TABLE F.4
CHANGES IN NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES
OF THEATER/REGIONAL FORCES

A. 1970 - 1975

		NUMBER OF UNITS		
		<u>1970-1975</u>	<u>NET</u>	<u>% CHANGE</u>
1. LRINF:	NATO:	171- 274	+ 103	+60%
	PACT:	1534-1339	- 195	-13%
2. LRINF+	NATO:	235- 322	+ 87	+37%
	PACT:	1534-1339	- 195	-13%
3. TNF:	NATO:	1595-1385	- 210	-13%
	PACT:	3794-4117	+ 323	+ 9%

D. 1975 - 1979

		NUMBER OF UNITS		
		<u>1975-1979</u>	<u>NET</u>	<u>% CHANGE</u>
1. LRINF:	NATO:	274- 350	+ 76	+28%
	PACT:	1339-1250	- 89	- 7%
2. LRINF+	NATO:	322- 398	+ 76	+24%
	PACT:	1339-1250	- 89	- 7%
3. TNF:	NATO:	1385-1283	- 102	- 7%
	PACT:	4117-4478	+ 361	+ 9%

KEY: LRINF: All nuclear systems in Europe and Western USSR with ranges between 100 and 3500 n.m.

LRINF+: Same as above plus Poseidon SLBMs assigned to SACEUR.

TNF: All nuclear systems with ranges less than 3500 n.m. except dual-purpose artillery and naval aircraft.

SOURCE: See Appendix E, Table 2,

(as NATO forces rose by 37-60% and Pact forces declined by 13%). However, the precipitous drop in elite perceptions from 1975-79 cannot be explained by these indicators alone. Even if one considers the impact of modernization programs in the post-1975 period (See Table F.5, LRTNFT) the change in NATO forces is at least as large as the increase in Pact forces, and much more in total percentages. The indicator that most closely matches the trends of perceptions would, therefore, seem to be TNE, with Soviet modernization programs magnifying perceptions of changes in NDV inventories^B (See Table F.5) as was true in the case of strategic delivery vehicles.⁹

^B Authors' Note: This would tend to explain the minute levels of responses to Codebook variables dealing with tactical nuclear forces. Most short range missiles and aircraft that one would consider tactical may have been included under the theater nuclear rubric.

Second Note: A secondary explanation may lie in the fact that virtually no one considered deemed theater/regional forces salient in 1971/75. The large increase in awareness by 1979 suggests that even though LRTEF or LRINF totals fell for the USSR until 1978-79, elites were unaware of (or unimpressed) with this drop and only perceived the Soviet modernization efforts which began to receive considerable attention CIRCA 1978.

⁹There is, however, one difference: although modernization programs for US SNF apparently had little effect on perceptions of US capabilities, which varied more or less directly with the modernization of Soviet SNF, this was not the case for US/NATO TNDVs. Here, the drop in perceptions of their contribution to security was only about half as steep as the rate of increase in modern Soviet TNDVs. (Compare Figure 7.5 with Table F.5) this will suggest either that:

- a. US/NATO modernization programs had some impact on perceptions; or that
- b. Other forces (such as French and perhaps British missile submarines) were factored into perceptions of capabilities.

TABLE F.5

PERCENT OF MODERN FORCES IN THEATER/REGIONAL/INVENTORIES

A. US/NATO

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>LRTNF+ (NEW)¹</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>TNF (NEW)²</u>	<u>%</u>
1970	235 (13)	5.5	1595 (13)	>1
1971	292 (91)	31.2	1662 (91)	5.5
1972	301 (123)	40.8	1649 (123)	7.5
1973	290 (120)	41.4	1495 (120)	8.0
1974	306 (120)	39.2	1399 (186)	13.3
1975	322 (120)	37.3	1385 (240)	17.3
1976	316 (120)	37.9	1405 (235)	16.7
1977	400 (204)	51.0	1364 (396)	25.3
1978	398 (204)	51.3	1411 (381)	27.0
1979	398 (204)	51.3	1283 (381)	29.7

¹F-III, Poseidon C-3

²F-III, Poseidon C-3, Jaguar

B. SOVIET UNION/PACT

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>LRTNF+ (NEW)³</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>TNF (NEW)⁴</u>	<u>%</u>
1970	1534 (-)	-	3794 (-)	-
1971	1473 (-)	-	3879 (-)	-
1972	1447 (-)	-	3998 (115)	2.8
1973	1437 (-)	-	4013 (225)	5.6
1974	1402 (-)	-	4161 (413)	9.9
1975	1339 (10)	> 1	4117 (493)	12.1
1976	1256 (20)	1.6	3924 (883)	22.5
1977	1107 (30)	2.7	4064 (1230)	30.3
1978	1077 (110)	10.2	4199 (1500)	35.7
1979	1250 (160)	14.4	4478 (1830)	40.9

³SS-20, TU-22M Backfire

⁴SS-20, TU-22M Backfire, SS-21, SU-17C, SU-19/24, MIG 23/27. (Note: Assumed 75% of USSR aircraft inventory available for European missions.)

SOURCES: IISS, The Military Balance 1970/1971 - 1979/1980.

b. The Theater/Regional Nuclear Balance

While elites viewed the composite theater-regional balance as primarily adverse across all time periods (see Chapter 7, Table 7.4, p. 259), a major negative surge occurred between 1975 and 1979 which corresponded with the growing salience of the theater nuclear issue. However, as discussed above, the trends of most of the objective balance indicators were toward parity, as rather large decreases in Soviet LRINF and LRINF+ forces occurred. Only the TNF category generally followed the perceptual trend though actual NDV ratio changes were small, from a Pact advantage of 3.0:1 in 1975 (2.6:1 in 1977) to 3.5:1 in 1979. (See Figure F.5.) This could mean one of three things:

- 1) The perceptions of change generally followed shifts in the TNF balance amplified by the Soviet modernization programs which accompanied these shifts;
- 2) The perceptions of change reflected the general downturn in ratios circa 1978 in vacuo, i.e., separately, without considering (favorable) balance changes in the preceding years (something we cannot validate; or similarly;
- 3) The perceptions of change derived from the publicity given to the growth of Soviet theater/regional forces in and after 1977, as reflected in Chancellor Schmidt's speech of October 1977, the NATO "dual-track" decision of December 1979, etc.

Given the different implications of each finding, this topic may well warrant further research.


In this connection, one can sense a closer association between perceptions of the balance and actual changes in the balance than was true in the case of strategic nuclear forces. It is not likely that this reflects salience (which was, even in 1979, comparatively low) or levels of information, which are, as far as we can determine, less precise than they are for SNF. Although we cannot give any hard and fast reason for this (partial) correlation it may reflect the belief that theater nuclear forces are more likely to be employed than are strategic nuclear forces; in fact, the author of the SOWI report stated that even though strategic forces were of primary importance, it was the sub-strategic forces (conventional and theater nuclear) that in that they are "useable" instruments of military power. (See Chapter 6, p. 230.)

3. Conventional Air, Ground and Naval Forces and the Conventional Balance

a. Conventional Force Capabilities

Following the other perceptual trends, elites perceived Soviet/Fact conventional forces as negatively influencing European security, with concerns increasing after 1975, and with Americans the most pessimistic. (See Chapter 7, Figure 7.6, p. 269). Elite views about US/NATO conventional capabilities were, however, "mixed". (See Chapter 7, Figure 7.7, p. 270.) As a result of this dichotomy, determining those indicators that

FIGURE F.5
THE THEATER/REGIONAL NUCLEAR BALANCE



influence elite perceptions about conventional forces proved more difficult than with either the strategic or theater/regional forces, primarily because no one indicator seemed to predominate for all elites.

As indicated in Chapter 7, elite perceptions of Soviet/Pact conventional forces remained essentially negative and static from 1971-75 and became even more negative thereafter (considerably for Americans and marginally for Europeans). Although one might expect these changes to be influenced by increases in numbers of tanks and/or aircraft, the only indicator that partially correlates with this trend is simple division equivalents.

(See Table F.6.)¹⁰ Similarly, American perceptions of the contributions to security of US/NATO forces, which rose from 1971-1975, could reflect the increase in NATO divisions from 24 to 27. This would not, however, explain British perceptions of NATO capabilities (which rose slightly between 1971-1979), nor French perceptions, which dropped slightly and steadily.¹¹

¹⁰ This Table shows six possible indicators of capabilities. Ratios of combat manpower, the simplest gross indicator, did not appear to be a likely candidate as most elite references focused on those indicators presented and manpower levels remained essentially unchanged (thus maintaining a slight Pact advantage).

¹¹ The rise in British net perceptions (Figure 7.7, p. 270.) is remarkable considering: 1) that most objective indicators did not provide optimism; 2) British elites focused upon conventional issues in the thematic references to external threats (See Chapter 7, Table 7.3, p. 257); and 3) specifically the large number of references to naval matters. Perhaps the British perceived NATO modernization efforts as "over-compensating" for decrease in quantity and thus were sensing an increased ability to perform (although not nearly enough to neutralize Pact strength as reflected by the overwhelming British view of an adverse conventional balance). As for the French, it is impossible to say which indicator(s) provided a sense of (marginally) increasing concerns.

TABLE F.6

CHANGES IN CONVENTIONAL GROUND,
AIR AND NAVAL INDICATORS

A. 1970 - 1975

		NUMBER OF UNITS		
		1970 - 1975	NET	%CHANGE
1. DIVISION EQUIVALENTS* (DIV EQ.)	NATO:	24 - 27	+ 3	+13%
	PACT:	69 - 68	- 1	- 1%
2. MAIN BATTLE TANKS (MBT)	NATO:	5500 - 7000	+1500	+27%
	PACT:	14000 - 19000	+5000	+36%
3. TACTICAL AIRCRAFT* ¹ (TAC)	NATO:	2166 - 2050	- 116	- 5%
	PACT:	3940 - 4024	- 85	+ 2%
4. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS ² (CV)	NATO:	30 - 25	- 5	-17%
	PACT:	2 - 2	-	-
5. MAJOR SURFACE COM- BATANTS (MSC)	NATO:	456 - 414	- 42	- 9%
	PACT:	223 - 250	+ 27	+12%
6. SUBMARINES ³ (SS)	NATO:	196 - 194	- 2	- 1%
	PACT:	304 - 266	- 38	-12%

*North/Central Fronts in Europe and the Western Military Districts of the USSR.

¹Includes all strike aircraft, including nuclear-capable dual purpose systems.

²Includes all carrier types: attack, ASW, VSTOL and Helicopter.

³Includes nuclear and diesel attack submarines.

SOURCES: See Appendix E, Tables 3 and 4.

TABLE F.6

CHANGES IN CONVENTIONAL GROUND,
AIR AND NAVAL INDICATORS (Cont'd)

B. 1975 - 1979

		<u>NUMBER OF UNITS</u>		
		<u>1975 - 1979</u>	<u>NET</u>	<u>% CHANGE</u>
1. DIVISION EQUIVALENTS*	:	NATO: 27 - 27	-	-
(DIV EQ.)	:	PACT: 68 - 76	+ 8	+ 12%
2. MAIN BATTLE TANKS*	:	NATO: 7000 - 7000	-	-
(MBT)	:	PACT: 19000 - 20500	+1500	+ 8%
3. TACTICAL AIRCRAFT* ¹	:	NATO: 2050 - 2350	+ 300	+ 15%
(TAC)	:	PACT: 4025 - 4200	+ 175	+ 4%
4. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS ²	:	NATO: 25 - 26	+ 1	+ 4%
(CV)	:	PACT: 2 - 4	+ 2	+100%
5. MAJOR SURFACE COM-	:	NATO: 414 - 396	- 18	- 4%
BATANTS	:	PACT: 250 - 279	+ 29	+ 12%
(MSC)	:			
6. SUBMARINES ³	:	NATO: 194 - 192	- 2	- 1%
(SS)	:	PACT: 266 - 274	+ 8	+ 3%

*North/Central Fronts in Europe and the Western Military Districts of the USSR.

¹Includes all strike aircraft including nuclear-capable dual purpose systems.

²Includes all carrier types; attack, ASW, VSTOL and Helicopter.

³Includes nuclear and diesel attack submarines.

SOURCES: See Appendix E, Tables 3 and 4.

Although it is possible that changes in perceptions would have a higher correlation with changes in some combination of indicators, which would vary with the rationality and the profession of elites, we have no way of proving this. We suspect that a closer association lies with another set of indicators for which we have no good data: those dealing with modernization. Our reasons for believing this are as follows:

- 1) Both before and during this period most elites seemed resigned to quantitative inferiority (within limits), in large measure because this was offset by NATO's qualitative superiority;
- 2) During the 1970's the Soviet Union accelerated its programs for the modernization of its conventional forces, programs which by the latter half of that decade were both visible and significant;¹²
- 3) The Americans (who seemed to be most affected by changes in Soviet/Pact conventional forces) were the loudest advocates of "military-oriented" solutions to NATO problems.

¹²During the 1970s the Soviet Union introduced new battle tanks (T-72), self propelled artillery (122/152/204mm), air defense missiles (SA-6, SA-8), surface-to-surface missiles (SS-21), tactical aircraft (MIG-23, SU-17, SU-19/24) and major combat ships (Kara and Kresta II cruisers, Krivak frigates, Tango class submarines and Moskva VTOL aircraft carriers). See John Collins, U.S. - Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities 1960-1980 (New York: McGraw-Hill Publications Co., 1980). Appendix 2, pp. 470-520. Moreover, in terms of divisions, the Soviets increased manpower, tank and artillery holdings in front-line units, thus increasing the firepower of already existing combat formations. Ibid., p. 212 and pp. 306-307.

We admit that this judgement is highly speculative; however it would seem reasonable that gross changes in Soviet capabilities, reflecting changes in division equivalents and the introduction of masses of new modern equipment could explain the shifts in perceptions which we recorded earlier.

b. The Conventional Balance

The conventional balance was universally observed as adverse to the West by American and European elites (See Chapter 7, Table 7.4, p. 259). Moreover, this negative evaluation increased over time, especially between 1975-79. Correspondingly, most of the objective indicators (division equivalents, main battle tanks, tactical aircraft and submarines) also remained adverse to the West throughout the period, but only division equivalents and tanks shifted (as did perceptions) more in favor of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. (See Figures F.6 and F.7.) It is unlikely that the naval indicators played a large role in elite views of the balance as (except for submarines) the West maintained a (decreasing) lead, which was not reflected in perceptions. Thus, it would appear that elite perceptions of the conventional military balance are primarily affected by the numbers of major ground combat units and secondarily by the rate of introduction and numbers of the latest modern equipment, with all that this implies for increased capabilities. Moreover, the capabilities of Soviet/Pact forces would seem to weigh more heavily in evaluations of the balance than those of NATO, as elites did not seem to react to as consistently or as much to NATO modernization efforts.

FIGURE F.6
THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE -
AIR AND GROUND FORCES





FIGURE E.7
THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE-NAVAL FORCES



4. The Overall Military Balance

a. Force Postures

Presumably the overall military balance is a composite of the three balances already discussed--though it may also include defense organization, the military-economic base and other factors not analyzed here. The analyses we have made indicate that the Soviet Union led throughout the period in theater-based ground and air forces and in theater nuclear forces above the battlefield level, and that in the latter part of the decade it achieved numerical superiority in strategic nuclear forces. Along with this went a large-scale effort at modernization, which enhanced Soviet capabilities of all kinds. On this basis, therefore, we could expect views of the overall balance to be adverse throughout the period, becoming more so in the period 1975-1979.

b. Perceptions

In point of fact, allied perceptions of the balance did not follow that pattern; save for the French in 1979, more elites deemed the overall balance equal or favorable than characterized it as adverse.¹³ Although we can only speculate about the reasons for this, it would appear that:

¹³So, in that same year, did US and West German publics -- who were, incidentally, more optimistic than their respective elites. Schönborn, *op. cit.*, Appendix D, Table 3; However, note on Table 7.4, p. 259, by 1979 the largest single category for all elites was the perception of an adverse overall balance.

- 1) In the case of American, British and French elites, perceptions of the strategic balance carried the most weight;
- 2) In the case of British and French elites, however, perceptions of (increasingly adverse) theater nuclear and conventional balances were reflected in increasingly adverse perceptions overall balance, albeit at a lower level. (Table 7.4, pp. 259 and 260.)
- 3) The differences in perceptions between Americans and Europeans is an interesting find. It would seem to suggest that assessments of the overall balance are significantly affected by perceptions of the elements of an adversary's forces most likely to affect the home territories of the respective elites.¹⁴

This again, however, is a subject for further research.

¹⁴This finding would explain the British preoccupation with naval forces, which pose an indirect, if not a direct, threat to the United Kingdom. It may also explain West European concern about Soviet SS-20s and other theater nuclear forces, epitomized in Chancellor Schmidt's speech of October 20, 1977.