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MILITARY FAMILIES  
THE MILITARY IN MEDITERRANEAN DEMOCRACIES  
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION

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### PREFACE

This book results from papers presented at the Eleventh World Congress of Sociology held under the auspices of the International Sociological Association in New Delhi, India, August 18 - 22, 1986. Almost three dozen papers were presented and discussed in nine academic sessions during the five meeting days of the Research Committee on Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution.

The volume at hand contains eleven papers covering three major research topics: Section I deals with problems and prospects of military families; Section II informs on the role of the military during periods of rapid socio-political change in Italy, Portugal, and Spain; Section III focuses on conscientious objection in Australia, Switzerland, and Norway.

As the editor of the FORUM INTERNATIONAL series I am most grateful to the Research Committee's Executive Secretary Dr. Jürgen Kuhlmann for his efforts in preparing the volume. While this is being printed he is about to assort a second compilation of Delhi papers to be published in Fall/Winter. Also my appreciation goes to the authors for their cooperation in reviewing their contributions and reading the proofs.

Munich, August 1987

Bernhard Fleckenstein  
Director and Professor

Section I

**MILITARY FAMILIES**  
**CURRENT ISSUES AND DIRECTIONS OF CHANGE**

Charlene Lewis

DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTY:  
AMERICAN MILITARY FAMILIES IN EUROPE

The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and should not be construed as representing either the Department of Defence or the Department of the Army.

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## C O N T E N T S

## Abstract

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## Abstract

A variety of significant changes have taken place in the recent past which affect the ways in which American soldiers and their families deal with an extended tour in Europe. In order to put these changes into a comprehensive structure in which they may be viewed, theories are adapted from the field of organizational development. Using this framework it is anticipated that differences among families (principally those who cope successfully and those who do not) will become more understandable and this understanding may lead to broader changes in policies and procedures which affect military families.

## Defining the 'New' Army Family:

At any given time, roughly one third of all active duty personnel in the United States Army are stationed outside of the continental United States. This means that approximately 200,000 army personnel and a nearly equal number of their family members are experiencing an OCONUS (outside of the continental United States) tour of duty. For many of these families, the experience will be both rich and rewarding, giving them an opportunity to experience other cultures and other ways of life. For others, the experience will be close to unbearable, an additional hardship inflicted upon them by an already uncaring, unresponsive military personnel system. Between these two extremes will fall a multitude of other reactions. This paper is an attempt to draw together these experiences and place them along a comprehensive continuum, one of the major dimensions of which is the experience of uncertainty.

Before expanding on this concept of uncertainty and examining its effect on the experiences of American Army families, however, it will be useful to review first the changing nature of the American Army and its families.

Over the past forty years, three broad changes have taken place, within the United States Army and within the American culture, which dramatically affect the lives of U.S. Army families stationed in Europe. Briefly, these changes are:

- (1) the changing demographics of the army brought on, in part, by the transition to an all volunteer force;
- (2) the so-called crisis in the American nuclear family; and
- (3) the changing nature of the mission of the U.S. Army in Europe.

Each of these changes is significant in itself; however, viewed together, their impact is sufficient to radically alter the environment within which U.S. soldiers and families of today must live.

The abolition of the draft system and the transition to an all volunteer force has changed the army from an organization of conscripts to an organization of volunteers. The ramifications of this change have been enormous, for soldiers and policy-makers alike. Among the most noticeable of the effects is the fact that the armed services have for the first time in their history found themselves subjected to the same economic and market forces that affect the civilian economy. Generally speaking, there is an inverse relation-

ship between the national American economy and the degree of difficulty in obtaining high quality recruits. When the economy is poor, inflation and unemployment high, the number of potential recruits increases. Quotas at recruitment offices are quickly filled, and the quality of the recruits themselves tends to increase (Goldich, 1981). Conversely, when opportunities in the private sector are good, armed services recruitment tends to drop off, and recruitment quotas are filled more slowly. This market effect is expected to be further exacerbated by the declining birth rate of the 1970's which by the 1990's will mean a smaller cohort of candidates for recruitment into all branches of the armed services.

Therefore, recruitment, once an automatic phenomenon generated by a local draft board, is now a policy issue, and attention must be paid to making the military an attractive alternative to a civilian career. Incentives, such as enlistment bonuses for particular MOSs (military occupational specialties), an enhanced G.I. Bill (whereby the soldier attends college first and then enters the military), and opportunities for travel can become as important as actual career opportunities. Further, once the distinction is made between military service and employment in the civilian sector, it then becomes important for the army to make itself a more attractive alternative than another branch of the uniformed services. Potential recruits may now 'shop' among the army, navy, marines and air force for what they perceive to be the most attractive package of vocational and educational benefits and career and travel opportunities.

In a similar vein, retention of highly trained and well-qualified soldiers has become an area of



great concern and continual study, as competition with private industry for skilled technicians and professionals becomes more of an issue than ever before. Since the army, as an organizational entity, cannot independently increase its benefits (and hence its attractiveness), other inducements not requiring an act of Congress must be examined. Early studies, such as those by Szoc (1982), provided convincing evidence that 'quality of life' issues, particularly those which affect the family, had enormous impact on the service member's decision whether or not to re-enlist. Many of the inducements, then, to which the armed services turned their attention dealt with 'intangibles' such as changes in living quarters policies, improvements in opportunities for schooling while in the service, and some freedom in selecting the next assignment. Indeed, the army and all of its sister services must, in fact, deal with these environmental issues in new ways if they are to continue to recruit and retain a well-trained, ready force.

The largest and perhaps most noticeable effect of the all-volunteer force, however, has been in the dramatic change in the army's demography, particularly in the large increase in the number of married soldiers. Traditionally, young men were drafted into the military during their school careers and before establishing their own families. These draftees fulfilled their military commitments and then returned to their lives as civilians, often marrying as they left the service. Until the mid-1950's, only a small percentage (roughly one third) of career soldiers were married. Moreover, army policies did not encourage or financially support a married, enlisted soldier, especially among the junior ranks. Since 1972, however, the trend has been towards an annual increase in the number of married soldiers, both career and transitional.

By 1984, 87 % of all officers and 55 % of all enlisted soldiers were married. By 1985, nearly 25 % of all soldiers enlisting in the army were already married before beginning their first tour of duty in the service (Defense '83), and of these, as many as 10 % already had at least one child (Martin, 1984). The next result of this increase in married personnel and their dependents is that the U.S. Army now has more family members associated with it than it does active duty personnel.

As the above changes were taking place in the army, broader cultural changes have taken place in the United States which directly affect the American family in general and military families in particular. Generally, these changes are grouped under such terms as the "decline of the nuclear family" or the "breakdown of the American family" and include such items as the increased participation of mothers of school-aged children in the work-force, a rapidly increasing divorce rate, the increase of family violence and the absence of strong ties to the extended family. Wives and mothers who traditionally remained at home to raise children are increasingly seeking employment outside of the home; some seek employment because of the economic necessity for a second income, and others because of the increased sense of self-esteem and self-worth. It is estimated that roughly 60 % of women with school-aged children now work outside of the home, and that number is expected to increase (U.S. Census Bureau, 1981). Two-parent households, once the American ideal, now comprise less than 80 % of all households (U.S. Census Bureau, 1980). Coupled with an increasing trend for marriages to dissolve early, this percentage is also expected to drop over the next ten years. Extended family households of more than two generations, once perceived as the norm in American

life, now comprise less than 4 % of all American households. Non-traditional family configurations are indeed rapidly becoming the norm, while the traditional constellation of husband-wife-and-children is becoming increasingly more rare.

Although the army remains one of the last bastions of the intact nuclear family, with less than 5 % of all army families headed by a single parent, it does not mean that these families have completely escaped the impact of these trends. A major roadblock to the single-parent household was removed in 1971, when pregnant soldiers were allowed to remain in the military during their pregnancies; nor are female soldiers any longer required to choose between their children and military service (Women's Equity Action League, 1984). Although single women with children are not permitted to enlist in the army, should they become a single parent during their tour of duty (either through divorce or pregnancy), they can no longer be discharged solely on the basis of their new status. A similar set of standards is now also applied to single male soldiers with children as well.

More than ever, army wives, like their civilian counterparts, are seeking employment outside of the home and are increasingly convincing both the family and the army itself to recognize the validity and the necessity of their doing so. Most recent in a series of moves designed to assist military spouses with employment is Executive Order 12345, signed by President Ronald Reagan. Under certain circumstances outlined in the Executive Order, government agencies may now hire military family members outside of the normal competitive procedures for civil service. Further, volunteer work, once the cornerstone of the military wife's obligation and contribution to the

army, is now recognized as legitimate work experience and can be used by the spouse as a stepping-stone to paid employment. Indeed, at several major USAREUR posts, employee assistance centers have been set up to assist spouses with prior volunteer experience turn these assets into paid employment.

Family violence, increasing in the civilian population, is also on the rise among army families (ACS, 1984). Whether this rise is an artifact of an enhanced army reporting system and increased levels of community awareness or whether it is an actual statistical trend remains unknown at this point. Current research in this area, however, has begun to isolate military-specific factors (principally extended separations and unit assignments) as specific stressors thought to exacerbate the problem of both spouse and child abuse (Russell, 1985).

The final factor which we must consider here is the nature of the United States Army in Europe (USAREUR). Since the end of World War II, an American military presence has been maintained throughout much of Europe, but its role has evolved from that of an occupying force to that of an invited military presence which maintains its own military posts within the borders of its NATO allies. More than recent shifts in international policy and politics, advances in technology or the re-direction of the military's mission, this change has had two major impacts on soldiers stationed abroad. First, an occupying force does not typically bring its families with it, and, in an effort to counter memories of this earlier status, American soldiers are now increasingly encouraged to bring wives, children and family pets with them when stationed overseas. Second, it has meant that American soldiers

stationed abroad are now taught to refer to themselves as 'guests' of the host nation, and are regularly exhorted to fulfill the behaviors and attitudes that are commensurate with that status. Both of these changes will be discussed more fully below.

These three factors - the continuing changes in American family life, the demographic changes in the army itself, and the nature of the U.S. Army in Europe - have not only affected the quality and nature of military family life in general, but also the very study of these families. In order to encompass the variety of family life styles and to attempt to explain the differences between successful and unsuccessful families, new theoretical constructs must be developed and used.

#### The "Typical" Army Family

Before beginning the theoretical section of this paper, it would be appropriate to give a quick, statistical profile of a typical army family. Obviously, it is not practical or possible to deal with all of the permutations of army family types, and indeed, the conditions for families with two service members, with a female soldier and a civilian husband or for single parents are special cases deserving an amount of consideration which is simply not possible here. Therefore, in this paper, we will deal exclusively with the configuration of male soldier, civilian wife and children. A profile of both the enlisted and officer family was recently developed by the Military Family Resource Center and will be repeated here.

#### The 'Average' Enlisted Family

The uniformed member is male, 23 years old, has a high school diploma and has been in military service a little over four years. He holds the rank of E-4 and will shortly make the rank of E-5. He is married, and his wife is 21 years of age; she too, has a high school diploma. They have been married for three years and have one child with another child on the way. Their military salary (including housing allowance) is \$ 1,144.00 per month, and the service member earns another \$ 290.00 per month moonlighting (which is approximately the same amount the wife was earning before she became pregnant again). They are about \$ 3,000 in debt.

#### The 'Average' Officer's Family

The uniformed member is male, 29 years old, has a B.A.-level degree, and has been in military service five years. He is at the pay grade of O-3. He is married; his wife is 27 years old and attended college for a little over two years. They have one pre-school aged child. Their military salary (including housing allowance) is \$ 1,620.00 per month. The wife earns another \$ 600.00 a month at her job. They are about \$ 7,000.00 in debt.

(Center for Military Family Support, 1984)

A few other points about the typical army family should also be made here. First, all of these families (officer and enlisted) are characterized by frequent geographic moves both within the United States and to foreign countries. A recent DoD survey showed that:

29 % of surveyed enlisted personnel have been at their present location less than one year. 36% between one and two years, and 21 % between two and three years. Among officers, 33 % have been at their present location less than one year, 33 % between one and two years, and 22 % between two and three years. (Doering and Hutzler 1982: p. 161)

The high level of geographic mobility is frequently cited as a major hardship of army family life. The stressful ramifications of multiple family moves include: geographic separation from the extended family and other elements of the family's support network; disruption of children's schooling; disruption of the wife's employment or career, and a concomitantly lower contribution of her salary to the finances of the household; and an increased financial burden associated with unreimbursed moving expenses and other financial losses subsequent to the move. Equally characteristic of the army family is the frequent absence of the father from home. Although the reasons are varied and legitimate (field exercises, training, unaccompanied tours and special schooling), the effects on the wife/mother are very similar, and have been grouped under such terms as "submariners' wives syndrome" (Isay, 1968) and "intermittent husband syndrome" (Morrice, 1985). Disruption in the household in terms of roles and expectations is the norm, rather than the exception, for these families. Wives, accustomed to sharing some of the household and child care responsibilities with their husbands, are on their own, frequently for extended periods of time and often without assistance from their own, geographically distant families. They become, in fact, geographic single parents, but with none of the supports normally offered to women in these circumstances. Some wives cope successfully with the periods of se-

paration, and their independence is nurtured by the separation. New skills and successfully managing a home and family alone can be, in fact, a source of pride and self-esteem for both husband and wife.

Regardless of the couple's attitude about the success of the separation and regardless of its perceived success, they must further endure an equally stressful reunion period, for which ironically, "there is evidence that families that have coped best during the separation experience have greater difficulties reintegrating the service member into the family" (Segal, 1985: p. 19). Wives who have successfully extended their roles and exercised sole judgments in household affairs may become reluctant to return to the previous status of sharing the decision-making, and husbands may well feel threatened that their roles have been usurped and that the family no longer 'needs' them.

For the purposes of examining the army family's overseas experience, we should also mention here that before their OCONUS tour of duty, many of these families have never before left the United States. Some, indeed, had never been away from home until their first service related move. Many have never met a foreigner and have no training in other cultures. With the exception of the Hispanic population, only a very few have acquired skills in foreign languages.

#### The Principle of Uncertainty:

One of the central premises of this paper is that army families, perhaps more than any other type

of American family, are confronted with the task of continually making decisions in an uncertain and changing environment. In this respect, army families have much in common with corporate business managers, and it is perhaps fruitful to adapt some of the theoretical constructs of organizations and management from this field. As with all analogies, there are areas of 'imperfect fit' - army families will not go out of business, generally speaking, through a series of bad decisions (although they may well end up at or near bankruptcy); nor do they necessarily compete with each other for success in the market place. However, the analytic components of the environment in which both families and corporations find themselves and the necessary skills for making the best decisions in a changing environment are strong areas of similarity which need to be explored.

Uncertainty here is used to describe situations (from the trivial to the critical) in the environment in which the outcome of any action or decision cannot be predicted or cannot be predicted with a great deal of accuracy. Uncertainty is not an absolute, but rather a continuum along which a variety of life-styles and events can be placed. The lack of predictability may be quite small, and the decision-makers reasonably confident of the desired outcome. Or, the doubt may be large, and the decision-maker totally unable to predict, prepare for or control the outcome. Further, areas of uncertainty in the environment do not necessarily remain stable, and families can learn about the environment, thus making it increasingly less a source of uncertainty. Equally important is the perception of the environment by the family itself. In the context of this paper, one family may find that the move from Fort Hood, Texas, to Baumholder, Federal Republic of Germany, connotes a move into a relatively comfort-

able environment; however, another, similarly-configured family, may find themselves totally ill at ease at their new duty station.

As with the corporate business environment, the degree of uncertainty inherent in any given situation can be viewed as the interaction of one or more major characteristics of the environment surrounding the family (see, for example, Jelinek et al., 1981; Bedeian, 1980; and, Khandwalla, 1977). For the army family, perhaps the most compelling factors are restrictiveness of the environment itself, stability or turbulence within the environment and the perception of hostility, both personal and institutional. Like the principle of uncertainty itself, each of these characteristics can occur along a continuum - from non-restrictive to highly restrictive, from stable to unstable, and from hostile to benign. We can also postulate that uncertainty has a cumulative effect, and that a combination of small amounts of each of the three major factors may well result in the family's viewing the environment as maximally uncertain.

As a final part of the principle of uncertainty, we can speculate that the placement of any given situation along the dimensions of this continuum would appear to be mediated by information and the perception of the individual decision-maker. It would be appropriate here to discuss both the major characteristics of uncertainty and the effect of information separately.

Restrictiveness: "A restrictive environment is one in which the organization must operate under many constraints. These constraints may be legal . . . they may be political . . . there can also be many cultural constraints." (Khandwalla,

1977: pp. 339 - 340) It is not difficult to perceive the army as an institution which is much more restrictive than employment in the civilian sector, and indeed the army, along with its sister services, has been called "a way of life, not a job". Indeed, whether one views the restrictions as having a legal, political or even a cultural basis becomes a moot point since the net effect on soldier and family alike is approximately the same. Regulations abound and cover a seemingly endless array of professional and personal details from establishing an internal and validated hierarchy of professional relationships (which can spill over into the family's social life), with proscribed behaviors covering even the type of greeting due a superior, from the length of a hair cut to the proper quality of shine on one's boots. Nor do family members escape the effect of the army's ability to restrict the soldier's behavior. For, through the soldier, the army controls the family's access to many necessary goods and services.

The degree to which the individual soldier perceives the army as a restrictive organization and the degree to which he perceives these restrictions as affecting his personal life form the continuum along which we must evaluate the personal experiences of the army family living overseas. In essence, the soldier experiences the restrictions directly, and, then, passes his knowledge of the 'system' on to his family who then experiences the restrictions in a somewhat more indirect fashion. At one end, the army provides a structure for the soldier's life and behavior, a set of consistent rules which provide comfort and guidance in an otherwise uncertain environment. At the other end of the spectrum, the regulations, policies and normative army values are perceived to be unnecessary intrusions, a violation of the necessary distance between public life and private person.

In terms of assessing the most effective type of corporate planning, "a restrictive environment begets a need for a good deal of careful planning and controlling of operations and a fact- and research-based scientific approach to decision making. This is especially true where the restrictions are largely legal in nature and imposed on the organization because of its monopoly nature or because it serves vital public interests" (Khandwalla, 1977: p. 340). An analogous set of statements can also be made for American army families overseas. First, the American Army in Europe is, in terms of its families, a monopolistic organization in that the army itself is the only American-based set of agencies and offices available, supplying (and thus controlling) everything from grocery stores and schools to housing and legal assistance. Second, the army in Europe is itself controlled to some extent by the international Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) with its NATO allies. SOFAs cover an enormous array of details from how many Americans or local nationals can be employed to what items must be sold in limited quantities at the commissary to whether or not a spouse can become an Avon lady. In an overseas environment, these restrictions, particularly those of which impose or imply a limit on the choices available to family members, become particularly important, and a fact-based decision-making process becomes a necessity.

#### Stability and Turbulence:

A stable environment holds few surprises for one who has been socialized into its mores and customs. "What little change occurs is highly predictable. The information about the environment is easy to get and generally fairly reliable" (Khandwalla, 1977: pp. 333 - 334). Again, we might easily view the institution of the army as a stable environment for the soldier in which

changes (whether of a policy nature or personal status) are usually discussed far in advance of implementation. However, we must also remember that while the army as an institution is relatively stable, one of the keystones of a successful career within this institution (and one of its overriding characteristics) is a high degree of geographic mobility.

The effect of such institutional stability carried out against a background of geographic mobility would seem to be unequal on all soldiers and similarly unequal on all members of the family. For the most part, the soldier-husband goes from one occupational setting to a roughly similar setting where he enjoys a built-in set of ascribed statuses and a reasonably accurate forecast of the roles he will assume and the expectations that he must meet. A recent study of marines involved in permanent changes of station (PCS) showed that the closer a new job is to the old one in structure and content, the easier it is for the service member to become socialized into the new group and the more quickly he adjusts to his new environment (Woodman and Shaw, 1982). Often the work group at a new duty station will become his initial social group as well, and, indeed, the army assists in this process by assigning a "sponsor" for him from his new unit. His family, however, moves geographically without the same amount of prior knowledge and often without the built-in social assistance inherent in an occupational setting. Sponsorship, extended through the husband, may or may not effectively extend to the family, and often the soldier's adjustment is far speedier than that of the other family members.

Whether the soldier and his family view their environment as stable or turbulent (or, where they

would place their current environment on such a continuum) depends on the twin variables of information and perception. At the extreme end of the continuum in a completely unfamiliar environment, the family will be unable to make coherent sense of the events which they see around them, unable to untangle themselves from bureaucratic necessities, unable to obtain the necessary information with which to make decisions and may ultimately decide that the new environment is one with which they do not wish to deal. For soldiers and families living overseas, the phenomenon is so common that it has its own terminology. "Little America Syndrome" is a phrase used to characterize the family who rejects even the idea of interacting with the new cultural environment and who thus limits itself to dealing only with other Americans and American-sponsored activities. (A single soldier experiencing the same phenomenon will be referred to as a 'barracks rat'.) Similarly, family members who fail to make the initial necessary adjustments to their new environment may be "ERODed", an acronym from the phrase "early return of dependents" whereby family members are sent back to the United States in advance of their soldier-sponsor.

When a new duty station is familiar, we can postulate that the family will find the environment much less turbulent and disturbing. In between the extremes of turbulence and stability is again a continuum. Families who are able to secure accurate information and to use it appropriately for their needs may well find that there are some positive aspects to the uncertainty surrounding them. "A highly turbulent environment is a challenging environment because of this blend of uncertainty and opportunity" (Khandwalla, 1977: p. 334). For families this blend can mean the excitement of exploring a new city or country, the experience of exotic food and the discovery of different life styles.

Hostility: Environmental hostility for army families needs to be broken down into two basic sources, the army itself and the surrounding civilian environment in which the family is living. As we have mentioned above, the traditional army was essentially an organization of unmarried men, and it seems reasonable to state that discouraging marriage was one way of assuring, at least temporarily, the undivided loyalty of the soldier to the institution. Marriage was encouraged (and, indeed, considered a social necessity) only for officers, and then only for those who were career-minded. The wives of these soldiers, however, had roles and functions tightly proscribed and validated by the army structure. Further, these roles were designed and intended to complement the husband's roles as commander and officer. Young enlisted soldiers who wished to marry found a variety of bureaucratic roadblocks in their paths and even had to seek permission from their chain of command before they were allowed to marry. Little was offered in the way of assistance for the young couple. In fact, this situation was commonly typified by the tongue-in-cheek expression: "If the army wanted you to have a wife, they would have issued you one."

Theoretically, the U. S. Army of the 1980's presents no roadblocks to the young married soldier and his family. Soldiers may marry without permission and be accompanied by the family to most duty stations. Activities for families, job opportunities for wives, and acknowledgment of the family's contribution to the mission of the army have all become more frequent. Even the pejorative term "dependent" used to describe spouses and children has been replaced in most of the official literature by the phrase "family member". The traditional attitudes, however, have not necessarily disappeared, or even been erased from the standard administrative procedures. A wife

who has lost her own identification card will quickly discover:

- (1) that she cannot replace the card by applying for another by herself;
- (2) that she needs her husband's permission in order to replace the card; and
- (3) that her husband cannot replace it for her without demonstrable proof (e.g. a valid marriage certificate) that they are, in fact, married.

The other source of environmental hostility which army families experience stems from the army's relationship with the surrounding civilian community.

Typically, army posts are located in the U.S. in rural areas or near small towns, sometimes making the town a "company town" with the soldiers a prime source of revenue for the local businesses. The economic interdependence, however, need not be a benign or mutually beneficial one, and businesses may well use their positions to exploit the soldiers and their families. In many areas, landlords who own low cost housing near major army posts would seem to keep informed about the latest pay raises and increases in housing allowances and to ensure that their housing units cost no more (and no less) than the maximum amount which the average soldier can afford to pay. Area businesses may advertise: "No credit check for soldiers", or "E-1s and up, instant credit available", encouraging soldiers and family members to incur more consumer debt than their family budget can sustain. Employers in some areas use the local pool of family members as a source of minimum-wage labor, justifying this by the fact that they, as adjuncts to the service member, will be leaving shortly anyway.



Information: One of the key distinctions which needs to be made in discussing the relationship between uncertainty and information is that not all 'facts' are information and that not all information comes in the form of 'facts'. In order for information to dispel uncertainty (or to lessen the impact of the uncertainty) certain conditions need to be met.

- (1) The information needs to be available to the decision-maker.
- (2) The information needs to be relevant to the uncertain situation.
- (3) The information needs to be accurate.
- (4) The information needs to be useful or in a useful form, and perhaps most importantly.
- (5) The decision-maker in the uncertain environment needs to know that the information has been previously missing.

A brief example of the difficulty surrounding information may be useful. The following appeared in EurTour, a publication containing facts for Americans living in the Federal Republic of Germany:

Whereas electrical power in the United States is 110 volts, 60 cycles, power in Germany is 220 volts, 50 cycles.... This means that you'll need one or more transformers to operate your American 110-volt appliances... nothing more is required. All you have to do is buy a transformer locally, plug it into the socket and plug your appliance into the transformer. (1981, 32)

Although this sounds relatively straight forward, several pieces of misinformation can be construed in the above paragraph. First, one could easily assume that a transformer is necessary for each

American appliance when in fact this is not the case. Lamps may be used with an adapter and 220 volt bulbs; no transformer is necessary. Even other appliances may be used with adapter plugs if they were designed and built with dual voltage. Second, "all you have to do is to buy a transformer" totally neglects the concept that transformers are frequently more expensive to buy than a replacement appliance which runs on the local current (e.g., a transformer which will run a 1,000 watt hair dryer costs approximately \$ 75.00; a new 220-volt hairdryer can be purchased for about \$ 15.00 at the Post Exchange). Finally, some appliances, notably televisions and turn tables, will not work at all without special modifications.

The ability to evaluate the relevance and the usefulness of the information, however, comes only with experience.

#### Generic Uncertainties in Army Life:

Inherent in military service whether stateside or in Europe are the twin uncertainties of armed conflict and possible injury or death in combat. Predicated as it is on the international situation and the decisions of the U.S. Congress and the President, the uncertainty of armed conflict is well beyond the ability of the individual soldier either to predict or control. Similarly, the uncertainty of injury or death in combat are probabilities against which the soldier can only prepare through training and experience. As large in scale as these uncertainties are, however, they do not affect all soldiers equally.

To some extent, the probability that a soldier will be involved in either of these situations depends on the soldier's military occupational speciality (his MOS) and his current duty station. It is much less likely, for example, that an administrative clerk stationed in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, will be involved in combat than it is for an infantry soldier stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Further, even within the combat arms units, when the decision has been made that the U.S. Army will be involved in the latest "hot spot", it is relatively uncertain which of the combat units will be seen. But, even these somewhat "local" decisions are beyond the control of nearly every soldier, and even further removed from the realm of the family.

We might call situations such as these the "macro-uncertainties" of the army life. On a day-to-day level, these macro-uncertainties would seem to be subsumed by more mundane concerns which, by their very nature, generate yet another set of uncertainties with which the family must cope. As with the macro-uncertainties, some of these are generated at levels far above that of the individual soldier and his family. Again, we find a continuum ranging from the very serious to the somewhat trivial. A major impact on both the soldier and his family can, for example, come with a set of PCS (a permanent change of station) orders. Junior soldiers in particular have little choice about where the army will send them, and even those soldiers who are senior enough or who are in 'shortage' occupations, may find unpleasant surprises in their orders. Among these are locations which are perceived to be undesirable, and a tour where the family will not be allowed to accompany the soldier. Additionally, soldiers may well find that the lead-time to prepare for such a move is much too short in which to accomplish everything that needs to be done. A

final twist which can add measurably to the uncertainty of the PCS orders is called "diversion" in which a soldier who is scheduled to be stationed at place A, finds himself diverted to place B. In the case of European assignments this difference can be as small as the difference between two troop posts or as large as the differences between two countries and whether or not the family will be allowed to accompany the soldier to the new duty station.

Some of the daily uncertainties which confront soldiers and families are unit-specific, local policies which, from an observer's point of view, would seem to be almost whimsically applied. For example, duty hours in many units are not routine, and soldiers may be home as early as 1700 or as late as 2400 on two consecutive days. When these variations take place on a daily basis and when the wife cannot even predict when her husband will come home in the evening, uncertainty increases to the point where it is difficult, if not impossible, for the family even to plan whether or not they will have dinner together. Similarly, some units announce training schedules months ahead of time; others may give almost no notice at all, or may deviate substantially from the announced plans. Either of these situations increases the level of environmental uncertainty and makes both long-term and short-term planning difficult for the family.

Moreover, it is also our contention that as the army family is moved into an overseas environment that the degree of uncertainty in the surrounding environment increases dramatically in that both the number and kind of decisions which need to be made will increase. Further, it appears likely that the degree of success which the family has in adapting to the overseas environment will depend, to a large extent, on the ability of the

family to shift decision-making modes from those that were appropriate and useful at home, to those which will be productive overseas.

The remainder of this paper will be devoted to discussing specific areas of uncertainty and how these are 'played out' in an overseas environment.

#### USAREUR as a Source of Uncertainty:

The time spent in basic training and Advanced Individual Training are both used by the army as principle periods of socializing the civilian recruit into the mores of the army. Although there is no similar training program or socialization process for the family, it is expected that the soldier will take home that which he has learned and convey it to his family. This theory of unilinear information transfer from army to soldier to family works only imperfectly at stateside duty posts and even less well OCONUS.

We must first consider that the 'army' which the soldier learned about and was socialized to in the States is not necessarily the same 'army' which exists in Europe. The appearance of similarity can, in fact, be quite deceptive and cause both soldier and family to question facts learned earlier in their army career. One major difference which is constantly noted by soldiers themselves (and which, incidentally, has a major impact on the family) is that duty hours and training mission are not at all similar to what the soldier experienced at his last CONUS duty station. For the most part, duty hours are perceived to be longer here and to entail many more

'unnecessary' or trivial tasks. Similarly, training areas are often geographically quite distant from troop concentrations and, thus, time spent in the field cannot be broken up easily by the occasional weekend at home.

Many of the other differences which the soldier and his family will experience center around the degree of control which the army in Europe can exert on the soldier directly and indirectly on the family. The level of uncertainty which the family then perceives will be a function primarily of how hostile or benign they believe this control to be and of how consistently they see the rules and regulations applied.

In terms of additional areas of control which the army in Europe can exert, we must remember that initially the mere presence of the family in Europe is at the pleasure and discretion of the army; a privilege (not a right) which must be treated as such by soldiers and family members alike. Many duty stations are not termed suitable for families and are de facto classified by the army as 'unaccompanied tours'. Although the tour length is shorter (twelve to eighteen months, rather than thirty-six), the separation can produce a great deal of hardship - financial, emotional, and social - on the family. Circumventing this classification by bringing the family to an overseas 'unaccompanied' duty site, however, can also lead to serious difficulties for the family and the soldier since the family is not entitled to much assistance from the agencies of the army. Further, the behavior of family members comes under much closer scrutiny in Europe, and 'sponsors' (i.e., the soldiers) are ultimately held responsible not only for their own misconduct but also for that of their family. Soldiers who are unable to 'control' their family members may well

find that the family itself has been sent back to the States.

Second, if the army decides that the soldier may bring his family, they will also decide when this will be allowed to happen. Depending on the location to which the soldier is sent and on the perceived availability of housing in the area, the soldier may be allowed to travel between duty stations with his family (a condition called 'concurrent travel') or he may be told by the army that the family must wait 'at home' for a period of time (called 'deferred travel'). Either of these situations can then be perceived as uncertain.

After arriving in Europe, family members quickly discover yet another major source of uncertainty, namely the re-definition of the family member's status vis-a-vis the army, its agencies and institutions and the local national culture. Many of the rights and privileges which family members enjoyed in the States are not, in fact, available to them overseas. For example, a family member cannot own a car or contract for a car loan in their name alone. Family members are not even permitted to drive a car unless they have passed the special licensing test which, incidentally, they may not take without the sponsor's (i. e., the soldier's) permission.

For soldiers who are granted either concurrent or deferred family travel, the army will then determine who the members of his family are and what their needs will be for housing. The first premise, determining who the members of the family are, causes the average soldier very few problems; although many soldiers find it a nuisance to be asked repeatedly to show valid proof of

their marriage or to display the birth records of their children. We should note here, however, that the generic army perception of 'a family' is that of the traditional nuclear family. Family members, other than a spouse and biological offspring, must be validated as legitimate dependents of the soldier before the army will assist the soldier in moving them to Europe. Often in the case of widowed or aged parents, orphaned sibling or unadopted stepchildren, the soldier may not be able to 'prove' that the family member is indeed a legitimate member of the household, and the request for inclusion may be denied. Similarly, children of previous marriages may or may not be considered as dependents, a decision which would seem to be made without regard to birth records or court orders. Although as we stated above, the problem affects many soldiers at the moment, the current trend toward non-traditional family constellations within the American culture would suggest that this area of deciding who is a member of the family will become increasingly uncertain as time goes on.

Once the constellation of the family is determined, the army will then determine what the specific housing needs of the family are. For soldiers who will live in quarters furnished by the government, this means accepting limits on the amount of living space appropriate to his rank and his family size. Further regulations will govern the furniture to which the family is entitled and even the number of closets which the army believes will be satisfactory to meet their needs. Clearly, for soldiers who choose (or who are forced to choose) government furnished housing, many areas of uncertainty are abolished through policy and regulations. For soldiers who do not choose (or who are simply ineligible for) government housing, the degree of uncertainty in getting the family housed is multiplied.

his environment, one of the necessary prerequisites is that he understands that certain information categories are missing. For many newly-arrived soldiers in Europe, house-hunting opens up a variety of uncertain areas of this type. Under the best of circumstances, looking for a place to live is a stressful and uncertain process. In Europe, the process for American Army families is compounded many times by differences in duty requirements, leasing laws and even vocabulary. For example, soldiers travelling accompanied by their families have a 60-day period during which they are granted a 'temporary living allowance'. Theoretically, this allowance provides for both a temporary living accommodation and meals for the entire family. In practice, it more often seems to be true that the allowance is barely adequate. The family generally spends this time either in an army-run guest house or in the hotel on the local economy. In either case, space is always limited, and seldom are cooking facilities available. The 60-day period for which the soldiers are paid this allowance, however, does not necessarily correspond with the amount of time which is available to the family to look for a place to live. Often the soldier will find that his first week in a new duty station will be spent in processing through the various offices and agencies which will handle his records for the next three years. This process enters the soldier into the 'system' of the army and is a type of rite de passage before the soldier can officially take up his new duties. A second requirement that the soldier must meet soon after arrival is attendance at a two-week Head Start program. Designed to acquaint the soldier with his new locale and to give him rudimentary language skills, the program generally runs from early in the morning until late in the afternoon. As useful as many people perceive the program to be, it nevertheless takes time away from looking for a place to live. By the end of the third week, it

nevertheless takes time away from looking for a place to live. By the end of the third week, it is fairly common for the soldier to be sent to the field, leaving his family to cope as best as they can.

Throughout the house-hunting process, other areas of uncertainty are also bound to occur. To an American, the phrases 'unfurnished apartment' and 'furnished apartment' denote the difference between a living space equipped with furniture and one that includes no furniture. The fact that these phrases do not convey this meaning in European parlance sets up a condition of uncertainty for the soldier trying to find a place for his family to live. Not only do words and phrases have different meanings, but his environment has now taken on a new degree of instability in which even his own language cannot be trusted to convey the meaning of an idea properly. A soldier who is caught unawares by this change in meaning may or may not learn to question other standard phrases; and we can predict that the longer it takes him to realize that meanings can change, the more uncertain he will find his new environment.

#### Managing Financial Uncertainty

As we mentioned above, military families are characterized by a slightly lower family income than their civilian counterparts. The financial uncertainty which surrounds the military family is, in general, somewhat different from that of the civilian family. Whereas individuals employed in private industry may be uncertain as to the future of their company or the security of their jobs, the concerns of soldiers and their families

center around their ability to make their pay stretch to the end of the month. For military families are not exempt from the economic forces which compel so many families to need two incomes in order to survive. Inflation in the civilian economy, which drives prices upward at a rate faster than the increase in wages, also affects the military family. Indeed, for many young families, the second income is not a luxury, reserved for 'extras' like vacations and better stereo equipment; rather it is a necessity in order to ensure the family's financial survival.

A family move overseas, however, can add some new dimensions to the family's economic difficulties. First, it would seem to be true that a move "at the expense and convenience" of the U. S. government does not necessarily mean that the move is free-of-charge for the soldier and his family. Based on a complicated formulation of rank, years of service, household composition and availability of housing and furniture support, the soldier is allocated a certain amount of weight for household goods. This weight allowance may or may not be adequate to accommodate the possessions of the family. Excess weight can be dealt with in one of two ways. The family may choose to sell items of household goods, often receiving much less than they paid for them, or they can choose to pay the additional costs themselves. In either case, the family faces an immediate expense (or financial loss) which they would not necessarily have encountered in a civilian job. Many families, indeed, when interviewed about sources of debt will cite unreimbursed moving costs as a major factor in their financial lives.

A recent study of army families stationed at a CONUS (Continental United States) post showed

that more than 60 % of military families do not use a budget to assist them in planning for routine expenditures (Thoresen, 1985). Although it is not directly stated in this study, it would seem to be true that one of the reasons why the families do not use budgets is that the income and expenditures are roughly equal. When budget items remain consistent over a period of time, this is perhaps a workable system. For the family stationed overseas, however, it can become a financial nightmare.

We mentioned above that army families are not exempt from feeling the effects of inflation in the civilian economy. Similarly, they are not exempt from the effect of the fluctuating international money markets. In the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, the dollar-to-mark ratio dropped approximately 23 % in the five month period between September, 1985 and January, 1986. In practical terms, this means that all expenses incurred on the economy have risen by the same 23 %. In real terms this means that an apartment which cost \$ 336.70 (or DM 1,000) in September had risen to a cost of \$ 413.22 by January. For the landlord receiving the payment, the rent of DM 1,000 had remained the same. For the soldier paying the rent, however, there had been a 23 % increase. Further, all expenses incurred in the economy, including utility bills and consumer debts, rose by that same 23 % during this period. Families who were unable or unwilling to budget in a fixed economy can easily find themselves floundering financially when basic expenses (rent, utilities, and car payments) increase so dramatically over the course of a few months. When one considers that these same families were in debt an average of \$ 5,000 (Thoresen, 1985), this inflationary rise in expenses becomes even more dramatic.

Here, the effect is most noticeable for those families who live on the economy; however, it is not limited to them. Families who budget well and live within their means can, under the same circumstances, discover that small pleasures (eating out at a local restaurant, taking a day trip, or making a small purchase from a local store) also need to be excised from their budget until the exchange rate becomes more favorable.

### Coping with Cultural Uncertainty

Military families have, by their very nature, an inherent amount of experience in coping with different cultural spheres, for the army is, at a minimum, a sub-culture unto itself. They learn the language and its abbreviations (the grocery store is commissary; the department store is a post exchange, a PX; an automobile is a POV, a privately owned vehicle). They learn the behaviors (respectful to superiors; respectful to wives of superiors; and beware of fraternization). They learn the values, mores and customs of a life-style within the larger American culture. Moving overseas adds yet another culture about which they must learn and to which they must adjust.

Most American soldiers and their families begin their European tours with very little real information about the country in which they will be stationed. For some soldiers, a degree of uncertainty in terms of information will be dispelled by attending a Head Start program of the CONUS duty station; others will receive rudimentary language and cultural training upon arrival. Seldom however do family members have the opportunity to attend such a course, and they are of-

ten the ones who are simultaneously most bewildered by the new environment and more often forced to cope with it. This is particularly true for younger families who do not live in government quarters. In many of these families, the husband takes the family car to work, leaving at home his young wife who often has no knowledge of the public transportation system, no access to the American facilities, and only limited personal resources for dealing with her isolation and loneliness. Unable to communicate with the majority of her neighbors and similarly unable to access her own social support network of friends and relatives, the situation can become increasingly stressful not only for the wife, but also for her husband.

Isolation, however, is only one aspect of the problem. Equally difficult can be the family's effort to explore and integrate themselves into their new environment. Perhaps one of the most difficult areas for Americans stationed overseas is the fact that Europeans look deceptively like Americans but behave in ways that are very foreign. Regardless of the country in which the soldier is stationed, many things will strike him as odd about the ways in which life and business are conducted. Initially, small things may be the most bewildering. For example, by law, all doors on public buildings in the United States open outward. Opening a door, then is an automatic reflex action requiring a pull if one is going in or a push if one is leaving. If, however, there are rules governing which way doors open in Europe they are, to the average American, not discernible. Similarly, when an American indicates two with his fingers, he generally uses the index and middle fingers. Doing so in Germany, where the thumb is used to denote one, may well net him three of what he wanted.

For families who venture out onto the economy for a meal, there are many new areas of differences. First, they may find that they are the object of much curiosity because of their table manners since the European norms of handling knife and fork are quite different from what the American learned as a child. Second, particularly in Germany, they may discover that being seated at a table does not give them the exclusive use of the table and that they are soon sharing with a German family. Third, they may well discover that European chefs make not particular efforts to cook all of the meals from a single order at the same time. Counseled throughout childhood to wait to eat until all are served, the average American may well find that he or she is constantly eating cold food. Finally, Americans accustomed to the 'restaurant hassle' where the bill is presented either with the food or immediately thereafter can become frustrated and impatient with what they perceive to be 'slow service'. These small items can be nothing more than a group of minor irritants, or, taken as a whole they can grow into a major cultural barrier.

### Terrorism

While acts of political terrorism have a lengthy, worldwide history, discrete and concerted terrorists attacks against Americans are a relatively new phenomenon whose occurrence would seem to be on the rise. Since 1968, there have been 406 terrorist acts against DoD interests in Europe, and of these, over half have occurred in the past four years (U.S. Army, 1986). The Federal Republic of Germany, with the largest number and highest concentration of American troops outside of the continental United States has, of course, been the site of the majority of these events.

Terrorist attacks and the threat of terrorism may well present the individual with the ultimate source of uncertainty. Characterized by unpredictability, personal violence and extreme distance between the victim and the target (or goal) of the act, the degree of uncertainty in the environment of the American Army family in Europe rises and falls in response to these random, internationally-motivated events. The recent bombings at Rhein-Main Air Base, at the Frankfurt shopping complex, and at a Berlin disco which lead to the American air strikes against Libya provided excellent examples of the increase in the degree of uncertainty in the environment and the range of possible responses.

One of the key problems with terrorism is perception of the threat against the individual based on attributes which are difficult to disguise. At the height of the terrorist alarms, every American resident was encouraged (overtly or covertly) to behave as if the threat was personal. A soldier in uniform is uniquely conspicuous, and even out of uniform bears the distinctive marks of his haircut and gait. Civilians, too, are perceived to be easy to distinguish from Europeans through their American clothing, speech, and behavior. Publicly, Americans were encouraged to do all that they could to diminish or disguise these differences. They were also encouraged to avoid those places (restaurants, discos, etc.) which were known to be popular with Americans. Official travelers were cautioned to wear "European-style" clothing while on public transportation, and residents were advised to "keep a watchful eye" and to vary their daily patterns of behavior.

Whether or not families and individuals felt that the terrorist threat was either real or personal



Locations such as Rhein-Main and Frankfurt, which had already been targets of terrorist activities, were more sensitive to the probable outcome of such attacks (and their security procedures were commensurately more tight). At other locations, factors such as types of personnel, missions of resident military units, and types of weapons were all used as bases of justifying and explaining the perception of threat and the increase in security precautions. Families who are able to receive the American television station, AFN or SEB, were also able to garner information on the national perception of threat whereas those families living on the economy were less likely to know or be exposed to the prevailing American view. Finally, those families whose relatives and friends canceled long-standing plans to visit Europe were probably the most deeply affected.

Regardless of the individual's perception of the level of threat, however, the institution's perception prevailed and impacted, often severely, on the lives of individuals. On the institutional level, the American Army's response to the Berlin bombing was concentrated on the protection of U.S. personnel stationed overseas, but like each of the uncertain areas outlined above, the effect on various parts of the institution and on individuals were uneven. Some casernes only tightened security procedures for access. Others enforced curfews, not only for their resident military populations, but also throughout the surrounding local national neighborhoods and towns. Still other areas, instituted 'neighborhood watch programs', in which senior commissioned and non commissioned officers patrolled housing areas throughout the night and supplemented the efforts of the local MP patrols. People, accustomed to showing only ID cards to gain access to major activities, where routinely

people, accustomed to showing only ID cards to gain access to major activities, where routinely asked to open the hoods and trunks of their cars, to submit to a search of hand-carried items and, in some cases, to submit to a body search.

Not every caserne, however, carried out these procedures uniformly, and some added local twists to the prevailing policy. One caserne insisted that any automobile entering the caserne be occupied by a minimum of two people, causing parking problems outside the caserne and long lines while drivers waited for a passer-by to come along and be the second person in the car. Another caserne, whose only open entrance is a busy main street, conducted inspections of cars in a major parking lot - directly across from the building housing their division offices. Even on the broadest level, the responses among American institutions were uneven, for as the army canceled all group activities, including sightseeing tours, the air force did not.

#### Applications for Research

The preceding pages have outlined the concept of environmental uncertainty as it pertains to American Army families living in Europe. While the concept itself is not new, its application to the understanding of army families probably is. In the simplest terms, we can posit the following hypothetical construct:

1. Uncertainty in the environment causes stress for individuals and for families.
2. The elements which contribute to an uncertain environment can be identified and examined.

3. Uncertainty, and its attendant stress, can be reduced by obtaining accurate information and by applying decision-making styles which are appropriate to the perception of the environment.
4. Family decision-making styles can contribute significantly to the family's satisfaction with their environment.

These four concepts are operationalized in the paper "Decision Making in Army Families: A Multi-dimensional Analysis of Family Structure, Decision Styles, and Environmental Uncertainty".

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Nicholas A. Jans

**THE QUALITY OF LIFE  
IN THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE**

## C O N T E N T S

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## Abstract

The aim of this study was to identify the determinants of the quality of family life (QFL) in the Australian Defence Force. The wives/partners of male officers in the navy, army and air force were surveyed by questionnaire and interview, in conjunction with a questionnaire survey of officers in the rank range lieutenant to colonel. The response rate for the wives/partners was 91%, giving a sample of 942. Two methods of investigation were used. First, respondents rated each of a number of facets of service family life in terms of the extent to which it was causing problems, currently and in the past. Facets included absence of the officer on duty, children's education, etc. Whilst ratings varied across age groups, there was general agreement that the following were significant problems at all ages: uncertainty as to the location of future postings, separation from parents/friends, and absence of the officer on duty. Children's education was a significant problem for wives/partners aged 31 or more. The second method of investigation was a multiple regression analysis, with QFL as the dependent variable (using Likert scales). Six factors accounted for 30 % of the variance - career involvement of the officer, quality of children's education, problems with the uncertainty of future posting locations, satisfaction with housing, problems with the absence of the officer on duty, and satisfaction with friendships. The woman's age, and whether or not she was employed in paid work, did not affect QFL. The results point to an inherent conflict in service family life, between an officer's career development and his family's development. Balancing these conflicts may require a re-direction in career management strategy for ADF officers.

In her study of work and family in the U.S., Kanter (1977) identified four major occupational factors which affect family life:

- a) the extent to which occupational characteristics, such as work schedules and hours, affect family life;
- b) the rewards and resources available to or demanded from or taken from the family as part of the work/family bond;
- c) the degree to which the occupational role requires the involvement of other members of the family, apart from the employed member; and
- d) the cultural or socializing effect which the employed member's (or members') work situation(s) has on the other members of the family.

This paper reports part of a study which investigated each of the above issues within the officer corps of the Australian Defence Force. The findings associated with the first two of these are given below. Other findings are reported elsewhere (Jans 1985, in press).

The dependent variable used in this study is quality of family life (QFL), as assessed by the officer's wife. QFL is defined as the emotional state which results from an assessment of whether one's family life fulfills what one wants from and for the family.

QFL is one of a collection of variables which social scientists have used to tap the construct of quality of life. In recent studies in the U.S. and Australia (Campbell, Converse & Rodgers 1976; Headey & Wearing 1981), QFL was found to be among the strongest influences on a person's overall

quality of life. There is no reason to expect that this is not the case among servicemen and their wives; and, indeed, it is popularly believed that low QFL is a significant contributor to the attrition of service personnel in peacetime (Hamilton 1986). Despite this belief, no study of service QFL had been conducted in Australia prior to this investigation. In contrast, in other countries - notably the U.S. - the military family has long been of interest to social scientists (Hall 1981; Hunter 1978; McCubbin, Dahl & Hunter 1976; Segal 1985; Snyder 1978; Stoddard & Cabanillas 1976). As these studies show, the unusual family life style factors of the military family - factors such as frequent relocation, residence in service married quarters, and educational turbulence of children - make it likely that there will be idiosyncratic factors associated with the QFL of military families (Mulhall 1981), just as there are with service officers' work attitudes (Jans 1979, 1985 in press).

### Hypothesis

The QFL of service families is significantly affected by service life style factors.

### Method

#### General

The study reported here was part of a larger study of contemporary professional careers in the Australian Defence Force. The study was aimed at the population of male regular officers in the rank range lieutenant to colonel (or equivalents) in all three Services, and the wives (or unmarried partners) of these officers, where applicable.

### Sample

The population in the given rank range was sampled, using stratified random sampling with proportional representation by rank and professional/employment category. Three surveys were conducted: an interview survey of officers (N = 129), a questionnaire survey of officers and wives/partners (N = 1300 for officers and 942 for wives) (see Table 1), and an interview survey of wives (N = 35). In the questionnaire survey, separate questionnaires for officers and wives were sent as pairs, and the responses to both were established as a specific data case. The response rate for the officers was 69 % and for the wives 91 % (i.e. of the 1,070 officers who were married in the final sample of 1,300, 91% of wives/partners responded). Some of the wives who lived in Canberra and who responded to the questionnaire were later contacted and some were interviewed. (This sample does not pretend to be adequate either in size or representation, but many of the comments made by the female interviewees illuminate the statistics reported below.) (See Table 1).

### Variables

Quality of family life was the major dependent variable investigated in that part of the study reported below. QFL was measured by the subjects' scores on six Likert-type items, summed and averaged. The items are shown in Table 2. The alpha coefficient of the scale was .73 (see Table 2).

Other variables included the following:

Problems experienced as part of service family life. The questionnaire presented a check list of factors which had been identified as common problems in service family life. (The list was

derived from literature reviews and preliminary surveys using open-ended questions.) Aspects included "children's education", "husband's absence for service reasons", and "uncertainty as to the location of future postings". Subjects were asked to rate these according to the extent to which they were currently causing problems (1 = none, 3 = marked degree).

Husband's career involvement. The officer's career involvement was measured by his responses to eight Likert-type items, such as "I am very much personally involved in my career as a Navy/Army/ Air Force officer" and "Most of my interests these days are concerned with things outside the Service". The items formed a single scale which had an alpha coefficient of .81. The scale was significantly related to intentions regarding future service ( $r = .67$ ;  $p < .001$ ).

Satisfaction with housing. The wife's satisfaction with the residence currently occupied by the family was measured by responses to six Likert-type items, adapted by those used by Morrison and Cook (1985). Items included "I am satisfied with my family's present housing" and "I can't wait to leave my present location". The alpha coefficient of the scale was .86.

Satisfaction with friendships. The wife's satisfaction with friendships was measured by her response to a single 7-point Likert-type item, "How satisfied are you with friendships in this general area?".

Wife's employment status. The wife was asked to indicate her employment status on a four-point scale: not presently in paid employment; not employed but preparing to be; in part time paid employment; and in full time paid employment.

## Analysis

There were three stages of analysis. First, the sample was examined to identify the current characteristics of the service wife and her family. Second, aspects which are currently causing problems to officers' families were identified, and the circumstances associated with these were investigated. Finally, some of these, together with other variables, were included in a multiple regression analysis using QFL as the dependent variable.

## Results

### Level of QFL

Before outlining the results in detail, it is worth noting that the level of QFL in the sample was quite high. Two-thirds of the wives reported a high level of QFL i.e., their mean scores on the scale were greater than 4.50 on a 7-point-scale. Only 13 % were low scores (less than 3.50), with 21 % in the middle zone.

### The Service Family

The characteristics of the contemporary service wife and her family are revealed in the statistics contained in Tables 3 to 8.

The sample statistics show the following:

- a. High geographic mobility. The service family tends to be very geographically mobile. Only 12 % had not had at least one relocation in the past five years, and about the same per-

centage had had four or more in that time. The families of younger wives (who tend to have young husbands, who are relatively junior in rank) are generally the most mobile, but even among older wives (45 years of age or more), one quarter had relocated in the previous 12 months.

- b. High educational turbulence. As a consequence of this mobility, the children of service officers usually attend a number of schools. Almost two thirds of the families in the sample who had children of primary school age had seen the eldest (or only) child of the family attend three or more primary schools, and 28 % of those families with children of high school age had had such children attend three or more high schools.
- c. Many wives in paid work. Despite their peripathetic life-style, a majority of officers' wives are in paid employment. At 53 %, their participation rate is 10 points above that of the population of Australian married women (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1982, p. 88). Half of the employed wives in the sample were working full-time, and 45 % are in what the Australian Bureau of Statistics classifies as a "profession". Most of these professional employees among the wives are either nurses (16% of the total employed) or teachers (18 %), with no age-related differences in the proportion of wives in professional categories.
- d. High educational levels of wives. The wives are a relatively highly educated group. One in four has a tertiary qualification, compared with one in 10 in the Australian population of adult women (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1982, p. 88). An educational



level is a strong predictor of whether or not the wife is in paid employment: those with tertiary qualifications were more than three times as likely to be working as those who had not reached the high school matriculation standard.

- e. Educational level related to age. In turn, age was a strong predictor of educational level: 44 % of those aged 30 or less had or were completing tertiary qualifications, twice the proportion of those aged 41 or more.
- f. Many in their own homes. A little more than one family in three was resident in a service married quarter, but this varied widely between the services. Army families were slightly more likely than were air force families to be in married quarters; navy families were the least likely to be in such housing. A large proportion of families currently occupied their own home (38 %), with perhaps many more owning a house but not being currently in occupation of it.

### Problems in Service Family Life

#### General

Table 9 shows how wives view particular aspects of service family life as being "problems". Although there are statistically significant differences of detail between different age groups, these are slight: overall, the same things seem to cause problems whatever the wife's age. According to these data, the chief problems in service life are:

- a. posting uncertainty,
- b. separation from friends and family,
- c. absence of the husband on duty, and
- d. children's education.

#### Posting Uncertainty

Posting uncertainty - not knowing when and where the husband will be posted - is the most common complaint among the wives at all ages. Comments made in interviews and written on the questionnaire show that there are two main ways in which this causes problems, viz. children's education and the wife's career.

"It's so very difficult to educate children when postings come out of the blue and Australian states have different education systems... If one knew in advance where and when a posting would occur, one could plan or book into boarding schools."

"People said 'you knew what the Navy would be like', but there's nothing that tells you about the little irritants, like uncertainty of postings. My career plans are being disrupted by this too!"

#### Separations from Friends and Family

The younger wives in the sample tended to find separation from friends and family more difficult than did the older wives, but such separations apparently continue to be problems later in life. One wife wrote at the end of her questionnaire that

"I am proud and happy that my husband is associated with the defence of our country. But I do find it a tremendous strain to be

separated from family and friends and to be moved so often. Surely in 'peacetime' this is a bit unnecessary."

Another made a point about the relative importance of being close to parents at different life stages:

"I felt real guilt about leaving my sick father to go on an overseas posting. There was real anger there, but you don't blame your husband; it's not his fault. Therefore I suppose you develop an unconscious resentment against the service ... In the early years of our marriage, I hoped to get a home posting to be close to my mother and brother. Nowadays I couldn't care less."

#### Absence of the Husband on Duty

Table 10 shows the patterns of officers' absence on duty from their families for the previous year by service and by age. Not surprisingly, those most affected by duty-induced separation are the families of the younger wives and the navy wives. Husbands of wives in their 20s had been away, on average, for almost three months of the previous year, compared with less than two months for wives in their 40s. But, interestingly, the correlation between a wife's rating of this aspect as a problem and the length of absence of the husband was not statistically significant. Apparently, the critical thing is how the family copes with the absence, not the length of the absence itself.

"I made up my mind during those early days in Sydney (after she had lived most of her life elsewhere prior to marriage). One day I found myself crying my head off. I said to myself, 'this is ridiculous - you can either stop or go on crying for the rest of your

life'. Well. I didn't stop crying straight away - I had another little weep - but then I did stop and I coped. I had to cope, so I did."

For other wives, adaptation to absence is more difficult.

"When he was at sea, family life was pretty grim. I found it difficult to cope financially and the children were difficult. They resented him being away and I suppose my mood of anger and resentment reflected on them. On a scale of 10, our quality of family life would've been about 3 or 4."

"Although it is a few years ago now, I spent a very difficult 12 months alone with my four-year-old when my husband was at sea ... My child believed that her Dad had left us and I could not convince her otherwise."

Even when the wife outwardly adjusts to the problem, there are many ways in which family life can be adversely affected by the husband's absence. When the service wives whose husbands are frequently absent talk about their problems, the points they make seem not dissimilar to those of single parents, recently studied by the Commonwealth Government Social Welfare Commission (1976). The common problems mentioned fall into four main areas:

- a. children's relationships with parents and problems of family discipline;
- b. loneliness of the wife;
- c. coping with domestic tasks plus those the husband normally deals with (e.g. car problems), especially if the wife has a non-family role such as student or employee; and

d. social and occupations limitations placed on the wife.

There are some wives, however, who have adapted so well to this aspect of service life that they actually welcome the officer's absence.

"For me, having him away from time to time is actually a safety valve. Sometimes you feel so pressured when you have to be both a mother and a wife - getting the children fed then getting his dinner ready on time. When he's away, I can eat with the children at 5 p.m. - fish fingers or whatever! - and then the rest of the evening is mine. You can be your own person."

#### Children's Education

The effect of the service life-style on the education of the Australian servicemen's children has been a subject of some controversy in recent times. Although an officially sponsored study by a university school of education found that frequent changes of school did not appear to have an adverse effect on servicemen's children's education (Mackay & Spicer 1975), many remain skeptical. Rahmani's (1982) research, for example, shows that servicemen's children do experience benefit or detriment associated with school changes, depending on individual differences and - interestingly, in view of the above - the length of the father's absence from home.

However, the point at issue here is not what the true situation is as much as it is what the serviceman and his wife believe it is. The indication is that wives do tend to believe that it is detrimental for their children to change schools frequently. As shown earlier, many believe that

service life is causing problems for their children. And there is a small but significant relationship between the number of schools attended and the perceived degree of detriment experienced by the child associated with changing schools ( $r = .24$  for primary school and  $.12$  for high school, both  $p < .001$ ). Third, when wives were asked to indicate their feelings about the findings of the Mackay and Spicer study, only about one in 20 accepted the findings without reservation. More than four times that number rejected the study's findings, with or without reservation.

The wife's view on educational turbulence is strongly affected by the child's schooling stage. When asked how important it was for their child to have stability of education, those with children in high school or at tertiary level were more than twice as likely to rate stability as "vital" as were those with their eldest/only child at primary school. (This was measured on a 7-point-scale where a rating of 7 was labeled as "vital"; the respective percentages were 64 %, 71 % and 27 %. (See Table 11.) The following comment was typical of the many made on this subject during interviews or written on questionnaires:

"Having seen my child suffer considerably scholastically and socially because of relocating during his primary school years, I am determined that the secondary and tertiary years will be settled and have continuity. I sincerely regret that this may be at the expense of my husband's Army career."

#### How Many Problems?

Table 12 shows that, although many wives reported problems with aspects of service life, in general there were few who were experiencing a number of

problems simultaneously. Over one third reported no "marked" problems at all, and about the same proportion are experiencing only one or two of these to a marked degree. The remainder - 28 % - have marked problems with three or more of the listed aspects of service life simultaneously, but only 7 % are not experiencing any problems at all.

There is probably a considerable degree of inter-relatedness among the problems discussed above. That is, when a wife reports problems with one aspect of service life, she is likely to report problems with others also. For example, a wife who is experiencing problems with posting uncertainty is likely also to feel that the children's education is a problem, and one who is concerned with the husband's absence on duty may report this as a problem because she is isolated from friends and family.

#### Quality of Family Life - A Multivariate Analysis

The multivariate analyses described below were used to take account of any inter-relationships between the factors likely to effect QFL. QFL was the dependent variable in a multiple regression model with the following factors as independent variables:

- a. posting uncertainty,
- b. the quality of the children's education,
- c. satisfaction with housing,
- d. problems with the husband's absence on duty,
- e. satisfaction with friendships,
- f. the wife's age,
- g. the wife's employment status, and
- h. the husband's level of career involvement.

Table 13 shows the results of two multiple regression analyses: one for the total sample and a second for the wives who did not have children.

The pattern of results is essentially the same in both the analyses. The strongest influences on QFL were the husband's career involvement and the quality of the children's education (if applicable). Other strong influences on QFL were posting uncertainty, satisfaction with housing, and problems with the absence of the husband on duty. The wife's age and employment status (i.e. whether or not she was in paid employment) did not affect QFL.

The husband's career involvement has not yet been discussed. Whilst there is probably a case for seeing career involvement as an outcome of QFL, rather than as an antecedent, it was included in the model after interviewees had repeatedly told the researcher of the importance to the family of the husband's feelings about his career. "If he's happy, I'm happy" was typical of these comments.

Satisfaction with housing was strongly dependent on the type of residence which the family was currently occupying. Wives living in their own homes were much more likely to be satisfied with their housing than were wives in married quarters (84 % satisfied compared with 49 %).

#### Summary

A service wife's quality of family life appears to be dependent on a number of different types of factors, some associated with the physical/social environment, some with the children's education and some with the husband's career attitudes. It seems reasonably clear, from the above, that the service life-style does have a significant influence on the wife's feelings about family life.

Many of the factors shaping her feelings are characteristic of the service: posting uncertainty, educational turbulence, the reliance on service housing, and the husband's absences on duty.

## Discussion and Conclusions

### General

The hypothesis is supported: the QFL of service families is significantly affected by service life-style factors.

The amount of variance explained by the multiple regression model is, at first glance, only at a moderate level. Even if all the factors examined above were favorable, a wife's QFL could still be low. But given that there are many factors likely to affect QFL which have not been included in the analyses - factors such as interpersonal relationships within the family, especially those between the wife and the husband - then 30 % of explained variance looks more impressive. And if policy aimed at the improvement of QFL in the services is to be developed, then these results are likely to be useful for policy makers.

### Conflict in Service Family Life

There is a potential for conflict in the factors which contribute to QFL in the Services. The underlying issue is career development versus family development. This is illustrated in Figure 1.

If the husband pursues his career with full involvement, his family may have to make sacrifices which detract from its QFL; but if he wishes to

give priority to family development, his career will frequently be restricted. For example, an officer who is highly involved in his career is likely to be willing to change location frequently and unexpectedly so as to respond to career opportunities, and to be willing to spend time away from the family on duty. Whilst his high career involvement will tend to enhance his wife's estimate of QFL, such factors as children's educational instability, posting uncertainty, and the frequent disruption of local friendships will tend to detract from QFL.

If the family's priorities lie with family development, the family will tend to want to be relatively static (i.e. not be relocated frequently). If static, the family can possibly live in its own home, the children can have stability in their education, and the wife can make lasting friendships and develop her own career. But this may be detrimental to the husband's career opportunities: he may feel unwilling to respond to unexpected posting opportunities if they arise, and may even gain a certain "unreliable" reputation with career managers.

However, Figure 1 does not imply a perpetual conflict between career and family. As evidenced by the wives' levels of QFL, most service families seem to achieve a satisfactory balance between career development and family development. And the family "life cycle" assists here: early in the career, when absences on duty and posting uncertainties are likely to be greatest, the family's children are not likely to be of school age; and later, when the children are in late primary school or in high school, the officer may be serving in the Department of Defence where he can have high job rotation without family relocation. But the diagram does show where tradeoffs or sacrifices may need to be made; and it shows why the officer can experience such a conflict of

interest that he may put his career into second place in his life, even perhaps to the extent where he will decide to quit the service.

### Implications for Policy

The results reported here do not show whether QFL is a significant factor in determining officer's career intentions. But it is popularly believed that how a serviceman's wife feels about his career is an important factor in his career decision making. If policy maker wish to improve QFL in service families, there are a number of feasible changes which could be made:

- a. slow down the rate of geographic relocation associated with changes in posting;
- b. make postings more predictable, and give more warning for postings;
- c. improve the standard of service housing; and
- d. give some form of assistance with the education of servicemen's children.

These changes could be expensive, but if the consequence is a higher retention rate of officers at middle career - men in whom their nation has invested a good deal in career development terms - such expense could be well justified.

TABLE 1

CHARACTERISTICS OF OFFICERS SURVEYED BY  
MAILED QUESTIONNAIRE (N = 1300)

Characteristic	Value	%	Remarks
Service	Navy	29	
	Army	36	
	Air Force	35	
Years of Service	0-5	11	Median = 18.18
	6-10	25	
	11-15	21	
	16-20	25	
	21-25	10	
	26-30	5	
	31+	3	
Marital Status	Never Married	18	
	Now Married	77	
	Separated	2	
	Divorced (still single)	3	
	Widowed (still single)	0	
Dependent Children (married officers)	0	22	Median = 1.78
	1	18	
	2	37	
	3	19	
	4	4	
	5+	1	
Rank (Army or Army equivalent)	Lieutenant	9	
	Captain	24	
	Major	25	
	Lt Colonel	28	
	Colonel	14	

TABLE 2

## "QUALITY OF FAMILY LIFE" SCALE ITEMS

Some of the best times of my life have come about by being part of "Service Life".

I would advise any daughter of mine against marriage to someone in the Services.

On balance, for me the advantages of Service family life outweigh the disadvantages.

Although a Service family has to face many difficulties, on balance many women would get a lot out of the life.

On balance, I am happy with the way my family life is going in the Services.

Considering all the aspects of Service life, I think my family enjoys a good quality of family life at the moment.

TABLE 3

## AGE AND EDUCATIONAL LEVELS OF WIVES SAMPLE

Education	Age			Total
	19-30	31-40	41+	
College/University (fully or partly completed)	44	30	22	33
High School grad- uation or equivalent	33	33	32	33
Less than High School graduation	23	38	47	34
TOTAL	32	48	19	

Note: Percentages shown only. Percentages may not total 100 because of rounding-off errors. (N = 937).

Chi-square = 38.1, df = 4, p < .000

TABLE 4

## TYPE OF RESIDENCE CURRENTLY OCCUPIED, BY SERVICE

	Navy	Army	Air Force	Total
Own home	50	31	38	38
Married quarter	20	40	35	33
Rental	31	29	27	29
N	246	344	324	914

Note: Percentages shown only except for bottom row. Percentages may not total 100 because of rounding off errors.

Chi-square = 32.8, p < .000, df = 6

TABLE 5  
GEO GRAPHIC MOBILITY

## A. Removals in Past 5 Years

	%	Cum %
0	12	12
1	23	35
2	29	64
3	23	87
4+	13	100

## B. Months in Current Residence, By Age

	19-30	Age 31-40	41+	Total
0-5	20	13	7	14
6-11	38	28	18	29
12-17	13	9	5	10
18-23	17	20	20	19
24+	12	30	50	28
N	306	457	179	942

Note: Percentages shown only except for bottom row

Chi-square = 96.4, df = 12, p < .000

TABLE 6

NUMBER OF SCHOOLS ATTENDED BY ELDEST/ONLY  
CHILD OF SCHOOL AGE

Type of School	1	2	3+
Primary (elementary)	16	21	62
Secondary (high)	45	25	28



TABLE 7  
WIVES EMPLOYMENT STATUS BY AGE AND EDUCATION

Employment Status	Age <sup>a</sup>					Education <sup>b</sup>			Total	
	19-25	26-30	31-35	36-40	41-45	46+	Sub HS	High School		Post HS
Not employed	30	47	52	39	29	47	53	42	27	42
Preparing for Employment	21	3	7	9	4	4	6	5	3	5
Part-time paid Job	21	20	25	34	36	24	27	28	25	27
Full-time paid Job	47	31	16	19	31	24	14	24	45	26

Note: Percentages shown only. Percentages may not total 100 because of rounding-off errors.

a Chi-square = 81.0, df = 18,  $p < .000$

b Chi-square = 74.4, df = 6,  $p < .001$

TABLE 8

CAREER ORIENTATION OF WIVES IN PAID EMPLOYMENT BY  
AGE AND EDUCATIONAL LEVEL

Importance of job to personal career plan	Age <sup>a</sup>			Educational level <sup>b</sup>		
	19-30	31-40	41+	Sub HSC	HSC	Tertiary
No career plan	18	31	42	48	26	17
Job unimportant	10	10	9	12	9	9
Job moderately important	29	39	32	31	42	36
Job very important	34	20	18	9	23	39

Notes: Percentages only. Percentages may not total 100 because of rounding-off errors.

a. Age differences: Chi-square = 24.0, df = 6,  $p < .001$

b. Educational differences: chi-square = 55.5, df = 6,  $p < .001$

TABLE 9

## EXTENT OF PROBLEMS IN SERVICE FAMILY LIFE BY AGE

	Age											
	19-30			31-40			40+					
	%No	%Some	%Marked	%No	%Some	%Marked	%No	%Some	%Marked	%No	%Some	%Marked
Uncertainty as to location of posting	36	36	28	32	33	35	34	35	31			
Separation from friends	34	39	27	36	39	25	44	42	14			
Separation from parents*	37	36	27	43	33	24	57	21	22			
Absence of husband for Service reasons*	38	34	28	56	29	16	66	21	13			
Settling into a new community	54	34	12	58	30	12	70	25	5			
Making a home in MQ/rental	60	30	10	63	25	13	74	18	8			
Admin inconvenience during removals	64	25	11	66	23	11	77	16	7			
Lack of fairness in postings	70	18	11	70	16	13	69	17	14			
Damages in removals	68	26	6	62	28	10	67	20	13			
Social distinctions between wives	78	15	7	85	12	3	91	6	3			
Childrens Education*	91	7	2	58	23	19	52	24	24			
Childrens' jobs	99	0	1	96	2	2	79	14	12			

\*p &lt; .005 (differences between age groups)

Differences are based on one-way ANOVA (see Jans, 1985, p 294)

TABLE 10

## SEPARATION FOR SERVICE REASONS IN PREVIOUS YEAR BY SERVICE AND AGE

Months Absent	Service a						Age b			Total Cumulative %
	Navy		Army		Air Force		19-30	31-40	41+	
0	19	9	22	10	16	12	16	16	16	
1-2	33	52	55	42	51	52	47	63	63	
3-4	22	26	16	27	22	17	22	85	85	
5-6	11	9	4	14	6	6	8	93	93	
7-8	9	2	1	6	3	2	4	97	97	
9+	5	1	1	1	2	2	2	99	99	

Notes: Percentages shown only. Percentages may not total 100 because of rounding-off errors.

a. Chi-square = 40.4, df = 10, p &lt; .001

b. Chi-square = 26.3, df = 10, p &lt; .01

TABLE 10 (CONTINUED)

SEPARATIONS FOR SERVICE REASONS IN THE PAST FOUR YEARS  
BY AGE

Months Absent	19-30		31-40		41+		Total	
	%	Cum%	%	Cum%	%	Cum%	%	Cum%
0	13	13	9	9	13	13	11	11
2-4	21	34	24	33	29	42	24	35
5-6	13	47	19	52	13	55	16	51
7-12	24	71	29	81	21	76	26	77
13-18	16	81	11	92	15	91	14	91
19-23	7	94	4	96	6	97	6	97
24+	6	100	5	101	3	100	5	102

Notes: Percentages may not total 100 because of rounding-off errors.

Chi-square = 23.2, df = 12, <.03

TABLE 11

## IMPORTANCE OF EDUCATIONAL STABILITY FOR CHILDREN

Level of Education	% believe stability is		Importance rating <sup>a</sup>	
	Vital	Unimportant	Mean	SD
Primary	27	3	5.18	1.65
Secondary	64	0	6.50	.83
Tertiary	71	2	6.47	1.29
				N
				513
				522
				497

Notes: a. Importance rating: 7 = Vital, 1 = Unimportant.

TABLE 12

## NUMBER OF CURRENT PROBLEMS IN SERVICE FAMILY LIFE BY AGE

Number of problems being currently experienced simultaneously	Experiencing problems to "some" extent or to a "marked" extent			Experiencing problems to a "marked" extent		
	Age <sup>a</sup>			Age <sup>b</sup>		
	19-30	31-40	41+	19-30	31-40	41+
0	6	7	7	36	34	33
1-2	14	19	20	36	36	43
3-4	28	24	27	18	19	15
5-6	24	20	24	9	8	5
7-8	21	18	15	2	3	3
9-12	7	12	5	0	0	0
N	885			885		

Notes: Percentages show only except in final row. Percentages may not total 100 because of rounding-off errors.

a. Chi-square = 31.3, df = 22, n.s.

b. Chi-square = 21.04, df = 20, n.s.

TABLE 13

## MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE QUALITY OF FAMILY LIFE


	Those childless	Total
Husband's career involvement	.26 ***	.25 ***
Quality of childrens' education	-	.24 ***
Problem with uncertainty of location of postings	-.20 ***	-.16 ***
Satisfaction with housing	.14 ***	.14 ***
Problems with absence of husband for Service reasons	-.14 ***	-.10 **
Satisfaction with friendships	.15 ***	.08 *
Age	.03	.04
Wife's employment status	.01	-.01
R <sup>2</sup>	.26, p < .000	.30, p < .000
F; df	43.56; 7,853	25.51; 8,471

\*\*\* p < .001

\*\* p < .01

\* p < .05

FIGURE 1  
A FORCE-FIELD DIAGRAM  
OF FAMILY LIFE FACTORS



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REALITY EXPERIENCES IN MILITARY FAMILIES  
OF THE BUNDESWEHR

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### 1. Preliminary Remarks

The results presented here are to be viewed within the framework of a comprehensive research project conducted by the German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research (SOWI) (1) on the family of the enlisted longer term soldier for whom military service represents a temporary or permanent career (2).

A highly technicalized general and standing army such as the Bundeswehr is dependent on a large backbone of longer-term soldiers. The customary characterization of the Bundeswehr as a conscript army should not obscure the fact that at least in peacetime volunteers account for not less than one-half the manpower of the German Army. Being a soldier thus manifests itself not only as a heeding of the patriotic call of civic duty but also as the pursual of an occupation. By this we shall understand quite pragmatically for the beginning the making available of one's work capacity for remuneration under certain organisational conditions (3).

This study aims to unravel the causal connection between family and occupation of the married Bundeswehr soldier.

### 2. Introduction

Without aspiring to even approach an exhaustive description of the complex web of relationships interconnecting the individual, career, family and society attention shall nevertheless be drawn towards a few general casual relations.



Occupational activity should not be viewed merely as a means of securing the material conditions of existence if one is to avoid disregarding other effects important for the individual and society. Occupation serves not only to satisfy important material and social needs but in addition it places the individual and his family in their societal position, establishes their social prestige and reveals itself as an important variable in the allocation and utilization of social opportunities.

The more complex, differentiated and differentiating a society, the higher its degree of segmentation, of division into various spheres. These -in the language of systems theory- sub-systems are not spatio-temporal or personal entities divided by lines of social demarcation, though career and family can be regarded as separate spheres alongside others, they are all the same closely interrelated. The various structures, demands, expectations of behavior as well as dependencies constitute a web of relationships that is generally held to be full of tensions and potential for conflict (Fürstenberg 1982). This seems to be specially true for the relation between the soldier profession and the soldier family. The reason for this lies, we feel, in the fact that the activities of the soldier constitute an occupational category of a unique type.

The essential determinants of this special character are provided by the parameters of military service. The term "service" clearly implies a normative line of argument connecting it with the value "security". It is the task of the soldier to ensure the security of state and society. His workday is shaped by "requirements of duty". Embodied in them are the functional requisites of

the military as defined by the political and military leadership under the prevailing premises of national security. The occupational profile projected for the soldier is, however, much less focused than this functional perspective seems to suggest. Included in reality are all those much less clearly definable conceptions that are in a diffuse and global manner integrally associated with the "particularities of the military profession" and derived from tradition and ideology. The activities of the soldier are elevated to "service for the community". "Military service" implies specific rules that lift the occupation of the soldier out of the sphere of the labor market place and the existing market-mechanisms. Through this lever not merely the soldier but his family as well are maneuvered into a special position vis-à-vis state and society. This is reflected in the theoretical patterns of argumentation concerning the special societal and political commitment of the soldier and primarily also in the very real, "practical" life contexts of those affected.

This becomes apparent when one engages in a short historical reflection on the relationship between armed forces and the military family. This relationship was decisively influenced by an institutional perspective in which the soldier - divorced from any social context reaching beyond the military organisation - was seen mainly from the viewpoint of functionality: as an instrument for the implementation of military policy. From this vantage point the family bonds of the soldier figured as "annoying appendages" which possibly might interfere with his unrestricted utilization (as well as increasing his keep). The attempt was made to prevent, or at least to obstruct, the setting up of families, though a general "celibatory" ruling for soldiers was never realized. In general, legal marriage restrictions

were successively relaxed or abolished altogether - often in accommodation of a reality long since changed by "force of fact" (3). The claim to comprehensive control and disposal was not, however, thereby waived but transformed into a more far-reaching one. The military family was for all intents and purposes "incorporated" as a component of the military system. The demands of the military organization were directed towards securing the "primacy of service". Wife and children were expected to defer individual needs and aspirations, subordinate them to the exigencies of duty, restrict their claims on the father's time and physical presence and to offer moral support for this fulfillment of the "call of duty". The corresponding ideological elevation of the soldier profession to a "selfless service for the common good" played its part in the almost unquestioned implementation of these pretensions. While the husband was to bravely fight for his country and if necessary to die for it, the women were assigned the role of "courageous little soldier wife". From all this it becomes clear that soldier wives assumed their societal position by virtue of their husbands' occupation. This was of course also a reflection of the prevailing historical relationships between women, family and society. Yet the military context certainly amplified the existing tendencies and imbalances.

Considering the scope of universal societal change, this intraorganizational and instrumental way of viewing the soldier and his family was able to prevail almost unchallenged for an astonishingly long period of time. In conscript armies specially a large majority of soldiers are, due to age alone, unmarried (5). The military is consequently geared towards them (6). The number of married men increases with age and duration of service in conjunction with military career. The possibilities for successful socialization from

the military's standpoint increases accordingly, a socialization aimed also at securing the acceptance of the pre-set order of priorities between the demands of service and family. As long as the proportion of married soldiers was relatively small compared to those unmarried, the necessity of studying the soldier family appeared secondary. And since those married were mainly career and often career oriented soldiers, the leverage of selection and/or socialization was deemed sufficient to ensure their behavioral compliance. A problem-oriented raising of the issue through systematic analysis for instance - did not therefore constitute a concern of the military or political leadership. It comes as no surprise then that the study of the military family was a path strewn with obstacles.

In the meantime it has become almost universally recognized that disregarding the soldier's family would be to ignore an integral component of his life nexus; and that in the face of the consequences of technological and social change for the military in an industrial society this would be possible only at the expense of de-coupling the armed forces from the rest of society.

### 3. Theoretical Approach and Methodological Procedures

The reality within which man acts is his reality: The situations which he encounters are perceived, interpreted and evaluated on the basis of his everyday knowledge. In interaction with the surrounding environment and thus socially conveyed, the individuals produce and actively shape their own social reality.

Our methods here are largely determined by the premise that one has to embark on the point of view of the individuals in order to understand the individual process of constituting social reality (T. P. Wilson 1973). Above all we aimed at comprehending the subjective dimension of how military families experience reality in their daily interactions within the family.

These considerations based on the interpretative paradigm (A. Witzel 1982) had some specific methodological implications. They called for a qualitative approach with a close relationship between the problem area under analysis and the methods chosen. We tried to proceed in both a flexible and reflexive way excluding the formulation of hypotheses beforehand. There are good reasons to assume that the rationality with which the interviewed themselves plan their lives and evaluate life's reality is not of a lesser quality than if undertaken by the researchers; therefore, we laid emphasis on letting the military families themselves describe how they experience day-to-day reality in order not to bury it under our perception thereof. Nevertheless there was no reason to negate our foreknowledge (7). It provided the basis for a flexible research concept (8) which - open-ended in principle - was virtually structuring itself by absorbing content during the research process. The so-called "theoretical sample" corresponded with this rather exploratory procedure (B. Glaser, A. Strauss 1971).

The question of the statistically representative sample did not pose itself, because the study was not aimed at profiling the basic entity "military family", but at qualitatively reflecting the reality of military families in the army-specific context.

In order to reflect the diversity of the armed forces, members of all three services of the Bundeswehr were interviewed (9). Their military ranks ranged from sergeant to colonel. Assuming that the situationally determined variables (e.g. the specific duties each soldier was entrusted with, housing conditions, etc.) might have some influence on the perception of the existing life-situation without necessarily gaining highest priority in a general survey of the social conditions of military families, we included the variables "length of time in service" and the particular "life-phase" in which the soldiers and their families found themselves. Accordingly, we incorporated into the sample different "family types" such as couples with small and very small children as well as couples whose children had already left home.

The appropriateness of our sample depends on the measure in which the general problems of military families are brought into relief; thus, validity is inseparable from the nature of the results. All in all we conducted 34 interviews ranging in length from two to five hours. Our interviewees were largely selected by chance.

It needs to be pointed out that the couples were interviewed together, sometimes their children being present. In every case we obtained permission to tape the interview sessions, giving us the opportunity to draw on the original texts of the conversations at any stage during our interpretative efforts.

At the start of the interviews (10) we explained the aim of our project to the interviewees, i.e. to examine the "intersection" of Bundeswehr and military families and to identify the problem areas as felt by the families.

Then the couples were asked to give an account of their lives aimed at securing a portrait of problems along biographical lines as experienced at least from marriage onward as a common, that is family biography. Recounting biographies helped relax inhibitions and provided for an identical entry into all interviews; furthermore, the conversations between husbands and wives developed dynamics which condensed description and evaluation of facts into "family tales". The structuring of the conversations, the extent to which they portrayed problematic situations and the solutions found were nearly exclusively left to the interviewed.

All this provided us with a retrospective picture of the course left behind as well as an evaluation of the present situation and the plans and hopes for the future. In general, we tried to focus not merely on a factual account of their (common) lives up to the present, but rather to get a subjective interpretation of the intersections of job and family situations of military families.

Accepting the interviewees as partners to the conversation, looking at problems from their point of view and avoiding the usual (and problematic) question-and-answer structure resulted in a remarkable degree of openness and willingness to cooperate on the side of the interviewed. In most cases the ability to reflect and communicate was evinced to a considerable extent.

Often it was not even necessary for the interviewees to explicitly focus the conversation on the topic of Bundeswehr and family: The Bundeswehr as the husband's place of work was rather naturally introduced into the conversations by

the family members as a very complex factor influencing the day-to-day family life.

This form of empirical survey is, in our opinion, appropriate to the object under scrutiny; it contains elements of biographical and narrative interviews (F. Schuetze 1977) as well as aspects of the case study and of group discussion (A. Witzel 1982).

For every interview "a case description was prepared having the character of a general survey of the main patterns of the course of life and of the case-specific characteristics. These case descriptions take on the function of a 'social map' facilitating orientation within the totality of the material" (M. Buchmann, R. Gurny 1984, p. 774).

The corresponding analysis of the content requires structuring and reducing the plethora of material. In the methodological discussion about forms of qualitative social research the question is rightly posed as to the extent to which such a procedure "would be able to meet the demand for an integral and authentic assessment of the produced accounts" (M. Buchmann, R. Gurny 1984, p. 779). Indeed, it was not possible to transfer this claim from the collecting of the data to its interpretation without rupture. By condensation, the family histories as experienced individually were divested of an all too marked concreteness and individualism without losing these references entirely. Obviously, the underlying relevance structure was formed by our research perspective; consequently, a superimposition of the relevance structure on our respondents cannot entirely be excluded. Such a critique, however, has to take into account our starting position: its prin-

cipled openness allowed a structuring by the interviews themselves in an inductive way thereby revealing focal points of the analysis. We took the individual case descriptions and put them upon each other like foils creating a profile of the social situation of the interviewed families. Allegedly individual behavior patterns and outlooks, the supposedly singular views of problems and attempts to deal with them ("we aren't typical of military families!") reveal their societal and structural conditionality and set in comparison, unveil their intersubjective representativity.

#### 4. Results

In the presentation of the results we largely follow the structuring of the conversation as undertaken by the interviewed themselves. The issues broached by them and the areas which they most intensively and exhaustively addressed are easily identified as those in which the occupation of the soldier was described as being constitutive of a problematic social situation. The underlying perspective of the directly affected can be inductively reconstructed through a comparative analysis of the interview material. It becomes apparent that the various lines of reasoning are repetitive to certain aspects, forming clusters of common interpretations with respect to everyday reality.

In the following presentation the various issues are not sharply broken down and itemized by clear and distinct category. This is the result not merely of the fact that the analysis of complex subject matter can be conducted from any different angles but above all because the prob-

lem area was experienced by those interviewed as an integral whole. Thus the classification of issues as delineated may be understood less as the result of analytic disassembling of what is by nature integrated experience than as a practical matter of rendering the total problem in an ordered form at once more accessible and understandable.

#### 4.1. The professional situation of the husband

The decision to take up the profession of a soldier is based on highly diverse motives that are often interrelated but are biographically assessed and valued differently. Thus a desire for economic security plays its part as well as a thirst for adventure, a fascination with technology, the opportunity of working with different kinds of people, and, finally, the conviction of serving the common good.

This diversity reflects the wide range of expectations that are generated by the Bundeswehr as employer. One has to add, however, that the job's specific requirements remain quite vague at least at the beginning of one's career. Remarkably enough the aspect of national security plays only a marginal role in the perceptions of either the soldier himself or his wife. Above all, the probability of having to serve in combat and all the related fears were hardly mentioned by those interviewed. The Bundeswehr and its importance of national security are secondary as compared to more intimate points of reference such as the individual service, the service branch assignment or unit with which one serves. It is the latter's peculiarities which to a large extent determine the soldier's conception of his profession.

A concept of personnel management which aims at a broad range of assignments (Verwendung) leads, mainly among officers, to a frequent change of highly diverse activities tied to reassignments, promotions and training programs. This kind of personnel management is often experienced as opaque and arbitrary. The soldier tends to forego specific occupational and personal long-range planning that might transcend the desire for a certain post or the anticipated promotion. He feels chained to his employer by a "one-sided pledge of loyalty".

The principle of unrestricted power of disposal over its soldiers that is fundamental to the Bundeswehr is particularly felt as an encumbrance. Soldiers have to be willing to be transferred as well as to work irregular hours and to be absent from their families. All this is made necessary by training programs, military exercises and additional duties.

The working conditions of the army are increasingly compared to those of analogous occupations in our society. In this respect the Bundeswehr scores negatively among soldiers. The hoped for self-fulfillment through individual responsibility is impeded or even prevented by the increasing bureaucracy reflected in the patterns of daily routine.

Even areas which were once considered particular assets of the Bundeswehr begin to lose their intrinsic value. Soldiers complain about a subdued social climate within the armed forces, about the fact that the term "comradeship" has lost its meaning and has been replaced by technocratic and career-oriented thinking. The soldier is often lacking in alternatives to his military

profession because his training is of no use on the job market. Often the economic risk of taking up a civilian occupation is considered too great - after all one's family has to be fed - resulting in a fundamentally resigned attitude to the job.

Among younger officers there can be found an optimistic "short-range-orientation" directed towards meeting the challenge at hand. The personal life-perspective of middle-aged soldiers looks different. They perceive their professional careers as largely completed. Family life becomes more important to them, resulting sometimes in a total reversal of former maxims. This may include the actual renunciation of promotion when the familial strain involved is considered too great.

For many soldiers the exigencies of national security, such as perpetual readiness for action and efficiency, have started to become obsolete. Among them the feeling predominates that their employer does not try hard enough to find a solution supportable by all.

A married soldier evaluates his professional situation according to the extent to which his interests harmonize with the expectations and demands of the Bundeswehr. His family is a major factor in this equation.

#### 4.2. The wife's situation

In the interviews many wives complained of not having been able to anticipate the consequences of marrying a soldier due to the lack

of information about the actual working conditions of their future husbands. On the other hand, even rational knowledge can never replace personal experience.

Without being part of the Bundeswehr themselves, the wives are strongly affected by their husbands' profession.

Thus the irregular and extremely long working hours typical for many duties cut deeply into the wives' daily arrangements. Plans such as taking adult education courses, going to the theatre or to the movies or joining athletic clubs have to be dropped in resignation, because the wife has to keep in mind that her husband may come home late and therefore the children will be unattended. And occasions for meeting other people - occasions that are of considerable importance especially after having moved into a new neighborhood - are missed.

By the same token a soldier's wife has to think twice about taking up or even keeping her job. Plans to spend the weekend with friends have to be canceled, because the husband has to take up duty unexpectedly. It is almost impossible to plan or organize any long-range activities since interference by military obligations has to be reckoned with continuously.

Besides irregular working hours, social, official and semiofficial affairs, there are special duties, training at night, alert and night duty, which severely obstruct any regularity of a family life. In addition to all this the husband may be absent for a long period of time due to his participation in maneuvers, in seminars which

last weeks or months and due to field training exercises. Particularly in the navy long periods of separation because of sea duty can be noted. All this has a decisive impact on the wife's range of action.

The impression of having to bear consequences resulting from decisions made by the Bundeswehr without ever being asked is reinforced in the event of transfers. The soldier meets with familiar structures at all headquarters. This allows him to cope even with new tasks more easily, whereas wife and children usually lack these points of orientation. Transfers are crucial in so far as they touch all spheres of family life. On the wife's part this often means the temporary separation from the husband until a new apartment has been found. This search can take weeks, sometimes months. A transfer results in renunciation of existing social contacts and in a multitude of new challenges: The wife must get acquainted with the family's new neighborhood, get used to new neighbors, make new friends, find out where different goods can be bought at reasonable prices. She must also help her children overcome their difficulties to adjust.

If the wife has a profession of her own, she will be severely affected by her husband's transfer. In case she does not want to be temporarily separated from her husband or she refuses to restrict seeing him on the weekends she has to decide whether to quit her profession altogether or find a less qualified job.

This problem is hardly ever solved satisfactorily. The force of environment in a Bundeswehr settlement represented by the other inhabitants, such as her husband's superiors and comrades,

other wives and last but not least her own husband will combine to exclude any unorthodox solution. Frequently latent dissatisfaction is disguised by apparent accommodation. Having a job becomes particularly important for wives without any or with older children, because having a job is a source of self-confidence and helps them establish social contacts. Few wives list material causes for their insisting on a job.

If the working wife decides to join her moving husband she has to put up with considerable disadvantages especially in smaller garrison towns. In view of the labor market situation she might not find a new job at all. The profession of her husband often proves to be an additional obstacle. Generally she has to accept a loss of income. In her new job she must start all over again and win the confidence of her colleagues and her superiors, accordingly her career prospects are small.

Not just the transfers themselves, merely the idea of a future transfer affects the family and in particular the wife. Most of the women speak of their continuous, secret dread of their husband's next transfer. With this in mind it becomes understandable that the justification of the husband's mobility as demanded by their employer is increasingly called into question. Specifically among more highly qualified wives a "leave me out of it" attitude predominates. Their willingness to move whenever their husbands do and to quit their own jobs is diminishing.

The prevalence of changes that are considered advantageous by an individual leads to a more positive evaluation of the transfer, if for instance the family moves to a place close to

relatives and friends, if the family succeeds in getting hold of a house and a garden, if the husband's transfer is combined with a promotion and if wife and children come upon patterns they consider pleasant. But the next move will be all the harder. The particular point of rupture with regard to the family's life cycle matters too. Thus it is easier to move while the children are still of school age and when the wife is not bound to a particular locality by her job.

It should have become clear that the brunt of a transfer and the pulling up of roots connected with it has to be borne not by the soldier alone but by the soldier's family as a whole. The family's collective experiences and assessments are reflected in their attitude toward the geographic mobility that is asked of them.

The individual limits of toleration in these matters vary greatly. They depend on variables such as the acceptance of the necessity of military transfers as such, and of the way these transfers are handled. In regard to the latter aspect critical reservations are increasing.

#### 4.3. The children's situation

The social condition of soldiers' children is problematic due to their father's profession; they seem affected by their father's terms of service in a peculiar way.

Long and irregular working hours lead to a process of alienation from his children, he becomes "invisible" to them in the very real sense of the



term due to their father's repeated absence. Certainly many fathers, when off duty try to compensate for their recurring absence by intensely attending to their children during the periods they are at home. Sometimes, however, they lack the energy to do so when they return worn out from their job. Some fathers are so exhausted by their long working hours that they - in spite of all good intentions - find themselves unable to cope with their children's needs and demands.

When the father sees his wife and children only on weekends, or even less frequently, the entire constellation of the family is changed. It is self-evident that the mother alone assumes full responsibility for her children. The mother has to take care of her children's day-to-day problems as they turn up. Later, however, if her husband does not approve of her decisions this may cause frictions. On weekends, some fathers feel they have to assert themselves to rectify the omissions committed by wives with regard to the children's education during their absence. And it must be remembered that the fathers then react from a limited overview and understanding caused by their frequent absence. As a rule they are unaware of the background of problems or do not know how the problematic situation developed step by step. Consequently paternal punishment may be inappropriate or unjust.

Other fathers retreat from education tasks and leave the educational arena to their wives because they don't have any continuous influence on their children due to their long working hours anyway. Thus it remains for the mother to iron out both the smaller frictions and the larger problems regarding their children. The fathers, on the contrary, are experienced by their children almost exclusively from their "best side", their holiday mood.

It is mainly the transfers which interfere seriously with familial life. The frequent pulling up of roots generate a plethora of problems. The loss of familiar social subcultures implies the loss of existing friendships. This may lead soldiers' children into a reduced willingness to form close social ties, which may finally result in genuine deprivation of contact. This behavior is sometimes reinforced by the awareness that the family will not stay at the respective location for long. Under these circumstances the children can hardly develop a sense of "being home".

In addition to the loss of friends, difficulties at school arise to reinforce the problems of these children. This does not come as a surprise given the enormous differences in the school systems of the various states.

In this respect it is the children who, in particular, have to pay a high price for their father's profession. After moving hitherto good students may have to face failure at school due to different curricula, a different combination of courses and different requirement levels. This is a situation they don't have to answer for, yet a situation that affects them more than others, because they need the appreciation of their new schoolmates after having lost their old friends.

Certainly, positive effects were also mentioned by those interviewed. Through occasional shifts children may learn how to adjust; they also may acquire more intellectual flexibility. These positive aspects, however, were infrequently listed and, if at all, this was exclusively by parents whose children had been confronted with this situation a few times only and whose children either did not attend school yet or were

attending grammar school. Once the children were older, however, their parents became more opposed to moving. An altogether negative assessment of the consequences of moving with regard to soldiers' children predominated.

#### 4.4. The housing situation and removals

The practice of transfer forces on the soldier a high degree of geographical mobility varying, of course, in scope and impact. Generally, non-commissioned officers are less affected than officers, whereas officers of the general staff head the list. Since reassignments more often than not are made to posts outside the garrison locale there is little choice but to move. The alternative option of temporary separation is seldom preferred. This situation confronts the soldier with a multitude of problems.

As there is no housing program provided for by the Bundeswehr itself it remains for the individual soldier to search for housing facilities at his new garrison locale. The Federal government, however, has apartments at its disposal that are either owned or partly financed by it. These apartments are distributed to soldiers or government employees by the garrison administration and local housing boards. It is this "housing program" and the apartments procured by it give rise to endless complaints.

The pattern of distribution of these government subsidized apartments was not considered transparent by almost all of those interviewed. Again and again manipulation was suspected. Higher ranks were supposed to have fewer difficulties in

obtaining decent apartments; also personal connections and corruption were seen as being part of the distributive process.

It is largely insignificant whether this criticism is justified. It is important as a reflection of the widespread feeling among soldiers and their families of being at the mercy of the bureaucracy in such a central aspect of their life design.

The home is especially crucial as a refuge for all of those who are continuously forced to break off social relations and settle in new surroundings. For them more than for others "their home is their castle".

Particularly non-commissioned officers and lower officer ranks are economically dependent on these federal housing facilities after having been transferred because of the low rents charged. But even soldiers inclined to and in the position to accept higher rents find themselves forced to live in such apartments due to the tight situation on the housing market. Many of them are part of settlements built specifically next to the barracks. They are exclusively occupied by government employees. In the soldiers' vernacular these settlements are called "Bundeswehr-Ghetto" or simply "ghetto". They are ambivalently rated. When questions concerning the quality of these apartments are discounted - as a matter of fact there are considerable qualitative differences - social aspects play a dominant role in their evaluation. Thus the common understanding of one's respective neighbors' situation and mutual eagerness to help are emphasized.

These settlements, however, are also experienced as places of social control where military structures impinge on the private sphere.

When at last an apartment has been found the preparations for moving, the removal itself and refurnishing require considerable pain and effort. The varying condition and format of the apartments cause additional problems. The soldier himself has to pay for all the costs of moving not covered by financial grants of his employer.

Thus even transfers in connection with promotions imply financial losses due to the frequent removals. Apart from the fact that a transfer often results into the wife's losing her job, a removal may also cause the cost of living to rise. This is largely caused by the landlord's habit of charging higher rents for new tenants.

#### 4.5. Familial interaction

The consequences of being a soldier by profession become very clear when examining the interactions within the family. The specifics of service, mainly with regard to assignments and sea duty for the navy largely structure the way familial functions are distributed between the spouses. In view of long and irregular working hours combined with frequent periods of absence it is generally the wife who is forced to bear the brunt of familial tasks.

In most families the financial management is left to the wives. The husbands are content with this arrangement because it saves them from having to

take care of "irksome trifles" - often they would not have time to do so anyway.

The wife's indispensable independence in certain areas contrasts with the renunciation of the ability to pursue her own aims and professional goals which is enforced by the military structures.

The conflicts generated by this distribution of functions are particularly tense when the husband returns home and wants to be informed and asked for his opinion. This problem is exacerbated by his difficulty in dispensing with his occupational mannerism at home, a phenomena, however, not exclusive to the military.

This is caused on the one hand by the specific communication patterns, speech and tone-of-voice in the military. On the other hand the soldier cannot easily switch from being a member of the hierarchically structured military into the partnership role of husband and father. To put more drastically: The attempt to carry over the functioning principle of an army - command and obedience - into the familial domain, almost inevitably results in problems, especially when the position of the soldier's wife is typified by the specific independence alluded to.

The "weekend marriage" is another characteristic problem common to military families. It entails times of separation in which the husband serves far away from his place of residence and returns home on weekends only. This arrangement is only in part by deliberate choice, e.g. in order to save the children from having to change schools, to allow the wife to continue in her job, or,

more generally, to avoid a change of social structures. Families may resort to this arrangement, when they assume that the next transfer will allow the soldiers to return to a post in the vicinity.

Often, however, a weekend marriage is forced upon families by recurrent training programs, detachments, or by the simple fact that a new apartment has not yet been found.

The weekend marriage in particular is regarded to be extremely conflict-prone, even damaging to marriage.

The high expectations regarding the weekend to be spent together are hardly ever fulfilled. This results in myriad disappointments and frustrations between the spouses.

The demands of military service deeply affect familial life weighing down the family with burdens. It is not surprising therefore that the soldier's marriage is perceived as extremely imperiled: all persons interviewed estimated that the divorce rate in the Bundeswehr is higher than the overall rate in the Federal Republic.

#### 4.6. Social contacts

In the light of the results presented so far it comes as no surprise that soldiers and their families see only few opportunities for social activities outside of job or family. Frequent transfers combined with the high probability of

immanent transfer especially leave their distinctive imprint.

The difficulty in establishing contacts with civilians on occasions other than official events, e.g. at garrison balls is especially marked. Several factors play a role in this respect.

A high fluctuation rate lowers the willingness to approach the other on both sides. Constant "living subject to recall" puts into question the feasibility of these integrative efforts. To this must be added the heavily time consuming demands of military service which limit the possibilities for leisure time activities. In the cases where soldiers live in a "Bundeswehr ghetto" neighbourhood contacts are confined to other members of the Bundeswehr.

Yet there are efforts to escape this situation. Many military families make use of sports clubs to meet people at their new garrison locale. Sometimes this presents financial difficulties, because particular clubs, e.g. tennis clubs, often demand rather high admission fees which have to be paid anew after each transfer when a new club is joined. In this respect NCOs are in a somewhat better position due to the reduced frequency of transfers.

In addition, a family just moved is expected to show a considerable capability in adjusting to the local patterns of social behavior. This is particularly true in small garrison locales and in cases where military families live in small villages outside the garrison. Regional cultural differences, e.g. different dialects, between the local population and the newly arrived military

families can also hamper integration. The multi-fold difficulties in attempting to establish contacts with civilians reduce the chances of a successful integration of a military family all the more so when the hindering factors accumulate.

Without engaging in the risky task of semantic interpretation or entering the difficult area of socio-linguistics it is remarkable how the "we" in self-referral of soldiers and their families is experienced in a way distinctly separated from the environment which is associated with adjectives like "civilian", "free", or "normal".

It is not only the specifics of the military career which make military families view their reality as being unique, but also the fact that they suspect society of not sufficiently appreciating the role of the soldiers.

Considering the large number of possible barriers to the integration of the soldier and his family into the civilian environment it is not surprising that private contacts are largely limited to fellow members of the Bundeswehr.

It is in their dealings with their fellow soldiers in the private and semiprivate sphere that the extent to which duty structures determine the private lives of military families becomes apparent. Thus, the hierarchical structure of the military and its organizational principle of command and obedience prove effectual beyond the narrow scope of duty. The functionally defined aims of the military lead to a particularly strong manifestation of domination and subordination, much more rigid than in any civilian

bureaucracy. The individual finds his place in the social order of the Bundeswehr according to rank and service post. If one looks at the social contacts of military families with fellow members of the Bundeswehr, it becomes apparent that circles of acquaintances are in most cases of rather homogeneous composition: families of officers and families of NCOs largely keep to themselves.

A considerable part of the social life of the soldiers and their families is devoted to quasi-official events characterized by the fact that they take place before an official background - soldiers sometimes can be ordered to attend - and military resources are expended.

There is a great variety in the occasions and the participating groups of these events. Among them are large-scale festivities for representative purposes of the Bundeswehr and for contacts with the civilian population (e.g. balls), events which can be of great importance in the social life of some garrison localities. But the major part of the social events are smaller festivities such as bowling evenings, parties due to promotions, transfers or at the end of one's term of duty, Mardi Gras or "stag evenings" the latter being especially widespread in the officer corps.

Yet, the spectrum of opinions about these activities is equally broad. Prominent, however, is not so much a consistent "pro" or "con", but rather an ambivalent attitude having to do foremost with local circumstances and the way the events are carried out. Principled rejection is rare and limited to the exception where a soldier is posted at the place where he lived before joining the army and has been able to maintain

his previous relationships. A reduced willingness to participate in these events can be observed in garrison locales with an attractive selection of leisure time activities. The more prominent the feeling of compulsion the less enthusiastically accepted are these events.

As an equivalent to "stag evenings" there are events organized solely for the benefit of the soldiers' wives. These events, as well as those which the wives attend together with their husbands, can take on compulsory character, if only by the subtle pressure or frequent inquiry as to why they may not have been present.

One can easily observe a shadow hierarchy: rank and service post of the husband also determine the social position of the wife at these events. Especially wives of higher ranking soldiers are - sometimes implicitly - expected to play a special role. Custom has it that the wife of the battalion commander and to a certain extent also of the company commander feels responsible for the "social climate" of the unit and thus organizes social activities for the soldiers' wives.

Looking at the structure of social contacts of soldiers and their families, one notes their separation - to a varying extent - from society as a whole. Relationships with the "civilian, normal, free" population exist mostly on the superficial, formal level. The handicaps which result from the particularities of military service lead to a more or less isolated intra-Bundeswehr social life modeled on the hierarchical organization of the military. It is only those who make a specific effort and who remain at one garrison locale sufficiently long so as to establish social relationships with persons outside the pa-

rameters of the Bundeswehr that succeed in "breaking out" of this isolation.

## 5. Conclusion

The numerous demands on the soldier, derived from the functional requirements of the armed forces on the one hand and from traditional behavior-expectations on the other, are aimed at ensuring maximum control and power of disposal. The organizational structures of the military are largely attuned to the "single man army". Marriage and family appear to be negligible factors. This image of the soldier as being unmarried has, however, long since been rendered obsolete by reality: even in the Bundeswehr the majority of career soldiers are married.

Our largely descriptive analysis has attempted to trace and present the everyday lives of military families and to show up underlying perceptions and justifications. At the same time it documents the valuation of their own social situation by the interviewed themselves. The criteria for such evaluation are inseparable from a social value and reference system transcending that of the military (unless one views the military as a "total institution"). If one accepts the fact that the military is an integral though specific part of society it becomes impossible to abstract from this societal web of values and references.

The instrumentalization of the soldier geared as it is to maximize power of disposal over him assigns fundamental priority to military requirements over those of a personal nature.

The Janus face of the Bundeswehr reveals itself. On the one hand its existence is based on the necessity of protecting the democratic form of government, the individual freedom and pluralistic life styles of its citizens, on the other hand the restrictions in personal liberty and self-realization imposed on the soldier and his dependents are perceived as a great contrast.

The soldier is increasingly inclined to question the why and wherefore of "official duties". The organization-centered line of reasoning has lost its persuasiveness. The functionally determined uniqueness of army life appears less and less compelling: especially when he contrasts his personal situation with that of his civilian counterpart. That the soldiers' selfless attitude is a functional imperative because the collective good takes precedence over the needs of the individual has increasingly lost its ability to convince. This is all the more the case the larger the gap is between the values held in the society at large and their realization by military families under the conditions of army life.

Our results indicate that both soldiers and their families are becoming increasingly aware of these discrepancies. Undoubtedly the selection and socialization mechanisms of the Bundeswehr as well as its attractiveness as an employer in today's labor-market possess a modifying effect. In the long run, however, if soldiers feel cut off from the benefits and developments of the society they are asked to defend, this will certainly have an impact on the armed forces. The willingness to bear the social costs of safeguarding the national security will be impaired. Soldiers serving a society clearly want to experience the values and enjoy the benefits they are defending.

The military family can be considered the criterion by which to measure the seriousness of the Federal Republic of Germany's intentions to protect and preserve the family structure and the institution of marriage; its laws provide the legal parameters of the military structure.

Taking into consideration the soldier's interests as well as the effectivity of the German Armed Forces, it is clear that the traditional role models dictated for wives and children of active duty personnel are no longer supportable: clinging to the "trusted" remedies of the past to solve problems is no longer viable. A broad-based re-evaluation of the military family relationship is definitely necessary.

## Notes

- (1) The German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research(SOWI) is a central military agency. At the present time there are 25 researchers of different disciplines working here.
- (2) Initial results have already been published in H. Dillkofer, G. - M. Meyer, S. Schneider: Soziale Probleme von Soldatenfamilien der Bundeswehr, Opladen 1986.
- (3) "Soldier" and the latin "sold" for salary are etymologically closely related.
- (4) Compare the various marriage regulations existing in all armies in part - though modified - until the present day. The respective regulations for the Bundeswehr were abolished in 1974.
- (5) This applies in times of peace. During war the proportion of married soldiers rises even among conscripts.
- (6) "In the single man's army the problem of choosing between work and family life did not exist" (Janowitz, 1960).
- (7) Including not only the "theoretical" knowledge of the relevant literature, but also "practical" experience: All in charge of the project are married, have children, and also experience in moving; one of the authors is a career officer.
- (8) Within the meaning of the "sensitizing concept" as described by H. Blumer in an older article (H. Blumer, 1954).

- (9) Eight of the interviewed husbands were members of the navy, eleven of the air force, and fifteen of the army. The interviews were conducted in 1983/84.
- (10) The interviewers are identical with the authors of the project.

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Leena Parmar

**RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND INDIAN SOLDIERS:  
SOME CONCEPTUAL ISSUES**

Curiously enough, in academic discussions armed force organizations constitute one of the most generally ignored and overlooked areas of great importance despite the role of armed force organizations in budgets, despite the frequent figuring of members of such organizations as central figures in revolutionary situations, despite the decisive role played by operations in terms of such organizations during periods of war, etc. The vast majority of the work on armed force systems has been carried out by historians or persons interested in armed force systems per se (e. g., military experts) rather than by general social scientists. In recent years an increasing number of social scientists, especially in the fields of sociology and political science, have concerned themselves with armed forces systems as such or with restricted interrelations between armed force organizations and other specific matters. Armed force organizations have two major foci of significance in any society. One is the role of such organizations as far as external use, either for defense or aggression, is concerned. The other is the use of such forces for the internal maintenance of order.

I make no attempt whatsoever to treat armed force organizations at any length in the context of problems of war, since in that context they have received their most thorough and detailed treatment by military experts, historians, etc. The concern here is rather with possible relevances of armed force organizations in societies generally and in the process of development along increasingly modernized lines - especially the development of latecomers to the process of modernization.

One of the most fascinating aspects of armed force organizations is the literal degree of isolation of members of these organizations from members of other organizations in the society. When operations take place in terms of armed

force organizations, to some extent their members are always isolated as clearly as possible from non-members. The isolation of armed force personnel means, among other things, that the inter-relationships of armed force personnel and other members of the society are periodic and delimited. They are subject to enormous variation in these respects. For quite considerable lengths of time under crisis circumstances or even under training circumstances, members of armed force organizations may be kept in nearly complete isolation from other members of the society.

The isolation of members of the armed forces is also in terms of the age classification of the members. Even when the members of the armed force organization are determined primarily by birth or class or the like, they generally belong to the armed force organization only for a limited age period. That period is usually all or a portion of their adulthood. This means, of course, that one of the problems universally associated with membership in armed force organizations is the problem of getting members from a general social context and of returning them to a general social context, if they survive to the age of retirement. Within the period of their membership in the armed force organization there may be other periodic returns to a general social context, but in all such cases it is important that the rules governing the transition from one context to another be clear-cut and that the solidarity of the member of the armed force organization with other members of that organization take precedence over his other solidarities in the general social context.

Critical for an understanding of the fit of armed force organizations into general social structure is the fact that their members are frequently isolated for important periods of their time, even when other members of the society except for

religious ascetics and imprisoned criminals, are never so isolated (1).

This problem of isolation leads to the theory of relative deprivation. The purpose of the present paper is to examine the relation between military organization and social structure. And even in this field the task is limited. In this paper (data has been taken from my Ph. D. work on Indian soldier - A study of their Modernization in the Context of Professional Commitment Aspiration and Morale) the emphasis is to seek the levels of relationship between selected attitudinal variables with the structural variables, within the army organization. We have analysed the attitudes and values not for their own sake but only in so far as they throw light on generalization which, however tentative, are sought to be established.

In all these cases, the concept of relative deprivation serves the same theoretical purpose: it is used as an interpretative, intervening variable. The aim was designed to study the sentiments and attitudes of Indian soldiers - their attitudes towards life, marriage, children, promotion, aspiration, commitment, morale etc. These attitudes are typically taken as the dependent variables. The analysis of data finds that these attitudes differ among soldiers of varying status, for example, older or married men exhibited more resentment towards the working conditions of army than unmarried and younger soldiers. The ranks of the army, which go with age and experience, have been taken provisionally as the independent variable. Once the relationship between independent and dependent variables are established, the problem is one of accounting for them, of inferring how it comes to be that the married men exhibit greater resentment in the army than the younger ones.

At this point of interpretation the concept of relative deprivation is introduced, so that the pattern of analysis becomes somewhat as follows; the married man (independent variable) more often questions the justification of his duty towards army organization (dependent variable) because he appraises the situation within the frame of reference (interpretative variable) yielded by comparing himself with other married men in civilian life, who escapes the danger of isolation from his family or with unmarried men in the army, who have not sacrificed to this extent. We may thus see the function of the concept of relative deprivation as an interpretative concept which is intended to help explain the variation in attitudes expressed by soldiers of differing social status.

Sociologists, social psychologists and cultural anthropologists have always operated on the fundamental principles that an individual's attitudes and conduct are shaped by the group in which he has membership and that self-appraisal and the correlative feelings and behavior flow from the individual's location in a particular group within a social hierarchy. "That men act in a social frame of reference yielded by the groups of which they are a part is a notion undoubtedly ancient ... (2) "men frequently orient themselves to groups other than their own ..." (3), thus reflecting the influences of the group to which they refer themselves, if not their membership group.

The term was first used by Hyman, who elaborated the concept and explored some of its properties in an inquiry in 1942 into "The Psychology of Status" (4). Seeking to understand the way individuals ranked themselves in terms of their choice of a social framework for comparison, he first explored by interview the reference groups and reference individuals that subjects employed

and some of the dynamics underlying such selection, and then determined the effects of particular reference groups on self-appraisal by experimental manipulations. At about the same time, Newcomb - searching to understand processes of attitude change or lack of change, among individuals all of whom had prolonged membership in Bennington College, explored systematically by interview and repeated testing the various ways in which they related themselves to the Bennington community - in other words, chose it as a reference group (5). These first systematic studies by social psychologists in comparative and normative reference group processes respectively (to use the distinction later developed by Kelley) stimulated no one but a few other social psychologists, notably, the Hartleys and Sherif, to continue research on reference groups. Sherif emphasized reference groups in his 1948 "Outline of Social Psychology" (6), which included a summary by Newcomb of his Bennington study, rephrased in terms of the explicit concept reference group.

The concept had clarified for Newcomb various paradoxical findings. Similarly, Stouffer and his associates were led in their studies of "The American Soldier ..." to the concept of relative deprivation", a close cousin to the concept of comparative reference group, as they confronted the apparent contradictions between feelings of satisfaction or deprivation and the objective situation among groups of soldiers (7). They then invoked the interpretative principle that the soldier's sense of deprivation was not dependent on an absolute level, but was relative to the perceived level in the groups with which he compared himself.

These ideas and concepts, however, had little prominence until 1950, when Merton and Rossi synthesized and presented in systematic form their

"Contributions to the Theory of Reference Group Behaviour" (8).

The reference group concept reminds us that individuals may orient themselves to groups other than their own, not merely to their membership groups, and thereby explains why the attitudes and behavior of individuals may deviate from what would be predicted on the basis of their group membership. Thus a theory of the group determination of attitude has been properly enlarged by the concept of reference group.

From these distinctions flows the hypothesis that the attitude held tends to reflect the reference group, whereas the attitude expressed tends to reflect the membership group (9). It is only when the individual reveals his non-conformity that he is in danger of sanctions from his membership group. Thus the membership group and the reference group normally divide the realm, the former holding way over the sphere of expression and the latter over the sphere of private thoughts.

Of the various concepts employed by the authors of "The American Soldier" to interpret their multifarious materials, there is one which takes a major place. This is the concept of relative deprivation. "The American Soldier", in two volumes contains selections of research done in the American Army during World War II by the Research Branch, Information & Education Division of the War Department. These works, together with books on experiments in 'Mass Communication' and 'Measurement and Prediction' contributed a four volumes series of studies in social psychology in World War II. This very fact demonstrated how rapidly the studies concerning army as an organization in the broader social context became not only popular but also people became aware of the fact of relative deprivation, which is one of the numerous interesting findings of the

American Soldier.

In India army as an organization has not attained the interest of social scientists much, as in other areas such as caste, class and other broad categories. But army, as a social category not only has diverse structural value but also people who join army come from different strata of society with wide differences of attitudes and opinions with a common aim to serve the nation voluntarily. It is, in this regard, important to understand the structural constraints and attitudes they hold to serve in various unpromising situations which the nature of job demands.

It will be noted that individuals take as a base for self-reference the situation of people with whom they are in direct social interaction, primarily, the in-groups of friends and associates. At other the assumed frame of reference is yielded by social categories of people - officers who are posted at the field area, or those officers who may be posted in the peace area but actually leaving separated from families due to internal home pressure (problems like Punjab, Assam, Nagaland etc.) with whom the individual is not in sustained social relations. In order to highlight the connection of the concept of relative deprivation with reference group theory, these others, with whom the individual does not interact are here designated as non-membership groups or out-groups. Since both membership groups and non-memberships groups, in-groups and out-groups have in fact been taken as assumed social frames of reference, in these interpretations, this at once leads to a general question of central importance to a developing theory of reference group behavior, under which conditions are associates within one's own groups taken as a frame of reference for self-evaluation and attitude formation and under which condition do out-

groups or non-membership groups provide the significant frame of reference?

That men act in a social frame of reference yielded by the groups of which they are a part is a notion which is ancient and clear. There is, however, the further fact that men frequently orient themselves to groups other than their own in shaping their behavior, constitute the distinctive concern of reference group theory. And in this context the relative deprivation can be understood of Indian soldier as such. Here in this reference that Indian soldier's evaluation and self-appraisal in which he perceives the values of other individuals and groups as a comparative frame of reference.

From our examinations, it appears that the Indian soldier utilizing the concept of relative deprivation can act as a catalyst for further empirical study. Becoming a soldier meant to many men a very real deprivation. But the felt sacrifice was greater for some than for others, depending on their standards of comparison.

Take one of the clearest examples - marital condition. The married man, and especially the father, was making the same sacrifices as others plus the additional one of leaving his family behind. Reluctance of married men to leave their families would have been reinforced in many instances by extremely reluctant wives whose pressures on the husband to seek deferment were not always easy to resist. Comparing himself with his unmarried associates in the army, he could feel that induction demanded greater sacrifice from him than from them; and comparing himself with his married civilian friends, he could feel that he had been called on for sacrifices that they were escaping altogether. Hence, the married man, on the average, was more likely than others to come into the army, with reluctance and, pos-

sibly, a sense of injustice.

Or take age, compared with younger men - apart now from marital condition - the older man had at least three stronger grounds for feeling relatively greater deprivation (10).

Thomas pointed out many years ago that what a man does depends largely upon his definition of the situation. One may add that the manner in which one consistently defines a succession of situations depends upon his organized perspective. A perspective is an ordered view of one's world - what is taken for granted about the attributes of various objects, events, and human nature.

It is an order of things remembered and expected as well as things actually perceived, an organized conception of what is plausible and what is possible; it constitutes the matrix through which one perceives his environment.

There is abundant experimental evidence to show that perception is selective; that the organization of perceptual experience depends in part upon what is anticipated and what is taken for granted. Judgments rest upon perspectives, and people with different outlooks define identical situations differently, responding selectively to the environment. As Goethe contended, history is continually rewritten, not so much because of the discovery of new documentary evidence, but because the changing perspectives of historians lead to new selections from the data.

In this study efforts were made to know the attitudes of married men who are in the army in comparison to the civilian counterpart and the married men in comparison to unmarried men in the army or men who are posted in the field area in contrast to those who were posted in the peace zone. Comparing himself with his unmarried as-

sociates in the army, he feels that his sacrifice is greater, than theirs, and comparing himself with his married civilian friends, he feels he has been called on for sacrifices much more which they were escaping altogether. Hence the married man, on the average was more likely to feel deprived than others in the army and feels a sense of injustice.

This refers to the fact that soldiers do not take the official institutional norms as a direct basis for judging the legitimacy of their own voluntary induction into the armed forces. These same rules - since they are defined in terms of such statuses as marital condition and age - also focus attention on certain groups or statuses with which individuals subject to service will compare themselves. This problem is highlighted by the hypothesis which uniformly assumes that the married soldier compares himself with like statused individuals with whom he is or has been in actual social relation associates in the army or civilian friends. This then raises a question concerning reference group behavior when the frame of comparative reference provided by impersonal status categories in general (other married men, unmarried counterparts etc.) and by those representatives of these status categories with whom he is in sustained social relations.

This greater sacrifice needs to be explained to some extent. There is no measure of social distance by which "greater" relative deprivation may be given a meaning; and second, a "greater" deprivation need not necessarily be more intensely felt than a lesser one. These difficulties can only be answered by reference to the particular person's own standards. The intensity even of the most measurable deprivations may not correlate at all with their magnitude; for instance, marginal differences of income within a family might be more deeply resented than greater

external differences. Moreover, different people have very different pictures of the social structure of which they form a part (11).

Let us compare to some extent the work of Stouffer in this regard while analysing "The American Soldier".

This question leads at once to the comparative significance of general status categories and intimate sub-groups of which one is a member. Suppose, for example, that all or almost all of a married soldier's married associates have also been drafted, even though, in general, this status category has a smaller proportion of inductions than the category of the unmarried male. Which basis of comparison will, on the average, prove more effective? Will he compare himself with the other drafted benedicts in his clique or sub-group and consequently be the more ready to accept induction for himself, or will he compare himself with the larger status category of married men, who are in general more often deferred, and consequently feel aggrieved over his own induction? The question has, of course, a more general bearing. For example, are workers' expectations regarding their personal prospects of future employment shaped more by the present employment of themselves and their associates on the job or by high rates of unemployment prevailing the occupation at large (12) ?

The individuals comparing their own lot with that of others have some knowledge of the situation in which these others find themselves. It assumes that the individual knows about the groups with whom he compares himself. In other words, if the individual is taken to be positively oriented towards the norms of a non-membership group, the theory assumes that he has some knowledge of these norms. Thus the theory of reference group behavior must include in its fuller psychological

elaboration some treatment of the dynamics of perception (of individuals, groups and norms) and in its sociological elaboration some treatment of channels of communication through which this knowledge is gained. That a significant proportion of married soldiers indeed compare their lot with that of married civilian friends and unmarried associates in the army in arriving at their judgment remains an assumption from the data collected through vigorous field work which included questionnaire, schedule, observation and interview method. These comparisons are inferred, by intervening variables. But they need not remain assumptions. These are not only facts in hand, but are of a kind which can be directly tested in future enquiries employing the concept of reference group.

But there is, of course, no reason to assume that comparisons of oneself with others are uniformly conscious. Numerous experimental studies in social psychology have shown that individuals unwittingly respond to different frames for reference introduced by the experimenter. To the extent that unwitting reference groups are involved in the ordinary routines of daily life, research techniques must be extended to detect their operation. Why will A, in one situation, compare himself with B, and in another, with C? Or, more concretely and illustratively: when do workers compare their lot with that of fellow-workers in close association, and when with others of markedly different status? Which aspects of the social structure and which psychological processes limit the range of individuals and groups regarded as pertinent frames of reference? It is this type of problem - the processes shaping the selection of reference groups - that stands in most conspicuous need of research (13).

This paper affords a clue, and possibly an important clue, for solving the sociological problem

of finding the common residual which constitutes the reference groups distinctive for those in a social status category. The findings of this study seem to converge in emphasizing the great importance of the primary reference group within the larger reference system. Within this social structure and ongoing social process the ties between the individual soldier and his group of friends and finally his aspiration and evaluation may be understood, first in terms of his primary groups and secondly in terms of the larger organization in which these groups are implanted.

A modern soldier is much too sensitive to structural constraints and its consequences on his aspiration and values than a traditional soldier. Progressively as we move from a traditional soldier's role - to a modern soldier's role, "sanctional rationality" is replaced by "substantive rationality". This has a significant consequence over morale because now soldier looks at structural phenomena not only of the army but also of society from a critical viewpoint and is likely to judge them negatively more often than in the past, if therein structural limitations prevail.

To make any sacrifice, the individual wants to know the reasons and the rewards. He must be convinced that the effort is necessary for the defence of a country and have faith in what his leaders preach. Every individual and group must be convinced that the commanders whose orders they have to obey are proficient in their work, sincere in their actions, fair in their dealings, and that they will place the cause of the country before self.

The strong drive for self-evaluation concerning one's opinions and abilities has implications not only for the behaviour of persons in groups but also for the processes of formation of groups and



changing memberships of groups. How strong the drives and satisfactions stemming from reference group sources by which a soldier feels relatively deprived are compared to other needs which people satisfy in groups is impossible to say, but it seems clear that the drive for self-evaluation is an important factor contributing to understanding a human being more clearly and more reasonably. Thus, a deep examination discloses three distinct referents:

- (1) Groups which serve as comparison points;
- (2) Groups to which men aspire;
- (3) Groups whose perspectives are assumed by the actor.

Under some circumstances, however, group loyalties and aspirations are related to perspectives assumed, and the character of this relationship calls for further exploration.

One small experiment is of course only a bare beginning. Other experiments on these factors can and undoubtedly will follow. The ramifications of the problem are many and the answers such experiments can supply are very important to understand any social reality. The purpose of this paper has been to demonstrate the utility of a social explanation for personal appraisal of life situation. This study proposes that personal evaluations of life situation are relative to the precise social locations which people occupy in society and the specific groups to which they commit their identities. With this theoretical position we may propose that sub-groups in a society respond differently to the occupational structure, that their evaluations of their occupational status is a response to their social experiences.

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## Section II

### THE MILITARY IN MEDITERRANEAN DEMOCRACIES

Maria Carrilho

**ARMED FORCES AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN PORTUGAL**

**A brief survey and some conclusions  
of a research**

## C O N T E N T S

1. Background of the republican revolution of the 5th of October, 1910
2. From the democratic republic to dictatorship
3. From dictatorship to democracy

## Conclusion

- a. Organization
- b. Profession
- c. Civil-military relations

## Notes

## Tables 1 - 4

A fundamental fact in the Portuguese history along this century is the protagonistic role of the military in the three moments that involved political changes: from Monarchy to Republic on the 5th October 1910; from the Liberal Republic to a Dictatorship with the coup of the 28th May 1926; from Dictatorship to Parliamentary Democracy with the coup of 25th April 1974.

How can we interpret this constant participation of the armed forces in political change in Portugal?

An exhaustive search for explanation would have to consider the globality of the Portuguese society, in its whole economical, social and political aspects, inserted in extranational coordinates. However, it is impossible to carry out such a task for the moment, due to lack of empirical knowledge in social sciences, that were marginalized by the dictatorship. Therefore, I confined my research to a more limited purpose: the identification of factors that, inside the armed forces and concerning civil-military relations, have contributed to military intervention.

We started from a basic sociological hypothesis: it is possible, besides the historical diversity of the three periods, to find some constants and to establish some correlations. So, we followed the trail of some variables that are suggested by military sociology - intra-institutional variables (organizational and professional) and extra-institutional ones (civil-military relations, strictu sensu, that means relationship between civil and military sectors of power).

It may be important to underline that one of the evidences coming from this work is the interest of the research on armed forces in order to enlighten some aspects of the national history of a country.

It must be said, that, in the absence of empirical data and valuable bibliography on Portuguese military, I had to plunge in direct sources, sometimes difficult to reach. Anyway, I found precious support among military and within the Portuguese military institution itself.

I shall not try to sketch a general idea of the research (1), but only to present a socio-historical survey in order to make understandable some conclusions.

### 1. Background of the Revolution of the 5th of October, 1910

By the end of the last century, Portugal was already relatively less developed than most of the other European countries, from both the economical and the technical points of view. However, it constituted the political and administrative center of a vast colonial empire, which caused the envy of the largest European powers, namely Germany and England.

As a result of the Berlin Conference (1884- 85), that established the division of Africa amongst the European powers, the effective occupation and colonization of the territories under its colonial rule was imposed. Under this clause, England sent, in 1890, an ultimatum to Portugal, which forced it to abandon the zone situated between Angola and Mozambique. This humiliation started a wave of patriotic indignation, mainly among the military, who strongly criticized the government's colonial policy.

As far as the political organization was concerned, the constitutional monarchy had adopted a multiparty system, in which the progressive and the regenerator parties took place alternatively. In the meantime, the republican ideology was

gaining ground and followers, not only through secret organizations such as Carbonaria and Masonry, but also by the legal way, as the Republican Party belonged to parliament.

1.1. Let us examine in very general lines, what was the situation of the armed forces, and firstly what concerns military system and organization.

The permanent organization already started by Marquis of Pombal during the 18th century was established without significant opposition. The same did not apply to the introduction of conscription. Even if during the last decades of the monarchy the conscription was backed by the law, such a system was opposed mainly in two ways. On the one hand, the use of remissions, that were an exemption from the military service through payment. So, most young men belonging to the middle and higher classes did not pass through the ranks. On the other hand, military duty - that was too long (five years and sometimes increased by duty overseas) - was unwelcomed by the population, mostly in rural zones, often backed by the Church. In fact, some catholic sectors considered that military service, taking away the young men from their families, introduced them to new spiritual and flesh sins, which would lead them away from the Church.

An additional problem was caused by the existence of colonial troops. When Portugal had effectively to occupy its colonial territories, the deficiencies of the overseas Portuguese military mechanism became obvious. In order to attenuate this situation, the governments resorted to specific expeditions (expedicoes extraordinárias) that, as a rule were improvised, with all its consequences, so negative to both rank and officers.

All these factors pointed out to a certain disturbance at the organizational level.

1.2. As for the officer corps, it was involved in a process of professionalization, since its opening to men not belonging to the aristocracy (1792 to the army and 1832 to the navy, although in this branch many exceptions existed already in the 18th century) and specially after the appearance of military academies, in the middle of the last century.

At the end of the monarchy, titled aristocracy did not any longer hegemonize the officer corps. The urban and bourgeois background became dominant, in the first decades of this century, and more than 1/3 of the officers were born in the district of Lisbon.

As a consequence of this social shifting and because the officer corps was no longer backed by the wealthy aristocratic families, which granted it a high social status the military career was fully affected by the economical crisis. Economical difficulties felt by the officers and their families forced some of them often to recur to usurers and to look for a second job.

At the same time, dramatic tensions touched the military ethos itself, due to the new roles that had become expected from the officers. In fact, in the military career the managerial and technical skills became more important, and the "heroic model" lost ground in relation to the "managerial model".

1.3. With regard to the civil-military relationship, the final period of the monarchy was characterized by an accentuated crisis of the aristocratic model (using the model proposal formulated by M. Janowitz). The coincidence of elites - military and economic-political - which

had ensured, for a long period, the subjective control of the military institution by the nobility, had ceased to exist. The officers, predominantly connected to median and low bourgeois families, had no longer any reason to still think as the nobles.

The responsibility for the unsuccess at the external political level was, on the other hand, ascribed to the governments of the monarchy. As a matter of fact, a progressive estrangement in relation to the monarchist cause, could be detected amongst the officers.

As such, when the republican revolution occurred, on the 5th October 1910, the participation of a small military force, including an artillery unit, in support to the republican rebels, was enough to dictate the final result. The vast majority of the armed forces, with a few and brief exceptions, remained neutral and watched, without involvement, the fall of the monarchy.

## 2. From Democratic Republic to Dictatorship

The First Republic, anticlerical and democratic, started its evolution under a strong sign of great voluntarism and idealism. It had been hoped that, together with a greater amount of liberty, this would give Portugal a new national strength, more social justice and more wealth. However, this never materialized due to the conjunction of various factors, both endogenous and exogenous. Particularly disturbing were the participation of Portugal in the Great War and the governmental instability: from 1910 up to 1926 45 governments were formed, and about 30 rebel lions, "pronunciamentos" and conspiracies took place.

As far as the armed forces were concerned, the republic aimed at the formation of a new army,

socially integrated, which would express the national interest and, simultaneously, become a school of civism and a personal formation, through the alphabetization of the ranks and the introduction of new agricultural and industrial technics, taught by the officers.

With this in mind, a differentiation was established between military and police functions, in agreement with the officers' opinion. In 1911 a "Republican National Guard" was formed, as a rural police corps. The army was therefore liberated from police duties, and its legitimacy reached a higher level: the defense of the whole nation against eventual external threats.

2.1. The most fundamental alteration under the organizational point of view was, however, the attempt to substitute the permanent army by a militia force, consubstantiated by a law of the 2nd May 1911, that reflected the concept of "nation armée" and the ideas which were supported by the most advanced political trends in Europe, at the time.

This alteration implied an inevitable organizational disturbance due to the fact that many officers were against the new military system. The situation was highly aggrieved as a sequence of the 1914 - 1918 World War. The Portuguese military structures, going through a time of changes, had to be rapidly adapted to war necessities, irrevocably jeopardizing the republican project for building a new army.

2.2. In relation to professional factors we can state, in short, that throughout the First Republic, the officers' day by day was characterized by a progressively more acute perception of instability.

Under the circumstances, the new regime unchained

a contradictory process: while the development of the bourgeoisie and democracy favoured the consolidation of the military career as a profession, with its bureaucratic implications and its own requirements, the political vicissitudes caused frequent disturbances at the level of the characterizing aspects of the profession. The training method demanded to the officers suffered successive changes, the "esprit de corps" was altered by the political involvement in parties and rival fractions, and the criteria for career progression was, several times, reviewed by the government.

Special emphasis must be given to the transference of the so-called "militia" officers into the "Special Forces" or into the "Permanent Forces". When the World War I ended, many of the young men who had been conscripted and had to leave their civil careers to serve as officers (named "militia officers") under the Portuguese Expeditionary Force in France, found no attractive alternatives in civil life. Consequently, they went on serving the army and, through it, became a significant pressure force. The republican governments, to fulfill the needs of this sector, had to create an "Officers Special Corps" and to facilitate the transfer of these officers into the "Permanent Force". These facts caused dissatisfaction amongst the officers who had attended the normal courses at the Military Academy.

On the other hand, the economic crisis that had occurred during and after the war, affected the military as much as the civil servants or any other professional or occupational category. During 1924, the acquisition power of a general was reduced to 45 %, in relation to 1914; that of a colonel to 56 %, and those of the majors and captains to about 65%.

With regard to the social recruiting of the offi-

cer corps, we can say that it took place predominantly amongst the small and median urban bourgeoisie. Besides this, it could also be noticed the outline of the formation of a military caste, conspicuous during the post-war years. The percentage of students at the Military Academy, sons of previous officers, increased to over 50 percent.

2.3. Leaving aside the institutional variables, the most prominent aspect to be considered is the attempt to implant a civil-military relationship which would substitute the already suppressed aristocratic model.

A fundamental condition to promote a democratic model of civilian-military relations existed already, as previously mentioned, at the birth of the republic: the differentiation between the military and politico-economical "elites". But the tensions between the various governments and the armed forces, which could be felt since the attempt to establish a militia system, worsened with the Portuguese participation in the World War I. The republican governments, since 1914, bore in mind to enter the war at the side of the allies, to ensure the safeguard of the colonies. As the sequence of a complex and at time intricate process, finally, during 1917, the first Portuguese troops left Lisbon on their way to France (Flandres). Various happenings, amongst which typhus and mumps epidemics and the ineptitude of the politicians to solve some logistic problems, prevented the normal replacement of the troops, which had to spend as long as 10 months in the trenches. The truth is that the conditions under which the ranks and officers had to fight led to discontent and rebellion. The situation had a tragic conclusion on the human point of view. In the day-break of the 9th April 1918, on the eve of the replacement of Portuguese by British troops, at La Lys, the Germans attacked.

To give an idea of the terrible toughness of the battle it is enough to mention that in about eight hours, the Portuguese Division lost 7,325 men, nearly half of its strength.

This disaster, caused in Portugal a wave of emotion and a great controversy. For the military, the results were looked upon as a consequence of the government's ineptitude, inserted in a system dominated by political parties in permanent confrontation.

From the end of the war, and although Portugal had attained its goal, that is, to keep the colonies, the young democratic republic was condemned.

The economic crisis worsened by the military expenses with the war was often accompanied by violent episodes, which spread a feeling of insecurity.

Unable to keep public order, the governments often resorted to martial law, that means, public order through the armed forces.

Amongst the military, the idea of the need to intervene to keep order in the country by suspending the parties (considered responsible for the situation), advanced.

In the meantime, the increase of the structural weight of the military sector into the state, throughout the First Republic, could clearly be felt through the following indicators: strong increase of military expenses; high percentage of the military in the various cabinets (over 1/3 of the ministries occupied by officers); higher number of officers (Table 1); more hypothesis of longer terms of duty at general level (2). Using a gramscian interpretative formulation, it



can be stated that, in a context of debility of the civilian society structures, during the crisis which occurred only a few years after the birth of the republic, the relative position of those organizations less dependent from the conjunctural political fluctuations - the armed forces and, in a more discrete way, the church - was reinforced.

The large movement responsible for the military coup of the 28th May 1926, showed a heterogenous political composition, from constitutionalistic and democratic center sectors, to the extreme right. These last forces hegemonized the process unchained by the coup. The leader of the military movement himself, General Gomes da Costa, would be exiled to the Azores in less than two months, that was, during July 1926.

### 3. From Dictatorship to Democracy

The first question normally asked by those who reflect on the events of the 28th May 1926 and the 25th April 1974, is the following: how did the armed forces intervene to install a dictatorship, and, 48 years later, carry a military coup to end that same dictatorship and restore liberty?

A correctly viewed explanation passes through the identification of the nature of the dictatorship itself - military or civilian.

The winning faction of the plight for power following the 1926 coup (its better known personality was General Oscar Carmona, who became president of the republic in 1926) established a military dictatorship, that opened the way to fascism. This, however, did not materialize without the opposition of a large part of the officers that took part in the 28th May movement

itself, who, in the meantime, had understood the totalitarian trend of the political process. The most significant episode of opposition was the rebellion of the 3rd February 1927, which was backed by the population. The combats, which lasted for four days, caused hundreds of deaths and were followed by a terrible repression resulting, amongst other things, in the imprisonment and deportation of thousands of people. All the army units, National Republican Guard units and police forces that had been involved in the rebellion were disbanded. The armed forces were depurated of many officers, sergeants and ranks.

During April 1928 Salazar takes over the Ministry of Finances with special powers. His purpose, however, was to obtain complete control of power. Actually, Salazar, at the same time that he successfully balances the finances of the country, acts in a very capable way to overrule the militaries.

Between 1928 and 1937, an intense and hard lobbying process occurs, scarcely noticeable through the censured press but, nonetheless, most decisive. Salazar - who in the meantime had become prime-minister - succeeded in subjecting the armed forces via multiple control system. On one hand, through legislation which reduced the dimension and the powers of the military sector: decrease in the number of officers (table 1); introduction of promotions by choice in a large scale, which allowed the diffusion of informal and subjective criteria; political police watching over the officers; formation of a separate staff cadre (Estado Maior), which became autonomous. Parallely, Salazar ensured the concentration of powers in himself, by presiding personally over the most important military and defense organizations: Superior Council for National Defense; Superior Council for the Direction of War; Military Superior Council; Study Group

for the National Defense; Army and Navy General Staff Commissions; General Secretariat for the National Defense, and the Army Supreme Council - being the Minister of War at the same time.

So, as results from the indicators above, and contrary to what some authors, like Poulantzas and Nolte, thought, the dictatorship led by Salazar was not a military dictatorship but a civilian police one.

3.1. The slow decline of the totalitarian model of civilian-military relationship, defended by Salazar, started with the entry of Portugal into NATO. It is true that the adhesion to the Atlantic Pact, on one hand, constituted a victory of the regime in international political terms, and permitted the immediate survival of Salazar's dictatorial regime. But, on the other hand, it had an irreversible impact over the armed forces, as it determined the increase of the organizational efficiency level, which, on its turn, implied the quantitative growth of the officer corps (which made police control a more difficult task) and the prevalence of more objective criteria for the promotions, opposing the informal and ideological selection. Besides this, and within the scope of the Atlantic Pact, the contacts of the Portuguese officers with democratic political realities multiplied, allowing them to establish critical terms of comparison with the Portuguese regime.

During February 1961, insurrection begins in Angola. Salazar did not accept the hypothesis of a negotiated independence, and imposed an attempt for a military solution. However, the highest military authorities at the time, well aware of the reality of the African scene, realized the impracticability of Salazar's policy, and in April of the same year, an attempt for a "palacian" uprising took place, involving the Minister of De-

fence, the Army Minister, the Army Under Secretary (Costa Gomes, who later became president of the republic in 1974 - 1976) and the Chief of the Joint General Staff. This attempt did not succeed, and Salazar got rid of those elements, reinforcing his war policy. But instead of a rapid and decisive victory, an escalation of the conflict occurred: in 1963, the armed struggle begun in Guiné-Bissau and, two years later, in Mozambique.

The colonial war would have profound repercussions not only at the institutional military level, but also in the relationship of the armed forces with the governing authorities.

3.2. At the organizational level, the main problem soon became the scarcity of officers of intermediate patents, necessary to cadre the troops in Africa. This difficulty was overcome by the conscription of numerous young students. But amongst these students, especially at university level, contestation to the war was increasing rapidly. The repressive pattern of the regime blinded the responsables, in as much as sending to the front the most active contesters. Obviously, some of these young conscripted officers had to influence the also young career officers with their criticism of the war as a solution for the colonial problem. On the other hand, the application to enter the Military Academy became more and more scarce, endangering the normal output of new officers.

In 1973, the armed forces could not satisfy the unrealistic government requirements. The organizational aspect was seriously affected.

As far as the professional status was concerned, the war again severely interfered with it. Higher pragmatism in the promotional criteria prevailed, making almost impracticable the ideological con-

trol of the officers by the police. Leadership was not any longer defined only at the top, but it was also established from the base, on the fighting grounds. The young officers, who acquired combat knowledge, showed the marks of this experience: their operational aptitudes, leadership and command capacity developed.

In the meantime, dissatisfaction among the officers increased - they were subjected to successive commissions, which made a normal family life impossible, and their salaries became increasingly less compensatory.

The war also caused the weakening of the weight of the professional socialization with regard to standards and traditional values, as it was necessary to privilege the technical and organizational aspects. Combat situations provoked the dilution of standards and formalities, distinctive and isolating. These circumstances facilitated the influence, over the officers, not only of the immediate social context but also of their social origins, mostly from the white collar workers and the low bourgeoisie.

The conditions for the weakening of the barriers which traditionally separate the military professionals from the social context were therefore assembled.

In August 1973, the governmental authorities, in a desperate act, aiming at the urgent increase of the effectiveness of the officer corps, published legislation which seriously damaged military professionalism. In short, the chance was given to the conscript officers (named "militian officers") to be integrated in the Permanent Forces through a course of only two semesters.

As such, the officers who had followed a normal career felt that their studies, which had lasted

for four years, were being underrated. On top of this, the new law would lead into unfair injustices at promotion level: in 117 cases known at the time, it was concluded that the majority advanced immediately from 9 to 14 years, surpassing therefore the officers who had attended the Military Academy. This episode unwound something which was already under gestation, and gave birth to the Movement of the Armed Forces (M. F. A.).

At professional level, dissatisfaction had reached the breaking point.

As far as the civil-military relations were concerned, the effective interrelation of the civilian and military forces, in the area of power, goes through a process of deep change, pointing to a strong increase of the structural weight of the military sector: the number of effectives, which in normal times rounded about 40,000 men, increased to more than 180,000. The officer corps grew considerably in number, the generals had longer permanences at the top of the career, and military expenses became a heavy burden on the total of the public expenses, reaching the level of 40 % (see tables 1 - 4).

Under these circumstances, when during the summer of 1973 the authorities interfered in a field which traditionally belonged to the sphere of military autonomy, as already referred to - their career and professional education - the solution for the conflict between the armed forces and the government reflected the strengthening of the military sector. The government draws back through the annulment (December 1973) of the controversial decree. But the background problem - the solution for the colonial war - was still alive.

The non-existence of a democratic control system, expressed by free elections, rendered as evident,

to the militaries, the lack of legitimacy of the governmental war policy.

On the 25th April 1974, when the population understood that the rebellion was against the regime, it came out into the streets in support of the military, even before victory. And, during the following days, the image of soldiers and weapons adorned with flowers and mixed with the crowds, shown by international mass-media gave the first insight into the popular legitimation for the change which had taken place.

### Conclusion

In conclusion, in the Portuguese case what do we find out in the periods preceding military interventions and political changes, concerning institutional variables and civil-military relations?

#### a) Organization

In the three periods, it can be found an organizational disturbance (and a consequent decrease in the organizational efficiency level), due to several reasons, but ascribable to the governmental authorities responsibility that is to say to the political sphere.

#### b) Profession

In the three periods we register professional dissatisfaction (moderate in the first period, higher in the last ones), due to extra-institutional threats to the conditions of professional performance (not only from the technical and economical point of view but also concerning the professional-institutional prestige). Heavy interferences by the governmental authorities into the zone of professional autonomy (passing "militian officers" of the World War I into the Per-

manent Staff in the beginning of the Twenties; attempt to transfer "militian officers", of the colonial war, into the Permanent Staff in 1973) caused a defense reaction concerning military corporatist interests.

It is worthwhile to mention that the Portuguese case confirms the conclusions of Perlmutter and Nordlinger (3) researches about the importance of intermediate patent officers (captains, majors) - the most directly concerned with the soldiers command - in the success of interventionist actions.

#### c) Civil-military relations

A growing of tension, evidenced by several facts, precedes, namely the military coups of 1926 and 1974. It must be underlined that the worsening of tension is mostly connected with recent combat involvement, under unsatisfactory conditions to the officers (colonial campaigns, at the end of the monarchy; the World War I during the First Republic, the colonial war at the final period of dictatorship). The military men show their perception about governmental legitimacy crises, though those were differently caused: unsuccessful in the economical policies (1926); in the maintenance of social order (1926); in the military policies (1910; 1926; 1974); in foreign affairs (1910; 1974); and lack of a democratic control system over the governmental action (1974).

Each one (or more) of these situations, referred to organization, profession and civil-military relations, had occurred at certain moments along the century, but only in the three periods that preceded military interventions appear clearly simultaneous.

We can say that a low level of global organizational efficiency; a high level of professional

and corporatist dissatisfaction; the growth of an evident tension between governmental authorities and armed forces, appear, in social contexts characterized by deflation of governmental legitimacy, as factors that have favoured the military intervention in order to change the course of national policies.

We shall not end without calling your attention to the recently formulated suggestions by Moskos and Horowitz (4), which tend to point out to the fact that southern or mediterranean societies, would present a balanced situation in which the economical factors (more relevant, according to Horowitz, in the industrialized capitalistic societies); political factors (more important in the socialistic countries); and military factors (shown by the Third World countries) are more isomorphically distributed. As far as Portugal is concerned, or research, although following another direction, confirms the suggestions mentioned above.

#### Notes

- (1) Carrilho, Maria: *Forças Armadas e Mudança Política em Portugal no séc. XX*, Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional 1985.
- (2) *Ibid.*, Part 2, tables 14, 15, 16, 17, 18.
- (3) Nordlinger, E.: *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Government*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1972.
- (4) Horowitz, I.L.: *Beyond Empire and Revolution*, New York: Oxford University Press 1982.

TABLE 1  
PERMANENT FORCES - NUMBER OF OFFICERS

ARMY			NAVY		
Years	Officers	Generals	Years	Officers	Generals
1905	3173	29	1905	690	9
1910 (1911)	3336	30	1910 (1911)	639	4
1915	3464	23	1915 (1916)	606	7
1920	4794	26	1920	805	25
1925	4888	36	1925	858	20
1930	4777	26	1930	735	14
1935	4315	24	1935	734	11
1936	4314	—	1940	712	8
1940	3194	21	1945	753	5
1944	3051	19	1950	793	5
1947	3062	—	1955	861	24
1950	3173	46	1960	953	21
1955	3084	48	1965	1130	34
1958	3150	—	1970	1305	34
1960	3305	58	1974	1299	27
1965	3746	67			
1970	4094	72			
1973	4164	—			

AIR FORCES		
Years	Officers	Generals
1955 (1956)	392 (mais 170, Q.C.)	6
1960	502 (mais 342, Q.C.)	11
1965	936 (mais 993, Q.C.)	19
1970 (1968)	1187 (mais 1631, Q.C.)	21
1973	1421 (s/ dados sobre Q.C.)	43

NOTE: Q. C. = conscript officers

TABLE 2

## MILITARY EXPENSES

(%)

Percentagem despesas sobre públicas totais	Ministério da Guerra (Exército)	Ministério da Marinha	Encargos Gerais da Nação, c/ Defesa Nacional *	M. da Guerra + M. Marinha + D. Nacional
Anos				
1947	14,1	8,1	—	22,2
1948	12,7	9,3	—	22,0
1949	13,2	7,1	—	20,3
1950	15,8	7,5	—	23,3
1951	15,1	6,8	—	21,9
1952	11,5	6,5	7,7	25,7
1953	10,1	5,9	—	16,0
1954	11,1	5,9	14,3	31,3
1955	11,2	6,2	—	17,4
1956	11,7	6,1	8,5	26,3
1957	11,8	6,3	—	18,1
1958	10,8	6,1	8,0	24,9
1959	11,1	6,2	8,3	25,6
1960	7,0	5,1	14,0	26,1
1961	6,0	4,2	25,8	36,0
1962	5,9	4,1	28,3	38,3
1963	5,8	4,1	27,9	37,8
1964	5,9	4,0	27,9	37,8
1965	5,4	4,0	31,3	40,7
1966	5,5	4,1	30,7	40,3
1967	4,8	3,9	32,2	40,9
1968	4,7	3,7	34,0	42,4
1969	4,7	3,7	31,6	40,0
1970	4,8	3,9	30,2	38,9
1971	6,0	3,8	29,1	38,9
1972	4,2	4,0	26,6	34,8
1973	3,7	3,7	25,2	32,6

Fonte: Conta Geral do Estado referente aos anos 1947-1973.

(\*) Inclui Secretaria de Estado da Aeronáutica.

TABLE 3

## NUMBER OF MILITARY MINISTERS PER CABINET

(1926 - 74)

Ministérios (N.º de ordem)	* over total	Ministérios (N.º de ordem)	* over total
Ditadura de 28 de Maio (28-5-1926 / 17-6-1926)		A. Fragoso Carmona 56.º Min.	8/18
47.º Min.	10/10		
48.º Min.	8/10	F. Craveiro Lopes (1951-1958)	
49.º Min.	8/10		
A. Fragoso Carmona (26-11-1926 — Int.º) (1928-1951)		56.º Min. (cont.)	4/11
		Américo Tomaz (1958-1974)	
50.º Min.	7/10		
51.º Min.	7/10	56.º Min. (cont.)	5/14
52.º Min.	7/10		
53.º Min.	7/10		
54.º Min.	3/10	Américo Tomaz 57.º Min.	3/14
55.º Min.	4/12		

Fontes: Orgânica governamental, sua evolução e elencos ministeriais constituídos desde o 28 de Maio de 1926 a 31 de Março de 1972. Publicação da Secretaria de Estado da Informação e Turismo, Lisboa, 1972.

Listas de Antiguidades do Exército, 1926-1972.

Listas da Armada, 1926-1972.

\* military ministers

TABLE 4

## GENERALS PERMANENCE AT THE PATENT

Décadas Anos	1930-39	1940-49	1950-59	1960-69	1970-74 (24/4/74)
	n.º de casos	n.º de casos	n.º de casos	n.º de casos	n.º de casos
Até 3	4 (8,9%)	3 (10%)	8 (21,1%)	6 (15,8%)	3 (12%)
De 4 a 6	22 (48,9%)	16 (53,3%)	22 (57,8%)	18 (47,4%)	6 (24%)
7 e mais	19 (42,2%)	11 (36,7%)	8 (21,1%)	14 (36,8%)	16 (64%)
Total	45 (100%)	30 (100%)	38 (100%)	38 (100%)	25 (100%)

Notas: a) Mortos no activo ou sem informação da data de passagem à reserva: 21.

b) De 1927 a 1929 passaram à reserva 11 generais, dos quais 3 (25%) com permanências de 4 a 6 anos e 9 (75%) com permanências de 7 e mais anos.

Fonte: Listas de Antiquidades do Exército: todos os anos desde 1927 a 1974.

Giuliano Savi / Maria Romana Zorino

THE LEGITIMATION CRISIS  
OF THE ITALIAN MILITARY OFFICER

The political structure of the Italian postwar society is autopoietically oriented, while the Italian Armed Forces were formed within the political structure of the past century and allopoietically oriented (1). During the transition from one form to the other the basic reasons of legitimacy of armed forces have changed, so did the essential aims pursued by them and the social prestige of professional members of the forces. The process of adaptation of a professional officer to the structural changes of the society to which he belongs (inclusive society) reached a critical point between the later part of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies. We propose to examine some theoretical levels adopted by officers of the air force in support of their own career strategies during this period and collected in articles published in the "Rivista Aeronautica", our main documentary sources for this inquiry.

The armed forces as an institution and organization are closely related from the point of view of the career strategies (2) of their members. Our object in this paper is the only institutional aspect of the forces and in particular the political dimension of legitimacy. During the peak period of the crisis of legitimation a considerable number of armed forces officers is interested in the institutional aspects of the forces. For this reason we have a lot of articles on that argument at our disposal. Since the object of the present paper is a dynamic and not the static aspect of matters, we propose to carry out a synchronic analysis within a diachronic perspective.

\* \* \*

In the new 19th century in Italy the relationship between the Italian Army and the inclusive society was one of a separation between state and



society, typical as already existing in other European countries, where the establishing of the state has preceded the formation of the nation (3). The Italian nation was formed later, not only in the temporal sense, but also in the ontological sense. It was built from above, by the state as an ontological "prius" (or conscious efforts at least have been made in this direction). Italy was divided: different cultures and Italian customs have put the north in opposition to the south (brigandism), laymen opposed the Catholic Church (the church-state problem), the legal state was against the real country (the bureaucratic occupation by the Piedmont of the rest of the country, imposing over the varied and different local elites an estranged centralized scheme, different from the preexistent traditions). The rising Italian state (just an administrative extension of the little kingdom of Piedmont) stood not above the parts, but, at least in the initial period of the formation of the nation, took an active part in the divisions by the weight of legitimation.

The armed forces were considered by the political center as one of the means for the allopoietic building up of the nation. Therefore, besides the technical competence connected to its military function, a wider competence in the internal politics was ascribed to it. Within this perspective two tasks were attributed to the armed forces as a cultural institution and of a guarantee of internal order.

Among other particulars, the new regulations which came into power in 1865 (4) regarded recruitment and allocation of troops with a declared intention to guarantee the consensus and the internal order by means of separation, so as to avoid the forming of strong ties between conscripts of different ethnical origins and between soldiers and the local population. The immediate

effect of such imperative of separation both within the army and between the army and society was that of guarantee a particularly restricted limit for a possible extension and autopoietical development of informal organizations to that more ample connections could be managed formally according to schemes part of a hierarchical centralization. The philosophy of separation between the armed forces and society is also the key for the choices made about non-territoriality for the destination of conscripts: this is still formally valid. The general effect of it is that the armed forces can take part in the separation state-society according to the relation friend-enemy.

The second political task ascribed to the new Italian Army is that of a cultural institution, as a "Schule der Nation", and has a unifying function, complementary to the first one. It had to make the Italians into a nation, unify them through a formal act, which came from above, from a centralized hierarchical structure. This enters directly into contact with the single members of the population without any intermediate structure for communication. This is a manifestation of general trend: the intermediate structures were avoided in a large part of the territory, as the new state has restricted attribution of the institutional legitimation to a very small part of the local elite everywhere, and has preferred to occupy all of the remaining places by proper officials.

During the period of the territorial formation of Italy, the armed forces may have been proposed to become a cultural institution of the nation in the absence of a real unification, as this one offered by common language or by a culture accepted by the state. Italy shared a common catholic culture, but there were hostilities between the two institutions: the Italian State and the Church. Lacking a common accepted background,

what the army transmits to the conscripts is a formalistic culture of a state-nation, but not a national culture. Indeed, the real education the armed forces offered, was the industrial pre-education of a large number of conscripts up to the 50ies, before industrialization started spreading over the country. The outcome is connected with the general characteristics of the military organization, which, facing a social structure based on the participation of illiterate country folk, presents itself similar to an industrial enterprise, and according to this logic treats the conscripts. Such an efficacy in the field of instruction was often wrongly interpreted as a help in the formation of national feelings, a misunderstanding which helped the professional members of the army to consider themselves as those who form national feelings.

The two mentioned tasks are an expression of a political competence, ascribed to the armed forces as to a political mediator of allopoiesis. With the passing of time, the two mandates became in the facts more formal and less substantial. From the very beginning the two tasks of political competence were already more and more eroded by the modernizing process of differentiation and specialization which introduced national police and school and created specific functions with proper areas of differential competence. In the second place, when the Fascism came into power, the Fascist party-state has on one hand managed directly all violence against the home enemies and on the other continued, partly with proper means and partly flanking schools, to form the nation in the cultural sense. The party-state had not usurped anything what regarded the armed forces. The two political tasks could not stand up to any competition, but became formal mediators of different contents by means of the same form. (Indeed, the allopoiesis is a form!) In spite of the fact that Fascism had represented a

mass movement, the party-state carried on the task of forming the nation from above. The allopoietic form remained and also the structure of the state and the relation which it maintained with its citizens through the institutions.

What deprived the armed forces as a political institution of allopoiesis has been the 1978's Laws ("Norme di principio"), a postponed application of the autopoietic choice of the Italian society, formally expressed in the 1947's Constitution of the Republican State. It does not mean that the republican state has deprived the armed forces of any political connotation. The transition from the allopoietic status to the autopoietic form is neither abrupt nor complete. Besides the very existence of the armed forces is that of a political institution, representing a stronghold of state monopoly for the management of violence. This monopoly is part of the political essence of the modern state. Furthermore the army is a stronghold of existing political unities of a national type. These are the unities to which the existing social complexity refers to.

Now, a century later, what meaning can be given to the fact that, during the seventies, a part of the military officers has re-proposed the same allopoietical dimension of the armed forces?

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Towards the second half of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies, the radical movement in Italy organized demonstrations against the armed forces. They took place more or less at the time when the crisis of legitimation of officers started, but the demonstrations have not caused it. Its beginning can be dated back to the first

half of the sixties. Two significant changes were evident within some institutions at the time. Firstly, the range of social forces represented politically in the Italian government widened owing to the union of the Christian Democratic Party (D.C.) and the Italian Socialist Party (P.S.I.). Secondly, the Catholic Church through the II. Vatican Council ascribed official character to many social expectations during this year. The Vatican Council designates in particular the individual and not the institution as the ultimate base for the legitimation of the military order. The two important pillars supporting the Italian Armed Forces are the government and the church. Social dialectics and the autopoietic tendency are more and more marked in them. The government and the church appear in the eyes of the officials as expressing the opinions of the society in general, whereas the changes in the armed forces have a slower course. In brief, as regards the source of legitimation, the government and the church are autopoietically oriented, whereas the armed forces are allopoietically oriented. An institutional transformation took place, but not an institutional revolution; therefore, changes occur at different stages in the many sectors of the state organization: each sector has a proper different time of development. These diachronic differences in the evolution are among the causes of crisis.

As a result of what happened in the government and the church, a significant part of the articles written by officers during the sixties expresses opinions in opposition to what seems to them a non-legitimation of army by its own institutional sources. For this party, the autopoietic trend of the institutions brings as a result a military delegitimation. They express a claim for an allopoietic form of the legitimation of the armed forces. However, there was also a party in opposition which claimed an autopoietic

legitimation of the armed forces. Formally, the process of transition from one form of legitimation to the other initiated in the armed forces in 1978 with the Law "Norme sui principi" (Norms for the principal issue). But the law was defined later than the changes in the opinions of a large part of military officers. The changes created a crisis of legitimation and a conflict between the different types of military officers. This conflict extends itself over the various proposals regarding the relations between the armed forces and society. The many proposals are backed by different professional groups and are connected with various career strategies. Our aim in this paper is to offer a sketch of the general claims only leaving out the different career strategies.

The diatribe about the allopoietic/autopoietic legitimation should be collocated within a wider context of the autodefinitions of military identity expressed by some officials during the mentioned period. The autodefinition is a significant step in the evolution of the career strategies. Furthermore the autodefinitions are in part proposed in general, as if the specific interests of the group of officials proposing such definitions expressed the general interest of armed forces or of the society. The various groups move in conflict on such a general level so as to readjust the reciprocal positions of power. Distinction should be made between

- a) those who refer to society or humanity in general, and
- b) those who refer to aspects and specific models of what is civilian in the environment.

For the study of forces as an institution, case a) is more interesting.

Those who refer to society in general may take a position

- 1) as an institution (transmitting state values considered as opposed to social values), or
- 2) as soldiers (holders of military expertise into the society, that is considered as a sum of various expertises), or
- 3) as citizens (sharing the values of the society in general).

These three types are aligned with their positive propositions, moving in one or the opposite direction of the connection vector between armed forces and society. (At the beginning tertium non datur. The supposed positive/negative bipolarity in the relationship armed forces/society gives evidence of a radicalism of the internal conflict).

The "warrior" (first case) and the "technocrat" (second case) share the allopoietic position, as regard to the relationship armed forces/society. Both consider as a point of reference for their proper career strategy also the previous areas of 19th century political competence of armed forces. Both refer in negative terms to the inclusive society.

The warrior belongs to the first case, as he is also an official of allopoiesis of the past century. The two aspects of warrior-official meet in the same actors. The warrior-official utters negative evaluations against the social transformations, referring to the doctrine of natural law of Hobbes and/or the state ethics of Hegel, condemns subjectivism and the instrumental rationality diffused in what is social. He defines the new values of the society as "egocentrism" and "materialist values", and considers these as opposed to the "human and spiritual values", of which, he maintains, the army men, as a micro-

society, are the exemplary holders.

The ideological scheme of reference to the subject and theme of the armed forces/society as adopted by type 1, gives expression to his double origin: warrior-official. The relationship armed forces/ society is presented by type 1, both as a relation of the allopoietic pattern between the state and the citizen, as well as of a position of a moral superiority of a warrior, characterized by personal qualities ascribed to him, rather than by acquired expertise and skillness. Both aspects, the political allopoiesis and personal qualities, collocate the army man in the zone of the "sacred". However, all this is only a re-proposal of a outdated conviction.

The verbal attack, which the warrior-official is waging against the citizen as a political and economical protagonist has also an internal use within the armed forces, used against the emergent technocrat-military (second case) and the citizen-military (third case) who are indirectly accused as holders of materialistic values.

The second group of officers is decidedly the most interesting one. They also refer to the society in allopoietic terms, but not as mediators of a political center, or official of state institution, as in the case of the warrior-official, but as holders of specialistic military skills. The attitude towards society is at first radical: it will be termed at first as psychological war and later as home war. The whole society is judged by the use of terms friend/enemy. This discrimination was helped to pass even through the government and the parliament, reaching a point when golpist temptations may have been suspected. Different from the preceding group of officers who believe in a teleological rationality, this group is convinced of an instrumental rationality, borrowed from the new

central zone of values, this of economy. The political suggestion that social conflicts should be resolved by military methods is nothing else but an idea of a technician proposed to a politician, according to the views of a profession and the principles of a technical efficiency of an expert. (This group is moving according to the general trend of the "materialistic society": the "economic" trend to become "politic".) This is an attempt of the army men, as specialized experts, to reach the zone of the central power. The instrumental rationality is used as a form of self-founded autolegitimation. It could be considered a tension of the autopoietic type on the part of the army men toward the state. The same tension would permit, in other situations, the formation of pressure groups first and new corporative phenomena later (5). But our army men are unable to proceed at the same time with other social groups, towards a direct participation in the "widespread" political power, typical of the present-day complex society. They try their participation in the wrong social area. The "technician in applying force" offers his own expert services in the area of political competence and has this way self-assigned to himself the legitimation to give political judgments. Besides, he also maintains that political power to which he offers proper services remains always purely allopoietic. (In reality the "Invernal Palace" does not exist anymore!) The move within this area and towards the wrong referent is a failure, but it is also true that there were no conditions in Italy for a political exchange in the adequate area for the creation of a military group of pressure, comparable for example to the United States Army.

The third group makes reference to the inclusive society with a positive judgment about it, underlining the need that the armed forces (considered out-fashioned) should reconsider the values

of the inclusive society. The third group asks for a democratization of the armed forces and emphasizes that the members of the army are state employed and serve the citizens. In the third version, the feature of citizen is considered as prevailing over the feature of military men and the reference values are those of the autopoietic type, as regarding the relationship state/society and armed forces/society. Army men belonging to the third type will limit their own proposals to an area of competence which roughly coincides with their proper functions.

The problem of military "prestige" and therefore of the relation army men/inclusive society, can be contained within the three schemes as mentioned. Only in the first case the army man mentions a lost prestige in terms of a personal charisma of one who belongs to the area of "sacred"; he speaks therefore in terms of a caste. The lamented privation is not related to groups of reference among civilians, but is an auto-reference, the reviewing of the past. The technocrat-military defines prestige mainly in financial terms and aspires to equalize with an elective reference group, this of industrial managers. The citizen-military wants to equalize with the public employment, which he considers his proper group of reference. The citizen-military asks also for an aperture of a channel for the voice (6) of the soldiers of all the ranks arrive to the state. This channel can be of the trade union type, or admitting representatives. Such requests are significant for two reasons: the diminished political importance of the armed forces in the "sacred" allopoietical zone left the army men deprived of their voice with regarding to their proper patron, the state, with a risk of a distorted communication, one way only, from top to bottom, or a lack of communication, as is the case in Italy, where a true center of contacts between the top political and military autho-

rities is missing. Secondly: the voice of which activation is requested is completely different from the previous one, as quality: it is not aiming at a participation in the "sacred zone", but is an expression of autopoiesis; it is not a confusion of identity between the forces and the state, but a differentiation.

These three aspects are connected with the complex transformation of the inclusive society, which passed from one central zone of reference of teleological values to a central zone of instrumental values and finally to a plurality of values.

What effect has all this on the loyalty of army men towards the state? The values of reference have changed. The area of competence became narrower and so did the aims of the armed forces. Also the state has changed from a monarchy, it became a republic, and from a Hobbesian form it changed into a democracy. It is difficult to describe the situation of the forces following only two parameters: of loyalty in following up the aim of preservation of the organization and/or loyalty regarding the general objectives of the organization (7). Paradoxical is the double loyalty (the first typical of the warrior, the second of the allopoietic official), which makes the warrior-official a potential transgressor, disloyal towards the post-second war state, which permits the autopoietic social growth, frustrating part of the earlier allopoietical objectives of the armed forces. As far as loyalty is concerned, the technocrat-military is a potential ally both of the warrior-official and of the citizen-military. He has an illuministic loyalty towards general objectives and a low degree of loyalty as far as the preservation of the organization is concerned. He is ready to transform the organization, to render it illuministically more efficient in following up the general objec-

tives. This readiness for a transformation of the organization makes the technocrat-military a possible ally of the citizen-military, who is ready to modify both the organization and the objectives in the name of more ample loyalty to the autopoietic form of the republic. The defender of the institution of the contemporary form of state is such a man who is less loyal within both parameters. The form of state during this period needs rather a transformation and not the preservation of what is military.

There was during the seventies at first a period of an alliance between the warrior-official and technocratic-military, followed by a second period of alliance between the technocratic-military and the citizen-military. When the warrior official loses support of the technocrat, his decadence is signed. The new autopoietic state needs new armed forces. A direction is given to the transition by the citizen-military. But the new type of today's officer is the technocrat and citizen in one, as the old type of officer was the warrior and official in one. These are the basic characteristics to be considered when defining the army men of today. These basic characteristics are the present central trend and the point of reference of the various types of military as subsystems of the system.

#### Notes

- (1) The two concepts, allopoietic /autopoietic, were introduced by H. Maturana (1972), F. Varela (1979), and M. Zelany, N. Pierre (1976). See M. Zelany (ed.): *Autopoiesis*, New York 1981. We can find in M. Campanella: *Stato - nazione e ordine sociale*, Milano

1984, a valuable description of the translation of the two concepts from the theory of organization to the theory of nation building.

- (2) M. Crouzier: *Le phénomène bureaucratique*, 1963, trad.it. Milano 1969, e M. Crouzier, E. Friedberg: *L'acteur et le système*, 1977, trad.it., Milano 1978. J.-P. Thomas has applied the Crouzierian scheme of career strategies to the French NCO. The issues confirm the existence of many types of military men.
- (3) The theme of state-building/nation-building is well developed by S. Rokkan: *Dimensions of State Formation and Nation Building*, Princeton 1975, and S. Rokkan: *Models and Methods in the Comparative Study of Nation-building*, Bruxell 1967.
- (4) A good source of information for the role of Italian Armed Forces as guarantor of order is G. Rochat: *L'esercito italiano negli ultimi cent'anni*. In: *Storia d'Italia*, Vol. V, Torino 1973, and G. Rochat, G. Massobrio: *Breve storia dell'esercito italiano dal 1861 al 1943*, Torino 1978.
- (5) We are referring to the definition proposed by P.C. Schmitter: *Modes of Interest Intermediation and Models of Social Change in Western Europe*, in: *Comp. Pol. St.*, 19, 1, 1974 and G. Lemnruch: *Liberal corporatism and Party Government*. In: *Comp. Pol. St.*, 10, 1977.
- (6) A.O. Hirschman: *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*, Harvard 1970, trad.it., Milano 1982.
- (7) H. Simon: *Administrative Behaviour*, New York 1948, trad.it., Bologna 1978.

Pere Vilanova

#### THE SPANISH TRANSITION AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

## C O N T E N T S

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in socio-political systems

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Nature and functions of armed forces  
in socio-political systems

It is necessary to determine the nature and the functions of the armed forces in socio-political systems to which contemporary Spain can be related.

This is to be done both in relation to the state and to society (political/institutional level and social level). In order to do so, I intend to present some previous propositions.

a) Armed forces, in socio-political systems defined as "representative developed democracy" do not relate principally to the level of productive relations, but to the political/ institutional level, and more concretely to the state structure. Its statute is principally one of administrative type, although we can define it as a specific type of administrative branch. At a secondary level, of course, armed forces play a role, extremely important in some cases, as an economic factor and this can be considered a growing phenomenon. (See the military-industrial complex and its relation with new technologies.) In other words, according to marxist terminology armed forces are not a class but a part of the super-structure.

b) Given the large agreement on the concept of armed forces as a part of the administration, the debate turns around the type of its specificity and the level of autonomy within the structure of the state, as well as around the political and social impact which follows from it. Armed forces can therefore be defined as follows: Armed Forces (AF) are a specific branch of the administration; AF have the monopole of legal coercion and legal violence at the highest level (to make the dif-



ference with, say, the police). The legitimacy of its function is provided by the state and its nature, and this function is precisely to provide constantly a threat of potential or real coercion and use of force.

c) This function (of potential or real coercion) is under a peculiar situation: modern armies have been created historically in order to act according to a formal rule: defend the country - the territory - from external threats, foreign armies or targets easily identifiable. But one of the most important crises of our times, relating to military doctrines of a certain amount of countries (like Spain or Portugal) is that doctrine of national defense is under confusion. On the one hand the internationalisation of conflicts of all types; the possibility of nuclear war; the force of ideological confrontations; etc. are elements that tend to identify ideological enemies, but make the notion of traditional war more confuse. This fact creates in some countries the notion that the object of national defence is undefined; armed forces cannot control all variables related to modern war. In other words, who is the credible (in terms of conventional war) enemy of the Spanish Army?

On the other hand, those countries face the possibility of conventional war but under certain conditions which make A.F. intervene within a situation of precarious legitimacy (France in Chad). All those elements contribute to the general crisis of the doctrine of national defence.

d) Within this framework of confusion, new elements have arisen: the concept of "enemi interieur" (domestic enemy), the doctrine of national security, subversive war, terrorism, intervention, etc. The evolution of armed forces is placed in a framework in which there is an increasing dichotomy between the crisis of the

traditional function and the appearance of new confusing elements, which have political roots and require political decisions.

e) Armed forces fall into militarism when they tend to over-influence or to substitute the civilian legitimate power. This phenomenon can take various forms, as it is well known (and Spain has quite an experience of it in its last 180 years). Broadly speaking, militarism appears under conditions of political weakness of civilian power, and this weakness can be chronic, structural, or conjunctural, due to the breaking of the system, or in a moment in which the state is no more capable of fulfilling its role of political and social integration.

f) The point is to know, given a specific country in a specific moment of history, when and how the military decide to intervene in politics. There is no universal response to that question; there is a tendency to explain it in two directions (taking the extremes). The "emotional" or "psychological" explanation, and the "old-marxist" determinist view, according to which the military is always and only the mean or the tool of ruling classes, and that tool acts according to mechanical responses to the needs of those ruling classes.

g) My view is that under historical specific circumstances a social formation can face a situation in which: the state is weakened or unable to fulfill its role of integration of social and political conflicts; armed forces move towards militaristic position on the basis of an over-activated relative autonomy; armed forces implement decisions which can create a situation which cannot be explained only on the basis of the confrontation of antagonistic social interests) at the service of the ruling class); all social actors (we call them classes or groups) are therefore under a situation in which the conflict

takes a dynamic which is determined by the armed forces and not the opposite. We can think of Chile in 1973 and the relation between the state, armed forces and the Christian Democrat Party.

h) On the basis of that view, the decision making process within the army relates principally to the ideological level. In other words, the key factor is the way in which armed forces perceive the crisis and the alternatives to it. I can happen that the type of perception may not correspond with reality, or it might be over-conditioned by military values, because armed forces is an institution with a peculiar view of social relations and socio-political conflicts.

i) The specific way in which armed forces tend to perceive social reality depends on its internal system of values and organization, more rigid and hierarchical than any other institution of the state. Armed forces have internal rules of organization which tend to solve problems and conflicts in a specifically military way - discipline, hierarchy, efficiency - which do not correspond with those acting in the civilian society. It is therefore obvious that under certain conditions - of acute social and political destabilization - armed forces would tend to "export" its organization and its set of values to society in order to re-establish "order" and "supreme interest". All militarisms share the notion that military values and military mode of organization are far more efficient than civilian ones.

j) To conclude with preliminaries: the chance of a "coup d'Etat" depends not only on the structural interest of antagonistic classes, which tend to express them through ordinary means of institutional representation, but also on the subjective way in which armed forces perceive social and political problems and situations, par-

ticularly under situations of crisis. Military intervention can give an input to a political situation of crisis which goes far beyond any initial expectation, and create a total new situation in which all political and social actors will be forced to define themselves. In other words, the fact that according to some experts a "coup d'Etat" would have been "impossible" in a country like Spain in 1984 due to structural reasons, does not mean that such an operation can not happen and be successful.

#### The Case of Spain

I don't think it is necessary to insist on the fact that Spain is a peculiar case. The Spanish transition has been largely determined by the army, as I wrote in POUVOIRS in 1978:

"The particularities of the Spanish political situation must be analyzed under the light of the military attitudes: the pragmatism of the left and the search from all political sides of the word consensus. The key issue was to prove to the army that the construction of an irreversible democratic process was the interest of the vast majority of the Spanish people and therefore the interest of the army as well."

Since Franco's death, in November 1975, Spain has faced at least three real attempts of "coup d'Etat", as well as several movements of pressure upon the government and several attempts of provocation (from terrorism). It is necessary to underline the following elements of the Spanish recent history:

a) The army has played a crucial role in the process of construction of the state since the

beginning of the 19th century, a process which has been extremely unstable and complicated. The army has been involved between 1808 and 1900 in different "coup d'Etat" or attempts of it in an average of one every 20 months (the name created do design that specific type of intervention was pronunciamieno). The army has been involved in political problems in a country without a real party system, in which the ruling classes have controlled the state apparatus through reduced corrupted elites and the help of the military. The army has been forged as an institution not only through that specific version of liberalism, but also through two peculiar activities during the major part of the 19th and 20th centuries: colonial wars and public order. The Spanish Army has not involved in any classical European war since 1812 but has been involved in four civil wars and several colonial wars (Cuba, Puerto Rico, Morocco) all lost. That one has been a tradition which makes the Spanish Army to have little respect for liberal and democratic values. This relates to the fact, that Spain has known more than ten constitutions in 150 years, and all of them but the current one have appeared or ended through military interventions.

b) The Spanish civil war (1936 - 1939) is the failure of the most serious attempt of construction of a liberal democratic state. Franco's insurgency has divided and destroyed not only the state apparatus, but the army itself. The three years of war are the basis on which Franco as built both the new state and the new army. And the army has been the central element of the process: Franco has forced the unification of the plural forces of the right in the "movimiento nacional" (the only party) on the basis of the army control, and the army has been acting as the real sole active force in the regime. It is interesting to know that the army itself has faced symptoms of crisis in 1945, 1958 and the early

seventies, but Franco has solved those problems in a strict military way.

c) When Franco dies in 1975 it is obvious to everyone that any democratic alternative should take the army into account. The situation could be defined as follows:

The King has become the new head of state according to the legal mechanisms of Francoist institutions, but beneath that formal level, he did it on the basis of an implicit consensus among the majority of political forces, most of them illegal.

The absence of "political rupture" has got different aspects. The most important is that between the end of 1975 and the end of 1978 (the new constitution) there was on the one hand the "formal system", the one formed by the set of Francoist laws and institutions, still the only legal, and on the other hand the real situation, moving, changing, setting up the basis for a democratic system.

That situation was particularly important in the case of the army, the more Francoist of all institutions. The question was: how can a state apparatus be transformed in a democratic sense while the old institutions and the personnel of those institutions are still there? In other words, how can an authoritarian system be democratized if the army and the police are not previously destroyed by military means (revolution and/or external war)? It was a dramatic case of a situation of crisis in which the state apparatus is far behind the rhythm of transformation of society and political culture.

This is the real framework to analyze the problems between the army and the new democratic system, problems which go far beyond the three

visible attempts of "coup d'Etat".

d) There are four periods between Franco's death and 1986 according to the relation between armed forces and the civilian power.

1. The first period goes from November 1975 to the first general elections on June 15, 1977. The system has seen the first two cabinets of the monarchy: the cabinet of Mr. Arias Navarro, who was also the head of the last Franco's government, and Mr. Adolfo Suarez. The central problem of this period was to legalize parties, unions and other forms of social organizations, before the new constitution was ready, before democratic election and within the framework of the Francoist legal system, opposed to such measures. Mr. Suarez has negotiated personally that legalization with the armed forces and has faced several incidents, among which the resignation of two military ministers as a protest against the legalization of workers' unions and the Communist Party: General de Santiago and Admiral Pita da Veiga.
2. The constituent period, between June 1977 and December 1978, which ended with the promulgation of the new democratic constitution, has seen a cautious attempt to reform the military institution, some of its internal rules and norms and a policy of promoting officers on the basis of delicate negotiations. But this period is also the most dramatic one in terms of terrorist actions against the army, as an attempt to provoke an over-reaction from it. In less than two years nine generals and dozens of officers have been murdered by ETA or other terrorist groups. During this period there was a dangerous discourse gaining space within the

army: the problems of Spain are three: terrorism, separatism (for the Basque Country) and political subversion.

3. The third period goes from January 1979 to October 1982, date of socialist victory in the general elections. The constitution was there, the new democratic framework was supposed to provide a more solid base for a deep process of general democratization of the institutions, but at the same time it is the end of the consensus, in the sense of shifting towards a classical party competition and social confrontation. This period has seen the three attempts of "coup d'Etat", while terrorism was still active. End 1978: "Operación Galaxia", a sort of little conspiracy involving a small group of officers. Only three of them go on trial and are sentenced to six months of prison. February 1981, the invasion of the Parliament by Colonel Tejero, already involved in "Operación Galaxia", the most famous and serious attempt at destroying the democratic system. It is to be noted that only a few dozens of officers have been arrested and on trial, and most of them are already free. October 1982, the day before general elections, three officers are arrested, under the charge of preparing a military action which includes using artillery against the King's Palace, the Parliament and the Moncloa (government office). In all the cases, the attempts have been neutralized, but the government and the institution have given the appearance of being extremely weak, cautious in responding, accepting the pressure of the army.

We could say that those attempts fit perfectly well in the Spanish tradition of military intervention. Spain is a country

that since 1808 has been ruled permanently by the most conservative and authoritarian forces (with two exceptions: the democratic revolution of 1869, ended four years later, and the Second Republic, 1931 - 1936, ended with the civil war). Spain has been, between 1975 and 1982, ruled by the centre-right. Then international environment (Europe) was hostile to dictatorship. Under such conditions, how can we explain those attempts, when no threat was posed to the economic and social ruling classes, with no danger of purging Francoist institutions?

The answer is complex. But it is to be noted that the tradition of military intervention in the Spanish Army and in the Spanish extreme right wing is very ideological, very symbolic. That tradition is not only hostile to the "left danger", to marxism, to subversion, etc., but most of all it is extremely hostile to liberalism and its values: pluralism, democracy, political parties, etc.

4. The fourth period goes from October 1982 to June 1986, two elections which the PSOE (the socialist party) has won by an absolute majority. It was the first time since 1936 that the left had reached the government, and to say it clear, the second time in the Spanish contemporary history. Generally speaking, many observers predicted in 1982 that this fact was a sufficient reason for the government to face an increasing tension with the army. The PSOE has a history with a heavy component of anti-militarism and federal ideology, plus a tradition of republicanism, where the army is absolutely monarchist. Against those pessimistic views, we'll see how the socialist government has solved some of the more acute tensions, al-

though terrorism is still present. The policy developed on the military field give quite an achieved balance, inspite of the split in the opinion due to the NATO referendum. In any case, there is an agreement to admit that the danger of new attempts of "coup d'Etat" have decreased, and the degree of integration of the army in the system is perceived by the military as much bigger than any time before.

#### The Implementation of the Defence Programme (1982 - 1986)

The defence policy of the socialist government since 1982 cannot be defined as a "socialist" or a "leftist" programme as opposed to a "conservative" one. This specific field of PSOE's policy fits perfectly well in the general aim of modernization, consolidation of democratic structures and democratization of the state apparatus, with the support of the vast majority of parliamentary forces. A sort of new consensus. None of the specific measures implemented by the government could be defined as "socialist", but all of them tend to update the institutional position of the army within the state and the administration.

This is the basic and urgent response to different attempts of involution, which we have defined not as anti-socialist but mostly as anti-liberal and anti-democratic.

These are some of the most important landmarks in the process of "normalization" of the army:

- A more clear definition of the function the Constitution gives to armed forces, according to its article 8. It was very important to do so, given the fact that from a formal point of view,

article 8 of our Constitution is quite similar to article 37 of the "Ley Orgànica del Estado", the last "Ley Fundamental" of Franco's regime. Beyond the formal similarities of both texts, the nature of the two regimes is obviously too diverse, due to the fact that the nature of democratic institutions provide a framework to armed forces which is not comparable to those given by a dictatorship. But it was necessary to develop the constituent mandate in a sense capable of learning up any possibility of confusion concerning the constitutional nature and position of armed forces.

- It was essential to establish a clear relation between the military and the civilian power, and to do so it has been necessary to implement important legislative task. The aim was to put the army under the command of the government, and more precisely under the command of the Head of Government and its Minister of Defence. There was some ambiguity in the Constitution, since the only clear definition was the one concerning the role of the King as "supreme chief of the armed forces", while the relation with the government was less explicit. On the basis of this ambiguity some sectors of the armed forces have developed the strange theory of "military autonomy" in relation to political decisions concerning the army and its internal rules of organization.

- The third aim pointed to the reform of the military justice in relation to the judicial power. The general confusion concerning the two branches of justice and the judicial capacities of some army institutions needed a clarification. On the basis of it, the legislative work has clarified the limits of military justice to specific cases. At the same time the parliament has developed the constituent mandate concerning the states of emergency (Estados de Alarma, Excepción y Sitio) in which the army can have certain

limited tasks, but always under the command of the government and the control of parliament.

- The fourth point should require further analysis, and it has to do with the implementation of the military budget according to new priorities - defined and controlled by the government -, the reform of the internal rules of armed forces (Reales Ordenanzas Militares), and educational programmes.

- All the reforms have been sustained by a general programme of technical reforms (Plan de Modernización de las Fuerzas Armadas) under the priorities of the strategic situation of Spain, according to the new P.E.C. (Plan Estratégico Conjunto: Joint Strategic Plan). Obviously all those measures are closely related to the general trends of Spanish foreign policy defined by PSOE's government: integration in the European Community and Atlantic Alliance, etc.

The lectoral programme of the PSOE (1982) defined the priorities of the military reform as it follows:

- The interpretation and implementation of article 8 of the Constitution, which give to armed Forces the task of defending the sovereignty and the integrity of Spain, its Constitution and its institutions. Three were the priorities:

To obtain a more autonomous and independent National Defence.

To bring armed forces to a higher level of deterrence and a more rational and reduced structure.

To gain a major integration between army and Spanish people under the new concept of national defence.

To do so, the PSOE proposed a programme before the parliament in February 1983, right after the elections, which was the following one:

- To develop a general plan of modernization of armed forces, together with a more rational development of military industry.
- To modify the traditional deployment of armed forces on national territory.
- To increase the degree of professionalization of the officers and to modify the criteria for promoting them (the traditional ones were not based on capacities but on ancientness).
- Modification of educational programmes in Military Academies.
- Definition of a new legal status for the military within the administration.
- Legislative work on civil defence.

In four years, the majority of those projects have been achieved at least at the legislative level.

Among the most important legal texts we have the "Ley orgànica" (Organic Law) 1/84, 1984, and the "Decreto" (Ordinance), which have modified some previous legal texts, like the "Decreto Ley" (Order in Council) 1.558/77, 1977, which created the Ministry of Defence, and the Law 6/80, 1980, which defined "the basic criteria of National Defence and Military Organization". The new legal decisions have clarified the relation between the government and the Military Joint Staff (JUJEM), putting the head of military command under the power of the Ministry of Defence in a relation of explicit subordination.

The new text defines the JUJEM (Joint Staff) as "the consultant organ before the President of Government for military affairs", where the old text defined the JUJEM as "collective organ of

supreme military command". Why was it so important to clarify it? Because some sectors of the army, after the promulgation of the Constitution of 1978, tended to understand that the chain of command within armed forces was headed by the Joint Staff and above it only the King had a constitutional supremacy. Therefore, the government was credited with capacity for defining political decisions, but with no capacity of intervention in internal military affairs like promotion, career, military justice, disciplinary rules, etc. The new laws have clearly established that the Joint Staff is under the command of the government, and the King has a symbolic supremacy on armed forces, as well as symbolic power as the Head of State, but the King cannot use those powers in a parliamentary system (Spain can be compared, from this viewpoint, to the United Kingdom).

The results of such an important programme of reform of the military institution will probably require a long period of time before a confirmation. After all we are facing the most serious attempt to transforming the relations between military and civilians at the level of political power in a country with 200 years of a permanent experience of corruption of what the normal relation between them is supposed to be in a liberal democratic system.

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
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Carlos Gil Munoz

EVOLUTION OF THE VALUES  
OF THE SPANISH MILITARY ACADEMY STUDENTS

**C O N T E N T S****Hypothesis****Phenomena surveyed****Concept of "value"****Sample****Socioeconomic data**

- a. Endogmatic or internal recruitment in the forces
- b. Characteristics of the parents
- c. Profession of the parents

**Elaboration of the study**

1. Data included in the questionnaire
2. Instrumental values
3. Final values

**Evolution in the attitudes and values****Conclusion****Notes****Tables 1 - 28****Bibliography****Hypothesis**

The political evolution of the Spanish society, the new Constitution promulgated in 1978, has provoked changes in its values; the armed forces, according with the Constitutional precept, have started an adjustment to the social reality and to the legislation in force, bringing their institutional model as close as possible to that of the other countries adopted as standards. The social changes undergone by the structure of society, by the cultural and demographic structures are for a large part at the origin of the modernizing process undertaken currently in the armed forces.

I shall not consider the factors affecting the social sphere, neither the controversial relationship between cultural change and change of the social structures, but I shall focus on the main elements which appear in any social change, viz. alterations in the patterns of personal relationship, modifications of the social structures and changes in the ideas and values of a society (1).

There is a typical notion that the military institution is the depository of ethical values that have remained unchanged throughout the centuries, whereas modern society has been suffering frequent crises of its own system of values (2).

This alleged immutability of the values held by the military institution becomes even surprising when one considers that the society surrounding it has sunk into a really significant crisis of values. I shall, therefore, consider social "values" in general, as it is not possible to make differences between military and civil values.

The fieldwork, which is the basis for the study presented, was carried out between March and Sep-

tember 1985, and the values surveyed have been adapted to the theoretical frame of reference adopted, which was proposed by Rokeach (1973). According to this author the concept of 'values', referred to sociological evolution is a more central, dynamic and economic concept, and on more liable to interdisciplinary adaptation, than any other traditional psychological concepts such as 'attitude' motivation, norm, behavioural needs, etc.

### Phenomena Surveyed

Starting from the conclusions reached in 1978 in my work on 'The Scale of Values of the Students in the Military Academies' (3) and about 'The Qualities of the Officer according to Garcia Vagues "Vocational Programme"' (4), I aim to survey the evolution of the system of values, understanding 'values' as both desirable ways of behaviour and as the final objectives of existence.

### Concept of "Values"

I shall define the term "values" as representing what a particular and observable society considers, admits, recognizes and recommends as being worth of esteem by the individual, and what in fact regulates the social interaction or may explain specific options or decisions. According to this definition, values do not represent ways of behaviour but rather guidelines for action or foundations of particular attitudes.

According to Parsons (5), social values are based upon:

- a) Existential beliefs about the world.
- b) Motivational needs as human beings (value

motivation).

- c) Relationships with other people.

"Values" will be taken here as "a lasting notion of a specific way of behaviour or an ultimate state of existence which is individually and socially preferable to another way of behaviour or ultimate state of existence".

I shall consider a "system of values" as "a stable organization of concepts about the ways of behaviour about ultimate states of existence, hierarchized over a continuum of relative importance", (Rokeach, 1973 - 1975) (6). When it is said that the values of an individual can refer to ways of behaviour or to ultimate states of existence (that is to say, to objectives in his life) the instrumental and the final values must be distinguished, a classification recognized and adopted by both philosophers and by psychologists.

According to Rokeach, the final values can be centered either on the individual: dignity, wisdom, inner harmony, or on the group: equality, authentic friendship, national security, etc. In the first case, they are personal values and in the second, social values.

The instrumental values may carry a charge of morality, and may cause conscience conflicts, such as guilt complexes, when they are transgressed. That may be the case with honesty, responsibility. The subject can be misdirected in respect to his personal achievement: the individual self realization. to be able, logical, imaginative, etc. In the first case we deal with moral values and in the second, with competence values.

As for the functions of values and the systems of values three aspects can be considered:

Values as the genesis and orientation for the action.  
 Systems of values as general frames for problems solving and decision making.  
 Values as means of expressing human motivations.

Final values — individual  
                   — of the group

Instrumental values — moral values  
                           — competence values

#### Sample

The research about the students in the Military Academies is a part of a wider one, elaborated during 1985 within the armed forces and which includes significant samples from officers, officers in command and NCO's in the army, the navy and the air force, and contains as much as 6,000 dossiers. At the same time, another survey was made among the candidates for admission in the Military Academies, with more than 4,000 dossiers. This study is still in course of elaboration.

In the case of the students in the Military Academies, a distinction should be made between officers and NCO's academies and, further, between the different arms, corps, specialities, etc. These aspects shall not be considered in this work.

The samples examined belong to the army, the navy and the air force; making a further distinction between the future officers and the future warrant or petty officers.

Tables 1, 2 and 3 show the composition of the survey according to a merely descriptive classification, distinguishing between the Military Higher Education and Lower Education which corresponds to the distinction between Officers-to-be and future warrant or petty officers in the armed forces.

#### Socioeconomic Data

Before beginning the study of the students' systems of values, I found it convenient to gather a series of socioeconomic data which will serve as a frame of reference. These merely descriptive data are related to the following sections:

- a) Endogamic or internal recruitment in the armed forces.
- b) Characteristics of the students' parents.
- c) Profession of the parents.

In these sections I shall refer to my works elaborated in 1978, although in some of them the criteria for the classifications have changed.

#### a. The endogamic or internal recruitment in the armed forces

The transmission of the military vocation is a subject which raises great interest, and this interest does not diminish as one goes into detail to know which are the military classes that contribute the most to endogamic recruitment in the armed forces.

Many authors have pointed out the importance of the recruitment of officers-to-be within the military families, specially in the case of generals, officers and officers in command. Busquets (7) even stressed its importance in the case of warrant or petty officers.

There is no denying that the phenomenon of the handing on of the profession from father to son is by no means peculiar to the armed forces and that it occurs in other professions. As it is not the proper purpose of this survey, I shall simply outline the evolution of endogamic recruitment, according to the sources available.

Some inquiries, based upon statistic data, reveal a high degree of endogamic recruitment in the armed forces.

Notwithstanding this, the current trend (in 1985) does not apparently corroborate the aforesaid conclusions if we trust a comparison between the 1978 and 1985 data for the Academies of the three forces training future officers.

Broadly speaking, the following conclusions can be drawn: there is a clear diminution in the number of candidates whose father is either a general, an officer or an officer in command. This is not as evident in the case of the navy, which is still characterized by a persistent endogamic recruitment.

There is an increase in the number of students whose father is a warrant or petty officer, in any of the three Academies. The sons of non-military parents amount in 1985 to 40.23 % of the total number of students, instead of the 35.92 % in 1978.

This drop is more important if we bear in mind the evolution in the absolute number of candi-

dates for admission to the Military Academies in those years (Tables 5, 6 and 7).

Regarding the students in the Academies of Warrant and Petty Officers, the statistics bluntly disclaim the notion that endogamic recruitment is frequent, as indicated in Table 8 (1985 figures). The spectacular increase in the number of candidates for admission in the Academies of Warrant and Petty Officers (Table 9) is not attributable to the economic situation but to vocational factors.

It is important to mention that the military classes considered range from the rank of sergeant to that of general, and that there are other professional categories, belonging to the Police Forces, which are not included.

From the study of Table 8 we get the conclusion that the majority (82.87 %) of the students in the Academies of Warrant and Petty Officers come from non-military environment.

#### b. Education received by the students' fathers

Tables 10 and 11 indicate the educational level of the Academy students' fathers in 1985, both in the Academies of Officers and those of Warrant or Petty Officers. Table 11, about Lower Military Education, confirms the previous remark about the low proportion of students whose fathers belong to the armed forces.

#### c. Fathers' profession

Table 12 and 13 indicate the distribution of the Academy students according to their fathers' professions. Table 14 exhibits the data corresponding to 1978.

I intended to compare these results with those of other countries (8), but the available statistics dated in the '50s. Nevertheless, I found the data about the professions of the students' parents in the case of the Hannover Higher Military Academy in a report by the SOWI in 1974 (9), (Table 15).

A brief comparison of Table 12 with Table 15 proves that the transmission of the military career is still very frequent - in Spain and that the social extraction of the Academy students is more middle-class than in the German case.

To sum up this section, I must point out that endogamic recruitment in the armed forces is diminishing and that the origin of the students in the Higher Academies is mainly middle-class, despite of further distinctions.

With regard to the Academies of Warrant and Petty Officers (Table 13), lacking reference figures from other years and countries, I can only call the attention to the limited amount of endogamic recruitment and to the more frequent origin from clerks and employees.

#### Elaboration of the Study

The anonymous questionnaire filled by the students included familial data concerning education, social extraction and the scales of instrumental and final values.

I was acquainted with the work elaborated by J. P. Rangel de Lima (10), with a similar scale of values but whose criteria of numerical evaluation I modified. In previous works (11) I had already realized, indeed, how difficult it was to present 18 values in order of preference and the same fact appeared, from the statistical point of view, in Rangel's work, the statistical figures being squeezed near the median with little dis-

crimination. I preferred, therefore, to make the subject choose five values as the most important and reject three as less noteworthy. This decision is based on my works about statistics and motivation, where it is explained that although it is easy to put in order positive values, it is much harder to graduate negative ones (12), since the rejection is generalized without nuances, unless binary comparisons are proposed.

This is the reason why only three negative values were required (Table 16).

#### 1. Elaboration of data included in the questionnaire

The processing of these data involved a great amount of work, and the ENCU and AS-CRI programmes of Data-Processing Centre were used.

The tables included in this work are only a synthesis, intended for commentary, of the original ones, as it would have been arduous to focus them on. Notwithstanding this, they are valuable for the classifications made in the first part, i.e. into Higher Military Education and Warrant Officer Education.

I must point out that in order to establish an ordinal scale with five degrees, that a weight of 5 to 1 has been given, according to the order of preference, in the course of the statistical elaboration. It is the same with the negative preferences, which have been given a weight of 1 to 3, so that negative figures appear in the tables. That is, these are weighted tables. This presents the advantage that the tables are easier to read and that their orders are comparable. However, the distance between the scores is not homogeneous, so a normal curve cannot be extracted. But

the comparison between the two samples, that of the officers and that of the warrant or petty officers, has been made, in order to see whether the differences between them are noteworthy, both within the groups and between them.

To simplify the study of the scales, I have distinguished between instrumental and final values.

## 2. Study of the instrumental values

Tables 17, 18 and 19 show the intragroup results, divided into the different forces, with significant differences as precise as 1 %. The five uppermost values are honest, responsible, able, courageous and well-mannered. They are common to the three forces and to both officers and warrant and petty officers. Regarding the results about the negative (rejected) values, there are no important variations between officers and warrant officers of the army, who agree in rejecting tolerant, imaginative and tidy-orderly. In the navy, the most important variation occurs in the value cheerful, which is positive for the officers and negative for the petty officers; in the overall results of the navy, the most often rejected values are imaginative, tolerant and affectionate. In the air force, no significant difference appear between officers and warrant officers, both categories reject imaginative, tolerant and tidy-orderly.

The unanimity in the rejection of the value imaginative is surprising, since it was considered an average value in Rangel's work (13).

Table 20 shows the intergroup results, with the same values as in the case of the intragroup results, but in a different order depending on whether they refer to officers (List 13) or to

warrant and petty officers (List 14).

The values thus classified show the same priorities as when we compared officers and warrant and petty officers, i. e. honest, responsible, able, courageous and well-mannered.

Concerning the negative values (Table 21), the officers, in a high proportion, reject tolerant, whereas among warrant and petty officers the most rejected value is imaginative. Moreover, affectionate, strongly rejected by the officers, receives a smaller rejection among the warrant and petty officers.

To sum up, it can be stated that no significant variations appear between officers and warrant and petty officers with respect to the hierarchization of the instrumental values, since both groups show the same ultimate results. In order to find noteworthy differences, the intermediate values should be studied: those, precisely, which are less important.

If we compare these results with the data about the education and profession of the parents, which show such diversity in the proportions of military parents, we may come to the conclusion that those are the instrumental values that the Spaniards who send their sons to the Military Academies consider as being the qualities of the members of the armed forces, independently of the cultural level of the families.

## 3. Survey of the final values

Tables 22, 23 and 24 show the intragroup results divided up into forces. In the case of the army, the officers and warrant officers coincide over the following five values: familial security, authentic friendship, happiness, national security

and peace in the world, with no observable differences. On the other hand, there indeed are differences between officers and petty officers in the navy (Table 23), since the second value for the officers is salvation (28.79) whereas for the petty officers it is a negative value (-12.38), which reveals a clear rejection. Another significant difference between both categories in the navy is the value peace in the world.

No significant differences between officers and warrant officers appear in the case of the air force; they both prefer familial security, authentic friendship, peace in the world, national security and happiness.

Concerning the negative values, there are no significant differences between officers and warrant officers in the armed forces; they coincide over the values pleasure, social notoriety, world of beauty and comfortable life.

Tables 25 and 26 show the intergroup results. The total values (List 29) are the same as those already given. If we separate the results of the officers from those of the warrant and petty officers, 1 % significant differences appear. Indeed, whereas national security stands in the second place for the officers (List 30), it vanishes away from the five uppermost places in the case of the warrant and petty officers (List 31) and is located in the eighth place. Salvation is perhaps more noteworthy: it is in the fifth place for the officers (19.70) but represents a negative value for the warrant and petty officers (- 8.05). In contrary, freedom stands in the fourth place among the warrant officers (21.08) while for the officers it is located in the ninth place.

Finally, it is worth considering that authentic friendship is a favorite choice for the Academy

students in general, a fact that confirms that comradeship is still an abiding value. The officers show a more professional spirit, since for them national security comes in the second place. This is not the case with the warrant and petty officers. Yet it must be pointed out that in the summary of the total of the armed forces (List 29), the next value in order of preference is peace in the world.

The rejection of hedonistic values such as pleasure or comfortable life shows a willingness to serve the community, even to the detriment of self-satisfaction (social notoriety).

### Evolution in the Attitudes and Values

#### 1978 Survey about the attitudes and values

A point of reference is provided by the research carried out by José García Gutierrez, Pedro Valderas Tello, Rafael Blázquez de la Paz and the author on two independent samples of 284 students of the Officers' AGM and 80 students of the Warrant Officers' EM, although this survey was not elaborated with exactly the same values as that of 1985.

The 1978 survey was based upon Osgood's Semantic Differential, with 27 items, 11 bipolar scales, with a 1 to 5 score. The statistics used were the mean, the standard deviation and the critical ratio (Rc), revealing the difference between the means.

The values surveyed comprise, apart from the instrumental and final values that I have defined, others referring to the military profession, and these will not be considered.

Table 27 shows the data of scale I (important ...



not important), among officers and warrant officers, and indicates the mean, the standard deviation and the critical ration (Rc 1.96, 5 % differences and Rc. 2.58, 1 % differences).

The interpretation of this table requires noticing, that the nearer the datum is to the numerical amount of the mean, the more important is the value.

If we choose the five uppermost values and divide them up into instrumental and final values (Table 28), we observe that the uppermost moral and competence values for the officers are honest, responsible, self-controlled, obedient and well-mannered. The warrant officers show the same results, but in a different order and tidy (orderly) is included. Concerning the individual and group values they coincide on authentic friendship, national security, familial security, dignity and freedom, but in a different order.

It is convenient to compare the commentaries to these data with those (Lists 1, 2, 18 and 19) of 1985 (Table 28). Whereas there is a greater balance, among the officers, between moral and competence values in 1985, in 1978 the moral values prevailed. The same could apply to the warrant officers, although the 1978 figures are partly explained by the limitation of the warrant officers' education, modified subsequently, and by their definitely subordinate function.

Concerning the individual and group values, the value dignity present in 1978 was substituted by happiness in 1985 among the officers.

Among the warrant officers, authentic friendship, which reflected an important sense of comradeship, standing as it did in the fourth place in 1978 has dropped in 1985 to the sixth place, a not significant by itself

as if it is compared with the officers since it shows smaller conscience of fellowship which perhaps reflects the variety of educational levels and social origins of the warrant officers.

## Conclusion

The survey of the different results attained enables us to draw several conclusions that will now be enumerated and which in some cases may represent the starting point for ulterior surveys.

Endogamic recruitment of officers-to-be is decreasing gradually, although it is still very common. This drop cannot be understood without considering the army as an integral part of society: I lack data to compare the sociological fact with the situation in other professions that, like the military profession, serve society. In the case of the Lower Education, the proportion of endogamic recruits fluctuates around 15 %, a proportion which is much lower if one the candidates for admission are considered, too.

The socioeconomic origin of the officers-to-be is middle-class, and there is a notable increase in the social level of the future warrant and petty officers.

The instrumental values (qualities) show almost no change. What has been labeled as "military mentality", i.e. a set of features shared by the majority of the members of the armed forces has remained unchanged throughout the deep transformations registered in society. Those qualities were in 1978 focused on moral values and they have evolved into criteria of professional competence. That is to say, what we might call "professional values" are becoming more important. To

repeat what Martín Jiménez said, we might summarize these values as caution vs. frivolity, rigour vs. delusion, perseverance vs. fashions, what is permanent vs. what is passing. The evolution of the warrant and petty officers' values is noteworthy. In 1978 their professional ethos seems centred on "subordination and respect", but later on it stretched to include values similar to those, above mentioned, of the officers. Obviously, it is subordination that represents the link between officers and warrant officers, in as much both groups share the same values.

Concerning the final values, group (institutional) values are neatly differentiated from the individual values. In the more recent survey, the value happiness appears among the officers, revealing the current importance of self-realization for the youth, together with comradeship and freedom. National security, although it is still important, is considered as an institutional but not as the major value, due to the lack of a sense of military threat after several decades of peace. Among the warrant and petty officers, the same values are preferred, and together with them, that of dignity, a fact which might be due to professional claims. It must be pointed out, finally, that material success and hedonism are given a low priority.

Summing up, it may be stated that the member of the armed forces, according to this survey, is an active individual with a concrete and particular role, who shares the postmodern ideas of justice and curiosity towards the unknown and at the same time is aware of the various social realities different though they may be from his own beliefs and values and who, moreover, is wishing to participate integrally in a pluralist and diversified society.

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TABLE I - SAMPLE OF ACADEMY STUDENTS, DIVIDED INTO ARMS/CORPS

A R M Y	OFFICERS		NCO's		TOTAL
	A.G.M. Cadets	2nd Liev- tenants	A.E.M. Specialists	A.B.S.	
Cadets	412		--	674	1.086
Infantry		223	122	301	646
Cavalry		54	26	59	139
Artillery		109	64	164	337
Engineer		69	53	149	271
Service		83	5	20	108
Other Corps(Special)		--	60	--	60
SAMPLE	412	538	330	1.367	2.547

AGM: Academia General Militar (General Military Academy). A.E.M.: Academia Especial Militar (Special Military Academy). A.B.S.: Academia Basica de Suboficiales (Basic Academy of Warrant Officers)

TABLE 2.- SAMPLE OF ACADEMY STUDENTS , DIVIDED INTO ARMS/CORPS

N A V Y	OFFICERS		NCO's	TOTAL
	E.N.M. Cadets	Midshipmen	E.S.	
General Corps	90	108	--	198
Marine Corps	12	15	--	27
Service	8	13	--	21
Specialists	--	--	315	315
TOTAL	110	136	315	561

ENM.: Escuela Naval Militar (Naval Military School). E.S.: Escuela de Suboficiales (School of Petty Officers)

TABLE 3.- SAMPLE OF ACADEMY STUDENTS, DIVIDED INTO ARMS/CORPS

A I R F O R C E	OFFICERS		NCO's		TOTAL
	A.G.A. Cadets	2nd Liev- tenants	A.E.	A.S.	
Air Force	116	60	--	--	176
Transport	55	53	--	--	108
Service	11	30	--	--	41
Specialists	--	--	149	--	149
Warrant Offiecers	--	--	--	63	63
TOTAL	182	143	149	63	537

A.S.: Academia de Suboficiales (Academy of Warrant Officers). A.E. Academia de Especialistas (Academy of Specialists). A.G.A. Academia General del Aire (General Academy of the Air Force)


TABLE 4 - FAMILIAL ORIGIN OF THE STUDENTS

(in percents)

HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION

	1978	1985
AGM (Army)		
Father General or Officer or Officer in Command	53,66	43,15
Father Warrant Officer	4,33	5,79
Non-military father	41,88	50,78
ENM (Navy)		
Father General, Officer or Officer in Command	69,13	66,66
Father Petty Officer	7,35	8,09
Non-military father	23,51	24,39
AGA (Air Force)		
Father General, Officer or Officer in Command	56,50	43,69
Father Warrant Officer	3,50	10,77
Non-military father	40,00	45,53
Total of the Academies		
Father General, Officer or Officer in Command	59,76	
Father W. or P. Officer	5,06	8,21
Non-military father	35,13	40,23


TABLE 5

GENERAL MILITARY ACADEMY  
Results of the admission examinations

SOURCE: Report on the 1982-1986 period of office, Ministry of Defence

TABLE 6


NAVAL MILITARY SCHOOL  
Results of the admission examinations



SOURCE: Report on the 1982-1986 period of office, Ministry of Defence

TABLE 7

GENERAL ACADEMY OF THE AIR FORCE  
Results of the admission examinations



SOURCE: Report on the 1982-1986 period of office, Ministry of Defence

TABLE 8.- MILITARY ORIGIN OF THE PARENTS OF THE STUDENTS IN THE MILITARY ACADEMIES TRAINING NCO's.

	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
Father General/Offic.	8,41	4,44	3,38	5,41
Father NCO's	11,12	10,47	12,97	11,52
Non Military Father	79,74	85,07	83,31	82,87

TABLE 9 GENERAL BASIC ACADEMY FOR WARRANT OFFICERS

Results of the admission examinations




TABLE 10 EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF THE ACADEMY STUDENTS' PARENTS

Higher Military Education  
(in percentages)

	ARMY A.G.M. and Special Academies	NAVY E.N.M.	AIR FORCE AGA	TOTAL
No education	1.15	0.40	0.92	
Primary education	15.79	5.69	11.69	
Skill Training	1.62	1.62	2.15	
(equiv.to) O level	6.00	4.47	6.46	
(equiv.to) A level	4.53	2.43	6.46	
University Degree	9.05	5.29	8.92	
Master, Engineer, PhD, etc.	11.16	11.82	7.38	
Military Education	48.92	65.91	54.46	
Others	1.80	2.42	1.54	
Primary Education	16.90	6.09	12.61	11.86
Secondary Education	12.15	8.52	15.07	12.11
University Degree	20.21	17.11	16.30	17.62
Military Education	48.92	65.91	54.46	56.43
Others	1.80	2.42	1.54	1.92

TABLE 11 - EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF THE ACADEMY STUDENTS' PARENTS

Lower Military Education  
(in percentages)

	ARMY A.B.S.	NAVY SPECIALISTS AND PETTY OFFICERS	AIR FORCE SPECIALISTS AND WARRANT OFFICERS	TOTAL
No education	4.90	16.19	7.32	
Primary education	42.28	44.76	47.33	
Skill Training	3.51	9.47	6.40	
(equiv.to) O level	11.77	5.71	9.52	
(equiv.to) A level	5.99	2.55	3.14	
University Degree	6.22	4.46	4.60	
Master, Engineer, PhD, etc.	2.99	0.92	3.26	
Military Education	19.63	10.83	12.39	
Others	2.78	5.08	5.98	
Primary Education	47.18	60.95	54.65	54.26
Secondary Education	21.27	17.73	19.06	19.32
University Degree	9.21	5.38	7.86	7.45
Military Education	19.53	10.83	12.39	14.25
Others	2.78	5.08	5.98	4.61

TABLE 12 - PROFESSIONS OF THE ACADEMY STUDENTS' PARENTS 1985.  
HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION (in percentage)

	Army A.G.M.	Navy E.N.M.	Air Force AGA	Total
Managers	4.14	4.88	5.84	4.95
Professional persons	10.94	9.76	11.07	10.92
Civil servants	9.04	3.66	7.98	6.89
Armed Forces	48.94	75.21	54.45	59.53
Teachers	1.68	0.41	2.15	1.41
Employees	13.47	1.23	14.14	9.41
Manual workers	2.84	1.23	1.23	1.77
Other professions	4.84	2.25	3.07	3.72

TABLE 13 - PROFESSIONS OF THE ACADEMY STUDENTS' PARENT 1985.  
LOWER MILITARY EDUCATION (in percentage)

	Army ABS	Navy E.S	Air Force FE and ES	Total
Managers	3.87	2.22	3.26	3.12
Professional persons	6.01	2.54	6.54	3.03
Civil servants	15.54	8.25	4.21	9.34
Armed Forces	19.53	14.92	16.65	17.03
Teachers	1.09	0.32	1.67	1.03
Employees	36.93	42.86	44.65	41.48
Manual workers	13.60	14.60	15.31	14.50
Other professions	4.82	14.29	6.64	8.58

TABLE 14. PROFESSIONS OF THE ACADEMY STUDENTS' PARENTS 1978.  
HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION (in percentage)

	Army A.G.M.	Navy E.N.M.	Air Force A.G.A.	Total
Managers	5.72	1.47	10.69	5.96
Professional persons	5.42	7.35	10.50	7.66
Civil servants	5.72	10.29	9.50	8.50
Armed Forces	57.99	76.48	60.00	64.82
Teachers	1.20	1.47	--	0.84
Employees	6.63	--	10.50	8.53
Manual workers	4.52	--	3.50	2.67
Other professions	9.04	1.47	4.50	5.00

TABLE 15 PROFESSIONS OF THE HANNOVER SCHOOL OFFICERS-TO-BE'S  
PARENT IN 1973. (in percentage)

High official	10.9
Intermediate level official	9.5
Member of the Armed Forces	9.0
Employee	18.2
Middle-class employee	16.2
Professional person	12.6
Farmer	3.4
Manual worker	19.9

TABLE 16 - SCALE OF VALUES

Among the qualities proposed below, choose five that you consider as being the most important, allocate a mark to them according to their relevance. So, write a "1" at the right of the most important, a "2" at the right of the second, etc. up to the fifth.

Choose then three qualities you consider less important for you, allocating the following marks, "6", "7", "8".

0061 AFFECTIONATE (Tender, loving, fond) <input type="checkbox"/>	0161 INDEPENDENT (Self-sufficient, self-reliant) <input type="checkbox"/>
0071 CHEERFUL (Joyful, genial) <input type="checkbox"/>	0162 INTELLECTUAL (Intelligent, discriminating) <input type="checkbox"/>
0081 AMBITIOUS (Hardworking, enterprising) <input type="checkbox"/>	0171 TIDY (Orderly, clean, methodical) <input type="checkbox"/>
0091 ABLE (Competent, efficient) <input type="checkbox"/>	0181 LOGICAL (Rational, consistent) <input type="checkbox"/>
0101 SELF-CONTROLLED (Restrained, self-disciplined, composed) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0191 OBEDIENT (Respectful, observant, disciplined) <input type="checkbox"/>
0111 WELL-MANNERED (Polite, civil, courteous) <input type="checkbox"/>	0201 RESPONSIBLE (Dependable, accepts responsibilities) <input type="checkbox"/>
0121 OPEN-MINDED (Unprejudiced) <input type="checkbox"/>	0211 OBLIGING (Willing to help other people) <input type="checkbox"/>
0131 HONEST (Truthful, veracious, trustworthy) <input type="checkbox"/>	0221 TOLERANT (Forgiving, sympathetic, conciliatory) <input type="checkbox"/>
0141 IMAGINATIVE (Creative, daring) <input type="checkbox"/>	0231 COURAGEOUS (Resolute, self-confident, undaunted, with the courage of his convictions) <input type="checkbox"/>

Among the values proposed below, choose five that you consider as being the most important, allocate a mark to them according to their relevance. So, write a "1" at the right of the most important value, a "2" at the right of the second, etc. up to the fifth.

Choose then three qualities you consider less important for you, allocating the following marks, "6", "7", "8".

0241 INNER HARMONY (Lack of inner conflict) <input type="checkbox"/>	0331 SALVATION (Eternal life) <input type="checkbox"/>
0251 DISINTERESTED SELF-GIVING (Spiritual and sexual intimacy, physical and spiritual self-giving) <input type="checkbox"/>	0341 FAMILIAL SECURITY (Concern with your people) <input type="checkbox"/>
0261 DIGNITY (Self-respect, self-esteem) <input type="checkbox"/>	0351 NATIONAL SECURITY (Defence against outer threats, defence of the constitutional values) <input type="checkbox"/>
0271 HAPPINESS (Inner satisfaction) <input type="checkbox"/>	0361 SENSE OF ACHIEVEMENT (Lasting contribution) <input type="checkbox"/>
0281 EQUALITY (Fraternity, equal opportunities for all) <input type="checkbox"/>	0371 WORLD OF BEAUTY (Natural and artistic beauty) <input type="checkbox"/>
0291 FREEDOM (Independence, freedom to take decisions) <input type="checkbox"/>	0381 PEACE IN THE WORLD (Without wars, and upheavals) <input type="checkbox"/>
0301 PLEASURE (A pleasant and uncomplicated life) <input type="checkbox"/>	0391 EXCITING LIFE (Active, stimulating life) <input type="checkbox"/>
0311 SOCIAL NOTORIETY (High regard, glamour, prestige) <input type="checkbox"/>	0401 COMFORTABLE LIFE (A cushy, successful, palmy and stable life) <input type="checkbox"/>
0321 WISDOM (Profound knowledge of life) <input type="checkbox"/>	0411 AUTHENTIC FRIENDSHIP (Comradeship, disinterested, devotion) <input type="checkbox"/>

TABLE 17 -- INSTRUMENTAL VALUES IN THE ARMY

HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION (list 1)	LOWER MILITARY EDUCATION		TOTAL IN THE ARMY (list 4)
	A.E.M. (list 1)	ABS (list 3)	
HONEST 36.25	HONEST 43.26	HONEST 30.09	HONEST 36.51
RESPONSIBLE 32.49	RESPONSIBLE 34.13	RESPONSIBLE 29.97	RESPONSIBLE 32.19
COURAGEOUS 17.76	ABLE 13.14	ABLE 13.71	ABLE 14.87
ABLE 14.59	COURAGEOUS 10.57	COURAGEOUS 13.55	COURAGEOUS 13.96
INTELLECTUAL 7.23	WELL-MANNERED 9.66	WELL-MANNERED 9.17	WELL-MANNERED 8.30
OPEN-MINDED 6.56	SELF-CONTROLLED 7.61	OBEDIENT 6.04	SELF-CONTROLLED 6.38
SELF-CONTROLLED 6.36	INTELLECTUAL 6.59	AMBITIOUS 5.70	INTELLECTUAL 5.76
WELL-MANNERED 6.09	OPEN-MINDED 4.43	SELF-CONTROLLED 5.17	OPEN-MINDED 4.69
AMBITIOUS 4.14	OBEDIENT 4.09	CHEERFUL 3.86	AMBITIOUS 4.38
LOGICAL 2.94	LOGICAL 3.45	INTELLECTUAL 3.48	OBEDIENT 4.30
OBEDIENT 2.79	AMBITIOUS 3.30	OPEN-MINDED 3.09	LOGICAL 3.05
CHEERFUL 1.09	TIDY -1.78	LOGICAL 2.75	CHEERFUL 0.54
INDEPENDENT 0.51	AFFECTIONATE -2.46	OBLIGING 0.43	OBLIGING -1.10
IMAGINATIVE -0.04	CHEERFUL -3.26	INDEPENDENT 0.00	INDEPENDENT -1.61
OBLIGING -0.53	OBLIGING -3.30	AFFECTIONATE -1.72	AFFECTIONATE -3.08
AFFECTIONATE -5.06	TOLERANT -4.77	TIDY -3.01	TIDY -4.42
TOLERANT -7.70	INDEPENDENT -5.34	TOLERANT -5.18	IMAGINATIVE -4.48
TIDY -8.47	IMAGINATIVE -7.96	IMAGINATIVE -5.44	TOLERANT -5.88

TABLE 18 -- INSTRUMENTAL VALUES IN THE NAVY

HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION E.N.M. (list 5)	LOWER MILITARY EDUCATION E.S. (list 6)	TOTAL-NAVY (list 7)
HONEST 47.15	HONEST 43.33	HONEST 45.24
RESPONSIBLE 37.33	RESPONSIBLE 39.20	RESPONSIBLE 38.26
ABLE 20.12	ABLE 17.46	ABLE 18.79
WELL-MANNERED 13.94	COURAGEOUS 13.51	WELL-MANNERED 14.06
COURAGEOUS 10.86	WELL-MANNERED 14.18	COURAGEOUS 13.18
OBEDIENT 8.74	OBEDIENT 11.16	OBEDIENT 9.95
SELF-CONTROLLED 6.50	SELF-CONTROLLED 8.57	SELF-CONTROLLED 7.53
OPEN-MINDED 6.43	AMBITIOUS 7.77	AMBITIOUS 6.39
INTELLECTUAL 5.42	LOGICAL 7.19	INTELLECTUAL 5.00
AMBITIOUS 5.01	INTELLECTUAL 6.35	LOGICAL 5.66
LOGICAL 4.13	TIDY 5.92	OPEN-MINDED 3.93
CHEERFUL 3.59	OPEN-MINDED 1.43	TIDY 2.65
OBLIGING 0	OBLIGING -1.90	CHEERFUL 0.21
TIDY -0.61	AFFECTIONATE -2.48	OBLIGING -1.90
INDEPENDENT -2.57	CHEERFUL -3.17	INDEPENDENT -3.53
AFFECTIONATE -7.25	INDEPENDENT -4.49	AFFECTIONATE -4.86
TOLERANT -9.62	TOLERANT -6.72	TOLERANT -8.17
IMAGINATIVE -9.68	IMAGINATIVE -9.31	IMAGINATIVE -9.49

TABLE 19 -- INSTRUMENTAL VALUES - AIR FORCE

HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION A.G.A. (List 8)	LOWER MILITARY EDUCATION A.S. (List 9)	E.E. (List 10)	TOTAL LLIST 11
HONEST 50.41	HONEST 51.05	HONEST 34.90	HONEST 45.45
RESPONSIBLE 40.82	RESPONSIBLE 34.65	RESPONSIBLE 33.22	RESPONSIBLE 36.23
ABLE 22.51	ABLE 15.93	WELL-MANNERED 20.33	ABLE 21.91
COURAGEOUS 20.77	WELL-MANNERED 15.93	COURAGEOUS 12.19	WELL-MANNERED 14.78
SELF-CONTR. 14.15	OBEDIENT 12.43	SELF-CONTR. 9.50	COURAGEOUS 11.37
OPEN-MINDED 9.13	AFFECTIONATE 12.17	ABLE 9.05	SELF-CONTR. 9.20
LOGICAL 8.15	INTELLECTUAL 5.02	AFFECTIONATE 8.50	OBEDIENT 7.43
WELL-MANNERED 7.27	LOGICAL 4.75	AMBITIOUS 7.71	INTELLECTUAL 6.37
OBEDIENT 7.13	AMBITIOUS 3.96	INTELLECTUAL 7.38	AMBITIOUS 5.43
INTELLECTUAL 6.72	SELF-CONTROLLED 3.96	OPEN-MINDED 4.31	LOGICAL 5.20
AMBITIOUS 4.63	CHEERFUL 3.70	INDEPENDENT 3.53	OPEN MINDED 4.35
OBLIGING 0.92	OBLIGING 2.54	CHEERFUL 3.24	AFFECTIONATE 2.30
CHEERFUL -1.49	COURAGEOUS 2.54	LOGICAL 2.58	OBLIGING 2.04
INDEPENDENT -4.36	OPEN-MINDED 1.01	OBEDIENT 2.68	CHEERFUL 1.32
TIDY -7.39	INDEPENDENT -4.75	OBLIGING 2.57	INDEPENDENT -1.31
AMGINATIVE -7.90	IMAGINATIVE -5.35	TIDY -1.23	TIDY -4.55
TOLERANT -9.54	TIDY -5.92	TOLERANT -1.45	TOLERANT -5.60
AFFECTIONATE -11.95	TOLERANT -5.32	IMAGINATIVE -3.52	IMAGINATIVE -7.95



TABLE 20 - (POSITIVE) INSTRUMENTAL VALUES IN THE ARMED FORCES  
 HIGH MILITARY EDUCATION

ARMY (List 1)	NAVY (List 5)	AIR FORCE (List 8)	TOTAL (List 13)
HONEST 36.25	HONEST 47.15	HONEST 50.41	HONEST 44.27
RESPONSIBLE 32.49	RESPONSIBLE 37.33	RESPONSIBLE 40.82	RESPONSIBLE 36.88
COURAGEOUS 17.76	ABLE 20.12	ABLE 22.51	ABLE 19.07
ABLE 14.59	WELL-MANNERED 13.94	COURAGEOUS 20.77	COURAGEOUS 16.46
INTELLECTUAL 7.23	COURAGEOUS 10.86	SELF-CONTROLLED 14.15	WELL-MANNERED 12.38

## LOWER MILITARY EDUCATION

ARMY (List 3)	NAVY (List 6)	AIR FORCE (List 10)	TOTAL (List 14)
HONEST 30.09	HONEST 43.33	HONEST 34.90	HONEST 36.10
RESPONSIBLE 29.97	RESPONSIBLE 39.20	RESPONSIBLE 33.22	RESPONSIBLE 34.13
ABLE 13.71	ABLE 17.46	WELL-MANNERED 20.13	WELL-MANNERED 14.49
COURAGEOUS 13.55	COURAGEOUS 15.51	COURAGEOUS 12.19	COURAGEOUS 13.75
WELL-MANNERED 9.17	WELL-MANNERED 14.18	SELF-CONTROLLED 9.50	ABLE 13.41

ARMY (List 4)	NAVY (List 7)	AIR FORCE (List 11)	TOTAL (ACADEMIC)
HONEST 36.53	HONEST 45.24	HONEST 45.45	HONEST 42.41
RESPONSIBLE 32.19	RESPONSIBLE 38.29	RESPONSIBLE 36.23	RESPONSIBLE 36.33
ABLE 14.87	ABLE 18.79	ABLE 21.91	ABLE 18.52
COURAGEOUS 13.96	WELL-MANNERED 14.06	WELL-MANNERED 14.78	COURAGEOUS 13.00
WELL-MANNERED 8.30	RED COURAGEOUS 13.18	RED COURAGEOUS 11.87	WELL-MANNERED 12.38

 TABLE 21 - (NEGATIVE) INSTRUMENTAL VALUES IN THE ARMED FORCES  
 HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION

ARMY (List 1)	NAVY (List 5)	AIR FORCE (List 8)	TOTAL (List 16)
IMAGINATIVE -0.04	TIDY -0.61	INDEPENDENT -4.36	INDEPENDENT -3.46
OBLIGING -0.53	INDEPENDENT -2.57	TIDY -7.39	TIDY -5.45
AFFECTIONATE -5.06	AFFECTIONATE -7.25	IMAGINATIVE -7.90	IMAGINATIVE -5.54
TOLERANT -7.70	TOLERANT -9.62	TOLERANT -9.54	AFFECTIONATE -8.00
TIDY -8.47	IMAGINATIVE -9.68	AFFECTIONATE -11.95	TOLERANT -8.95

## LOWER MILITARY EDUCATION

ARMY (List 3)	NAVY (List 6)	AIR FORCE (List 10)	TOTAL (List 17)
AFFECTIONATE -1.72	AFFECTIONATE -2.48	TIDY -1.23	AFFECTIONATE -2.10
TIDY -3.01	CHEERFUL -3.17	TOLERANT -1.45	TIDY -2.12
TOLERANT -5.18	INDEPENDENT -4.49	IMAGINATIVE -9.62	INDEPENDENT -2.24
IMAGINATIVE -5.44	TOLERANT -6.72		TOLERANT -4.45
	IMAGINATIVE -9.31		IMAGINATIVE -8.12

ARMY (List 4)	NAVY (List 7)	AIR FORCE (List 11)	TOTAL (ACADEMIC) (List 15)
INDEPENDENT -1.61	OBLIGING -1.90	INDEPENDENT -1.81	INDEPENDENT -2.31
AFFECTIONATE -3.08	INDEPENDENT -3.53	TIDY -4.55	AFFECTIONATE -3.97
TIDY -4.42	AFFECTIONATE -4.06	TOLERANT -5.60	TIDY -4.46
IMAGINATIVE -4.48	TOLERANT -8.17	IMAGINATIVE -7.96	TOLERANT -6.55
TOLERANT -5.88	IMAGINATIVE -9.49		IMAGINATIVE -7.31

TABLE 22 - FINAL VALUES-ARMY

HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION A.G.M. (List 18)	A.E.M. (List 19)	LOWER MILITARY EDUCATION A.P.S. (List 20)	TOTAL OF THE ARMY (List 21)
AUTHENTIC FRIENDSHIP 22.79	FAMILIAL SECURITY 32.16	AUTHENTIC FRIENDSHIP 23.37	FAMILIAL SECURITY 21.95
HAPPINESS 20.26	NATIONAL SECURITY 19.30	HAPPINESS 19.50	AUTHENTIC FR. 20.40
NATIONAL SECUR. 19.45	PEACE IN THE WORLD 18.22	FAMILIAL SECUR. 17.73	HAPPINESS 18.33
FAMILIAL SECUR. 15.97	DIGNITY 16.63	FREEDOM 16.94	NATIONAL SECUR. 17.98
FREEDOM 14.91	FREEDOM 16.17	NATIONAL SECUR. 16.21	FREEDOM 16.03
DIGNITY 14.50	AUTHENTIC F. 15.27	DIGNITY 13.36	DIGNITY 14.83
P. IN THE WORLD 11.88	HAPPINESS 15.23	P. IN THE WORLD 13.00	P. IN THE WORLD 16.36
SALVATION 10.06	SALVATION 7.39	INNER HARMONY 6.53	INNER HARMONY 6.80
INNER HARMONY 7.37	INNER HARMONY 6.52	SELF-GIVING 6.39	SELF-GIVING 6.12
SELF-GIVING 7.22	EQUALITY 5.83	EQUALITY 5.39	WISDOM 5.66
WISDOM 6.63	WISDOM 5.34	WISDOM 5.02	SALVATION 4.87
EXCITING LIFE 4.09	SELF-GIVING 4.77	EXCITING LIFE 3.84	EQUALITY 4.27
EQUALITY 1.60	ACHIEVEMENT -1.55	ACHIEVEMENT 0.65	EXCITING LIFE -0.09
SOCIAL NOTORIETY -0.41	COMFORTABLE LIFE -6.14	SALVATION -2.84	ACHIEVEMENT -0.43
COMFORTABLE LIFE -8.24	EXCITING LIFE -8.22	COMFORTABLE LIFE -5.09	COMFORTABLE LIFE -6.44
WORLD OF BEAUTY -9.94	WORLD OF BEAUTY -9.70	WORLD OF BEAUTY -8.37	WORLD OF BEAUTY -9.37
SOCIAL NOTORIETY -12.53	SOCIAL NOTORIETY -11.25	SOCIAL NOTORIETY -9.24	SOCIAL NOTORIETY -11.60
PLEASURE -12.96	PLEASURE -13.07	PLEASURE -10.19	PLEASURE -12.07

A.G.M.: Academia General Militar (General Military Academy)

A.E.M.: Academia Especial Militar (Special Military Academy)

A.B.S.: Academia Básica de Suboficiales (Basic Academy of Warrant Officers)

TABLE 23 - FINAL VALUES-NAVY

HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION E.N.M. (List 22)	LOWER MILITARY EDUCATION E.S. (List 23)	TOTAL NAVY (List 24)
AUTHENTIC FRIENDSHIP 33.40	FAMILIAL SECURITY 31.54	FAMILIAL SECURITY 38.10
SALVATION 28.79	PEACE IN THE WORLD 31.15	AUTHENTIC FRIENDSHIP 27.70
NATIONAL SECURITY 29.05	NATIONAL SECURITY 24.29	NATIONAL SECURITY 25.17
FAMILIAL SECURITY 24.66	AUTHENTIC FRIENDSHIP 21.01	WORLD IN THE PEACE 23.07
HAPPINESS 22.22	FREEDOM 17.57	HAPPINESS 19.79
DIGNITY 18.29	HAPPINESS 17.75	DIGNITY 17.04
PEACE IN THE WORLD 14.37	DIGNITY 15.37	FREEDOM 14.73
INNER HARMONY 12.24	EQUALITY 11.59	INNER HARMONY 9.47
FREEDOM 11.74	INNER HARMONY 8.87	SALVATION 8.21
SELF-GIVING 5.34	SELF-GIVING 4.15	EQUALITY 5.10
WISDOM 6.23	WISDOM 4.75	SELF-GIVING 3.55
EXCITING LIFE 3.33	EXCITING LIFE -1.33	WISDOM 5.31
EQUALITY 3.41	COMFORTABLE LIFE -2.55	EXCITING LIFE 0.3
ACHIEVEMENT -1.97	ACHIEVEMENT -2.70	ACHIEVEMENT -2.33
COMFORTABLE LIFE -9.01	WORLD OF BEAUTY -9.42	COMFORTABLE LIFE -5.40
WORLD OF BEAUTY -14.43	SOCIAL NOTORIETY -12.42	WORLD OF BEAUTY -12.33
SOCIAL NOTORIETY -15.94	SALVATION -12.33	SOCIAL NOTORIETY -14.31
PLEASURE -13.29	PLEASURE -14.29	PLEASURE -17.19

TABLE 24 - FINAL VALUES-AIR FORCE

HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION	LOWER MILITARY EDUCATION		TOTAL AIR FORCE (List 28)
A.G.A. (List 25)	A.S. (List 26)	E.E. (List 27)	
NATIONAL SECURITY 29,28	FAMILIAL SECURITY 40,47	AUTHENTIC FRIENDSHIP 30,20	FAMILIAL SECURITY 28,52
AUTHENTIC FRIENDS 28,92	AUTHENTIC FRIENDS 20,90	PEACE IN THE WORLD 29,75	AUTHENTIC FRIENDS 26,67
HAPPINESS 23,89	PEACE IN THE WORLD 20,63	FREEDOM 28,63	P. IN THE WORLD 23,66
FAMILIAL SECURITY 22,51	NATIONAL SECURITY 19,31	HAPPINESS 24,38	NATIONAL SECURITY 20,22
WORLD IN PEACE 20,61	DIGNITY 16,66	FAMILIAL SECURITY 22,59	HAPPINESS 17,85
SALVATION 20,25	SALVATION 15,34	INNER HARMONY 13,31	FREEDOM 17,02
FREEDOM 16,87	SELF-GIVING 13,22	NATIONAL SECURITY 12,08	DIGNITY 12,85
INNER HARMONY 13,33	EQUALITY 8,99	SELF-GIVING 10,62	SELF-GIVING 11,66
DIGNITY 12,61	FREEDOM 5,55	DIGNITY 9,39	INNER HARMONY 10,47
SELF-GIVING 11,20	HAPPINESS 5,29	EQUALITY 8,83	SALVATION 8,88
WISDOM 8,30	INNER HARMONY 4,76	WISDOM 8,09	EQUALITY 7,15
EQUALITY 3,64	WISDOM 2,91	EXCITING LIFE 1,11	WISDOM 6,43
EXCITING LIFE 2,87	WORLD OF BEAUTY 0,26	ACHIEVEMENT -1,56	EXCITING LIFE 6,23
ACHIEVEMENT -0,25	ACHIEVEMENT -0,52	COMFORTABLE LIFE -3,35	ACHIEVEMENT -0,74
WORLD OF BEAUTY -11,84	EXCITING LIFE -2,11	WORLD OF BEAUTY -5,25	WORLD OF BEAUTY -5,61
COMFORTABLE LIFE -12,15	COMFORTABLE LIFE -3,43	SALVATION -8,94	COMFORTABLE LIFE -6,31
PLEASURE -19,83	SOCIAL NOTORIETY -6,87	PLEASURE -13,08	SOCIAL NOTORIETY -14,71
SOCIAL NOTORIETY -20,15	PLEASURE -11,37	SOCIAL NOTORIETY -17,11	PLEASURE -14,76

TABLE 25 (POSITIVE) FINAL VALUES

ARMY (List 21)	NAVY (List 24)	AIR FORCE (List 28)	TOTAL (List 29)
FAMILIAL SECURITY 21,95	FAMILIAL SECURITY 30,10	FAMILIAL SECURITY 28,52	FAM. SECUR. 29,52
AUTHENTIC FRIENDS 20,48	AUTHENTIC FRIENDS 27,70	AUTHENTIC FRIENDS 26,67	AUTH. FRIENDS 24,95
HAPPINESS 18,33	NATIONAL SECURITY 26,17	PEACE IN THE WORLD 23,66	NATION. SECUR 21,46
NATIONAL SECURITY 17,98	PEACE IN THE WORLD 23,07	NATIONAL SECURITY 20,22	P. IN THE W. 21,03
FREEDOM 16,03	HAPPINESS 19,79	HAPPINESS 17,85	HAPPINESS 18,66
HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION			
A.G.M. (List 18)	E.N.M. (List 22)	A.G.A. (List 25)	TOTAL (List 30)
AUTHENTIC FRIENDS 27,29	AUTHENTIC FRIENDS 30,40	NATIONAL SECURITY 29,28	AUTH. FRIENDS 28,37
HAPPINESS 20,26	SALVATION 28,79	AUTHENTIC FRIENDS 28,92	NATION. SECUR. 25,59
NATIONAL SECURITY 19,45	NATIONAL SECURITY 28,05	HAPPINESS 23,89	HAPPINESS 22,12
FAMILIAL SECURITY 15,97	FAMILIAL SECURITY 24,22	FAMILIAL SECURITY 22,51	FAM. SECURITY 20,90
FREEDOM 14,91	HAPPINESS 22,22	WORLD IN PEACE 20,61	SALVATION 19,70
LOWER MILITARY EDUCATION			
A.B.S. (List 20)	E.E. (List 23)	E.E. (List 27)	TOTAL (List 31)
AUTH. FRIENDSHIP 23,37	FAMILIAL SECURITY 51,54	AUTH. FRIENDSHIP 30,29	FAM. SECURITY 30,64
HAPPINESS 19,50	PEACE IN THE WORLD 31,16	P. IN THE WORLD 29,75	AUTH. FRIENDS 25,22
FAM. SECURITY 17,73	NATIONAL SECURITY 24,29	FREEDOM 28,63	P. IN THE W. 24,64
FREEDOM 16,94	AUTH. FRIENDSHIP 22,01	HAPPINESS 24,38	FREEDOM 21,08
NATIONAL SECURITY 16,21	FREEDOM 17,67	FAMILIAL SECURITY 22,59	HAPPINESS 20,41

TABLE 26 - (NEGATIVE) FINAL VALUES

ARMY (List 21)	NAVY (List 24)	AIR FORCE (List 28)	TOTAL ARMED FORCES
ACHIEVEMENT -0,43	ACHIEVEMENT -2,33	ACHIEVEMENT -0,78	ACHIEVEMENT -1,18
COMFORTABLE LIFE -6,49	COMFORTABLE LIFE -5,80	WORLD OF BEAUTY -5,61	COMF. LIFE -6,20
WORLD OF BEAUTY -9,37	WORLD OF BEAUTY -12,03	COMFORTABLE LIFE -6,31	WORLD OF BEAUTY -9,00
SOCIAL NOTORIETY -11,00	SOCIAL NOTORIETY -14,21	SOCIAL NOTORIETY -14,71	SOCIAL NOTOR. -13,31
PLEASURE -12,07	PLEASURE -17,19	PLEASURE -14,74	PLEASURE -14,66
HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION			
A.G.M. (List 18)	E.N.M. (List 22)	A.G.A. (List 25)	TOTAL (List 33)
ACHIEVEMENT -0,41	ACHIEVEMENT -1,97	ACHIEVEMENT -0,25	ACHIEVEMENT -0,88
COMFORTABLE LIFE -8,24	COMFORTABLE LIFE -9,01	WORLD OF BEAUTY -11,84	COMF. LIFE -9,80
WORLD OF BEAUTY -9,94	WORLD OF BEAUTY -14,63	COMFORTABLE LIFE -12,15	WORLD OF BEAUTY -12,14
SOCIAL NOTORIETY -12,53	SOCIAL NOTORIETY -16,94	PLEASURE -19,83	SOCIAL NOTOR. -16,54
PLEASURE -12,96	PLEASURE -18,29	SOCIAL NOTORIETY -20,15	PLEASURE -17,03
LOWER MILITARY EDUCATION			
A.B.S. (List 20)	E.S. (List 23)	E.E. (List 27)	TOTAL (List 34)
SALVATION -2,84	ACHIEVEMENT -2,70	COMFORTABLE LIFE -3,35	COMFORT. LIFE -3,67
COMFORTABLE LIFE -5,09	WORLD OF BEAUTY -9,42	WORLD OF BEAUTY -5,25	WORLD OF BEAUTY -7,71
WORLD OF BEAUTY -8,47	SOCIAL NOTORIETY -11,48	SALVATION -8,94	SALVATION -8,05
SOCIAL NOTORIETY -9,24	SALVATION -12,36	PLEASURE -13,08	SOCIAL NOTOR. -12,61
PLEASURE -10,12	PLEASURE -16,02	SOCIAL NOTORIETY -17,11	PLEASURE -13,12

TABLE 27 -- LIST OF ITEMS ORDERED ACCORDING TO THE WARRANT OFFICERS'  $\bar{X}$ 

SCALE I = Important .... Less important

Item order number	ITEMS	$\bar{X}_s$	$\bar{X}_o$	Warrant Off. Sigma	Officer Sigma	Rc	Confidence Level
1.-	NATIONAL SECURITY	1,13	1,11	0,40	0,42	0,39	-
2.-	FAMILIAL SECURITY	1,25	1,18	0,55	0,48	1,10	-
3.-	DIGNITY	1,25	1,28	0,55	0,51	0,24	-
4.-	SOLDIER	1,27	1,22	0,75	0,54	0,55	-
5.-	SELF-CONTROLLED	1,29	1,21	0,51	0,43	1,25	-
6.-	AUTHENTIC FRIENDSHIP	1,25	1,09	0,53	0,56	2,74	1%
7.-	WELL-MANNERED	1,30	1,25	0,52	0,53	0,73	-
8.-	HONEST	1,30	1,14	0,58	0,38	2,00	5%
9.-	TIDY	1,37	1,39	0,55	0,55	0,55	-
10.-	UNION	1,37	1,24	0,77	0,52	1,41	-
11.-	LIEUTENANT	1,40	1,44	0,53	0,52	0,50	-
12.-	RESPONSIBLE	1,42	1,19	0,51	0,40	3,15	1%
13.-	ECONOMIC SECURITY	1,47	1,78	0,59	0,54	0,50	1%
14.-	PROMOTION	1,50	1,80	0,71	0,73	3,05	1%
15.-	FREEDOM	1,51	1,28	0,50	0,52	2,40	5%
15.-	OBEDIENT	1,54	1,55	0,71	0,53	2,20	5%
17.-	COURAGEOUS	1,55	1,49	0,71	0,59	1,71	-
18.-	AMBITIOUS	1,57	1,53	0,73	0,59	0,57	-
19.-	SERGEANT	1,58	1,47	1,62	0,55	0,55	-
20.-	DISINT. SELF-GIVING	1,55	1,55	0,59	0,53	1,50	-
21.-	INTELLECTUAL	1,70	1,79	0,65	0,75	0,54	-
22.-	HIERARCHY	1,74	1,57	0,71	0,64	1,51	-
23.-	OATH	1,91	1,50	1,15	0,55	2,20	5%
24.-	ABLE	2,04	1,65	0,53	0,57	3,51	-
25.-	TRADITION	2,04	2,10	0,59	0,55	0,52	-
25.-	PUNISHMENT	2,54	2,45	1,17	1,05	3,25	1%
27.-	POLITICS	2,55	2,45	1,25	1,12	3,13	1%

 $\bar{X}_s$  = Mean of Warrant Officers $\bar{X}_o$  = Mean of Officers $R_c$  = Critical ratio of media difference significationCriterion of significance:  $R_c > 1'96$  , 5% significant $R_c > 2'58$  , 1% significant

TABLE 28 . COMPARED RESULTS

ARMY.

INSTRUMENTAL VALUES

1978	HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION	1985
HONEST		HONEST
RESPONSIBLE		RESPONSIBLE
SELF-CONTROLLED		COURAGEOUS
OBEDIENT		ABLE
WELL-MANNERED		INTELLECTUAL
	LOWER MILITARY EDUCATION	
SELF-CONTROLLED		HONEST
WELL-MANNERED		RESPONSIBLE
HONEST		ABLE
TIDY		COURAGEOUS
RESPONSIBLE		WELL-MANNERED

FINAL VALUES

1978	HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION	1985
AUTHENTIC FRIENDSHIP		AUTHENTIC FRIENDSHIP
NATIONAL SECURITY		HAPPINESS
FAMILIAL SECURITY		NATIONAL SECURITY
DIGNITY		FAMILIAL SECURITY
FREEDOM		FREEDOM
	LOWER MILITARY EDUCATION	
NATIONAL SECURITY		FAMILIAL SECURITY
FAMILIAL SECURITY		NATIONAL SECURITY
DIGNITY		PEACE IN THE WORLD
AUTHENTIC FRIENDSHIP		DIGNITY
FREEDOM		FREEDOM

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Section III

**CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION**

Hugh Smith

**CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN AUSTRALIA**

## C O N T E N T S

Abstract

Introduction

Australia: 1901 - 1945

The cold war era

After Vietnam

Conclusions

Footnotes

## Abstract

Australia has taken a distinctive approach to the question of conscientious objection to compulsory military service. This paper examines the tradition which been developed in Australia of allowing individuals to decide whether or not to participate in particular conflicts. In 1903 Australia became the first country to make statutory provision for conscientious objectors. In most wars in which Australia has subsequently been involved in this century reliance has been placed on voluntary enlistment. The major exception, which proved traumatic for Australian society, was the Vietnam War. In recent times the Australian Parliament has been considering a proposal for legislation which - in line with this tradition - would permit conscientious objection to particular wars.

## Introduction

This paper looks at the approach to conscientious objection to military service taken by one country, namely Australia. Conscientious objection becomes a significant issue, of course, only in those countries where some form of conscription for military service is in operation. At the present time out of 120 countries with military personnel numbering more than 5,000 some 44 have no system of conscription (1). This figure is naturally not constant. Thus a number of countries which do not currently have conscription - including Australia and the United States - have in recent years imposed some form of military service.

Of the 76 states which currently conscript young males into military service, only 11 make provision for a conscientious objection in a broadly defined form (2). These states define conscientious objection generously to include sincere re-

ligious or ethical convictions against military service and will grant total exemption from all such duties. The majority of states with conscription - 65 in all - either make no provision for conscientious objection or make only limited provision. Policies on dealing with conscientious objectors vary enormously. At one extreme, certain states deny the possibility of genuine conscientious objection and treat those who refuse military service very harshly. Again, some states will compel all conscripts to put on uniform though they may - either administratively or as a legal right - permit individuals to undertake non combat-service e.g. in medical units. Some states will grant exemption to very narrowly defined religious groups, most notably the Mennonite community. A few countries, too, will allow individual objectors to engage in some form of civilian service as an alternative to military service.

Inevitably, a great deal depends on the way in which conscription laws are administered from country to country. What seems to be quite harsh laws can be generously interpreted or carried out with the minimum of rigour; in some countries, it seems, the law can be avoided by payment of appropriate sums to the right people or simply disregarded. The converse, of course, applies to seemingly liberal laws or policies on conscientious objection. Thus some states will formally deny the possibility of such objection while in practice treating individual objectors quite humanely.

It is not surprising that states have developed a great number of different ways of dealing with the problems raised by the existence of conscientious objectors. There are, on the one hand, practical difficulties posed by individuals who will not conform to the requirements of the state. While the state has regular and accepted

ways of handling criminals who break the law of the land, it is often difficult to treat those who refuse to perform military service in the same way as those who perform criminal acts or refuse to pay taxes.

On the other hand, conscientious objection raises difficult and complex questions of politics, morality, law and theology (3). It goes to the heart of the relationship between the individual and the state. There is no problem with the conscript who complies - perhaps willingly, perhaps reluctantly - with the conscription system. There are millions of conscripts around the world who might prefer to be doing something else but who have no conscientious objection to military service. But can the state require a citizen to perform military duty which he considers to be against his conscience?

The interest of the state is twofold. In the first place, it has the responsibility of providing for the defence and security of all citizens. Without some form of military establishment the very existence state is likely to be at risk. In some circumstances, governments will judge that conscription is necessary to maintain the nation's defences. In the second place, the state must try to ensure that individuals do not shirk or evade their responsibilities. This is partly out of a desire to prevent the failure or undermining of the system of conscription and partly out of fairness to those who do cooperate with the policy of the state. Governments are also naturally concerned that disregard for conscription laws should not set an example of disregard for other laws of the land.

Nonetheless, a number of governments have found both practical and principled reasons for granting exemption to conscientious objectors. The conscience of the individual - even if it runs



against the policy of the state - may be considered worthy of protection. Though individuals might claim a conscientious objection to many of the activities of governments, military service is in a category of its own. For it requires the citizen to train to take the lives of others and ultimately to kill. No matter that the enemy may also be in uniform and trained to kill, no matter that a war may be in defence of the homeland, there will still be individuals who consider participation in military activities to be against their conscience. It is to protect the personal integrity of such individuals that some governments have seen fit to grant them exemption from a public duty in this particular instance.

The practical reasons for granting exemption are variable. It may simply be easier to exempt a number of citizens than to prosecute them and put them in jail. Such treatment, the government may judge, could provoke extensive opposition to the conscription system. Granting exemption might also reduce the number of those actively opposing a particular military undertaking. It is easier for the government, too, if those seeking exemption are otherwise respectable members of the community of life-long members of a pacifist church. It is also significant that in practice governments are usually faced with only small numbers of conscientious objectors. If only 1 or 2 % of those conscripted are claiming objector status, this is far more manageable than a figure of 10 or 20 %.

It is only in this century that states have begun to make legal provision for those who objected to military service on grounds of conscience. Previously, ad hoc arrangements were sometimes instituted to deal with conscientious objectors, particularly religious groups such as the Quakers and the Mennonites. It is probably also true to say that the administration of earlier conscrip-

tion schemes was much more inefficient and left many more loopholes than has been the case in this century. Australia was the first country to make statutory provision for conscientious objectors in its Defence Act of 1903 though it did not in fact introduce conscription until some decades later (4).

In those countries that have provided for conscientious objection the requirement has always been that the individual holds an objection to participation in all wars. No state has expressly granted a right of exemption to those who have a conscientious objection to a particular war. For clearly there is an important distinction between conscientious objection in general and what has been called "selective conscientious objection" (5). The latter is based on objections to the nature of a war that is actually in progress, whether the reasons for which it is being fought or the manner in which it is being conducted. Thus individuals might find it against their conscience to participate in a war of aggression or of colonial conquest; or they may conscientiously refuse to become involved in hostilities which disregard the rules of war such as those which prohibit the wanton killing of civilians or the use of inhumane weapons.

It is a serious step for a government to grant exemption from military service to such individuals. Far more than traditional conscientious objectors, they appear to be challenging the rightness of their government's decision to wage a particular war. They raise the spectre of individuals obtaining exemption from their public duty on the basis of a political difference with the government. Selective conscientious objectors also threaten to pose much greater practical problems. Such objectors, by their very nature, can be identified only when a war is actually in progress; some, indeed, will be able to form

their objection only after they have been conscripted and seen what is happening on the battlefield (6). Yet another problem is that some of those claiming exemption may do so on the basis of beliefs about the particular war which appear utterly erroneous to the government and the majority of citizens. Can beliefs of this kind be deemed conscientious?

Though no state has yet legislated for selective conscientious objection, it is the case that one country at least has adopted a policy close to this position. In Britain during World War II those seeking exemption were examined essentially for the depth of their convictions against military service, not necessarily for a conscientious objection to all wars (7). Hence exemption was granted to a number of individuals such as socialists who refused to take part in what - at least until the entry of the Soviet Union in 1941 - they considered to be a capitalists' war. Again, the point must be stressed that in regard to conscientious objection the letter of the law is often a far from clear guide to actual practice.

The rest of this paper will examine Australia's approach to conscientious objection. As mentioned above, Australia was the first country to legislate for exemption from military service on conscientious grounds. When it did introduce conscription for military service (as opposed to military training) during World War II, it took the unusual step of placing a geographical limit on the area in which a conscript soldier could serve. Following the bitter experience of conscription for the Vietnam War, Australia has in recent years been considering the introduction of legislation which would provide for conscientious objection to particular wars. Though Australia's circumstances are in some ways unique, its approach to the problems of conscientious objection

may prove of general interest.

#### Australia: 1901 - 1945

Australians consider themselves a peace-loving nation. Since the federation of its separate states in 1900, however, Australia has been engaged in military operations of one kind or another for about 34 years out of 86. Apart from the global hostilities of World War II these operations have taken place in Africa (the Boer War 1899 - 1902), Europe and the Middle East (World War I) and Asia (the Korean War 1950 - 1953; Malaya, Malaysia and Borneo between 1955 and 1965; and Vietnam 1962 - 1972). Australia, it can be observed, has frequently been willing to participate in distant conflicts - to take part in "other nations' wars".

Individual Australians, nonetheless, have for the most part been able to choose for themselves whether or not to fight in these conflicts. There has been no compulsory military service in any of these conflicts with the partial exception of World War II and the major exception of Vietnam. Attempts by the government to introduce conscription in 1916 and 1917 were clearly rejected by referendum. Even in the war of 1939 - 1945 which saw hostilities on Australian territory conscripts were required to serve only in the geographical proximity of Australia. In the majority of wars Australia has been able to rely on volunteer soldiers who have usually come forward in adequate numbers (8).

Australia has a strong tradition of voluntarism. It relates to a long-standing suspicion of authority and of militarism - perhaps with origins in Australia's convict past. It is also tied in with the popular myth of the Australian soldier - "the digger" (9). He is someone who in time of

peace lives an independent sort of existence in the "bush" and brings the qualities of resourcefulness, toughness and mateship to the business of war. He is willing to forsake his civilian pursuits when his country needs him - but not before. Whatever the truth of such myths, they do reinforce the strong resistance to conscription for military service which has been evident for most of Australia's history in this century. It is conscription for military service that has been the source of greatest resistance. Compulsory military training in time of peace has proven much more acceptable; such schemes were in operation from 1911 to 1929 (briefly interrupted during World War I) and again from 1951 to 1959.

The approach to conscientious objection to military service in Australia points in the same direction. The Defence Act of 1903 made provision for compulsory service for all male citizens between 18 and 60 years of age in "time of war" or "danger of war". Exemption was to be available for "persons whom the doctrines of their religion forbid to bear arms or perform military service". An attempt to extend the grounds of exemption beyond religious beliefs to individual conscience attracted little support at this time. A more significant issue in the light of subsequent events was parliament's rejection of a clause which would have authorized the government to send conscripted troops overseas.

Amendments to the defence act in 1910 made a significant extension to the scope of conscientious objection. Exemption was granted to "persons who satisfy the prescribed authority that their conscientious beliefs do not allow them to bear arms". In a country without an established religion the individual's religious beliefs were not to be made the sole criterion for exemption. The atheist's conscience was equally acceptable. Though widening the basis of conscientious objec-

tion, the act did limit the scope of exemption. The conscientious objector could now be required to perform non-combat duties with the military forces.

Such were the provisions with which Australia entered the Great War in 1914. In the absence of conscription for this momentous conflict the question for individuals was whether or not to volunteer to fight with Australia's forces overseas. Out of a total population of about 5 million some 330,000 men were to volunteer in the course of the war - a remarkably high proportion. In the first year or two of the war Australians came forward in great numbers but as recruiting figures fell away the government faced the question of introducing conscription for military service overseas. Anticipating strong opposition to such a move, the government saw no alternative but to put the matter to referendum. The referendum campaigns of 1916 and 1917 did indeed see the issue debated with great passion and hostility on both sides. Those who believed everything possible should be done to assist Britain and to support those already at the front were confronted by those - many of them of Irish origin - who believed it was Britain's war or a capitalists' war. Others continued to place their faith in the volunteer.

In the event conscription for overseas service was rejected on both occasions by a clear if not overwhelming margin. The tradition of voluntarism had been maintained and the individual remained free to determine whether or not to take part in the war. The effect of the referendums was to maintain freedom of conscience in Australia. The kind of conflict over conscientious objection to military service which Britain experienced between 1916 and 1918 was avoided. If there was pressure on the conscience of young men in 1914 - 1918 it came from those public-spirited citizens

who handed out white feathers and asked when they were going to do their duty.

In World War II the problem of conscription was handled in a rather different fashion. When compulsory military service was announced in October 1939 it was purely for duty within Australia and its territories. Forces for service overseas - in Europe, Africa and the Far East - again consisted entirely of volunteers. But the system of two armies - volunteers able to serve anywhere and conscripts liable for service only in Australia and its territories - proved militarily and diplomatically inconvenient. The fact that numerous American conscripts were present in Australia, for example, drew attention to the differences between Australia and its allies. After wide public debate and much agonizing within the ruling Labor party, the Defense Act was amended in early 1943 to permit the employment of conscript forces in the South-West Pacific area south of the Equator. In practice, however, this change made little difference to the actual deployment of forces.

The second Defence Act of 1939 had made certain changes in the law relating to conscientious objection. The most significant was a new subsection in Section 61 of the Principal Act:

Section 61 (3) In this section 'conscientious beliefs' includes all conscientious beliefs, whether the ground thereof is or is not of a religious character, and/or whether the beliefs are or are not part of the doctrines of any religion (10).

This made clear that the word 'conscientious' in the 1910 Act was to be broadly interpreted. It also clarified the apparent problem of objectors who belonged to one of the great majority of churches that did not officially espouse pacifist

doctrines. While the position of Quakers, for example, had always been accepted, there was now no debate over the possibility of, say, Anglicans or Catholics claiming conscientious objection to war despite the fact that their churches were not pacifist and might endorse a particular war.

The Labor opposition in 1939 had unsuccessfully attempted to introduce total exemption from service for those who established their status as conscientious objectors. They were still required to perform non-combatant duties. In 1942, however, the Curtin Labor government replaced the provisions of the Defence Act relating to conscientious objection with the National Security (Conscientious Objectors) Regulations. These provided for total exemption if an objector could satisfy a court that he held a genuine conscientious belief that it was wrong to perform any kind of naval, military or air force service, whether of a combatant nature or not. Objectors could still be allocated to non-combatant duties or to compulsory civilian service. The regulations were terminated in 1946.

This legislation appears to have dealt with questions of conscience in a successful fashion. Given the nature of the war, it was perhaps not surprising that relatively few people applied for registration as conscientious objectors. Of the 2726 applications that had been finalized by August 1944, 1014 were granted full exemption, 1076 were employed on non-combatant duties and only 636 rejected (11). This is to be measured against a total of more than a quarter of a million conscripts and over half a million volunteers.

### The Cold War Era

The end of the war brought the end of compulsory military service. It was a short respite for in 1950 the government introduced a new proposal for short-term (six months) but universal compulsory military training (12). The National Service Act of 1951 followed the Defence Act in granting full exemption to "persons whose conscientious beliefs do not allow them to engage in any form of naval, military or air force service" and partial exemption to persons whose conscientious beliefs allow them to undertake only duties of a non-combatant nature. The scheme operated in varying forms until 1959 but none of the issues posed by conscientious objection appear to have caused real difficulties. It was, after all, a training scheme and there was no serious prospect of conscripts being sent overseas to fight.

Service with the Australian forces in the Korean War was on a voluntary basis although conscripts who chose to perform national service with the navy or air force were deemed to have volunteered for service overseas. Similarly, the military operations in Malaya, Borneo and Malaysia in which Australia was involved at varying times between 1955 and 1965 were conducted by regular forces recruited on a volunteer basis.

Since 1901 Australia had one way or another managed to avoid too great a clash between conscription and conscience, whether for training in peacetime or service in war. In part, of course, this was due to the pre-eminence of other bitter conflicts over compulsion and overseas service. But the issue was not to be avoided in the 1960s. A new National Service scheme and the sending of conscripts to Vietnam raised in acute form the issues of conscientious objection and above all the problem of conscientious objection to a particular war.

In November 1964 the Liberal-Country Party government announced the introduction of a system of selective compulsory service. Conscripts would be chosen by ballot and would serve for two years in regular units on a full-time basis. "If the scheme is to be effective", Prime Minister R. G. Menzies argued, "those called up must... be under an obligation to serve overseas as necessary and must be available to go with the regular unit in which they are serving" (13). The government had already dispatched a team of military instructors to assist South Vietnam in 1962. It now stressed the importance of strengthening Australia's military capabilities in the face of the growing threat of communism.

Though the public at large seemed acquiescent, there was sharp debate over this provision in Parliament. This was, after all, a major break with tradition. Old fears were revived of conscript Australian forces being sent to all quarters of the globe or placed under foreign command. Nor was there any restriction on their commitment to wars not directly threatening Australia (14).

Fears were heightened when the Prime Minister announced in April 1965 that a regular infantry battalion would be sent to Vietnam. With the first batch of conscripts due to begin training in June it was not mere rhetoric for the leader of the opposition Labor Party to predict that national servicemen would be sent to fight in Vietnam (15). Twelve months later (on April 19, 1966) the first conscripts left for Vietnam.

At the federal elections in November 1966 the government was returned with a record majority in the House of Representatives. Conscription for overseas service had been introduced with relatively little contention but if the government believed that the long-standing tradition of vo-

luntarism for overseas service would - like old soldiers - simply fade away, it was to be proved very wrong. Intense opposition to the war emerged in 1967 and one of its focal points was conscientious objection to the particular war being fought in Vietnam.

The provisions of the National Service Act of 1964 regarding conscientious objection were as follows:

Section 29A (1) A person whose conscientious beliefs do not allow him to engage in any form of military service is, so long as he holds these beliefs, exempt from liability to render service under this Act.

(2) A person whose conscientious beliefs do not allow him to engage in military duties of a combatant nature but allow him to engage in military duties of a non-combatant nature, shall not, so long as he holds these beliefs, be required to engage in duties of a combatant nature.

....

(5) For the purpose of this section, a conscientious belief is a conscientious belief whether the ground of the belief is or is not of a religious character and whether the belief is or is not part of the doctrines of a religion.

It was the National Service Act rather than the Defence Act that provided the relevant legislation since the latter authorized conscription only in time of war or threat of war. This was quite narrowly defined in terms of "invasion or apprehended invasion of, or attack or apprehended attack on, Australia by an enemy or armed force". No attempt was made by the government to argue that the conflict in Vietnam constituted a war in

this sense.

From the time of the government's announcement of its decision to send conscript troops to Vietnam controversy over the war escalated. The opposition Labor Party, while rejecting conscription for any undeclared war overseas, was for a long time unable to come out unequivocally against the Vietnam War itself (16). The main stumbling block for Labor was the belief of many members that the alliance with the United States had to be maintained even at a high price. Opposition to Australia's role in Vietnam was thus fragmented among numerous groups as well as sections of the Labor Party. In this context the actions of individuals who refused to be conscripted for the war in Vietnam took on greater significance.

Those who held conscientious beliefs against participating in all wars or whose conscience allowed them to undertake only non-combatant duties could, of course, apply for exemption. But from 1965 onwards a number of young men claimed exemption from military service on the grounds of a conscientious objection to participation in the Vietnam war itself. Claims were heard in the first instance before individual magistrates. The majority refused to acknowledge the possibility of conscientious objection to service in a particular war but from time to time a magistrate did reach conclusions that ran counter to the norm. In most instances, however, the government appealed against the decision and the would-be objector lost on appeal. In one instance, however, the case reached what was the final court of appeal at the time - the Privy Council in Britain - before the government succeeded.

There were various legal arguments supporting conscientious objection to a particular war. The major one turned on the phrase "any form of military service" in section 29A (1) of the Na-

tional Service Act. The usual reading of this section required a conscientious objection to "each and every form of military service". An alternative interpretation was that an individual who held a conscientious objection to "any one form of service" - such as service in a particular war - could be granted exemption. This reading relied on the ambiguity of the word 'any' but was clearly not the intention of the legislators.

Such arguments were dismissed unequivocally by Justices of the High Court in Australia on two separate occasions. In the case of William White, Mr. Justice Windeyer delivered a lengthy interpretation of the relevant law. His view was that the National Service Act must be interpreted to allow complete exemption from military service only for total pacifists:

The requisite for total exemption is thus, it seems, a conscientious and complete pacifism. I do not read s. 29A (1) as referable to an objection to participation only in a particular war or in operations against a particular enemy. I mention this because the stringency of the conditions for exemption under the Australian law is not always appreciated (17).

The legal issue was put beyond doubt in a case in 1968. The Chief Justice, Sir Garfield Barwick, stated that a conscientious objection to military service must be an objection to all conceivable forms of warfare for any conceivable purpose. What is required, Barwick declared, is "the existence of a present compulsive and complete conscientious aversion to military service of any kind including non-combatant service at any time and in any circumstance" (18). The dissenting view of one High Court justice who argued that conscientious objection could only be assessed in

relation to a known conflict - a view which would in effect permit conscientious objection to a particular war - received no support from other members of the court.

Most of the issues surrounding conscription were debated in the parliament in 1968 when the government introduced a number of changes to the National Service Act. Many of them were designed to tighten up registration procedures and to deal with those whom the Minister for Labour and National Service called "self-styled 'objectors' or simply 'draft dodgers'" (19). The opposition Labor Party, though uncertain of its stand on Vietnam, was clear on its opposition "to conscription for Vietnam or anywhere else outside Australian territory except in time of declared war" (20).

The opposition moved a number of amendments to the Act, including one which would specifically permit conscientious objection to a particular war. The first part of section 29A would then read as follows:

(1) A person whose conscientious beliefs do not allow him to engage in military service, whether in relation to a particular war or otherwise, is, so long as he holds these beliefs, exempt from liability to render service under this Act.

In proposing this and other amendments, the Shadow Minister for Defence, Lance Barnard, pointed to the trend during this century to liberalize laws relating to conscientious objection both in Australia and overseas. The amendment to permit conscientious objection to a particular war now proposed by the opposition was primarily aimed at recognizing what the Labor Party saw as a natural and reasonable state of mind - a moral objection to the war in Vietnam.

One response of the government was to point out that young men had a choice. They could volunteer - before they went into the ballot for full-time military duty - for six years part-time service into the Citizen Military Forces (CMF) whose members were not obliged to serve overseas. For the Labor Party, however, it was not a satisfactory alternative to the provision of conscientious objection to particular wars. For one thing, it required all such objectors to take on some burden of military service in contrast to those who objected to all wars. For another, it presented a choice not between CMF service and regular service but a choice between CMF service and a chance of regular service (21).

In the event only a small proportion of those registered opted out of the ballot; between 1965 and June 1971 approximately 35,000 young men sought to enroll in the CMF (though not all of these were enlisted) compared with nearly 643,000 registered for national service (22). Clearly, it was not a very attractive alternative to the great majority of young men who preferred to take a sporting chance - about 1 in 10 - of being called up in the ballot. The gambling element in the ballot was reinforced by the resemblance to a game of lotto - balls marked with birth dates were drawn from a container, on some occasions by well known sporting personalities.

The government further pointed out that of the 454 applications for exemption so far determined 197 individuals had been granted total exemption and 171 partial exemption. The matter could be put in its correct perspective when it was understood that only 86 men had their applications totally rejected (23). Some of these, moreover, may have been refused on the grounds of insincerity of belief. For the opposition, however, the issue was more than one of mere numbers.

Supporting the amendment, Labor front-bencher Dr. Jim Cairns appealed to the doctrine of just and unjust wars. If there was such a thing as an unjust war, the individual must have the right to claim exemption from such a conflict. The Nuremberg trials, he pointed out, had established that individual soldiers charged with war crimes could not claim the defence of superior orders. "There must be some room in a free and civilized community", Dr. Cairns declared, "for an individual to decide for himself what is right and wrong". It was a matter too important to be decided on the weight of numbers in Gallup polls or at elections (24).

This was precisely what the ruling Liberal-Country Party coalition did assert. The elected government had responsibility for the defence of Australia and must be able to decide when and where the country's armed forces need to be deployed. Furthermore, only the government was in a position to know all the relevant facts and to receive all the necessary military advice. If individuals could opt out of any war they chose, the defence of the country would become unmanageable. Those who took objection to Australia's participation in a particular war could and should have recourse to the polls. The government's record victory in the 1966 federal elections was frequently recalled by members of the Liberal Party.

Much debate focused on the nature - indeed the possibility - of conscientious objection to a particular war. Supporters of the ALP amendment stressed that sincerity and strength of conviction about the morality of participation in a particular war constituted the nub of the issue. It was pointed out that some men who had fought resolutely in World War I became conscientious objectors in World War II. If people could hold a conscientious belief that forbade them to take



part even in such a manifestly just war as that against Germany and Japan, surely the case for granting exemption in respect of a contentious war such as that in Vietnam was all the stronger.

The Labor Party also recalled the tradition in Australia of allowing individuals to decide whether or not to take part in wars, especially those distant from Australian territory. Now young Australians were to be given no such choice. While the Labor Party was prepared to accept conscription for a war which had been declared and which was for the defence of Australia, the conflict in Vietnam was held to satisfy neither of these conditions.

A concern expressed by some government members was that the granting of exemption from the operation of one law seemingly at the request of the individual would encourage "selective obedience to the law". It would undermine the government's authority with dire consequences for social and political order. More immediately, the amendment appeared to constitute an invitation to the draft dodger to evade his patriotic duty simply on the basis of his political views. While a government could permit exemption from military service on the basis of conscience, no government could allow citizens to escape their public duty on account of their political beliefs. Some government supporters did recognize that a political belief against participation in a war could also be a conscientious belief. But the political element was decisive and could not constitute grounds for exemption.

At the heart of the debate, of course, was the rightness or wrongness of Australia's involvement in Vietnam. It was in practice impossible to separate this issue from the principle of conscientious objection to particular wars. The ALP could not avoid the appearance of seeking a means of

discomforting the government by its support for conscientious objection to particular wars. The government, for its part, could not afford to allow any suggestion that the war in Vietnam was unjust or morally wrong. Important arguments of principle were heard from both sides but the debate would invariably return to the particular war that was causing death and injury to Australian conscripts. The ALP amendment - inevitably - was lost on party lines. The same fate was to befall similar efforts by Labor in October 1970 and August/September 1971.

From May 1968 opposition to the war grew more active and more extensive. Draft resistance increased and public demonstrations against the war and the national service scheme became frequent. Public opinion began to swing against the war and against conscription for service in Vietnam (25). Nonetheless, opinion surveys continued to report majorities in favour of the war itself and in favour of conscription (provided it was not for Vietnam). The problem for the government was how to deal with those who resisted the National Service scheme. Attempts by some government members - with the encouragement of the opposition - to solve the dilemma through the provision of a civilian alternative to military service made little headway for both practical and legal reasons.

By contrast, dealing with conscientious objectors who sought exemption under the Act was straightforward. Indeed, the government introduced procedures in 1970 which could compel draft resisters to appear before the courts in order to determine their possible status as conscientious objectors. Between August 1970 and the end of 1972 a total of 344 resisters were compulsorily examined by the courts and 20 were granted exemption as conscientious objectors, including two who refused to cooperate in any way (26).

It was not only the government that found itself in a predicament with the problem of conscientious objectors to the war in Vietnam. In 1970 the leader of the opposition, Gough Whitlam, advised young men who objected to the war and who were selected for military service by the ballot to give notice in writing of their intention to refuse to go to Vietnam. Those who held such objections and who were already in Vietnam, Whitlam was reported as saying, should notify their commanding officer that they could not conscientiously continue. This did not quite amount to inciting disobedience to orders but it came close enough for the government to make great political capital at Labor's expense (27).

As the United States' commitment to the war in Vietnam diminished and the prospect of victory faded, Australia scaled down its military effort. In August 1971 the period of full-time National Service was reduced from two years to 18 months; in December the same year Australia withdrew its combat forces from Vietnam. In December 1972 the election of the Labor Party to government saw an immediate decision to withdraw the remaining military advisers and to end compulsory military service. The National Service Termination Act of 1973 legally ended the liability to register for military service.

In the seven years of the conscription scheme some 50,000 youths had been compelled to serve in the forces of whom 17,424 went to Vietnam. In the course of military operations 187 conscripts were killed and 1030 wounded (28). Of the 1,012 young men whose applications for total exemption from military service on conscientious grounds were determined between 1965 and June 1971, some 733 (72 %) were granted total exemption, 142 (14 %) were granted exemption from combat duties and 137 (14 %) were refused any exemption (29). Interestingly enough, the rate of exemption had increased

in the later years of the war.

#### After Vietnam

In the years of the Whitlam Labor government (1972 - 1975) and the Fraser Liberal-National Party government (1975 - 1983) there was little discussion of compulsory military service. Occasional calls were heard from groups such as the Returned Services League whose large membership consisted mostly of service personnel who had served overseas. The RSL believed that a period of military training and discipline would do much for the youth of Australia as well as bringing military benefits in the form of a reserve of trained manpower. But neither Labor nor Liberal governments saw any strategic need for conscription; both in fact were well aware of the military and financial disadvantages of having to train large numbers of young men to relatively unskilled levels with no obvious military purpose.

Then in May 1983, shortly after the election of the Hawke Labor government, the ALP Senator Michael Tate introduced a private member's bill concerning conscientious objection to particular wars. Senator Tate's interest in the subject dated back to the Vietnam war when his contemporaries and later his students at the University of Tasmania had been subject to the National Service Act. The proposed legislation was intended to reinforce protection of the individual conscience which had come under challenge during conscription for the war in Vietnam. The present time, Senator Tate argued, was opportune precisely because no military campaign was under way with all the hysteria and party political divisions likely to be associated with it. The fundamental principles involved could be calmly debated in a way that had not been possible

during the Vietnam war.

The proposed legislation took the form of an amendment to the National Service Act 1951 which remained on the state books although it had been inoperative since 1973. The amendment contemplated a major extension of the principle of conscientious objection to war in proposing that

A person whose conscientious beliefs do not allow that person's participation in a particular armed conflict shall not be required to render military service in that particular conflict so long as those beliefs are held (30).

The grounds for exemption which the bill's proposers had in mind included:

- (a) the justness or otherwise of a war e.g. "a war of territorial aggrandizement as opposed to defence against an invading force";
- (b) the conduct of hostilities e.g. "the obliteration of centres of civilian population as opposed to the fighting of enemy units";
- (c) particular forms of warfare e.g. "the use of nuclear as opposed to conventional weapons" (31).

The bill was referred to the Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs which held public hearings in the course of 1983 until 1984. Witnesses presented views on these and related questions which ranged from full support to total opposition.

At one end of the spectrum the Returned Services League opposed the amendment essentially because they believed it would permit individuals to present a political stance against a particular

war as a conscientious objection. It was impossible, the RSL argued, to separate an armed conflict from the political context in which it arose; any attempt to discriminate between one war and another would almost certainly be based on political beliefs. To allow exemption from participation in a conflict on the basis of such a belief would cause "incalculable harm to the national will and the defence capability" (32).

There was opposition, too, based on concern about the practical consequences of the proposed legislation. The Department of Defence submission to the Senate Committee raised a number of problems of this kind (33). One set of concerns focused on the need to guarantee a ready supply of manpower whether prior to a conflict or in the course of a conflict. In a period of ambiguous threat to Australia the government might need to demonstrate its resolve to a potential aggressor by introducing conscription or by initiating limited hostilities. The goal of deterring an enemy could well be undermined if recruits were able to exempt themselves from military service in such circumstances.

More generally, longer term mobilization plans could be threatened. If there were easy access to exemption from service, volunteers could become more difficult to recruit and - more troubling still - regular members of the defence force might seek exemption, thereby causing a loss of trained manpower and a reduction in effectiveness. It was perhaps not surprising that the armed services should lay great stress on a reliable supply of manpower.

Another problem raised by Defence was the prospect of having to deal with conscientious objectors who formed their views after they had been inducted or - even more problematical - after they had entered a combat area. It is in the na-

ture of some kinds of conscientious objection to a particular war that they depend on knowledge about how a campaign is actually being conducted and what weapons are actually being employed. Conscientious objection to an existing conflict, moreover, might be developed not only by a conscript but also by a volunteer. It would not be easy, Defence maintained, to develop procedures to deal with claims of this kind that arose in the course of a campaign.

The gravest problem would arise if a member of the defence force did not obey orders in the course of operations, albeit on conscientious grounds. This could involve a serious disciplinary offence and have very grave operational consequences. The rules of war, Defence pointed out, do prohibit a great number of military activities which might give rise to conscientious objection; the proper recourse is to ensure that the rules of warfare are observed. "It should not be assumed," the Department of Defence submission went on to say, "that breaches will be allowed to continue and will be officially condoned" (34). The type of military actions which the supporters of the legislation appeared to have in mind were all contrary to international law and could not properly be incorporated into national legislation as the basis of conscientious objection.

Governments and military authorities, of course, rarely admit that their forces are party to breaches of international law or could be in the future. But it is true that despite breaches from time to time the laws of war can and do regulate the conduct of hostilities. The difficult question is to identify the point at which a soldier can give up attempting to ensure that the laws of war are observed and claim that the nature of the campaign itself is repugnant to his conscience.

A number of other submissions argued the military

benefits of excluding from the services individuals opposed a particular war who might be a cause of discontent and constitute a threat to morale. But the services were not much attracted by the idea of excluding those whose participation in a particular war was reluctant or half-hearted. To exclude the latter types, one might observe, could be to exclude the majority of soldiers; it is one of the military skills to lead the unwilling and to create enthusiasm for a cause. A more important problem for the military should selective conscientious objection be introduced was the potential threat to morale. Soldiers actually serving could be greatly disheartened if they knew that others were evading their duty at little or no cost.

A variety of organizations, including several churches, and a number of individuals supported the extension of conscientious objection for various reasons. The point in common was the belief that such a move was appropriate to a democratic society which sought to protect the personal integrity of each citizen.

The bipartisan Senate Committee came down unanimously on the side of extending the scope of conscientious objection. The essence of its argument was that individuals could hold beliefs about a political issue which were sincere and conscientious. The crucial test was whether these beliefs were such that to compel an individual to act contrary to them would violate his personal integrity. This would exclude mere political dissent or simple adherence to a party line. If, the personal integrity of the individual were genuinely under threat, then the nature of the individual's beliefs - religious, moral, political or whatever - did not matter. Consistent with this, the Committee rejected that section of the draft legislation which proposed moral, ethical and religious grounds as the appropriate basis for con-

scientious objection. The test of conscientious objection was depth of conviction about a particular war rather than the category into which the basis for objection happened to fall.

This was reflected in the Committee's consideration of the appropriate tribunal to examine the claims of those seeking conscientious objector status (35). It rejected existing procedures which relied on the decision of a single magistrate in a court of summary jurisdiction. The fundamental drawback of that system was its adversarial nature. In the eyes of the community the issue seemed to be reduced to a clash between the government and the individual citizen. In these circumstances the decision of the court seemed like a decision on the merits of the particular war in question. To minimize this problem special tribunals for the sole purpose of dealing with conscientious objectors were proposed. Their role would not be to determine who won as between the government and the individual but to answer the question: "What is the state of mind of the applicant; can it be properly described as a conscientious belief?" (36).

The Committee was also unanimous as to the workability of the proposed legislation. The level of conscientious objection to a particular war would depend on "the success with which the government is able to argue for its policy and for the actual direction of military operations". If conscientious objection occurred on such a scale as to threaten the functioning of the system of military service, this would indicate to the government that it should "re-examine the nature of the military operation being undertaken or at the very least its presentation of it to the community" (37). The Committee noted the concern of the services about reliable numbers of personnel but this too was considered to be fundamentally a question of convincing the public of the

rightness of Australian participation in a particular conflict. In response to those submissions that raised the possibility of public opinion being turned against a war by manipulation of the media or by fifth column activities, the committee again counselled faith in the democratic process.

For the Committee, indeed, the whole proposal was an attempt to extend the tolerance of individual beliefs which was a hallmark of a democratic society. A democratic government could be expected to tolerate dissent of a conscientious nature, especially dissent that touched upon questions of life and death. Australia was a democracy that even in times of armed conflict could well "accommodate the proposed extension of the recognition of conscientious belief in order to protect the integrity of the individual against the coercive power of the State" (38).

### Conclusions

The fate of the bill to introduce conscientious objection to particular wars is yet to be determined. If it does become law, Australia would be the first country to legislate expressly for such a protection of conscience although Britain in World War II did permit selective conscientious objection in a de facto fashion. Courts in that country interpreted the existing law broadly and focused on depth of conviction; the courts in Australia have confined themselves to the narrower forms of conscientious objection in accord with the letter of the law and the intentions of the legislators.

In the broader context, nonetheless, Australia has for most of its history allowed individuals to determine for themselves whether or not to participate in a particular war. Although there

has been provision for compulsory military service in the event of a threat to the homeland since 1903, the course of events has allowed Australians to decide for themselves whether or not to go into battle until the later stages of World War II and until the Vietnam war in the case of a conflict posing no direct threat to Australia. The contrast with the experience of Britain and the United States, both allies in the World Wars, is a marked one. In those countries, as in many other Western powers, conscription has automatically involved a liability to serve in wars whether close to home or in distant parts of the world.

The rejection of both conscription referendums in World War I reflected in part a widespread uncertainty in the country about the wisdom and morality of Australia's involvement in that conflict. The government - through no wisdom of its own - was spared the problem of dealing with conscientious objectors to the Great War.

At the start of World War II conscription was operative for service in Australia and its Territories, the latter having been included by the Defence Act passed three months before war broke out. Although - unlike the First World War - there was a clear prospect of war on Australian soil, compulsory military service in defence of the homeland was widely accepted and caused little disquiet. In the course of the war, however, the government had to face the prospect of compelling conscripts to serve overseas. The agonizing which this decision caused the government and the Prime Minister in particular is perhaps a measure of the belief that the choice to serve overseas should be left to the individual. The result was a compromise: to extend the area in which conscripted soldiers could be compelled to serve to the strategic approaches to Australia.

Many of those who might have had a conscientious objection to liability to military service anywhere in the globe were apparently willing to accept conscription for service in Australia's region. In the eyes of the great majority of Australians military action in this area was directly and convincingly related to the defence of the nation. Military action elsewhere was less obviously defensive. Here, then, was a crude but effective distinction between types of war which reflected a moral distinction accepted by a great many Australians.

The issue of compulsory service overseas was again avoided during the Korean war. Though Australia provided the UN with two infantry battalions together with other units from all three services and lost nearly 300 killed, military operations were undertaken by those who volunteered to serve in Korea. Compulsory military training at home, however, was in a sense the price to be paid for committing a large proportion of the army to action overseas. It was also considered necessary in the face of what was seen as a growing communist threat in the Far East. But the pattern of relying on volunteers to go to distant battlefields was maintained in Korea and in the counter-insurgency operations in Malaya, Malaysia and Borneo from 1955 to 1965.

It was the war in Vietnam that was to see the pattern broken in a clear and painful fashion. This dramatic change came in three stages which - perhaps by design, perhaps fortuitously - made opposition to the government's policy more difficult to coordinate. The three decisions were in November 1964 to introduce national service, in April 1965 to commit regular forces to Vietnam and in March 1966 to increase the commitment and send conscripts to the war. Only at this point did opposition within Australia begin to spread more widely. Those who rejected conscription in

any form began to join forces with those who opposed the Vietnam war. Questions of conscientious objection to participation in the war at hand could and did arise.

The government naturally and perhaps inevitably refused to accept the principle of conscientious objection to the particular war it was waging; its determination was no doubt reinforced by the fact that Australia was fighting in support of its principal protector, the United States. Attempts by the ALP to amend the legislation by introducing selective conscientious objection were inspired both by a dislike of conscription for overseas service and by a growing unease about the war in Vietnam. This was one form of attack, albeit indirect, on the government's commitment in Vietnam.

It is interesting to note that many churches in Australia - as in the United States - supported the principle of conscientious objection to a particular war at this time. This reflects the importance which at least some religions place on the integrity of the individual conscience and perhaps the greater familiarity of certain churches with the idea of just and unjust wars. Selective conscientious objection would also give the churches greater opportunity for influence over individuals during a war.

The end of the Vietnam war and of national service removed the issue of conscientious objection from the political agenda. But memories of the divisiveness occasioned by Vietnam and perhaps a sense of an Australian tradition served to revive it over a decade later in 1983. The proposal to grant exemption to those who held a conscientious objection to a particular war certainly stirred some passions but the debate did proceed, as the originator of the proposal intended, in a calm and rational fashion. The deliberations of the

Senate Committee resulted in a bipartisan conclusion in favour of selective conscientious objection but the acid test is still to come. Will the government of the day - will any government - agree to pass legislation which could have far-reaching consequences for any future military undertaking by Australia?

The answer to this question might appear self-evident but some observations suggest that the conclusion is not foregone. In the past, at least, Australia's wars could be divided into two categories: those - or, more accurately, the one - in direct defence of Australian territory, and those - World War I, Korea, Malaya and Vietnam - which sought to promote Australian security in an indirect fashion. The Defence Act itself defines war as "any invasion or apprehended invasion of, or attack or apprehended attack on, Australia by an enemy or armed force." (Emphasis added.) Such a distinction was drawn in World War II. It is a distinction made possible in part by geography and in part by Australia's lack of a sense of empire of a kind which has drawn Britain and the United States into many wars in foreign fields. This distinction may be one that can continue to survive - though much depends, of course, on Australia's strategic environment - and hence might serve as the basis for a differential treatment of conscientious objection. It was with no prospect of success but in accord with a long tradition for a minority party Senator to propose in 1985 that parliamentary approval be required for overseas service by members of the defence force (39). More importantly, Australian governments from both sides of politics have begun in recent years to focus on the defence of Australia rather than on contribution to allied operations distant from the homeland. A future government may be prepared to accept - implicitly if not expressly - that volunteers alone could be expected to serve in more distant battlefields.

A second observation is that the concept of defence of Australia provides a workable distinction between just wars and other wars. Defence of the homeland naturally appears a just and worthy objective. Participation in distant conflicts is more problematical. Some such wars could no doubt contribute to Australia's security but this would depend on a number of diplomatic and strategic assumptions. Others might not contribute to Australia's security except in the most indirect fashion. Yet others may be downright unjust. It is likely that any war not obviously in direct defence of Australia will arouse opposition within Australia. The question for future Australian governments is whether they are confident of being able to persuade the population at large of the merits of a particular war and hence to justify conscription for it.

Finally, it is clear that the acceptance of conscientious objection to particular wars - like the acceptance of conscientious objection in general - depends on the robustness of the democratic society concerned. A democratic government which is confident of its decisions and of public support for them will - so the theory runs - find adequate volunteers for its military undertakings, even those not manifestly in defence of the homeland. The great majority of citizens will be prepared to do their duty and will be prepared to accept the conscientious objections of others whether to war in general or to the particular war at hand. The conclusions of the Senate Committee in 1985 are noteworthy for their professed faith in the democratic process.

But the matter of conscientious objection would need careful handling by any government. It would be important, for example, to avoid the suggestion that every hearing of a claim for exemption from service in a particular war was also test of the justice of the war concerned. For this rea-

son, it would be wise for a government to focus less on the objector's assertions about the nature of the war and its conduct and more on the depth of the convictions that he holds. The government might also find some merit in a policy that grants exemption to individuals who could otherwise become active opponents of the government's policies. The strength of democracy is often to be found in the coincidence of concern for the rights of the individual with the practicalities of effective government.

#### Footnotes

- (1) Data are taken from International Institute for Strategic Studies: *The Military Balance 1985 - 1986*, London 1985 and the United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights: *Report to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities*, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/30, June 27, 1983
- (2) These countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden
- (3) For representative discussions see P. Mayer (ed.): *The Pacifist Conscience*, London: Hart-Davis 1966; M. Walzer: *Obligations*, New York: Simon & Schuster 1970; G.C. Zahn: *War, Conscience and Dissent*, New York: Hawthorn 1967
- (4) Members of the Mennonite religious community were at times exempted from military service in Prussia and Russia in the 19th century but were usually required to pay a tax in



lieu. During the Civil War in the United States a number of states made various provisions for those with religious scruples against participation in military activities; however, no national legislation was passed to grant exemption to objectors. See E.N. Wright: *Conscientious Objectors in the Civil War*, New York: Barnes 1961 (first published 1931)

- (5) For discussion of this form of conscientious objection see for example, J. Finn (ed.): *A Conflict of Loyalties: The Case for Selective Conscientious Objection*, New York: Pegasus 1968; J.A. Rohr: *Prophets Without Honor*, Nashville: Abingdon Press 1971; A. Gewirth: *Reasons and Conscience: The Claims of the Selective Conscientious Objector*, in: V. Held, S. Morgenbesser, T. Nagel (eds.): *Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs*, New York: Oxford U.P. 1974; D. Malament: *Selective Conscientious Objection and the Gillette Decision*, in: M. Cohen, T. Nagel, T. Scanlon (eds.): *War and Moral Responsibility*, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1974
- (6) For an argument in favour of conscientious objection based on the possibility of involvement in war crimes see D.A. Peppers: *War Crimes and Induction: A Case for Selective Nonconscientious Objection*, in: *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 3, no. 2, Winter 1974
- (7) D. Hayes: *Challenge of Conscience*, New York: Garland 1972 (first published 1949); R. Barker: *Conscience, Government and War*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1982
- (8) For the history of compulsory military training and of attempts to introduce conscrip-

tion in the period up to World War II, see K.S. Inglis: *Conscription in Peace and War, 1911 - 1945*, in R. Forward, B. Reece (eds.): *Conscription in Australia*, Brisbane: University of Queensland Press 1968; L.C. Jauncey: *The Story of Conscription in Australia*, Melbourne: Macmillan 1968 (first published 1935); J.M. Main (ed.): *Conscription: The Australian Debate, 1901 - 1970*, Melbourne: Cassell 1970; N. Meaney: *The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901 - 14*, Sydney: Sydney University Press 1976; T.W. Tanner: *Compulsory Citizen Soldiers*, Alternative Publishing Co-Operative Limited 1980; J. Barrett: *Falling In: Australians and 'Boy Conscription' 1911 - 1915*, Sydney: Hale & Iremonger 1979

- (9) J. Ross: *The Myth of the Digger*, Sydney: Hale & Iremonger 1985
- (10) In addition Section 61 of the Principal Act was amended so as to exempt from service in time of war "persons whose conscientious beliefs do not allow them to bear arms", the reference to prescribed authorities being placed elsewhere in the Section
- (11) G. Long: *The Six Years War*, Canberra: Australian War Memorial and Australian Government Publishing Service 1973, p. 296
- (12) See N.T. Shields: *National Service Training 1950 - 1959*, in: R. Forward, B. Reece (eds.): *Conscription in Australia*, op. cit.
- (13) *Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives (CPD, HR)*, November 10, 1964, p. 2718
- (14) Allan Fraser (ALP), *CPD, HR*, November 16, 1964, p. 2989

- (15) Arthur Calwell (ALP), CPD, HR, April 29, 1964, p. 1107
- (16) K.C. Beazley: Federal Labor and the Vietnam commitment, in: P. King (ed.): Australia's Vietnam, Sydney: Allen & Unwin 1983. Beazley is currently Minister for Defence in the Hawke Labor government. For a full description of the impact of the war and conscription on Australian politics see H.S. Albinski: Politics and Foreign Policy in Australia: The impact of Vietnam and conscription: Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press 1970
- (17) Extract reprinted in Main, op.cit., p. 151
- (18) R.v. District Court; Ex parte Thompson(1968) 118 Commonwealth Law Reports 488, at 493
- (19) L. Bury (Liberal), CPD, HR, May 1, 1968, p.998
- (20) L. Barnard (ALP), CPD, HR, May 1, 1968, p. 1440
- (21) It was also argued that there was no statutory guarantee that members of the CMF would not be placed in the ballot or be sent overseas. E.G. Whitlam (ALP), CPD, HR, October 13, 1970, pp. 2016 - 2017
- (22) Minister for Labour and National Service, Answer to Question on Notice, CPD, HR, August 18, 1971, pp. 278 - 279
- (23) B. Snedden, CPD, HR, May 15, 1968, p. 1448
- (24) CPD, HR, May 28, 1968, p. 1618
- (25) Not until August 1969, however, did a majority emerge in favour of bringing back Australian troops. M. Goot, R. Tiffen:

- Public opinion and the politics of the polls, in: King, op. cit., p. 135. There was throughout the whole post-1945 period a majority in favour of compulsory military service but not for service overseas. See D. Campbell: Australian Public Opinion on National Security Issues, Canberra: Australian National University, Peace Research Centre, Working Paper No. 1, 1986, pp. 11, 29 - 30
- (26) M. Hamel-Green: The resisters: a history of the anti-conscription movement 1964 - 1972, in: King, op.cit., p. 120
- (27) See CPD, HR, October 13, 1970, p. 2011
- (28) Total Australian casualties were 494 killed and 2398 wounded. For full details see F. Frost: Australia's war in Vietnam, in: King, op.cit.
- (29) Minister for Labour and National Service, op.cit.
- (30) The proposed clauses in full were as follows:
- 29A (1) A person whose conscientious beliefs do not allow that person's participation in any armed conflict shall not be required to render military service so long as those beliefs are held.
- (2) A person whose conscientious beliefs do not allow that person's participation in a particular armed conflict shall not be required to render military service in that particular conflict so long as those beliefs are held.
- (3) A person whose conscientious beliefs do not allow that person's participation in military service of a combatant nature, but allow participation in military service of a non-combatant nature, shall not

be required to render military service of a combatant nature so long as those beliefs are held.

(4) For the purpose of this section, a conscientious belief is a conscientious belief whether the ground of the belief is moral, ethical or religious

- (31) Call for submissions, Canberra Times, June 8, 1983. See also Senator Tate, CPD, Senate, May 31, 1983
- (32) Report by Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs: Conscientious Objection to Conscripted Military Service, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service 1985, pp. 13 - 14. See also Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs, Official Hansard Report: Submissions and Incorporated Documents, especially December 5, 1983
- (33) Submission and Incorporated Documents, December 5, 1983, pp. 178 - 189
- (34) Ibid., p. 185
- (35) Conscientious Objection to Conscripted Military Service, pp. 17 - 19
- (36) Ibid., p. 17
- (37) Ibid., p. 29
- (38) Ibid., p. 30
- (39) CPD, Senate, April 17, 1985, p. 1104

Ruth Meyer / Hans Jörg Schweizer

## CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN SWITZERLAND

## C O N T E N T S

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## Introduction

At first sight it may be surprising that Switzerland, looked upon as the paradigm per se of democracy, liberalism and integration of minorities, should find it hard to cope with the problem of conscientious objection to military service and with the introduction of a complimentary civilian service even for those in heavy religious or ethical conflict.

If there is a certain reluctance to provide for this comparatively small minority group it can only be understood on the background of the historical development of our intense interrelation of military and society. They are like strands in a pattern which evolution has woven for almost six centuries.

Thus it will be necessary to look on the common history of Switzerland's social and political structures and of her peculiar variety of general conscription before we can discuss the issue at stake as it presents itself today.

### The Historical Roots of Our System of General Conscription

In the 13th century the three central valleys of now Switzerland joined forces in order to defend their cooperate self-government under the Kaiser (Reichsunmittelbarkeit) against imposed governors. (From that oath to the "everlasting league" the Swiss Confederation derives its German name Eidgenossenschaft i. e. "sworn corporation".)

Already there we find the main principles of our present form of general conscription. Every resi-

dent (i. e. land owner resident in the valley) was obliged to join in any military action that was decided in the Landsgemeinde (an open-air assembly of the community, electing the judges and leaders, deciding on legal and other common matters; it is maintained to this day in five of our smallest cantons). They had to procure their own military outfit including weapon. The weapon was the pass to enter the ring of the Landsgemeinde. Prescription included resident women who were either to present a man to deputizing for them as soldier or to pay a levy towards war expenses. Not land owning men could either deputize for woman residents or pay a levy.

This "material conscription" for women has prevailed in some form or other up to the 19th century (Meyer, 1983). The bayonet is still worn by men entering the ring of the Landsgemeinde in two cantons (the only ones without women's vote in cantonal matters!).

All the other principles of the 13th century Eidgenossen are still part of our present constitution (cf. "The Swiss military system" below):

- the identity of citizen and soldier for men (general conscription),
- the substitution of military service by a substitutionary toll for the physically and mentally unable (which surprisingly never seems to be a topic in the political discussion around conscientious objection),
- the clear subordination of the military under the political authority,
- the cantonal structure of the army in general and of the infantry in particular, although under federal regulation and command.

### The Swiss Principle of Militia

The principle of militia is originally derived from the interrelation in Germanic law between political and military participation and from the cooperative forms of the community (Frick, 1920, 5; Baumann, 1932, 41ss.). Its hallmarks like honorary office, liability to take office and personal union of political and military leadership (without dominance of the latter over the former) are already typical at the origins of the Swiss Federation in the 13th century as we have shown (cf. Peyer, 1978, 66).

Today this militia ideal is still the underlying principle in politics, administration and military. It is not only the basis of our conscription but also the leading pattern of political life as a whole with its militia parliaments on all levels, its wholly or partially militia administrations in the municipalities (partly even up to the small cantons) and the, in many fields, exercised moral or even legal obligation to take office (Riklin, 1982, 48).

### The Swiss Military System

**Basis in international law.**  
The Vienna Convention of 1815 and subsequent international agreements grant to Switzerland everlasting neutrality on condition of her ability to defend herself, i. e. to maintain an army (hence the expression of the "everlasting and armed neutrality").

**Constitutional basis (pertaining articles only).**  
The constitution originated 1848, was revised 1874 and is amended roughly once a year.

Art. 18: Every Swiss is liable to military service (with the amendments securing equal right for women this article was not altered since in German the word Swiss used here is of masculine gender).

....  
The substitutionary toll is ... collected on account of the federation.

Art. 8: The federation alone has the right to declare war and to sign a peace treaty

...

Art. 11: Military capitulations are explicitly excluded.

Art. 13: The federation is not entitled to keep standing troops ...

#### Militia even in high commands.

Besides a small corps of instructors (1'800 officers and NCOs) only the two and three star generals are professionals. They all gain their rank by their militia career shown below. Only the staff offices from division upwards are permanently manned by civil servants. The only four star general, the chief commander, exists but in time of war and is then elected by the federal parliament.

#### Conscription.

Every male Swiss national is called up for recruitment at the age of 19. According to ability and voluntary previous preparation (e.g. aviation, telegraphy or driving courses) he is allotted to a branch of the army or, if physically or mentally handicapped, to the "unable" who have to pay the substitutionary toll for each year of military service missed out (the same toll is due for those exempted later on or dismissed dishon-

onorably, e.g. by military courts following conscientious objection).

#### Military career.

- The fundamental principle is that any rank can only be gained by passing all the foregoing ones and, in most cases, through special officer's schools with additional promotional services (up to the rank of captain in a recruit school, but in the new function).
- The initial training (recruit school) is passed at 20 and lasts 17 weeks. After that a man is assigned to a specific unit, if possible together with people from the same local area.
- Repetition courses of 3, later 2 weeks follow, spreading over the years, up to the age of 50, totaling up to 32 weeks. An officer will be called, a private may be called up 3-4 days earlier each time for preparation.
- Promotion: A man may be selected for promotion to NCO in the recruit school and from that rank onward after some 3-6 years each time. Higher ranks imply, besides the already mentioned promotion schools and services, additional tactical and technical courses. Furthermore officers serve up to the age of 55, some higher ranks even longer.
- Total amount of military service: A private serves a life total of 330 days, a captain of at least 1174 days, a colonel of at least 1513 days. For the higher ranks the figures rise correspondingly.
- In times of immanent danger or aggression from the outside, parts of or the total army of presently 670'000 can be mobilized within days (thus denuding the country's economics of about 35% of the active male population).

### The Army - a Symbol of National Identity, Unity and Integrity

At the founding of the present form of the Swiss Federal State in 1848 (besides foreign politics, customs, post office and measurements) the military was transferred from the cantons to the federation. It became thus an obvious frame for the development of a federal national consciousness. In view of the religious, linguistic, regional and cultural segmentation of Switzerland Denis de Rougement, a great Swiss philosopher of recent years, calls the general conscription the "principal agent of federalization" (Mehlich, 1979, 157). The fact that Switzerland was not directly entangled in World War II is still attributed by the majority (61% partial to total agreement) of our population to our capability of defence, i.e. to our militia army. An overwhelming majority of 80% considers at least to some degree our army the symbol of the will to independence and freedom (Survey 1983, Haltiner, 1985b).

### The Army - an Integral Part of Society

In the near past the army was still the school of manhood and the only training place for civilian and political leadership. Due to the general changing of values and to a more cooperative style of leadership in politics and business this holds no longer true to the same amount. Nevertheless a military career is still more or less expected for the country's elite and leadership.

Our military system depends largely upon a man's partly voluntary, partly compulsory private contributions all along his 30 or more years of conscription. Every soldier has his personal outfit,

including weapon, ammunition and gasmask at home and is responsible for its maintenance. He has to do his yearly arms practice in one of the numerous rifle clubs which are an integral part of community life. Success in the yearly shooting contest, organized by these clubs under army supervision, is noted as well socially as in his army career. Numerous paramilitary clubs (for officers, staff sergeants, car drivers, mechanics etc.) offer all sorts of preparatory or promotional courses as well as contests in military sporting and technical disciplines.

The additional military promotion services are tolerated by the business world as much as the use of secretarial facilities for the considerable administrative and preparatory duties outside the spells of service that lie upon commanding officers of all levels, comprising e.g. for a commanding major and his assistants some 280 hours and for the whole army about one million hours per year (Wetter, 1984, 48s). Thus the country's economics contribute in a hidden way on a large scale to the cost of the army. The financial burden of an army comprising 22 % of the active population or 35 % of the active males would otherwise be unbearable. But thus the total defence expenditure (federal, cantonal and municipal) runs to slightly under 2 % of the gross national product (below that for social welfare!) and is the lowest second to Austria, although our army is, compared to the surface of the country only surpassed in size by Israel.

### The Present Legalistic Situation of the Conscientious Objector

Conscription is a constitutional principle and compulsory for all (male) citizens. The payment of a substitutionary toll is explicitly reserved

for those not fit for service. Nobody rejecting constitutional duties may claim any of the fundamental right of freedom of religion and conscience which is guaranteed in our Constitution as well as in the Convention of Human Rights, not even the conscientious objector.

As will be discussed later in this paper so far there is no legal basis for any sort of substitutional civilian service in Switzerland. Thus COs have to be dealt with according to the military penal code: They are trialed before a military court. As to be expected the military courts are militia courts on the first level, consisting of a law colonel (usually judge or lawyer by civilian profession) and four judges (military of any rank, otherwise still doing service with their unit), president and judges being elected even at this level by the Federal Government.

As far as conviction and penalty are concerned, the present state of legislation and court practice can be summed up as follows:

- A conscientious objector cannot be acquitted.
- If the court can be convinced that the CO has acted out of severe religious or moral conflict, the sentence is for a maximum of 6 months of half-detention (living in prison and working in an institution for the common welfare).
- All other COs must be sentenced to between 3 days and 3 years of detention. In practice the measure is usually between 7 and 10 months.
- If the convict is prepared to resume military duties, be it even in a non-combat unit, he is usually released on probation.
- If he seems renitent he is nowadays dismissed dishonorably from the army (in addition to the penal measures) at his first conviction already (and has to pay the substitutionary toll up to the age of 50 or 55, according to his previous rank).

## The Growing Number of Conscientious Objectors

### Preliminary Note

The numbers quoted in this paper of conscientious objectors to military service (COs) are of those convicted by military court. It should be noted that there is a time lag between the act of refusal and the conviction of an average of 1-2 years. Also is there a certain amount of discretion in the judges' assessment of a COs motives which may have slightly varied over the years.

The sources indicate furthermore some occasional uncertainty if not inconsistency in the distinction of religious, ideological, ethical, political and "other" motives, the latter comprising "grouzers", "defiants", "reluctants" and the like as well as those shrinking from physical strain or subordination or in fear of professional or financial problems or even loss of individuality. Doubts may be raised on the aptitude of such classification. But in our referendum democracy even military jurisdiction is influenced by the public opinion which tends to be more lenient towards objectors with "more honorable" motives (as shall be shown in a later chapter of this paper).

The figures concerning non-combat service (dealt with in a later chapter) on the other hand are more clearly determined: it is the total number of applications according to the year of their lodging and without regard to motives or reasons.

Except where other sources are explicitly mentioned the figures in this paper are derived from:

- Haltiner, 1985a.
- Schweizerischer Friedensrat, 1948.
- Internal reports by the Prosecutor General of the Swiss Army.



- Internal reports by the administration of the sanitary troops.

. . . . .

Towards the end of World War I there was for the first time in Switzerland a significant number of conscientious objectors to military service. The number of convicted COs rose within the two years 1916/1917 from 6 to 37. In the year 1917 besides the religiously motivated (8) there appear for the first time in the statistics of convicts the objectors that claim ethical reasons (8). In the same year for the first time the objectors on political grounds (21) outnumber the other groups by far. 1918 the total number sank again to 12 (1 on religious, 8 on political, 3 on other reasons). From 1919 up to 1939 the average annual number of convicts was 11.

When the danger became immanent that Switzerland might be drawn into the chaos of war, the number of COs on ethical and political reasons remained at 1-2 while that of the religiously motivated rose rapidly to 35 (1940), to decrease again to the previous level within three years.

A slow but significant increase in the numbers of COs began in the late forties. They remain, however, up to 1968 still below 100 (with one solitary exception of 122 in 1966). Even the amendments to the Military Penal Code (alleviations for cases of religious motive, 1950, and of severe religious or moral conflict, 1967) are not reflected in the numbers of convicts.

Due to the 1968 leftist upheavals the figures exploded from 133 (1969) to 545/520 (1974/75). The economic recession that followed deflated conscientious objection to between 340 and 390 convicts in 1976-1980. Obviously in consequence of the

peace movement, gaining momentum in Switzerland, towards 1980 there was an almost identical upsurge as ten years before: the figures rose from 350 (1980) to 730 - 790 (1982-84). After that we observe a decrease to 550 in 1986.

As for the motivation of COs it is remarkable that since about 1970 political motives have been largely outnumbered by the religious and ethical ones, the gap steadily widening. From 1970 onward another so far comparatively small motive group gained extraordinarily in weight. With the widening gap between the civilian and military realms and with a more critical attitude of the citizens towards their army the number of conscientious objections on privatistic reason grows enormously: The fear of subordination, physical strain and danger as well as financial and professional reasons (the latter two leading foremost to the rejection of promotion courses and assignments). Since 1972 this group accounts for over 40% of the convicts, passing 50% in 1985 (cf. graph 1).

The overall trend of conscientious objection is undoubtedly a rising one, even if fluctuations due to political events may occasionally invert it for a limited period. This holds true even if we take into account the increase of the Swiss population: the crude figure of the total of male Swiss nationals has only risen by 20 % from 1950 to 1980 while in the same period the convictions for CO rose by a factor of roughly 20.

Besides this open objection to military service there are also the many hidden ways of escaping conscription, such as emigration or exemption from the army on medical reasons. Experts agree on the assumption that here the increase is even greater than that of open conscientious objection.

**The Application for Non-Combat Service (NCS)  
- A Milder Form of Conscientious Objection**

Application can be made before or at recruitment or between repetition courses. If it is granted by the militia commission specially set up for these cases, the applicant will be assigned to a medical or an air-raid protection unit, which both serve the military and the civilians.

There are reliable figures for application to NCS but from 1950 onwards. If we compare the course of their number over the years with the curve for the COs, we find on the one hand a significantly high affinity ( $r = 0,81$ ) and on the other hand some remarkable peculiarities:

- 1950-1963 the number of NCS-applications fluctuates between 165 and 240 without obvious trend.
- From 1963 the figures rise sharply whereas with the COs the comparable take off is some 5 years later.
- Taking into account the time lag of roughly 2 years between a CO's act and conviction, the two curves run very similarly if on different levels.
- This relation between the numbers of the NCS-applicants and of the COs changes considerably: Up to the take off the relation is roughly 4:1, at the peaks in the early seventies and early eighties it is in the realm of 1,2:1 and after that it turns towards 1:1,2. I. e. for the first time now the COs outnumber the NCS-applicants by far.
- In the mid-seventy depression there seems to be a remarkably significant difference for which we have as yet no plausible explanation: both

curves show an intermediate peak, but while that of the COs is one mere + 15% that of NCS is about + 40%.

**The Public and Political Discussion  
of the Problem of Conscientious Objection**

The general discussion began during World War I and has carried on since with changing intensity, promoted mainly by the more leftist part of the political spectrum (cf. Etter, 1972; Hug, 1982). In between the two World Wars the leaders of the Socialist Party of Switzerland braced themselves against the army: it is remarkable that we find no corresponding general increase of the number of conscientious objectors.

In this chapter we will concentrate, however, on the discussion in the last roughly 20 years when it concentrated around two "initiatives" and when, on the other hand, the number of conscientious objectors and of applicants for non-combat service rose considerably.

It may be necessary to shortly explain the Swiss institution of Peoples' Initiative first: As against the Referendum where a public vote on a law passed by Federal Parliament is demanded, with the Initiative a minimum of 100'000 (50'000 up to 1977) voters demand with their signature that a particular amendment to the Constitution be brought to the public vote. There are two forms of Initiatives. The "general request" demands Parliament to formulate the amendment, the other has the form of a precisely formulated amendment on which Parliament can make no changes. In both cases, however, Parliament can bring to public vote their own version of an amendment on the same matter alongside with that demanded by the initiants. (There are other varieties

brought in by parliamentarians or cantonal governments as well as similar institutions in almost every canton.) Frequently the initiators do not succeed in collecting the necessary number of signatures in the allotted time (at present 18 months) and more often than not the Initiatives are turned down in the public vote.

Early in 1972 an Initiative was handed in that was launched by high school teachers (the "Münchensteiner Initiative"). It had the form of a general request and demanded the introduction of a substitutionary civilian service (SCS) for conscientious objectors on non-privatistic reasons, without in any way questioning general conscription. SCS would have to be granted after scrutiny of conscience and be of the same duration as the sum of military services rejected. Federal Parliament accepted the Initiative but decided, by formulating the amendment, to differentiate: religious and ethical reasons should qualify a CO for SCS, but not so all other motives including the political ones. This amendment was rejected in public vote (1977) by 62% against 38%.

Prior to the vote on the Münchensteiner Initiative yet another Initiative committee was formed by groups wishing a more fargoing solution. They demanded, this time in the form of a precisely worded amendment, a "genuine substitutionary civilian service on the basis of proof by deed": any CO, whatever his motives, was to be acquitted if he was prepared to work 1,5 times the duration of rejected military services in a venture for "the propagation of peace", "the abolishment of the causes of violence", "the improvement of humane life conditions" or "the strengthening of international solidarity". Although it reduced in fact general conscription to a free choice between military and "peace service", the required number of signatures was obtained. Parliament could not identify itself with this amendment and

the public vote rejected it 1984 by 64% against 36%, i. e. only slightly stronger than the one before. Considering the rather extreme changes in conscription implied in the amendment this is somewhat remarkable.

Public votes like these should not be over-interpreted. The voters partaking are not fully representative for the Swiss society since on the one hand there is a basical number of "grumblers" who vote against the "establishment" whenever possible and on the other hand the "innovators" are always more motivated to vote than is the often mentioned "quiet majority". Nevertheless the massive rejection of both initiatives, mainly of the later one, shows that general conscription is by no means fundamentally questioned. On the other hand there is a genuine interest in a substitutionary civilian service for conscientious objectors as indicated by the over one third of "pro" voters and by surveys discussed in the following chapter.

**Research in This Field  
by the Institute of Sociology  
of the University of Berne**

Surveys conducted by this institute in 1976 and 1983 investigated among others the cognitive as against the affective attitudes towards a substitutionary civilian service for conscientious objectors. In both surveys we found a stable majority of around 80% approving of the necessity to find a solution for the problem on a political level.

This tolerance towards the deviating behaviour of the CO corresponds with the tolerance towards propaganda for conscientious objection. The lat-

ter has significantly increased from 64% (1976) to 75% (1983) (cf. graph 2).

Answers to questions about the basis for and the form of a substitutionary civilian service show in 1983 that

- a majority of 58% values the respect for the conscience of the individual higher than the principle of general conscription
- a majority of 60% wants to grant this alternative only on the basis of scrutiny of conscience
- only 16% agree with the abolishment of general conscription and
- only 1/3 confirm that the possibility of an alternative for COs is an injustice against those that accept the duty of military service.

Today the cognitive acceptance in Switzerland of a substitutionary civilian service for conscientious objectors is significant. Still lacking are a concrete form and defined conditions for granting it, that can find a major consensus in Parliament as well as in public vote.

Some general outlines can be found in the answers of the described survey. They indicate also a change in the general embedding of the army in society and in the public consciousness.

#### General Change of Values and Instrumentalizing the Notion of the Army

The generally well-known socio-structural changes can be observed also in Switzerland, accelerating from the fifties into the seventies, then slight-

ly slowing down but by no means reversing in trend.

The characteristics of this value change can be summed up in the following way (cf. Meyer, 1978, 1981; Haltiner, 1985a, 1985b):

- decreasing values:
  - obedience and subordination
  - order and discipline
  - traditionalism
  - responsibility
  - common welfare and security
  - patriotism
- increasing values:
  - equality in treatment and chances
  - individuality and autonomy
  - group solidarity
  - tolerance (even towards deviation from public values)

Neither in Switzerland nor in most western countries this value change leads to principle doubts on the necessity of the army. Since 1970 (the year of the earliest accessible data) regularly about 85% of adult Swiss answer positively to the question whether Switzerland still needed an army (cf. Haltiner, 1985b, 157).

Equally strong and steady is the positive assessment of the militia principle. In the two surveys this institute undertook 83% (1976) and 84% (1983) preferred the militia as against 9% and 8% that approved of a change to a professional army (both times 8% uttering no opinion; cf. Haltiner, 1985b, 158).

This solidly positive view on the necessity of

the army in its present militia form let us expect an also unchanged evaluation of the army's social significance. But it is at this point that the value change leaves its marks: According to the before mentioned surveys traditional patterns dissolve gradually in favour of an increasingly instrumental view on public institutions. The military realm loses its former central function in society and the military service its importance for man's self-assessment. The army becomes increasingly a solely instrumental factor and even a necessary evil in view of the military aspects (and those only) of future security.

While 1976 49% of the adults (male and female) agreed with the army's central role in Swiss society, this sank to 42% in 1983. In the same interval the assessment of the army as a necessary evil rose from 45% to 52%. In the age-group 20 - 29 the change of the traditional affective notion was from 33% to 24% and the rise of the instrumental view from 51% to 62% (cf. graph 2; Haltiner 1985b, 158ss). In the same surveys it can be proved that the army loses its significance for general socialization and citizen's training in an analogue measure: all the norms of participation weaken apparently.

This is the setting from which the demand for a substitutionary civilian service for conscientious objectors has to be interpreted and also the growing tolerance for those publicly propagating objection to military service.

In conclusion we will, with the aid of the method of Smallest-Space Analysis, transpose a complete correlation matrix into distances, and thus gain a complete picture of the values, attitudes and norms of participation that attain to our subject. Our basis is the investigation of 1983 (cf. Haltiner, 1985b). We add to the previously treated variables some more belonging to the com-

plex of the "popular assessment of factors pertaining to security politics" (cf. graph 3).

There is an evidently circular order from traditional over instrumental until negatively critical security-political integration.

As main factors of traditional integration, which we have seen to decrease, may be mentioned the firm conviction that:

- conscription is the complement of civil rights,
- the army is the symbol of manhood and communal responsibility,
- it was due to the army that Switzerland was spared in World War II,
- at present the army is still an effective instrument to secure peace,
- any alternative to military service is to be strictly rejected.

The transition to the instrumental integration marks the acceptance of a substitutionary service solely for COs in severe religious or moral conflict. It is interesting that the other variables of instrumental integration are nearer to those of negative-critical than to those of traditional integration.

Within the realm of negative-critical but relatively near to the instrumental integration are found those who staunchly hold that the respect of the conscience be more important than the principle of general conscription and who demand absolute freedom of speech for propagators of refusal of military service.

In the center of negative-critical integration there is the cluster of those firmly persuaded that:

- civilian service is promoting peace far more than military service,
- conscription ought to be changed to free choice between military and civilian service,
- efforts to defend the small country Switzerland are in vain,
- military is contrary to the ideal of the free and responsible citizen.

Thus it becomes evident how closely the arguments pro and contra decriminalization of conscientious objectors to military service are lastly related to the refusal or acceptance of the army as representing the essential values of society.

### The Present State of the Affair

The above mentioned and so far last public vote on a substitutionary civilian service for conscientious objectors in 1984 fell into a period of great activity of the peace movement. Thus via civilian service the problem of the conscientious objectors got far more into public focus than it would have been in politically less tense periods. But because of the revolutionary breaking away from fundamentals of general conscription, the initiative could but fail. Nevertheless the majority realized that something had to be done in the matter.


Before this background a motion (i.e. a compulsory demand for action by the government) was

adopted by both Houses of Parliament in 1984, even prior to the vote on the Initiative. It demanded an amendment to the military penal code in order to decriminalize the penalty at least in its execution for the "genuinely" conscientious objectors, without altering the constitutional principle of general conscription. Very promptly the Minister of Defence installed a Committee that was to work out a proposition for this amendment.

The Committee concluded its work in May 1985 proposing conviction by military penal courts as hitherto. But for convicts the court judges to be in severe religious or moral conflict, and for those only, the sentence should be not for detention but for work under federal supervision and for common welfare. Its duration should be 50 or 100% over that of military services rejected. Since this is within the scope of the military penal code, the constitution remains unscratched.


As prescribed for legal amendments this proposal was subjected to consultation of federal and cantonal authorities, political parties and other groups vitally concerned. The proposal and the outcome of the consultation is now in the hands of the Minister of Defence who may alter the text of the amendment at his discretion but will have to present it to Parliament in due course (while this paper goes to print the Swiss Minister of Defence has brought the above mentioned proposal before the Parliament in almost unchanged form).

Public discussion on the matter resting for the time being does not imply it be not still latent, to become vivid again as the occasion arises.



Graph 1

Conscientious Objectors and Applicants to Non-Combat Service




Graph 2

Assessment of the Value of the Army  
 Acceptance of a Substitutionary Civilian Service  
 Tolerance toward the Propagation of Conscientious Objection

Graph 3

Popular Assessment of Factors Pertaining to Security Politics

(Minisae Edinburgh, Veraton 1975. Stress 0,06)



Items (short version)

- 1 Army plays central role in society and that is good so
- 2 Subst. civilian service is unjust to those serving in army
- 3 Army is of central necessity even today
- 4 Army spared us World War II
- 5 Mil. service promotes sense of community and responsibility
- 6 It is irresponsible to question defence institutions
- 7 Army symbolizes will to freedom and independence
- 8 Swiss defence institutions are efficacious
- 9 General conscription is counterpart to civil rights
- 10 Subst. civilian service only by scrutiny of conscience
- 11 Unfortunately military is still necessary
- 12 Army is a necessary evil
- 13 Substitutionary civilian service is necessary
- 14 Respect of conscience more important than conscription
- 15 Freedom of speech even against military service
- 16 Free choice between civilian and army service
- 17 Military contradicts free responsible citizen
- 18 Tolerance towards freedom-fighters questioning army
- 19 Voluntary military service instead of conscription
- 20 Civilian serviceman promoting peace more than soldier
- 21 Army serves but the mighty
- 22 Military expenses questionable for small Switzerland
- 23 General defence might be necessary but please without me
- 24 Abolish the army
- 25 Switzerland no more defenceworthy than any other country
- 26 Engagement for army depends on personal benefit

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Mauritz S. Mortensen

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN NORWAY  
- WHAT IS THE OPINION OF THE PEOPLE ?

## C O N T E N T S

Opinion surveys - an aid for democracy

Norwegian attitudes to conscription

Women and men

Different age groups

Considerable disagreement

The effect of education

Opinions based on political conviction

Conclusions

Tables 2 - 4

The question of conscientious objection surfaced in the public debate in Norway in 1986. There is one opinion in the debate which states that a limited number of conscientious objectors will not weaken the defense of the country. The idea is that it must be the seriousness of the belief, not the kind of belief which is decisive. If the conviction is honest and sincere, it should not matter if the reasons are political, humanitarian or pacifist, it is said.

The other opinion belongs to those who believe that the foundation of our defense by the people is the system of conscription for all adult males who are fit for this. It is necessary for a small population who must defend a large area to stand side by side in a joint defense.

Chief of Defense, General Fredrik Bull-Hansen, said it this way in his lecture at Oslo Military Society on the first of December, 1986:

"To open up for conscientious objection can in practice mean instead of conscription, a person can decide according to his beliefs whether or not conscription applies to him. Depending on moods or fashionable beliefs we can risk decisive changes in the number which at any given time could choose military duty."

"The question of exemption on a personal basis is also about solidarity and justice. There is already an imbalance in the burden between the 70 % of our male conscripts who do their duty to the society and those who for various reasons do not."

"The question about a possible conscientious objection could lead to a possibility of making conscription political. It could be very difficult to determine which political viewpoints are to be accepted as reason for exemption and which are not."

In order that the debate is not to hang in the open, the War College Educated Officers' Union (KOL) will publish a survey which was carried out in August/September 1986. The results have been prepared by Mauritz Sundt Mortensen and will be published in two articles in the magazine Vart Vern nos 1 and 2 1987.

#### Opinion surveys - an aid for democracy

Democracy is largely built on a continuous political debate. All who feel that they have something to contribute, can get involved in the debate in various ways. Some may choose to work for their points of view within political party frameworks, in committees, and on boards, others give lectures to the public and publish articles in the press as well as use the TV as a media.

Many of these lectures or debates are subjective. Even professional politicians sometimes make statements which are purely personal.

Most people do not actively participate in the public political debate. They talk in small groups, with other members of their families, with friends or colleagues. Therefore it is often difficult to know their opinions on certain matters.

In order to help the large majority of citizens to be heard in the political debate, opinion polls or surveys are being used.

Assuming that such surveys are held in accordance with ethical rules and scientific methods, they provide decent information on various opinions of the people, and they can be an important corrective to the continuous more subjective social debates.

#### Norwegian attitudes to conscription

In order to get reliable insight into the people's attitude to various types of military conscription in our society, in August/September 1986 some questions were asked of a random number of people totaling 1300, over 15 years of age. The number represents the Norwegian people with regard to sex, age and residence in the country. This means that the results should be equivalent to the division of the various replies of the people as a whole, subject to normal statistical errors.

The questions were asked when the debate was at its strongest and therefore could reflect well people's attitudes to military duty.

This was the first question:

"Ordinary conscription exists today in Norway for men, but conscientious objections can be raised for pacifist reasons. However, there has lately been talk about objection on a more political basis such as "situation-determined objection". Do you personally feel there should be conscientious objection for pacifist reasons only or do you feel that "situation-determined" objections must be allowed, or should there be no objections permitted at all?"

The replies from men and women are as seen in table 1.

The table shows that 32 % of the total number of people asked, prefer the existing rules of objection based on pacifism. Another 28 % want military objection based on situation-determined basis. A total of 25 % feel that military objection should not be allowed at all. 15 % say they do not have an opinion of the subject.

Table 1

Opinions on various types of objections to military service of men and women in percents:

Alternative replies:	Women	Men	All
a) Pacifist reasons only	27	37	32
b) Situation-determined	31	26	28
c) No military objections	20	30	25
d) Do not know/ cannot answer	22	7	15
	-----	-----	-----
	100	100	100
	(664)	(649)	(1313)

(The percentages are added vertically, and comparisons are made horizontally. Margin of plus/minus deviation approximately 3 %).

#### Women and men

The table shows that there is a big difference between men and women in their view on various forms of conscientious objections. 37 % of men say they are pleased with the present arrangement. A further 30 % of men would like an arrangement in which conscientious objection is not permitted at all. This indicates that 67 % of all men prefer a system of normal conscription and limited access to conscientious objection and then only for pacifist reasons.

Only 26 % of all men asked prefer that situation-determined objection is allowed.

Women also agree with the present system (27 %) and a further 20 % who would prefer ordinary military conscription, a total of 47 %.

However, a total of 31 % of all women asked feel that situation-determined objection should be allowed. A total of 22 % of all women do not have any opinion on this.

#### Different age groups

It is interesting to look at how the different attitudes are divided on various age group, men and women. This can be seen from table 2.

It shows that there are large differences between women and men in various age groups in attitudes to conscientious objections.

In the youngest age group (below 25 years) 31 % are pleased with the present arrangement. A further 25 % would prefer that conscientious objection was not permitted, this is a total of 56 %, whereas 32 % prefer that there is access for situation-determined objection too.

Among men 37 % are happy with the present arrangement, a further 26 % feel that conscientious objection should not be allowed, a total of 63 %. 32 % feel that situation-determined objections should be allowed.

Women in the group below 25 years are somewhat less pleased with the present system for men's military duty. Only 24 % of them support this. A further 24 % maintain that there should be no conscientious objection allowed at all. A total of 32 % for situation-determined objection and 30 % answered "do not know".

It is noticeable that women are less pleased with the present rules for conscription, with conscientious objection based on pacifist reasons, than those men to whom the rules apply.

In the next group (25 - 39 years) the difference of opinion between men and women is even bigger. 41 % of men are pleased with the present rules as opposed to 26 % of the women. On the other hand a total of 39 % of women in this group believe there should be an opportunity for situation determined objection - that is an arrangement which does not involve them - 32 % of the men say this. There are fewer men and women in this group who feel that conscientious objection should not be allowed at all, the figures are respectively 15 and 19 %. A total of 20% of the women could not give an answer to this.

In the age group 40 - 59 years, the same pattern repeats itself. Men are most satisfied with the present arrangement for conscientious objection on a pacifist basis, 36 %. A further 36 % of the men feel that conscientious objection should not be allowed, and only 18 % feel that there should be situation determined objection as well. Among women in this group there is less satisfaction with the present rules for men's conscription, more women feel that men should have the right to object for situation determined reasons. A total of 18 % feel that there should be no objection allowed at all, and 18 % said "do not know".

#### Considerable disagreement

Table 2 shows that there is considerable disagreement between men and women in the same age groups and between different age groups of the same sex.

In the two lowest age groups almost 40 % of the men feel that the present rules for conscientious objection for pacifist reasons are satisfactory. Another 20 % feel that there should be no conscientious objection, a total of 60 %.

A total of 32 % feel that objections which are situation-determined should be allowed.

Among women in these age groups it is noticeable that so many answer "do not know". However, this must be considered a reliable reply because very few of them have served any form for military duty therefore they have not been forced to make up their minds on the problem.

On the basis of this women are less satisfied with the present rules for conscription, and less inclined than men to want conscientious objection at all.

On the other hand, they also feel that situation-determined objection should be allowed. This particularly applies to women in the age group 25 to 29, a total of 39 %.

In the two highest age groups there is almost the same pattern; men are either pleased with the present arrangement or want no conscientious objection at all. In these groups there are also many "do not know" replies among the women.

As a temporary conclusion one can say that attitudes to conscientious objection are affected by both age and sex. It is not difficult to prove that experiences because of age, from a historical viewpoint, are those experiences which are the result of factors relative to conscription, and they help to create men and women's attitudes to questions about conscientious objection.

#### The effect of education

It is interesting to see if attitudes regarding military conscientious objection are affected by the person's level of education. This can be seen in table 3.

In the table the term low education is used for those with primary, secondary and lower upper education, medium is used for those who have completed high school or the equivalent, and high is used for those with a university degree or the equivalent.

Table 3 shows considerable differences between women and men with the same level of education and people of the same sex at different levels of education. People with low education largely agree (25 %) that situation determined objection should be allowed. Men (32 %) are more satisfied than women (25 %) with the present system of conscientious objection based on pacifist reasons. It is also noticeable that men (35 %) voted for no conscientious objection and the percentage of women was 24 %.

The various replies within this group, the low education group, are important because this group makes up a large part of the population.

Among persons with medium education men are more satisfied (43 %) than women with the system (26 %). In this group women are more interested in situation determined objection (42 %) as opposed to men 26 %. 25 % of men do not want to allow conscientious objection at all, the figure for women is 11 %. A total of 21 % of women cannot answer.

In the group of people with higher education the difference between men and women is even wider, 50 % of the men are satisfied with the present system as opposed to 15 % of women who do not want conscientious objection to be allowed at all. Among women 33 % are happy with the present system but 49 % would like to see situation-determined objection allowed as well.

The table indicates that the polarization between men and women increases with increased level of education. It is also clear that men who in practice do their military service, prefer the present or stricter rules for conscientious objection, whereas women to a larger extent are prepared to accept objection based on situation-determined basis.

If we look at men in the three different educational categories, it is those with the lower education in practice who make up the majority of conscripts (in all age groups), who want the present rules or even stricter rules. This is equivalent to approximately 70 % of all male youth who serve their military duty in the normal way. For men with medium and higher levels of education the total of those who are satisfied with present rules and those who prefer stricter rules, are approximately 65 - 68 %. These groups are to a larger extent more satisfied with the present system. The results can be interpreted to mean that men with low education (who maintain that conscientious objection should not be allowed at all), are more concerned with the fairness and solidarity aspect of the normal conscription, this applies to men as well as to women.

#### Opinions based on political convictions

It is interesting to analyze opinions on various forms for conscientious objection among people of various political convictions.

The persons interviewed are classed according to political party preferences in tables 4a and 4b. The percentages are based on a small number of people interviewed and therefore carries a large degree of statistical uncertainty. This applies to table 4, and in particular the small party groups.

Tables 4 (a and b), show that there is some disagreement between supporters of the various parties and between men and women within the different party groups.

There is a clear difference between the socialist and the non-socialist parties with regard to their views on different kinds of conscientious objection. There is, on the whole, satisfaction with the present rules for pacifist conscientious objection with the exceptions of the Socialist Leftist Party and the Progressive Party. SV wants situation-determined objection as well, but the majority in the Progressive Party feels that there should be no conscientious objection allowed at all.

Within all the party groups men are more satisfied with the present rules than women. In all party groups except the small SV group, men mostly do not want conscientious objection allowed at all. With regard to situation-determined objection, women in all party groups except the small "other" group most strongly support this alternative. Among the party groups it is especially SV and the Leftist Party which support situation-determined conscientious objection. The Labor Party group and the Christian People Party group are fairly even and the Conservatives are in between, and the Center Party and the Progressive Party are least positive with regard to situation-determined objection.

### Conclusions

Analyses of this data material show that the Norwegian people's attitudes to various types of conscientious objection are far more varied than the public media debate indicates. It also seems that various groups of the population have concise opinions on this problem. These opinions and

attitudes are probably based on a number of different influences.

It is somewhat surprising that the part of the population who carries the biggest burden with regard to conscription, is most satisfied with the present rules for pacifist conscientious objection and also does not want to allow conscientious objection at all.

This is probably based on the attitude that normal conscription for all would be the fairest system and that everybody should show solidarity in the execution of this social duty.

It is also interesting that those in the society who are not conscripted, most strongly support situation-determined conscientious objection.

Whether or not the results of this kind of survey are to be considered "good" or "bad" as regards some of the alternatives, depends on how the individual views them. However, it could be said that there are no clear winners or losers in these questions.

In any case it must be considered an advantage to base an evaluation of different conscript and conscientious objection systems on surveys, and not just on the largely subjective opinions which make up the so-called social debate.



Table 2

Opinions on various forms of objection to military service controlled for age and sex. (In percent)

Reply categories:	AGE GROUPS											
	Under 25			25 - 32			40 - 59			60 and over		
	Women	Men	All	Women	Men	All	Women	Men	All	Women	Men	All
a) Pacifist reasons only	24	37	31	26	41	34	27	36	31	29	32	31
b) Situation-determined reasons	32	32	32	39	32	35	34	18	26	22	20	21
c) No military objection	24	26	25	15	19	17	21	36	29	23	42	31
d) DK / No reply	20	5	12	20	8	14	18	10	14	26	6	17
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	(125)	(133)	(258)	(178)	(191)	(369)	(169)	(173)	(342)	(192)	(152)	(344)

(Sample error approx. 5 percent)

Table 3

Opinions on various forms of objection to military service controlled for education and sex. (In percent)

Reply categories:	EDUCATION											
	LOW			MEDIUM			HIGH					
	Women	Men	All	Women	Men	All	Women	Men	All			
a) Pacifist reasons only	25	32	29	26	43	34	33	50	42			
b) Situation-determined reasons	26	24	25	42	26	35	49	32	39			
c) No military objection	24	35	29	11	25	17	13	15	14			
d) DK / No reply	25	9	17	21	6	14	5	3	5			
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			
	(468)	(449)	(917)	(100)	(87)	(187)	(94)	(113)	(207)			

(Sample error approx. 5 percent)

Table 4

Opinions on various forms of objection to military service controlled for political party preference and sex. (In percent)

POLITICAL PARTY PREFERENCE

("if parliamentary election tomorrow")

Reply categories:	Social Democrats			Socialist Left			Conservatives			Christian Democrats		
	Women	Men	All	Women	Men	All	Women	Men	All	Women	Men	All
a) Pacifist reasons only	22	31	26	12	24	17	34	42	38	42	49	44
b) Situation-determined reasons	27	26	27	73	69	72	24	18	21	20	21	25
c) No military objection	26	36	31	11	0	6	23	34	29	11	12	11
d) DK / No reply	25	7	16	4	7	5	19	6	12	21	18	20
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	(203) (199) (402)			(41) (29) (70)			(155) (190) (345)			(59) (18) (77)		

Table 4 cont:

Reply categories:	Center Party			Liberal Party			Progressive Party			Other Parties		
	Women	Men	All	Women	Men	All	Women	Men	All	Women	Men	All
a) Pacifist reasons only	41	49	46	25	51	37	10	28	19	28	45	40
b) Situation-determined reasons	21	11	15	58	44	52	18	10	14	52	55	54
c) No military objection	20	28	25	0	5	2	49	62	55	0	0	0
d) DK / No reply	18	12	14	17	0	9	23	0	12	20	0	6
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	(26) (41) (67)			(23) (20) (43)			(12) (11) (23)			(4) (9) (13)		

(Sample errors is very large for small samples)

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