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SECURITY POLICY AND DEFENCE IN FINLAND

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P R E F A C E

This volume is a collection of half a dozen original research contributions to the 1988 I.S.A. - RC 01 Interim Conference. The papers presented here have been grouped in two sections:

SECTION I deals with military interventions and democracy - still a major and continuing problem in domestic and foreign policy.

SECTION II informs from a sociological viewpoint on past and present Finnish security and defence issues - thus presenting a rather comprehensive review of Finnish military-related social research.

Again, I have to express my gratefulness to Jürgen Kuhlmann for his efforts in putting this book together. I also acknowledge the help of Wolfgang Frantz who assisted in doing the word-processing. Finally, as is traditional, my thanks go to the authors for their stimulating contributions.

Munich, December 1989

Bernhard Fleckenstein
Director and Professor

S E C T I O N I

MILITARY INTERVENTIONS AND DEMOCRACY

Peter Karsten

THE COUP D'ETAT IN COMPETITIVE DEMOCRACIES:
ITS INAPPROPRIATENESS, ITS CAUSES,
AND ITS AVOIDANCE

Professor Karsten thanks Professor Robert Potash and the participants in the University-Argentina Program's seminar on "Civil-Military Relations in a Constitutional Democracy" at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst in October, 1985, and Professor John Markoff of the University of Pittsburgh for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this essay.

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Military coups have been the subject of a number of qualitative and quantitative analyses over the past three decades, and several of these analyses have identified economic distress, rates of capital investment, election frequency, literacy, years of schooling, and other such measures of economic, social or political development as variables predictive of the violent intervention of the military into domestic politics. Some then assert a causality to these relationships. None of these studies have restricted their scope to those states that have been competitive democracies for at least ten of the past thirty years, and few have gone beyond the mere analysis of coups and their causality to assess their effects on the civil, political, social and economic health of the nations experiencing the coups or to recommend measures that might make coups less likely. Drawing upon the literature on coups, attempted coups, or the absence of coups in some thirty-three competitive democracies, this essay seeks to categorize the causes for coups and to distinguish between necessary and sufficient causes. It also explores the more normative question of the propriety of military coups, and comes to some specific conclusions regarding coup avoidance.

The inappropriateness of military coups in competitive democracies

Civilian control of the legitimate monopoly of violence in the state is, I would contend, a necessary condition for the existence and survival of all competitive democracies. Apologists for authoritarian political systems may sanction, or even recommend, military control or oversight of affairs of state,¹ but, competitive democratic theory is at

odds with such views. Competitive democracies, unlike authoritarian states, presume the constitutional right to organize political movements, the safeguarding and enjoyment of free speech and association, a broad franchise, periodic, clearly legitimate opportunities for the electorate to choose substantial elements of the political leadership, and regular meetings of independent legislative and judicial bodies.² Military coups are inconsistent with competitive democratic theory and, as we shall see, they invariably damage the very facets of civil and political life that make competitive democracies theoretically attractive. Military figures who lead a coup that interrupts a legal political process and

1. See V.E. Chirkin, ed., The Armed Forces in the Political System (Moscow, 1981).

2. See Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (2nd ed., Westview Press: Boulder, 1988), 78, for a somewhat different, but comparable list of elements to what he calls "mature political culture" (legitimacy of succession, consensus regarding the wielding of power, widespread political participation). I readily acknowledge that there are substantial and important differences in the extent to which competitive democracies fulfill these conditions. The thirty-three nations I count as competitive democracies for at least ten of thirty consecutive years in the twentieth century are: Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Finland, France, Great Britain, Greece, India, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Mexico, The Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, pre-war Poland, Peru, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, pre-war Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, and West Germany.

who seek to impose their will by force may have the most pristine motives, the most disinterested civilian allies, the noblest of aspirations, the most successful of economic policies, and the briefest of tenures before returning government to competitive democratic forms, but they have still imposed their will by force, and they have set precedent for future interventions, some of which may not be as admirable.

If such coups were infrequent, we might not think them worthy of the attention they have received in academic circles, the media and the public in the past generation. But in most Latin American, African and Asian competitive democracies they are not infrequent. Indeed, Latin America has been governed about half of the time in this century by military regimes.³

Samuel Huntington, who has also noted this high frequency of military rule in Latin America, finds certain advantages to it. He points out that many modernizing states, long dominated by conservative political elites, have almost always to be yanked forward from time to time, either by reform-minded military coup-makers or by revolutionary war. Hence he feels that "frequent coups are a sign of change and progress."⁴ Lucian Pye has offered a similar argument, maintaining that the military institution has unique capacities to provide modernization in lesser developed and developing states: it is na-

3. Samuel Huntington, Changing Patterns of Military Politics (Glencoe, 1962), 33.

4. Ibid., 39.

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tional, technical, bureaucratic, outward-looking, and hierarchic.⁵

The facts do not appear to bear Huntington and Pye out. Some military intervenors (and some revolutions) produce changes that could fairly be described as progress towards competitive democracy, social progress, and economic development, but most military coup leaders lack skills or experience appropriate for socio-economic planning or political leadership (a point John Johnson made about Latin America in 1964 and T.O. Odetola made about Africa in 1982).⁶ Samuel Finer, Eric Nordlinger, Robert Jackman, and Martin Needler have demonstrated that military coups over the past fifty years have become increasingly anti-constitutional and violent, and the ensuing military regimes since World War II in Latin America, Africa and Asia have been measurably less able than civilian governments in their ability to spur GNP, improve productivity, advance education enrollments, or increase capital investment levels.⁷

5. Lucian Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in John J. Johnson, ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, 1962).

6. John Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford, 1964), 117, 133; T. O. Odetola, Military Regimes and Development: A Comparative Analysis of African States (London, 1982), ch. 2. Cf. Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations. (Chicago, 1964), 40-49.

7. S. E. Finer, "The Man on Horseback 1974: Military Regimes," Armed Forces and Society, I (1974), 5-28; Martin Needler, "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America," American Political Science Review LX (September 1966), 616; Eric Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti," American Political

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Moreover, by Nordlinger's measure, the "subjective commitment" of the leadership of these military regimes to economic development has been decidedly lower than their civilian counterparts, again, especially in Latin America.⁸ Finally, military regimes have had, on balance, a record decidedly less admirable than civilian competitive democracies with regard to the preservation of political rights and civil liberties. The emphasis on order in military regimes has all too often resulted in the suppression of political dissent, in undue infringements to speech, press and assembly, and in abuse to the person of numbers of men and women.⁹

Science Review LXIV (December 1970), 1131; Robert Jackman, "Politicians in Uniform: Governments and Social Change in the Third World," American Political Science Review, LXX (1976), 1096-97; Jackman, "The Predictability of Coups d'Etat: A Model With African Data," American Political Science Review, LXXII (1978), 1262-75. Cf. R.D. McKinlay and A.S. Cohan, "Performance and Instability in Military and Non-Military Regime Systems," American Political Science Review, LXX (1976), 850-863. Exceptions, of course, exist to these generalizations.

8. Nordlinger, loc. cit.

9. One of the more sophisticated efforts to discover the relative propensities of civilian and military regimes does not address the question of civil liberties at all. (Phillipe Schmitter, "Military Intervention, Political Competitiveness, and Public Policy in Latin America", in Abraham Lowenthal, ed., Armies and Politics in Latin America (NY, 1976) 113-163); another limits the question to the relative toleration of communist parties, political partyism and legislative assemblies (R.D. McKinlay and D.S. Cohan, "A Comparative Analysis of the Political and Economic Performance of Military and Civilian Regimes: A Cross-National Aggregate Study," Comparative Politics, VIII (1975), 8-11), but it finds the

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Recently, Samuel Finer, utilizing Freedom House data on political rights and civil liberties throughout the world, noted that, while military governments were less protective of civil liberties and political rights than civilian regimes in 1980, there were so many civilian governments lacking in these categories that "the boundary between the two categories (civilian and military) simply melts away."¹⁰ This would appear to contradict, then, what I have just said in the preceding paragraph. It does not. Finer coded Freedom House data for all civilian regimes - authoritarian states, absolute monarchies, and open and competitive democracies alike. I am confident that he would not want to be understood to imply that "civilian regime" and "competitive democracy" might be regarded as comparable, (especially in as much as he is the very scholar who introduced the concepts of mature, developed, low and minimal political cultures to the literature of political sociology and the study of military coups). As such, one need not be surprised that some thirty-eight of seventy-two civilian regimes had received poor scores (5, 6, or 7 on a seven-point scale). I re-examined the data, looking only at the thirty-three nations listed in footnote 2 (that is, at states that have functioned as competitive democracies for at least ten of the past thirty years). In 1980 eight of these nations were ruled by military governments or were "military-supportive"

military regimes considerably less tolerant on all three counts.

10. Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of The Military in Politics (2nd ed., Westview Press: Boulder, 1988), 295.

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regimes (Finer's term to describe a government with a civilian president and a military junta operating informally as silent partners). When one compares the Freedom House rankings of these eight states to those of the twenty-five competitive democracies with totally civilian governments, the differences are most striking. The military and "military-supportive" regimes averaged 4.15 on the "political rights" scale and 4.37 on the "civil liberties" scale, while the totally civilian governments averaged 1.52 and 1.75 respectively.¹¹ Military coups in competitive democracies do not produce more freedom, justice, or prosperity; they produce less.

Hence it seems fair to conclude that a constitutionally chosen government in a competitive democracy is preferable to one created by a military coup, no matter how inept that constitutional government may be in addressing perceived political, social, or economic problems. If the inept government be constitutional, and the democratic and legal processes be intact (presuppositions I will return to in a later section), then relief in the form of elections is always in sight. No such relief is available from an inept military regime that does not chose to permit it.

If military coups in competitive democracies are not desirable, how might we reduce their likelihood? If we examine what we now know of military coups,

11. Freedom House, Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1980 (N.Y., 1980), 15-21. I also checked the same data in the 1985 edition of this Freedom House annual (now published by Greenwood Press, Westport, Ct.) and found no appreciable differences.

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successful and unsuccessful, we can identify the causes of those coup attempts and identify as well those measures that might be taken to preclude coup attempts or to reduce the chances of their success. Fortunately, the literature on the subject of causality is abundant and rich.

Why military coups occur

Theoretically, a group of military conspirators might move to overthrow a duly chosen democratic government for no reason other than a thirst for power. That may describe a few "personalists" coups in undemocratic states of "low" or "minimal" political culture, coups in which a powerful, ambitious military figure leads his friends and loyal subordinates out of the barracks in an early morning raid on the Presidential palace and the radio stations,¹² but it does not describe the vast majority of military coups in competitive democracies. "Democra-

12. It appears that the Ecuadorian coup of 1963, the Dominican coups of 1963 and 1965, the Bolivian coup of 1969, and some African coups were of this "personalist" sort. Martin Needler, Anatomy of a Coup d'Etat: Ecuador, 1963 (Washington, 1964), 22-23; Abraham Lowenthal "The Political Role of the Dominican Armed Forces: A note on the 1963 overthrow of Juan Bosch and on the 1965 Dominican Revolution," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, XV (1973), 355-361; William R. Thompson, The Grievances of Military Coup-Makers (Beverly Hills, 1973); Samuel Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style, (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1976); Aristide Zolberg, "Military Interventions in The New States of Africa," in Henry Bienen, ed., The Military Intervenes: Case Studies in Political Development (New York, 1968).

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tic" coupmakers are inspired by other motives. The typical coup in such states is almost invariably associated with one or more of the following:

- Profound Economic Distress
- Political Corruption
- Political Stalemate
- Affronts To The Military's Corporate Values
- Threats of Injury To The Military's Corporate Interests

The first three of these might be described as "external" causes (in that they are generated by forces entirely external to the military itself), and are almost invariably accompanied by civilian groups in opposition to the government calling for military intervention. The last two, affronts to the military's values and/or interests are "internal" in the sense that, while the military figures so affected perceive the problems as having "external" origins, the values and/or interests at issue are those of the military figures themselves.¹³ Some of these "causes" are more important than others. Some might be styled necessary, but not sufficient causes. Let us briefly explore the nature of each.

1. Profound economic distress

Analysts like Warren Dean, Dorothy Nelkin, and Gilbert Merx have focused attention on the shortcom-

13. See Claude E. Welch, Jr., "Soldier and State in Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies, V (1967), 313 ff, for a comparable list of coup motivators (which I located some time after constructing my own list).

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ings in the economic systems of competitive democracies that experience military coups.¹⁴ Merckx found a strong correlation between the first year or two of serious economic distress in Argentina's economic history and the timing of military coups.¹⁵ Economic distress led to pressure on the government from various sectors in the polity, in the form of riots, strikes, and calls for a "man on horseback." This certainly describes the situation in Argentina in 1966, when the vast majority of a thousand Buenos Aires area residents of all social classes surveyed by the Gallup organization identified one or another economic concern (such as "the cost of living," "inflation," "the general economic situation," or "unemployment") as Argentina's most important problem (as opposed to political, international, moral, or other problems). These respondents also doubted

14. Warren Dean, "Latin American Golpes and Economic Fluctuations, 1823-1966," Southwestern Social Science Quarterly LI (1970), 70-80; Dorothy Nelkin, "The Economic and Social Setting of Military Takeovers in Africa," Journal of Asian and African Studies, II (1967), 230-44, at 231: "in every country the issues which best account for the case of military access to power relate to economic circumstances and their social consequences." Cf. Robert Putnam, "Toward Explaining Military Intervention in Latin American Politics," World Politics, XX (October 1967), 83-110; and Thomas Johnson, Robert Slater and Pat McGowan, "Explaining African Military Coups d'Etat, 1960-1982," American Political Science Review LXXVIII (September 1984), 636.

15. Gilbert Merckx, "Political and Economic change in Argentina, 1870-1966," unpublished Yale University Ph.D. dissertation, 1968, pp. 29-32. However, the overthrow of Peron in 1955 by military coup was not accompanied by economic distress. (See Robert Potash, The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1946-1962 (Stanford, 1980), 170.)

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that the government would be able to solve, or even slow the growth of those economic problems. A national sample of Argentines surveyed by Jean Kirkpatrick in the same year agreed: Twice as many felt that "Argentina's economic situation will deteriorate in the next months" as believed it "will improve."¹⁶ The armed forces intervened in 1966; after relinquishing control, they intervened again in 1976. The 1976 coup leader, General Jorge Rafael Videla, explained that "a vacillating and unrealistic economic leadership carried the country towards recession and the beginnings of unemployment, with its inevitable sequel of anguish and desperation...."¹⁷ Similarly, the collapse of copper prices in the 1960s and early '70s, coupled with a number of Chilean President Allende's nationalizing and redistributive measures and an accelerating increase in the money supply, led to inflation and economic distress (especially for the middle and upper classes), which was in turn partly responsible for the military's coup.¹⁸

Professor Merckx has hypothesized: "No nation can sustain parliamentary democracy without a reasonably

16. Cited in Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley, 1979), 149-150.

17. Quoted in La Nacion, April 5, 1976, translated and reprinted in Brian Loveman and Thomas Davies, eds., The Politics of Anti-Politics: The Military in Latin America (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1978), 179.

18. See Arturo Valenzuela, Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile (Baltimore, 1978), 19, 55, 59, 65.

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stable economy and a relatively constant pattern of long term economic growth."¹⁹ This sounds plausible enough, and if one could produce a formula for sustained economic well-being in nations plagued with problems of geographic market disadvantages (as with Australia, New Zealand and Latin America's Southern cone countries) or a dependence on the world prices for their exports (as with much of the developing world), one would have gone a long way towards reducing the likelihood of, or need for, military coups. But such formulae remain elusive. The question, then, regarding Merx's hypothesis is whether there are any intervening variables that may ameliorate its grim significance for a nation like Argentina. I will return to this question in the final unit of this essay.

2. Political corruption

Other analysts, among them Samuel P. Huntington, Juan Linz, Guillermo O'Donnell, Brian Loveman and Thomas Davies, have drawn attention to the relation between the "breakdown" of democratic political systems and military coups.²⁰ The orderly succession

19. Merx, "Economics and History in the Study of Rebellions," in Gary Brewer and Ronald Brunner, eds., Political Development and Change (New York, 1973), 126.

20. Of course Huntington calls it "political decay" (Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1968), 4, 12, 194-196); Juan Linz, "Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration," in Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore, 1978); O'Donnell, Modernization; Loveman and Davis, eds., The Politics of Anti-Politics.

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of political authority from one group to another requires prior agreement to satisfy questions regarding legitimacy. In medieval Byzantium there was no formal order of legitimacy regarding succession to the throne. Almost invariably, military force was the arbiter of questions regarding Byzantine political succession.²¹ Modern competitive democracies have constitutional and legal norms to regulate the process of political succession. However, in some states political leaders have been known to circumvent these regulations, by postponing or "rigging" elections, "buying" or otherwise manipulating key judicial, legislative or local officials, selectively administering the laws, intimidating potential opponents, or otherwise engaging in "corrupt" practices to serve the interests of their party and themselves and to remain in power. Where constitutional traditions are weak, and extant political-legal institutions inadequate to the task of preventing such corruption, only three corrective measures remain: popular insurrection, foreign intervention, or military coup. Few welcome the first, still fewer, the second. Hence the toleration, indeed encouragement by some, of the military coup.

It is difficult to fault a military that intervenes to demand the creation of those norms obviously missing in order to produce a competitive democracy. Indeed, military coups have been instrumental in the transformation of absolutist regimes to republican or democratic constitutional ones (as in Brazil in 1889, China in 1911 and Portugal in 1974). One is

21. Walter Kaegi, "Patterns of Political Activity of Armies of the Byzantine Empire," in Morris Janowitz, ed., On Military Intervention (Rotterdam, 1971), 4-35.

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rather prompted, with Huntington, to praise such "men on horseback." There exists a problem, however: How are we to know which man on horseback is a hero, which a villain? That is, some "golpistas" claim that they are intervening to end "corruption" when they know that the charge is without real foundation; others equate lawful uses of political prerogative with immoral, "corrupt" behavior. A scholar engaging in careful after-the-fact analysis can sometimes uncover enough of the facts to sort out the truly corrupt regimes from the purely partisan or merely inept; but "the facts" are often not as evident at the time of the coup. And what is one to make of the claim of a military coupmaker that his intervention was necessary to "redress constitutional norms" that "corrupt" politicians were not observing? For example, in 1960 President Menderes of Turkey and in 1977 Prime Minister Ali Bhutto of Pakistan were overthrown by their militaries, tried, and executed for "corrupt" practices, yet controversy continues over whether the charges were fully proved. Was the military intervention in Chile, September, 1924, due to "corrupted politics" where "personal and speculative interests came before the general interest," as General Pedro Darnell maintained, or was it due to mere political stalemate, aggravated by economic distress, as others claimed?²² Were the young Japanese military officers

22. Darnell to the Armed Forces of Chile, January 19, 1925, reprinted in Frederick Nunn, Chilean Politics, 1920-1931: The Honorable Mission of the Armed Forces (Albuquerque, 1970), 181. See also Robin Luckham, The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt, 1960-1967, (Cambridge, 1971), 218-19; and John Lovell, "The Military and Politics in Postwar Korea," in Korean Politics in Transition, ed. Edward R. Wright (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1975), 159.

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who attempted a coup in 1936 justified in their claims of corruption in high places, and were their grievances sufficient to warrant the extra-legal, violent measures they took or were they simply acting on a widespread sense within the Japanese Army that it, and not the civilians, was in charge of kokujii (national affairs)?²³ Perhaps the evidence is sufficient to say that President Hipolito Yrigoyen was engaging in fraudulent practices in 1930 when the Argentine military deposed him, and perhaps the Argentine golpe in 1943 was due to the officer corps' refusal to support fraudulent elections.²⁴ It may well be that military intervention in those instances was the only step remaining short of civil war to prevent illegitimate rule. But if that is so, it is also the case that these Guardians of the Constitutional Process did not eliminate the problem before leaving office; fraud, be it Radicalista or Peronista, survived the military's purging of the body politic.

If such fraud or corruption as threatens the legitimacy of the political process is extremely difficult to identify by scholars writing with the benefit of hindsight, it is difficult to imagine that the officer immersed in the crisis itself could or should regard himself an objectively informed

23. The best analysis of this phenomenon is Ben-Ami Shillony, Revolt in Japan: Young Officers and the February 1936 Incident (Princeton, 1973). See also Yoshikisa Nakamura & Ryoichi Tobe, "The Imperial Japanese Army and Politics," Armed Forces and Society XIV (1988), 511-525.

24. Robert A. Potash, The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1928-1945 (Stanford, 1969), 41, 181.

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judge and jury of his nation's politics. Moreover, actions taken by military intervenors have generally not served to reduce the frequency of corrupt behavior in the future. But the fact remains that officers sometimes do perceive the behavior of civilian politicians to be so evil or contemptible as to warrant forcible action. Those officers who plotted the overthrow of the Sri Lanka government in 1962 were distressed by the emergence of populist, ethno-religious party systems, upset by politicians in the executive and legislative branches who called upon the military for personal services or patronage, and dismayed by a mass democracy that was not as "good for an underdeveloped country" (as one put it) as had been the bureaucratic meritocracy they had experienced under British rule. Similarly, the Turkish officers who overthrew the Menderes Democrat government in 1960 saw the Democrats as religious fanatics who were rejecting Kemal Ataturk's secular modernism, repressing Republican political opponents and leading Turkey to "disaster in the economic and social field."²⁵ Perhaps neither government was quite as repressive or corrupt as they were seen by the plotters; but never mind: what counted was that their officer corps saw them as such.

3. Political stalemate

So much for corruption and fraud as incentives for coups. Somewhat more common is the military's charge

25. Donald Horowitz, Coup Theories and Officers' Motives: Sri Lanka in Comparative Perspective (Princeton, 1980); Ergun Ozbudum, The Role of the Military in Recent Turkish Politics (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), 13-15; Samuel Finer, Man on Horseback, 100-102, 110-112.

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that political incompetence and intolerance has produced a dangerous political stalemate. Politics has been called the peaceful reconciliation of conflicting felt needs. When the political system fails to offer such reconciliation, then stalemate, frustration, and anger may lead to rioting, revolutionary activity, calls for military intervention, and, often, to a military coup. Samuel Huntington has claimed that the increased level of political participation in many developing nations in the twentieth century has led to political deadlocks, a lack of conciliatory behavior at the political party leadership level, and high tension, followed by military intervention.²⁶ It is certainly true that massive increases in the franchise in Bolivia, Argentina, Chile and Brazil have been followed by political deadlock, tension, and golpes.²⁷ But then such nations also experienced deadlock, tension and golpes (or attempted golpes) before mass enfranchisement (Chile in 1891 and 1924, Brazil in 1889 and 1930, Bolivia in 1936 and 1943, and Argentina in 1890, 1893 and 1905). And nations like Costa Rica, Japan and Mexico, which also experienced a massive increase in the franchise in the twentieth century, have managed to avoid the "political decay" and military coups that Huntington sees as the fate of such political development.

26. Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, 1968); Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics, April, 1965.

27. See, for example, Valenzuela, Breakdown: Chile, 26, passim; and Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos, "The Calculus of Conflict," Ph.D. dissertation, (Stanford Univ., 1979).

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Perhaps the enfranchising of new political groups leads to political decay in those societies where the party system is unable to absorb these new groups without alienating traditional voting blocs; perhaps the constitutional process of proportional representation, with its segmentary propensities, is the cause of much of the political deadlock that seems to precede so many military coups. We need not answer such questions here. It suffices that we recognize that in some nations political stalemate often precedes a military coup.

A few examples of the relationship between political stalemate and an ensuing military coup may be useful. When Poland was recreated after World War I as a constitutional democracy, its political parties found collaboration and cooperation difficult. Parties split, dissolved, and reappeared. No less than fourteen Cabinets held the reins of power between 1918 and 1926. In the words of Joseph Rothchild, an "intensely partisan press aggravated the general political debasement and maximized the timidity of the ministers."

By 1926 substantial elements of the public clearly lacked confidence in the Diet and the coalition government. Some turned to Marshal Jozef Pilsudski. He was ready. On May 10, 1926, he told a willing reporter of his disgust with the government's ineffectiveness, and explained that "the moral interests" of the state and the army were at stake. A few days later he and his military comrades swept the government aside and began an ever-increasing process of military penetration of the political process.

In 1958 the Government of Pakistan proposed a vote

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of "no confidence" in the Speaker of the House. That gentleman refused to submit the resolution to a vote, was assaulted by Government supporters, and fled the House, whereupon the resolution was proposed by the Deputy Speaker (a supporter of the Government) and passed. A few days later the Deputy Speaker was attacked on the floor of the House by opposition members and mortally wounded, whereupon the President (a former army officer) called upon the Army Commander, General Ayub Khan to assume emergency powers and suspend the legislature and constitution. Two weeks later Khan was named Prime Minister, and the following week he assumed the Presidency as well. The Punjabi-dominated military had become the government at the behest of fellow Punjabis.²⁸

In Argentina, the opposition parties welcomed military intervention during the post-election crisis of March, 1962. Robert Potash writes:²⁹

So great was their distrust of (President Arturo) Frondizi that they preferred to risk the breakdown of civilian government rather than do anything that would enable him to serve out his term.

By 1966 President Arturo Illia had (in the words of Guillermo O'Donnell) "acquired the reputation of being a slow and ineffective decision-maker, while

28. Joseph Rothschild, Pilsudski's Coup d'Etat (New York, 1966), 10, 38, 54-55. Eliezer Be'eri, Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society (London, 1970), 269-270.

29. Potash, Army and Politics, 1946-1962, 346-65, 379.

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Parliament seemed to have been reduced to a forum for personal quarrels which produced no legislation." Now it was Frondizi's turn to welcome military intervention, and welcome it he did.³⁰ The public was not indifferent, but it was not committed to the political process either. Some 41% of a sample of adult Argentine's told interviewers three months before the coup that the national government had "great effect" on their daily lives, a percentage higher than respondents from any other European or Latin American nation so surveyed. Yet only 20% of these respondents identified themselves as supporters of a particular political party, and fully 54% said they did not even "lean" toward any party.³¹

Similarly, in 1976, General Videla recalled he "institutional stagnation, manifested in the unsuccessful attempts to produce in time the urgent and profound solutions which the country required." He spoke of "a total paralysis of the state, with a power vacuum incapable of revitalizing it...."³² In that same year Bolivia's General Ovando also referred to a "power vacuum" in explaining the military's interventions there. And political deadlock clearly preceded the golpe in Chile in 1973. There

30. O'Donnell, Modernization, 160. See also Jay Hakes, Weak Parliaments and Military Coups in Africa: A Study in Regime Instability (Beverly Hills, 1973); and Winfield Burggraaff, The Venezuelan Armed Forces in Politics, 1935-1959 (Columbia, MO.1972), 86.

31. O'Donnell, Modernization, 147-148.

32. Quoted in Loveman and Davies, Politics of Antipolitics, 179.

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President Allende's pressure on the Controlaria, his ignoring of Supreme Court decrees, and his socialist policies produced a high level of tension by 1972-73. His late hour attempts, a reconciliation with the Christian Democrats in an effort to save himself from a golpe by yielding on some of his more controversial policies, however, was resisted by no less distinguished a Christian Democratic leader than former President Eduardo Frei, who told his colleagues to oppose the Allende government totally:³³

This position stems from an attitude of opposition to the Marxist attempt to implant totalitarianism in Chile.... I am being threatened by a spiritual death by Marxism and dictatorship. I don't even want to live in a Marxist Country.

Where government and opposition do not engage in reconciliation and compromise, confrontation and tension are obviously going to exist, and golpes may well occur. But this process is not inevitable. An intolerant political culture can mature; it can learn toleration of political opposition, as the example of Colombia indicates. There bitter foes, the Conservatives and Liberals, managed to create a "National Front" to tackle problems without recourse to bloodshed, intrigue or intransigence. Similarly, in Venezuela in 1958 the opposition parties entered into the Pact of Punto Fijo, an agreement to accept the electorate's mandate and to cooperate in a coalition government led by the party with the electoral mandate, but involving representatives of the

33. Valenzuela, Breakdown: Chile, 89.

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opposition parties.³⁴ Even the United States was once plagued (in the 1790s) with a political culture that found political parties ("factions") an abomination and witnessed the leadership of these "factions" arresting and imprisoning the editors of papers loyal to the other "faction" and impeaching and removing judges friendly to the opposition.³⁵ Other nations aspiring to competitive democracy are clearly capable of moving toward greater political tolerance, cooperation, and the concept of a "loyal" opposition, especially such nations as have recently experienced an alternative vision, the military "protectorate".³⁶

"Subjective" versus "objective" civilian control

Many governments experiencing economic distress or political deadlock have turned to military leaders for assistance. Sometimes they have done this to coopt these officers in the hope of forestalling a

34. J. Mark Ruhl, Colombia: Armed Forces and Society (Syracuse, 1980), 12; Burggraaff, Venezuelan Armed Forces, 173. Cf. S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback (London, 1962), who focuses on the relationship between civilian political culture and coups d'etat.

35. See Leonard Levy, Jefferson and Civil Liberties: The Darker Side (Cambridge, Mass., 1963).

36. In this regard it is worth noting that Robert Putnam's quantitative analysis of Latin American coups and their causes found a high degree of "social mobilization" (high numbers of radios, newspapers, urbanity, college students, and middle class per capita) to be correlated with effective civilian control. Putnam, op. cit., 92-95.

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coup, sometimes in order to draw military men loyal to the regime into alliance, sometimes simply in order to utilize their technical or managerial skills for a critical task or a beleaguered ministry. Samuel Huntington has argued that this penetration of the military by, and integration of the military with, civilian political leadership (which he calls "subjective civilian control") politicizes the military and actually imperils civilian control. Isolation of the military from the political process, keeping it contained in its professional, defense-related realm (which he calls "objective civilian control") is Huntington's method of keeping the military "politically sterile and neutral."³⁷ What is the evidence that "subjective civilian control" leads to military coups, and that "objective civilian control" prevents them?

It is clearly possible to find evidence of the dangers to civilian control of the military flowing from government policies that draw officers into the political maelstrom. This appears to describe the consequence of President Alessandri's cultivating of Chilean army officers in 1924.³⁸ It seems also to describe the consequence of President Yrigoyen's favoring of Radical officers to promotions and assignments in the late '20's in Argentina.³⁹ It certainly applies to the case of Colombia's reform-minded President Alfonso Lopez, whose fear of a

37. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 84-88.

38. Nunn, Chilean Politics, 50-100, 181.

39. Potash, Army and Politics, 1928-1945, 10. Cf. Burggraaff, Venezuelan Armed Forces, 95.

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golpe in the mid-1930s caused him to discriminate politically in the promotion of officers, which may have been at least partly responsible for the two military coup conspiracies that hatched during Lopez's tenure.⁴⁰ Use of the military to support the party in power or to suppress political protests in inter-war Poland, Pakistan, Turkey, and Sierra Leone also appear to have polarized those armies and to have influenced the decision of Army plotters to intervene.⁴¹ The same may be said of the efforts of President Allende to coopt leading Chilean military figures like General Carlos Prats. Prats' service as Interior Minister, temporary Vice-President, and general trouble-shooter deeply angered many military officers.⁴² Perhaps a broadside signed by some seventeen Peruvian army officers in 1921 says it all. These officers complained of how "politics" had "infiltrated the army:"⁴³

40. Ruhl, Colombia, 20.

41. Andrzej Korbonski, "Civil-Military Relations in Poland Between the Wars: 1918-1939," Armed Forces and Society, XIV, No.2 (Winter, 1988), 169-189; Joseph Rothschild, Pilsudski's Coup d'Etat (New York, 1966), 34, 40; Steven Cohen, "Arms and Politics in Pakistan," India Quarterly X (1964), 413; Ergun Ozbudun, The Role of the Military in Recent Turkish Politics (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), 14; Thomas S. Cox, Civil-Military Relations in Sierra Leone (Cambridge, Mass., 1976), chapters 3-6, 223.

42. Linz, Breakdown, 71; Frederick Nunn, The Military in Chilean History (Santa Fe, 1976), 278, 286.

43. Quoted in Loveman and Davies, Politics, 4.

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We military officers have been serving as steppingstones for unscrupulous politicians. They use our services and then they promote us. This must stop. Promotions must be based upon professional competence and not on political activity....We (must) assume the reins of government of the country in order to root out political influence, the worst of all plagues.

"Subjective civilian control" appears, then, to be a perilous means of controlling the military, since it may sometimes actually promote the loss of control. But there is still something to be said for it, especially in the case of a nation engaged in democratic-constitutional reform. If the head of such a nation were to be convinced that the officer corps was a hotbed of reaction or dissent, he/she might reasonably seek to identify and cultivate those officers who might be amenable to one's lawful and constitutional policies. That was precisely what Presidents George Washington and John Adams did when they sought to gather only Federalist sympathizers into the fledgling U.S. Army and Navy in the mid and late 1790s,⁴⁴ and it is what President Thomas Jefferson did when he had Secretary of War Dearborn identify the political persuasions of all officers in the army, dismissed some of the more rabid Federalists, and promoted some of his own followers.⁴⁵ It describes the behavior of the U.S.

44. Lawrence Cress, Citizens in Arms: The Army and Militia in American Society to the War of 1912 (Chapel Hill, 1982).

45. Theodore Crackel, "Jefferson, Politics, and The Army," Journal of the Early Republic, II (1982), 21-38; Noble Cunningham, The Process of Government under Jefferson (Princeton, 1978), 175.

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Congress's Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, which, during the Civil War, sought to identify those Union Commanders who were unsympathetic with their war aims: reunion and abolition.⁴⁶

It also describes the Congress's alliance in 1867-68 with those army officers annoyed by the intransigence of the Southern state governments. These governments had come back into existence in 1865 and 1866 with the sanction of Lincoln's successor, President Andrew Johnson, a Southerner himself. Former Confederates staffed executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the governments, and made life and the performance of duty extremely difficult for the federal army and Freedman's Bureau officers stationed in the former Confederacy. Since the Congress sought to reconstruct the southern governments along constitutional lines of its own, it bitterly opposed President Johnson's policies and found a natural ally in the Army. When the President fired Secretary of War Edwin Stanton (a friend of the Congress-Army coalition) and began replacing army commanders in the South with men willing to tolerate the behavior of the former Confederates, the Congress passed legislation restoring Secretary Stanton to office and named General Ulysses S. Grant Commander-in-Chief of the Army in the South. A confrontation between Stanton and General Lorenzo Thomas, whom Johnson had named as the new Secretary of War, was resolved by a combination of force, whiskey and persuasion, and it became clear to all that President Johnson no longer controlled any U.S. military

46. T. Harry Williams, "The Committee on the Conduct of the War: An Experiment in Civilian Control," Military Affairs, III (1939), 139-156. Cf. Huntington, Soldier and the State, 181.

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forces.⁴⁷ At this point in time, the House impeached Johnson and sent the bill to the Senate for trial. (That trial failed, but within six months, Ulysses S. Grant had been elected the next President.)

I report the facts of this crisis in some detail because it seems an excellent example of why "subjective civilian control" can sometimes be both necessary and proper. Had the Congress not acted to draw the Army leadership politically into this constitutional struggle, Johnson's Southern governments would have continued to undo much of what victory in the Civil War had accomplished. The fact that Congress's Reconstruction policies were themselves only partially successful over the next decade is no response, for that could not have been known at the time (and, in any event, is partly untrue; Congress did manage to secure adoption of the powerful 14th and 15th Amendments to the Constitution in these years). What was known was that the nation's physical suppression of the rebellion were being undermined by an accidental, Southern-sympathizing President, some of whose conduct was of dubious legality. Under such circumstances it would have been difficult to expect Congress to permit the Presidency free control of the Army, limited only by Congress's control of the pursestrings.

Similarly, the French republican government's use of "subjective civilian control" in the age of the Third Republic, especially during and after the

47. Harold Hyman, "Johnson, Stanton, and Grant: A Reconsideration of the Army's Role in the Events Leading to Impeachment," American Historical Review, LXVI (1960), 85-96. Cf. Huntington, Soldiers and the State, 182.

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Dreyfus affair, can hardly be faulted. It is true that by the early twentieth century republican officers were being favored in appointments and promotions, in the wake of several anti-republican demonstrations by numerous royalist officers.⁴⁸ But what was the alternative? Ignoring the insults and threats to the Republic, the presence of Bourbon-royalists and Bonapartists in the services, the possibility of a royalist-led coup? After all, some fin de siecle Frenchmen could recall that in 1851 Louis Napoleon had dismissed a republican General, Changarnier, and had replaced him with the more amenable General Saint-Arnaud and his colonial colleagues preparatory to his coup that December.⁴⁹ It may well be that the Third Republic survived as long as it did (1871-1940), because of "subjective civilian control."

In the late 1950s, when Huntington's The Soldier and the State: A Theory of Civil-Military Relations appeared, the West German government had just embarked on a program of indoctrination of its new

48. David Ralston, ed. Soldiers and States: Civil-Military Relations in Modern Europe (Boston, 1966), 124-130. Cf. Ronald Chalmers Hood, III, Royal Republicans: The French Naval Dynasties Between the Wars (Baton Rouge: L.S.U. Press, 1985). The same may be said of the Mexican civilian elite's successful control of promotions and assignments of senior-level military officers since the 1920's. See also Francois Bedarida, "L'Armee et la republique: les opinions politiques des officiers francaisen 1876-78," Revue historique, CCXXXII (1964), 119-64.

49. Alfred Cobban, A History of Modern France (3 vols., London, 1961), II, 156-57; Gordon Wright, France in Modern Times (3rd ed., N.Y.; W. W. Norton, 1981), 143-44.

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Bundeswehr which included political education (in competitive democracy) and instructions that the officer corps was never again to follow blindly an oath to a civilian head of state; rather they were to uphold the constitution and their conscience.⁵⁰ Samuel Huntington warned that this sort of subjective civilian control would "foster the permanent embroilment of the German military in politics and reduce the fighting effectiveness of the new army."⁵¹ The jury is not yet in, but the past thirty years do not appear to warrant Huntington's fear.

Nevertheless, to say that the governments of the United States, France, West Germany, indeed, Israel⁵² have, at various moments in time, felt the need to engage in "subjective civilian control," and have done so with some success, is not to say that it is a sensible policy for those or other governments under all circumstances. Huntington's model may not sufficiently take into account that the military will always have some political role in even the most mature competitive democracy. Clearly, too much politicizing of the military, can endanger control itself. If there are certain circumstances where one must promote and appoint politically, these are likely to be moments when the military has already been politicized and when there are few purely "pro-

50. See, for example, Eric Waldman, The Goose Step is Verboten (New York, 1964); M. Donald Hancock, The Bundeswehr and the NPA (Denver, 1973).

51. Huntington, Soldier and The State, 123.

52. Yoram Peri, Between Battles and Ballots: The Israeli Military in Politics (Cambridge, England, 1983).

fessional," neutral officers left to offend.

Hence I am of two minds regarding the merits and demerits inherent in the act of some 20 constitutionalist Spanish army officers who presented Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales with a list of 40 "trustworthy" officers in October, 1982, attached to a Plan for Neutralizing Coup-inclined Officers, and advice on how to prevent a military coup. Coming in the wake of one abortive coup attempt, this gesture was understandable - indeed, commendable. Adrian Schubert, a close student of Spanish civil-military relations, is impressed with its value.⁵³ He believes that this gesture was helpful, and he is probably correct. But if a Spanish government should chose to call upon these "trustworthy" forty officers for support, and if it also differentially rewards them, it may discover that it has brought the rest of the Army out of the barracks. Given the Franco regime's pattern of officer recruitment, socialization, and promotions, subjective control today, practiced to correct past patterns, may be necessary. Drawing a line between defending democracy and manipulating the military for partisan or personal ends is never easy.

If "subjective" civilian control is problematic, what of "objective" civilian control? Is it the panacea (I don't think that overstates it) that Huntington believes it to be? Does professionalism of the military and isolation of it from things political serve as an effective form of civilian control? Is the professional soldier,⁵⁴ "isolated" from poli-

53. Adrian Shubert, "The Military Threat to Spanish Democracy: A Historical Perspective," Armed Forces and Society, X (1984), 54.

tics, unlikely to intervene? Perhaps. But first he must remain "isolated." It is not enough that those in office "isolate" him; if the "disloyal opposition" call upon him for assistance, he may be just as politicized as if the government itself had made him the Interior Minister. Juan Linz, Alfred Stepan, John Johnson, Jose Nun, Donald Horowitz, Orville Menard, Robert Potash, Adrian Schubert, S.E. Finer, and John Fitch, among others, have noted the tendency of opposition groups, the "middle class," and personal friends to call for the Man on Horseback in Sri Lanka, France, Spain, Ecuador, Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela and other developed or fledgling competitive democracies.⁵⁵ In March, 1941, following an abortive coup conspiracy in Argentina, La

54. "Professional soldier": A military man with considerable devotion to technical expertise and modern military schooling, with a well-organized system of discipline and internal prescriptive rewards, and a highly developed sense of responsibility to the public. See Huntington's Soldiers and the State, ch. 1, for one such definition.

55. Horowitz, Coup Motives, 187-88; Orville Menard, The Army and the Fifth Republic (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1967), 170-80; Linz, Breakdown, 36-37; Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton, 1971); Schubert, "Military Threat," 531; John Fitch, "Toward a Model of the Coup d'Etat in Latin America," in Brewer and Brunner, eds., Political Development, 179; Jose Nun, "The Middle-Class Military Coup Revisited," in Lowenthal, ed., Arms and Politics, 65ff. Cf. Claude Welch, "Civil-Military Relations: Perspectives from the 3rd World," Armed Forces and Society, XI (1985), 194-200; and John Lovell, "Civil-Military Relations: Traditional and Modern Concepts Reappraised," in Cochran, ed., Civil-Military Relations, 21-22.

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Presna's editorial outlined the problem precisely:⁵⁶

Every time the country faces a crisis, political or institutional, like the one we are confronting at this moment, people without weight or responsibility, almost always militants from some party segment, have sought by every type of artifice to win over the opinion of the armed forces, in order thereby to promote their proselytizing activities or their aspirations and interests. It is inadmissible that the military, as happens with some, should think they are authorized to intervene in the political contests, that agitate the people, trying by any means to gain positions; and it is much less tolerable that they lend themselves as instruments to the ambitious and the impatient.

Similarly, in 1959, Rafael Caldera, presidential candidate of the Social Christian Party in the 1958 elections, told John Johnson that Venezuelans⁵⁷

are so accustomed to see the army as a factor in their daily lives, so accustomed to make the army the arbiter of their political contests, that at each moment the most varied groups for the most dissimilar ends attempt to involve

56. La Presna, March 13, 1941, quoted in Potash, Army and Politics 1928-1945, 151.

57. Johnson, Military and Society, 120. Cf. Burggraaff, Venezuelan Armed Forces, 97.

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the army in new adventures to change our political reality.

The same phenomenon can be detected in the history of U.S. and British civil-military relations. The Continental Line's conspirators at Newbergh in 1783 did not make demands on the Confederation government without considerable prompting and advice from nationalists within the Continental Congress.⁵⁸ And, as I have already noted, numerous "Radical Republicans" in the Congress, in league with the Grand Army of the Republic, an organization of "Radical Republican" veterans of the Union Army, lobbied the Army for help in their constitutional struggle with President Andrew Johnson over the Reconstruction of the South in 1867-68.⁵⁹ In 1914, when the Liberal government in Great Britain announced plans for Irish "Home Rule," Unionist politicians successfully encouraged the Army's officers in Ireland to signal their refusal to act against Unionist resistance to such a change in the government of Ireland.⁶⁰ The "disloyal opposition" have thus sought to persuade the military to intervene in two of the more competitive and constitutionalist of democracies.

Compounding the problem of the "disloyal opposition" is the fact that clauses in the constitutions of some more-or-less competitive democracies sanction

58. Richard Kohn, "The Inside History of the Newbergh Conspiracy," William and Mary Quarterly, (April, 1970), 187-220.

59. Hyman, Johnson, Stanton, and Grant; Mary Dearing, "Veterans in Politics: The Story of the G.A.R." (Baton Rouge, 1952), 104-138.

60. Ryan, Mutiny at the Curragh (London, 1956).

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intervention by the military in defense of the constitution, while others assign the military the guardianship of elections. Thus in Turkey the army's regulations include the mission of "protecting" the political institutions of the nation if they are in "danger." In 1975 Army Chief of Staff General Semih Samcar, referring to its "caretaker" mission, said "the Army will not stay away from the nation's problems," and when economic problems grew in 1980 and political polarization led to domestic violence, the Army intervened "to replace a malfunctioning democracy" (in the words of General Kenan Evren).

In Ecuador and Brazil the constitutions (of 1945 and 1946, respectively) permit the military leadership to decide whether the President had exceeded his legal authority.⁶¹ In such settings it is hardly surprising that opposition voices might be directed at the barracks.

Consequently, one must conclude that unless one so isolates the professional soldier from the public arena so completely that he is inaccessible to the opposition and ignorant of what is being said to him

61. Johnson, Military and Society in Latin America, 162, 233; Fitch, "Toward a Model," 175ff; James Brown, "The Military and Politics in Turkey," Armed Forces and Society, XIII (1987), 241; Bener Karakartal, "Turkey: The Army as Guardian of the Political Order," in Christopher Clapham and George Philip, eds., The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes (London, 1985), 49. The Three Turkish military interventions (of 1960, 1971 and 1980) are clear examples of a "guardian" or "moderate" model: reluctant intervention to prevent political collapse and civil war, followed quickly by a new formula for competitive democracy, new elections, and a return to the barracks.

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in the media (both of which acts are obviously impossible, to say nothing of being improper), then "objective" civilian control must rest on the "professional" half of Huntington's formula alone. That is, if it is true that the professional soldier will not intervene if he is left alone to cultivate purely military, professional pursuits, then "objective" civilian control should still work. But under precisely those circumstances, it often does not work. Thoroughly professional military men who are not being politicized by their government sometimes respond to appeals from civilian friends, the Press, or the political opposition and overthrow that government none the less! Why? For answers we must turn to our last two "causes" of coups: affronts to the military's values and corporate interests.

5. Affronts to the military's values

For many military officers, the sense that they were "professionals" seems to have promoted a sense of superiority to politicians. As such, a number of these officers have intervened without the inspiration of civilian friends, the press, or a disloyal political opposition. Roy Hansen discovered that, among thirty-eight senior military men he interviewed in Chile in 1965, the most isolated (that is, those with the fewest close civilian friends and the least sympathy for "civic action" and other such civilian-political missions) held the most conservative political views and were the most "professional"!⁶² Charles Corbett, himself a former U.S.

62. Roy Hansen, "Career Motivation and Military Ideology: The Case of Chile," Morris Janowitz and Jacques Van Doorn, eds., On Military Ideology (Rotterdam, 1971), esp. pp. 129-133. We do not

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military officer, was persuaded that Bolivia's military officers were the only "disciplined administrative talent" available in Bolivia, and he was not surprised that they intervened from time to time.⁶³ It may well be that Bolivia, a relatively underdeveloped country with considerable illiteracy, does not have an abundant supply of skilled economists and administrators. It may, however, also be the case that her military officers have not demonstrated a high degree of economic and administrative talent themselves over the past forty or fifty years. Be that as it may, many of Bolivia's officers believe as Corbett does that they are Lucian Pye's military modernizers.

If Bolivia's civilian elite are relatively few in numbers, Argentina's are the proverbial opposite. Yet many of Argentina's military professionals also believe that they are the appropriate instruments of Argentine modernization. General Juan Onganía, leader of the 1966 coup, spoke of the professional role of the armed forces in 1964 and again in 1966. For Onganía these roles included active participation in "the nation's business," "promotion of the general welfare," and providing for "the economic and social development of the country". Similarly, General Park Chung-hee, one of the leaders of the

know, however, how those among these Chilean officers still active in 1973 lined up on the question of overthrowing Allende.

63. Charles Corbett, The Latin American Military as a Socio-Political Force (Miami, 1972), 68. See Robert Potash, The Impact of Professionalism on the Twentieth Century Argentine Military (Amherst, Mass., 1977), 16, for a different perspective.

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Korean military's coup in 1961, maintained that the "chief concern" of the military coupmakers had been "to effect an industrial revolution in Korea," and he indicated that he and his colleagues sought to emulate the achievements of the "Young Turks" in Mustafa Kemal's Turkey, Sun Yat-sen's China, Meiji Japan, Nasser's Egypt, and post-World War II West Germany.⁶⁴

How did these goals become the mission of the armed forces? In part, through "professionalism." Several competitive democracies have developed senior level "war colleges," integrating military and civilian elites. These generals-to-be socialize and study with political scientists, economists, ministers, engineers, and business leaders. Their topics include the economic, financial, and strategic future of their nation.⁶⁵ Even those generals and colonels who have not attended their Escola Superior de Guerra are not oblivious to these same subjects, as they can read, speak and listen to what is "in air."⁶⁶ Hence numerous senior officers have con-

64. O'Donnell, Modernization, 157; Loveman and Davies, eds., Politics of Antipolitics, 175; Lovell, "Military and Politics in Korea," op.cit., 176-79.

65. See Frederick Nunn, Yesterday's Soldiers: European Military Professionalism in South America, 1890-1940 (Lincoln, 1983), for a good account of the pre-World War II origins of French and German-run training programs in South American militaries, and the ensuing sense of "mission" and superiority to civilians.

66. Thus John Markoff and Silvio R.D. Baretta have argued that Alfred Stepan exaggerated the importance of the Escola Superior de Guerra in the development of the Brazilian golpe and junta of 1964. ("Professional Ideology and Military Activism in Brazil,

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cluded, as has former Argentine General Benjamin Rattenbach, that the military's mission is "not only external defense and internal security but also that of contribution to the development of the nation in the economic and social aspects as well as the cultural and political."⁶⁷

Where this is what "professional" has come to mean in one's military, then "objective" civilian control no longer has any particular effect. And in increasing numbers of states, Rattenbach's expansive model is precisely what military professionalism has come to mean. Many field grade, staff and flag-rank officers throughout the Third World have decided that they have a "modernizing" mission to perform. In addition to defending against foes foreign and domestic, "professional" officers may now see themselves as being responsible for the well-being of the nation's economy. That redefinition changes the rules. To put it differently, the creation of "superior war colleges" that integrate military and civilian policymakers, military, economic and "grand" strategies, constitute the kind of "fusionist" policy (a fusing of military and civilian roles) that Huntington criticizes. Such a "fusing" of military and civilian elites, for planning purposes, has some merit, but it can lead to problems for civilian control of the military if the military graduates conclude that they now know enough to govern by themselves and simultaneously feel that they have a mission, "saving" their politically-

⁶⁷ Comparative Politics, XVII (1985), 175-91).

67. Rattenbach, quoted in Loveman and Davies, Politics., 15.

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bankrupt country. Thus former Major Victor Villanueva of Peru maintains that the lessons taught at the Centro de Altos Estudios Militaries during the 1960s "rationalized the old rejection (rechazo) the military felt for the civilian."⁶⁸ It is worth noting that there is no such Superior War College offering non-military "strategic policy" courses in Mexico, a coup-free nation, for over 60 years.

Golpistas bent on creating a "modern", "organic", "structured", "economically integrated" state may well include "professionals", but many of these also believe that competitive democracy is hopeless, that it cannot possibly solve their nation's economic, political and social problems. Their preference for an organic, hierarchic, structured state,⁶⁹ their lack of patience with labor unrest, political dissent, and free speech are traits common to many officer corps and are central facets of the authoritarian variant of "the military mind."⁷⁰ When the

68. Villanueva, EL CAEM y la Revolucion de la Fuerza Armada (Lima, 1972), 170.

69. In this I believe I am in agreement with Loveman and Davies, Politics of Antipolitics, 4. See also Ali Mazrui, "Soldiers as Traditionalizers," Journal of Asian and African Studies, XII(1977), 236-58; Burggraaff, Venezuelan Armed Forces, 113; Luckham, Nigerian Military, 285; and Finer, Man on Horseback, 22, 28.

70. On the "military mind," see Huntington, Soldier and the State, chapter 3; Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy (NY, 1972), chapter 5; Horowitz, Coup Motives, chapter 8; Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization and Political Power (Beverly Hills, 1972); Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism (New York, 1937); and James Aho, Religious Mythology and the

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Uruguayan government was unable to suppress the Tupamaros guerillas in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the military steadily demanded more political authority. Defense Minister Antonio Fracese told a committee of Uruguay's Congress in 1969 that he came to them now "not as a minister, but as a general," and explained to them that "the armed forces are the guardians of the nation's institutions."⁷¹ Authoritarian soldiers make better followers than leaders,⁷² as General Ramirez of Argentina and General Antonio Seleme of Bolivia demonstrated in 1943-33 and 1952. Competitive democracies may well need "professional" militaries, but one that is limited to military skills and expertise and to service in defense of the nation against external aggression, not one that encompasses the management of the nation's economy and political institutions.

6. Threats or injury to the military's "interests"

Any analysis of the causes of military coups d'etat without attention to the military's own institutional motives would miss some of the main parts of the puzzle. As Eric Nordlinger, Samuel Finer, and William R. Thompson have argued, these institutional

Art of War (Westport, 1980).

71. Cited in Ronald H. McDonald, "The Rise of Military Politics in Uruguay," Inter-American Economic Affairs, XXVIII (Spring, 1975), 38.

72. See Charles Fair, From the Jaws of Victory (New York, 1971), for a similar argument.

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motives are very important,⁷³ constituting, according to Thompson, who gathered data on 229 military coups world-wide between 1946 and 1970, the primary motive in no less than 43% of these coups.⁷⁴ Sensitive to threats they perceive to their institution's resources and status or position, military officers often intervene to protest: a debilitating war; painful reductions of their budgets or salaries; manipulation of promotions or assignments; affront to their honor, self-esteem, or autonomy; or a threat to their control of the legitimate monopoly of violence. Let us briefly examine each in turn.

An unpopular war or civic action, or one inadequately provided for, can become a threat to the well-being of any military institution as it sees its base of support eroded, its prestige tarnished, or its resources sapped. This was the case with the Union Army in 1867, as it saw its occupation role in the defeated Confederate states undercut by President Andrew Johnson. It affected the decision of Spanish officers to seize power shortly after the Army's disastrous defeat at Annuel (in Spanish Morocco) in 1921, as it did the decision of the French

73. Thompson argues that Nordlinger overstates the case in claiming "the great majority" of coups are inspired by a defense of the military's corporate interests. (I find Thompson the more persuasive). See Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs, 1976), 78; Thompson, "Corporate Coup-Maker Grievances and Types of Regime Targets," Comparative Political Studies, XII (1980), 485-496; Finer, Man on Horseback, 41-49, 237-241.

74. William R. Thompson, The Grievances of Military Coup-Makers (Beverly Hills, 1973). See also Finer, Man on Horseback, 41-49.

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officer corps, who felt "sold out" in Indochina in 1954, and feared other "sellouts" in Algeria in 1958 and 1961.⁷⁵

Military systems jealously guard their control of promotions and assignments. When these appear to be threatened by civilian politicians, some militaries can react with a coup. This sentiment permeated a large bloc of Spanish officer corps in 1923 (a corps plagued with an excess of officers and, consequently, few promotions) and informed General Primo de Rivera's decision to seize power. It was at least part of the motive for the Argentine military coup in 1930, as it was for the coup attempts in Colombia in the mid-30s and Ghana in 1966. Eric Nordlinger notes that Brazil's President Goulart had "interfered with promotion policy in 1963-64," and he maintains that the unpromoted generals rebelled, while many of those promoted by Goulart were soon purged by the new military regime. Similarly, some of the army and police officers in Sri Lanka who planned a coup in 1962 told Donald Horowitz of their anger at the government's direct interference with and distrust of two non-Buddhist battalion commanding officers.⁷⁶

75. Carolyn Boyd, Praetorian Politics in Liberal Spain, (Chapel Hill, 1979); Raoul Girardet, "Civil and Military Power in the 4th Republic," in Changing Patterns in Military Politics, ed. Samuel Huntington (Glencoe, 1962); John Ambler, Soldiers Against the State: The French Army in Politics, 1945-1962 (Columbus, 1966). Cf. Claude E. Welch, Jr., and Arthur K. Smith, Military Role and Rule (Duxbury Press: North Scituate, Mass., 1974), 22, and Juan Linz, Breakdown, 52. The Portuguese coup of 1974 is an example from the non-democratic world, as is the Russian military revolt of 1917.

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Perhaps the most common grievance of military coup-makers concerns the government's allocation of funds for salaries and equipment. It is more hazardous to "lay off" or cut the pay of a military man than a great many others in the work force for the simple reason that military men have weapons. When the English Long Parliament⁷⁷ did not pay their army with sufficient speed and in sufficient amount in 1647, the Army added that to a short list of other grievances and decided to invade the Long Parliament. Rumors circulated in 1889 that the government of Brazil planned to disband some regular army units. The army leadership, already disgusted with the government for a number of reasons, was further alienated. It soon seized power itself.⁷⁸ Chilean officers were generally unhappy with the political stalemate in 1924, but they were more specifically unhappy with failure of the Congress to pass cost-

76. Boyd, Praetorian Politics; Potash, Army and Politics, 36; Ruhl, Colombia, 20; Robert Dawse, "Military and Police Rule," in D. Austin and R. Luckham, eds., Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana, 1966-1972 (London, 1975), 16; Horowitz, Coup Motives, 113-117. Cf. J. Bayo Adekunle, "Pay, Promotion, and Other Self-Interests of Military Interveners in Politics," Military Affairs, XLV February 1981.

77. Ian Gentles, "Arrears of Pay and Ideology in the Army Revolt of 1647," in Brian Bond, ed., War and Society (Leicester, 1983), 44-66.

78. Loveman and Davis, Politics of Anti-politics, 63. See also Ruth First, The Barrel of a Gun (New York, 1970), 208, regarding the relationship between the demobilizing of Togo's veterans of the UN operations in the Congo and the coup in Togo that year.

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of-living increases in pay and retirement benefits, and "when Congress prepared (in September) to pay its own members while apparently neglecting the armed forces," the military intervened.⁷⁹ When threatened by a rebellion of liberals in the Argentine officer corps, Colonel Juan Peron blocked the attempt in part by informing the military community that the plotters had planned to cut army pay by a third, to reduce the army's numbers by 30%, and otherwise adversely to affect the institution.⁸⁰ One of the arguments used against President Joao Goulart by Brazilian army plotters in 1964 (in Documento LEEX) concerned the "new deprivations and abuses" that had been "imposed upon the military" due to "insufficient salary adjustments."⁸¹ Both the 1966 and the 1972 coups in Ghana were preceded by cuts in pay and allowances, and the coupmakers noted their distress at these reductions quite publicly.⁸²

Salary cuts hurt professional soldiers in a personal

79. F. Nunn, Chilean Politics, 54-55.

80. Potash, Army and Politics, 249-250.

81. Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics, 142. Cf. Horowitz, Coup Motives, 135, for similar evidence regarding Sri Lanka officers involved in the coup plot in 1962, and Edmund Fung, The Military Dimension of the Chinese Revolution, 154, for evidence of the importance of promotion and salary cuts in the coup-revolution of 1911.

82. Valerie Plave Bennett, "Malcontents in Uniform - The 1972 Coup d'Etat," in Austin and Luckham, Politicians and Soldiers, 300-312. Cf. Michael F. Lofchie, "The Uganda Coup: Class Action by the Military," The Journal of Modern African Studies, X (1972), 19-35.

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way, but they can be just as offended, in their corporate self, by cuts to the rest of the military budget. The failure to modernize the Chilean armed forces was a grievance within that institution on the eve of the coup in 1924,⁸³ as it has been in other militaries. General Ongania's announcement of the motives and objectives of the Argentine military junta in 1966 included mention of "the modern concept of national defense" and the need for "the armed forces to overcome (their)...financial difficulties and to have at their disposal the means necessary to fulfill their mission."⁸⁴ When in 1969 Bolivia's president spoke of cutting the army's budget and pulling out of the Inter-American Defense Board, and when he told visiting envoy Nelson Rockefeller that he preferred economic assistance to military aid ("plows would be better than bayonets"), his days in the Palacio Quemado were numbered; a military junta replaced him in 1971.⁸⁵

Officers worry about their service's resources; they worry even more about its survival if they believe that powerful political forces have initiated measures that imperil their institution's monop-

83. Nunn, Chilean Politics, 54. Cf. Hansen, "Career Motivation," in Janowitz and Van Doorn, On Military Ideology.

84. Loveman and Davies, eds., Politics of Antipolitics, 211. See O'Donnell, Modernization, 157, for similar, pre-coup remarks of General Ongania (on the need of the armed forces "to maintain aptitude and capability.")

85. Charles Corbett, The Latin American Military as a Socio-Political Force (Miami, 1972), 57-58, 60-63. Cf. Lovell, "Military and Politics in Korea," in Wright, Korean Politics, 172.

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lization of the legitimate use of force. When Bangladesh's Prime Minister, Shiek Mujibur-Rahman, tried to decentralize control of the military by proposing to place it under the control of local government authorities for civic action duties such as road-building as of September 1, 1975, junior and middle-level officers (some of whom he had dismissed) assassinated him on August 15.⁸⁶ Rumors that the Brazilian government might rearm the National Guard in late October and early November of 1889 were just as threatening as the rumors of force reduction and appear to have played a part in the decision to intervene on November 15. Seventy-five years later Brazilian officers again feared the creation of a rival military force, as Alfred Stepan has noted. Documento LEEEX, circulated among moderate-constitutionalist officers shortly before the coup, warned of President Goulart's plan "to substitute for (the military) a version of a red army or a Cuban militia." Regular army officers approached some Brazilian state militia officers with the same argument. One regular explained:

We are both in the same boat. If the worst comes to pass it will affect us all equally. For the higher ranks, the price will be life itself, for the others, the least that will happen is the loss of jobs...the Communists...will have to destroy all that exists. There will emerge a 'popular' militia....

President Alfonso Lopez of Colombia created a na-

86. Gowther Rizir, "Riding the Tiger," in Clapham and Philip, eds., Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes, 225.

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tional police force in the mid-1930s, rivaling the military. He also secured the disfranchising of all armed forces personnel, and he called the officers "parasites" in public. One military coup attempt followed another (albeit the Lopez government survived both.)⁸⁷ Officers also feared the creation of rival political militia forces in Finland throughout the 1920s and Spain in the mid '30s, Guatemala in 1954, Argentina in 1955, Venezuela in 1958, Peru in 1968, Bolivia in 1969, and Chile in 1973.⁸⁸ The fate of the federales, Mexico's regular army, disbanded and replaced by revolutionary forces during the Revolution that began in 1911, and, more recently, the fate of Cuba's regular army purged and reorganized by Fidel Castro, were well known to military leaders in Latin America.

Another way to risk military intervention is to threaten the autonomy of the military's rank structure and disciplinary system. If the government pardons mutineers, or a radical political group politicizes the rank and file, military leaders may express their outrage in pre-emptive, severe fashion. A Communist-led mutiny, timed to augment a general strike in Balbao, alarmed the Spanish officer corps in August, 1923; their alarm turned to outrage and coupmaking when the Government recommended clemency

87. Loveman and Davies, Politics of Antipolitics, 63; Stepan, Military in Politics 157-160; Ruhl, Colombia, 20.

88. William Stover, Military Politics in Finland: The Development of Governmental Control over the Armed Forces (Washington, 1981); Johnson, Military, 127; Valenzuela, Breakdown: Chile, 99-103; Luigi Einaudi, The Military and Government in Peru (Santa Monica, 1970); Burggraaff, Venezuelan Armed Forces, 130-170.

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for the mutiny's leader, who had been sentenced to death by a military court-martial.⁸⁹ Similarly, when President Goulart failed to punish naval mutineers in March, 1964, and then spoke to a group of army sergeants in a way likely to induce insubordination, his allies within the officer corps swung angrily over to the opposition, and in short order he was overthrown. One officer, a member of the Army's General Staff, who remained sympathetic to Goulart and was consequently purged by the junta, is a credible witness to this process. He told Alfred Stepan that

"the thing that finally was most important in moving military opinion against (Goulart) was the 'inversion of hierarchy.' Even strong (Goulart supporters in the army) broke with him after the mutiny and his speech to the sergeants."⁹⁰

89. Boyd, Praetorian Politics, 260. Cf. Ruth First, The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa and the Coup d'Etat (London, 1970), 197, who notes that Nkrumah's creation of an independent Presidential Guard regiment in Ghana, "more than any other single grievance, ignited the military into coup d'etat action."

90. Stepan, Military in Politics, 208; Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics, 72. In Chile in 1973 the leader of the Socialist Party called upon soldiers "to disobey orders which would mean shooting at the people," and this certainly upset the officer corps, but it cannot be viewed as central to a decision to intervene, as the statement was made in the wake of a coup attempt (on June 29) and while army units were vigorously breaking into various union-headquarters and factories in search of weapons. Valenzuela, Breakdown: Chile, 102; Frederick Nunn, The Military in Chilean History (Albuquerque, 1976), 287. See also Horowitz, Coup Motives, 115, for evidence that some army plotters in Sri Lanka in 1962 were upset by the Prime Minister's meeting

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The Torres government of Bolivia fell to a military coup in 1971 immediately on the heels of a revolutionary manifesto from the desk of "The Vanguard of the People," which informed the Bolivian army conscripts that they were "proletarians." This manifesto went on to propose the replacement of the regular Bolivian military with a people's militia. The Bolivian officer corps had come close enough to extinction after the revolution of 1952. Since the Torres government did not seem as distressed by "The Vanguard's" announcement as was the professional officer corps, the latter chose to ask Torres to take early retirement. Military systems can react vigorously to threats to their autonomy.

Necessary and sufficient causes

We have now seen evidence that severe economic distress, constitutional or political stalemate and tension, government use of military officers in non-military government roles, appeals by civilian opposition figures to military leaders, a sense of professional superiority to civilian administrators, and threats to the military institution's resources or autonomy precede and can cause military coups in competitive democracies. But these are necessary, not sufficient, causes. They are present, to one degree or another, in any coup attempt, but they may also be present without any coup taking place.⁹¹

with soldiers on "strike."

91. Amos Perlmutter's and Samuel Finer's views are at least akin to mine on this score. See Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press,

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Let me offer an illustration. Between 1930 and 1939 the United States experienced a severe depression. Neither the Hoover nor the Roosevelt administrations were able to restimulate the economy (until the outbreak of World War II). For several years (1933-1937) a constitutional deadlock between the Administration and the Supreme Court checked relief, reform and recovery efforts as dozens of federal and state depression-inspired statutes were declared unconstitutional. Left- and right-wing groups pointed to Soviet Russia or Fascist Italy and Germany as models to emulate. The armed services experienced several substantial cuts in pay and equipment budgets, certain of their leaders were used to run New Deal programs (such as the C.C.C. and the National Recovery Administration), and the army was, on one occasion, ordered to break up an encampment of demonstrating veterans in the capital. Several of the founders of the conservative American Liberty League approached retired Marine Corps General Smedley Butler with a proposal to lead a coup of veterans to overthrow the government.⁹² Standing in the wings was another charismatic military leader, former Army Chief of Staff, Douglas MacArthur (in charge of the attack on the encampment veterans), who would tell the public some eighteen years later

1977), 96; Finer, Man on Horseback, 63.

92. See Hans Schmidt, Maverick Marine: General Smedley D. Butler and the Contradictions of American Military History (Univ. of Kentucky Press: Lexington, 1987), 223-230; Jules Archer, The Plot to Seize the White House (N.Y., 1973); John L. Spivak, A Man in His Time (N.Y., 1967).

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that military men owed "primary allegiance" to "the country and its Constitution" rather than to "those who temporarily exercise the authority of the Executive Branch of Government...."

Yet there was no coup attempt. Neither Butler, nor MacArthur, nor any other military figure responded positively to the appeals from the right-wing fringe of the American Liberty League. The nation endured the Depression. The Republican Party and Socialist Party offered blistering critiques of the Roosevelt "New Deal," but remained "loyal." The unemployed demonstrated, but preferred the ballot box to the bullet. The armed services protested the cuts in pay and procurement, but they did so in the normal fashion, before a congressional committee or a service Secretary. There was no coup because almost everyone felt that military intervention was out of the question.

Later, in 1974, at the height of the Water-gate affair, when the House Committee prepared to recommend the impeachment of Precedent Richard Nixon, rumors circulated in Washington that the President might call upon the military for political assistance. A reporter spoke with several military leaders, all of whom rejected the idea as ludicrous. "Don't give me any of that Seven Days in May crap," one remarked, and assured the reporter that he and his colleagues knew their duties under the Constitution.⁹³

93. The book that officers referred to, a novel by Fletcher Knebel, concerned a coup plot by U.S. military leaders against adovish President in the aftermath of a limited war that had ended in a fashion unsatisfactory to the military and their hawkish civilian allies. Knebel depicts military and civilian constitutionalists overcoming the plotters only with some

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The behavior of the British military in the 1920s and early 1930s, during the Coalition government of Ramsay MacDonald, is worth noting as well. Faced with strikes and severe economic distress, with a government not overly friendly to the military or the interests of the social class that most of the officer leadership belonged to, with a serious naval mutiny, and with cuts in pay, personnel and weapons systems, the military carried out its orders without pause. Similarly, even though the Indian army officer corps since Independence has often been "critical of the disorder and unparliamentary behavior of groups newly 'recruited' to the political system," and has been called upon frequently to perform quasi-political duties, it has never plotted a coup. The same may be said of civil-military relations in Scandinavia and the Low Countries.⁹⁴

Call it socialization or tradition, something has

difficulty and good fortune. The fact that the book's plot was widely regarded as fantastically improbable by reviewers may serve as further evidence of my point regarding the importance of socialization and tradition.

94. Stephen Cohen, The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation (Berkeley, 1971), 197; Lloyd and Suzanne H. Rudolph, "Generals and Politicians in India," Pacific Affairs, XXXVII (1964), 5-19; Jerrold Elkin and W.A. Ritzel, "Military Role Expansion in India," Armed Forces and Society, XI (1985), 489-504; R. Kroes, "Decolonization and The Military: The Case of The Netherlands: A Study of Political Reaction," in Morris Janowitz and Jacques Van Doorn, eds., On Military Intervention (Rotterdam, 1971), 95ff.

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been at work in certain competitive democracies to preclude military coups - something other than economic prosperity, constitutional formulas, or careful stroking of the military elite. This is not to say that such conditions and measures are not useful; it is simply to say that they are not sufficient. For the military to remain subject to civilian control it is, first and foremost, necessary that the military believe that it should remain subject to civilian control. The surest way to achieve that end may be for a nation's civilian community to believe in and practice each of the core elements of competitive democracy: unfettered political parties and media, high standards of probity for public officials, independence of legislative and judicial bodies, an open franchise, and the observation of constitutional norms regarding the transfer of authority. A nation that enjoys these civil liberties and political rights will produce a military culture that accepts civilian contrail; the political culture feeds the military culture. In the words of Alexis de Tocqueville:⁹⁵

When once the citizens have learned to make peaceful and productive use of freedom and have felt its benefits,... these same men, if they follow the profession of arms, will bring into it, unconsciously and almost in spite of themselves, these same habits and mores. The general spirit of the nation, penetrating the spirit peculiar to the army, tempers the opinions and desires engendered by military life,

95. Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. J.P. Mayer (N.Y. 1966), 650-51.

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or by the all-powerful influence of public opinion, actually represses them. Once you have educated, orderly, upstanding, and free citizens, you will have disciplined and obedient soldiers.

Coup avoidance: some recommendations of secondary and of primary importance

Summing up, it seems clear that several conditions are often associated with and can lead to military coups. Economic distress is one of these; prosperity certainly helps to prevent the perceived need for a coup. Constitutional measures, or their absence, are others; granting the military special privileges, or calling upon it be the final arbiter of constitutional questions clearly increases the likelihood of praetorianism. Fixing the tenure of military chiefs of staff and specifying on paper that the military is always to remain subordinate to duly elected or appointed civilian officials is clearly helpful,⁹⁶ but it did not save Prime Minister Ali Bhutto, who instituted these changes in Pakistan five years

96. However, I am not in agreement with Huntington (Soldier and the State, 102, 110, 177) that civilian control of the military is facilitated by concentrating civilian control in one branch (be it executive or legislative), as in Wilhelmine Germany. The potential for abuse of that power by that branch was precisely why colonial Americans chose to divide the power. They were not dealing with a theoretical; they saw George III's control of the military manifest in his control of army and naval officer "placemen" in the Commons. See Laurence D. Cress, Citizens in Arms: The Army and Militia in American Society to the War of 1812 (Chapel Hill, 1982), chapter 3.

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before being overthrown by his army.⁹⁷ The constitutional existence or creation of an alternative armed force (such as state militia's or a national police) may also occasionally help, as it appears to have in Chile in the mid 1930s.⁹⁸ But such forms are clearly not sufficient, and the rapid expansion of such an alternative force can clearly prompt the very coup it is designed to prevent.

Other formulae for improved civilian control include limiting the size and strength of the military to correspond to the likely defense and security demands it will face, something that might be done in the context of bilateral or multilateral negotiations with potential foreign foes (who may also wish to reduce the size and cost of their militaries). Argentina's officer corps doubled, quite unnecessarily, between 1930 and 1945, because both civilian and military politicians sought allies within the officer corps. Sri Lanka's and Sierra Leone's pre-coup years saw similar expansion of their officer corps. And Spain's history from the 1860s to the 1930s is filled with evidence of civil-military tensions flowing from a top-heavy officer corps.⁹⁹ Clearly the depolitization of the Mexican

97. Gowher Rizir, "Riding the Tiger: Institutionalizing the Military Regimes in Pakistan and Bangladesh," in Chris Clapham and George Philip, eds., The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes (London, 1985), 219.

98. Liisa North, "The Military in Chilean Politics," in A. Lowenthal, ed., Arms and Politics, 170.

99. Potash, Army and Politics, 1928-1945, I, 249-50; Horowitz, Coup Motives; T.J. Cox, Civil-Military Relations in Sierra Leone; C. Boyd, Praetorian Politics.

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army in the 1920s and 30s was accomplished in part by reductions in the military's budget and the forcible retiring of many senior officers.¹⁰⁰ Selection up-or-out, preventing the top-heavy, career-anxious officer corps, is certainly wise, but too much pruning and too rapid promotion of junior officers can damage civilian control as well as too little, as John Lovell has demonstrated with regard to the Korean military of the 1950s, and Robin Luckham has demonstrated with regard to the Nigerian army of the 1960s. The rising expectations of young, recently-promoted majors in Nigeria were blocked by the knowledge that the recently promoted lieutenant colonels and colonels were also young. Pakistan's General Ayub Khan described a similar phenomenon.¹⁰¹

There was considerable unrest (in the late 1950s) among the officers caused by a spate of swift promotions from junior to senior ranks. This raised expectations to unwarranted heights....It was a curious phenomenon. Perfectly sensible people, would go about bemoaning their lot. Each one of them was a Bonaparte, albeit an unhappy one.

100. Edwin Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism: the Political Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Army, 1910-1940 (Albuquerque, 1968); David Ronfeldt, "The Mexican Army and Political Order Since 1940," in A. Lowenthal, ed., Arms and Politics, 300.

101. Luckham, Nigerian Military, 170-175; Lovell, "Military and Politics in Korea," *op. cit.*, 168; Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: a Political Autobiography (London, 1967), 37-38. See First, Barrel of a Gun, 436, for evidence of the importance of a self-pruning of officers to prevent promotion "bottlenecks."

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Colombia may have as modest a record of praetorianism as it does in part because of the traditionally modest size of its military.¹⁰² Costa Rica's experience is obvious, and worthy of emulation in many parts of the world, in this regard; in eliminating the military (after it had attempted to prevent duly elected persons from assuming office in 1948), Colonel Figures set an example that nations with little or no fear of external enemies, but a history of military intervention in politics, nations like Haiti and the Philippines, might seek to imitate. But governments seeking to reduce the size of the military often find their wishes frustrated by renewed security demands or vigorous political opposition. And, in any event, merely limiting size and firepower is no panacea. Battalion-size armies can dominate the political order of competitive democracies with "plantation" economies where control of the central city generally means control of the state apparatus.¹⁰³

While on the subject of central city control, we might consider the sorts of things that can reduce the ease with which military praetorians can seize power. A glance at the map gracing the frontispiece to Robert Potash's study of Argentine civil-military relations from 1928 to 1945, suggests a major problem for advocates of civilian control in that

102. Ruhl, Colombia, 18.

103. Thomas J. Cox makes this point as well (Civil-Military Relations in Sierra Leone, 113-114), as does Joseph P. Smaldone, "The Paradox of Military Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa," in Charles L. Cochran, ed., Civil-Military Relations: Changing Concepts in the Seventies (Free Press, 1974), 212.

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nation. Forces located at the Campo de Mayo base, as well as those in Buenos Aires proper, have relatively easy access to the central government buildings and radio/TV stations. When coupmakers also control the local Air Force base (cutting off access to the area from the interior of the nation), the government is at their mercy, barring the kind of popular movement Juan and Evita Peron were able to orchestrate in 1945. (Peron, himself an army officer, knew well the importance of the campo de Mayo base. When he learned of a coup plot against himself in October of that same year, he and his allies quickly retired an anti-Peronist commander of the Camp de Mayo, moved certain other officers to desk jobs, replacing them with Peronists, and gave all the enlisted men leave until Peron's election in February, 1946!)¹⁰⁴ In short, garrisoning troops close to capitals and central cities gives the government little chance to react to a military coup. Stationing the garrison at great distance from the capital may reduce the ability of the government to monitor officer behavior, but if those officers are professionals, with respect for the concept of civilian control, if they have not been politicized, and if the competitive aspects of the democracy are alive and well, there should be little need to move or monitor anyone.

Regular rotation of zone and unit commanders (to avoid the development of personal followings) is

104. Potash, Army and Politics, 1928-1945, 280-81. Peron also reacted to a coup attempt in 1951 by moving units from Campo de Mayo and Buenos Aires to Cordoba and other distant bases. Potash, The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1946-1962 (Stanford, 1980), 136. See also Luckham, Nigerian Military, 102.

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another sensible way to increase the likelihood of civilian control. The dividing of the control of key areas between units from different branches of the armed services is another. These were among the steps taken by Mexican governments in the past fifty-five years,¹⁰⁵ but their advisability does not rest on the example of that nation; professional rotation of officers and the use of inter-service rivalries are obvious means of increasing (though, once again, not of insuring) civilian control.¹⁰⁶

Corruption, fraud, venality, incompetence, excessive divisiveness in the political arena clearly provoke coupmakers. It is easy to ask, but not easy to provide, for less corruption, venality, or divisiveness in the politics of nations perceived to be rent by class or ethno-religious lines (as in El Salvador, Chile, Uganda, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria, or Sri Lanka), but fortunately the task is not a hopeless one. Popular insistence on free and open elections, an independent judiciary, a free press, a "loyal opposition", and an orderly and constitutional transfer of power are essential if competitive democracies are to avoid military intervention, and such popularity can develop and grow where it is presently insecure. Political toleration can take root and flourish in inhospitable soil; witness the cases of Colombia and Venezuela. Where political toleration is weak, one of three things may ensue: the

105. See Ronfeldt, "Mexican Army," in Lowenthal, ed., Arms and Politics, 300.

106. See, for example, Lewis Dexter, "Congressmen and the Making of Military Policy," in Nelson Polsby, ed., New Perspectives on the House of Representatives (Chicago, 1963).

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beleaguered "ins" may invite a carefully politicized military to prop them up with force; the disloyal "outs" may persuade an irritated military to overthrow the "ins"; or a guerilla force of "left" or "right"-wing radicals may begin to attack the military, prompting it to seize power (as in Uruguay and perhaps Peru). Each of these unappealing scenarios can be made less likely by the development and cultivation of a more tolerant civilian political culture. That is a big order, involving public education, value transformation, and the active cooperation of the political parties and the press, but it is a sine qua non, constituting one of the two most important measures one can take to ensure civilian control in a competitive democracy.¹⁰⁷

The other is the development and cultivation of the conviction within the officer corps that civilian control is the cornerstone of professional military conduct.¹⁰⁸ Officers who were taught that as children in schools and as cadets at the Academy, and who teach that principle themselves to the next

107. The importance of political culture to the problem of military intervention was first stressed by Samuel Finer, Man on Horseback. Statistical evidence for propositions regarding the importance of political toleration, pluralism, and participation may be found in Johnson, Slater and Mc Gowan, "Explaining African Military Coups d'Etat," APSR, LXXVIII (September 1984), 636.

108. Thus I echo the views of Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Arthur K. Smith: "civilian control is not a matter of levels of social and economic development, nor of maximizing the professionalism of the military... (it) exists if the officer corps has internalized the value of civilian supremacy as part of its ethical make up." (Military Role and Rule, 6.)

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generation of officers, are much less likely to plot intervention than those who hear, instead, of the military's duty as "Savior" or "Guardian of the Nation". Jonathan Kandell's remarks on the Chilean plotters of 1973 is a propos:¹⁰⁹

The greatest obstacle (to the coup) was the armed forces' 40-year tradition of political neutrality. "I would have pulled my hair out for teaching my students for all those years that the armed forces must never rebel against the constitutional government," said an officer who formerly taught history at a military academy. "It took a long time to convince officers that there was no other way out."

Another hostile witness to the importance of this acquired "tradition" of civilian control is General Alberto Ruiz. This officer was forced by Colombia's President to resign his commission after he was discovered to have been engaged in a coup plot. Ruiz later complained that the "Colombian civilian ruling class" had kept the military in "a state of complete submission. A constant indoctrination concerning the intellectual, social and political superiority of the civilian has been carried out which has produced an inferiority complex in the military."¹¹⁰ It may or may not have produced "an inferiority complex" in the Colombian military, but it does appear to have produced civilian control.

109. In L. North, "The Chilean Military," in A. Lowenthal, ed., Arms and Politics, 188. Cf. S. Cohen, The Indian Army, 129.

110. Ruhl, Colombia, 29.

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The military must espouse, cultivate, and cherish this attitude towards civilian control from within; the civilians must cling to it as well, and monitor its observance from without.¹¹¹ Military coups have failed (as in Germany in 1922, Venezuela in 1958, the Sudan in 1964, and France in 1961) whenever civilians would not tolerate the challenge to civilian supremacy. But civilians must first believe in civilian supremacy themselves. The successive Brazilian governments in the twentieth century who first tolerated and then could not curb the practice of the Clube Militar to hold partisan, political elections of its officers every two years may have invited the politization of that officer corps.¹¹²

111. After I completed and presented the first version of this paper (at a seminar on "Civil-Military Relations in a Constitutional Democracy" at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst in October, 1985), I was pleased to see that the papers of Professors John Lovell of Indiana University and Carlos Floria of the University of Buenos Aires argued the same points (Civilians must learn to tolerate political differences and encourage the military to remain subordinate to civilian control, and the military must teach and espouse civilian control). However, Professor Lovell noted that it is especially hard to inculcate the model of civilian control in military cadets and officers who entered the service with antidemocratic, authoritarian values, and Juan Rial of the University of Montevideo offers a similar, pessimistic verdict: "The military organization is unlikely to accept, in Latin America, a change in its model of socialization and its internal authoritarian forms. To do so implies a ... threat to the (military) corporation." (THE LEGITIMACY OF MILITARY INTERVENTION AND THE OPTION FOR DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA. See pp. 110 of this volume.

112. Johnson, Military and Society, 220.

THE COUP D'ETAT IN COMPETITIVE DEMOCRACIES

Colombian President Lleras Restrepo showed more sense, and courage, in 1960 when he replaced and reprimanded General Pinzon Caicedo for publishing an article in a military journal expressing dissatisfaction with civilian scrutiny of the military budget.¹¹³ So did former Turkish President Ismet Inonu, who was approached by army leaders shortly after the victory of the populist Democratic Party in the 1950 elections. They asked whether a military coup would not be appropriate. Inonu, a former army officer himself, was a firm believer in civilian control and constitutionalism. He dissuaded the officers from intervening, at least at that time.¹¹⁴

In short, civilians must assert control, and the military must be trained to accept control, or praetorianism will flourish. For some competitive democracies with less than enviable records of civilian control in the past, these are difficult norms to achieve, to be sure. But they are, unmistakably, the only paths to follow if one wishes to escape the praetorian trap. And it is a trap worth escaping.

113. Ruhl, Colombia, 33.

114. Ozbudun, Role of Military, 15.

Juan Rial

THE LEGITIMACY OF MILITARY INTERVENTION
AND THE OPTION FOR DEMOCRACY
IN LATIN AMERICA

C O N T E N T S

1. Armed forces of Latin America
or of the Latin Americas
2. Armed forces, capitalism and the "West" -
The question of democracy
3. (Re) construction of democracy
and armed forces in Latin America
4. The legitimacy of military intervention
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References

1. Armed forces of Latin America or of the Latin Americas

The term "Latin America" is used in the social-scientific literature, in the press and, generally, in current linguistic usage. In referring to the group of countries falling under that label, it is difficult to get beyond very basic and weak generalizations. A first point to be elucidated when discussing the subject of civil-military relations in Latin America is, precisely, whether an analysis of that group of countries, taken as a unit, makes sense.

For the majority of U.S. scholars, for their political class, and for the members of their Armed Forces and related agencies, there is a "reality" behind the term "Latin America". In line with this view, it is a region with the same predominant language - Spanish - the same cultural tradition, expressed in such phenomena as the preponderance of Catholicism, "non-modern" cultural norms - e.g. "machismo" - and an unstable political organization, a society in which authoritarian manifestations prevail and where personalism is imposed through "caudillismo" and clientelistic relationships.

Whereas this stereotype labeled "Latin America" does not greatly contribute to understanding the phenomena occurring in the area, it does have practical consequences. For the U.S. academia and society, Latin America exists and can (we would almost say must) be treated as a unit. In fact, many of the decisions made by the U.S. political class with regard to the region or various countries of the region, are based on this viewpoint.

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Latin Americans also tend to treat the region as a unit, although in this case it takes on another nature. It expresses the desire for the existence of unity, even though, in daily life, it is impossible to detect such unity since it has not been realized in practice.

The effects of considering Latin America to be a unit in the military area achieve a broader scope through the idea of "Pan Americanism", which includes the U.S. and Latin America in an asymmetric relationship. The operational consequences of Pan Americanism, at the military level, were the signing of the Rio de Janeiro Inter-American reciprocal assistance treaty in 1942; the subsequent creation, at the end of the same decade, of the Inter-American Defense Board, the Inter-American Defense College, the now defunct USARSA; and, recently, the organization of periodic conferences of the armed services of the Americas.

The myth of "Latin America" exists, and its unifying effects are so strong that they cancel local peculiarities. The first point to be taken into account when studying civil-military relationships in Latin America is the existence of the differences between the states and the societies that make up the region.

A common feature of all of the nations of Latin America is the presence of a pre-eminent State. Historically, the state has tried to mold societies in a process of force from "above". Many of these societies were created together with the state, while others were only somewhat integrated. Localism and regionalism predominated. The building of the nation was generally undertaken more quickly

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than the formation of the state. Today, in any event, this process has culminated with a few exceptions; however, the results are not the same in all the nations of the region. In some cases the process was carried out in desolate areas with new populations, in others it was imposed upon indigenous populations, without integrating them. On some occasions it has been the work of a primarily civilian elite, and in others it has been of a mixed nature, involving the participation of armed caudillos and their men as well as well-known urban leaders. Many of the countries have created their nation and their state, but the "coverage" of these entities can be deficient, because they exclude not only territories, but also important segments of society.

The peculiarities involved in constructing each state and the different traits of each society in which they are inserted must be among the first considerations when studying the political role of the Armed Forces in Latin America. A brief review of the origins of some of the existing Armed Forces will illustrate our position.

The Mexican case cannot be assimilated with any other in Latin America. The Mexican Armed Forces emerged following the revolution that began in 1910, as part of the triumphant movement. As a result of the consolidation of the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional), the military assumed the capacity of Armed Forces at the service of a dominating party.

There are two other cases in which the Armed Forces also arose from a post-independence revolutionary movement: Cuba and, more recently, Nicaragua; however, the differences in the ideological references,

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as compared with the Mexican case, indicate two realities requiring specific analyses.

In Cuba and Nicaragua the subject of civil-military relationships has scant "visibility". In these countries the Armed Forces are dependent on a dominating party, the PCC (Cuban Communist Party) in Cuba and the FSLN (Sandinista National Liberation Front) in Nicaragua, in which the military command is, at the same time, part of the political leadership (Dominguez, 1974; Leo Grande, 1978); however, under a model that is very different from that of the Soviets and Eastern Europeans.¹ And, more importantly for us, they exemplify cases in which liberal democracy was not part of the founding myth of the states. Democractic-liberal forms were expressly rejected in Cuba, and qualified and restricted in Nicaragua. In the two countries, Marxist ideology (explicitly and implicitly) predominates. For the same reason, the Armed Forces of these two countries lack contacts with their counterparts in Latin America and with those of the U.S.

Some countries of Central America and the Caribbean experienced the active presence of U.S. military

1. The Soviet Armed Forces emerged during the post-revolutionary international civil war. The process that put the Bolsheviks in power was eminently political and not military. The political and military commands did not coincide. In Eastern Europe, the current military forces were created within the framework of the Soviet occupation following World War II. Only one force was created independently due to resistance against the Wehrmacht - the Yugoslav force - and it is not by chance that in that country dissidence with the USSR, in spite of a common communist ideology, began at an early stage.

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forces at the beginning of the 20th century. When the U.S. forces departed, they left in their place new bodies created during the period of occupation: armies or national guards, which constituted the Armed Forces of Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama and the Dominican Republic. Subsequent history makes it impossible, for our purposes, to deal with these cases as a group. We have already seen that in Cuba and Nicaragua the forces developed during the period of occupation were destroyed by armed revolutionary movements. In the Dominican Republic the same process was about to take place in 1964. Renewed U.S. military intervention avoided a similar outcome, but the Armed Forces had to be re-established.

Under Duvalier, the Armed Forces in Haiti ceded their pre-eminence to a paramilitary organization, the "ton ton macoutes". The fall of "Baby Doc" in 1986 brought to the foreground an army which is going through a period of accelerated reconstruction as it attempts to incorporate professional guidelines.

In Panama, the institution designed by the U.S. continues to exist: the ex-National Guard, which today is the Defense Force and has specialized services and professional officers, who increasingly attend professional schools in other American countries. To achieve this, it has become "politicized": it has created its own corporative foundations - although still very much shaded by the "caudillismo" of the chiefs - as a national basis, and it has become a support for populist politics, which has resulted in cyclical "confrontations" with its creators.

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The military corporations of these Central American and Caribbean countries are not associated with a national founding myth. The patrimonial, predatory nature of these military corps have made them increasingly indefensible from an ideological standpoint. In confrontations with opposing military forces, with strong ideological cohesion, they have not only suffered military defeats, but also, in some cases, have been destroyed. In others, they had to make profound changes, for example in the Dominican Republic in 1965, or the former National Guard in Panama, which came under anti-U.S. leadership with Torrijos (and was subsequently continued by General Noriega). In Panama, recovering control of the Canal offered a substantially protagonist role to the Defense Force and its leaders, first Torrijos and later Noriega; thus, it provided a founding myth for the corporation that has erupted totally from its original U.S. mold.

In Central America, Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras have military forces whose origins are in some way connected to the colonial past. Two of these countries are still involved in a civil war. In Guatemala, the war apparently is entrenched in favor of the Armed Forces (Keefe, 1984), and a return to a democratic regime is being tried. In El Salvador, the conflict continues, without it being possible to firmly forecast the outcome. Honduras, in turn, is part of the conflict centered in Nicaragua. Although international alignments would permit a group study of these cases in Central America, the local differences here also warrant a careful, country-by-country analysis.

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In Guatemala, the deep social division based on the opposition of races has, perhaps, made it possible to better manipulate control of the population than in the neighboring country of El Salvador, where the campesino rebellions, like those in 1932, have historically posed a conflict based on the opposition of classes.

Finally, let us look at another Central American country: Costa Rica, the country that "abolished" the Armed Forces in 1949, following a civil war. In its stead it created a police force to keep order, which was named Public Security Force and has a non-professional, elective command. In reality, a non-professional force, and not an army, was defeated in that year. The "abolition" of the Armed Forces did not involve the destruction of any professional force for the simple reason that there never was one. While the current international conflict in the zone has tended to "militarize" Costa Rica once again - a prospect to which the majority of the elite in that country and almost all of the elite in its Central American neighbors is opposed - it is still an exceptional case whose relevance goes beyond the Latin American sphere.

In South America, most of the armed corps find their roots either in their respective country's struggle for independence or, directly, in the colonial force. The armed corps of the Hispanic countries can be counted among the former category, although there are marked differences among them. Brazil is an example of the latter category. Although in all cases the current Armed Forces do not maintain much continuity with their origins, given the professional

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changes undertaken since the end of the 19th century, this past allows them to identify themselves as a substantial part of the process of construction of their states, and, on the basis of this assumption, as guardians of the nation.

It took quite some time for the Venezuelan Armed Forces to initiate measures of modernization. The process began after the fall of the old patrimonial caudillos Andeanos. In 1935, the last of the Andeanos was deposed by the army. Afterwards, the corporation (re)founded the military academies; thus, a professional officer corps was created. Its core nucleus was composed of the sons of the old caudillos Andeanos. While this process was taking place, a coup d'etat produced a new dictatorship. The transition from the latter institutionalized what Bigler (1977) has termed the oldest case of a civil-military relationship within a classical demo-liberal framework in Latin America. We could add, however, that for this to happen, the demo-liberal framework itself had to be given a new, extended meaning: certain spheres of military autonomy had to be preserved within the framework.

Colombia, where the Armed Forces accept the supremacy of civil power, has specific problems, resulting from the lack of national integration. The constant reproduction of rural violence (Maullin, 1973) gives a permanent central role to the military forces, who are always at the borderline - in one way or the other - of active intervention in political decisions (Ruhl, 1980).

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The countries located in the heart of Andean America share the problem of a lack of national integration, which is associated primarily with the absence of a solution to the problem of the native population in Ecuador and Peru, and the disintegration between regions in Bolivia. For the Armed Forces in these territories, those problems were and are relevant. In all three countries, the fear of indigenous uprisings caused the mestizo and white elites to not lead the independence process during the 19th century. This process was insured by the presence of troops from the northern and southern part of the continent; however subsequent events have posed very different problems for the Armed Forces in each of these countries.

In Peru, the indigenous masses, who are not fully incorporated as citizens, today represent the main problem as regards the stability of the democratic regime because they are influenced by an agitation movement that is promoted by intermediary social groups, i.e. the mestizos. Peru is the only country where, contrary to other countries in Latin America, the process of modernization had the Armed Forces as its chief protagonist and not as an opponent (Stepan, 1978; McClintock & Lowenthal, 1983). The Peruvian case could be compared to that of Guatemala, where the Armed Forces also backed the modernization process and then were confronted by an insurrection of the indigenous base, directed by mestizos ("cholos" or "ladinos").

Whereas the modernization process at the end of the 1960s in Peru was promoted by a military-controlled state, the situation in Bolivia is the opposite. In

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Bolivia the "modernization from below" was aimed against the Armed Forces as victim and following the revolution of 1952, they were disbanded. Their reconstruction was undertaken on "caudillista" patrimonial bases, repeating an old Latin American model (Prado, 1984).

Ecuador is an intermediate case. The Armed Forces' modernization projects, although important, did not go so far as to heavily reorganize the country's structure (Fitch, 1977), but neither have they had to confront a revolutionary process based on agitation of an indigenous population lacking effective status as citizens.

Altogether, the social situation of the three countries situated in the heart of Andean America establishes very different conditions for the relationship between the Armed Forces and their governments and political regimes, as compared with other areas in the region.

The countries of the Southern Cone - Argentina, Chile and Uruguay -, which have achieved high degrees of modernization, appear to be much more homogeneous in their social make-up. The urban population predominates in all of them, with the middle class playing a significant role in terms of number as well as in terms of both the educational level and the socio-political mobilization promoted by it. The differences with regard to politics are marked, and, therefore, the framework of political action varies for the armed corps of each of these countries.

In Chile and Uruguay, the political parties ensured the stability of the democratic regimes until the

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beginning of the 1970s; the subsequent developments diverge.

At the outset of the 1970s, Chile attempted to undertake a pacific passage - or at least one that did not explicitly deal with the military side of the question - from capitalism to socialism. The armed corporation, without whose participation it would have been difficult to consolidate the process, considered this experience, after three years, to be a threat to the "good" order and put an end to it.

Argentina has not had a stable political regime since 1930. The existence of competitive democracy has not coincided with that of an "estado de derecho" (constitutional state), except temporarily, and the exclusion of political actors, often accompanied by authoritarian forms of leadership, has been the prevailing form of government.

Between 1930 and 1986, a democratic regime and an "estado de derecho" existed simultaneously for only six years, although the latter can be affirmed only with strong reservations. During the same period, there were six military governments who came to power through coups d'etat (1930, 1945, 1955, 1961, 1966, and 1976) and, in turn, other coups within each of these processes, which lasted 23 years. Military caudillos (Justo and Perón) were constitutional presidents for 15 years. Their presidencies coincided with exclusions of other actors or with limitations on liberal guarantees. These circumstances make Argentina one of the countries most cited in connection with the political action of its Armed Forces, although, paradoxically, this subject is one of the least studied.

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The three countries of the Southern Cone have undergone, or are still undergoing, a process in which the Armed Forces, in the role of the chief political actor, developed a political-corporative ideological corpus in their attempt to change the political formula - in Mosca's terms (1936) - as a first step to refounding the polity in each of the three countries (Arriagada, 1981; Perelli, 1987; Potash, 1969/80; Rial, 1986, 1986a; Rouquie, 1978; Varas & Agüero, 1984). Only the Chilean military corporation was relatively successful in its venture. The process of transformation was never completed in Argentina or Uruguay.

Paraguay is the only South American country in which a prebendary regime based on the support of the military force has survived, and, for that reason, it cannot be compared with other nations.

Finally, let us turn to Brazil, which shared the new experience of a refoundational military power together with the countries of the Southern Cone (Stepan, 1971, 1988). After the phase of corporative handling of the government by the Armed Forces culminated, Brazil is now moving toward a new model of relationships between the military and the political system, which is unlike that of the other countries of the Southern Cone.

If our objective is to understand (and to some extent influence) actual policies, a case-by-case study would be essential, even if we start out with general hypotheses for handling of the problem. From an academic point of view, however, we will set forth a general framework in order to cover the entire subject, while attempting to make the least number of references to specific countries.

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We will first look at the socioeconomic and political orders, which are common to all but two (Cuba and Nicaragua) countries of the region.

It is important to note that the idea of the Armed Forces as an institution, which we address here, must not be confused with the concept of organization. The concept of institution is broader in scope and refers to an organization which shapes mentalities among its members. The members of an institution share values and visions of the world, myths and rituals, many of them organized and others institutionalized by nonformalized routes and twists. What is substantial for the existence of an armed force is its strong ideology, and not merely the routine expression of it in the form of condensed doctrines or weak ideologies. Strong ideology is at the heart of the socialization processes; it is transmitted to the members of the institution so that, even if the circumstances bring about change - such as the adoption of new organizational or technological guidelines - the institution itself remains unchanged and permanent, as a substantial reference of a given order.

Another important point needs to be clarified before continuing with the discussion. Throughout this paper we will make generic references to the Armed Forces, when, in many cases, the concrete application of the term would appear to be less broad, covering only the chief service - i.e. the army. Whereas that force plays a dominating role with substantial importance in all Latin American countries, in many countries, particularly in the smaller ones, it is the only force that counts.

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However, in spite of the fact that the other services - i.e. the navy and the air force - tend to have myths and rituals of their own, their ideological basis and their dependence on the chief service is so overwhelming that the affirmations we make in relation to the army cover them as well.

2. Armed forces, capitalism and the "West" The question of democracy

Alfred Vagts (1937) correctly sustained that an armed force rests "upon the order in which it takes form"; the military forces are thus the guardians of the status quo predominant at the time of their origin.

It cannot be affirmed that the armed contingents of Latin America were born within a capitalist context. But, when these "caudillista" military forces were created as part of the independence movement at the beginning of the 19th century the Latin American countries had interdependent links with the countries of Western Europe, which were in the process of building capitalism. The initial framework within which the region's Armed Forces appeared was that of expansion of capitalism to what today is called the "Third World." "Order" was geared to protect the constant expansion of the market, to the detriment of pre-capitalist forms and of "organizational neo-archaism," imposed in the uninhabited zones by the first settlers. The relationship between the new military forces and the social sectors that dominated the growing market was very close.

This was the first reference, of a material nature, but there was a second, more important one, of an

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ideological nature, in the weak, doctrinal sense. The national armies of Latin America were formed within a liberal ideological setting. Even those that were not involved in a war of independence, as is the case in Brazil, adopted a liberal political formula. Some of these military organizations were associated with oligarchic republics, while other sustained monarchical regimes.

Although there is no organizational and structural continuity between the present Armed Forces in Latin America and their 19th-century predecessors, the majority of the organizations present themselves as creators of their nation and, in many cases, of their state. This permanence finds its expression in the founding myths and the ritualized traditions which affirm them.

Almost all the professional forces of South America were not created until the end of the 19th century. The Central American forces were created in the 20th century, some very recently. Nevertheless, the majority of these armed corps trace their official history back to the period in which independence was obtained. There are two exceptional cases, Cuba and Nicaragua. In those states the founding myth refers to the "second" independence. The ideological framework of the armed corps in these two countries is not demo-liberal, but socialist with a Marxist stamp.

The armies of Latin America, with the exception of those of Cuba and Nicaragua, were created to support the construction of a social order dominated by market relationships. Those of Cuba and Nicaragua also had the main mission of supporting a new political system, which imposed a revolutionary

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change in the social structure, implying the end of the capitalist regime.

The prevalent political framework at the time of creation was professedly liberal in the majority of cases. Bolivia, in 1952, illustrates an opposite development. In other countries a democratic political situation did not exist when the military force was created or modernized in the process of re-founding, as was the case in the Dominican Republic in 1964, Brazil in 1889, and Uruguay in 1975. Nevertheless, in almost all the Latin American countries, the aspired political regimes, at least as expressed in discourse, were based on a liberal doctrine. The armies lived with democratic governments, even if the practical implementation of democracy was restricted and elitist, i.e. the so-called oligarchic republics. Given that framework, problems with the military force arose from the lack of agreement between the ruling classes and the political class, which included the heads of the armed groups.

The primary societal reference, the market, has led the Armed Forces of Latin America to constant tensions and maladjustments. Latin America did not attain a triumphant capitalism, but rather forms which have been classified by some academic trends as dependent.

In view of a reality that is perceived as unsatisfactory, the loyalty of the Armed Forces to the capitalist socioeconomic system tends to be questioned from time to time. Nevertheless, since the alternative system - the socialist system - has been associated with ideological trends that oppose the existence of the current armed corporations, the armed corporations have been forced to accept the

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existence of capitalism. However, their acceptance is, in general, highly critical, and they often voice their criticism explicitly in discourse.

Both liberalism and socialism have an anti-militarist doctrinal position, but they accept the the armed organization as a necessary evil.

Liberals and Marxists tolerate the military corporations since it was the solution of a military question that made it possible to impose their doctrine in a given political order. But both seek the application of the ancient maxim of Cicero: "cedant arma togae." Mao Ze Dong rephrased it as "the party commands the rifle."

Living with the military apparatus has been a constant concern of the ruling and political classes throughout history. One solution to this worry, which has been tested both by the ruling classes and the political class, and has been traditionally accepted by the Armed Forces, was to alienate the Armed Forces from society. The armed corps, without exception, accept the socioeconomic framework in which their activity takes place as a given. They also accept the political order deriving from its existence.

Capitalistic development pushes the military forces to strengthen that alienation. As proposed by many classical thinkers, a societal project that attempts to exclude war converts the military into plunderers. The capitalistic system tends, intrinsically, to limit the legitimacy of armed institutions, reducing them to a sort of security instrument, or, in Janowitz's formulation, to constabulary forces that must look after society by exercising

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violence or threats, but which lacks the means for its own legitimization. In the most important armed force of the region, that of the U.S., this is the prevailing model.

The predominating professional approaches of the U.S., especially with regard to recruiting personnel (which have led Charles Moskos to develop his model of an armed force governed by occupational and not institutional criteria (1977, 1986)), tend to give the market a leading role. The alienation of the military from civilian and political society is markedly reduced in this type of force. Nevertheless, many question the efficacy of a force conceived of in the same way as a business corporation.

Moskos himself has further elaborated his understanding to allow for the possibility of a pluralistic model: a military force based on institutional principles for its elite units and on professional principles for the rest of the units and diverse support services. Here, the problem of the legitimacy of a force which seeks to banish itself from its own sphere reappears.

The members of the Latin American officers corps generally tend to consider only the institutional model to be valid. They do not accept the idea that they are members of an organization that can be created, changed, and even "closed down". They believe they are part of a transcendent institution and not of a mere organization with a list of personnel in hierarchical order, material and financial resources, and a job to do.

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For them, the job, precisely and in the first place, is the institution itself, and not its incidental purpose, or its use.

Assuming institutional positions implies discussing the political models of all of society, and this is normally what is done by the armed corporations of the "underdeveloped" or "developing" world.

Trying to get beyond capitalism has been a constant temptation for the Armed Forces of various Third World nations. For those born within that framework, however, doing so can imply the fall of the military institution and the triumph of those whom the Armed Forces normally consider their enemies. Keeping in mind that, as Armed Forces, these corporations can only act in the name of a social order that is accepted - or desired - in practice, they are faced with a dilemma: either they support the capitalistic system or they accept the possibility of their own destruction. It seems very unlikely that they will be able to find another route. In those cases where the Armed Forces constitute an established part of a state whose desired order or whose prevailing doctrinal ideological form takes on socialist traits - as is the case in many African countries - attempts are made to get beyond the current order by other ways which, given that our subject is Latin America, will not be included here.

Acceptance varies with regard to the Western framework, if we understand the political-cultural references as such, including the demo-liberal doctrines. The Armed Forces are enthusiastic

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defenders of the traditional values of family, private property, and religious beliefs. In this respect, they affiliate themselves with the West. However, this affiliation does not extend to the set of political doctrines considered progressive.

Adherence to forms of thought derived from the Christian tradition is a constant among the Armed Forces of Latin America. In many countries, the military position coincides with the official position of the state in that they acknowledge Catholicism as the official religion of the country. In other cases, this stand accentuates the differences between the armed corporation and the state, particularly when there is marked secularization of the latter and this is perceived to be associated with a demo-liberal political regime. In all the cases, the demo-liberal doctrine and its implementation is perceived to favor the dissolution of traditions rooted in a natural order. This is one of the main reasons why such a doctrine is considered to be a threat to the maintenance of lifestyles considered to be the valid pillars of an order that "must exist."

Historical processes have caused the idea of democracy to be connected to the West, together with the Christian cultural tradition and the values associated with it. The "free world" with which the Armed Forces of Latin America identify themselves, defends democratic values. The Armed Forces cannot repudiate democracy: they must act in its name.

Despite the lack of confidence expressed by the officers of the majority of Latin American military forces with regard to democracy and liberalism, they have no other alternative than to sustain democratic values - even if attempts are made to deny liberal-

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ism and to restrictively qualify democracy.

The Armed Forces need to sustain democratic values - which are those of the West - in relation to the alternative, which implies the possible defeat and suppression of the existing armed corporations if these values are denied. In line with the logic - albeit a perverse form of argumentation - that the enemy of my enemy is my friend, it could be said that almost all the Armed Forces of Latin America have a vested interest in preserving democracy as a transcendent myth. This point should be taken into account by the political classes of Latin America when they address the subject of their relations with the Armed Forces.

Among the members of the military forces there is a much greater questioning of liberalism, of the corpus of ideas deriving from jus-naturalist positions at the basis of individual guarantees for the citizen, than there ever could be with regard to the operation of representative institutions in line with principles of majority.

Individual guarantees have been perceived as instruments utilized by organizations and interest groups that seek to "subvert order" and not as guarantees for individual citizens. Thus, political formulas such as "democradura" - to use Schmitter's conceptualization - find supporters within the military corporations.

On the other hand, the existence of elections and of representative institutions tends to be less questioned. A substantial exception is that those who are understood as enemies of the prevailing system participate in the political game. And, with regard

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to institutional functioning, the operation of deliberative bodies - primarily parliament - is being questioned and these bodies are accused of demagoguery and inefficiency.

Some members of the officers corps identify the West with older processes. They believe that the present West is the heir of Greece, Rome and the Holy Empire, the defender of Catholicism, and of the so-called natural order. They believe that the Reformation introduced a deviation of that tradition by opening the door to liberalism and to the "dissolving" values introduced by the North Atlantic revolutions. These versions of historical developments, which assume an integral character that at times appears to be Catholic in nature and at other times, paradoxically enough, secular (Perelli, 1987), are not usually predominant, except in some of the more important armed corps, e.g. those of the Southern Cone.

The mixture of such Western concepts as liberalism and, more recently, democracy, which is conceived substantially as a polyarchical competence, is a difficult one. Even the idea of democracy as consociation based on Medieval theories (Althusius), is more favorably than the formulation of democracy which aims at the predominance of the majorities, established through rules.

In other political contexts in the North Atlantic world these problems are not linked to the legitimacy of the corporations. They are outside this framework, i.e. meta-institutional. In most Latin

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American countries, the issue of corporative legitimacy is part of the institutional construction itself, and it comprises the organization that structures it.

Only rarely have the armed corporations of Latin America proposed alternatives that would question the Western models. The institutional "corrective" measures - the term being understood as institutional arrangements in this case - which are introduced when they intervene in the management of everyday politics, are based on the principle of exceptionality and of the commissarial dictatorship (Schmitt, 1966) they believe the Armed Forces should exercise as defenders of the nation and the state.

No social revolution has been possible without a change in the Armed Forces, and in the majority of cases a change implies their destruction. The norm is for the Armed Forces to defend the old social order, although on occasion they do participate - generally as leaders - in a process of reform or in the creation of a new socioeconomic system. Japan in the 19th century and the Peruvian attempt from 1968-1975 illustrate this point.

In the Latin American countries of today, it seems unlikely that the military forces would be willing to embrace a movement of social change that would abolish the capitalistic system in their countries. At most, some armed corporations may adhere to reform projects, who, at times, have to confront similar difficulties as those faced by revolutions.

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If this is true, the Armed Forces of Latin America, with the exception of Cuba and Nicaragua, will continue acting within a capitalistic framework² and, thus, the limit of possible conscience for these corporations will lead them to sustain, at least discursively, and presumably in more than one case substantively, democratic forms,³ and, under favorable circumstances, to tolerate or even support an estado de derecho in which liberalism fully prevails. Provided that the military corporations do not believe that parties opposed to the system could win an election, they will respect the rules of the game of democracy. The estado de derecho will be supported as long as social conflicts do not reach a level that constitutes a perceivable threat to the state and to the prevailing socioeconomic system. If this were to happen, given that the Armed Forces act corporately and tend to think according to the same paradigm, the military institution may believe that the enemy is trying to take advantage of the liberal guarantees contained in the estado de derecho. Once such a situation arises, it could cause the military to suppress or at least limit the said guarantees.

2. In this paper we will not discuss the possibility of defeat of some of the Armed Forces at the hands of other, opposing military corps, as may be the case in El Salvador. Even if this should happen, it would not invalidate the application of our argument to the majority of the remaining countries.

3. This is not the place to discuss the subject of convergence of capitalism with democracy. We merely note that the form in which this subject is perceived by the military tends toward this association. And that perception, regardless of whether it is true or not - or whether it functions efficiently in our countries -, does have practical effects.

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3. (Re) Construction of democracy and armed forces in Latin America

By the end of the 1980s the majority of South American countries will probably have a democratic regime. At least this is the wishful thinking of the majority of the political communities of those nations (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986).

Since authoritarianism has been surmounted in Brazil and the Southern Cone, only two dictatorships remain in 1988. These two forms of dictatorial government are based on the support of the Armed Forces; however, whereas the personal leadership of Stroessner in Paraguay is an archaism, that exercised by Pinochet is based on new developments, i.e. the new professionalism of the military organizations. Yet, it is possible that the two countries may undergo transition processes in the near future.

In the unstable environment in Bolivia, President Siles managed to complete his mandate, and the hyperinflation recorded at the end of his administration was not followed by the usual coup d'etat. The violence in the Peruvian sierras did not keep President Belaunde from fulfilling his mandate. In Colombia, the persistence of rural and urban guerrilla movements did not cause the collapse of the political regime. In spite of the eminent role of the military forces in Argentina, Brazil (Stepan, 1987), and Uruguay (Rial, 1986) after the armed corporations left the government, the regimes of these countries are considered democratic. Ecuador and Venezuela show the least active presence of the Armed Forces in the political arena.

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Only Surinam, which could not be considered a Latin American country before, presents a different pattern in this part of the Americas. There have been no changes in the Caribbean. The recent fall of Duvalier has pushed the regular military forces to the fore, although we still do not know in which direction the new regime is heading. The Dominican Republic maintains the demo-liberal pattern; Cuba, the socialist pattern; Puerto Rico continues to be a commonwealth of the U.S.; and the English-speaking Caribbean, after U.S. intervention in Grenada, presents no significant changes.⁴

Mexico maintains its PRI. In Panama the Guard continues to stay at the helm. On the other hand, the situation in Central America could change dramatically. Guatemala seems to have entered a process of (re)democratization, although the problem of the indigenous population is still present and its proximity to countries that are involved in conflicts could lead to a rapid reversal of the situation.

Political and military considerations have kept the U.S. from invading Nicaragua. The Latin American countries are not willing to do so in its name, as happened in 1965 during the second stage of the

4. The English-Dutch-French-speaking countries, located in Central America, the Caribbean and northern South America, do not have major ties to those of Latin America, but they are neighbors and share a zone of conflict. Some of these new states may find themselves involved in internal wars or internationalized wars. Their military forces, with their European roots, are closer to the patterns of action of the African nations, which were decolonized in the sixties and seventies than to those of Latin America. For this reason we have left them out of our analysis.

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invasion of Santo Domingo. If the scenario does not change, the "contras" can only harass, but it is improbable that they will win. And all revolutions that have significant support from the population tend, over the course of time, to favor that population. Nevertheless, the external context is not as favorable as it was to Cuba in 1961-62. This last factor creates high degrees of uncertainty regarding Nicaragua's future.

The persistence of the Salvadorean conflict favors Nicaragua, even if, ultimately, it is resolved in favor of the existing regime and its Armed Forces. It is obvious that a victory by the guerrillas would not only affirm Nicaragua, but also would alter radically the balance of power in the region. The war zone includes Honduras, whose political and military fate is tied to the resolution of the conflict, as well as Costa Rica. As far as Costa Rica is concerned, no matter who wins the conflict, the very existence of the conflict is bound to provoke the militarization of that country, even though it is questionable whether or not this process would imply the creation of a professional Armed Force.

The process of reconstructing democracy - which in the majority of cases could be more accurately called "construction" - seems to be restricted to South American countries and to only a few countries in other areas. In the Spanish-speaking Caribbean, the only country involved in this process is the Dominican Republic, and in Central America, those countries who have taken that course, such as Costa Rica, are threatened by an international war or are already involved in it.

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For the purpose of this paper, we shall understand democracy to be exclusively the effectiveness of polyarchical rules of the game and of the so-called "estado de derecho" according to juridical provisions as well as the limitations of such a state that may be established in accordance with legal resolutions. We will not take into account any definition which attempts to give social contents to the term democracy. It was not in this sense that the redemocratization process was proposed in the countries where it was initiated in the 1980s, i.e. the countries that had suffered dictatorial forms of government.

Within this democratic framework, in which social inequalities continue to be very marked, where the majority of the popular classes continue to live in poverty, and where economic growth will not be sufficient to catch up with the leading countries, it can be presumed that acute social crises, social protest movements, and, perhaps, new attempts by armed groups to gain power will occur.

Keeping this scenario in mind, what models can be used to establish a relationship between the Armed Forces and their governments be? Why is democracy the model that is most easily accepted by the Armed Forces?

To answer these questions we must first try to determine how the Armed Forces of the respective region understand their mission at this point.

The primary "raison d'etre" for all armed corporations continues to be to try to win any wars. However, how can a sense of identity with this mission be construed when the possibilities of tradi-

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tional confrontation among the states become less and less probable?

In order to establish a clear mission for the Armed Forces without segmenting and segregating them from the rest of society, without allowing them unnecessary degrees of autonomy as a social actor, both the members of the political class and the members of the military corporation - in their capacity as experts in the use of violence - should share a common view on the meaning of war and peace mean.

This is precisely what was not done in Latin America; instead the actual design of military policy was left in the hands of the armed corporation. In this way, the Armed Forces were allowed to reflect independently on war.

The outcome has been constant theoretical elaborations regarding their mission on the part of military intellectuals of some of the most important countries in the region, with very relevant practical results.

But much more important is the contribution regarding the subject of revolutionary war, which is scantily studied and normally confused with the so-called doctrine of national security, whose origin is - erroneously - attributed exclusively to the influence of the U.S. (Arriagada, 1981; Perelli, 1987).

The academic community - meaning a community of intellectuals recognized in this capacity by the universities - considers geopolitical thought of little value, and it is not taken seriously by the political class, either, at least not by those who

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aspire to obtain the support of the masses in order to represent them. Its importance has been substantial, however, in shaping the destiny of some countries; Brazil is a good example of this.

The transformation of Clausewitz's aphorism:

"war is the continuation of politics by other means"

into the theory set forth in the works of the German Marshal Ludendorf (1964):

"politics is the continuation of war by other means"

and the assumption of the concepts of "total war", constitute the strongest indicator of the degree of autonomy reached by the Armed Forces.

The definition of who the enemy is, of the mission corresponding to the Armed Forces, and of the legitimacy of the actions that can be undertaken by armed corporations, was the end product of the work of "organic intellectuals" of the Armed Forces of Latin America, many of whom did not belong officially to the military corporation. This elaboration did not involve the participation either of the governments or, of course, of civilian society.

These doctrines, or ideologies in a weak sense, and the discourses in which they were expressed were created in a number of ways. Geopolitical concepts, especially German ideas, the influence of the French doctrine of "guerre revolutionnaire" - which was transmitted directly, for example, in Argentina, through a technical mission - and the adoption of the elaborations relating to "national security" emanated by the U.S., were some of the main ways.

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The need for an enemy - any enemy - that could give meaning to military action and reinforce corporative identity, was satisfied with the discovery that wars of a new type could be waged.

Those who elaborated these concepts sustain that the current wars differ from the classic inter-state confrontations. The new forms of war involve internal confrontations, total mobilization of resources, and manipulation of the population. Identification with the West (vide supra) made it easier to identify the enemy, to wit, Communism, Marxism in other formulations, and more generally, subversion (Arriagada, 1976/1981; Perelli, 1987).

The doctrine of the military corporations in many Latin American countries has produced an "operational inversion" with respect to the recent positions, substantially taking as reference the "foquiste" doctrine, originally expressed by Ernesto Che Guevara. The new doctrines place the main enemy within the society and the state, responding to the process of militarization of the left (Arriagada, 1981).

Some military intellectuals attempted to elude the sole formulation of a reactive doctrine by seeking support in the philosophical-religious thought of the Christian Middle Ages, which was updated to correspond to current conditions, and by moving toward the integralist positions (Perelli, 1987). However, they could not get beyond the basic contradictions between this ideological corpus and the existence of a capitalist society in which the mass of the population is perceived to be located in the middle strata and where there is no space provided for warriors, i.e. a society which adheres to liberal

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positions - and even to post-Enlightenment brands of socialism.

The first point that needs to be looked at in the so-called civil-military relations in democratic countries would have to be, precisely, the discussion of the destiny of the Armed Forces, bearing in mind the following questions:

Why do they exist?
Who is their possible enemy?
What mission do they fulfill?
Who commands and why?

Lloyd George's aphorism regarding the role of the military in war should be remembered. The political classes of Latin America left those issues in the hands of the Armed Forces at the cost of losing control over the armed corporations, which were, thus, able to become autonomous. Today it has to be accepted that the Armed Forces not only discuss an issue also, finally, make the relevant decisions. Their autonomy, though not desired - or desirable -, is a fact. And it is only by acknowledging this circumstance, - i.e. that the Armed Forces constitute a political actor with a voice and a doctrine of its own, an actor accustomed to making decisions and being autonomous - that the political classes will be able to reconquer a role in determining the purpose of the military corporation.

The liberal doctrine that shapes the thought of the majority of the members of the political communities of Latin America tends to be "naturally" antimilitarist. The autonomous armed corporations of the region, on the contrary, only begrudgingly accept liberal principles. Instead they insist that

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the relationships between the state and the Armed Forces are copied from the advanced countries, which imply the preexistence of a provision tending toward subordination - a subordination which does not exist in Latin America -, and which leave the discussion of new issues in the hands of the Armed Forces alone. This promotes the tendency toward segmentation and autonomization of the Armed Forces.

Within this framework, the option for democracy begins, precisely, with this definition of the mission corresponding to the Armed Forces.

The military corporations as well as the majority of the political class perceive as existent an unlimited stock of ideologies, doctrines, institutional arrangements and modes of political action.

In a political culture that is shaped by a Christian heritage, subsequent contradictory jus-naturalist contributions as well as by the rationalist theories of the Enlightenment, the supply of ideologies (in both a strong and a weak sense), institutional arrangements and modes of political action which are perceived as existent - and we must stress this concept of "perceived" as opposed to what might really exist - tend to become polarized.

The majority of the Latin American Armed Forces reject any notions of class struggle and socialist doctrines. On the other hand, the preferable alternative is not so clear with regard to the predominant socioeconomic form, the forms of the state, the social policies desired, elite or mass politics and the ways to implement them, and the type of institutional arrangements.

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The preference for democracy or dictatorship appears to be subordinated to the basic ideological option: rejecting class struggle and the doctrines associated with this conception. Occasionally the military has perceived the democratic regime to be permissive and, consequently, threatening, since could facilitate the development of positions that subvert order, thus constituting the doorway to socialism.

Nevertheless, all dictatorial forms tried must be implemented in the name of a democratic restoration, even if the theories that are advocated are a contradictory form of nonliberal democracy, which never has been tried in practice.

Attempting to get out of the democratic regime implies refounding order, while maintaining the basic ideological options.⁵ The association between democracy, capitalism and the West predominates among the polar options, and, at the moment, it is the only one which can give legitimacy to military intervention of the Armed Forces in the political system.

5. For example, the Reichswehr, upon becoming the Wehrmacht, was a founding part of the Nazi regime. The force created to support a democratic regime in a capitalist society opted to support Nazism, when it perceived that the Socialist alternative would lead to anarchy and the dissolution of order as well as the elimination of the corporation's monopoly in the use of violence. Subsequently, the relations between the Wehrmacht and the new corporation, the SS, were also stormy, although this fact was partially concealed by the general situation arising from the great confrontation that began in 1939.

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4. The legitimacy of military intervention and the option for democracy

Underlying the problem of military intervention is that of its legitimacy. Normally, the Armed Forces act in the name of something. They cannot justify their action as a political actor in and of themselves. In Latin America, their segmentation with respect to society and the state is based on the belief that the legitimacy of the Armed Forces as a political actor is founded on the nation. They exist because of and for the nation. It is to that mythical entity - the nation - that they owe "subordination and obedience".

In a democracy, in operational terms, the Armed Forces should fulfill their duties of subordination and obedience to the mandataries regularly elected as representatives of the nation. In other nondemocratic regimes, the Armed Forces are subordinated to the existing regime, be it to the party or to its leaders etc.

In the formally democratic regimes of Latin America, however, the Armed Forces, through their doctrinal re-elaborations, have come to distrust the representatives of the will of the people as well as the state apparatus as a whole. The Armed Forces have faith only in themselves and in those who they consider their immediate allies, both inside and outside the country.

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A second substantial point of the discussion on civil-military relations needs to address the following questions:

- Does the armed corporation have legitimacy to intervene as a political actor in the political system?
- Should this possibility be totally rejected?
- If the possibility is accepted, when, how and with what limitations is it acceptable?
- Is it possible to translate it into norms?
- If it is considered unacceptable, how can the Armed Forces be effectively subordinated in view of their current segmentation with respect to society and their autonomy within the state?

These questions are not easily addressed. In the Federal Republic of Germany, where the new Armed Forces had to surmount the problem of an anti-democratic tradition among the armed corps, an inscription of the Pietist Christoph Friedrich Dettinger in the German Military School of Civic Education (Zentrum Innere Führung der Bundeswehr) says:

"God grant us
the serenity to accept the things we cannot change;
the courage to change the things we can, and
the wisdom to know the difference between the two".⁶

This is precisely the issue that needs to be addressed. Military ideology necessarily has authoritarian contents. The Greco-Christian concepts of honor, however, permit attenuation of the effects of those

6. Cited from Roghman: "Armed Forces and Society in Western Germany", in Janowitz and Doorn, 1971.

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aspects. For this to happen, however, the single ideological corpus of the military forces - which is the foundation for both the professional and the corporative aspects, to which the strictly political dimension is added - need to be broken down into so many clearly demarcated branches (Janowitz and Doorn, 1971).

The professional image, based on the esprit de corps, depends substantially on discipline and hierarchy. As sustained in several regulations of the Latin American military forces, discipline is the "soul" of the organization: it is what upholds the hierarchy and, in turn, subordination. This necessarily leaves little room for dissent and, as in all total institutions (Goffman, 1967), favors authoritarian tendencies. The diverse forms of punishment (Foucault, 1983) are geared to the same end. Discipline, hierarchy and punishment permit, together with the criteria of technical competence (Stepan, 1988), the normal and normative management of an institution whose ultimate source of authority is the superior commander. In this sense, and in the final analysis, it is then be the corporative as well as the political ideology of those who may come to exercise such command, which will determine the position of the military force vis-a-vis the current political regime. Obviously, the basic prerequisite for this to apply is the unity and verticalism of the military force.

The corporative ideology sought in the advanced countries of the West tries to confuse itself with the professional self-image of the expert in the use of violence at the service of the state of which it is a part. Nevertheless, in almost all the Latin American countries, with the exception of those that

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do not qualify as demo-liberal countries or whose qualification in that respect is, at least, questionable - e.g. Mexico and Nicaragua - they do not consider themselves to be a subordinate entity of the state or of society. They consider themselves above it, since they are its founders, guardians of the way of life and the lifestyles of the society and of the state.

In line with the history of their countries, where the creation of the state involved the Armed Forces in a protagonist role - or as the "vertebrate" institutions of a society lacking integration (Ortega y Gasset, 1952) - the Armed Forces cultivated a widely known tradition: the supremacy of the warriors.

General von Seeckt, chief of the Reichswehr, considered this force "the pure image of the state," while Juan Domingo Peron sustained that the Armed Forces were the "synthesis of the nation" and belonged only to it. In the 19th century, Spain went so far as to legislate the capacity of the Armed Forces as a "moderating power", a balance between possible forces that could affect national integrity (Finer, 1962).

As a corporation, the Armed Forces are an incarnation of legitimate order:

- (a) their institutional ideology needs to coincide with that of the political community in which they are established;
- (b) their personnel needs to represent the majority

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- of the sectors of civilian society; and
- (c) the political culture of the corporation would have to converge with that of the entire political community.

This model describes the situation in the West or in the countries where the armed force of a dominating or single party predominates. The model is far cry from the actual situation in the majority of the nations of Latin America.

In this region, the corporative ideology places the armed organization above society and the political community. In practice this form of ideology results in segmentation and autonomy.

One of the most marked manifestations of segmentation from society is the fact that the military corporation does not represent society, either in the social origins of privates and noncommissioned officers - which are normally slanted toward the scanty organized and poor popular sectors - or in its officers corps - which tends to assume the caste form, outside class lines. Perhaps the most visible expression of this phenomenon is the high level of endo-recruitment existing in Latin America, especially in the dominating service: the army.

The political ideology of the Armed Forces has caused "military parties" to be created. These military parties "duplicate" and are superimposed on - when they do not replace - the parties in the political community, whose composition and orientation are basically civilian. Obviously, in speaking of parties with respect to the Armed Forces, we are using a metaphor. The Armed Forces and the services they comprise cannot establish parties, as their

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very existence implies negotiation, competition and political play. If a military force is considered to be of the "ideal" North Atlantic type, those aspects need to be denied to a great extent. However, as Psellus rightly pointed out in 1926, when one refers to a Mediterranean country of Europe, e.g. Greece, this "ideal type" does not fit in many cases.

The existence of military parties can manifest itself in diverse forms. Rouquie, on the basis of the words of Juan Domingo Peron, referred to their existence in the case of Argentina, and, later (1982), extended his discussion to other Latin American countries. I myself have worked with the concept in referring to the existence of a single military party in the case of Uruguay (1986).

Military parties can be purely corporative or they can have explicit or tacit allies outside this sphere. There can be one or several. In some cases, the actions of military leaders, of promotions or of groups has resulted in the formation of "classical" parties, such as the PDR in Panama, the PCN in El Salvador, the PID in Guatemala, and ARENA in Brazil. In other countries, there have been such allied forces as the Partido Nacional of the 1970s in Honduras, the Partido Reformista of Republica Dominicana of the 1960s and the 1970s. In others, still, they have mobilized party factions, such as in Uruguay from 1973 to 1984. On other occasions, military leaders controlled traditional parties, and the latter identified with the preachings of those leaders, as was the case of the Partido Liberal in Nicaragua, which was controlled by the Somoza family, and of the Partido Colorado in Paraguay under the control of General Stroessner.

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Another traditional variant is the formation of parties by military leaders who use their pre-eminent position in the military corporation, for example the CAN in Guatemala, which is controlled by General Arena; Rojas Pinilla's ANAPO in Colombia; and the phenomena of political movements that are identified by the name of their leader, i.e. Peronism in Argentina and Odrism in Peru.

But there is another, more interesting case, namely the situation in which the corporation itself, even if it has civilian allies of a party nature, in fact reserves for itself a dominant area in political decision-making and, although it does not constitute a classical party organization, acts as if it were one. Here there appear diverse opinions, the necessity of negotiating on different levels and not merely of commanding. In a situation in which these activities are executed substantially by active members of the military corporation and in which the civilian allies take on a subordinate position, we speak of the appearance of "parties" or of a "military party".

This accentuates the divergence between the political system and the armed forces as well as the segmentation between society and the military. A precondition for constructing or reconstructing democracy is closing that gap.

The following affirmation may be paradoxical, but we propose it as a route to be explored. Despite the fact that the Armed Forces are anti-democratic due to their organizational form and the effects of a historical tradition that reinforced those characteristics, which are not only anti-democratic but also anti-liberal, they can come to be partners and

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trustees of a process of construction or reconstruction of democracy in the countries of Latin America. Bearing in mind our argumentation with regard to the permanent nature of capitalism as the predominating socioeconomic form in Latin America on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the countries' identification with the West, with the demo-liberal tradition prevailing in the North Atlantic world, the Armed Forces can, ultimately, achieve a negative integration. Without abandoning their corporative ideology in the discursive aspects, the military organizations can in practice support democratic regimes.

The military organization is unlikely to accept a change in its model of socialization and its internal authoritarian norms in Latin America. Doing so would mean confronting and reinforcing the perceptions of threat to the corporation.

On the other hand, the Armed Forces can accept that their political ideology tends to converge with that of the majority of society. The countries of the Southern Cone and Brazil will not risk a new corporative intervention by the Armed Forces as long as the polyarchical game is upheld and the tacit fundamental agreement on the current socioeconomic and political system is respected by all relevant political actors. The latter implies that opponents must act within clearly visible bounds of loyalty. The emergence of situations in which serious threats are perceived must not be facilitated. The Armed Forces are especially sensitive to what can be perceived as a threat aimed directly at the corporation.

(Past responsibilities come into play here, especially those related to abuses of the human rights of persons affected by

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repression during dictatorial regimes. In Argentina, the Armed Forces accepted the trial of their high commands, the Military Juntas, with the exception of the last one. That was made possible, substantially, by the adverse result of the war with Great Britain. There were also other trials, e.g. the trial of General Camps and his associates, for the proclaimed intention of Camps to obtain transcendence for his "diabolic banality." But other famous cases (e.g. that of Captain Astiz) could not be carried out, because of a curb imposed by the corporation: the principle of due obedience. In April of 1987, a movement within the army, which was led by Lieutenant Colonel Aldo Rico, the chief of one of the two commando companies that had participated in the South Atlantic conflict, proposed the symbolic creation of the "new soldier" for the "new army". This resulted in the sanctioning of a new law recognizing the principle of due obedience. In fact, this law covered almost all the persons involved in these acts. Subsequently, all the "military parties" and some civilian allies began a campaign defending the actions of the Armed Forces against subversives as of 1975. It is very possible that, given the agreement of various forces, this demand may be successful. Meanwhile, the actions of the ex-combatants in the Malvinas war and other groups which comprise sectors seeking a "new army" suffered a big defeat in January of 1988, with new movement, once again headed by Aldo Rico. But the situation is far from clear and the struggle between the diverse military parties has not been surmounted.

In Brazil, it has not been possible to get this subject on the public agenda. Not much progress has been made in Guatemala, either. In Uruguay, it was the cause of inter and intra-party confrontations, resolved by a law which prohibits investigation of the past, thereby protecting the entire military corporation. Although the Armed Forces supported the process of transition toward democracy, they did not accept any responsibility for the legitimacy of the actions undertaken during the 1970s. Behind the issue of human rights, the military perceived an attempt by sectors of civilian society and of the political class to

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condemn them as an institution. The Uruguayan political class unskillfully allowed a subject which constitutes an agreement on fundamental aspects to become an inter and intra-party game, and this eroded the process of democratic reconstruction. At the time writing this paper, i.e. June 1988, the signatures for a referendum derogating the law that, in fact, granted amnesty are in the process of verification. Although it will not achieve its goals, it will provide proof that vast sectors of Uruguayan sectors take a position that is opposed to the Armed Forces as an institution, provoking a widening of the segmentation of the Armed Forces with respect to society. In order for the referendum to be held, 25% of the citizens must sign. Whereas this would still represent a minority, it would embody a significant opinion, thereby crystallizing the loss of legitimacy of the armed corporation. This could be compensated with the appearance of a radical, "fundamentalist," doctrine. This concept of "fundamentalism", much used in Argentina these days, especially after its use by President Alfonsin, is not a very fortunate one, as it conceals very different processes. In some cases, it refers to the existence of integralist currents and in others to corporative sectors with a radical organic ideology.

When the Israelis condemned Eichmann they showed the importance of certain ethical positions in order to be able to consolidate a regime, even if the practical effects were only symbolic. In Argentina, this was the aspired scope for the trials of the Juntas, with the understanding that those trials did not put the entire armed corporation in the defendant's chair. In circumstances where the military corporation was not totally defeated (Malvinas was only a partial episode, materially, and had greater repercussions in the ideological and political sphere of the Armed Forces) and where the issue of human rights abuses is perceived as an attempt to delegitimize the very existence of the institution, the Armed Forces exert pressure to prevent all types of trials.

The recent processes in Argentina and Uruguay illustrate the

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errors that can be made when the diverse perceptions of the historical process on the part of the military elites and the political class are ignored. The latter consider the military to have been defeated - or that is, at least, what they transmit to their voters and supporters. On the other hand, the Armed Forces tend to believe that they have triumphed against internal enemies and that, precisely, thanks to these processes, party leaders can, once again, take up the daily administration of their countries.

In the future, the same conflict may arise in Chile, although there the personal leadership of Pinochet may attenuate the responsibilities to be attributed to the Armed Forces. On the other hand, the constant activities of the human rights movement has gathered significant evidence against members of the military corporation in that respect. It will depend on the ability of the political class to find an appropriate solution to this issue. Cardenal Silva Enriquez has already outlined a solution based on mutual pardon.)

The process can be facilitated if the political actor situated at the other ideological extreme also accepts involvement in a process of negative integration.

The basis of the process of integrating social democracy in the political system has been accepting the existence of the capitalist system and polyarchical competition (Dahl, 1971). The social pacts translated into practice the acceptance of capitalism by leftist social movements, complemented by active intervention in the political struggle, not only as agitators or witnesses of a position, but as competitors for office among the majorities. Social confrontation in Europe has shrunk as the negative integration of the left has grown.

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Some of the Latin America Lefts, especially those of the Southern Cone, which are made up of urban, educated militants, suffered heavy defeats during the revolutionary attempts of the 1960s and 1970s. Many of the movements, including some Communist parties, are now trying forms of negative integration.

This kind of process can favor the possibilities of negative integration of the Armed Forces. The idea would be to try to reach a tacit pact of support for the democratic regime. It would also favor those who, within each armed corporation, defend the ideological convergence of the military force and a democratic regime.

At a first stage, this type of agreement could only be conceived with a heavily rational content, in a search for mutual conveniences between partners who do not have too much trust in one another. But its affirmation would depend on a stronger ethical-political commitment.

Only belief in a myth can ensure a convergence between the Armed Forces and the political system as a whole. The attempt to (re)construct democracy implies having a myth and, thus far, not much progress has been made along that line. If this does not happen, the swing of the pendulum may lead to the rapid rebirth of military authoritarianism. And it can also lead to polar confrontations that exclude democratic actors from the political community as happened in Latin America in the 1970s; and we are all aware of the results.

Our argumentation would seem to reach a somewhat pessimistic point. But, unless we are willing to accept that:

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- a) social change is possible only if the current order is destroyed, and
- b) that this change must be brought about through a revolution, costly in social terms and bloody since it implies the destruction of the existing Armed Forces - propositions which, at this point, do not seem to be accepted by the political elites (leaders and opponents) or by the majority of the societies in Latin America - then it seems that the route outlined here could be followed in the region. This especially applies to those countries in which a sizable nucleus of the mass of the citizens has reached a quality of life considered acceptable and does not want to risk, on the promise of earthly paradises - which can be illusory - what has been attained thus far.

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C O N T E N T S

Transitions to democracy in South America

- I. Social and political factors
- II. Military elements: the institutional crisis
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- IV. The Armed Forces and the transitional process

Conclusions

Notes

Democratic stability in Latin American will depend on the ability of the civilian sector to prevent military incursions in politics, to restrict military institutions to their professional roles, and to contain their proclivity to keep indirect political control.¹ However, at the same time, the wisdom shown by the civilian sector in tackling military and security issues and in working out these mutual problems will be decisive.² The latter will also legitimize civilian leadership and control of the military during the process of democratic stabilization.

New civilian-military relationships are not just a simple restoration of the links existing prior to military political takeovers. Armed institutions change during military governments and the same holds true for democracy. Both emerge from military governments different than before. Accordingly, democratic government cannot be achieved on the basis of those factors which produced military coups. On the contrary, it will be achieved by strengthening the elements that made possible a given transition to democracy from military rule. Here it is possible to find some clues on how to proceed in reinforcing both formal as well as substantive civilian control and leadership.

1. For an analysis of the Latin American military political "adaption" process see Augusto Varas (Editor), Check on Democracy. New Military Power in Latin America. Greenwood Press, Mass., 1988.

2. A short but thorough analysis of this situation in Third World countries in David C. Unger, "Armies in Transition", The New York Times, December 13, 1987.

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Transitions to democracy in South America

Transitions from military dictatorships to democracy in South America commenced when the ruling armed forces and the civilian opposition initiated a process of negotiations for the transfer of power. Transitions have usually resulted in the first free, fair, competitive and informed election of new authorities. At that moment the democratization process is actually launched.

This introductory methodological consideration is important because it defines the following analysis and allows for a clearer formulation of the question: Why do the armed forces initiate this transitional process? It also provides an opportunity for setting forth the terms under which negotiations are held. In order to illustrate the variables involved in this process we shall refer to the cases of Argentina (1983), Brazil (1984), Bolivia (1980-1982), Ecuador (1979), Peru (1979), and Uruguay (1984). Finally, a comparison of these five cases with the conditions prevailing in Chile (1987) and Paraguay (1986) will be made.

The characteristics of the processes of transition to democracy in the region vary from one country to another, depending both on the way in which such negotiations are carried out and on the political relationship established between the parties at the beginning of the process. Therefore, it may be asserted that the characteristics of the process - the type of transition - are highly influenced by the system of civil-military relations existing at the beginning of the negotiations. Likewise, the

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future of this relationship during the process of democratization is strongly influenced by the transitional process itself.

Political relations between the civilian society and the military during the transitional period has been conditioned by the interaction of two basic sets of factors. On the one hand by the social and political factors related to the ability of democratic civilian forces to generate, from their side, new conditions which are meaningful for the armed forces; thus redefining internal relationships among their various factions. On the other hand by the impact of military events within the armed institutions which have generated favorable conditions for their withdrawal - negotiated or not - from governmental positions.

I. Social and political factors.

Major changes in society that have had an impact on the armed forces are related to transformations in the system of domestic political relationships, local political culture, the ability to mobilize the population, the shape of the civilian-military alliance, and the terms under which the armed forces are willing to withdraw from government. All of these factors constitute what could be called governance capability of the opposition. From the point of view of the Armed Forces the mere fact of the emergence of this possibility of replacing military authorities is essential. The self-definition of the armed institutions as bearers of the national being and protectors of the state collapse when a civilian governmental alternative is perceived. The latter

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challenges the leading role of the armed forces, giving way to or accelerating internal dissidence.³

- (1) A first set of preconditions for transition is the increasing unity of the opposition, making possible a government under a new civilian rule.

The crises of the party system as well as of political institutions favored military governmental involvement in Latin America.⁴ Accordingly, a critical precondition for transition to democracy is to build a new political arena, which largely depends on the efforts of those who aspire to play a role in it. Actions aimed at creating new terms for the political relationships within the opposition have been a major element in initiating the transitional process.

According to the analysis of political systems and party regimes prevailing in pre-transitional periods, it has been observed that the longer the authoritarian regime remains in power, the greater the changes that occurred in the party system and in the structure of the political relationships of the opposition. It is interesting to note that the vaster the transformation of the political system during the authoritarian period, the greater the possibilities of a democratic transition.⁵

3. An analysis of some factors related to society in: Ulf Sundhausen, "Military Withdrawal from Government Responsibility", Armed Forces and Society, Summer 1984.

4. Alain Rouquie, El Estado Militar en América Latina. EMECE, Buenos Aires, 1984, page 250.

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In the case of Brazil, for instance, "the authoritarian system fundamentally altered political cleavages, party organization, clientelistic networks and voting loyalties".⁶ Political alliances and alignments experienced significant breakups on the left, such as the crises and fragmentation of the Communist Party, or the convergence of traditionally conflicting sectors, such as certain socialist groups with the "Brizolist populism", or the admission of government dissidents in the opposing coalition.

Margination and/or isolation of anti-system forces have also helped cancel the armed forces' political crusade. These changes were also observed in Bolivia, where new political coalitions emerged, such as the Unidad Democrática y Popular (UDP), centralized sectors which were traditionally skeptical about democracy, and created a viable government coalition. Similarly, in 1979, the Comité Nacional de Defensa de la Democracia (CONADE) was created thanks to the coordination of political and labour organizations for democracy. The same year, the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) was reinforced by the Confederación Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia, which joined the COB. This new unit had

5. A comparative analysis of several Latin American cases, in Karen L. Remmer, "Redemocratization and the Impact of Authoritarian Rule in Latin America", Comparative Politics, April 1985. This factor is also related to the time length of dictatorship and its natural cycle of deterioration.

6. Ibid., page 270.

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an impact within the barracks under the form of institutional isolation that, in the absence of antisystem forces, prevented them from legitimately employing repression against such an array of sectors.⁷

In Uruguay, the campaign for the 1980 plebiscite and the changes that occurred within the main political parties -the Colorado and the Nacional- altered the traditional internal alignments and favored centrist factions in both parties.⁸ In brief, the alteration of the political scene that prompted the military government has been one of the elements that contributed to incorporate civilian members in military administrations.

- (2) A second type of change promoting favorable conditions for transition are the transformations observed in the political culture. Pragmatic orientations and civilian interests in developing political institutions coupled with the isolation of fundamentalist ideologies creating a national will. Thus, fragmented group interests were overcome, giving way to a genuine national interest for democracy.

In Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, it was observed that for the armed forces the emergence of a new programmatic - not ideological - national consensus, even if it was not the outcome their own ef-

7. Consensus to exercise coercion tends to be inversely proportional to the vastness of the opposing front.

8. Disfavoring Gallinal in the Partido Nacional and Pacheco Areco in the Colorado.

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forts, created the credibility threshold for a democratic governmental alternative. The democratic government reassured the military that there would be no new crisis which would force them to new interventions. The defeat of ideology by democratic forces was a major element in this respect.

In Argentina, the "aggiornamiento" of the Radical Party as a result of a significant generational change and a deep ideological transformation contributed to the emergence of a force capable of giving credibility to an actual alternation in power after the military government.⁹ The transformation of radicalism into a sort of social democratic party, as well as moderation within Peronists, created a strong centrist and moderate stream.¹⁰ Such changes were revealed in the policy adopted toward the armed forces which, although highly controversial, to a certain extent reassured the military, allowing them to accept a civilian government.

9. Regarding the importance of this factor, see: Samuel Finer, "The Retreat to the Barracks: Notes on the Practice and the Theory of Military Withdrawal from the Seats of Government", Third World Quarterly, January 1985.

10. Guido Di Tella, "Fuerzas Armadas y democratización en Argentina", in: Augusto Varas (Editor), Transición a la Democracia. América Latina y Chile. ACHIP-Ainavillo, Santiago 1985, pages 107 - 108. The latest result of the 1988 Peronist primaries, which defeated Cafiero, a moderate, and favored Mennen, a maximalist, could change this centrist axis.

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A similar change in political culture was observed in Peru, where sectors traditionally linked to the "guerrilla" movement, such as Hugo Blanco, participated in the election for a constituent assembly and received strong electoral support. Once again, this provided evidence of the absence of antisystem forces that might have justified the repressive-police facet of the military.

- (3) A third major element is the opposition's ability to create a national will for change. Although such mobilization of the masses has been associated to circumstances related to economic crises, it developed independently. It is also associated to essential political aspects connected to the demand for total enactment of civil rights. Peaceful mass mobilizations make a crisis unmanageable by military regimes when these are struggling for survival in their final phase of government.¹¹ They also provide a sense of national will, an important deterrent for the armed forces.

In Peru, mass mobilization as a sign of a general will for change made a strong impression on the military in power. According to the analysis of the process, "the strike held on July 19 (1977), the first nationwide strike in this century, proved the isolation of Morales Bermúdez's government".¹² In Bolivia, domestic resistance to

11. A. Rouquie, op.cit.

12. Henry Pease, "Avances y retrocesos de la democratización en Perú", in: Augusto Varas (Editor), Transición a la Democracia, op.cit., page 60.

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García Meza's regime was one of the key elements in promoting the subsequent evolution of an opposing unit. In Brazil, massive demonstrations and the movement for "direct" elections in 1984 "that mobilized millions of people, although it did not achieve its goal, eventually succeeded in uniting the opposition, gained the support of the governing party's major dissident faction, and structured a political campaign that convinced the regime that it would be extremely difficult to twist popular will". In Uruguay, the defeat of the military in a plebiscite and the impossibility of a legitimate military political project were the necessary preconditions to usher in negotiations and transition.¹³

- (4) The crisis of governmental management of the armed forces is mastered when the system of military-civilian relations in power remains consistently united. But when the armed forces face a legitimation crisis vis-à-vis its main supporting forces, it becomes unmanageable. A crucial element supporting democratic transitions in the region has been that the military has not been able to establish a stable order - whether legitimate or not - or to project into the future the achievements of the original insurrectional alliance. This holds true for Argentina, Brazil and Peru.

Although the military government in Argentina had to face serious difficulties in its relationship with the neo-liberal economic team and the

13. See Riordan Roett, "The Transition to Democratic Government in Brazil", World Politics, January 1986.

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military establishment from the very beginning (1967),¹⁴ political and economic tensions led the military government to increasing isolation vis-à-vis its own supporting elites. As mentioned above, "towards the end of Videla's government a sector of the armed forces became aware of the isolation in which they were immersed and attempted the Viola experiment (December 1981), that is, an opening in the Brazilian style... It abandoned the policy designed by Martínez de Hoz and tried to heed entrepreneurial demands in an effort to restore some type of alliance".¹⁵ The detachment of supporting elites prior to the South Atlantic conflict explains Galtieri's desperate attempt to recover a no longer existing political basis.

In Brazil, a key element that caused the armed forces to initiate the political opening was the contradictory relationship between the military government and its supporting business elite. As acknowledged, this initiative was adopted almost unilaterally by the armed forces: "the opening project was a military project, but there was no dialogue with nor participation of the political sector".¹⁶ Other analyses second this explana-

14. See: Andrés Fontana, "Armed Forces and Neo-conservative Ideology: State-Shrinking in Argentina (1976-1981)". Paper presented at the research conference on State Shrinking: A Comparative Inquire in-to Privatization. The University of Texas at Austin, March 1-3, 1984.

15. Guido Di Tella, Fuerzas Armadas y Democratización en Argentina, in: Augusto Varas (Editor), Transición a la Democracia", op.cit., page 106.

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tion. The Brazilian armed forces had to avert several dangers:

"One of them was the risk of fragmentation and 'argentinization', or worse still, the 'centro-americanization' of the Brazilian military. Another danger was the increasing separation of essential moderate forces of Brazilian society from the military if the security community continued to exist".¹⁷

The fact that the ruling armed forces were isolated from their supporting elites made it impossible for them to handle the internal military crisis as well as the crises resulting from the actions of opposing forces. Mass mobilization efforts combined with the detachment of business elites are variables that generate the climate for a military decision in favor of transition. This was the case in Brazil:

"The reaction of the elites was crucial in challenging the hegemonial pretensions of the authoritarian government in the mid 1970's. The usefulness of the 1964 regime was questioned not so much because of economic failure, although it did have its impact, but because it represented a risk of exclusion for the elites... By the end of

16. Saturnino Braga, "La oposición y la apertura política en Brasil", in Augusto Varas (Editor), Transición a la Democracia, op.cit., page 99.

17. See Alfred Stepan, "Rethinking Military Politics". Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1988. See also, William A. Bacchus, "Development Under Military Rule: Factionalism in Brazil", Armed Forces and Society, Spring 1986.

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the 70's vast sectors of elites were increasingly willing to support President Geisel in his efforts to submit the armed forces and institutionalize the liberalization process. Concurrently, the urgency of this process became evident as the unrest of the masses resulted in strikes and other forms of protest".¹⁸

The same conditions were reproduced in Peru, although mass mobilization and the distancing of the business elites momentarily tended to coincide. Thus, "towards 1973, both the industrial bourgeoisie and the popular sectors isolated the government... The military, for its part, mistrusted the apparently autonomous popular movement that started to develop... To a certain extent, the military were aware that the project which had brought them into power was beginning to expire... Furthermore, difficulties were encountered in renegotiating the country's foreign debt... Everything proved ineffectual in managing the crisis".¹⁹

Finally, the role played by the hierarchy of the Catholic Church in the process of distancing from

18. See Riordan Roett, "The Transition to Democratic Government in Brazil", op.cit.

19. Henry Pease, "Avances y retrocesos de la democratización en Perú", in Augusto Varas (Editor), Transición a la Democracia, pages 58-59. See also Chapters by Peter Cleaves and Henry Pease, as well as by Cynthia McClintock, and Luis Pasara in: Cynthia McClintock, and Abraham Lowenthal, The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1983.

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the government in those countries that have taken the road leading to democracy must be highlighted. Although it has not been univocal, it should be pointed out that while some churches in South America have taken a conservative stand, others have been very active in promoting changes.²⁰

- (5) The terms under which the military withdrew from government also played an important role in transitional processes. While they have not been entirely determined by the democratic opposition, one can assert that they express and synthesize the actual relative strength of military and civilian forces.

A brief analysis of these relations reveals that, despite the defeat in the South Atlantic, the Argentinian armed forces had been able to stockpile enormous amounts of arms before 1983. But more important, the democratic opposition ensured them institutional continuity through a policy that, while it anticipated penalties for a massive violation of human rights, it limited such penalties to the planners of the genocidal action. The modernization and professionalization policy of the armed institutions completes a military-civilian agreement that, although not easy to carry out, made democratic governance possible.²¹

20. On the Chilean case see: Humberto Lagos and Arturo Chacón, La Religión y las Fuerzas Armadas y de Orden. Ediciones Rehue, Santiago 1986; and Brian H. Smith, The Church and Politics in Chile, Princeton University Press, New Jersey 1982.

21. In this respect refer to Augusto Varas, "Democratización y reforma militar en Argentina", Documento de Trabajo, FLACSO, 1985;

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In Bolivia, prosecution of the military involved in drug traffic was confined to the groups that participated more actively in such activities. Nevertheless, the implementation of this policy has not been without difficulties.

In the case of Brazil, the price paid for transition has been a program for a remarkable increase in the nation's warfare capacity,²² without even considering penalties for excesses committed during the military regime. A similar, although less successful, situation has developed in Uruguay, where institutional continuity has been preserved despite the difficulties encountered in enforcing the Amnesty Law.²³

Similar conditions for withdrawal to those implemented in Brazil were observed in Peru, where military expenses increased dramatically to such an extent that the current democratic government reduced arms expenditure to uphold its credibility in debt negotiations. In contrast to the aforementioned cases, the democratic forces in Ecuador were unable to submit a consistent

see also: Carlos Moneta, "Las Fuerzas Armadas y el conflicto de las islas Malvinas: su importancia en la política argentina y en el marco regional", Foro Internacional, January-March, 1983.

22. The construction of an electronic war center for the Army is one example of this. See: Zenaide Azeredo, "Exercito Tera Centro de Guerra Electronica".

23. Ver, María del Huerto Amarillo, "Las Fuerzas Armadas y la Coyuntura".

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proposal for the withdrawal of the military from government. Accordingly, the Ecuadorian armed forces secured exceptional regulations for their inclusion in government, which has given them a level of relative autonomy that can hardly be compared with any other armed institution of the continent.

Briefly, although military withdrawal from government usually has been caused by a crisis, the terms under which the military withdraws tend to be extremely favourable for the armed institutions and preserve their institutional continuity. The higher this protection, the higher the obstacles that civilian groups will have to overcome during transition and consolidation of democracy, as we shall see later.

The analysis of main variables linked to the military decision to withdraw from power shows the basic conditions that determine transitional negotiations. All these elements have had an impact on the military. Insofar as there is no further justification to remain in power, either negatively - struggle against antisystem forces - or positively - unable to legitimate a new political order and/or being separated from the support of the elites -, the pivotal point of institutional self-images is questioned; the consensus for repression decreases; and the cost of employing force increases as the opposition coalition grows. Under these conditions, the isolation of the armed forces within the state and society is perceived and civilian dissuasive capacity is strengthened. Now the necessary internal conditions in the armed forces promoting the acceptance of a formula for civilian succes-

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sion in power are created, enabling negotiations on the withdrawal of the military with the least uncertainty for military institutional prospects.

More than a probabilistic pattern, which has not been fully observed in any of the countries analyzed, this "agenda" for transition is essentially a paradigm with heuristic functions. In each of the cases studied, at least one or a combination of factors have been observed. Thus, the characteristics of democratic transitions will depend on the way these factors are combined. However, they will initiate a transitional process if they occur simultaneously with other exclusively military circumstances.

II. Military elements: The institutional crisis.

The analysis of the French, Italian and Spanish cases shows that an essential condition for transition to democracy and for civilian tuition over the armed forces is the relative strength of the military establishment at the beginning of the process of transition.²⁴ Likewise, in South America the military decision to initiate negotiations for a democratic transition also has been determined by the degree of military crisis that the ruling armed institutions face, which affects their leverage in the negotiations.

24. Refer to: Felipe Agüero, "Dealing with the Military after Authoritarianism or Revolt. Exploratory Notes on France, Italy and Spain". Paper presented to the IPSA World Congress, Paris, July 15-20, 1985.

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Crises experienced by the armed forces during their administrations are the effects of a number of factors, which have prompted, individually or collectively, the military decision to withdraw from governmental functions. Three sets of distinct factors can be mentioned: the institutional crisis which results from contradictions between the professional role in defense and police functions in domestic politics; the ideological and moral crisis of the armed institutions; and the crisis of governmental management. All of them point in only one direction: the fragmentation of internal consensus. In this setting a new institutional consensus is generated, which aims at protecting the corporate interests of the armed forces. Institutional continuity is maintained by their return to the barracks.

- (1) The professional crisis created by the tensions between national defense and political order occurred in all of the countries studied. It appeared in the form of a deterioration of military modernization and professionalization efforts, which stemmed from the management of domestic repression. The institutional framework for either function is radically different. Preparing the armed forces for defense involves entirely different military functions and procedures than the preparation required to handle internal conflict and executing police functions.²⁵ The consolida-

25. An analysis of the military consequences of this paradox in the Brazilian case, in: William Perry, "The Brazilian Armed Forces: Military Policy and Conventional Capabilities of an Emerging Power", Military Review, September 1978. For the Argentinian case refer to Guillermo O'Donnell, "Modernización y golpes militares: teorías, comparación y el caso

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tion of "intelligence communities" that takes control over the state and society has been one of the most evident and frequent results of this "policialization" process.²⁶ In this institutional framework professional improvements and modernization of the armed institutions tend to freeze.²⁷

In Argentina, the practical consequences of this paradox were dramatically observed during the South Atlantic conflict. Her military defeat was also related to the institutional deterioration created by the policy of repression planned by the armed services.²⁸

On account of the above-mentioned factors and insofar as there is no military justification for the armed institutions to perform police tasks, a wider political space is created within the armed

Desarrollo Económico, octubre-diciembre, 1972.

26. On this aspect of the problem see: Clovis Brigagao, "Autonomia militar e democracia: O caso brasileiro", in Augusto Varas (Editor), Check On Democracy, op. cit. For the Argentinian case see: Andrés Fontana, "Los servicios de inteligencia: autonomia, poder y modernización". Unpublished manuscript, 1986.

27. For the Spanish case see: Angel Viñas, "Las Fuerzas Armadas y la transición", Diario 16, November 13, 1983, page 108.

28. Informe de la Comisión Investigadora de los Crímenes de la Junta Militar Argentina, Nunca Más, Buenos Aires, 1984.

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forces, which enables institutionalist groups to look forward. Institutional continuity in these conditions could be achieved by launching negotiations with civilian forces. This condition, clearly visible in Argentina, Brazil and Bolivia, was also evident in the case of Ecuador.²⁹

- (2) A second set of factors that fragment the armed forces and unleash the decision in the military to negotiate a transition has been the institutional crisis generated by a moral breakdown within the armed institutions. A high degree of moral crisis arises when the military performs police functions. But the dimension of the crisis is most evident when the results of the total use and control of power, without any other counterbalances than the corporate interests of other branches of defense, are considered. This condition was evident in Argentina, but was even more evident in Bolivia during García Meza's government. The rationale of the Bolivian institutionalist military to return to the barracks was based on the need for a moral recovery of the armed forces by defeating the corruption of drug dealers.³⁰ In this specific case the internal moral crisis led to a fragmentation of command and to a disciplinary crisis. The latter accentuated the economic crisis generated by the

29. On this case see: Anita J. Isaacs, "From Military to Civilian Rule: Ecuador, 1972-1979". Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oxford, St. Anthony's College, 1985, page 364.

30. Refer to: General Gary Prado, Poder y Fuerzas Armadas, 1949-1982, Editorial Los Amigos del Libro, La Paz, 1984.

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ruling armed forces and strengthened the prevailing institutional trends within the Army, making it possible to initiate negotiations with civilians.³¹

- (3) The third group of factors is linked to the internal impact of the crisis of governmental management within the armed forces. Insofar as the armed institutions govern, the result of their management will condition the stability of their political role. Beyond the legitimacy or justification of the armed forces' political role, it is worth emphasizing that the domestic support required to remain in power goes hand in hand with the chance of handling these matters successfully. Thus, the crisis of governmental management in Argentina during Videla's final period, that broke out severely during Viola and Galtieri's administrations, preceded the military defeat and fragmented their chain of command. This contributed to the emergence of internal sectors that eroded the verticality of command through their criticism of government management confronted by other proposals.³² A similar phenomenon was observed in Ecuador and Peru.

31. Ibid., pages 516-517. See also: Gloria Ardaya, "Bolivia, (Democracia para qué y para quién?", in Augusto Varas (Editor), Transición a la Democracia, op.cit., pages 80-82.

32. For an analysis of the Argentinian and Brazilian cases in this respect, see: Peter Calvert, "Demilitarization in Latin America", Third World Quarterly, January 1985.

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This type of crisis accentuates the traditional conditions faced by the armed forces in power, namely a tendency to reproduce in the barracks the same political cleavages prevailing in society. It transforms the armed forces "into an ambiguous political force",³³ fatally heading them on the road of internal confrontation, which endangers institutional continuity, the key element for united action in warfare. This condition was overcome only temporarily in Uruguay when the armed forces were transformed into a "substitute political party".³⁴ This was made possible by the peculiar strategic political context in which the Uruguayan armed institutions were located, lacking dissuasive viability vis-à-vis her neighbours. The Uruguayan experience, which cannot be repeated in other South American countries, shows that an armed institution can only perform governmental and police roles when its professional roles are not clearly perceived.

Another extreme case is Argentina. Here, each branch of the military was turned into a substitute political party, concurrently increasing the nation's defensive ability. The result was the division of the state into three monopolies - one for each armed service -, which deepened the crisis in government³⁵ and, of course, eroded the

33. See: Alain Rouquie, op.cit., page 337.

34. See: Juan Rial, "Los militares en cuanto 'partido político substituto' frente a la redemocración", in Augusto Varas (Editor), Check On Democracy, op.cit.

35. See: Andrés Fontana, "Fuerzas Armadas, partidos políticos y

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dissuasive ability of the military.

Nevertheless, fragmentations within the armed forces as a result of professional and/or political tension can or cannot be managed by the officers in command, either averting or unleashing the crisis, as discussed below.

III. Military crisis control.

The ability to manage any crisis - an essential and critical element in triggering or delaying the beginning of negotiations for transition - depends on the intramilitary relationships system. The ability or inability of the ruling military high command to handle a crisis is determined by its ability to control this system.

Despite internal differences over governmental topics, e.g. with regard to the weight attached to defense or domestic police functions, the high command can manage certain crises, thereby preventing the escalation of conflicts into internal confrontation. This political ability is determined both by the amount of resources controlled by the high command and by the degree of professionalism and internal cohesion.³⁶ A crack in the cohesion of the mili-

transición a la democracia en Argentina", in Augusto Varas (Editor), Transición a la Democracia, op.cit., page 117.

36. In this respect see: Abraham Lowenthal, "Ejércitos y política en América Latina", Estudios Internacionales, July/September 1976, page 62; also Abraham Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch, Armies and Politics in Latin America. Holmes & Maier, New York, 1986.

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tary impairs crisis-management capability.

Within a framework of differences over governmental and institutional management in military dictatorships, unity in command and internal cohesion is eroded as a result of tensions and conflicts arising from promotion and retirement processes. If the problem of succession to power is not handled fairly by the high command, it inevitably ends up unable to handle intramilitary crises that lead the regime - socially and institutionally harassed - to its final phase. As mentioned above, "the absence of a formal criterion of succession can become an actual threat to discipline, the hierarchy, and the internal cohesion of the armed forces, because it frequently leads to confrontations between military factions".³⁷

In the case of Peru, differences within the armed forces were not the only element that prevent the military from handling the crisis successfully. Velasco's incapacity of conducting the process and organizing internal trends due to his poor health conditions also played a significant role.³⁸

In addition to the importance of being able to maintain internal control, the repression of internal

37. See: Alexandre de S.C. Barros y Edmundo C. Coelho, "Military Intervention in South America", International Political Science Review, Nr. 3, 1981, page 346.

38. For the Peruvian case, see: Liisa North, "Perspectives on Development Policy and Mass Participation in the Peruvian Armed Forces", Working Paper, Number 22, The Wilson Center, Latin American Program, Washington, D.C., 1978.

dissidence within the armed forces by the ruling high command must be considered.³⁹ In many cases this makes it possible to, at least, postpone - if not to overcome - the crisis.

IV. The Armed Forces and the transitional process.

According to the analysis of social and military factors that determine the attitude of the armed forces vis-à-vis the process of transition to democracy, four types of transition can be described, according to the role played by the armed forces in the respective transition process.

In order to classify the South American cases, we have related social and military factors. The first refer to the action and attitudes both of mass organizations and power elites in their respective domestic policies. The second refer to the extent of intramilitary crisis and the crisis control capability of the high command.

Thus, in the cases of Brazil and Uruguay we have a transition that could be characterized as liberalization even though the decision to negotiate was made by the ruling military high command. In Brazil it stemmed from the crisis of intramilitary relations and cleavages in the relationship between the armed forces and the elites. In Uruguay (withdrawal was granted)⁴⁰ it was a result of the inabil-

39. In the case of Chile intramilitary control is very high, see: Genaro Arriagada, La Política Militar de Pinochet. ICHECH, Santiago, 1986.

40. According to Juan Rial, "Militares y redemocratización".

ity of the authorities to legitimate a new order and the changes occurring in civilian society, such as the sustained mass mobilization and the existence of an alternative governmental coalition. In Chile, while recomposition of the political system and alterations in the political culture began relatively late and their development has been slow, the defeat of the military regime in the 1988 plebiscite was crucial to strengthening the process of liberalization already contained in the Constitution of 1980. Nevertheless, Pinochet's defeat makes it impossible for him to run for a new mandate and, thus, it opens the way for competitive free elections in 1989. Mass mobilization during the plebiscite period in 1988 supported the already non-achieved unity in orientation and objectives, and it changed the stable coalition between the military, governmental technocrats and the business community, which is looking for other alliances. Even when the opposition is not able to submit a reasonable proposal for the withdrawal of the armed forces, the latter are withdrawing under the pressure of their own need of reprofessionalization. Nevertheless, the governmental ability for crisis management has been high and the power of the high command to control and keep the institutions united has been important, but discrepancies on essential aspects related to the nation's political future at the Governing Junta level have been noticed. The main topic under discussion is the level of influence that the Chilean military will have in the near future.

Unlike the preceding cases, Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru shared a common denominator. In these countries the emphasis was placed on the internal crisis resulting from internal fragmentation and the inability of the ruling high command to control the

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crisis. This arrangement of factors led to an overt military withdrawal.

Table: Types of Transitions to Democracy in South America

		<u>Combination of elite and mass pressures</u>	
		strong	weak
<u>Crisis control capability</u>	high	<u>Liberalization</u> Brazil Uruguay	<u>Dictatorship</u> Chile Paraguay
	low	<u>Withdrawal</u> Argentina Bolivia Peru	<u>Forbearance</u> Ecuador

In Ecuador, a military crisis - caused by inter- and intra-services fragmentations - that could have led to intramilitary armed conflicts, was coupled to a new civilian agreement to forbear the use of military force in solving their differences.

Finally, dictatorship prevails in those countries where social and military factors have not reached the highest degree of activation, for instance in Paraguay. Here, the ability of the government to avoid the crisis has been based on strong repression, a plan to increase public expenditure in social welfare programs by nearly 25% during 1986, the modernization of the state, cleaning up public administration by controlling suppliers, and launching a limited political opening.⁴¹ This has preserved an

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adequate relationship with the supporting elites. Concurrently, the fiction of a potential military conflict with Bolivia has been stirred within the barracks. This manipulation, creating the syndrome of "a sieged fortress", is rooted in the aftermath of the Chaco war. The plan has allowed Stroessner to retain military loyalty. However, his ability to control a political or military crisis has started to decline as a result of more than thirty years of personal rule and its effects on the dictator's health.

Conclusions.

An analysis of the mass and elite pressures as well as the crisis-control capability of military high commands permits an understanding of the diverse nature of the crises, which in some moments force the institutional governments of the armed forces and the high commands to negotiate a given transition to democracy.

It is also evident that the way in which the crisis is solved and the kind of the agreement reached between the civilians and the military as regards the transition to democracy will have an impact on the democratic prospects of each country. Since it is easier to demilitarize government than power,⁴² the

41. Carlos María Lezcano, "Fuerzas Armadas en Paraguay: situación actual y perspectivas", paper presented at the Latin American Congress on Sociology, Rio de Janeiro, March 1986.

42. Alain Rouquie, op.cit., page 417.

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future of democracy in South America will be conditioned increasingly, in certain cases, by the way the new democratic governments redefine their relationship with the armed forces. Since some previous organizational systems of the armed forces are less compatible with democracy,⁴³ the terms agreed upon with the military when they withdrew from government should be changed in some cases. Accordingly, the future of democratic governance in Latin America will depend on the changes that new civilian governments will be able to define and enforce in the armed forces without provoking new military political incursions.

The conclusions that can be drawn from transitional processes toward democracy show that two main set of conditions - necessary and sufficient - are crucial for democratic governance in Latin America.

The first one - the necessary condition - is related to the way that political civilian-military relationships are restructured. Changes in political culture that make possible the unity of democratic forces, which are manifested in feasible governmental coalitions, could create new references for the military, different from the power elites that push them into government. This new civilian democratic reference is crucial in re-legitimizing the armed forces vis-à-vis the rest of society. The acceptance of the military in future democratic

43. See: Samuel Huntington, "Tocqueville's Armies and Ours". Remarks delivered to the Seminar "Democracy in America Today: A Tocquevillian Perspective", John M. Olin Center for Inquire into the Theory and Practice of Democracy, University of Chicago, February 15, 1984.

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scenarios is essential for the stability of democratic governments. But the role of the military in such scenarios should be clearly designed.

Accordingly, the second condition - the sufficient one -, also manifested in transitional processes, is crucial. The main factor in restoring and stabilizing democratic governments is the civilian leadership of the military in their own professional field. Institutional continuity, avoidance of internal crisis, and a new internal consensus can only be provided by a new emphasis in the professional role of the military. This democratic professionalization of Latin American armed forces is going to be the most important factor in the future of the region.

The expansion of roles in the non-military field should be avoided and professionalization strengthened. However, enhancing military professional roles without endangering regional peace is also crucial. Finding a solution to this contradiction is the most important and urgent collective task for the military, civilians, and democrats in Latin America.

S E C T I O N I I

SECURITY POLICY AND DEFENCE IN FINLAND

Matti Lappalainen

ASPECTS ON FINNISH NATIONAL DEFENCE AND SOCIETY

C O N T E N T S

Introduction

From the fulfillment of a freeman's obligation to an organized army, to its position and influence in Finnish society:
Observations from the Swedish period

A Finnish army as a symbol of national unity and spirit:
Autonomous Finland 1809-1917

From the war of independence to present day harmonious relations:
Finland's national defence and society in the era of independence

Introduction

The prevailing and unaltered Finnish constitution of 1919 states: "Every Finnish citizen is obliged to participate in the defence of the nation". This expression contains an obligation that has been passed down through the centuries. Even ancient Finns felt a sense of general military duty, which may be considered militia-like in nature. Each and every able-bodied man was required to defend his family and tribe against external threats. In addition to defensive warfare, expeditions of conquest and retaliation, which were executed as self-acting measures, came into the picture. Later, during the period of Swedish reign, such measures were performed under the authorization of the state.

Starting from these preliminary stages of vaguely definable national defence, the organizational development of the Defence Forces can be divided into three main periods. First the era of Swedish reign; second the period of Finnish autonomy, from 1809 to 1917; and, finally, the period of independence.

Furthermore, the period of independence can be divided into 3 parts:

- 1) 1918 to 1939,
- 2) the time of World War II, and
- 3) from 1945 up to the present day.

During the past centuries, Finnish society has undergone several periods of transition which have effected the status of national defence, its significance, role and organization in a previously primitive, but presently pluralistic and highly developed Finland. On the other hand, the defence institution, with its traditional societal roots, has donated its own characteristics to the structure and

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life of Finnish society, from which it has gathered its strength. This was especially evident during the periods of war - for Finland, despite its brief seven decades of independence, has already fought four difficult wars. These experiences are reflected in today's Finnish society and its national defence and Defence Forces.

The national defence of present-day Finland is built on the basis of the aforementioned historical developments, on the experiences gained in the last wars, and on the requirements set forth by a pluralistic modern-day state and its political standing with regard to security. The latter is not easy. Due to swift societal processes of change and rapid technical developments, it is under constant pressure for harmonization and change. In the Finnish democratic society parliamentary control has been extended also into national defence and the principles of democracy are applied to all possible spheres, without compromising the Defence Forces' capability to execute its duties. This optimal adjustment of democratic and authoritarian principles has been a central and controversial question in post-war Finland. To my knowledge the main lines concerning the issue have settled into place rather well.

From the fulfillment of a freeman's obligation to an organized army, to its position and influence in Finnish society:

Observations from the Swedish period

The Finnish will to defend found its primitive expression in tribal wars, in battles against the Swedish crusaders during pagan times as well as in

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other quarrels against coastal invaders.¹

Under the Swedish rule, the Finnish society was increasingly burdened by recruitment, taxation as well as a general neglect of Finland's proper defense as the Swedish kings engaged in wars in the Baltic area. These strains peaked during the Thirty Years War and the Great Northern War.

The first regular military units were founded in Finland during the rule of Gustavus Vasa in the 16th century.² Later the Swedish-Finnish Kingdom saw the creation of an original military establishment, the so-called military tenure system, which was perfected by the late 17th century. According to this system, 2-3 farms, which formed a "ruotu" (tenure), gave one man for the crown's army during a war and a hut with a small piece of land for the soldier and his family to live on. Already very early cavalry

1. Einar W. Juvelius (Juva) states in his work Suomen Sotahistorian pääpiirteet I osa (The main Outlines of the Finnish Military History, Part I, the Time up to 1617), Helsinki 1927, p. 383, that in the late Middle Ages the military establishment of Sweden-Finland rested on the same basis as earlier. "The defence of one's home district still belonged to the duties of all men fit for military service".

2. Before the time of Gustavus I (Vasa) no homogenous military service can be considered to have existed in Sweden-Finland. The military establishment was split into sub-establishments in provinces and in large fiefs dominated by a castle. The castles had mercenary soldiers, the inhabitants of the fief entered into service when danger threatened. Otherwise they worked normally and paid the taxes for the support of the garrison of the castle. See, e.g., Juvelius, *ibidem* pp. 116-119.

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men who showed courage in battle were exempted from land taxation and raised to the nobility.

This epoch witnessed also the birth of a (rural) peasant cavalry - a sort of farmers nobility. The roots of the military tenure system reached deeply into the period of Gustavus Vasa when so-called "ten men" or "smoke soldiers" (i.e. 10 farms gave one soldier) were sent to serve the crown.

This was, in a manner of speaking, a militia system. It established a very effective link between civilian society and the military establishment. Traditionally, there were also enlisted troops. During Gustavus Vasa's time middle class men could also be subjected to recruitment.

Traits of democracy in the Swedish-Finnish military establishment could be found in the fact that it was the meeting of estates which decided the issue of larger recruitment and determined the financial questions. A strong king could, however, pass over the estates in these matters. The burden of defense had a relatively greater effect on the poor areas of Finland, which were plagued by epidemics, dearths and attacks from the east. However, hardly any notice was paid to complaints voiced in Finland. There were desertions and even a few rebellions, the most noteworthy of which was that of Nuijasota (Club War), a peasant rebellion against the landlords during the late 16th century.³

3. A castle encampment meant the obligatory billeting of troops on the farms of peasants. The practice, which was exercised even in time of peace put a heavy burden on the peasants; it was discontinued even though the peasants' rebellion was quelled.

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Already during the period of Swedish rule, the Finnish people exhibited a will to defend their country⁴ along with a strong allegiance towards the king and authority in general. One could say that with the exception of the national crisis in 1918, the same characteristic can be found in present-day Finns, though in somewhat modernized form. The relationship between the ruled and the ruler, however, has not been wholly harmonious. During the war of Gustavus III from 1788-1790, a group of Finnish officers tried to disengage Finland from Sweden with the aid of Russia.⁵

A Finnish army as a symbol of national unity and spirit:

Autonomous Finland 1809-1917

The War of Finland (1808-1809) resulted in the separation of Finland from its century-long unity with Sweden and her attachment to Russia as an autonomous Grand Duchy. Czar Alexander I proclaimed to have elevated Finland to the status of a nation among nations.⁶ For a long time, the period of autonomy was

4. As the Crown was unable to defend the Finnish eastern border, it became necessary to defend one's own territory; the peasants formed troops and engaged in battle. In the war of 1808-1809, a genuine feeling of national defence could be recognized, as the Swedish State could not fulfill its duties in this respect.

5. The so-called "Anjala alliance" failed, however, and its leader was executed. Nevertheless, it was a clear sign of Finnish efforts for independence, which were centered around the intellectuals.

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marked by political, economic and cultural development until panslavism and the ensuing period of oppression in the latter part of the 19th century embittered the Finnish people and precipitated the idea of gaining independence amidst the turmoil of the Russian Revolution in 1917.

From the point of view of national defence the period of autonomy is interesting. Finland had its own national army, which, at first, from 1810 onwards, consisted of some enlisted units and, later, from 1881 onwards, mainly of conscript troops following the new conscription law from the year 1878.⁷ The duty and the right of free Finnish men to defend their country received a form of manifestation.

Constitutional laws from the Swedish period with provisions relating to national defence remained in force during the time of autonomy.⁸ Even the old

6. This took place at the opening of the Diet in 1809.

7. There were 8 sharpshooter battalions, the Finnish Guards and the Finnish Cavalry Regiment. Additionally, a military academy was operating in Finland. It dated back to the Swedish reign and played an important role, not only in military education, but also as a source of general enlightenment.

8. The Constitution of 1772 and the Union and Guarantee Act of 1789. The former stipulated that "the cavalry and infantry as well as the navy remain in the military tenure establishment hitherto"; and the latter established that "nobody is allowed to withdraw from the defence of the realm, whenever defence is required and needed". The stipulation in the Constitution of independent Finland, obligating every Finnish citizen to participate in the defence of the nation, can be considered a direct derivative of the latter.

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military tenure system was upheld in principle, although the czar-grand duke decided on a proposition by the Finnish estates in 1809 that no Finnish army be established in 50 years. Instead the households comprising part of the military tenure system were under the obligation to pay a special vacancy fee as a compensatory gesture. During the Crimean War, the tenure system was rehabilitated to organize nine battalions. These were suspended in the next decade, and the military tenure system came to an end after two hundred years of existence and influence on Finnish society. The coupling of national defence to landownership and its exploitation for living faded away into the pages of history. The old concept of "military tenure" remains, however, in present-day Finnish Defence Forces as a popular expression reflecting a long-standing tradition in its own way.

During the period of autonomy, the national Finnish army was a valuable preserver of national sentiment among the population, particularly as it performed well beside the Russian army in practice maneuvers and at the shooting range as well as in the Bulgarian Liberation campaign.

The Finnish people recognized its small army of about 5,000 men as its own, and men were generally happy to serve in it. The military tenure battalions organized during the Crimean War also were well received by the population.

When conscription was discussed in Finland before the enactment of the 1878 law, various systems, including a militia system, or the creation of en-

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listed units and mixed formations, were considered. It was a philosophical question of fundamental national, political and economic importance. The Russians and the Finns had disagreements.⁹ The Finnish Parliament and the majority of the population supported universal conscription, though some thought it offended individual rights.

Russian oppression in Finland included the suspension of the national army by 1905. The czar also had confirmed the conscription law of 1901, which was later annulled, according to which young Finns could be ordered to serve in Russian units. The law caused a vehement anti-draft strike in Finland and, as a result, the conscription law was revoked. Instead the Finnish estates had to pay so-called "military millions" to the Russian state every year. Thus, Finnish society found itself in a situation, in which it was without the protection of its own army. This fact had an obvious influence on the destiny of the society in 1918. On the other hand, the new situation could have precipitated Finland's endeavors to disengage itself from Russia and become an independent state. This possibility emerged in the turmoil of the First World War, which had a great impact on Finnish society as well.

9. The divergence of opinion centered around three main issues: the question of who had the right to be Commander-In-Chief of the Finnish military forces, the question of the Russians' right to serve in Finnish troops, and the use of these troops outside Finland. See O. Seitkari, Suomen Sotalaitos Venäjän sotilashallinnon osana 1800-luvulla" (The Finnish Military Establishment as Part of The Russian Military Administration in the 19th Century), a treatise in the periodical Sotilasaikakauslehti 1-2/1939.

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From the war of independence to present day harmonious relations:

Finland's national defence and society in the era of independence

In the turbulences of the First World War and the Russian Revolution, Finland freed itself from ties to the newly-born Soviet Union and declared its independence in December 1917. Securing national independence was, however, not a peaceful process. The people of Finland were divided into two groups and, in the spring of 1918, a War of Independence was commenced, which simultaneously was a civil war between the "Whites" and the "Reds" in Finland. The Russians supported the Reds and the Whites were backed by the Germany. The Whites won the war, and the Defence Forces of independent Finland, now 70 years old, were built on the basis of the White Army.

There were periods of repression against Finland, which found their origins in panslavistic and imperialistic motivations. These attempts at repression reached their climax in the fall of 1914 with the Russian attempt to dismantle almost completely Finnish autonomy. Primarily they gave rise to strong passive (civil-)resistance among the Finns. This resistance was cited as an example when the significance and organization of similar resistance in national defence was deliberated after World War II. Earlier examples of passive resistance in Finland, however, did not produce the desired results. Consequently preparations for achieving independence through the use of arms were initiated. From 1905 onwards, the bourgeois side organized national guards, Civic Guards, order patrols and fire bri-

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gades to maintain order in areas of the country where military forces had been canceled and where a revolution of the workers, fueled by the events in Russia, was on the rise.

The socialists organized their own guards; the objective of this group changed from maintaining order to promoting revolution by the beginning of 1918. On the bourgeoisie side well-known preparatory bodies for the struggle for independence - Voimaliitto (Power League), Active Committee and Military Committee - were set up. The climax of the preparations was reached when over 1,800 Finnish young men from all social classes voluntarily traveled to Germany for military training. This well-trained group of soldiers returned to Finland to join the war that had broken out in the spring of 1918. It formed an effective crew of trainers and leaders for the White Army, whose high command was in hands of Mannerheim, Finnish officers trained in Russia and some voluntary Swedish officers.

When the Governmental Army, i.e. the White Army, was being established, the question as to its foundations naturally came up. The voluntary civic guards already were declared government troops before the outbreak of the war. This, in addition to some enlisted troops and Jägers, was, however, not enough to form a sufficient army. Therefore the Senate enacted general conscription on the basis of the old conscription law from 1878. Hence the struggle became an endeavor of the whole nation and its will to safeguard its independence and just social order on an international scale. General conscription was rather well accepted. More than 70% of the persons called up for service were drafted. An interesting feature from the military-sociological point of view

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is that youngsters who were ideologically close to the opposite side also joined the white troops. Following their training by the Jägers these troops, however, carried out their tasks well.

Already prior to the declaration of general conscription many a region had applied conscription locally. This again reflected the traditional Finnish obligation to defend one's own home-stead. On the Red side, too, conscription was applied in addition to voluntary service and other kinds of obligatory recruitment. An army of 100,000 men was thus assembled, 2/3 of which took part in fighting, i.e. approximately the same proportion as on the White side.

When an independent Finnish state was established after the war, one of the crucial tasks was to develop defence forces that would meet the requirements of national security and, simultaneously, adapt to the prevailing society as well as possible. This adaptation was strained by the experiences gained during the War of Independence. These experiences also affected the discussions on the national defence system that were held in the Parliament in the 1920's. Proposed alternatives were a cadre system based on general conscription and a militia system. The former was supported by the majority of the bourgeois parties, while the social democrats and agrarians placed their support behind the militia system. On the side of the left, the attitude reflected fear over possible use of armed force against it in some potential occasions. As circumstances normalized, the cadre system, however, won increasing acceptance. The provisional conscription law of 1919 was followed by the conscription laws of 1922 and 1932. The law of 1932, which stipu-

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lated that the length of service in regular troops was 12 or 15 months, was in force when the Winter War broke out in 1939.

Although the Defence Forces of the first two decades of independence were established on the basis of the White Army of 1918, suspicions among the left gradually faded away. By the time of the Winter War, the Defence Forces had developed into an army with reserves of the whole nation. It was supported by the entire population, fought the wars, and secured the independence of the country. From the very beginning, the newly established army, where young men from a variety of social backgrounds served side by side, formed an institution contributing effectively to smoothening out social contrasts. In addition to the conscription law of 1932 and the state of war law, this adaptation process was reflected, for instance, in the following events: in 1928, the social-democratic prime minister received a military parade commemorating the 10th anniversary of the termination of the Independence War; the Defence Forces unreservedly supported the Government during the right-wing "Mäntsälä uprising" in 1932; in the 1930's the Parliament began to take a more favorable stand towards increasing defence expenditures and, in 1938, it enacted a basic procurement law which enabled the Defence Forces to increase its material inventory by 2.7. billion marks (at 1938 value) within seven years.

Civic Guards, which were founded on a voluntary basis before and during the Independence War, reflected the positive attitude of the Finnish people, especially bourgeois circles, towards national defence. Pursuant to the law of 1927, the Civic Guards became part of the Defence Forces of the country. In

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addition to this organization, which later comprised more than 100,000 men, a women's voluntary non-military organization, Lotta-Svärd, was founded. Already in peacetime, but particularly during the wars, it made a highly esteemed contribution to national defence. The left maintained a reserved and partly hostile attitude towards these organizations for a long time. A corresponding attitude prevailed among these voluntary organizations in spite of their officially non-political nature. Such contrasts already had been smoothed out considerably by the summer of 1939, and in February 1940, during the Winter War, the Social Democratic Party and the Civic Guard organization agreed that party members may join the Civic Guards. This agreement was only one expression of the sense of national unity known as the "spirit of the Winter War".

As early as the beginning of the 1930's, Marshal Mannerheim made his well-known statement: "There is no longer any need to ask which side one was on in 1918". These words by the Commander-in-Chief of the White Army, Chairman of the Defence Council set up in 1931, Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Defence Forces in three wars and President, accepted by whole nation, reflected the rather quick recovery of the Finnish nation from the wounds of 1918.

It is extremely interesting to note that the underground Communist Party of Finland in the latter half of the 1930's signaled that the Defence Forces, even the Civic Guards, might be acceptable to it.¹⁰

10. Timo Soikkanen, SKP: n ja muiden vasemmistoradikaalien turvallisuuspoliittisen asennoitumisen kolme vaihetta v 1919-1939. (The Three Stages in the Attitudes of the Finnish Communist Party and of other leftist Radicals towards Security Policy in 1919-1939),

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The Winter War was a severe experience for the Finnish nation and its Defence Forces. The crisis unified the whole state, regardless of the political standing of individuals. The Defence Forces received unanimous support from the population, thus the tendencies towards national cohesion, which already had been evident in the 1930's, were accelerated. The unprovoked attacks, the setting up of a communist puppet regime, which contrasted sharply with the values of the majority of Finns, and the bombing of civilian targets gave an additional boost to Finnish efforts, which resulted in the retention of independence. A strong expression of the nation's uniformity was the fact that, except for a few individual cases, all of the population from the territories ceded to the Soviet Union moved to Finland, where they were rehabilitated as soon as possible.

Frontline comradeship developed into a bond that transgressed political boundaries. The Comrades-in-Arms Union, which was established to protect achieved uniformity and give assistance to the needy, was a concrete manifestation of this. Other similar organizations were formed, whose purposes were to care for the frontline soldiers and their families, in cooperation with the Defence Forces. Solidarity took several different forms. Since the men fit for combat were at the front, women, children and older men engaged in a toilsome struggle which still has its effects on the Finland of today.

An interesting reflection of national unity was the

Forssa, Univ. of Turku, Pol. History Publications D: 2, p. 19.

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abovementioned agreement between the Socialist Party and the voluntary Civic Guards. According to this treaty, neither side set limitations to the involvement of Socialist-minded men in activities of the Civic Guards. This concrete approach was made easier by the extensive and unselfish work of the Civic Guards, both at the frontline and at home. Another noteworthy example of how the wounds of 1918 had healed was the request of former members of the Red Guards to fight as a single unit at the frontline for the preservation of independence.

During the period of great uncertainty that followed the Winter War, the unity of the people prevailed as did its close ties to the Defence Forces. The people felt that the Defence Forces were their only guaranteed protection against the external threat. After what had happened it was rather surprising that some left-wing radicals founded the "Finnish-Soviet Society for Peace and Friendship". When it became clear that its activities were directed against the interests of the society, the state authorities suspended the association.

During the so-called "Interim Peace", the readiness of the Defence Forces was kept at a high level and demobilization was carried out slowly. As an expression of strong defence-mindedness the Parliament granted without hesitation the Defence Forces the money needed to augment its capabilities.

Reconstruction work continued in a strong manner, the war-time spirit of active participation was kept alive, the activities of the Civic Guards and Lotta Svärd were carried on as before, uniting the lines of the people.

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In the summer of 1941, Finland was drawn into a new war against the Soviet Union. For Finland this was a separate war though the comradeship-in-arms bound the Finns to Germany. Also England and its dominions declared war on Finland at the end of 1941. As an insult to injury, the Finnish Defence Forces were obliged to expulse the German mountain army of 200,000 men from the Finnish Lapland in the autumn of 1944 in order to fulfill the obligations of its Peace Treaty with the Soviet Union.

The Wars of Continuation and Lapland were hard on the Finns. However, even after the dire experiences of the Winter War and the Interim Peace period, the people remained united and supported the Defence Forces.

The extent of the efforts is exemplified by the fact that, at the beginning of the war, 16% of the Finnish population was employed by the 640,000 strong Defence Forces. In addition, the direct economic burden was heavy. During the period of 1939-1945, Finnish defence expenditures were approximately 48% of the total state expenditures. The population made extensive sacrifices in these wars for independence with 86,000 casualties. The Finnish nation accepted the preliminary goals of the Defence Forces to reconquer the territories lost in the Treaty of Moscow of 1940. The crossing of the old Finnish border and the pursuit of strategically advantageous positions in eastern Karelia caused some dissension and refusals in the Defence Forces. However, the trust of the Finnish nation in Field Marshal Mannerheim and in the government remained strong, although the war, contrary to expectations, was extended by several years. The protraction of the war was accompanied by heavy economic burdens. Finland's depen-

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dence on Germany made it possible for Germany to put pressure on the Finnish population when the Finnish leaders declined to set their goals according to German wishes. In 1943, a so-called "peace opposition" was formed, the objective of which was to hasten the process of disengagement from the war; a decision which had already been adopted by the state leadership. The following proclamation made by Mannerheim in the autumn of 1943 is connected to this point: "The army is not only a fighting machine, it also feels and thinks, strong bonds tie the war front to the home front. When restlessness occurs on the home front it spreads to the war front. If the state of affairs continues, the army can become insecure any day, which would signify the end of Finnish independence".¹¹

Nevertheless, research done in the Defence Forces and war-censorship proved that the will to defend the nation remained, although there was uncertainty as to the result of the war due to the prolongation of the stabilized war and the realization of the eventual German defeat.¹² The long-lasting trench warfare gave rise to so-called deterioration phenomena which were countered by rather effective measures, such as periodic leave, sports and recreational events, and the transferring of troops. Frontline comradeship in itself strengthened the feelings of togetherness, exceeding beyond political boundaries. This had a positive bearing on the capacity of the Finnish nation to retain its form of

11. Kalle Lehmus, *Kolme kriisiä, (Three Crises)*, Espoo 1971, p. 177.

12. SARK (Finnish Military Archives), 15707/9 and Lehmus, *Ibid.*, p. 163.

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society while adapting to the time of peace and facing the challenges of reconstruction, payment of war indemnities, and rehabilitation of people from the ceded territories.

The critical test to the Finnish nation and its will to defend took place in June 1944 when the Soviets launched a massive offensive against Finland. By employing extreme efforts, Finland was able to repel the attack and the political leadership, headed by the Commander-in-Chief Mannerheim, received a chance to seek peace.

That goal was achieved in September 1944 on severe terms, but Finland retained its independence. In the spring of 1988, an interesting study was published based on interviews of over 2,000 veterans. It tried to unravel how soldiers experienced that major offensive and what caused them to exert all their strength to ward it off successfully. The study concludes that "successful defence would not have been possible had the Finnish soldiers and their co-sisters not had a strong will for independence and a common consciousness that Finland, at that particular juncture, was fighting for its existence as an independent country".¹³

In the moment of deep shock caused by the Soviet Attack some men deserted and were mentally shaken, but the phenomenon was brought under control without developing into a military-psychological catastrophe. A well-organized and vigilant nation that

13. U. E. Moisala - Pertti Alanen, Kun hyökkääjän tie suljettiin. (When the way of the aggressor was closed), Helsinki 1988, 302 pages, p. 274.

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fought its own war stood behind the Defence Forces and gave its support to the fighting army. With the exception of some acts of sabotage, there was no resistance against the government and organized society during the Continuation War and Winter War in particular.

Under the leadership of an aged commander-in-chief Finland still had to fight a war in order to expel the Germans from Lapland. In view of the brotherhood-in-arms of many years' this was a difficult task from a military-psychological point of view since the relations between the Germans and Finnish Laplanders had been good. This, however, was the price that the Finnish nation had to pay for peace.

In 1945, Finland passed from war to peace in changed circumstances in terms of foreign, military and internal policies. The traditional democratic social system, however, was preserved, and reconstruction was initiated at the same time as severe war reparations had to be paid to the Soviet Union in addition to territorial concessions. The reparations were completed in 1952. Hence the Defence Forces stayed in the background in the immediate post-war years and were attacked by the extreme left as a fascist organization.

Under the Armistice Agreement the strong ties between the Defence Forces and the rest of society, voluntary Civic Guards and Lotta-Svärd organizations, were forced to stop their activities. The Comrades in Arms Union, mentioned before, suffered the same fate. In those difficult circumstances the Defence Forces also tried to prepare for the worst - occupation of the country - and, to this end, organized a major operation with the purpose of

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hiding arms that was disclosed following a revelation. The entire project, however, proved unnecessary as the feared threat failed to materialize. In the immediate post-war "years of danger" the Defence Forces had to raise its preparedness a couple of times due to rumors of a coup-d'etat by the extreme left. The debate on the veracity of these rumors still continues in Finland.

The Allied Control Commission, which was stationed in Finland in 1944 -1947, rigorously monitored the Finnish Defence Forces. Mobilization preparations and reserve officer training were forbidden in those years. The Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 repealed both the Control Commission and the above-mentioned restrictions, but confirmed those that had been imposed on the Finnish Defence Forces within the framework of the Interim Peace Agreement of 1944.

As the conditions in the country calmed down, the position of the Defence Forces in the society began to improve. A Defence Revision Committee had been set up as early as 1945 to draw up a proposal for the future defence system. The Committee emphasized the public support of the Defence Forces and consequently was in favor of maintaining general conscription. A new Conscription Law became effective in 1950, and the reorganization of the Defence Forces was carried out in 1952.¹⁴ Maintaining general conscription has since received the support of other

14. Finnish government recently submitted to the Parliament a proposal for some changes to the Military Service Act to take effect the beginning of 1989. In addition to rearranging the duration of service, the Act will also expand the rights of conscripts to engage in political activities.

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defence committees, i.e. three Parliamentary Defence Committees, the Defence Forces Committee, and the Parliamentary Defence Commission. The report of the First Parliamentary Defence Committee notes: "The Defence Forces have to be regarded as an organic part of Finnish society. In this way, in all their activities, they have to adapt themselves as closely as possible to the aims of the pluralistic society and its general policy."¹⁵

Parliamentary Defence Committees and the Defence Commission indicate the existence of strong ties between the Defence Forces, society and parliamentarism in general. The fundamental fact in this respect is that the Parliament enacts the laws and decides upon the defence expenditures. Thus, the Defence Forces are under strong political control. When it is further taken into account that the

President of the Republic is the Supreme Commander of the Defence Forces, whose advisory board is the Defence Council, consisting of ministers as well as some civil and military experts, that control can be regarded as effective.

A modern national defence has wide operational functions. By means of organizational and other readiness measures, Finland tries to achieve optimal flexibility in crises situations confronting the society. The Planning Board for Defence Economy (PTS), the Commission for Defence Information (MTS),

15. On July 4., 1988, the Commander-In-Chief of the Defence Forces stated that "we must show the relatives of our conscripts and the rest of the society the good, righteous and secure feeling of solidarity that prevails in the Defence Forces".

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and the Civil Defence Board exist for this purpose and undertake the necessary preparations for crises in the respective ministries.

For a long time, the Finnish Defence Forces acted on the basis of a statute within the general framework of the Constitution and the Conscription Law, although it had been permanently established in 1928. Not until 1974 was the Law on Defence Forces enacted which still defines their basic objectives. Parliamentary defence committees have drawn up specific requirements, which have served to develop the Defence Forces in recent years.

Finland's defence expenditures have been relatively low, about 1,4 - 1,5% of the gross national product and 5-6% of the total state budget. The financial framework has, however, enabled development of Defence Forces which are appropriate for Finnish conditions. Recently, a lag from the level recommended by Parliamentary Defence Committees has caused concern in the leadership of the Defence Forces. The constant increase in the prices of armaments causes problems, particularly for the future of air defence.

The Finnish Defence Forces aim to fulfill the security needs of Finnish society. Thus, it is, in a sense, an institution geared for production. Maintaining national defence is a question of economics; it is a matter of adjusting the expenses to other societal and individual needs and relating the necessary expenditures to the resources of the society and the total state budget. Economic development in Finland has been rather good and allows the maintenance of a national defense that is suited to particular Finnish conditions at a reasonable

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cost. In addition it must be remembered that the Defence Forces affect directly production in the society. The personnel employed by the Defence Forces, conscripts included, represent about 100,000 working years of the total production in Finland.

The Defence Forces create jobs in the communities where they are stationed, support various regional development programs, and are welcome taxpayers in the communities. In fact, communities may even fight over the presence of the military. Co-operation in the domains of health care and sports has already become an important tradition between local authorities and the Defence Forces.

The defence establishment has its own industrial enterprises, which create employment opportunities. Orders by the Defence Forces also play an important role in creating jobs. On the other hand, the growing capacity of industry to fulfill the demands of the Defence Forces increases employment and, thus, has a cumulative positive impact on the whole society.

A significant part of the money spent on defence returns to the state and local authorities in the form of taxes and as a result of the above-mentioned multiple cumulative effect.

Since the early 1960's, research has been conducted on attitudes towards national defence among the population, the cadre, the conscripts and the reservists. These studies have shown that the Finnish population understands well the position and importance of the Defence Forces as a factor in their security and as part of the society. The time of service in the Defence Forces is appreciated as

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something beneficial as regards societal responsibilities. The defence of the country is solidly anchored in the attitudes of people. This is reflected in newspaper articles as well as party programs. The traditionally positive general attitude is, however, perhaps not fully evident in the defence budgets. According to an opinion poll published in the spring of 1988, about one third of the Finns would like to increase defence budgets while two thirds would like to maintain the present level.¹⁶

In the above-mentioned study the will to defend Finland is found to be at a high level. Depending on the wording of the questions, 76-82% of the Finns would defend their country with arms if it were attacked.

The feasibility of non-violent defence has also been studied in Finland, and the conclusion is that, in itself, it would not create the required security. Likewise we have compared the costs and benefits of professional and conscript armies: a conscript army is considered the most suitable for Finland. It has the great benefit of automatically including all strata of the nation in the Defence Forces as reservists and conscripts, which, at the same time, provides a broad training basis. By nature, this system fits democracy and the Defence Forces are unable to become "a state within the state". In its capacity as a "man's school" the Defence Forces advances an individual's propensities to act in society and to further his professional capabilities.

16. Notification of the Ministry of Defence, 19 May 1988. 980 Finns were interviewed by telephone. The sample reflects the Finnish population on a miniature scale.

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ties, while, on the other hand, it lets him reap the benefits of a conscript's civilian education.

The relations between the Defence Forces and Finnish society have continued to progress positively. The Defence Forces try to explain to the citizens as clearly as possible how their tax money is being spent by means of its own information, exposition, publication and PR-activities. In specially organized National Defence courses, civilians in leading positions are given information on questions of national defence, which they can then apply to their own professional spheres of activity. Almost all Members of the Parliament, for example, have participated in these courses, also including women.

The question of including women into national defence training has been widely debated in Finland in the past few years. It is interesting to note that in a poll taken in 1986, at least nine out of ten of the interviewed persons supported the training of women on a voluntary or other basis to perform unarmed defensive duties; half of the interviewed women were in favor of armed defense training as well.¹⁷ It is hardly probable that women will be given armed training in Finland, but their share in contributing to national defence is being pondered increasingly.¹⁸

17. Notification of the M.O.D. 9 March 1987.

18. The duty of woman to do military service is traditionally connected only with crisis situations. Women can then be ordered to fulfill defensive (not armed) tasks on the basis of the Act on Compulsory Labor (1942).

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The Defence Forces and, generally speaking, all the defence-related activities prescribed by law are supported in Finland by a host of defence minded voluntary organizations, a number of which act as front organizations or interest groups. Among these can be named the League for Reserve Officers, League for Reserve NCOs, defence guilds, Officer Cadet Corps, Union of Officers, Union of NCOs, and organizations of war veterans. The conscripts also have an interest group that represents them, the Union of Conscripts, which today works in good cooperation with the Defence Forces. The various units of the Commissions for Conscripts have separate functions. Particularly in recent years, there has been an increasingly strong positive attitude towards the fate of war veterans. This is illustrated by a number of concrete acts passed by the Parliament and local authorities to improve the material as well as the non-material situation of the veterans. The generally appreciative attitude of youth towards the veterans is a gratifying phenomenon. In its own right it is a powerful expression of the ties between Finnish society and national defence.

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DEVELOPMENT OF AND RESEARCH ON ATTITUDES RELATED TO SECURITY POLICY IN FINLAND

C O N T E N T S

Abstract

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References

Abstract

The background and development of the attitudes towards security policy in Finland are discussed on the basis of the historical and political as well as sociological studies by Jansson (1986), Allardt (1985, 1986), and Suhonen (1986).

Views on security policy can roughly be divided into attitudes and opinions. Attitudes towards security policy are considered long-range phenomena, the foundations of which were laid in the course of decades, maybe centuries. Most opinions on security policy may be short-range, on-the-spot opinions. Attitudes towards security policy prove to be rather slow moving or stable, this also has been confirmed by recent surveys that have been held since the 1960's. The present favorable attitudes, for example, towards cooperating with the Soviet Union have to be considered against the historical background, i.e. the fact that Finland was a Grand Duchy of Imperial Russia for a century. Then the Finns were autonomous with the exception of foreign policy and defense. During this period Finland developed into a nation, and the foundations of Finnish independence, achieved during the turmoils of World War I, were laid.

The sociological part introduces the crucial role of values. These values did not develop in a vacuum. Finally, the paper compares the different types of values according to Suhonen's (1986) research. A wide range of aspects, ranging from the will to defend the nation to more general security aspects (for instance, social security), can be discerned.

Altogether this paper tries to augment the customary approach of surveying attitudes towards security po-

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licity by probing deeper into the essence of more deep-seated attitudes associated with broadly conceptualized security.

Introduction

In general security policy means defense or defense policy, particularly in great powers. In a small country like Finland security policy means foreign policy and defense policy because of power constellations. Due to these circumstances the study of security policy was an investigation of attitudes towards defense and foreign policy. The systematic study of attitudes towards security policy in Finland started with surveys in the 1960's. In the 1970's the research was extended in the direction of international politics and general security (Leimu 1975, 442-444).

In the 17th century, security originally meant the political security of a community, i.e. the security of a state in the sense of defense policy. The concept of security was not used in a much more general sense until the 20th century. Nowadays security often means socioeconomic security. Indeed, security has become a slogan (Kaufmann 1973).

It is a central aspect that the attitudes towards security are not created in a vacuum. These attitudes develop in certain communities which increasingly depend on other communities. Accordingly, when we study the attitudes towards security policy of citizens, we are obliged to consider the field of the citizens' attitudes in a much wider sense. A researcher has to be able to follow the development of the status of the armed forces in society. This

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means taking into consideration the general views on security as well as, for instance, research on the legitimacy of the use of force.

In Finland these questions were first studied by the Planning Commission for Psychological Defense (HMS, mainly an expert body) in 1964-1975 and thereafter by its successor, the Planning Commission for Defense Information (MTS, in which the main Finnish political parties are represented) 1976 -, and by Tampere Peace Research Institute (TaPRI) since 1971 (a brief survey of previous research, e.g. Leimu 1974 a, 1-5). The birth of HMS is a story in its own right. Let it suffice here that the Swedish Beredskapsnämnden för psykologiskt försvar founded in 1953, nowadays Styrelsen för psykologiskt försvar was the model for HMS, which worked as an official committee within the Department of Defense. In Finland this means that many experts and politically affiliated persons work for no salary or only for nominal fees, while a very small office staff bears the brunt of the work. The body had its own research capacity only temporarily.

The objectives and tasks of MTS do not include research work of its own at all. On the basis of its very limited means, MTS has commissioned research, for instance, with university departments. In 1986, MTS published the book "The Finns and Security Policy" (Suomalaiset ja turvallisuuspolitiikka), which discusses the attitudes (values, to be more precise) and opinions about security policy. The chairman of MTS, Kaarlo Hartiala (1986, 5, 7), states in the preface of the book that the concept of security can be understood on an individual, state (national) or world (international) level. At the individual level, security is psychological,

physical, social, and economic. Hartiala's analysis of the individual's concept of security found that aspects pertaining to the individual's concept of security belong to value categories, which are weighted differently by different age groups as well as by persons with different levels of education/knowledge and experience. Security policy must consider all these aspects. In order to "be generally accepted, security policy must be based on the spontaneous will of the people and on the priorities of values. These, in turn, are expressed in free elections and in the opinions aired by people as well as in research reports. Knowledge and information have a central significance in helping people to define their views about different issues".

At the same time, we have arrived at the core of the problem: how should attitudes and opinions about security policy be defined and how are they formed. This paper will follow a rather general definition which, however, is based on research. In sociology and psychology attitudes are defined as rather stable dispositions to react to a situation or an object. An opinion can be considered less stable and more superficial. When a systematic study of security policy attitudes was started in Finland in the 1960's, Dr. Juhani Tauriainen, who was in the armed forces as a conscript, was ordered to plan a new survey of these attitudes and opinions. At the time, Dr. Tauriainen was the first to distinguish between attitudes and surface opinions. This was documented by Pekka Kansi and Kari Kärkkäinen in a relatively thorough study in 1969, an abbreviated report of which was published by the Commission for Psychological Defense. The objective of the Commission was to concentrate its studies on attitudes instead of opinions, because the commissioner of research

considered variable opinions, and even more variable interpretations based on them, to be questionable.¹ This distinction, however, is hardly familiar to authorities using attitude and opinion measurements nor to interested citizens.

In research opinions are considered to be proportional distributions of different questions on opinions in questionnaires, while attitudes, for instance, are studied as summated scales constructed by adding up scaled opinion questions. Often multivariate methods, e.g. the factor analysis, are used, too. Usually scales that are constructed on the basis of different methods give rather similar results. The problem of scales and advanced special methods is that the distance from empirical reality may increase considerably, and a person who "does not know the ropes of the trade" may find it difficult to read the research documentation. Nowadays the stress on more stable factors is discerned by the weight given to "thinking" and values (Allardt 1986, Haranne 1986, Jansson 1986, Suhonen 1986). The stability of values, for example, is indicated by the expression 'basic values', at premium in Finland in many discussions.

Hartiala introduces another, perhaps more important issue, i.e. how attitudes and opinions arise and how their formation can be influenced. Public opinion has frequently been referred to, but public opinion was unknown between the wars in the sense of sur-

1. I participated in this research, particularly in the Häme regional division of HMS during its exploratory activity period in 1964-1968 and thereafter in the research committee of HMS. Later I was a member of an ad hoc research group of HMS.

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veys. Modern opinion and attitude studies did not become known in Finland until after World War II. Between the wars public opinion seems to have been equal to the leaders' interpretation about what stand people took to questions important to the leaders. During the war this was augmented by a network of more or less effective informers. But irrespective of the efficiency of the indicator of public opinion during different periods of times, it is justified to ask how well present studies reflect public opinion or attitudes. Proceeding on the assumption that opinion and attitude measurements have a certain significance in predicting, say, voting behavior, it can still be said that questions, for example, as to the propensity for defense in peacetime do not tell much about how people will behave in the event of war. For instance, how do nuclear weapons influence people in war?

The quality or usefulness of concepts or measures is likely to be ambivalent. This is elucidated by Jansson's (1986, 26) view about public opinion. In the politics of a democratic state public opinion refers to the sum of expressions of opinion originating in parties, different pressure groups, mass media, and other influentials. Note that the man on the street or laymen is lacking. Here speaks a professor emeritus of politology at Helsinki University, an ex-chairman of the Swedish People's Party in Finland, and the editor-in-chief of Hufvudstadsbladet, who has both theoretical expertise and vast practical experience. Public opinion in this sense has been as familiar to our decision-makers in the past as it is probably now, even when information based on research (surveys) may be lacking.

We are now coming to the very sources of opinions

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and attitudes, which are difficult to approach by ordinary surveys. These surveys are usually rather superficial dissections of reality (one point in time) and their samples (N = 1000 - 2000 Finns in the age groups 15 - 74) are so small that the ordinary schematic background variables (e.g. age, gender, schooling, income, occupation, place of residence) hardly provide opportunities to analyse, for instance, causation. On the other hand, making a comparison of the situation at different points in time is reliable and possibly interesting, but the way time series usually have been studied is still plain description.

Opinions and attitudes are created in communities, and this means that we have to reach beyond the usual background variables (individual characteristics). There are research approaches and methods for such an advance, if researchers employ them and funds (sponsors) are available. For instance, decision-makers and members of elite groups can be studied; this was already suggested by politologists when the Commission for Psychological Defense was still in existence. The effects that small primary groups have on opinions could be studied, for instance, by group interviews or depth-interviews. Further snow-ball sampling could be employed, i.e. the persons interviewed are asked by whom their opinions have been influenced the most, and these influentials are interviewed in turn etc. Generally speaking, an effort should be made to approach entities comprised of more than one individual and to reach existing groups, not only analytic set-ups such as people in a certain age group, or with certain incomes or certain schooling.

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In principle, appropriate entities and their contexts can be studied, but it requires broad-minded industriousness both on the part of researchers and of readers. For instance, it is hardly sufficient to employ one branch of study and a certain approach and method within it. Most likely several branches and approaches are needed. In his work "Strategies of social research", Smith (1978) calls this theoretical and methodological triangulation. Apropos - the greatest impediment to this is not a lack of funds but the tradition of the academic lone wolf as well as a lack of willingness and ability to cooperate with representatives of other academic subjects in the social sciences. Funds for research also are available in Finland and the present (1988) willingness to invest more in schooling and higher education means that further funds will be supplied, provided that good research plans are produced and that there is stamina and cooperation enough to carry out these plans.

Accordingly, communities and contexts can be studied in principle. This should be done by considering the development of a community or society on the basis of, at least, its recent history. Furthermore, it can be done by studying the structure of society in sociological terms or by studying values and thinking from the vantage points of psychology, sociology and philosophy. (The following are examples of mostly sociological studies that contain some history and psychology: Kalela and Pietilä 1974, HSFK Mitteilungen 4/1972, Munck 1972, Jonsson and Manson 1972, Matthews, Arosalo and Joenniemi 1972, Leimu 1974, Suhonen and Suhonen 1972, Suhonen, Vesa and Virtanen 1985, Allardt 1976, Allardt 1985.)

Sociologists also have tried to develop models or

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employed modeling on the basis of research approaches and methods. With regard to opinion and attitude formation, Dr. Jürgen Gantzel's model is illuminating. The model worked out by Gantzel and his associates considers the manipulation of friend-foe pictures relevant to foreign policy in the Federal Republic of Germany (HSFK Mitteilungen 1972, 110a, see Leimu 1974 a 18-19, 23; 1974 b, 9). The gist of this hypothetical model is that parliamentary elites in the FRG disseminate information, evaluations and models of interpretation, which influence mass media. These media filter information and models of interpretation to the population, which forms its attitudes and opinions on the basis of this information. All this influences or reflects party preferences and voting behavior, and, in the final analysis, the set up of the parliamentary elite.² All in all this can be understood to mean that the persons responsible for formulating the security policy legitimize their security policies themselves (cf. Leimu 1974 b, 72-73).

This kind of research shows that citizens do not form their opinion in a vacuum and that these opinions do not as such influence decision-makers. Instead the question can be raised as to how decision-makers, (mass) media, or the group of influentials as a whole have an influence in different ways or, at least, how their publicized opinions influence the opinions of citizens. We can also speak about the influence of the center on the periphery. In this case the center reflects its own ideas in the periphery, though these ideas can to some extent

2. Unfortunately any more recent phases of this project are not familiar to me.

change in this reflection. When the factor of time is added to this approach, as for instance Jansson (1986) and Allardt (1986) have done, the resulting picture of attitudes towards security policy is considerably closer to reality than that obtained with ordinary surveys.

2. Characteristics of thought on security policy

2.1. A politico-historical approach according to Jansson, supplemented by survey data 1964 - 1987³

At the beginning, Jansson discusses the liberal tradition, which found its roots in the Swedish-educated people, and the Snellmanian tradition, which was embraced by the growing number of Finnish-minded people.

The liberal tradition adopted the worldwide liberal belief in international law and in the rights of small nations. The Snellmanian tradition stressed the necessity of taking into account the actual power relations, particularly the relations with Imperial Russia, when deciding on political actions.⁴ Liberalism developed into constitutionalism, representing passive resistance; and the Snellmanian tradition became a policy of acquiescence, representing

3. I follow the main historical lines of thought and the present situation in foreign policy according to Jansson (1986, 27-34).

4. On the other hand, it incorporates the belief that a nation can secure its future by developing its culture and moral powers (Jansson, 28).

'Realpolitik' (see below). The latter is interesting because it had a strong influence on the way J.K. Paasikivi later governed Finland. The concept of passive resistance later gave birth to a new tradition, namely activism, which employed force, also in opposing the Russianization of Finland. The Jäger-movement was a special branch of this activism. Within the framework of this movement, Finns clandestinely joined the German military service as soldiers in the Jäger Battalion 27 on the Eastern front during World War I in order to obtain military training that was to be employed later in achieving Finland's independence.⁵

Once Finland became independent, the liberal-constitutional tradition prevailed to the extent that the new republic adapted a pointedly Western course. This included the country's belief in a liberal democratic ideology and in the League of Nations as a factual expression of this belief.

After World War I, Finland had to choose between the Baltic states and Poland on the one hand and the Scandinavian countries on the other hand. Following the dispute about the Aland Islands with Sweden, an orientation toward the Baltic states was at first particularly supported by the ruling political center. However, it became increasingly necessary for Finland to search for the safer cooperation with the Scandinavian countries. The basic elements of security policy of this cooperation were neutrality and the effort to stay out of any European war.

5. One type of activism was also the cooperation with Russian revolutionaries (Jansson 1986, 28).

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The Continuation war (1941-1944) signified the temporary revival of the orientation towards Germany that had been prevalent in 1918, and, simultaneously, the revival of the dream of a Finnish tribes-nation. After this orientation suffered defeat, Finland had to build-up confidential relations with the Soviet Union. The main problem of the political line proposed by Paasikivi was how to combine Finnish independence with the basic interests of the Soviet Union. J.K. Paasikivi based his policy on the thinking of his teacher K.R. Danielson-Kalmari, according to which only a military point of view and the safety of the capital (at that time Petersburg) were important to Russia. This thinking found its most significant implementation in the Treaty of Cooperation, Friendship and Assistance in 1948, in which the national interests of both Finland and the Soviet Union were combined.

In designing his policy, President J.K. Paasikivi followed the line of thinking expounded by "Realpolitik", i.e. he took into consideration actual situations and circumstances as well as the prevalent power constellations. It becomes very important to emphasize "Realpolitik" when public opinion is opposed to necessary political action. It is well known that Paasikivi's political course of action met with opposition from the beginning. However, Finnish attitudes towards the official foreign policy line have changed. According to Jansson a climax was achieved among the political parties in 1977, when six parties supported the re-election of President U.K. Kekkonen, thereby showing their full support of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line of foreign policy.

In this phase, Jansson supplements his considera-

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tions by adding a question on how well Finnish foreign policy has been handled, which has been administered regularly to a sample of Finnish citizens since 1964. He states that this measure reacts quickly to changes in the political climate. Though a majority of the citizens has supported the current foreign policy, small differences are symptomatic (Table 1).

Table 1.

Opinions on "how well or badly the foreign policy of the country has been managed during recent years", 1964 - 1987

% (MTS 17.6.1986, table 1, p. 1; MTS 6.1.1988, table 1, p. 1)

	1964	-69	-70	-71	-72	-73	-74	-75	-78	-79
Well	90	87	95	96	86	87	85	85	84	86
Cannot say	5	5	1	2	7	7	7	6	10	8
Poorly	5	8	4	2	7	6	8	9	6	6

	1980	-81	-82	-83	-85	-86	-87
Well	87	93	93	94	95	93	90
Cannot say	6	4	3	4	2	3	5
Poorly	7	3	5	2	3	4	6

Jansson evaluates this time series in a national and international context: when Kekkonen and his foreign policy were vehemently attacked during the 1978 electoral campaign, public support of the country's foreign policy fell to an all time low (84%). A new peak was reached in 1984 (95%). Kekkonen also was successful in persuading significant Western states

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to recognize Finland's policy of neutrality; however, he ascertained the standpoint of the Soviet Union particularly when Finland joined EFTA in 1960 and concluded a treaty on free trade with the EEC. Kekkonen applied a rule he called the Finnish paradox: the more confidence we can achieve in our relations with the Soviet Union, the better conditions we have to cooperate closely with Western countries.

Finland tried to be more active as a proponent of peace and detente. Finland participated actively, for instance, in the peace-keeping actions of the United Nations. In 1963, Kekkonen proposed a plan for making the Nordic countries a nuclear-free zone, which originally was received with skepticism in the West (cf. Väyrynen 1986, 87-96) but which has achieved new significance recently.

Finland wanted to be a kind of bridge builder between East and West, and purposefully commenced in its efforts to convene the European Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE). The citizens also have been asked about their opinions on Finland's chances of succeeding as a conciliator (Table 2).

In all probability, the most significant point is that the citizens' evaluations of Finland's chances of being a successful conciliator seem to be influenced by the international climate and world events. Whereas about two thirds of the citizens considered Finland's chances good in 1964 and 1974, this number fell to about half of the citizens in 1969, following immediately after the "crazy" year of 1968 in Europe, including the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia.

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Table 2.

The opinions on Finland's chances of succeeding as a conciliator % (Leimu 1975, 448)

	1964	1969	1974
Very good	21	6	14
Rather good	44	43	48
Rather poor	22	38	24
Very poor	5	8	7
No chances	-	-	4
Cannot say	8	5	4
	100	100	100

According to Jansson, altogether, a new and generally accepted principle in Finland's foreign-policy ideology was born, which was based on the wish to promote cooperation between East and West in Europe. - Though the fundamentals of foreign policy are generally accepted, different views have been presented as to how the basic line should be applied. Jansson considers two questions: the primacy of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA-treaty) or the policy of neutrality and the tension between "moral" and Realpolitik. Let me illustrate the former by means of a question on the citizens' attitudes towards the FCMA-treaty. (Table 3).

In the 1960's more than 10 percent of the interviewees still considered the effects of the treaty negative and one seventh considered them nil. Thereafter, beginning in the 1970's, a change has taken place in the level, which seems to reflect the influences of ECSC on public opinion. The number of

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persons who consider the effects of the FCMA-treaty to be positive comes to four fifths, and the proportion of other opinions has decreased correspondingly.

Table 3.

An assessment of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA-treaty): "Has the FCMA-treaty had positive or negative effects or has it not had any effects on the international position of our country" (1964-1986)

* (MTS 17.6.1986, Table 2, p. 2)

	1964	-69	-74	-78	-79	-80	-81	-82	-84	-86
Positive	57	65	80	73	73	79	81	84	85	83
No effect	15	13	7	6	9	10	7	7	7	8
Cannot say	16	12	9	11	11	6	8	5	4	3
Negative	12	10	4	6	7	5	4	4	4	5

Jansson's politico-historical description of the development of thinking related to security policy in Finland could have been completed by Matilainen's treatment of the subject (1986). Matilainen's point of departure is the security policy stand of the political parties since the war. Though the author has tried to study the effects of parties on the attitudes towards security policy according to the party preferences of citizens and according to the effects of parties on the opinion climate (Leimu 1972, 1974), these aspects would exceed beyond the purpose of this paper. Let us turn to the sociological-structural treatment of values and security policy thinking by Allardt (1986).

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2.2. The sociological-structural consideration of the background of our security policy values according to Allardt, supplemented by opinion studies 1964 - 1987⁶

It is crucial that Allardt chooses the position and societal development of Finland, including the temporal perspective, as his point of departure, i.e. even in this treatment, historical aspects are accentuated in trying to understand and describe Finland's mode of thinking and values about security policy.

At the beginning, Allardt discusses the geographical-historical base of the development, stating that Finland is a Nordic country and that it is situated between Eastern and Western Europe. The circumstance that Finland was a part of Sweden for 700 years and then an autonomous region of the Russian empire meant de facto that Finland was a buffer periphery between Stockholm and Petersburg without having a center of its own. This was the overall situation up to the 1850's. Helsinki, which became the capital of the country in 1812, developed gradually into a center in its own right, but the point that Finland is geographically located between Sweden and Russia has been relevant constantly. Still today Finland's most important commercial partners are Sweden and the Soviet Union.

The peasant roots of Finnish societal development are based on the participation in the meetings of the Estates of the Realm and in the territorial army. The peasants (land-owning farmers) comprised

6. I follow Allardt (1986, 136-148). Cf. also Allardt 1987.

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the fourth Estate. Though this estate was often without real influence, the fact that the farmers were able to participate in the meetings of the Estates laid the foundation for the general participation and the influence of the people. When the Estates began to convene in the Grand Duchy in the 1860's, the fourth Estate had achieved equal status. According to Allardt, the participation of the fourth Estate can be counted among the conditions that contributed to the birth and the development of the nation.

Sweden-Finland was the first state, which implemented a kind of conscription for its territorial army. This system combined national defense with agriculture, and defense was the duty of the peasants. Even in its inflexibility, the territorial army was a kind of a national militia, in which the men were bound to their home region.

Allardt also discusses the advent of farmers entering the market economy as well as the landless rural population and the great land reforms (Lex Kallio in 1922). Furthermore, he looks at the changes that occurred in the political climate starting at the end of the 1800's, to the one chamber Diet (since 1906), and, finally, to the greatest open class conflict, the Civil War in 1918. He also discusses the exceptionally rapid structural changes of recent decades and stresses the significance of information technology and computerization. Whereas an estimate made in 1980 suggested that about 80,000 persons were working with computers or corresponding equipment, this figure had climbed to about 400,000 by 1985. According to Allardt, Finland is once again approaching a new type of society, and it is merely a question of personal preference whether it is called

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a service society, an information society, or a post-industrial society.

Let us take only the traditions and changes regarding the sphere of values connected to security policy. Allardt emphasizes that the point of departure in devising security policy is based on the following aspects:

- 1) the fact that the Soviet Union is a neighbor of Finland, and Finland's efforts to maintain friendly relations with the Soviet Union;
- 2) the fact that Finland is a Nordic country, both in terms of its history and of its societal form;
- 3) the fact that Finland is eagerly following international treaties and arrangements, like many small states do.

One of the corner stones of Finland's foreign policy is the FCMA-treaty with the Soviet Union. The surveys that have been conducted since the 1960's show to what extent citizens have accepted and internalized Finnish foreign policy. According to Allardt the country's foreign policy is considered both wise and morally good by the population. The differences in attitudes are slight among different strata and among political orientations but have not been politically significant. The supporters of all the significant political parties increasingly consider foreign policy to be well managed and decreasingly think it is poorly managed. The foreign policy thinking of these supporters is more alike in the 1980's than earlier. Altogether, the differences between the supporters of different parties are slight.

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Allardt asks whether the unanimity in security policy and foreign policy depends on the fact that Finns are used to relying on the state despite conflicts and that they have a tradition of democratic participation (i.e. the circumstance that the farmers formed the Fourth Estate and convened with the other Estates of the Realm).

Structural and technological changes have changed the basic lines of security policy to some extent. The accelerating arms race between the superpowers and the extremely fast development of weapons of mass destruction are endangering the existence of mankind. Erik Allardt states: "Structural changes also influence the conditions of defense policy. Our defense policy is still founded on the deeply ingrained view that the armed forces belong to the whole nation. Moreover, according to international comparisons, the armed forces are widely accepted as an institution of society by all strata. This tradition is reinforced by the hardships shared during the Winter War and the Continuation War". The considerable influences of these wars on Finnish society have never been thoroughly analyzed.⁷ Here we can illustrate these opinions by means of data on the views about the defense budget (appropriations) (Table 4.).

The number of persons who want the appropriations to be the same as before increased somewhat in 1986, and the number of persons who want to increase the

7. When Allardt planned the interview schedule for the HMS in 1964, he included a question about participation in the wars. But it is hardly exceptional that these data are insufficiently analyzed (cf. Leimu, 1972).

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Table 4.

Opinions on the defense appropriations 1964-1987

% (MTS 17.6.1986, table 5, p. 4; MTS 6.1.1988, table 4, p. 3-4)

	1964	-69	-70	-71	-72	-73	-74	-75	-78
Higher	17	46	56	46	36	42	42	41	38
As before	55	38	33	42	48	44	41	41	38
Cannot say	12	7	3	4	8	5	8	7	12
Lower	16	9	8	8	8	9	9	11	12

	1979	-80	-81	-82	-83	-84	-85	-86	-87
Higher	37	41	32	32	33	33	36	26	29
As before	43	42	48	49	48	51	48	57	49
Cannot say	10	5	7	5	5	3	3	4	5
Lower	10	12	13	14	14	12	12	13	16

appropriations has declined. The number of persons who want to reduce the defense appropriations have remained at the previous level; and, in 1986, they numbered half of those wanting to increase the appropriations. The eventual changes again evened out somewhat in 1987. The variance of answers reflects the changes in the international atmosphere, but it hardly shows an upwards jump in the number of persons who want to increase the appropriations, except in 1969 (and maybe 1970). A corresponding decrease is not visible in 1974 and 1975 during CSCE. However, when the international atmosphere again turned cooler at the end of the 1970's, there is a reduction in the number of those wanting an increase in

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the appropriations, and the number of persons who want an increase is rather low in 1986.

How do the standpoints of the parties influence the people? The parties have quite different views, particularly as regards the defense appropriations (cf. Matilainen 1986). Pro primo, the left, the center, and the right have advocated clearly different amounts; therefore, among the supporters of the right about two thirds were in favor of an increase, among supporters of the center about 60%, and among supporter of the left about one third in 1969-1971 (Leimu 1975, 445). In 1986, there was a return to the lower level of 1964 (Leimu, op. cit., and table 5 as follows).

Table 5.

Opinions on the funds appropriated to the armed forces: "increase (higher), maintain at previous level (as before), decrease (lower)" in January-February 1986

% (standing question, MTS information 3.10.1986)

Supporters of the	Higher	As before	Lower
Social Democratic Party	23	64	13
The National Coalition	46	51	3
The Center Party	28	61	7
The Democratic League of the Finnish People	13	48	38
The Finnish Countryside Party	24	70	6
The Greens	13	49	33

In any case, Allardt emphasizes that the differences should not be accentuated. Without believing myself to be in a position to evaluate the following, I, in

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my capacity as a researcher, would like to point out that the armed forces have somehow learned to live with the paradox that although they are widely accepted and legitimate, they are not given a very big slice of the "common cake". This slice would be even smaller at the opinion level, if we were to present the appropriations of the armed forces and, for instance, the appropriations of the social and cultural sector simultaneously, as was done in the 1974 survey. It is rather obvious that during peacetime, actual and personal needs seem more important than the needs required during times of crisis or in wartime, particularly if these seem very remote. Some Finns even venture to discontinue their private insurances when they consider their payments too onerous. However, Allardt emphasizes the legitimacy of the armed forces which originated in the peasant tradition. Allardt's view is well founded when we consider defense from a long-term perspective of attitudes and values and not from the point of view of short-term opinions.

3. Recent values and thought related to security policy according to Suhonen⁸

We have tried to go beyond the usual opinion considerations by looking at the thinking related to security policy thinking from a politological, sociological and historical perspective, using opinion data that has been collected since 1964 as supporting information. Another approach that probes deeper than ordinary opinion studies is to take into account values, which Allardt already did.

8. I follow Suhonen (1986, 149-159).

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Suhonen purports to describe how thinking related to security policy is affected by the acceptance of certain values. Thus, the question is not to determine correct values. When social values are considered in the social sciences, they are often defined as rather stable preferred choices that direct actions of people.⁹ People order their own goals and even more distant things according to relative importance. - Suhonen states: "... although values are an important part of the people's will, it is not possible to predict the behavior of people exhaustively on the basis of these values." According to Suhonen, one explanation for this phenomena may be the fact that values can be contradictory.

Suhonen examines Finnish values on the basis of the data obtained in two national opinion polls. The same question was asked in both surveys, i.e. the respondents were asked to rank five out of twelve values in their order of relative importance and to mention the least important. This measurement is an application of M. Rokeach's (1973) scale of basic values.

According to both the study by MTS and the study by TAPRI, two thirds of the Finns chose the values of 'peace', 'health', and 'independence of our country' as the most important values from the list. Suhonen maintains that the consideration of primary values does not necessarily provide a correct description of the relative importance of the values. For instance, the 'survival of nature' and 'eliminating famine' obtained few primary choices, but half of the respondents placed them among the five most im-

9. Cf. attitudes as stable ways to react to different things.

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Table 6.

The value preferences of Finns in November 1984 (and in December 1984) % (Suhonen 1986, table 1. p. 152)

	Most important %	Among the five most important %	Least important %
Peace	34 ^{a)} (31)	82 ^{b)} (81)	0 (0)
Health	20 (22)	74 (72)	0 (0)
Independence of our country	13 (13)	56 (60)	0 (1)
Saving the soul	9 (5)	15 (11)	28 (28)
Good human relations	5 (8)	44 (53)	0 (1)
Eliminating famine from earth	5 (6)	52 (51)	1 (1)
Good income	4 (8)	26 (35)	7 (9)
Keeping nature unpolluted	2 (3)	52 (48)	1 (2)
Freedom	2 (.)	30 (.)	1 (.)
Work for all	1 (4)	38 (51)	1 (2)
Equality between people	1 (2)	19 (32)	4 (5)
Achieving something	1 (1)	4 (4)	48 (41)
Total %	97 (103)	492 (498)	91 (90)

a) A postal survey administered by the Social Sciences Institute, commissioned by the Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI). A random sample of the Finnish speaking population aged 15 - 74.58% answered (n = 1098).

b) An interview administered by Taloustutkimus Ltd, commissioned by MTS. A quota sample of the Finnish speaking population aged 15 - 69, balanced according to age, gender and place of residence (n = 1963).

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portant issues and hardly anybody considered them least important.¹⁰

Views on war, peace and security were also treated in the study by TAPRI and the Social Sciences Institute. After the questions about future aspirations, values and threats people were asked: "different thoughts have been expressed in public about what Finland should do to increase the security of its citizens. How do the following actions increase the security of citizens. Check your evaluation of each item."

Societal forms of action undertaken with the intention of increasing the citizens' security are connected in the minds of people so that one end of a dimension includes an 'increase in defense appropriations', 'activities of the reserves', 'increasing the time of conscript service' etc. Those who stressed the utility of these acts from the point of view of security for the citizens seldom emphasized 'starting disarmament', 'peace work by citizens' and 'activities by friendship associations', which comprise the other end of the basic dimension. Suhonen calls this the dimension of "armed and disarmed security thinking". Note that the popular active foreign policy, the proposal to make the protection of the people more effective, and the desire to increase the number of women involved in the decision-making process are not included in this dimension.¹¹

10. The researchers study the order of preferences by multivariate analysis as well. The most clear value dimension arises between the value of one's own welfare and worldwide responsibility (Suhonen 1986, 152).

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Table 7.

The views held by Finns as to the effects that certain actions have on the security of the people, autumn 1984, % (Suhonen 1986, Table 2., p. 152)

	I N F L U E N C E S			
	very much	some	not at all	rather the opposite
Active foreign policy.....	63	33	3	1
Activities of friendship associations.....	40	48	11	1
Peace work by citizens.....	36	50	13	1
Making the protection of the population more effective.....	35	45	17	3
Increasing the proportion of women in decision-making process.	33	47	18	2
Starting disarmament.....	44	28	17	11
Activities of the reserves.....	10	41	41	8
Increasing the defense appropriations.....	11	33	41	15
Putting weight on civil defense...	9	28	51	12
Increasing the time of conscript service.....	5	19	66	10
Conscript service for women.....	2	13	64	21
Joining a military alliance.....	2	9	41	48

(The order of preferences is based on the sum of the first two columns in rows).

11. Somehow Suhonen (1986, 157) later adds to these independent factors the activities of friendship associations, too, though he includes it in a disarmed dimension above.

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When we consider values to be the goals of individuals, communities and societies, security policy represents the means. In human thought or consciousness, values and thinking related to security policy can theoretically be arranged in the form of a hierarchy. In such an arrangement, values are primary and views on security policy are determined by values.

Let us examine dependencies (associations) by values in terms of correlations (Table 8).

The choices 'independence of our country', 'equality', 'peace' and 'eliminating famine' are values, the supporters of which most systematically chose means to increase the security of the citizens. 'Independence' correlates positively with 'increasing defense appropriations' and negatively with 'starting disarmament'. According to Suhonen, this means that the higher independence is ranked among the evaluations, the more likely it is that people think the security of citizens can be increased by increasing armed defense rather than by disarmament, peace work etc.

Without diving into statistical details note that the multiple correlations on the summing up-row reflect the association of each value with the whole group of security views. The second column of Table 8 shows the correlations (associations) between the evaluation of peace and the security views. Compared with the first column they have systematically an opposite sign, though they are somewhat weaker. The figures of the second column reflect an opposite way of thinking compared with the figures of the first column, in which the item 'independence of our country' is experienced as a condition of the citizen's

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Table 8: Associations of some evaluations and views about security policy in terms of correlations and multiple correlations (Suhonen 1986, table 3., p.156)

	V	A	L	U	E	S	Good	Preserv-
Actions improving the security of citizens	Peace	Equality	Eliminating	Famine	Freedom	Sustenance	ing	Nature
	Independence							
Increasing defense appropriations.....	0.30	-0.14	-0.20	-0.15	0.11	0.09	-0.15	
Activities of reserves...	0.25	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.13	0.08	-0.14	
Longer conscription time.	0.21	-0.14	-0.11	-0.12	-0.08	
Effectivisation of the protection of population.	0.15	..	-0.15	-0.08	
Conscription of women....	0.14	-0.08	-0.14	-0.12	
Joining military alliance	0.08	-0.09	-0.12	0.13	-0.10	
Active foreign policy....	..	0.08	
More women into decision-making.....	0.12	0.13	0.10	-0.15	-0.11	
Activities of friendship associations.....	-0.11	0.13	0.10	0.11	-0.08	-0.08	..	
Peace work of citizens...	-0.17	0.20	0.11	0.15	-0.15	-0.10	..	
Weight into civil defense	-0.18	..	0.08	0.12	
Starting disarmament.....	-0.23	0.20	0.11	0.20	-0.16	..	0.09	
<u>Multiple correlation</u>	<u>0.38</u>	<u>0.28</u>	<u>0.28</u>	<u>0.26</u>	<u>0.23</u>	<u>0.21</u>	<u>0.19</u>	

(Values included only whose multiple correlation with the security policy views surpassed the significance level of 0.001. Out of these those correlations are printed which surpassed the significance level of 0.01.)

security. Independence is also a primary value, the defense of which presupposes armaments. The way of thinking described in the second column is mainly characterized by the necessity of peace as a condition of safe life with corresponding means of security. These two ways of thinking, however, are characteristic for only a part of the Finnish population, which is reflected by relatively low correlations. The multiplicity of this way of thinking is mirrored by the fact that the items 'active foreign policy' and 'activities of friendship associations' were among the most popular means of security, but they were not associated with either way of thinking.

4. Other ways to enlarge on usual surveys

I have tried to show how often rather straightforward, plain opinion and attitude studies can be enlarged or how they can be used primarily to complete political-historical or structural research. I have also stressed that opinions and attitudes are not created in a vacuum. In addition to the family, for instance, schools, mass communication and all the communities which mediate between people and society influence the values adopted from the national and the entire Western cultural heritage (cf. Suhonen 1986, 150).

To put it bluntly, the problem a social scientist is faced with is that "everything influences everything", although it is impossible to study everything. A study must always be strictly limited, and when it is enlarged, the choices must be "intellectually disciplined". In the preceding sections, I described social security as a relevant dimension in

the discussion on security policy, which, therefore, had been preoccupied with security in terms of foreign policy and defense (Leimu 1972, Leimu and Kärkkäinen 1969). I used Kaufmann's (1970) thorough treatise on security as my theoretical base. In the 1960's and early 1970's this would have been considered confusing the issue of national security. As we have seen above, current views, as exemplified by Suhonen's (1986) research on values, are more pluralistic. The following provides additional viewpoints on the study of the influence of parties on opinions and attitudes as well as the study of the relationships between attitudes, particularly the tendency towards defense, and information on security policy (knowledge).

The studies looking into the influence that political parties have on security-policy-related thinking through the mass media, particularly via the press (for inst. Anckar 1971) can be counted among the most interesting projects. In principle, parties can be considered a frame (or constructors of frames), in which citizens' opinions and attitudes are created. One of the most recent studies is Matilainen's (1984) report on the views on defense and the cohesion of party groups of MPs in the Diet, the Finnish parliament, from 1945 - 1978 (cf. Matilainen 1986. Tervasmäki's (1964) corresponding study concerns the period of time between the World Wars).

By employing ordinary survey data and its variables to the utmost, I have made an effort to study the influences of parties as "party atmosphere" or as a frame of thinking on security-policy attitudes (Leimu 1972, Leimu and Kärkkäinen 1969). - The significance that political parties have in forming opinions on and attitudes towards security policy

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was underscored by associate professor Onni Rantala, who gave me the long line of thinking on security policy after the wars (cf. Leimu 1974b,a). Corresponding views have been presented by Juhani Mylly (1978) in his discussion of Finnish foreign policy and security policy issues within the politics of the Agrarian League (later the Center Party) from independence to the Winter War. In my discussion (Leimu 1974b), I combined this "party frame of thought" with attitudes towards security policy, particularly the tendency towards to defense.

The relationship between knowledge and attitudes is an issue in its own right. It is usually assumed that more knowledge on an issue will make for a more favorable attitude towards that issue. This common-sense assumption was first studied by Christiansen (1959). In his study of Norwegian cadets in a military school, he assumed this relationship to be curvilinear. For instance, a rather high level of knowledge is required to be able to influence attitudes. This transformed hypothesis was corroborated by the data. I have also studied this set-up and discussed it, obtaining certain corroboration from my data (Leimu 1972, 1974a,b).

In my study I was confounded particularly by the evidence that knowledge and attitudes, primarily knowledge on foreign policy and attitudes towards security policy, including the tendency towards defense, are relatively independent at the level of scales. Dr. Vilho Harle originally marveled at these findings until he obtained similar results in his study of elites. He was equally surprised because of the independent status between attitudes and knowledge (Harle, oral communication).

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The efforts to enlarge ordinary opinion studies refer to the formation of attitudes and values within a greatly extended time span and as the result of a combination of so many factors in different environments that knowledge, as one factor, is diluted in the multiplicity of different factors. Moreover, values - and attitudes - can be primary and can form the core of a frame of interpretation, in which "ideas" - and not only superficial opinions - are created. In this case information incompatible with or contradictory to the person's own values and attitudes does not penetrate the "frame", or at least it does not influence the thinking or attitudes of people perceptibly.

Various studies already have employed different approaches and advanced methods. The different academic subjects are not delimited as strictly as in the past. I am convinced that ordinary surveys have to be enlarged or that a real advance from their level needs to be made, if, for instance, researchers do take their job seriously and decision-makers expect more applicable studies. I grant that this will not make the position of even an enlightened reader or user of these studies one bit easier. On the contrary, consumers of opinion and attitude studies can brace themselves for more history, more political and sociological theory as well as advanced methodology.

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THE FINNISH ARMY DURING THE WAR OF 1941-45

SOME RESULTS OF SOCIAL RESEARCH

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Bibliography

1. Introduction

This paper discusses the social scientific research which has been conducted on different aspects of the Finnish wartime army. For the purposes of this paper, social scientific research includes military sociological and psychological studies as well as, for instance, different wartime attempts at evaluating the fighting morale and spirit of the army. First a short summary of war events during 1941-45 is presented as a general background. Then a brief survey of studies on the Finnish army as well as of research organizations and researchers is given. After that two studies are looked at more closely. The first is a military sociological field study about an infantry company, which was initiated during the war and completed as a doctoral dissertation after the war. The second of these studies is a "retrospective" questionnaire survey, for which the empirical material was gathered from the veterans who fought against the Russians during the Red Army's mass attack in 1944. This study was published only a few months ago in Finland.

2. General background:

The Finnish army at war in 1941-45

After the so-called Winter War (1939-40) between Finland and the Soviet Union, Finland was forced to cede a considerable amount of its territory to the Soviet Union. In July 1941 a new war started between these two countries; a war, which is called the Continuation War in Finland. In the latter part of 1941, Finland succeeded in getting back all of its former territory and even moving over the old frontier to new and better defensive positions. The Finnish attack stopped well before Leningrad in the

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south and the Murmansk railway line in the northern part of the combat zone. After the situation had stabilized at the end of 1941, there followed two and a half years of relatively quiet trench warfare, during which there was not much fighting. In June of 1944 the Red Army launched a surprise mass attack, which was halted only after five weeks of extremely heavy fighting. During this time the Red Army was able to penetrate about one hundred kilometers in the main attack direction. After that the Russians began to move their troops to Central Europe. The armistice was signed a few months later.

The wartime Finnish army consisted of more than half a million men, almost all of whom were conscripts. The Army had 16 divisions (only one of them was a panzer division) and a few brigades. About 60,000 men were killed in action during the war and 160,000 were wounded.

When one thinks about the Finnish wartime army, many things seem quite surprising. In both of Finland's wars (1939-40 and 1941-45) the army was greatly outnumbered in manpower. For instance, in the final phase of the war in 1944, the Russians at first had a six-to-one superiority in manpower in the main attack direction. The Finnish army was not mechanized, even the artillery pieces were often drawn by horses, but it had to fight against mechanized and panzer formations. The Russians were also greatly superior in indirect firepower and planes. Despite these facts, the Finnish army fared surprisingly well in all phases of the war, and, in the end, it was able to halt the Soviet offensive in 1944.

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Why did the Finnish army fare so well during the war? What was it like? In what ways did it differ from other armies? War historians have made in-depth studies on the war events, of course, and a part of these questions can be explained on the basis of special tactics, training and the difficult Finnish terrain. The Finns, for instance, were good at mobile warfare. The troops were able to fight in the wilderness and to move with skis in the heavy snow. One specialty of the troops was the cross-country outflanking maneuver, and during the Winter War the word "motti" (meaning an encircled enemy formation) became widely known in Finland.

But despite all this, the purely "military" aspects such as tactics, training, terrain, concentrated use of artillery, use of reserves and so on do not provide an adequate explanation. War historians and others writing about the Continuation War also speak about things like "fighting morale" and "spirit", about the morale and cohesion of units, the paralyzing effect of static trench warfare and so on. The importance of military psychological and sociological matters and knowledge is well understood among Finnish war historians. Unfortunately, rather few military sociological or psychological studies about the Finnish wartime army have been published. However some studies have been made, and it is the purpose of this paper to introduce some social scientific research results about the Finnish wartime army. On the basis of these studies, a comprehensive answer to such questions as why the Finnish army was successful in the war as a whole or in some specific phase of the war cannot be given, and nothing like that is even attempted in this paper, although something can be said about a few selected problems. The

studies and results are also interesting if we want to compare them to other results of social scientific research on the Second World War from other countries or with more recent research results.

3. Social research on the wartime army: an overview

Very few social scientific studies have been made about the Finnish wartime army, even if we include the historical research that is related to the social sciences. During the war, the Defence Forces conducted only a few questionnaire surveys, one of which dealt with the reasons for and types of panic, and another concentrated on the religiosity of the soldiers. In addition the Headquarters tried to follow and evaluate the morale and spirit of the troops by systematically collecting reports from different divisions and small units. After the war, university scholars (sociologists and psychologists) generally have not been very interested in topics related to the Defence Forces, although there have been some exceptions. The Institute of Military Science, which can look back on a long tradition in war history, only lately has had a small military sociological research group or researchers. Military psychological research was not started in the Defence Forces until after World War II, and the research activity has focused mainly on current topics.

In 1947, the sociologist Knut Pipping published a study about a wartime infantry company with the title "A Company as a Society". The study will be presented later in this paper.

Mikko Heikura, a sociologist, has studied the morale and spirit of the troops during the war (Heikura

1967). He gathered empirical material from the aforementioned morale reports and also constructed indicators of fighting morale, for instance, by comparing battle losses (dead and wounded) to non-battle losses (deserters, sick etc.). On the basis of these methods the researcher was able to compare different divisions with each other. Esko Salminen (1976) has studied the Defence Forces' efforts to support and raise the morale of the troops by various methods.

Paavo Junntila (1955) has studied the factors that had a negative influence on combat effectiveness during the war, including social psychological factors.

Jukka Kulomaa, a young historian, has made an extensive study about deserters during the Continuation War (Kulomaa 1984).

The latest social scientific study about the wartime army is Dr. U. E. Moisala's questionnaire study, which is directed at war veterans. That work will be presented at the end of this paper.

4. "A Company as a Society": A field study of an infantry company

After the Second World War, the importance of primary group ties and of group phenomena in general were found to be important when examining the behavior of soldiers in war and battle. It has been argued that the best way to study such group phenomena may not be by looking at the attitudes of individuals, as is common in many sociological investigations (Shils 1950, 18). Another way to study

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group phenomena is, of course, by conducting field studies on small military units during the war using methods like participant observation, interviews, sociometric measurements and so on. But such field studies are rare even today, perhaps because it is easier to mail questionnaires than to sit in a dugout and observe combat behavior. With regard to the Second World War, such investigations of small units are rare indeed.

During the Second World War, Knut Pipping, a young Finnish sociologist, served as a NCO in a machine-gun company. During the war, he began an extensive sociological study on his own company. He gathered empirical material systematically during, and after the war and his work was published as a doctoral dissertation in 1947 (in Swedish but with an English summary). The empirical material was gathered by systematically observing the behavior of soldiers in different situations (Pipping had excellent opportunities of doing this because he served as Orderly Sergeant and, thus, knew the entire company very well). During the war, the company saw many kinds of combat action, from relatively peaceful trench warfare to mobile operations in the northern wilderness and heavy fighting on the Karelian Isthmus in the main direction of the Russian attack. The losses of the company (dead and wounded) were larger than the company's entire original manpower.

Pipping also collected statistical and other material by means of interviews and by using the company's War Diaries and other documentary material. No sociometric measurements were made.

With respect to the behavior of soldiers in general, one of the most important questions for military

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sociologists is, of course, to what extent the soldiers' behavior is regulated by the formal military organization and authority and what influence various informal intragroup controls and loyalties have, and how these two interact.

Pipping investigated the informal organization of his unit, the relations between formal and informal structures, their different norm systems and how these in turn affected the soldiers' behavior. A significant part of the study is an extensive analysis of different formal and informal groupings within the company. These included rank groups, military groups (sections, etc.), local groups (for instance, men who manned the same outpost), age groups and small groups of friends (2-4 men). Every soldier felt loyalty to each of these social groups, and in different situations the groups influenced and controlled their members' behavior in different ways.

Pipping made an extensive analysis of the company's informal norm system and how this influenced the men's behavior and attitudes towards different things. For instance, there was a set of norms which concerned courage. The security of the community was one criterion, on the basis of which the men evaluated each other's behavior. Another principle was their aspiration for comfort. Whereas the soldiers didn't place great store on men who volunteered for dangerous patrol missions, because these had nothing to do with the security of the group, the men who destroyed attacking tanks were highly valued. Everybody was expected to show a "normal" amount of courage, and those who didn't were despised or ridiculed. It was also expected of the officers to show the same amount of courage as the men, and

sometimes the men would threaten to shoot an officer who didn't share in the risks of battle with his men (but it was often just talk, of course). The aspiration for comfort would sometimes lead to apparently reckless behavior such as going to a sauna which was situated 300 meters away from the enemy. But generally the men tried to maintain a balance between security and comfort. Pipping's analysis of courage is extremely interesting, and one is tempted to believe that his results are not limited to the Finnish wartime army only.

Pipping's study is especially interesting, when it is examined in the context of other military sociological studies on small military units at war. As we have seen, Pipping's study was a very thorough empirical sociological investigation on one small military unit at war. Pipping studied, among other things, the social organization (both formal and informal) of the unit, different informal groupings, their norms and the loyalty they produced in men, the soldiers' behavior in battle and otherwise as well as the norms regulating it, the relations between officers and soldiers, the attitudes among the men and so on. With regard to other military sociological and psychological studies on soldiers in the Second World War, one naturally cannot overlook "The American Soldier" (Stouffer et al., 1949), a massive work based on empirical questionnaire studies. Edward A. Shils wrote about it in 1950: "For the most part, 'The American Soldier' is based on studies of the attitudes of individuals. There is no direct observation of groups in action and only occasional, indirect observations of group performance. The actual operation of primary group life is not described and indeed is seldom referred to" (Shils 1950, 18). The importance of primary (infor-

mal) groups was, however, noticed by Stouffer et al. Another notable study is an article by E.A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II" (1948). In this article the authors argue that in the German army primary group cohesion was a very important factor in keeping units together in battle and otherwise. It should be noted that Pipping's dissertation was published in 1947, i.e. well before these two notable research efforts. Alexander L. George wrote about these two American studies and their relation to primary groups: "Earlier studies based on World War II experiences in Western Europe (Stouffer, et al., 1949; Shils and Janowitz, 1948), postulated or seemed to imply the existence of a rather rich cluster of primary group ties shared by many members of units as large as squads or even platoons. In the more recent literature, however, a new conception of primary group ties ... has emerged. They are now described as being more molecular or granular in structure, often taking the form of a series of two-person relationships rather than affiliations among larger numbers of men" (George 1971, 298). It might be worthwhile to add to George's analysis that Pipping made a very thorough investigation of the formal and informal groups in his unit in 1941-44, and found that there were as many as six different kinds of groupings, starting with formal military groups (for instance, sections; according to Pipping, a section was the single most important membership group of the soldiers) and concluding with informal groups, for instance, "small groups consisting of two to four mates" (Pipping 1947, 257). (For Pipping's analysis of these groups, see Pipping 1947, 93-128).

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One notable feature in Knut Pipping's work is that the observations were made over a long period of time. The results obtained by similar studies which were made, for instance, in Korea (Little 1964) or in Vietnam (Moskos 1970) were based on only months or even weeks of participant observation.

5. A questionnaire study of combat veterans

In a recently (April 1988) published study, Dr. U.E. Moisala tried to explain why the Finnish soldiers were able to halt the final Russian offensive in the summer of 1944. As mentioned before, the Russians launched a massive attack against the Finnish main position on the Karelian Isthmus in the south in June of 1944. The force of the attack at first caused panic among the troops because they were accustomed to trench warfare, and the Finns had to retreat about 100 kilometers to a new defense line. But there the opposition stiffened and the Russian offensive was halted. The defenders were aided by the concentrated use of field artillery, the arrival of new German anti-tank weapons at the front, and the use of dive-bombers.

The researcher collected his empirical material by circulating questionnaires among the combat veterans of the Karelian Isthmus. The veterans' organizations and local newspapers helped in circulating the questionnaires. A few more than 2,000 veterans answered to the questionnaire, about 2% of all those veterans who are still alive today. (Dr. Moisala worked together with Mr. Pertti Alanen, a war historian, who wrote about the war events).

Dr. Moisala wanted to find out which factors moti-

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vated the soldiers during battle and helped them to endure the stress. The veterans were asked to choose eight single most important factors from a total of nineteen aspects given in the questionnaire. The veterans also were asked to rank these eight factors according to their importance. The nineteen factors included such items as the strength of their own field artillery, loyalties towards old pals, fear of death penalties given to the deserters etc. (see Appendix). The significance of different factors is presented in the table below.

The following factors were the most important:

- acting according to orders
- fear of occupation of their country
- desire to maintain the trust of their companions
- new weapons (especially anti-tank weapons).

When the material was analyzed further, single items were grouped together into "dimensions". The following groups of items were found important:

- (1) adaptation to discipline and battle stress (items 14, 19, 1 of appendix 1)
- (2) willingness to stand up for ideological/political reasons (items 9, 3, 12)
- (3) social psychological influences of their own group and leaders (items 15, 17)
- (4) observing the possibility to control the situation with their own weapons (items 8, 10, 11).

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Table: Significance of different factors of fighting morale (will) according to respondents.

	Effectuated	%
1. Acting according to orders	1486	74,5
2. Fear of enemy occupation	1280	64,2
3. Desire to maintain confidence of companions	1262	63,3
4. Effect of new weapons	1215	60,9
5. Avoiding unconditional surrender	945	47,4
6. Surviving surprise attack	916	45,9
7. Trust in their own government	892	44,7
8. Fighter - example of the leaders	846	42,4
9. Power of field-artillery	810	40,6
10. Getting accustomed to the new weapons of the enemy	766	38,4
11. Receiving information about successful fighting elsewhere	717	35,9
12. Significance of Mannerheim's Order of The Day	635	31,8
13. Info about Ryti - Ribbentropp agreement	540	27,1
14. Believed that situation improved on VT-and VTK-lines	478	24,0
15. Apathetic about their own life	359	18,0
16. Feelings about their own life due to combat zones during the Winter War	350	17,5
17. I did not want to be considered a coward or deserter	262	13,1
18. Influenced by increased discipline	246	12,3
19. Frightened by punishments inflicted on cowards and deserters	194	9,7
20. Influenced by personal reasons	170	8,5
21. Strength from traditional education	93	4,7
22. Other reasons than above	68	3,4
Total	1995	100,0

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If these results are compared to the results of Stouffer et al. (1949, 108-109) (U.S. enlisted men were asked about their combat incentives), the following can be observed:

- feelings of solidarity with group was an important factor in both studies
- ideological or political reasons had a lot more weight among the Finnish veterans.

An interesting result of Dr. Moisala's study was that such factors as more rigorous discipline and fear of being punished as a deserter (even death penalties were used) seemed to have surprisingly little significance.

When the answers were related to background variables, it was found, for instance, that ideological or national factors meant less to young men than maintaining their companions' trust. Group dependence meant less to married soldiers with children. The ideological factors were more important to officers than to the rank and file. Dr. Moisala's study (which has been published in Finnish only) contains a lot of interesting information, only a part of which could be presented in this paper. The study was published in the publication series of the Institute of Military Science, and both the Institute and the Headquarters of the Defence Forces helped Dr. Moisala conduct his study.

The empirical material used in Dr. Moisala's study is at the disposal of the Institute of Military Science, and the material will probably be subjected to further computer analysis in the near future.

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Finally, a few words must be said about the limitations of Dr. Moisala's study. First of all, the sample of veterans was not selected randomly. There is perhaps reason to suspect that those who answered the questionnaire had more positive views and memories of the battle than many of those who did not answer. (But perhaps the veterans who answered were men who had fought well or adequately and had therefore played a more important role in battle?). The sampling procedure was not satisfactory. Of course, another problem is the long time, more than forty years, that has passed between the battle and the study. (However, the questionnaire also included open-ended questions, and the answers to these questions showed that many veterans had a very vivid recollection of wartime events). Yet another problem is the formulation and wording of the questionnaire. A more comprehensive set of questions may have produced somewhat different results.

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Appendix

INTERVIEW-QUESTIONNAIRE OF VETERANS OF THE KARELIAN ISTHMUS WAR IN THE SUMMER OF 1944

I think that the endurance of the defensive action during the offensive launched on the Karelian Isthmus in the summer of 1944 was influenced, as far as I am concerned, by the following factors I have chosen. I have placed them in order of importance on a scale of one to eight (1-8).

ALTERNATIVES TO ANSWER

1. I recovered from the fear and shock caused by the surprise of the attack
2. My own superiors tightened the discipline and made harder demands
3. My belief that the Soviet demand of unconditional surrender can be eased by fighting
4. My knowledge that our chances to repel the enemy will be better in the positions of Vammelsuu - Taipale and Vyborg - Kuparsaari - Taipale.
5. My idea of being labeled as a coward, deserter or the like in the group
6. I was informed of the agreement President Risto Ryti had made with Germany, which would provide us with additional material
7. Mannerheim's Order of the Day was read to the troops. We were ordered to stop the enemy attack and to hold our positions
8. I could see and experience the effect of our own new anti-tank weapons in practice, among other things, the effect of "panzerfausts" (anti-tank rocket launchers) and bazookas as well as Stukas in the air
9. My impression was that unless we started resisting and fighting, the enemy would soon be on the home front too, and I would be in a prison camp
10. I observed the real strength of our own field artillery

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11. I was informed of the first successful defensive action in Siiranmäki, Kuuterselkä, Tali and later elsewhere as well
12. My belief and confidence that the government of the country would handle the agreements if we soldiers did our share
13. I was afraid of the death penalties, to which deserters and cowards were sentenced, as well as of other severe consequences
14. I obeyed the orders and tried to act accordingly
15. I was surrounded by my old pals; I trusted them and didn't want to leave them in the lurch
16. We reached the battle fields of the Winter War, where we has previously also repelled the enemy attacks
17. My superiors served as models for combatants by being in the frontline or its vicinity
18. Indifference towards my own life as parts of the country were lost
19. I just got "accustomed" to the arrival of ground attack aircraft, to the Katyusha rocket launcher, and similar weapons as part of the new attack
20. Some other reason or reasons.

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