

SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTLICHES INSTITUT DER BUNDESWEHR

FORUM

internationales
international

Band
Cahier
Volume

12

STRESS AND CHANGE
IN THE MILITARY PROFESSION OF TODAY

PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE
XIIth WORLD CONGRESS OF SOCIOLOGY
INTERNATIONAL SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
MADRID/SPAIN July 1990

SESSIONS OF RESEARCH COMMITTEE 01:
ARMED FORCES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

edited by
Jürgen Kuhlmann
and
Christopher Dandeker

München 1991

PREFACE	
by Bernhard Fleckenstein	
FOUR DILEMMAS FOR MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS	
by Fabrizio Battistelli	1
THE STATE OF STUDIES OF THE MILITARY PROFESSION	
by Giuseppe Caforio	21
THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE MILITARY PROFESSION: A VIEW FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM	
by Christopher Dandeker and Paul Watts	75
THE MILITARY OFFICER - PROFESSION OR JOB ? SOME CONSIDERATIONS AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS	
by Jürgen Kuhlmann	105
PROFESSIONAL ARMY AND PROFESSIONALIZATION	
by Jaromír Cvrcek	139
MILITARY UNIONISM: THE ITALIAN SOLUTION, ITS PERSPECTIVES AND PROBLEMS	
by Giuseppe Caforio and Marina Nuciari	149
MILITARIZATION OF ARGENTINIAN POLITICAL CULTURE: WORSHIP OF SAN MARTIN	
by Rut Clara Diamint	185
HEALTH STATUS AND STRESS AMONG U.S. MILITARY WOMEN	
by John A. Ballweg and Li Li	223
THE YOUNG ARMY WIFE: LIFE SATISFACTION, PROBLEMS AND ATTITUDES	
by Florence R. Rosenberg	253
FATAL TRAINING ACCIDENTS: PATTERNS OF STRESS AND RECOVERY	
by Mary P. Tyler and Robert K. Gifford	275
THE CONTRIBUTORS	295

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Printed at SOWI
ISSN 0177-7599

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PREFACE

This book is a visible outcome of the academic sessions of the Research Committee 01 "Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution" conducted during the XIIth World Congress of Sociology held under the auspices of the International Sociological Association (ISA) in Madrid, Spain, July 9 - 13, 1990.

The volume at hand contains ten contributions dealing with the military profession in a rather broad perspective - including a lively discussion of the question whether the term and the concepts of professionalism can still be applied to the military occupation.

Jürgen Kuhlmann, Executive Secretary of the Research Committee, and Heidi Fleck were responsible for putting the book together and getting it ready for print. I am especially grateful for their enduring efforts. I further want to show my appreciation for the co-editorship of Christopher Dandeker. We owe him an important thank you for revising the papers and bringing them into proper English. At long last, I trust that the improvements which have been made to the lay-out and overall quality of the publication will meet with the readers' approval.

As the editor of the FORUM INTERNATIONAL series, it is my privilege to present VOLUME 12 to the international community of scholars working in the field of military-related social research.

Munich, December 1991

Bernhard Fleckenstein
Director and Professor

Fabrizio Battistelli

FOUR DILEMMAS FOR MILITARY ORGANISATIONS

C O N T E N T S

Characteristics of the Military Organisation

1. Centralisation / Decentralisation
2. Integration / Differentiation
3. Conservation / Innovation
4. Formalization / Informalization

Bibliography

All organisations meet numerous problems in pursuing their goals. It is our argument that, given the uniqueness of their aims, military organisations have their own specific problems. Bearing in mind the special nature of the military mission (the "management of violence" as defined fifty years ago by Laswell) (1941), this paper intends to examine the uniqueness of the organisational forms in which this mission takes shape.

The main difference between military organisations and almost all other organisations is the clear duality of the environment in which it operates. The changing nature of the environment may be a feature common to all organisations - ranging from the smallest public office which issues documents, to a corporation, which sells and buys on the international market. In the case of the military we need to consider not just the factor of environmental change, but of that of genuine duplicity. In fact military organisation resembles a two-faced Janus whose day to day environment is basically calm but which, in an emergency (which is to all extents and purposes its ultimate mission) is destined to operate in an environment of the utmost turbulence. Two equally different regimes fit these diametrically opposed situations: one (peace) is that of preparation for the task, the other (war) is the actual carrying out of this task. These two regimes in turn, do not operate in isolation, but in the context of a series of more general regulating principles. In peace-time the main function within the social system is of an economic nature, consisting in production and exchange; in war-time its main function is political, consisting in destruction (or defence against destruction). There is a parallel change in the ethical principle behind the two regimes: in the first situation it is utilitarian, in the second the underlying principle is solidaristic.

The organisational model also changes accordingly: mechanistic in the first case and organismic in the second.¹

Characteristics of the Military Organisation
in the Dual Regime Peace/War.

	P E A C E	W A R
Mission of organisational sub-system	Prepare for task	Carry out task
Main function in social system	Production and exchange	Destruction/Defence against destruction
Ethical principle	Utilitarian	Solidaristic
Organisational model	Mechanistic	Organismic

This radical division of the military into two different regimes, each characterised by its own functions, ethical principle and organisational model, generates a corresponding division in the problems that the organisation has to face and in the solutions it provides.

1. On the presence of both models in contemporary military see the Institution/Occupation Thesis in Moskos 1977 and 1986; Moskos and Wood 1988.

This paper sets out to discuss these organisational dilemmas; a set of four pairs of alternative solutions:

- 1) Centralisation / decentralisation
- 2) Integration / differentiation
- 3) Conservation / innovation
- 4) Formalization / informalization.

1. CENTRALISATION / DECENTRALISATION.

Historically, hierarchy and centralisation of decision-making has always been a typical characteristic of the military function and its organisation, one which has spread from these spheres of activity to the rest of the social system (Weber, 1922). Different types of hierarchical set-ups based, for example, on a plurality of leaders divided according to their fields of competence (such as that devised by Taylor, 1911), have met with little success in the productive sector. It becomes even clearer, then, that uniqueness of command remains a requirement which cannot be relinquished in an organisation such as the military, characterised by its need for rapid and univocal decisions and their immediate execution. Members of the military, however, were the first to realise the dangers inherent in a rigid and unilateral command and, in the XVII century, Gustaphus Adolphus of Sweden introduced the organisational innovation of the General Staff which was perfected in the Prussian Army of the XIX century. This type of structure was also to meet with huge success outside the military sphere. Its objective is to integrate the decision-making process - the ultimate responsibility borne by the Commander-in-Chief - with the whole complex of specific spheres of competence rendered essential by the intricacy of modern warfare. Not without its contra-indications (e.g. the delicate

relationship with the Line, see for example Lang, 1965), the Staff is nevertheless designed to confront and resolve the problems of the centre and not the periphery of the organisational sub-system. Yet it was the problem of the latter which has increased most in recent times. The nuclear deterrent has made the prospects of large-scale conventional conflict more unlikely but it has not prevented (and has perhaps even encouraged) the proliferation of local, low intensity conflict. In such confrontations, small units operating in isolation and exposed directly to the risks, play an ever-increasing role. Under such conditions the propensity and ability of individual soldiers and their leaders to take and carry out decisions and ensure adequate relations becomes a crucial element. Here decentralisation is a necessity and this poses problems and conflicts with the hierarchical and disciplinary structures of centralisation.

2. INTEGRATION / DIFFERENTIATION.

Integration and differentiation form two poles in any organisation and, fundamentally, in any social system. Once more, however, they are accentuated within the military organisation. As this entity has to perform a specific task - war (which is not one single act but a whole complex of actions) it had, since its very beginning, to develop an intricate pattern of structures. Marx (1857) was impressed by the fact that a division of labour developed in the army before it did in the sphere of production and in wartime before it did in times of peace. Spencer (1876-1896) described the evolution of various structures within troops from tribal and territorial up to functional (type of weaponry) criteria. Functional specialisation of corps existed in the armies of ancient times, but it is only

in the XVIII and XIX century with the development of Artillery and Engineer corps that this becomes one of the basic features of modern military organisation.

Alongside differentiation by function, and at least as important, lies differentiation by caste. Rigorously structured along a hierarchical ladder which leads from the Commander-in-Chief down to the lowest of the soldiers, power within the military organisation is transmitted along a continuous line, but is at the same time, distributed among three distinct castes: officers, N.C.O.'s and soldiers. The use of the term "caste" is not arbitrary, as becomes clear when the means of separating one social group from another are considered (without even taking into account the differences in social strata for recruitment). Reaching the top of one's career in the two lower groups does not bring with it promotion into the top category. Whenever this does occur (and it is a rare event) the passage is marked by rituals which emphasise the exceptional event.² The division into three distinct categories is a characteristic so common to all armies that it constitutes an **organisational isomorphism** which seems independent of the socio-politico-economical systems where these armies exist (Geser 1983). Though this isomorphism represents an interesting intellectual challenge (which has not as yet been taken up) for critical sociology, the division into officers, N.C.O.'s and troops has also not stimulated as much interest as it deserves in the field of military sociology.

2. There is for example the case illustrated in *The American Soldier* where soldiers selected for admission into the officer trainee school were first discharged from the army and then enrolled a second time. Stouffer et al., 1949-1959, I, p. 56.

In this paper we can hypothesise that an adequate evaluation of this question could take as its starting point the simplification, for analytic ends, from a three part to a two part division. This can be accounted for by the significant and increasing continuity between soldiers and N.C.O.'s and by the essential nature of the division between N.C.O.'s and officers. Though military sociology is not particularly fond of this issue, the contrast between soldiers and officers is a recurring phenomenon in empirical research dealing with the military organisation's internal relationships, from the second World War (Stouffer et al. 1949-1959; American Journal of Sociology, 1946) to Vietnam (Moskos, 1970).

The American Soldier reveals that there is very frequent criticism of the material and symbolic privileges granted to officers (in 1943, in an area of the Persian Gulf, 50% of the unprompted comments soldiers made concerned this issue; one of the most common points was the reserved access to exclusive recreational facilities) (Stouffer et al. 1949-1950, I, p. 71). One interesting factor was that these criticisms were much more vehement in geographical areas where there was little or no action, and the units behind the front, than at the front itself. Stouffer's team explains this discrepancy by the fact that at the front officers find it difficult or even impossible to take advantage of their privileges. We feel that along-side this objective factor, the changed psychological state of the soldiers should also be considered. It is highly probable that their attitude is more critical of a differentiation which, in a routine situation, appears to be particularly arbitrary. By way of contrast, in a situation where the officer plays his effective part (leading combat), the soldiers are more inclined to accept forms of recognition of this role. It is hard to

overemphasise the company officer's role in leading the group into combat. As pointed out in The American Soldier, the lieutenant and captain are crucial figures who take upon themselves all the formal authority, with its base in the hierarchy, and the effective authority as the central members of a peer group.

In the specific organisational trial represented by war, the authority of the leader derives from his very actions, but in the routine of peace-time it becomes much more difficult to demonstrate this authority. Furthermore, given the uniqueness of the tasks to be carried out and the uncertainties involved in reaching an accurate evaluation of them, the demonstration of the authority in this case is more difficult than in a normal inferior/superior relationship, such as in an economic organisation. So, in the military, the legitimisation of the superior presents a number of difficulties which must be counterbalanced. Thus we have the awarding of status symbols - insignia and special uniforms - both verbal and non-verbal forms of communication (salute, separation of living and recreational quarters, etc.) which are intended to emphasise the superiority of the higher caste in the eyes of the members of the subordinated castes. This important element of socialization and control with regard to the inferior groups, clearly provides the superiors with significant elements of gratification. As we have tried to demonstrate elsewhere (Battistelli 1990), the interesting discovery, concerning the social (and not absolute) nature of deprivation/satisfaction of needs, brought to a conclusion in The American Soldier, indicates that not only does the soldier perceive the satisfaction of an officer's need (denied to him) as a deprivation; but the officer perceives the satisfaction of this need as his own satisfaction, in relationship to the deprivation of the soldier.³

the structural nature of the officer/soldier (we can also add the NCO's to the latter) differentiation is demonstrated by the universality of its application and, by means of a contrast, by the failure of attempts to abolish it - even in radically innovative situations such as the Chinese cultural revolution. So, in this sense we can refer to a "structural classism"; a form of social discrimination which has its roots deeply buried in the objective requirements of the inclusive organisation as such. This serves to distinguish this form of classism from other forms which, without the element of organisational function, are nevertheless apparent in the military organisation of complex societies. This structural classism, which is functional to the basic mission of the military - which is after all combat - has become, in certain crisis situations, a means by which to avoid the expected leadership role behaviour. With reference to the American experience in Vietnam, Gabriel and Savage (1978) and Geser (1983) underline that amongst other violations was that of the principle of the "camp community" among inferiors and superiors. Command was exercised via modern means of electronic transmission, and therefore the officers (even the lower orders) were often able to keep well away from the battlefields.⁴ This type of

3. Besides this internal function (which we see as fundamental) the caste privilege of the officers has an external function of legitimation. As Janowitz and Little (1965: 40) observe, to make up for the relatively low social prestige of an officer, the military organization compensates with various mechanisms - the main one being the distinction between officers and soldiers.

4. Geser (1983: 156) comments on the paradox that "in ancient times, when officers were recruited from the nobility the participation of both subordinates and superiors in all the risks of combat never entered into discussion".

social differentiation which cannot be justified by any organisational requirements (and is in fact counterproductive) can be called "opportunistic classism".

3. CONSERVATION / INNOVATION.

Every system has to deal with, and find its own mediation for, the dual problem of its own identity and that perceived by those outside itself. The movement and the balance between these two poles are, respectively, the basis of conservation and innovation. This oscillation occurs in various forms in any organisation, but it acquires an especially relevant significance in the military organisation where both extremes are strongly accentuated. On the one hand, the military organisation is highly conservative. This is above all due to the structural factors conditioned by their ultimate mission. As this consists in preventing the enemy's use of force and, if dissuasive action is not sufficient, in using its own force in opposition, the military organisation is obliged to exist in a future projection, that is, in the dimension of its own and others' potential actions. The future that the military organisation would like to pre-determine is, however, highly aleatory. Not only will it seem to depend upon the enemy's initiative; but such initiative is constituted by both the enemy's representation of the situation and by his construction of the military's representation. To this uncertainty with respect to the enemy's intentions, the military organisation has to add the uncertainty which derives from the relative difficulty in evaluating and controlling the efficacy of its own actions. This can only be truly verified in the ultimate extreme moment of war.

While faced with the objective difficulty in pre-determining the future (which nevertheless remains a vital aim), the military organisation does have its set point of reference established and represented by the past. In actual fact the only real verification upon which the organisation can rely belongs to the past (the development of scenarios, simulations and military exercises can only represent rather feeble substitutes). Here lie the origins of the tendential conservatism of General Staff, which, following a widely used *boutade*, tends to remain committed to planning a war which has already been fought.⁵

On the other hand, however, this conservatism meets a strong counter-balancing current within the emulation factor, inherent in the strategical situation. This is based on the identification of the presumed intentions of the enemy (usually on the basis of a worst-case scenario) and therefore generates a marked dynamism towards keeping up with the enemy's developments (real or presumed) especially in the technological field. Grafted into the structural and cultural conservatism of the military organisation, the dynamism brought by strategic emulation takes on the form of compromise, based on gradual development rather than on innovative

5. The prevalently external dimension (orientated towards managing the threat) of the military should always be remembered in sociological analyses of this organization. In contrast to most State organizations (with the exception of diplomatic structures) the military is destined to compete with and relate to, analogous organizations which are outside the politico-social system to which it belongs. This is where the misunderstanding between social scientists and military personnel has its origins. The former tend to compare the military organization with other state organizations, whereas members of the military compare their organization with that of other nations (whether allies or adversaries).

change, which we can define as *Lamarckian* rather than *Darwinian* model of evolution. Janowitz (1960) makes the observation that "whether the problem in hand is missiles or men, planning for the future tends to be a projection of existing tendencies rather than an imaginative evaluation of revolutionary developments". Here, for example, lies the reasoning behind the proliferation of new weapon system prototypes, rather than the clear-cut choice of the philosophy and product to be favoured. Within this context it is not surprising that innovation - not so much in the technological field, but more in the social and organisational sphere - comes from outsiders (Janowitz 1960) or is the result of "lucky" individual and collective transgressions.⁶

4. FORMALIZATION / INFORMALIZATION.

The specific conditions of stress in which the military organisation may find itself having to work, accentuate its tendency, common to any organisational system, to predetermine and codify the range of responses which

6. The theme of transgression from the rules as an innovative factor is one well-known to sociology (a classic description can be found in Merton, 1949) and it takes on particular significance in a highly disciplined organization such as the military. Besides the numerous historical examples of victorious disobedience (the prince of Homburg, Eugene of Savoy; Nelson who, to avoid carrying out a mistaken order at Copenhagen, replied that he "could not see the signal") there are the equally interesting instances of collective violation, rich with future developments (such as the spontaneous battalion quick march pace of the Prussian columns in the 1870-71 war: see Engels, 1878). Apart from the conservation/innovation polarity, organizational transgression also calls into account the formalization/informalization polarity (see above).

its single members have to employ under various circumstances. Rather more often than ordinary organisations, and in war-time much more frequently, the military organisation finds itself in a position where it has to ensure the transmission of orders and information even in the face of the loss of single members, however important they may be. Their dispensability is continued through the set chain of command which ensures that command goes to the highest rank survivor of the inferiors who outlive their commanding superior. Obviously this is only possible when the hierarchical criteria are absolutely clear cut and univocal. This requirement is fulfilled through the capillary subdivision of personnel into ranks, each superior to all those who follow in the hierarchical ladder. This permits a superior to give orders without having to prove his authority to do so (in terms both of legitimacy and expertise) each time, whichever the functional area where he operates. This example emphasises the differences between what happens in a civilian organisation. Here the hierarchical set-up gives the conditions generally necessary but still incomplete to exercise command, which are only completed by the specific competence of the various sectors. To give an example: in a company the production manager cannot normally give orders to a sales clerk, nor, even in state administration, can the general director of the Treasury give orders to an account manager.

The specific formalization of (hierarchical) relationships which comes under the title of military discipline is but one of the mechanisms to which the military organisation resorts in the attempt to codify - to an extent which other organisations don't reach - all possible behaviour of its members which may be considered relevant to the aims of the organisation. The military has to organise huge numbers of individuals

who are socially, culturally and psychologically different from one another, it has to finalise its activity towards goals which are characterised by their high level of subjectivity (because of the aforementioned problems in evaluation and above all because of the high political content of its aims), it therefore pursues a strategy which we would define as "total normativization".

We mentioned this process in the context of hierarchical relations, rigidly set down by the disciplinary rules expressed in military regulations and codes. An analogous normativization also covers technical operations, codified in extreme detail (the same applied to industrial organisations in the Taylorist phase) in the **Standard Operating Procedures**. Formalization is also a pronounced feature in communication: standardised into formulae when verbal, de-verbalised whenever possible and substituted by acoustic (horn, sirens) or visual (uniforms with corps and rank insignia, salute, symbols such as the flag, etc.) signals.

As this is a principle which is widely apparent in the social sphere, the pressures applied by the organisation can only be met by resistance on the part of its members. This resistance is usually proportional to the intensity of the pressure applied. Thus the maximum formalization pursued by the military organisation is met by its members (especially at the more inferior levels) with a tendency towards informalization which goes beyond that found in any "open" civilian organisation (Geser 1983). Subordinate members of the military organisation react to the hyper-normativization of behaviour with what has been defined as "selective obedience" (Kuhlmann 1984). From the overload of orders and regulations subordinates identify those which are at the same time most practical to carry out and most

FABRIZIO BATTISTELLI

obligatory. The meticulousness of the instructions is met by a marked personalization of areas, equipment and task forms which are typical of informal barracks organisation. Lastly the de-humanisation of communication is countered by the multiple forms of barracks culture which in different organisational and social contexts is nonetheless surprisingly similar (consider, for example, the establishment of an informal hierarchy among draftees based on seniority; or the adoption of certain rituals which resemble official ceremonies etc.).

* * *

The themes which we have rapidly outlined are to be seen as a contribution to a meeting between the empirical perspective of American sociology and the critical tradition of continental European. The objective of such a meeting should be to examine the military organisation with a view to emphasising its uniqueness, but at the same time, following the example of the classics, lead it back into a comprehensive analysis of the social system to which it belongs. Such an outlook can bring the main problem afflicting contemporary military organisation into focus: its existence as a social sub-system obedient to a collectivist god (Mars) within an environment which obeys an individualist god (Mercury).

FOUR DILEMMAS FOR MILITARY ORGANISATIONS

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Giuseppe Caforio

THE STATE OF STUDIES OF THE MILITARY PROFESSION

C O N T E N T S

Introduction

1. Origins and Development of the Debate on the Military Profession
2. The Henning Sørensen's Model
3. Prandstraller and the Bureaucratic Profession
4. The First Lucca's Meeting, October 1986
5. The Cathy Downes' Critical Essay
6. Nicholas Jans and the Process of Change
7. The Harries-Jenkins Synthesis
8. The Second Lucca's Meeting, October 1989

Conclusions

Annex No. 1

Annex No. 2

Bibliography

INTRODUCTION

Henning Sørensen, drawing on Talcott Parsons, argues that the concept of "profession" is central to an understanding of social change (Sørensen 1982). Parsons' thesis in fact is more ambitious: that is to say, the professions have become the most important single component in the structure of modern societies (Parsons 1968, p. 545). His views have been echoed by other scholars such as Gian Paolo Prandstraller (Prandstraller 1985, p. 20), who argues, soundly, that whilst ancient society was "a co-ordination of crafts for the purpose of satisfying the needs of communal life"... "modern society is a co-ordinated group of professions".

As the proportion of resources invested world-wide in military activity is so great, exceeding all other areas of human activity, the study of the professional aspect of the management of these activities acquires a fundamental importance for an understanding of contemporary society. This is why I argue that the concept of the military profession has become central, in the field of military sociology.

Although some scholars believe that the concept of military profession is "over-used" (Kuhlmann, paper presented at the Lucca meeting, Oct. 1989), it appears clear that today's armed forces are institutions which are rigidly subdivided into internal categories, with power resting almost completely with the upper category, the officers. The officers themselves are hierarchically arranged by rank and function, with levels of power attributed accordingly.

The attribution of power seems so important for the construction of the officer ideal type that some scholars regard it as the distinctive characteristic of this professional category (Dandeker, Watts in the Lucca's meeting quoted above). The powers of officer-ship are in fact greater than the literature seems usually to allow for, some of them being powers which in normal circumstances are only potential, while others appear more "de facto" than "de jure". We can identify these various powers as follows:

1. An internal, hierarchical, top-down power best summed up in the term "command". This is the best known and most obvious of the powers. Hierarchical power can be increased beyond the strictly foreseen limits when the officer succeeds in creating charisma, as discussed by Bernard Boëne (Boëne 1989).
2. A power to influence a state's military policy. Although this is the politicians' area of competence, it cannot be managed without the expertise of the military, and this expertise can be a conditioning factor of significance.
3. An overall power of political influence as a pressure group. Since the group holds the monopoly of organised violence this power can take on considerable weight in certain contexts.
4. An economic power, influencing choices of expenditures within a budget which is usually among the biggest of which a modern state disposes.
5. A power to influence the direction of scientific research, given the importance of the areas of research dedicated to military ends.

If the officer class is charged therefore with managing a series of significant powers within the society to which it belongs, I think this should be reason enough - though it is not the only reason - for recognising the importance of devoting sociological study to it.

This essay aims to give an up-to-date account of the state of studies on the military profession, and concentrates on the concept of the military profession. In dealing with the military profession I am concerning myself only with officers, in accordance with a line of thinking which is generally - if by no means unanimously - accepted.¹ In my judgement, the figure of the N.C.O., whether defined in terms of attributes or by means of qualitative or quantitative measurements (Sørensen 1982), represents an occupation which, while it certainly requires separate study, cannot be considered as reaching a professional level. It could perhaps be classified as semi-professional.

It is necessary to clarify the confusion that may occur, at least in Italy, when one speaks of a professional and a non-professional army. By the first expression we mean an armed force constituted exclusively of long-service volunteers (as in the all volunteer force of the U.S.): Despite the actual descriptive term used, this is to be regarded as an occupation, rather than a profession. In reality the distinction between the two types of service, voluntary or conscript, is that between an occupation on the one hand and a compulsory form of public service on the other.

1. Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960; Abrahamson, 1972; Downes, 1977; Sørensen, 1982; Rochat, 1984; Prandstraller, 1985.

1. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEBATE
ON THE MILITARY PROFESSION.

Current sociological debates concerning the military profession derive from the American literature of the late 1950s. An early and widely available argument from a structuralist standpoint and producing a model based on attributes was that by Greenwood (Greenwood, 1957).

According to the model, the occupation of the officer was defined by a core of essential attributes that differentiated it from other professions and occupations. The selection of such attributes naturally varied with different writers but grouped around two views: those of Samuel Huntington (Huntington 1957) and of Morris Janowitz (Janowitz 1960).

A second model of the officer profession is the processual model and is part of a critique of the structuralist approach, which is considered not to take sufficient account of the formative process of the profession. From this standpoint the occupation of officer should be studied in terms of the process of professionalisation and its acquisition of social legitimacy.

Some writers (Abrahamson 1972) also examine the socialisation of the individual entering the profession. For others (Van Doorn, 1965) the professionalisation of the officer corps cannot be studied separately from the institution or organisation of which it forms part. A hypothesis of fusion between profession and organisation in the study of the officer's role thus converges with Huntington's ideas on professional bureaucracy, thus facilitating a dialectic conception of the military profession as structured by a dynamic equilibrium between professionalisation and bureaucratisation (cf. below, Prandstraller, 1985 and Caforio, 1988). Other

writers on the subject who have used the processual model are Wilensky, 1964, Vollmer & Mills, 1966, and Feld, 1975.

A separate attempt at conceptualisation, within the structuralist field, is that which Kourvetaris & Dobratz (1977) call a "pluralist model"; it has also been described as "segmented", or "fusionist". It recognises the phenomena of super-professionalisation (often accompanied by an "atomistic" fragmentation of professionalism into single internal specialisations) and of de-professionalisation (the insertion into particular sectors of the organisation of professionals and technicians from outside), as identified and best described by Sørensen, 1982. These phenomena seem particularly characteristic of the military profession as it is today. As a result, some writers (Hauser & Bradford, 1971; Moskos, 1973; Jordan & Taylor, 1973; Deagle, 1973; Taylor & Bletz, 1974) have become convinced that one cannot speak of a unitary military profession. It is, rather, to be considered as subdivided into deeply differentiated sectors or "segments". The professional ethic of some sectors can, for example, be brought back to conformity with a traditional military ethic (that of the "heroic leader"), while other sectors have to adopt a typically managerial ethic. This model, strongly criticised for its potential divisiveness in military circles (Larson, 1974; Margiotta, 1974), has become known as "fusionist" because it seeks to reconcile the opposed trends of the divergence hypothesis of Huntington (1957) and the convergence hypothesis of Janowitz (1960) concerning the relationship between the armed forces and society. Divergence and convergence are seen to coexist at the same historical moment inside the same military institution, giving their respective characteristics to individual sectors within it.

2. THE HENNING SÖRENSEN'S MODEL.

Henning Sørensen (Sørensen 1982) departs from a processual viewpoint to construct his own model of the military profession, although it also addresses the structural aspects of the profession.² Sørensen's study is based on the observation that, in contemporary military institutions and particularly in the officer corps, one can see a division between a group of traditionalists and a group tending to follow social change, a group which he significantly calls "Trade Union oriented". This division, confirmed by my own observations of the Italian case, is connected to a view of power as varying in different parts of the military leadership. Where the idea of power as service prevails (to the group or to an individual) no obstacle is seen to the innovations that follow social change and there is no difficulty in ceding areas of power to whomever, in the changing situation, is able to exercise it with optimum efficiency. A different attitude in the face of such change exists among those officers who hold that it is almost a duty to transmit to their successors all the power they themselves received from their predecessors.

As a processualist Sørensen is interested in the group oriented towards social change, and he has constructed a model of development applicable either to the professionalisation of an occupational group or to that of an individual. The model is based on four aspects of professionalism: function, group, responsibility, corporate spirit. Of these four, the two final items are seen as attributes by the majority of structuralists, while the first two seem to be processual elements and seem like empty boxes that may be filled in a number of

2. Differential between the bureaucratic profession and simply "profession".

ways. Its creator claims that the model can be used to describe professionalisation, profession and professionalism.

It seems to me, however, that Sørensen, between his varied positions (processual when dealing with the individual and the group; structural when concerned with concrete cases) sometimes uses mixed terms in his argument, which do not help the reader to understand and to apply his model. Nevertheless, the model was subsequently applied in empirical research carried out in Denmark. The results were published in 1988 (Sørensen, 1988).

3. GIAN PAOLO PRANDSTRALLER AND THE BUREAUCRATIC PROFESSION.

Discussions on the interaction between profession and organisations (set in train by Van Doorn) and those on the characterisation of the occupation of officers as a bureaucratic profession (initiated by Huntington) have been taken further by Gian Paolo Prandstraller³ (Prandstraller 1985), who uses a bilateral approach using the theories from the sociology of professions and the sociology of organisations.

Adopting a processual point of view, Prandstraller argues that the professionalisation of the officer corps is not a spontaneous phenomenon but arises from decisions and choices within the military organisation. Along structuralist lines, Prandstraller argues that in military institutions the division between professionals and bureaucrats, who make up two separate and

3. And has stimulated the writer: cf. Caforio 1988.

GIUSEPPE CAFORIO

sometimes opposed bodies, is overcome (and not only there; it also happens in other bureaucratic professions, such as the Church). In fact in military institutions, as in all professional bureaucracies, both aspects are present in the same individual. Each component of the officer corps modifies its character and its behaviour according to the professional and the bureaucratic model at the same time, assuming a complex configuration in which it is not easy to distinguish the two polarities.

Given the general attributes of professionalism as identified and applied to the given profession by other scholars (Huntington, 1957, Janowitz, 1960), Prandstraller recognises five factors specific to a professional bureaucracy (factors which also differentiate it from bureaucracies *tout court*):

1. The presence of a corpus of specific knowledge, parallel to that of other professions, and which compares and integrates itself with a body of formal rules which are themselves an element of moderation and balance.
2. A formation of bureau-professionals inside the organisation and with theory and training comparable to and at the same level as the other professions. This particular aspect, leading to a group at University level inside military institutions, has already been indicated as a differentiating element in the other professions by Henning Sørensen (Sørensen, 1982).
3. Employment of bureau-professionals potentially for a lifetime, as in other professions, but differing in that the career proceeds entirely inside the one organisation.
4. A confluence in individuals of professional-type activity and bureaucratic activity.

THE STATE OF STUDIES OF THE MILITARY PROFESSION

5. An analogous meeting at individual and group level on principles of hierarchy and on promotion by professional competence.

This ideal type provides the basis of an analysis of processes of change and a means of locating cases in terms of a continuum from organisations to professions, from bureaucratisation to the professionalisation of the individual and/or of the entire officer corps of a nation.

4. THE FIRST LUCCA'S MEETING, OCTOBER 1986

A further opportunity, to meet and debate on this theme was the conference at Lucca (10-12 October, 1986) on the subject of "The military profession - sociology and history".⁴ During its sessions two areas of enquiry were developed. First the process of change, which I will not discuss here, and second, the physiognomy of the military profession today. On this topic, there was a certain amount of agreement on its classification as a bureaucratic profession (Lissak, Nuciari, Prandstraller, Caforio) but an argument also developed that it is no longer correct today to talk of "the military profession", insofar as its pluralistic character has become so fragmented that it is no longer possible to see it in any sense as a unity (Lissak). Lissak's argument was not new: at least two other writers, M.D. Feld (Feld 1975) and Kurt Lang (Lang 1973), had independently underlined the crisis and decline of the profession of officer.

4. See, Caforio and Del Negro (eds.), "UFFICIALI E SOCIETA" (Officers and Society).

GIUSEPPE CAFORIO

M.D. Feld in particular traced the decline of the profession historically since the First World War, which was seen as a test of the profession and a test which it signally failed. "The planning and conduct of operations" says M.D. Feld "were almost exclusively in the hands of career officers recruited, trained, and assigned within a corporate body that had for about forty years planned and prepared itself for exactly this eventuality. From beginning to end in that war, little was improvised. Every notable action was the product of massive and detailed planning. The results were almost uniformly horrendous". (M.D. Feld, 1975, p. 208). M.D. Feld, who moreover has not given an equally analytical examination of the professional aspects of the very different battles of the Second World War, saw a perceived decline in the social esteem given to the military profession.

Lang placed his emphasis, rather, on the quantitative development (confirmed by statistics) of the employment of officers in non-operational activity - which he calls secondary, i.e. technical and scientific work, and tertiary, i.e. management and administrative jobs. He is concerned with problems of compatibility among different sectors and the boundaries between areas of civil activity and civilian professions and occupations as such. The subject was subsequently developed and empirically tested by Nicholas Jans (see below).

Though stopping short of such general conclusions as Lissak's, Enzo Ferrante⁵ has to some extent supported this thesis when speaking of "compartmentalised professionalism" in the Navy, as has Andrea Curami when he

5. For this and the scholars quoted subsequently see "UFFICIALI E SOCIETA" (Officers and Society), op. cit.

THE STATE OF STUDIES OF THE MILITARY PROFESSION

distinguishes "technical professionalism" from "flight professionalism" in the Air Force. The fragmentation of an originally unified officer profession is also outlined by Virgilio Ilari whose examination of the process presents as evidence the separation of an area of a technical professionalism from the originally single area of the military profession. For this author the link no longer consists in a professional culture as such, but in a shared work background and common military status. It therefore seems possible to throw doubt on the very essence, or at least on one of the chief attributes of professionalism, i.e. the existence of a specific professional culture. But it is this specificity which, according to André Martel, seems inherent at all times and in all places in the military profession. This is so because of the use of arms designed to kill or destroy, and the consequent total physical and intellectual availability of the officer. Thus, according to Martel, a specific technical competence cannot be the sole foundation of an officer's profession, particularly at the highest levels.

Prandstraller also, noting how the military profession appears activated by two pressures, one directed towards assimilation to civil professions and the other towards maintaining its specificity, attempts to overcome the divisive factors with his argument that the occupation of an officer is not founded solely on specific professional ability which could be differentiated and individually assimilated to civilian capability, but chiefly on a harmonious blend of professionalism with the bureaucratic aspect of the work. Through this blend there is a final convergence with the objectives of the institutions which results in a "reductio in unum" of the two forms.

But is a purely functional fusion a sufficient attribute to define a specific professionalism? The doubt is legitimate and it lends interest to the reply given by Caligaris to the "antiprofessional" argument of Lissak. For Caligaris the officer remains always and above all a commander of men, and therefore even today finds the oneness of his particular professionalism in the specific military leadership - to which all technical and managerial components are subordinated.

5. THE CATHY DOWNES' CRITICAL ESSAY

In an article published in "Defence Analysis", Cathy Downes (Downes, 1985) gives specific treatment to the very question tackled by Lissak: the problem, that is, of the continuation today of a professional identity for the career officer.

Her thesis is that the present military profession, particularly in the U.S., seems characterised by a double conflict of professional demands concerning, on the one hand, the members of the profession and, on the other, society itself. Downes appears to argue the officer's occupation is progressively losing its professional attributes, or at least some of them, so providing the basis of the hypothesis of a declining profession.

From a critical review of the literature on professions, Downes extracts a synthesis of eight attributes of professionalism:

1. Monopoly control of a body of theoretical knowledge and practical ability;
2. Candidate preparation and training which is long, intensive and subject to formal regulations;
3. A complex of professional activities functioning in an area of vital importance to society;

4. A relationship between the profession and society built on a spirit of service;
5. A certain degree of autonomy in recruitment, training, conduct and professional code;
6. A corporate-style internal organisation;
7. Full time work and a tendency to life-long employment;
8. A complex of professional activities considered by society to be of high moral value.

This review of attributes allows Downes first to argue that there is only a partial and limited convergence between the military profession today and the ideal type she describes. Secondly, through an analysis of some attributes, she suggests that the military profession appears to be in decline. This argument is applied specifically to the profession in America, but it seems it could be extended to other Western societies.

Since in both these arguments Downes makes use of her ideal type, I will discuss them together, attribute by attribute.

Under the first head Downes affirms that today there is a loss of the monopolistic control of a body of knowledge - whether by dilution or fragmentation - in the case of the military profession. She suggests the following reasons for this:

- a. The "management of organised violence" is by now an inadequate definition of the specific field of the military profession because it is actually called on to perform many other tasks, such as deterrence, the building of national unity, developing a revolutionary process, co-operation in civil tasks, pacification, polar and space exploration;

GIUSEPPE CAFORIO

- b. The military profession has been involved in different non-traditional forms of conflict and has evolved new tactics and new techniques of response; it is also often employed simply to control the withdrawal of hostile forces from occupied territory;
- c. The development of nuclear armaments has relieved the profession of the task of protecting society by deterring potential adversaries.

Concerning the de-professionalisation of the military profession, Downes (and other scholars already quoted) points out that today a growing number of bureaucrats, technocrats and civilian scientists work in areas relating to national defence.

Downes also writes that today it is difficult to define who is entitled to be called a military professional and describes as "peripheral" the distinction between officers and N.C.O.s. To support this she affirms that society as a whole relies for its military defence on the whole complex of the armed forces and not on this or that category.

Passing to a critique of the persistence of the fifth chosen attribute (autonomy), she claims that the particular form of monopoly, monopoly of organised violence exercised by officers, imposes a series of limits on their professional autonomy.

In relation to the sixth of her ideal attributes she observes that in contrast to many other professions the internal regulation of the military profession is not done by a professional association but through rules formulated by the State and elaborated from above by the hierarchy.

THE STATE OF STUDIES OF THE MILITARY PROFESSION

Another aspect of the decline assumed by Downes is that, referring to her eighth ideal attribute, there is a devaluation in social esteem of the armed forces, especially in the USA. This is revealed by various signs and, for the writer, is a consequence of a series of failures of the US military machine such as the Vietman war, the attempt to liberate hostages in Iran, the fruitless losses sustained by deployment in Lebanon.

The observation is correct, but can be seen as contingent; in terms of time, because since the publication of Downes' study, the United States has carried out brilliantly successful military operations such as the various air raids on Libya; in terms of space because other armed forces, such as the British in the Falklands, have achieved even greater success as a result of a clear deployment of professional capabilities, and have enjoyed social esteem as a result.

Downes finally rests her position on the internal dissension in the military profession, a dissension which makes it difficult to decide what are the constituent elements of an officer's identity.

* * *

If this is the overall picture of the spiralling de-professionalisation which Downes claims to have identified, there are important qualifications to be made to it.

First of all, Downes does not put deterrence in its proper context. In fact, whether it is exercised through conventional weapons alone, nuclear weapons alone, or through a combination of the two (which is the most likely present hypothesis), it is always a

case of management of organised violence because, even if only potential, its efficacy depends on the capacity to put it into action.

Similarly, through the constant presence of a potentiality for organised violence, a military force acquires the authority to effect and monitor the withdrawal of hostile forces occupying a territory. And the management and reaction to forms of unorthodox struggle are certainly not outside the field of the management of violence.

The accent that Downes places on de-professionalisation is of a different order of importance. This is an aspect which has certainly become more noticeable in the decades since the Second World War.

But, real though the problem undoubtedly is, it is debatable whether it is a symptom of professional decline. Alternative interpretations can be offered such as a growing importance and scope for the problems of national defence, for example, leading to a total mobilisation of the professional and working skills of the nations involved during all of this century's wars. It thus appears as the logical counterpoint to the widening of knowledge and areas of action affecting military management itself.

Furthermore, there is little relevance in the claim - which in any case would require justification - that public opinion does not draw a clear distinction between officers and non-commissioned officers, and that any such distinction is therefore of marginal importance. To show how little foundation there is to Downes' claim, it is sufficient to apply to both officers and N.C.O.s the list of attributes she herself puts forward for defining a profession.⁶

Downes is on firmer ground when she states it is incorrect to divide the operational officers from those who work in other sectors of the military profession. In carrying out their specific duties they all contribute to the management of organised violence and they all, even if sometimes only potentially, carry the responsibility for commanding men in emergency conditions - and they all exercise the military virtues of honour, loyalty, patriotism, etc. referred to by Downes.

It is also true that the military profession lacks autonomy when compared to the liberal professions, but this objection of Cathy Downes seems to be open to a number of observations, which completely alter its significance:

- First, by practically unanimous consent, the military profession is to be considered among the bureaucratic professions, one of whose identifying characteristics is in fact a weakening of formal autonomy;
- Secondly, any lack of independence on the part of the officer corps is often more formal than real. An examination of the areas in which it is exercised, as these are listed by Downes
 - conditions of belonging,
 - internal organisation,

6. Take for example training and development of candidates for the profession. We can see with reference to Italy (other countries do not differ greatly) that officers face: from four to six years of training at University level; other variable specialist courses; two years of Staff College during their career and for the higher ranks other periods of study. N.C.O. training is a basic one-year course, specialist courses vary between one and two years.

- recruitment,
- training and qualification standards,
- equipment requirements,

shows that these are areas where decisions are evidently and as a matter of course prepared by the military establishment itself, and approval by the political authority is almost always a formality;

- Third the objection contributes nothing to any theory of a present decline in the military profession.

The internal divisions within the military profession do seem to me to constitute a real and relevant problem - there is undoubtedly a crisis of identity among Western officers. This is also shown, as the writer underlines, in the tendency in some quarters to embrace civilian values more than military ones. If it is true, as Downes affirms, that we are witnessing a decline in the popularity of the officer profession - whatever the causes (a long period of peace, the rise of consumer values) - this does not necessarily mean that the military profession is objectively losing the ability to react to a real social emergency in an area of vital importance to society. As long as the international scene is dominated by what Hobbes referred to as "homo homini lupus", it does not seem likely that the security needs of single national groups can be guaranteed except by the professional management of organised violence. This, despite all the mingling and the co-operation with other sectors, remains overall the peculiar function of the military profession.

6. NICHOLAS JANS AND THE PROCESS OF CHANGE.

Nicholas Jans considers changes in the technical knowledge and capacities of the military profession, and how these react on individuals and the institution (Jans, 1989). Although he refers specifically to the Australian armed forces the tendencies he identifies can be applied more generally to western societies. The traditional combat-oriented image of the military professional role, argues Jans, now corresponds less and less to what officers actually do. Taking Australia as example, he points out that among senior officers nearly one-half work at the Department of Defence or linked centralised organisations. This is a type of work which requires a change from the traditional expertise demanded of military professionals. The senior officer, observes Jans, is now required to do work similar to that of senior administrators in government departments and industrial corporations. The professional military officer in these jobs requires a different expertise from that acquired through traditional military training. They need to understand many civilian skills, such as systems analysis, operational research, corporate planning, commercial negotiations. This is a training very different from that required by the combat leader.

This brings the need for internal specialisation ('super-professionalisation'), which creates a series of problems for the institution and for individuals - particularly career problems. In a hierarchical, vertical and pyramidal structure such as that of the military profession, the valuation placed on services rendered by superiors in the hierarchy is the basis of career advancement. However, Jans argues, it is still the case that, the traditional expertise on which, more than any other, the military profession is to be judged

is operational service - the ability to command combat units. On the other hand, the amount of technical and managerial specialisation required makes it increasingly difficult for the same officer to alternate periods of operational command with periods of specialist employment. Jans asks, how has the military profession adapted to the requirement of national military institutions to enlarge this corpus of technical knowledge and increase technical skills? He sets out to evaluate this adjustment through the replies given by a group of officers to three fundamental questions. How competent do you feel to do the work you have to carry out? How do you assess your professional preparation for this particular work? How much faith do you have in career prospects in this specific area?

The results of this survey show that the majority of the officers feel competent and prepared for their operational tasks, for which they show a clear preference. The move to a different function in the central Defence Department came as a shock to many, which was only overcome after a certain number of years in effective practical work. The average Australian officer felt little motivation towards non-operational functions, for which he felt he had not had adequate preparation. This last finding appears to be confirmed by a significant detail of the enquiry: the officers who had followed a degree course in civilian institutions felt better prepared and more competent in non-operational task fulfilment than those who had been to Staff College. What conclusions can we draw from Jans' research? Taken together with the earlier research of Lang, it raises problems which are not solely Australian. In the second half of this century the body of technical knowledge and the necessary specific abilities for the military profession have largely changed. Neither its professional training nor to some extent its ethical

code and life-style have prepared it to adapt to this situation. This could well be a primary constituent of the identity crisis at present affecting the officers of Western nations.

7. THE HARRIES-JENKINS SYNTHESIS

I conclude this updating of published studies on the military profession with a work written by Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, "The Concept of Military Professionalism".⁷

Harries-Jenkins sets out to create a conceptual synthesis on military professionalism with the aim of reconciling "apparently contradictory theoretical concept". He opens with severe criticism of the structural functionalist approach and also of what he calls the historicist (processual) approach. He attacks the structuralist approach to the "profession of arms" on the grounds that:

- One cannot apply the ideal type model of a profession constructed in the late 19th century to a group that evolved before then.
- It is wrong to use a "trait" approach to a profession lacking, a number of the attributes assigned to the ideal type, i.e.:
 - the importance of a professional association
 - autonomy and self-regulation of the profession
 - internal homogeneity in the profession.

The processual approach is equally invalid because:

- The process of professionalisation of the officer corps occurred in different ways in different

7. Defence Analysis, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1990, pp. 117-130.

GIUSEPPE CAFORIO

countries, some tradition based, some after political and social revolution, in yet others through a fusion of professionals and amateurs (guerrillas, partisan leaders, etc.).

- The process of professionalisation has taken on a masculine character whereas nowadays the equal female component is increasingly evident in the professions.

Following these criticisms Harries-Jenkins states that the study of the occupation of the military under the heading of "profession" is highly dysfunctional. Any organisation should be studied in its own right; the constitution of the armed forces is a unique example of the total fusion of profession and organisation and therefore he substitutes for the concept of military profession the concept of "military establishment" - the armed forces in all their complexity of organisation.

Harries-Jenkins argues that this conceptual synthesis gives back importance to the individual soldier as a member of a bureaucratic organisation which can be studied on a matrix based on two axes. Along the first axis he places the categories superior/subordinate, with all their possible internal subdivisions, and along the second axis the categories combatant/non-combatant. Inside this matrix there is always a point which locates a single member of an armed force. The usefulness of this, according to Harries-Jenkins, will be shown in enquiries into the cohesiveness of the armed forces, which he considers to be the most important problem for military institutions.

THE STATE OF STUDIES OF THE MILITARY PROFESSION

Cohesion, he says, is determined by three factors:

1. relationship among peers (horizontal);
2. relationship between subordinates and superiors (vertical);
3. relationship to the military as organisation or unit (organisational).

A fourth is suggested by other writers:

4. relationship of the military and the individual to the society or culture at large.

Contrasting his matrix with the traditional "profession" approach, Harries-Jenkins claims that its chief usefulness as a tool of research is with investigation of only the first of these factors.

* * *

If Harries-Jenkins' aim is to shift the attention of students of the armed forces from enquiry into only one category of the institution (i.e. the professional) onto a broader approach, then his account has a valid "raison d'être" and the matrix he proposes probably has interesting applications in the study of problems relating to the armed forces as a whole. But if the author's aim, as is his declared intention in the introduction, is to produce a conceptual synthesis on the military profession, this does not seem to have been achieved. We see in this paper a "synthesis" which destroys the concept of the military profession, declares it dysfunctional and substitutes for it another concept which appears fitted for research in a different and wider social field. This seems the same as declaring that it is not useful to study single categories inside the military establishment.

But is this true? As a test, let us look at "problems common to all the organisations" which Harries-Jenkins, in his conclusion, suggests should be analysed using his organisational matrix. These are recruitment, training, management, and retention of military personnel. Is Harries-Jenkins so certain that these aspects can be studied in a unitary, undifferentiated manner for the four categories into which he divides military personnel (officers, N.C.O.s, long-service volunteers and civilian employees)? Certainly a general study on these problems could be made, but what use is there in gaining and recording knowledge of, for example, motivation in recruitment to such different categories? Could we really suggest to those responsible that they should use the same language and direct the same message to the same social and cultural groups in order to recruit both officers and long-service soldiers? The same argument applies to training, management, and retention. Problems such as that of retaining men in the services are specific for each category.

This does not mean we should not study other categories than the officer group individually and in relation to the whole complex of military institutions. Harries-Jenkins is right to draw the attention of researchers to this point. This, however, seems to me quite different from wanting to destroy and abandon a tool of research simply because it cannot be used for studying the whole institution.

I also want to touch on some of the criticisms which he makes of the concept of the military profession - particularly his criticism of the structural-functionalist model, which to me seems still to have a certain validity.

First of all it does not seem particularly relevant that the occupation of officer arose before the formation of the ideal type of the professions; the scope of sociological investigation is to deal with present reality. It is more important to find out if this ideal type is useful in studying the occupation of any officer than to establish the historical priority.

It is more important to consider the author's criticism of the usefulness of the structuralist model. He says the professional ideal type is not appropriate to the officer corps because three of the attributes do not apply (viz. a professional association, autonomy and homogeneity). The weight to be placed on the lack of these attributes depends on how essential they are in the ideal type of profession and this is much disputed (Huntington for example does not include them in his model and Janowitz only includes one of the three). Many writers from Huntington to Prandstraller list the military profession under the heading of "bureaucratic profession" (a classification which Harries-Jenkins seems to accept). Very few of these match the ideal type under which the liberal professions are studied. If, as Harries-Jenkins observes in his paper, a consistent "hard core of the ideal type of profession"⁸ can be attached to the occupation of officer and if this helps in understanding the officer-role in relation to society, would it not be more constructive to redesign the ideal type by adapting it to the growing category of bureaucratic professions?

8. The monopoly of an area of knowledge, a long preparation of formal study, the recognised social importance of the function, a code of professional ethics, full-time employment, etc.

During Harries-Jenkins' development of his system he seems to slide terminologically from the concept of military profession to that of "the Profession of Arms" (this is a verbal change only, for if the term profession is used correctly it always refers to the category of officers) and hence effectively to the concept of the whole military organisation. Thus, instead of creating a synthesis, he has shifted his point of view and altered the field of study. It is as if he had moved from a telephoto to a wide-angle lens. In my opinion he commits the error of considering as alternatives study tools which are actually complementary.

8. THE SECOND LUCCA'S MEETING, OCTOBER 1989⁹

This second meeting was devoted to the definition of a theoretical framework to be used in an empirical research project on the military profession in a variety of European countries. The first topic of discussion was the usefulness of studying the military profession from the point of view of the sociology of professions. In fact, whereas substantial agreement exists on this point (see Dandeker, Muñoz, Nuciari, Prandstraller, Sörensen, and also Boëne, 1989), other positions exist: For example, Paul Watts believes that "the military" should be approached in terms of organisation theory and considered as a whole. Mauritz Mortensen replaces sociology's concept of the professional with one supplied by the U.S. Labour Office,

9. It was an interim meeting of the Working Group VI of ERGOMAS: In this paragraph - devoted to the interim meeting - where I quoted an author without dating, reference is understood as being to the paper presented in the meeting; all these are collected in the "Working Document No.1" of the VI Working Group of ERGOMAS.

though this is admittedly in the context of peace-keeping units. Anton Bebler believes that we might find it worthwhile to look at commissioned and non-commissioned officers as a single category, to be considered together.

And, lastly, Jürgen Kuhlmann describes the concept of profession as over-used, maintaining that research done so far shows that the military profession "should be viewed as any other job, with some peculiarities". Although not present at the meeting Boëne has argued that: "The uniqueness of the military does not rest only on the real or supposed risks of the combatant"... "it also resides in the limits of instrumental rationality in combat, and in the transgression of habitual social norms"... "This implies a peculiar socialization"... because all Armed Forces members "partake of the same overall mission, and no service member can rule out the possibility of having to commit an act of legitimate violence one day within that broad framework"... Despite the actual convergence between military and civilian organisation... "it does not necessarily follow, however, that the most authentic part of militariness ought to be further diluted"... "Despite partial analogies, combat and 'civilian' emergencies do not really belong to the same realm." And further "an officer is thus no ordinary public servant; he must answer a 'calling', made up of keen interest in military things, dedication to the common good, acceptance of risk to life and limb and of the peculiar obligations of the profession of arms."... "Technology does not modify the essence of the military calling."

Leaving aside the acceptance of an ideal type of military professional centred on the officer, most of the scholars present at Lucca too were concerned with the idea, and even more with the practical problem, of

GIUSEPPE CAFORIO

the de-professionalisation - or even, as some saw it - the erosion of the professional monopoly and/or social acceptance of the military profession. This problem is connected with, and seems to originate in, the rapid process of change affecting both society itself and the techniques and tactics of combat over recent decades. Once again it is Bernard Boëne (1989) who seems to me to have most quickly identified the main outlines of this change, saying that:

- In percentage terms combat has become a minority activity,
- The likelihood of experiencing combat is diminishing.
- War becomes abstract; it is displaced by symbolic expression (changes in military posture, subtle variations in states of alert...), or it is reduced to 'surgical' constabulary operations, or even to peace-keeping operations.
- Operational use of the armed forces is increasingly in the context of civil emergency.
- Deterrence comes to be the more or less widely accepted principle of external security.
- The use of military force immediately attracts media attention and coverage, and gives rise to public opinion reactions that are not long delayed, and such that no politician can afford to disregard.
- Public opinion in post-industrial countries holds that the use of force is illegitimate (but Ferruccio Botti, for example, would claim that as early as the end of the 19th century there was a general perception of war less as "business" and increasingly as a generalised damage to society).
- There is increasing government interference even at the military's tactical level of operation-commanding officers at even the lower levels are empowered to make decisions of a political nature during military operations constructs". This, he says,

THE STATE OF STUDIES OF THE MILITARY PROFESSION

comes as a fourth and necessary phase after three phases of "concept formation" (Huntington and Janowitz), "concept analysis" (various authors 1967-1977) and "concept revision" (Moskos and others 1977- 1987). Demonstrative/technical subsystem tends to counterbalance the operational/combat-oriented subsystem in war, and to submerge it in peacetime.

The papers presented at Lucca seem to identify the following as the evident signs - the indicators - of the erosion of military professionalism (and it will be interesting to compare and correlate these with the outlines of change described above):

- Dilution of military professionalism into contexts which are not specifically military (Nuciari).
- An increase in the number of civilian experts working in strictly military areas (Nuciari, Dandeker).
- A symmetrical phenomenon of officers specialising in civilian expertise (Nuciari).
- Growing public diffidence towards "experts" of whatever professional area (Dandeker).
- An exodus from the military towards the civil professions (Watts).
- Growing difficulty in the recruitment of new military professionals (Watts, Dandeker, Kuhlmann).

Marina Nuciari therefore suggests that there should also be a close examination of the content of military professionalism as it is today, and that certain pertinent questions should be asked, including:

- Has the content of military professionalism changed over the last fifty years?
- If so, what other content has emerged beside it or in replacement?
- Is such new content still military in nature?
- Is this new content still professional in nature?

What then is the place, within the new technical contents of the modern military profession, of that military uniqueness which we have mentioned above and to which Bernard Boëne has referred? Boëne focuses on two current aspects of militariness which seem worthy of consideration. The first is that "core elements of it, unparalleled in civilian life, persist: obedience, loyalty (in liberal democracies: political neutrality) and unlimited liability for service, with all the limitations of civil liberty they imply"... "Uniqueness also expresses itself, among other things, in lower age limits or in restrictions on the utilisation of women". The second is that "military institutions and service members seem to live and operate in the realm of potentiality, with only very limited prospects of ever crossing into the realm of action - though unfortunately that possibility cannot be ruled out". It follows that "If there is room left for idealism in today's armed forces, it probably resides in the recognition and acceptance of such uneasiness - the absence of a single meaningful logic transparent to all at all times".

The indicators of professional erosion cited by several scholars concern not only the changes in content but involve other aspects of professionalism as well. These include the attitudes found in members of the profession themselves, their interpersonal and social relationships, and so on. Models can be used to provide a global vision of the profession and allow us to evaluate these processes of change. Such models include the I/O one of Moskos, Thomas' four career strategies model, Gouldner's local/cosmopolitan model, and the bureaucratisation/professionalisation model suggested by the present author. There is a wide diversity of opinion concerning the models and their practical usefulness, as was demonstrated at the Lucca interim meet-

ing. We have to ask ourselves therefore "to what degree the model can serve as an instrument to describe the military and explain attitudes and behaviour of the real existing military - at present as well as in the past and in the future." (Kuhlmann). We have to find out if it is true that "the model does not describe reality. We have to evaluate opinions such as expressed by Paul Watts that "we do not base research on a model of the profession because no model may be adequate, rather we base our research on the particular problems the military confronts".

CONCLUSIONS

A panoramic investigation such as this presents more questions than answers. But as the aim of our panel is, I think, to create a theoretical framework sufficiently clear, accepted and acceptable to lead to parallel and comparable empirical research in different countries, a discussion of principles and concepts seems an indispensable stage.

I suggest some questions that seem to me fundamental and which the discussion ought to confront - these are topics from which we can choose and are by no means exhaustive.

1. How do we define the concept of a profession? If the approach by attributes is acceptable can we see Cathy Downes' thesis as valid?
2. Can the military today be considered as a profession? How should it be studied?
3. Various writers place the military profession among the bureaucratic professions; so should we modify Downes' thesis to fit such professions?¹⁰

10. I propose - in Annex No. 2 - a settlement of characteristics for bureau-

4. Who really are the military professionals?
5. What critical factors influence the military professions and how do they impress themselves on the professional identity?
6. What today is the concrete content of the military profession?
7. How much do present changes in the professional content influence the ethical values of the armed forces? Is a reformulation of these values needed?

If results are to be achieved, the discussion will have to be conducted in a consistent manner; if we are to build together then we must find a common language, a common semantics and a common sociology.

To conclude, I would now like to state my views on the content of the military profession. As a matter of fact I believe that even to evaluate either the existence or persistence of an individual officer profession today, it is useful and pertinent to remember the special uniqueness and solid reality of that profession.

I would cite Gert Teitler (Teitler, 1977). He states that the standardisation of procedure necessitated by the absolute uncertainty of combat imposes a rigorous monopoly of "decision-making" at the officer level, with greater scope and size for the decisions at the higher levels. This monopoly of knowledge,¹¹ respon-

cratic professions, which summarizes both the Downes' and the Prandstraller's hypothesis. See also Caforio, 1988.

11. Knowledge extending nowadays, as various scholars affirm, to a wide spectrum of professionalism, as self-measured, with a specific unifying element of the military institution's own philosophy. This is a philosophy of self-sacrifice, of discipline, subordination to a hierarchy, but also at the same time of responsibility and individual initiative; a philosophy of command and

sibility and authority, in sectors of human social activity of extreme seriousness and in situations of great uncertainty, is the unique professional content of the officer's trade and is also the unifying point of the different specialisations and abilities which the individual officer acquires. As Lissak, Downes, Sörensen and others point out, this can be very close to other particular professions and civilian occupations.

This unifying content can be expressed as "management of violence". One also has to refer to qualities of "leadership". An expression we could discuss and examine in the attempt to define the general and individual content of the military profession is: "leadership in the management of violence".

therefore of self-control. It is the basis of a special kind of mentality exasperating to outsiders (who call it the "military mind") which tends to motivate permanent militarisation and institutionalisation even of sections of civilian professions which become included in it, i.e. military doctors, engineers, chaplains (where allowed for), etc.

GIUSEPPE CAFORIO

ANNEX No.1

SETTLEMENT OF ENDURING CHARACTERISTICS
FOR BUREAUCRATIC PROFESSIONS

(Downes + Prandstraller)

1. The profession maintains a monopoly control over a body of defined theoretical knowledge and the practical competencies that accompany such knowledge; this knowledge challenges and compares itself with a "corpus" of formal rules;
2. Aspirants to the profession must undertake intensive, lengthy, formal and practical education and training in some cases inside the organisation; their competence and skills are assessed and formally recognised by qualified practitioners;
3. The activities of the profession are located areas of vital concern to human kind;
4. The relationship between the profession and society (BETWEEN PRACTITIONER AND CLIENT) is based upon altruistic service by the former to the latter;
5. The profession retains some degree of autonomy over matters such as recruitment and training practices, the behaviour expected of its members;
6. The profession is organised into a form of community: professional associations, if exist, are not always very important;

THE STATE OF STUDIES OF THE MILITARY PROFESSION

7. The profession is seen as a full-time, permanent career oriented form of occupation: the whole career runs inside the organisation;
8. Society sanctions the activities of the profession as morally praise-worthy and accords to the profession a status of esteem, respect, prestige and so on;
9. Professional and bureaucratic roles flow together and settle themselves on every single member of the profession.

GIUSEPPE CAFORIO

ANNEX No.2

TABLE OF INDICATORS PROPOSED BY G.CAFORIO
LIST OF VARIABLES

Variable	Indicator of bureaucratisation	Indicator of professionalisation
Aim of the officer's activity	Developing the concerns and ideas of the higher-ranking person in charge in order to meet with his approval	Acting according to own professional knowledge to achieve optimum results for the institution.
Lines of action	Keeping strictly to the norms and based as far as possible on "precedents"	Adapting the norms to the situation at hand: creating new patterns of behaviour where there's room for initiative
Prevailing normative ethical references	Laws, rules, official circulars	The professional ethical code of the category
Prevailing sources of thinking directions	Internal circulars and publications, official or approved articles and studies	Wide spectrum of studies and publications; specialised publications on the specific field of activity
Leadership style	Leadership is based on rank or charge authority	Leadership is based on the higher professional competence

THE STATE OF STUDIES OF THE MILITARY PROFESSION

ANNEX No. 2 continued

Variable	Indicator of bureaucratisation	Indicator of professionalisation
Motivation to choose the career	Economic security; ordered career advancement; will to operate in an ordered milieu	Peculiar leadership type of the officer; professional ethics and values' appreciation
Types of satisfaction	Career advancement or factors favouring this (commendations, prestigious duties rather than real responsibility)	More demanding assignments and duties or activities in particularly sensitive and difficult areas
Sociocultural references	Behaviour of higher-ranking officers; prevailing trends of the surrounding environment	Behaviour of the more innovative colleagues; stimulus from subordinates; behaviour of those in charge of sectors doing a similar activity.
Reference group	Vertically upwards within the institution	Horizontally both within and outside the institution; vertically within the institution in both directions.

GIUSEPPE CAFORIO

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THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE MILITARY PROFESSION:

A VIEW FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM

C O N T E N T S

1. Introduction

2. The rise of the military profession and the nation-state: an overview

3. The context of the rise and decline of professionalism: stages in the development of capitalism and the modern state

Phase 1: The age of liberal capitalism
Phase 2: The age of organised capitalism
Phase 3: The emergence of neo-liberal capitalism

4. Neo-liberal capitalism and the decline of professionalism: the case of the military

References

1. INTRODUCTION

In this essay we consider the question: is the military profession in decline in modern western societies? Changes in the military profession today are of course linked with recent dramatic shifts in East/West relations which will promote cuts in defence expenditure and a re-organisation of the shape and role of armed forces. However, we argue that changes in the military and indeed other professions should be located in the broad social and historical context of shifts in the organisation of modern capitalism and the nation state. When this is done, we argue that the development of the military as well as nonmilitary professions can be conceptualised in terms of a long-term process of rise and decline.

Our overall theme is that the traditional social power of professional expertise is being eroded by a number of changes in contemporary societies: viz the emergence of what we term neoliberal capitalism, a related restructuring of the modern state and changing public perceptions. These social changes are having a significant impact on the military profession. However, in conclusion, we stress that insofar as the military profession today is experiencing a process of relative decline or erosion, geo-political and military factors are also important, and in this context we draw on Moskos' recent statements on the future of armed forces in a Warless Society (C Moskos 1990).

The steps in our argument are as follows:

- i. An overview of the development of the military profession and the modern nation state.
- ii. An analysis of the links between types of professional organisation and stages in the development of capitalism and the modern state. This concludes with a statement of criteria for the decline of professionalism together with an outline of the main factors at work which account for this process today.
- iii. There then follows an application of this analysis to the case of the military profession drawing on the case of the United Kingdom.

1. THE RISE OF THE MILITARY PROFESSION AND THE NATION-STATE: AN OVERVIEW

The modern military profession is best understood as a bureaucratic profession or as a fusion of profession and organisation. In defending this view, we reiterate a position which has been used in earlier work on the British naval profession (1978, 1984, 1989) and which converges with the suggestions made recently by Caforio (1989) and Harries-Jenkins (1990). While this line of argument was presented earlier by writers like Van Doorn (1965), its fundamental principles derive from Max Weber's analysis of the part played by rational bureaucracy in modern society and particularly in the modern nation state (C Dandeker 1990 7-22).

The distinctive features of the modern military profession can be identified in terms of the relationships between three concepts: professional expertise; bureaucratic organisation and the modern nation state.

By professional we refer to a clustering of four attributes: first, the specialisation of an occupation in the division of labour. This occupation provides the social basis of a vocation and life long career for most of its membership. Vocationalism provides the basis of a community life style normally based on a professional association. Second, the expertise of professionals is rooted in their mastery of theoretical and practical skills, acquired through a lengthy period of formal training. This expertise commands widespread legitimacy in the wider society and is the basis of the high prestige of the profession: the profession is seen to be performing a vital service - or at least its claim to do so is widely accepted as valid. Third, a profession successfully claims a monopoly in respect of the provision of a service to a client. Fourth, a profession possesses autonomy or power in relation to determining how the service is provided and thus in determining what the needs of the client(s) are and how these should be met. This power autonomy is guaranteed by the legal and coercive powers of the modern state. This power or autonomy of the profession normally operates at two levels: at the level of the collectivity - the profession as a whole in relating to the client(s); secondly at the level of the individual practitioner the individual professional has considerable discretion in how he or she provides a service to a particular client within the context of peer review, and colleague control through, for instance the regulatory and monitoring procedure of the professional association.

Drawing on Max Weber, four aspects of bureaucratic organisation can be highlighted, with the first two of these being shared with professional occupations:

- i. The existence of specialised full-time personnel organised in careers.

- ii. The employment of technical/scientific relation to solve problems and perform work tasks.
- iii. A hierarchy of legal competences - the knowledge in bureaucratic organisations is structured in terms of a disciplined hierarchy and made to serve the wishes of the organisation's leader(s).
- iv. Finally, in bureaucratic organisations the personnel as officials or employees are separated from the means of administration in terms of proprietary control over access to progress within and exit from their career structure.

The development of the modern military profession has involved a fusion of profession and bureaucratic organisation in the context of the development of the modern nation state. (As will be seen later, it might be argued that perhaps the military profession should not really be considered as a proper profession at all because of the dominant position occupied by the state as client).

The distinctive features of the modern nation state derive from an emergent division between external and internal relations together with a corresponding specialisation of bureaucratized military power on the one hand and police surveillance on the other. This division between internal and external relations involved a monopolisation of the means of legitimate violence by the state. The corollary of a predominantly externally facing military organisation is a pacified domestic population. In the domestic sphere, the population does not, as a matter of routine, provide sources of collective armed opposition to the rule of the central authorities. In this sense, war and peace are then two sides of the same coin (C Dandeker 1990; A Giddens 1985 17-34; 83-121).

This process was a long term development in Europe characterised by the phases of feudalism, absolutism and the modern nation state. With the triumph of absolutism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, mercenary service gave way to the principle of exclusive service to the state. By 1700, the basic characteristics of the modern military had been established: a state machine responsible for and capable of maintaining a full time force in war and peace, paying, feeding, arming and clothing it; and a coherent hierarchy of men with a distinct sub-culture of their own set apart from the rest of society not only by their specialised function but by their habits privileges and responsibilities.

The development of the military profession by the state did not mean that the officer class was under full bureaucratic regulation - this was a process that occurred in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This argument can be illustrated briefly as follows. The establishment of officers as members of a bureaucratic profession meant that they became fully separated from the means of administration. They lost those remaining property rights in their occupation that were the residues of an era when the state had relied more on self equipped and self financing armed forces. As officers moved through their careers, they were subjected to processes of detailed evaluation and monitoring by their supervisors. The information retrieved through these processes was used to judge the technical efficiency of officers.

In the case of British naval officers for example, the formation of a bureaucratic profession involved a number of changes in the structure of their careers. First, the central authorities monopolised the right to recruit officer cadets. Second, the education and

training of officers was transformed. Instead of being a direct result of the individual practices of commanding officers, these functions were centralised and performed in the context of formal educational institutions. The industrialisation of war and the complexity of military technology promoted occupational differentiation within the military profession and a consequent proliferation of such education establishments. The development of staff organisations in the services was linked with the formation of staff colleges for the higher education of those officers destined for the more senior positions in the service. With these developments, a more uniform military doctrine and expertise could be inculcated into officers (C Dandeker 1978).

A third aspect of officers' careers to be transformed was promotion. Officers' privileges in this area were curtailed. The central authorities monopolised the right to promote and so transformed officers rights into a highly circumscribed power of recommendation only. In addition, the basis of decisions on promotions shifted. Decisions on promotions were increasingly informed and legitimated by judgements on the technical qualifications of candidates as revealed by a professional registry. This was a store of bureaucratic information on each officer's service history, technical merits, special qualifications etc. as recorded by their superiors in regular reports. A fourth change in the career structure of officers concerned the issue of retirement. The introduction of compulsory retirement was perhaps the clearest indication of the separation of officers from the means of administration.

Through these four sets of bureaucratic mechanisms a bureaucratic naval profession was formed in Britain. All aspects of officers' careers came under the

bureaucratic purview of the central authorities. Under traditional arrangements, when there had been a balance of patronage powers between officer and central authorities in respect of the distribution of occupational rewards, the size and shape of the officers' corps were the aggregate results of a myriad of different patronage decisions (C Dandeker 1978; T Johnson and C Dandeker 1989). They were not the outcome of an explicit public policy enforced in the organisation by the century, such matters as the number of officers of particular specialisms in each rank, promotion rates, recruitment numbers, projected personnel requirements for the future were all determined centrally by staff organisations in the light of strategic policy and financial budgets. This overall process can be referred to as a shift from patronage to bureaucratic control (C Dandeker 1978; 1990: 93-101).

In the light of the above discussion, the question of who or what is the modern military profession can be clarified. Some have argued that the profession refers to the officer class and not to the NCO or rank and file (G Caforio 1988). Others have suggested that professionals should include a far broader category of service personnel (C Downes 1985). It seems to us that Caforio is right for two reasons. First, professionalism, in essence, is about expert power. Professionals are those who occupy the strategic levers in the organisation, production and delivery of an expert service to a client. Those who are not involved in the conception and strategic execution of professional work tasks but are instead concerned with the detailed application of other peoples instructions fall outside the category of professional. Secondly, when one looks at the careers, professionals are those whose normal career pattern is to move into or near these levers of power. Their recruitment and training is organised with

all this in mind. So long as professionalism is considered in the context of power it seems we have a good way of distinguishing the professional and non-professional elements of the armed services. (Similar distinctions between different occupations could be made in the non-military sphere). Those who wish to use the word professional to mean competent and full time worker in a particular field are entitled to do so but they are using it in a different way from the one adopted here.

Is the military profession really a profession, given that it is a bureaucratic profession subordinated to the civilian political will of that political party which has temporary charge of the state? Until recently, there has been no serious difficulty in identifying the officers corps as a profession, albeit a state bureaucratic one. Thus, as was pointed out above, although the military profession was formed through its very subordination to the state, it retained crucial areas of autonomy. This autonomy has varied at both the collective and individual levels within the profession at different times and in different societies, but the term military profession could still be usefully applied. Within the civilian structure of political control, the military profession had discretion in how it met its servants' politically defined goals and could influence the formulation of these goals through its provision of advice, information and influence through the lobby systems. In addition, individual officers had scope in relation to whether they slavishly obeyed orders from above or sought to develop possibilities for showing initiative and drawing on links with parallel occupations in the division of labour. This of course is one of the points raised by Caforio's discussion of the poles of professionalism and bureaucracy within the modern officers' corps (G Caforio 1989).

At this point in the argument, we locate the emergence of the officers' corps as a state bureaucratic profession and the experiences of non-military professions in the broader context of stages in the development of capitalism and the modern state since the late eighteenth century. When this is done, it can be observed that the traditional social power of the modern military profession, along with that of other professions is rooted in structural arrangements which are being undermined by major processes of social change. In consequence, we can speak of a relative decline of the military profession in contemporary society.

3. THE CONTEXT OF THE RISE AND DECLINE OF PROFESSIONALISM: STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM AND THE MODERN STATE

The preceding analysis of the emergence of the modern military profession and the nation state can be located in a broader social context by referring to the schema outline in Fig 1. (On the general issues in social theory raised by this schema see C. Dandeker 1990; D. Harvey 1989; S Lash and J Urry 1987).

PHASE 1: THE AGE OF LIBERAL CAPITALISM

As is indicated in Fig 1, Phase 1 running from about 1800-1870 witnessed a structural transformation of national economies and the international division of labour: i.e., the emergence of liberal capitalism centred on small scale production by entrepreneurial/family organised enterprises, employing individualised and formally-free labour and competing in a market economy. Despite the emergence of a more globally interdependent economic system, production priorities were largely geared into localised economies.

Fig. 1 The Rise and Decline of the Military Profession*

CHRISTOPHER DANDEKER/PAUL WATTS

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE MILITARY PROFESSION

- 86 -

- 87 -

	ECONOMIC STRUCTURE	STATE AND POLITICS	PROFESSIONS	MILITARY ORGANIZATION & PROFESSIONALISM***
LIBERAL CAPITALISM 1800 - 1870 **	Birth of class, individualized labour; small scale production by competing family firms; personal/entrepreneurial capitalism.	Laissez-faire; emphasis on individual political and civil rights; liberal nationalism; colonialism	Classic age of the independent licensed professional; selling services to a mass of clients; colleague control; underwritten public power of the state. Delimited public sector.	<u>WAR PREPARATION</u> Professional forces; Suspicion of national conscription From patronage to bureaucratic control. Military profession as bureaucratized element of delimited public sector.
ORGANIZED CAPITALISM 1870 - 1970's	Growth of class organizations of capital and labour; mass production in large units, concentration of ownership of capital, growth of public ownership.	Growth of welfare and social rights of citizenship; state regulation of economy and growth of corporatist structures; Integral nationalism, growth of imperial blocs - World Wars.	State mediation and state control; growth of state and corporate client power. The housing of professionals in bureaucratic organisations.	<u>WAR READINESS</u> Rise of Mass conscript armed forces and the Prussian model of industrialised warfare in the modern nation state. <u>WAR DETERRENCE</u> Professional Military Growth of Occupationalism.
NEO-LIBERAL CAPITALISM 1980's	Decline of organized labour, dispersal of production, global co-ordination by TNC's. Decentralization of economic tactics and centralization of strategic power. Contracting out.	Deregulation; re-emphasis on individual rights but added weight to law and order institutions. Delegitimation and delimitation of public sector. Collapse of empires; growth of supra- and sub-nationalisms.	Deregulation of professional producer power, market forces from below, financial controls from above.	Cadre/reserve system from occupational to 'civic' military. Smaller, less valued military in delimited and delegitimated public sector. <u>WARLESS SOCIETY</u>

*) Ideas for this scheme were developed in discussion with James Fulcher.

***) N.B. Overlapping of periods/phases.

***) Adapted from C. Moskos ARMED FORCES IN A WARLESS SOCIETY.

Turning to the sphere of political institutions, and with particular reference to the British case, liberal capitalism was linked with the development of the public power of the liberal state: i.e., the emergence of a sharply circumscribed public sector in terms of its relative consumption of national resources, and strictly accountable through its consumption of national resources, and strictly accountable through its political masters to public scrutiny through parliamentary mechanisms. In this type of state, laissez-faire was paramount; thus the emphasis that was placed on individual political and civil rights of citizenship rather than on the collective provision of social rights of citizenship. On the international front, this was also the age of liberal nationalism and the establishment of colonies. (See Peter Alter 1989: 4-36).

It is in this context that one can locate the analysis of the rise of the modern military profession outlined earlier. After the decline of the mercenary principle, the early development of the military profession in Europe from 1600-1800 was structured by the principles of central and local patronage powers of the state and senior figures of the officers corps. (C Dandeker 1978). As was argued above, the development of the modern officers corps can be expressed in terms of a shift from patronage to bureaucratic control by the client - the modern state - a process which ran roughly from the late eighteenth to the later decades of the nineteenth century. The military profession became a component of a delimited and more financially rationalised public sector. At the same time, for the first half of the nineteenth century, in relation to the organisation and mobilisation of armed forces, there was still a fairly firm division between war and peace (M Pearton 1982: 19-35; C Dandeker 1990: 80-101).

From the standpoint of non-military professions this was the classic age of the individual solo professional and the principle of colleague control underwritten by the public legal power of the modern state. Under liberal capitalism then, collegially controlled individual practitioners determined the needs of a mass of individual clients and provided them with services from a monopolistic position in the market guaranteed by the state. Johnson has pointed out how the modern sociology of professions has both taken this specific historical period as a basis for abstract and ill-founded generalisations about the nature of professionalism and failed to see how at this, as at every other point in their history, the relationship with the state has been a pivotal fact of the story of all of the professions and not just the military or other state sponsored professions (on these issues see T Johnson 1972 passim; 1989).

PHASE 2: THE AGE OF ORGANISED CAPITALISM.

In this phase, with the rapid development of an industrialised world, national economies became more closely interdependent. In each one, production shifted to a large or mass scale and there was a concentration of the ownership of capital. At the same time, collective class organisations became much more clearly defined and the state took on a more interventionist role in steering economic performance and this was revealed in the extension of the public section of employment. In contrast with the preceding phase, production was geared into national rather than local economies, but accompanied by a major increase in global exchange and interdependence.

The role of the state in economic steering brought in its train corporatist arrangements for the regulation

of the same time, the state's role in the economy was also extended because of the social pressures stemming from demands for citizenship rights and the establishment of collective provision for what Marshall referred to as social rights. At the interface between economics and politics on the international level, this was an age of competition between emergent blocs of imperial/colonial powers equipped with the means of industrialised war. The age of organised capitalism saw the modern military profession become the core of mass conscript armed forces, while the distinction between war and peace broke down as the armed forces become preoccupied with war readiness in time of peace (C Dandeker 1990: 80-101). It was also the age of what Peter Alter has referred to as integral rather than liberal nationalism and culminated with the World Wars. (P Alter 1989: 37-54).

For the military profession, this phase witnessed their rise to an increasingly privileged position within a burgeoning public sector, in which 'producer power' ruled. It was during this phase that other professions began to experience processes of client control either from the state or the large business corporations which were becoming the linchpin of the organised industrial capitalist economy.

Turning to non-military professions, from the late nineteenth century onwards, the age of the solo individual profession providing services to a mass of individual clients gave way to a situation in which practitioners were increasingly housed in large corporations, or professional organisations such as law and accountancy firms, or in the burgeoning organisations of the modern welfare state. As Johnson has argued, this shift involved processes of state mediation in the relationships between professional and client, or in

processes of state or corporate control of the conditions under which professionals serviced the needs of clients. (T Johnson 1972; 1989). Indeed, in many respects the client, in the form of the state or large business corporation, asserted control over professionals. The significance of this observation is that modern professions have generally experienced a process that characterised the formation of the military profession from its early stages of development - that is a process of fusion between professionalism and bureaucratic organisation, in this case under the aegis of the modern state.

PHASE 3: THE EMERGENCE OF NEO-LIBERAL CAPITALISM.

In this contemporary phase, the pivotal feature of the capitalist system is the Transnational corporation which co-ordinates greatly dispersed production and distribution facilities in what is now a truly integrated global economy. This dispersal of production - associated with the 'deindustrialisation' of some sectors of the advanced societies and the relocation of manufacturing to third world economies - is indicative of a generalised decentralisation of the tactics of economics activities within an overall context of a major centralisation of strategic and financial control in the capitalist economic system. The latter has been facilitated by the revolution in communications technology the products of which include electronic financial transfers and computerised stock controls. While the major economic actor is the Transnational corporation, this coexists with an expanding number of smaller firms. These are involved in sub-contractual relations with the larger concerns which are increasingly inclined to contract-out many of their requirements. Contracting-out is also increasingly found within the state itself as it privatisation of elements of the

public sector. In this economic context, the traditional power of organised labour, rooted in corporatist regulatory structures, goes into decline.

Within the political realm, the emergence of neo-liberal capitalism witnesses an increased emphasis on individual rights and a corresponding reduced emphasis on the collective provision, of social rights. On the other hand, the neo-liberal state is a 'strong state', as is indicated by the resources that are put into security and law and order institutions. At the international level, neo-liberalism is associated with the collapse of empires and the increasing significance of supranational institutions such as the European Community and related structures to be found in North America/Canada, and paradoxically, an increase in sub-nationalism and separatism. Thus, the nation-state is undercut from both above and below. (P Alter 1989: 119-163).

The age of neo-liberal capitalism undermines the traditional power base of professionalism. In general terms, what does the decline of professionalism entail, what are the criteria one can use for comparative analysis? We suggest the following guidelines:

- (1) Decline in monopoly power to provide a service to the client(s), for instance the opening up of a sector to competition from other producer groups, (for example the opening up of property conveyance to groups other than solicitors).
- (2) An erosion of the distinctive culture or way of life of a profession; for example the increasing difficulty experienced by professions in resisting the imposition of the idea that efficiency in their world can be computed with performance indicators and the like in much the same way as in other areas of the division of labour. More

broadly, this can be recognised as 'just another job' syndrome (C Moskos and F R Wood book with this sub-title 1988).

- (3) Assertion of client power over the professional group, particularly the state and large business concerns (for example see the struggles between the medical profession and the financial managers of state and private health enterprises). This client power is often asserted with the aid of other professions most particularly accountants and related financial analysts.
- (4) A relative social devaluation of a profession in the eyes of the public. (See the comments on Nikolas Rose's book immediately below).

For the professions generally, the highpoint of their power and prestige was during the age of organised capitalism, and it was during this period too that the public sector was both a seemingly ever increasing consumer of national resources and regarded as having high legitimacy. With their emphasis on the values of altruism and service, the professions found a supporting cultural and structural system of support. However, this social base of the professions has been undermined by the development of neo-liberal capitalism. For example, as Nikolas Rose has argued recently, in relation to the welfare state, these public bureaucracies have been subjected to attack by neoconservatism, neo-liberalism and, from the left, various civil rights movements. All of these have, in different ways, sought to defend the rights of the 'autonomous family'. Under neoliberal arrangements, there is an ongoing shift in the focus of the organisation of welfare services away from the ministrations of subject citizens by monopolistic public welfare bureaucracies wielding producer power, towards a system of more self-initiated contracts between individual consumers - the 'responsible

family' - and state licensed but more competitive, rather than monopolistic professional and expert producers (This theme is addressed in N Rose 1990).

This creation of a market led enterprise culture within a diminished and considerably delegitimated public sector is affecting not just the welfare state but education - witness the establishment of devolved budgeting and the bidding in British universities; and, as will be seen in the next section, the same can be said for the realm of defence. The case of the military profession under neo-liberal capitalism can now be analysed in more detail.

4. NEO-LIBERAL CAPITALISM AND THE DECLINE OF PROFESSIONALISM: THE CASE OF THE MILITARY

In the case of the modern military profession we already have literature which is directly relevant to the theme of profession decline. This literature can be used to link the first and third of the criteria identified above: namely the decline of monopoly and the assertion of client power. For example, Cathy Downes, drawing on the work of Ginsburgh has suggested the following: she charts the ways in which the role of civilian experts in defence management has undermined the monopoly power of the military in delivering military advice/services to its client the state (C Downes 1985).

This assertion of civilian power should be located not only in the geo-political and military context of the development of nuclear weapons and the related civilian political distrust of relying exclusively on the military for advice as to their development, deployment and use; it is related also to financial considerations

and the domestic politics of defence budgets. For as Martin Edmonds has argued, in many contemporary states, as a consequence of the emergent mismatch between the commitments of the national security system and the financial resources that governments feel able and willing to provide for it more effort has been put into devising financial and administrative means of obtaining greater value for money from the system. The emergence of neo-liberal capitalism analysed above, has given added impetus to this trend. Many modern states, including the UK., 'manifest a desire for improved efficiency and expanded central financial control over defence spending. The pressure of spiralling defence costs for modern weaponry, full-time professional forces, and the requirements to maintain minimum levels of preparedness have necessitated certain structural changes within central organisations of defence. Furthermore, the emphasis on administrative and planning efficiency has resulted, to a varying extent in different countries, in the introduction of combined and joint planning staffs, and a heavy emphasis on the use and application of managerial and analytic techniques.

These changes have involved a centralisation of administrative power in this sector of the national security system together with a further subordination of senior military officers to civilians - either politicians or bureaucratic financial controllers. Indeed, what we are witnessing in the area of defence is the impact of neo-liberal capitalism and related political strategies on the organised 'producer power' of the military profession.

This is the context in which one should place the restructuring of the higher organisations of defence in the UK and in particular, the changes introduced in 1984 and the financial controls currently being instituted.

As a result of the changes introduced in 1984, with the new responsibilities given to the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Permanent Under Secretary of State as the principal military and civilian advisers to the Secretary of State for Defence, 'relatively little policy making authority' was left to the service chiefs. (M Edmonds 1985: 100). The Chief of the Defence Staff chairs the Chiefs of Staff Committee, but is supposed not simply to provide a clearing house for the presentation of a package of different service interests, but to give independent advice to the minister on overall policy. (Similar developments have taken place recently in the USA). The PUS is responsible for financial and budgetary control and with the new Office of Management and Budget operating under his deputy, the government hopes that greater value for money and general efficiency will result.

None of these new administrative structures can produce the results desired without a major overhaul of the management information systems deployed within the defence bureaucracy. This is the context in which one should view the pursuit of the government's New Management Strategy (NMS) within the Ministry of Defence. As has been outlined in the Defence Estimates of 1989, this financial strategy has three main components:

- (1) A Departmental Plan setting out clearly ... programme and performance objectives linked to the long term costing ... and subsidiary operating cost management plans;

- (2) A comprehensive system of budgets throughout the Department and the Service Commands;
- (3) A continuing cycle of object setting and performance review and down the management chains. All these will be supported by a network of management information systems throughout the Department and the Commands' (Statement on the Defence Estimates 1989 Vol. 1: 43).

It is envisaged that from 1 April 1991, four changes will come into play:

- (a) 'Budgets held by accountable individual managers will be extended to cover all the Department's operating costs - that is all its spending except that on the procurement Executive's equipment programme.
- (b) Those who actually manage activity will also manage the associated resources, and there will be a shift from control of resource inputs towards output-orientated management.
- (c) The annual process by which budget holders contract to achieve tasks will be fully integrated with the Long term costing.
- (d) The objectives and targets set for individual budget holders will flow from the Department Plan and subsidiary management plans'. (Items quoted from *ibid*).

These financial arrangements impinge directly on the professionalism of the military. It will be recalled that earlier, and set in the context of the broader challenge to the traditional position of the professions in society, we postulated four specific ways in which this challenge is experienced by the military profession. Firstly, we suggested that there is a significant decline in the monopoly power the military has historically possessed to provide a service to its

society. Secondly, we suggested that there has been a dramatic increase in the extent of client power (the Government) over the military profession. Thirdly, we argued that there is an erosion of the military culture though a corrosion of the military ethic. Finally we maintained that there is growing devaluation of the status of the military profession.

Taking our first two points together, the challenge to monopoly power has been brought about by the development of neoliberal capitalism evidenced in the emphasis on the New Management Strategy (NMS) and on the appointment of successful personnel from the business world to the most senior positions in the civil service. The New Management Strategy essentially requires all intermediate and senior levels of management to produce a statement of their aims and objectives and resource requirements. These plans will be consolidated at each level of command but ultimately they must accord with the Management Plan to the client, the Secretary of State for Defence. This will necessarily imply that the increased awareness of what happens at all levels within the military will commensurately increase the power of the client over the military. In implementation, command levels down to Brigade level will have a civil servant - a member of the Defence secretariat staff - as financial adviser on the implications of the management plan. One can imagine such an advisor having a significant input into such decisions as to whether practice the troops in war fighting or allow an adventure training exercise. Decision-making therefore will be increasingly vested in the client and will dilute the monopoly power of the military.

Our third point concerned the erosion of the military culture. This occurs primarily because the impact of

the New Management Strategy is to introduce a high degree of competitiveness for resources between different groups within the military (for example, between money for transport and money for ammunition). This competition undermines and threatens the cohesion of the military as a social system and causes individuals to identify with their own branch - if necessary at the expense of an identification with the wider military society. In addition, the growing intrusion of the civil servant into the daily operations of military units at the decision making level further undermines professional pride and contributes to a corrosion of the service ethic. This effect is experienced through growing problems of retention and recruitment difficulties. This development of civilian power and financial control over the military has been linked by Moskos to the trend towards 'occupationalism' - the further bureaucratisation of the officer corps and the erosion of the military profession as a distinct or 'institutional' way of life. (C Moskos and F R Wood 1988).

Our fourth point is that there is a growing devaluation of the status of the military profession. As the demands for a peace dividend become more raucous and as the issue is not whether the armed forces will shrink, but by how much, so does the status of that profession decline. Quantitative data are currently being collected on this hypothesis in an European research project on the officers' corps (being conducted by the Military Profession study group of ERGOMAS co-ordinated by Guiseppe Caforio).

The decline of military professionalism discussed above should be located not only in the internal political and economic structures of nation states but also in the context of military and geo-political shifts in the

international situation. It is at this point that the present arguments conclude by being linked with those offered recently by Moskos in his provocative paper on 'Armed Forces in a Warless Society' (C Moskos 1990).

Moskos develops a threefold typology to chart the shifts in military organisation that have occurred since the 19th century. These changes are encompassed in the terms war readiness; war deterrence and warless societies. Moskos' schema provides the basis of the right hand column in fig 1. As Moskos argued in Utrecht, the key motor of change in his model of change is the threat of perceived threat, or lack of these experienced by states.

Moskos argues that after the decline of mass armed forces since the second world war and the re-emergence of professional war deterrence forces, current international developments are promoting a shift towards cadre/reserve forces: 'In the warless society, the active-duty force shrinks dramatically to a (well-paid) cadre who train (modestly compensated) longterm reservists. A militia and territorial defence system evolves. In warless societies moreover, civilian service (including large numbers of women) becomes a common alternative to military service.' (Moskos 1990 5-6).

This development is likely to be associated with a continuing blurring of the distinction between the different services of the national security system. As Edmonds has argued for example, ethnic and regional strife have already played their part in undermining the sharp division of labour between the internal and external dimensions of nation states and the historical division of labour between police and military professions. (See the interesting discussion of this issue in M Edmonds 1988: 20-43; 113-160).

With the rise of a warless society, Moskos contends that public attitudes will become more sceptical of the armed forces. We would interpret that view to imply a diminution of the social value of the armed forces relative to other occupations. Here, a crucial area of research must concern changing public perceptions of the military and defence issues in the era of Gorbachev. In the broader context of the pressing claims of the welfare state and non-defence public expenditure generally (the environment, infrastructure and so on), the military will have a difficult task in maintaining its claim on its traditional portion of state funds and national income as against the claims of other lobbies.

The projected social transition from 'a large force in being to a small cadre backed by reserve forces' (ibid 3.4), when placed in the context of the political and economic changes impacting on the military and other professions, spells both a diminished role for the military profession - in terms of its size; consumption of national resources; prestige; its power to influence the client and resist new forms of client control; and its distinctive role in the division of labour concerning national security. However, as Moskos wisely notes, much hinges on the nature of threat and threat perception; a more troubled scene in European and world politics (as in the 1991 Gulf war) could spell something of a revival of the professional military but this would have to exist in a social environment in which very large social processes of change have already undermined the traditional power base of the professions in general.

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THE MILITARY OFFICER - PROFESSION OR JOB ?

Some considerations and empirical findings

C O N T E N T S

Introductory Remarks

Professionalism of Military Officers

1. The Concept of Professionalism
2. The Military Profession

Towards an Effective Task Analysis Technique

3. Recording Activities of Executive Cadres
4. The Ideology of Executive Behaviour
5. Practical Problems of Effective Analysis Techniques.
6. A New Method to Conduct Empirical Analyses.

Empirical Results of Task Analyses

7. The Military Commander - Head and Leader ?
8. The Military Officer: An Administrator ?
9. A Perception Gap: Professional Image and Professional Reality of Military Officers.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

After all the debates and discussions that followed Charles Moskos' "Institution-Occupation" thesis "Military Professionalism" today really appears to be a somewhat over-used concept. There really is not much left to be said about the military profession. For example, debates about whether the military is a job like any other or whether it is or should be a "calling", a profession sui generis, so to say, were resolved in Germany some 15 years ago.¹

To take another example: The question whether career soldiers should be remunerated in terms of rewards corresponding to traditional values than by monetary inducements guided by market-place standards was in Germany answered by reality. Soldiers' salaries are similar to those in the public service. When civil servants receive a pay increase - which as a rule stands at the end of intensive negotiations between trade unions and government - then soldiers wages rise, too.

Caforio's recent essay titled "The Military Profession - Theories of Change"² contends, however, that the intensive debate in the U.S.A. and Germany some years ago

1. Ending generally that it should be viewed as any other job, with some peculiarities, however, and - in war time - carried out under special working conditions. See for a thorough description of the German concept "Citizen in Uniform" Donald Abenheim, "The Citizen in Uniform: Reform and its Critics in the Bundeswehr", in Stephen F. Szabo (ed.), "The Bundeswehr and Western Security", The Macmillian Press, London and Basingstoke: 1990, pp. 31-51 as well as Michael A. Lytle and Terry L. Cockman, "An Institutional Evolution: the Bundeswehr - a New German Army", Defence Analysis, 1989, pp. 207-220.

2. Armed Forces and Society, 1988, pp. 55.

about the military's role in democratic societies might have reached other countries with a certain time lag.³ In Australia, for example, at present a market trend to occupational style employment conditions in the military can be observed. And some Australian officers still fear that this trend will negatively affect the military.

A comparable development was observed in Leicester/UK during the conference on "The Armed Forces into the '90s. - Personnel Problems and the Future of the Military Contract".⁴ Difficulties and problems reach the British forces (a traditionally institutional military) now, that obviously are typical trends of All-Volunteer Military Forces in democratic, well developed and leisure-oriented societies. There will be an insufficient supply of young people who wish to join the armed services in Britain. Surprisingly enough the British Armed Forces are now caught by a severe experience that was forecasted by scholars already at the beginning of the eighties.⁵

3. The papers of the RC 01/ISA 1988 Interim Conference in Munich point into the same direction. See J. Kuhlmann (Ed.), Military Related Social Research - An International Review. Papers presented at the 1988 Interim Conference of the Research Committee 01: Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution. German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research, FORUM international, volume 8, Munich 1989.

4. September 12 - 13, 1989, Leicester/UK, organized by the British Military Studies Group (BMSG) under the headship of Christopher Dandeker and Paul Watts.

5. Which obviously was seldom read in the U.K., although published in English, see Gwyn Harries-Jenkins (Ed.), Armed Forces and the Welfare Societies: Challenges in the 1980's. Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden and the United States. London and Basingstoke, 1982.

This article presents a set of questions concerning the profession of Military Officers and proposes a method how to answer them on an empirical basis. Some very personal answers are offered which result from almost 18 years working experience with military related social research. One may call this essay a sample of working ideas, theoretical considerations and empirical findings on the daily professional life of soldiers - mainly in Germany prior to the unification of both Germanies. Not more but not less than that.

1. THE CONCEPT OF PROFESSIONALISM

The concept of 'profession' is an ideal type model, a theoretical construct. Professions, in the context of this model, do not refer simply to "experts" or "specialists", who are well trained, who offer a certain configuration of skills and vocational qualifications; in short, people one can rely upon to produce a competent service in exchange for money.

According to the ideal type model, professions distinguish themselves from this kind of occupational groups in many aspects. Professions claim to have a privileged status within society and demand a monopoly of influence in their fields of knowledge. Professions value themselves highly, even considering their role as vital for the existence and for the future development of society as such. According to the model professionals behave in conformity with certain commonly accepted values, and display distinctive patterns of behaviour. Professionals perceive themselves as possessing a "corporate identity".

It is well known that not all scholars concerned agree in detail on every single component of the "model of

professions" (some of them even doubt that professions along the lines indicated by this model have ever existed). Cathy Downes comes to the point, when she argues that, "most researchers recognise and acknowledge, that there is a core set of ...(8)... characteristics which may be regarded as imperative and constant".⁶

These enduring characteristics of a profession are according to Downes:

1. - Monopoly control over a body of defined theoretical knowledge, and
 - the practical abilities that accompany knowledge;
2. - Intensive, lengthy, formal and practical education and training of the aspirants to the profession;
 - assessment of performances, learned competencies and skills through formal examinations executed by qualified practitioners;
 - awards of a professionally and socially recognized qualification.
3. - Activities of the profession are located in areas of vital concern to humankind.
4. - Altruistic based service by the profession to society.
5. - Considerable degree of autonomy over matters such as recruitment, training practices, expected behavior, and professional standards.

6. Cathy J. Downes, "To Be or Not To Be a Profession: The Military Case", Defence Analysis, Vol. 1, No. 3, London 1985, p. 147.

6. - Organization of the profession in a form of community;
 - occupational consciousness often expressed by a professional association.
7. - Profession is seen as a full-time, permanent career-oriented form of occupation.
8. - Society sanctions the profession's activities as morally praise-worthy.
 - Society accords to the professions a status of high esteem, respect, confidence, prestige and privilege.

2. THE MILITARY PROFESSION

Those who use an ideal type like "profession" have to face the fact that reality only partially corresponds to the model. This is normal in social research and therefore no one should be surprised by Cathy Downes' statement, that "the extent to which the military profession conforms to the professional model is in many respects limited and qualified".⁷ Nevertheless, social research is still interested to know, to what degree the model can serve as an instrument to describe the military and explain attitudes and behaviour of the real existing military - now as well as in the past and in the future.

In this respect, however, one is well advised to be careful or even suspicious. On the one hand, the military traditionally stands in one line with other so called professions for example priests, medical doctors, judges, professors and the like. On the other

7. Downes, p. 162.

hand, however, empirical research has widely failed to verify the facets of the "professional model" in case of the military.⁸

David Segal is right when pointing out that the institutional/occupational model by Charles Moskos includes the premise, that militaries sometimes have followed the whole set of institutional orientations at all. If that ever happened to be reality, he continues, it must have been in those good old golden days.⁹

Manifold attempts were made to measure institutional values within the military in order to prove that a change is taking place in direction towards a more occupational system. But according to Segal the findings do not provide sufficient evidence that could support the hypothesis of such a change.

To the contrary the results feed the suspicion that in all times institutional and occupational values have more or less coexisted. Soldiers obviously were more concerned with economic issues than the institutional approach admits. And why shouldn't they? "Being aware of pay, benefits and the economic well-being of one's family need not mean that one is a bad soldier".¹⁰

8. And maybe did or will fail, too, in case of the other professions mentioned. Adding my personal experience after 24 years service in the German armed forces (although this is not an scientific argument): I can't remember a fellow officer, a superior or subordinate, who fully or even mainly would have fulfilled the model's requirements. And further, should one have done so, he surely would have been viewed to be "not from this star".

9. Segal, David, "Measuring the Institutional/Occupational Change Thesis", Armed Forces and Society 1986, p. 363.

10. Ibid., p. 364.

Segal calls this attitude "pragmatic professionalism" explaining that occupational orientations may be pursued "without rejecting traditional values and norms".¹¹

This conclusion is in accordance with our daily experience - not only in the military but also valid for non-military occupations, for those money-making jobs as well as for the other esoteric, so-called professions.

Herzberg's "Two Factors Theory of the Motivation to Work"¹² broadly supports this conclusion. His considerations have brought about generations of scholars to search for the real needs of the working people. Although his conclusions were severely criticised they have at least shown clearly, that "pragmatic professionalism" seems to be the rule with any occupation - at least during the last 20 years.

The core statement of Herzberg's model is that there do exist so-called "maintenance factors" which are:

- working conditions
- kind of supervision
- salary
- personal life
- status, and
- job security

11. Ibid., p. 363.

12. Herzberg, F., "Work and the Nature of Man", New York, 1968. Herzberg, F., "One More Time: How Do You Motivate Employees?", Harvard Business Review, 1968.

and so called "satisfiers" or "content factors" like

- recognition
- the work itself
- responsibility
- advancement, and
- growth (of one's personality).

According to Herzberg, maintenance factors are viewed by employees as fundamental, basic needs which the employing organisation is expected to meet without any discussion. They are prerequisites to bring the "satisfiers", the "content factors" into action. In short: generally speaking, there is only a small chance for a positive job commitment, when the economic basis is meager. A common daily experience, as one must admit even without arguing in scientific terms. And to repeat it: why should this not apply to soldiers ?

Provided these arguments are correct (and there is some evidence that they are), what remains then from the ideal type construct "military profession"? Not much, as one must admit.

The model obviously does not describe reality. It is not a "how it is" but rather an "how it should be" statement. The concept of military profession serves a society well that wants to get along with the knowledge that soldiers are allowed and sometimes even encouraged to do what generally is forbidden in society itself: lawfully managing deadly violence and killing man, if necessary. On the other hand soldiers themselves seem to welcome the concept for the same reasons: how better should they justify their "handicraft" than by referring to the community's well-being?

The "military professional" model is an ideology, a myth. It seems to be especially useful in times when rational arguments are not at hand or fail to succeed. Surely most officers in every country know these reasonings well, like "You have a 24 hour commitment", "You serve your country" or "You should have a separate code of morals and manners from that of the civilian population". What could one have said against it without undergoing the risk to be called and treated a bad soldier and thereby spoiling one's own career ?

And it is after all not so important whether the military's job is or should be a profession in the model's sense. More adequate questions to be asked are for instance those, who will increase our understanding of organisational peculiarities of the military (if there are any) and of inner dynamics of the military system.¹³

- What, for example, are the real orientations and values of to-day's soldiers ?
- What really guides their daily commitment ?
- Are decision-making processes in the military indispensably different to those in civilian organizations ?
- To what extent can one organise (military and non-military) effective defence without using typical military practices like: Order and obe-

13. See for example for the German armed forces J. Kuhlmann, "On an 'Ideology' of Military Leadership", in: J. Kuhlmann (ed.), Military and Society: The European Experience. German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research (SOWI), FORUM international, Volume 4, München/Toulouse 1984, pp. 281, recently reprinted in F. Battistelli (ed.), "Marte e Mercurio, Sociologia dell'organizzazione militare", Milano 1990, pp. 513 under the title "La professionalità dei commandanti militari in Germania".

dience, living in barracks, giving up one's individuality and the like ?

- Is it really necessary to cut short civil rights of those whose task is defined to defend just these rights in a vivid democracy ?¹⁴

Most of these questions can't solely be answered by theoretical arguments. They need an empirical basis, which conclusion brings one very soon to the difficulties that must be overcome before empirical research on the officers' daily work can be implemented.

3. RECORDING ACTIVITIES OF EXECUTIVE CADRES¹⁵

Empirical inquiries about the real content of activities peculiar to personnel in positions, that are similar to those of military officers, cannot be solved as easily as it at first glance seems to. The well known techniques developed primarily by F.W. Taylor¹⁶ for the analysis of tasks and activities are almost exclusively suitable only for the analysis of relatively simple and repetitive types of tasks. There is no such similarly well-defined and tested available instrument for the analysis of the much more complex and less

14. See for example the questions raised by E. Lippert and G. Wachtler in their essay "Military Strategy and Social Order", in: J. Kuhlmann (ed.), *Military and Society: The European Experience*. op. cit., pp. 23.

15. The following Chapters 3-6 are partly taken from: J. Kuhlmann, *On an 'Ideology' of Military Leadership*, op. cit.

16. Cf. Taylor, F.W., "Die Grundsätze wissenschaftlicher Betriebsführung", Munich - Berlin 1919.

definable tasks accomplished by personnel in supervisory positions. Task analysis research tools are therefore limited primarily to simple, easily observable and identically structured and constantly repetitive activities. The activities of personnel in management positions, however, change frequently and usually at short notice and have, therefore, generally escaped acceptable empirical analysis.

Various attempts to describe and explain such elusive tasks and activities performed by executives or supervisors have remained largely theoretical in nature. These studies remained primarily within the theoretical body of knowledge of management science either because they were never seriously tested empirically in regard to their relationship to actual situations and/or the actual situations themselves have up to now not been sufficiently well defined.¹⁷

17. "Management Sciences" in general attempt to confine the breadth of all actual possible activities within a few so-called functions. The "classical organizational theory compacts the tasks of managers into only three major categories: "Planning, controlling, and administering" (Kosiol, E., "Organisation der Unternehmung", Wiesbaden 1962, p. 123).

Critically viewed, it becomes clear that such types of function catalogues are generally insufficiently defined and show far too many contradictions to illustrate objectively complete and empirically acceptable observable tasks or activities. In the sense that they attempt to separate actual management activities from the task objectives, in other words, from the actual situation or task being accomplished that produces actions, they indeed obtain superficially general dimensions of such activities but these hardly permit assertions about the actual content of the activities.

The more recent literature describes these tasks fittingly as "formal and cross-sectional functions". "The concept of co-ordinating, for example, does not describe a particular series of operations, but rather all activities that

4. THE IDEOLOGY OF EXECUTIVE BEHAVIOUR

This lack of empirical job-descriptions for executives lead to remarkable consequences.

On the one hand managers could orient their behaviour in organisations to ideologies, by enforcing empirically undocumented theories. This meets fundamental needs of a lot of executives: they appear to be under pressure to explain their own duties in the organisation as a function of a quasi meta relationship.

The pertinent literature offers a real jungle of such attempts to explain it. These originated not only from the directing persons themselves, but are attributed partly to popular-science advanced education institutes and also to the academical area, there mostly as a product of scientific competition and related profile demands.

As managers of private economic enterprises were content for a long time "to determine business politics and to direct the enterprises", their occupation would transform itself later into the already mentioned distinguishable so-called management functions. Decision-making theories saw in management the "homo oeconomicus" simply personified, who has perfect rationality and information and therefore makes absolute correct objective decisions. The concept of leadership

lead to the end result of "unity of action". Thus, assuming that we question a director as to when he is co-ordinating, or how much time he utilizes each day for co-ordinating activities, he will not be able to do so; nor would the most experienced observer be able to tell." (Brinkmann, G., Rippe, W., Gardin, H., Qualität und Quantität des Bedarfs an Führungskräften der Wirtschaft Nordrhein-Westfalens bis zum Jahre 1990, Opladen 1972, p.30).

attempts to idealise the manager as an example for his subordinates and as a "leader". The newest approach called "Corporate Identity" appears to promise no more success than its predecessors.

The second remarkable consequence is the obvious fact, that such unverifiable declarations like the above mentioned "concepts" have really determined the perception of themselves of generations of managers and their actions. In the function of management rights, for example, subordinates should and must accept corresponding principles against themselves, adopt their behaviour towards it and be evaluated. These theories de facto take care that the members of the organisation had to submit to the reality that was earlier defined as true. Since such philosophies are made obligatory mostly of the managers, it is assumed that it depends on less than reality but more because of it to bring the subordinate member of the organisation to a unified behaviour.

This organisational-sociological phenomenon is particularly easy to document in private business enterprises, but it can be equally proved in other large organisations. The German Bundeswehr has tried to rationally justify and legitimise the "military leader", not insignificantly contributing to similar aspirations in civilian organisations. Fragments of all the described origins are evident in the language used in the Bundeswehr and were found in its officially expressed conception of itself.

5. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF EFFECTIVE ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES.

Fundamentally, questionnaires as well as field observations of the activities performed can be used when one wants to collect complete and detailed data concerning the real behaviour of personnel in management positions. Experiments, interviews, group discussions, or participating observations are generally unsuitable.

But even written questionnaires and non-participatory field observations have peculiarities that influence the results of empirical task analysis.

In written questionnaires the subject analyses his own behaviour under conditions that include the environment in which it occurs, but always after the fact. Even if the questionnaire is completed immediately after the particular behaviour the quality of the record is made by the individual's own evaluation, his interpretation of the occurrences and in the case of factors that have occurred some time ago, his dependency on the capacity of his memory. Because the recording of personal activities always requires time and often interrupts these activities, the empirical data gathering process thus changes the circumstances to be investigated. Because of the constant demand for reflections upon one's own work a qualitative change of behaviour also can influence the outcome of the data.

Even during non-participating field observations the situation, strictly speaking, is influenced and changed by the mere fact that a non-participating actor is present. The observed person additionally can mislead the observer in that she/he acts in a different than normal manner, deletes certain otherwise accomplished activities or emphasises others. Furthermore, the subjective reason for an activity and its desired value

within the total organisational context can hardly be observed and would have to be obtained through questioning.

Despite these shortcomings, trained observers are far more effective in objectively obtaining data from nearly all observable activities than could be obtained through questionnaires. Within the framework of given categories the trained observer can do an excellent job of accomplishing a sufficiently dependable interpretation and even avoid self-created distortions in the investigation process.

6. A NEW METHOD TO CONDUCT EMPIRICAL ANALYSES.

The "ideal" methodological mix, however, would be a combination of the non-participating observer and the written questionnaire. This would permit collection of objective circumstances as well as their interpretation through the actor.¹⁸ In recent years I developed such a method that utilises the advantages of both the non-participating observation and the written questionnaire. The method was used several times with good results.

18. Nevertheless, the questionnaire - which by the way also includes the so-called diary method and the so-called self-observation process - despite its inherent serious shortcoming in comparison to the non-participating observer method was and is at almost all empirical functional analyses of activities conducted by personnel in management positions clearly the preferred method. That may be due to its economical resource requirements on the one hand, and on the other because particularly observations of such activities a priori require very detailed knowledge about the contents and characteristics of these activities which, in the final analysis, are supposed to be the actual results of the observation.

The problem of defining tasks of commanding officers beyond the available data of the "functions catalogues" was aided by a peculiarity of the Bundeswehr which it shares most probably with large civilian organisations and military organisations elsewhere. The individual tasks in almost all complex and hierarchical structures and the position description at various levels of the organisation have been clearly defined and described in a mass of regulations manuals, pamphlets, orders, and directives. If the soldiers actually accomplish all these prescribed tasks - which can at least be assumed of a military organisation that is built on and characterised by the principles of order, obedience, and discipline - then each of these tasks must result in one or more concrete and observable activities or behaviour, or in a "task accomplishment process". The listing of all such "ordered" tasks therefore must result in a list of contents and thereby also to the desired task objectives.

A thorough analysis of all relevant documents and regulations of the Bundeswehr in existence since 1956, supplemented by interviews with affected soldiers and lengthy observations in the field verified the assumption. Based on this, an exhaustive catalogue was developed containing about 600 characteristics which describe the task objectives of military superiors at hierarchical levels of boat and company commanders.

During the field observation, this task list serves as the most important indicator within the framework of non-participatory observation for the clearly defined and differentiating activities of the subject observed. Based on Kosiol's "characteristic factors for each task" other task dimensions such as "place of execution of the activities"; "length of time during which the activity is accomplished"; "persons with whom interfac-

ing takes place"; and "types of communication" (i.e., person to person, via telephone, etc.) are considered in obtaining a more accurate description of the activities. During the non-participating observation the given task dimensions are recorded. The result of the observations thus actually only consists of the verification of the given characteristics.

Within the framework of the written questionnaire the task characteristics serve as reference points, to which the observed subject themselves, their subordinates, and their superiors provide comments and opinions. A comparison of the task content data obtained through observation and questionnaires permits comparison of the self-evaluation by the subject with the evaluations of others within the organisations and if necessary, provides opportunity for relative adjustments.

Such a specific empirical instrument, totally focusing on the activities of military officers, places special demands upon the observers. When they identify and categorise the given characteristics that are to be observed during the behaviour process of the observed officer, the observers themselves must be familiar with the activities. They must be able to speak the military language and understand and interpret it. Therefore, in all up-to-now accomplished investigations only those observers were utilised who were familiar with the activities spectrum of those to be observed through previous personal experiences - naval commanders gathered data about the activities of naval commanders, former or still active company commanders observed company commanders, etc.

JÜRGEN KUHLMANN

As a rule, each observed subject was accompanied for one week and observed in the accomplishment of his tasks from morning until evening. All his activities were recorded.

Thorough training of the observer, detailed guidance and direction, as well as the fact that observer and observed shared the identical professional experiences ensured, that the otherwise typically expected distortions occurring through non-participating observations were avoided.

No arguments are known that question the high degree of validity, dependability, and objectivity of the research results of this method. The research expense is economical and justified. Officers themselves and their commanders concerned with the observations confirm that the research distracts only minimally from everyday activities.

The empirical findings reported in the following are based on field observations and interviews conducted in combat units of the Bundeswehr's Army and Navy.¹⁹

19. In the Navy three mine sweeper squadrons, three patrol boat squadrons, and the Navy's two submarine squadrons were investigated. 27 commanders were observed for a total of 120 work days while in port, in training at sea, and during manoeuvres. Questionnaires were answered by 235 naval officers, 320 non-commissioned officers, and 136 enlisted personnel of these squadrons. The Navy-Study was published 1986 under the title: J.Kuhlmann, "Zeithaushalte und Tätigkeitsprofile von Bootskommandanten der Bundesmarine - Eine empirische Studie" (Work Schedule and Job Profile of German Navy Boat Commanders - An Empirical Study), SOWI Report No. 42, Munich 1986. (Reviewed in Rivista Marittima, Rome 1989, pp. 23 by A. Brauzzi "Una ricerca di sociologia militare").

This Navy study was designed as a follow-up study to the project: Kuhlmann, J., "Einheitsführer-Studie. Eine empirische Analyse der Tätigkeiten von Kompa-

THE MILITARY OFFICER - PROFESSION OR JOB ?

Evidence concentrates on two core elements of the military officers' self-perception: Should officers really be viewed to be "leaders" in the social-psychological meaning of the word or are they rather superiors, formal heads that rely mainly on order and obedience? And how should one value those frequently expressed complaints that military officers are "overburdened" by superfluous paperwork ?

niechefs des Feldheeres in der Deutschen Bundeswehr" (Unit Commander Study. An Empirical Analysis of the Activities of Infantry Commanders), German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research, Reports vol. 16, Munich 1979. The Unit Commander Study is based on field observations in 39 infantry combat companies covering 100 work-days with a total of 1200 work-hours.

There are several more completed task analyses for various task areas within the Bundeswehr. In the non-commissioned officer positions these studies concentrate on the functions of squad leaders and platoon leaders and specialists in the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy. (Cf. Dillkofer, H., Klein, P., "Der Unteroffizier der Bundeswehr", German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research, Part I, vol. 18, Munich 1979; Part II, vol. 21, Munich 1981). The German Air Force utilized my method to analyse the activities conducted by its wing commanders. (Schwans, W., et.al., "Ausbildungsplanung und Curriculumentwicklung in den Streitkräften", Schriftenreihe Innere Führung, Reihe Ausbildung und Bildung, vol. 33, Bonn 1978). Several abbreviated descriptions permit an overview of major findings and their consequences. (Klein, P. (ed.), "Das strapazierte Rückgrat. Unteroffiziere der Bundeswehr", Baden-Baden 1983. Kuhlmann, J., "Zum Berufsbild des längerdienenden Soldaten in der Bundeswehr", in: Barth, P. (ed.), Die Bundeswehr in Staat und Gesellschaft, Munich 1982. Kuhlmann, J., "Probleme einer Führungskonzeption für die Bundeswehr - Anmerkungen aus sozialwissenschaftlicher Sicht", in: Truppenpraxis 1980, p.149 ff.).

7. THE MILITARY COMMANDER - HEAD AND LEADER ?

There is hardly any other human attribute that so often is cited to be an original military virtue as it is the case with leadership. But although social research on leadership issues has a long tradition (that actually came to a stop some years ago) there is at present no definition at hand convincing enough that all scholars could agree upon. That ambiguity is normal in social sciences and it helps the militaries to describe leadership "to come from one's heart: either you have it or you don't have it" - as one career officer stated lately.

The term "military leadership", however, stands actually for a number of tasks. First, it means directional power, the organisational responsibility and the ordering power for the subordinate soldiers. The military leader is the in-line-superior. Second, it indicates the military leader's job to train the soldiers. Equally in the handling of the weapon and its implements as well as in preparing the soldiers for the task which they should accept with "fighting spirit". Therefore, one expects expertise and competence of a military leader which should at least be equal to those to be trained, if not better.

In all these functions the military leader acts as a warden of the public employer, as an official authority. In doing this he holds the executive control. Using the instruments of order and obedience he carries out what preferably should be called "headship".

But this is not all. The more important task of a military leader is commonly seen in his ability to attract the formal subordinates even emotionally. According to German military regulations the military leader should

be an "example", have "good humane relationship with his (sic!) subordinates" and should "assure that his (sic!) soldiers can convey their requests - even the private ones".

It is useful to hold the term "leadership" only for this part of a superior's job. Leadership in this understanding can best be described as the willingness of the crew to internalise the values and norms of the commanding officer in absence of any other pressures. Leadership therefore is a matter of perception of the formal subordinates. Mostly those superiors are accepted to be a leader besides their headship functions who either really meet the needs of the people or at least make them believe that their needs are met.

To distinguish in this way between command and leadership is very important. First, as already pointed out, is an officer officially expected to be head and leader simultaneously. Second, he doesn't automatically become a leader when he is appointed to a certain position. He may for instance remain a "commander" only for the whole time of that special commitment without having even a chance to become accepted by the subordinates to be a leader as well. Third, leadership is a result of intensive and mutual processes of social interaction. Therefore it doesn't only depend on the officer alone whether he will accomplish both roles - head and leader. To a very great extent it depends on the perceptions of the subordinates. One may say that the subordinates by their behaviour decide whether an officer has become a leader or not. (In this sense the subordinates "elect" an officer to be a leader).

There is, after all, no doubt that military superiors are able to impose their will with the legal means at their disposal, primarily with orders. But in the light

JÜRGEN KUHLMANN

of empirical evidence it is less sure that they will be acknowledged as leaders by their subordinates.

In Army combat units commanding officers were observed for about 100 working days. Every occasion was registered where the officer either personally talked to his men or was as close to them that a face-to-face contact could be assumed. In the Navy questionnaires were used to evaluate the perceptions and opinions of commanding officers themselves, and of lower ranks.

The outcome of all these investigations during the last years have constantly been nearly the same: There is every indication that a close relationship between commanding officers and their subordinates are unlikely to occur. Since there is very little personal contact between the commanding officer and the crew, one could also raise the question about the Commanding Officer's credibility as an "educating authority".

Privates and NCO's say that they have very little opportunity to speak personally with the commander. Actually the Army study revealed that the commanding officer reached every soldier only once every four to five weeks for personal conversation. In general this talk lasted on the average only four minutes, and it mostly included official subjects but rarely private ones.

Privates and NCO's feel that the officers are not able to help them with work problems or with private concerns. Hence officers are not sought out for assistance when difficulties arise. Aboard submarines, for instance, only one out of ten sergeants would address the boat commander in case of private problems. But nine of ten commanders view themselves to be the sergeant's preferred problemsolver.

THE MILITARY OFFICER - PROFESSION OR JOB ?

This difference in mutual perceptions appears to be typical for the relations between commanding officers and the crew members both in the Army and the Navy: whereas commanding officers think that they are successful in leading the subordinates, most of the crew has a quite different perception. Privates and NCO's place greater trust in their own members than in the officers. They exhibit strong cohesion in their own ranks.

It appears that the soldiers learn about the commanding officer's orders and guidance especially from intermediate supervisors in the military hierarchy. The chain of communication (that is commander - officers - NCO's - sergeants - privates) seems well enough defined that (indirect and impersonal) leadership of the crew can be accomplished by intermediate supervisors.

The majority of the soldiers - one may conclude - see their commanding officer as mainly the training manager and disciplining superior. They most probably do not accept him to be their leader.

This situation holds even true aboard submarines. We know about the tight quarters and the proverbial bonding aboard submarines. Nevertheless, the findings in submarines are similar to those in larger infantry units.

The following hypothesis therefore seems reasonable: if leadership even aboard submarines is weak despite favourable conditions then increasing social distance between commanding officers and the lower ranks can be expected, the larger military units are.

8. THE MILITARY OFFICER: AN ADMINISTRATOR ?

Mass armed forces are bureaucratic organizations. This holds true for Germany and probably for other countries as well. And frankly, could we think of any other organizational model that promises to keep such an accumulation of manpower, of technical and financial means and of weapons effectively under control ?

However, this system has costs: The ideal type model of "legal power", formulated by Max Weber, is characterised by a number of principles, that normally will make an organization work in the desired way but which at the same time may be viewed to be troublesome to the individual. In fact, at the first sight, it is not very convincing why every event must be kept in records and files, why it has to follow prescribed legal procedures and why it always has to fall in a specific individual's competence.

It seems therefore understandable enough when soldiers complain, that interventions and impositions of administrative authorities often appear to serve more frequently their own interests rather than those of the military. In the Bundeswehr, for example, it is the task of the administration to "serve the duties of personal matters and to satisfy the needs of the armed forces". Consequently, the power of disposal over the financial resources, which is necessary to fulfill these tasks, is given to the administration and taken away from the soldiers. Thus interventions and control possibilities by the administration are almost constantly present to the soldier.

But to be fair, one should admit too that soldiers themselves tend to be often even more bureaucratic. Orders, regulations and instructions are often detailed

to such a degree that the individual soldier only has to react in the requested manner without even being expected to use his own brains. This organizational framework obviously reduces complexity and uncertainty but it also is in contradiction to the official "mission tactics" doctrine, which provides the objectives and leaves it up to the subordinate which decisions should be taken to achieve the goals (a kind of management by objectives, so to say).

Last but not least one should realise that restrictions of the bureaucratic model do not apply to military organizations alone. In this respect the military stands in line with organizations of similar size - not only in the public sector but equally in private business establishments.

Why then specially discuss bureaucracy in the military context as it appears to be concomitant to any large organization ?

There is some evidence that the stereotype of and hostility towards much administration in the military addresses a central concern of the soldier's self-image. Soldiers tend to perceive themselves to be men of action and of decision-making. In contrast, administrative norms and values set limits which as a rule tend to interfere with the freedom of quick decision-making and rapid action.

The above mentioned empirical studies in combat units of the German Army and Navy offered a unique chance to measure the real amount of administrative load in the commanding officer's daily work. All activities of the officers were recorded in terms of "task contents" and of "length of time required for an activity". The resulting time budgets include 220 working days of com-

JÜRGEN KUHLMANN

manding officers - all data collected by means of non-participating field observation.

The term "administrative load", however, needs to be defined before measuring. It has very little to do with the amount of time a commanding officer spends in his office or at a desk doing "paperwork".

The primary obligation of commanders of combat units, for example, is to train the soldiers for military action. Indeed they concentrate on this job and on assuring the combat readiness of the unit.

Roughly 70% of their time is dedicated to that purpose. But in garrisons and in similar situations, which cover the greatest deal of the year, commanding officers spend more than half of the time used for training purposes not in the place of training or in the field, but in the office, at the desk, in meetings. Here the officer decides and coordinates, he sorts out training plans and the like - simply because he would barely be able to overcome without the aid of the administrative personnel of the unit.

All this is paperwork - but it is not necessarily "bureaucratic load". It is a toll to be paid to the fact that armed forces nowadays are material-intensive as well as personal- and technical-intensive undertakings. Even the officer whose main duty is combat has to sit behind a desk. He wouldn't be able to accomplish his tasks without performing these unmilitary cores - as a traditional oriented officer might have said in "those good old times".

"Burdensome paperwork", that "nasty administration load" should on the other side only refer to activities of the commanders that are not really necessary to

THE MILITARY OFFICER - PROFESSION OR JOB ?

manage the combat unit. What is meant by that has to be decided upon in any single case, for any single activity of the officer concerned. To discriminate important administrative work from unessential paperwork, one therefore must have a lot of own experience in the officer's working field. As a matter of fact no general criteria can be given here how to measure superfluous administrative work. That depends to a great deal on the special situation and context of those forces to be investigated.

The empirical results for the German case present a convincing documentation that the actual bureaucratic burden is not as heavy as one might have guessed after all the complaints.

Commanding officers of infantry units as well as boat commanders were occupied with administrative duties for an average of 20% of their time on workday in their garrisons (in peacetime, of course). During manoeuvres the average of company commanders scored only 13%, that of naval commanders only 5%.

These results surely do not conclude that the soldiers are excessively burdened with administrative work. Commanding officers in the German combat troops are definitely not administrators.

These findings result from observations - that is to say from an empirical method that gives little way to the observed person to influence the result of the measurement. In the Navy-study we additionally asked the commanders by a questionnaire to evaluate their actual administration load. The aim was to contrast quasi objective data (gained by field-observation) with the individual perceptions of the officers concerned.

JÜRGEN KUHLMANN

The outcome was really surprising and striking. Only about 10% of the boat commanders reported scores which coincided with the results gained by observations. Submarine commanders by 30% hit the actual average score. The rest of the officers reported proportions of administrative work, that reached as much as 70% of the total time spent for the daily duties.

9. A PERCEPTION GAP: PROFESSIONAL IMAGE AND PROFESSIONAL REALITY OF MILITARY OFFICERS

The Commanding Officer of combat units in the Bundeswehr most probably is not a leader. And he is not an administrator either. This at least rules out the possibility that administrative responsibilities keep the officer from leading and training military personnel.²⁰ When evaluating themselves, most officers concerned have an entirely different point of view. They not only believe that they are burdened by a greater administrative responsibility than what was observed, but they also believe that they are the primary problemsolver and confidant for their crews.

The officer's assessments of their job are not consistent with our data nor with the crew's picture. In the day-to-day routine, military personnel officers as well as NCO's and lower ranks - apparently interpret their own role on the job differently from their closest work associates.

20. Cf. for similar arguments Kirkland, Faris R., Military Leadership: The Gap Between Policy and Praxis, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Washington, September 1989

THE MILITARY OFFICER - PROFESSION OR JOB ?

How should one explain these considerable contradictions between self-perception and reality? At this point, I think, almost necessarily the traditional image of the soldier comes into sight.

The "traditional" heroic soldier with its concerns of social cohesion, intimacy, and charisma finds professional fulfilment in himself, his weapon and in the field. They are, in accordance with these ideas, the real and most important soldier's duties: the core of their professional ideas are still the military tasks of combat action.²¹

It appears quite reasonable that the bureaucratic, rational and impersonal reality is experienced by the affected officers on the background of their own subjective scales: and these are - as a lot of empirical evidence shows - still more of that traditional type. One therefore may suppose that complaints about too much bureaucracy signal the difficulties of each of the affected, to identify themselves with the complex planning and decision making process of today's military.

These organizational processes show in accordance with the bureaucratic procedural rules - sphere of responsibility, recordkeeping, official channels, justice, etc. - throughout and desired civil service character. It seems understandable that traditional military values and norms are viewed to somehow getting lost. Where one can only determine his own position on a limited basis in the work and communication net, uneasiness and work dissatisfaction understandably increase.

21. Even though more than two thirds of soldiers would not be directly participating in fighting in case of war, but would have to take combat supporting tasks, which are often enough mainly of administrative character.

Whoever criticises the superiority of administrative needs - that is the conclusion - obviously let it be known that he himself feels pushed by civilian controls, which appears to him unjustifiably subordinate - not military like. Complaints about too much administration, in this view, is therefore not really commenting on specific bureaucratic procedures but expressing some vague annoyance about military duties that are believed not part of an officer's profession.

Explaining the perceptual gap concerning the leadership functions of officers traces the same pattern. Leading and developing subordinates is a very central component of the more traditional officer's understanding of his job. And officers responding from this position are helped by military regulations and the official phraseology which point in just this direction. So why shouldn't officers interpret their daily activities in terms of leadership when military regulations state that officers are performing "leadership" when dealing with their daily tasks ?

Having a high opinion of oneself as a "leader of his men" only shows the other side of the coin. Both the positive side (leadership that I do) and the negative aspect (bureaucratic work that I am forced to do) are overemphasised - frequently unconsciously - to put something in a more favourable light or find greater fault with something.

Obviously both phraseologies - the overburdening story as well as the leadership syndrome - have one in common: they are normative, prescriptive rather than descriptive. Whereas the bureaucracy argument discloses, how it should not be, the leadership is a wishful thinking as well. It tends to sum up central desirable virtues and qualities of military officers to

the effect that a pleasing catchword is a hand. In other words: leadership describes rather how officers want to be seen (by themselves and their surroundings) than it actually describes reality.

All these considerations and conclusions are not that leftish and revolutionary critical as they may appear at first glance. Sune Carlson, a Swedish scholar, already in 1951 pointed out, that executive managers in civilian enterprises consider typical elements of their daily work - as for example administrative work - as a real unpleasant burden. Although these elements turned up frequently and at regular intervals, managers nevertheless viewed them to be only temporary. Carlson evaluates this attitude a "pathological behavior". To his opinion the managers measured their daily activities by an extreme high level of aspiration thereby unavoidably scoring negative results and disappointments.²² Perceptions and realities - one may recognise relaxed - do not only fall apart in the officer's profession but do the same in civilian jobs.

The "perceptual gap", that is "between what the military hierarchy and leaders themselves perceive they ought to do, and what leaders actually do"²³ is not restricted to the Bundeswehr but obviously applies to services of other nations too. Charles Cotton, commenting on my empirical findings, made evident for the Canadian Armed Forces, that the traditional self-image

22. Sune Carlson, Executive Behavior. A Study of the Work Load and the Working Methods of Managing Directors, Stockholm 1951, p. 114.

23. Charles Cotton, Alternative Approaches to Continuity and Transformation in Military Organization; in: J. Kuhlmann (Ed.), Military and Society: The European Experience, op. cit., p. 436.

JÜRGEN KUHLMANN

of officers, "a subjective phenomenon in its essence, has, however, objective consequences in dissatisfaction, alienation, and selective disobedience. One finds the curious and paradoxical phenomenon within the military, which I ... (that is Charles Cotton)... term the 'beleaguered warrior syndrome'. This is the situation in which those members who are most dedicated to traditional norms and the combat subsystem become alienated from the system they nominally control. Increasingly they see themselves as 'surrounded' by civilians-in-uniform and bureaucratic controls at every turn".²⁴

24. Ibid., p. 438.

Jaromír Cvrcek

Professional Army and Professionalisation

With the creation of the pluralistic democracy of Czech and Slovak Federative Republic the question was raised of how to establish a small army, equipped with a defensive military doctrine sufficient to guarantee the sovereignty of our country. We have to take into consideration that there is already in existence an army of about 200,000 people which was once one of the main pillars of the former totalitarian regime.

When creating a new democratic professional army a choice was faced: whether to restructure the present army and its institutions, or to dismiss the army and start afresh. This question was resolved by the political transformation of our country, and now the task for us is the long-term principal restructuring of our army. The main points of this restructuring concern the changes in the command of the army, the abolition of the leadership task of Communist Party (CPC), prohibiting the activities of political parties within the Army, dismissing the political apparatus and the creation of a new apparatus of education and culture, appraisal and approval of officers currently serving.

The challenge of changing the Czechoslovak army derived from the fact that it is, relatively speaking, one of the largest in the world in terms of its military-participation ratio. It is envisaged that it will be cut to 140,000 and then to 70-50,000. This will be a defensive army; a component part of the process of creating a Europe without an arms race.

The strategy of professionalising the army should be located in a broader context. Modern weapons systems have already led to a decline in the effectiveness of mass armed forces. This shift to more professional forces has been accelerated by recent strategic changes and the move from a war deterrence society to a warless

PROFESSIONAL ARMY AND PROFESSIONALISATION

society, and even creates a situation in which the army could be seen as superfluous.

In this context, general military service is not viable and professionalism is the more appropriate military organisation. On the other hand, in questioning the need for a mass armed force and advocating a more professionalised structure, we cannot ignore or substitute the long-standing civic responsibility, obligation or even the right of every people in case of necessity to assist in the defence of his country with weapons. Thus, systems of homeguards, military defence, the systems of regularly trained reservists exist in countries with a fully professional army.

In considering how best to build a more professional army, we need to note that the number of professional soldiers in the Czechoslovak Army was in 1989 comprised 28% of the total number of soldiers. When the length of military service was reduced to 18 months this share increased to 32%. This means that if we reduce the length of military service to 12 months and when the scheme of "civic service" is in full operation, the percentage will exceed 50%. However, it should be emphasized that, even if this development in the Czechoslovak army takes place, it will be far from real professionalisation because the core of professionalisation is the replacement of military service-men by permanent employees.

In this sense, the present Czechoslovak army is far from being a small professional army. The first problem is that, superimposed on the relatively small number of combat troops, is a command structure situation comprising four divisions (division, army, district, general staff and Ministry of Defence) as "the professional" framework or kernel of a mass army. In these

JAROMIR CVRCEK

oversized, higher levels of the organisation structure which are more than sufficient for present and future needs, there is almost complete professionalisation (80-95%). At the level of combat troops, the percentage is somewhat lower (less than 80%). If we consider the level of professionalisation of soldiers at such levels as, e.g. platoon commander (57.9%), efficient regimental sergeant major (37%), we see at once where the weak point of our army lies. It is necessary to add that these figures refer to 1.1.1990. Since then, the situation changed significantly. It is interesting that public criticism of the army, the proposals to reduce its size, and resulting social uncertainty as well as unwillingness to serve in the army did not affect the higher staffs but had a serious impact on combat units. In some of these units, a number of young and well prepared officers and regimental sergeant majors submitted their applications to leave and to join the reserves while others solved the problem by not signing the new oath of allegiance. This departure of personnel leads to a deterioration in the working conditions of those who remain and it is difficult to suggest how to stop this negative process. There would be no need for the highly reliable army command, and the high quality staffs, if we do not also produce those "professionals" who translate operational commands and information into detailed military activities. This is a key problem of professionalisation. How can one man have such functions as, e.g. tank commanders by professionals, when the higher level functions which have been allocated for professionalisation cannot be filled by professional soldiers and are thus filled by national servicemen instead.

However, this is not the only problem posed by the professionalisation of our army. That is to say, it is hard to accept that our **present** professional soldier is

professional. Becoming an army employee does not necessarily mean that a person becomes a real professional. There is evidence which indicates that there are a number of long-standing problems in the professional structure of the army, e.g.:

- passivity and waiting for orders and instructions
- formalism, punitive controls, as driving mechanisms in the organisation
- autocratic decisions and minimal social participation
- careerism and suspicion of, or hostility towards, the ideas of subordinates
- decline of occupational identity and efforts to leave the service
- decline of perceived social prestige of the army.

The basis of military professionalism is that society considers that there is a social need for an effective social organisation of violence as the means of state politics. The military profession differs from the civilian ones first because of its role in the preparation for armed combat and the corresponding claims connected with this activity. Secondly, professionalism in the military arises in the actual conduct of the fight itself. In both stages special significance is attached to the quality of hierarchical relationships between superior and subordinate. However, the traditional model of the military professional role concerned with the preparation and conduct of war does not correspond with the actual action of officers. There are four main reasons for this situation. Firstly, the number of armies which actually take part in actual fighting has declined and thus their function is more or less one of potentiality. Secondly, there is a substantial differentiation of professional roles; in particular a separation of the direct command of soldiers from structure of support and services. Thirdly, there is a

strong "assimilation" with the civic professions in the sphere of support and services as well as in the sphere of direct command. Therefore there is a tendency to consider the military professional as a manager, teacher, educator, clerk, or technician in uniform and not at all as an armed fighter. Fourthly, the specific nature of military professionalism is determined by the historical context and equipment of the army and its place in society.

The proper functioning of an army, especially a small one, requires a brand new structure and skilled professionals equipped not only with technical and military knowledge but also increasingly with knowledge and experience in management. Our present commanders and chiefs are mainly amateurs in this field, not only because of lack of qualifications and deficient training and education, but also because this area was monopolised in the past by the political apparatus. The increasing demand for qualified management will be reinforced by the increased number of "professional" subordinates. Autocratic styles of management will decline as relations based on natural authority, co-operation and participation in decisions will be preferred.

Past and future differentiation of functions means that it will be hard to talk about an homogeneous military occupation. However, this means that professionalisation of the army consists in the creation of more and more types of professional roles. The content of these roles in a small, professional, deeply democratic army needs to be established in order to prepare officers for them. This is a difficult scientific task. Professionalisation involves more than recruitment and drilling; it requires effective performance of a professional role. Each role will have different requirements and career implications. Controversies concern-

PROFESSIONAL ARMY AND PROFESSIONALISATION

ing the question of whether the future military professional is going to be mainly a manager, technician, teacher, or educator will be probably resolved by establishing in the army corresponding proportions for each type of professional role. However, it is certain that as a result of new training programmes it will be easier to transfer personnel between the military and civilian professions.

The course of professionalisation process of our army will be determined in part by the actual conditions which have been created in Czechoslovakia today. The conversion of military doctrine, the whole reconstruction of the army, and the idea of professionalisation itself all result from the revolutionary process which started on November 17th, 1989. The army of a sovereign state which is also a pluralistic democracy, must significantly differ from its predecessor. Its new character must be reflected in significant changes concerning its relationships with the wider society, the new distribution of troops and garrisons, in the changes in the definition of the commander's authority, in the different quality of the army's internal relations, which must be characterised by being above party politics, high expertise, social partnership and new moral qualities based not only on the equitable evaluation and reward of work but also on professional military honour. For all these reasons the professional Czechoslovak Army should be formed as follows:

- On the basis of defensive military doctrine and newly created social army, it is necessary to determine in a new way the positions, roles and careers of professional soldiers.
- To design a new system of recruitment, selection and especially training of new military professionals. Besides high military expertise, technical knowledge and

JAROMIR CVRCEK

moral qualities, emphasis will also be placed on management ability, the ability to re-evaluate the system of promotion based on seniority, and to create a system that produces the skills required and leads to their effective implementation in the organisation.

- To establish new working conditions, motivation, systems of evaluation, pay and conditions of service. Serious consideration will have to be given to the fact that the new professionals will have to confront the question what is the need for an army and to build their personal development on the basis of their interest, skills and desire to serve honestly for the defence of their country. New systems of pay and conditions of service together with a new distribution of troops and staffs will raise questions about recruitment, training, selection and quality of future professionals which will require answers.

- A new system of command will be established inside the new professional structure. Instead of autocratic systems of command, relations of co-operation will be developed with wider participation, and more self-responsibility and autonomy. Professionalisation increases the problems of managing the army. Thus, it will be necessary to involve The Professional Soldiers Union and other organisations in order to create an effective means for the autonomous self-regulation of the profession.

In contemporary Czechoslovakia, the support of wider public opinion is an essential component in the creation of a prestigious professional army. The fundamental problem is finding young people who will be willing to join a long service army in the functions of platoon commanders, regimental sergeant majors or tank commanders. It is important that they will be willing to

PROFESSIONAL ARMY AND PROFESSIONALISATION

go through the appropriate training, to give up some civic rights, and not to be ashamed of wearing their uniforms in public. It is not possible to realise all these changes with the help of army powers alone. But it is true that the new army itself, especially the new professionals, must take prime responsibility for building the new prestige. However, in order to create such an army, the whole society must help in this process. The old heritage deeply rooted in the minds of ordinary people leads to mainly negative views about the army and these views represent the main obstacle for the foundation of new professional army. Such epithets as "parasite", "the brass", and "wooden head" are not likely to encourage high-quality men to join the new profession and to engage in genuinely professional service. Also the policies of some cities which seek to eliminate military garrisons, training grounds or airports will not help us to build a new army. Such negative views have been largely overcome in western countries a long time ago.

In brief, the construction of a new democratic, small but high quality professional army is the responsibility of the whole society starting with its president and ending with ordinary citizens. The mission of the army and especially of each professional is to serve society and even to lay down one's life for it as required by the oath of allegiance. If the army is to be an effective professional force, society should not neglect its responsibilities.

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MILITARY UNIONISM: THE ITALIAN SOLUTION, ITS PERSPECTIVES AND PROBLEMS.

Data discussed in this article come from a wider research published in Italy, in the volume "La Rappresentanza Militare in Italia", Roma, 1990.

C O N T E N T S

1. The Military Representative Bodies in Italy
2. The Ten Years Life Experience of the Military Representative
 - a. The Elections
 - b. The Composition of the Central Representative Council (COCER)
 - c. Topics Dealt with by the Representative
 - d. Focused Interviews to a Sample of COCER Members
3. The Opinions of the Base: Some Survey's Results
4. Problems and Perspectives

Bibliography

1. THE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE BODIES IN ITALY

In Italy the first public indication of the desire of military personnel to have some kind of representation of their professional interests - as had already occurred in some other European countries - was in the foundation of federations of retired men, at the end of the 1950's. Their activities spread, in the next decade, to men in service.

These initiatives, together with a shift of opinion within the Army, led to the presentation of two successive bills to the Italian Parliament in 1973.¹ A law emerged, dated July 11, 1978, No.382, which dealt with the new institution of military representative (articles 18, 19 and 20). A Regulation for the implementation of the Military Representative (RARM), was then published on January 12, 1980 and an internal regulation (RIRM) was delivered in 1985.

The representative bodies of the Italian military personnel are established as mandatory institutional bodies: they have the exclusive right of the representative function (any other form of union associating among military personnel is prohibited.² Even non-syndical associations between members of the armed forces need previous ministerial authorisation. Participation in the election of these representative bodies is mandatory and the election of members is recorded in the personal files of the soldiers, while the

1. One by the Christian Democratic Senator Ettore Spora, and the other by the Italian Social Movement (extreme right wing) Congressman Giuseppe Niccolai.

2. Just like the membership to union associations of civil professional categories.

administrative procedures and internal functioning are minutely checked by regulations (particularly by RARM).

The representative bodies are divided into three levels: basic, intermediate and central (see table 1.). The basic level comprises collegiate boards called COBAR (Basic Representative Councils), one for each military unit (battalion level) or equivalent body. They include the representatives of all categories of military personnel, both professionals and conscripts.


The intermediate level comprises collegiate boards called COIRs (Intermediate Representative Councils), one for each military regional area or equivalent extent, which have jurisdiction over a very different number of COBARs. The central level is formed by only one superior body, the COCER (Central Representative Council). They both include representatives of all classes of personnel:

- A -- Regular officers
- B -- NCOs
- C -- Long term volunteer and military cadets
- D -- Reserve officers in draft service
- E -- Rank and file draftees.

The horizontal level divisions are crossed by five vertical divisions, which refer to the five forces and armed corps of the State to which the representative system is applied. These divisions remain inside the COCER (different sections), but the central council deliberates unitedly.

The Italian representative bodies are elective: the elections occur according to category and they are stepped according to the different levels. That is to say that each personnel's category elects, by means of a primary election, within the limits of the single

TABLE 1
The Military Representative System Composition in Italy



* Italian Army corps which is also a police force

military unit, its representatives in the COBAR; in turn the elected members, according to their own category, choose, by means of a secondary election, the members of the COIR of the military region to which they belong. Delegates of the COIRs throughout Italy choose among themselves the members to send to the COCER, by means of a third election.

The law gives real proposal power (but not bargaining power) of a syndical type only to the COCER, which may be heard by the Joint Chief of Staff, and, by observing certain procedures, by the Defense Minister and by the Parliament. The other two levels (COBAR and COIR) have a proposal and stimulating function towards the central council and some suggestion powers towards unity commander or military region commander. Delegates must anyway carry on their service task.

Table 2 shows the representativeness of the central council.

2. THE TEN YEARS LIFE EXPERIENCE OF THE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE.

a. The elections.


By considering electoral trends in the period 1980-90 concerning the basic level (the only one where a universal vote is provided), a high turn-out of voters is evident at the beginning (more than 95%). When correlated with this percentage it tends to decrease in subsequent elections (see Tab. 3). When correlated with the blank and void votes trends (see Tab. 4) the analysis reveals a degree of disaffection towards the representative institution. This disaffection appears to be greater for career personnel.

TABLE 2
COCER: Representativeness rate
for classes (x 100.000)

Classes	Army	Navy	Air Force	Carabinieri	Customs Guard	Average
Officers (A)	38	48	63	137	127	58
NCOs (B)	7	16	15	40	24	19
Volunteers (C)	124	72	173	18	19	25
Reserve Officers (D)	65	177	158	469	524	113
Rank and file (E)	1	9	8	17	-	4

TABLE 3

Percentage of voters for classes




- 156 -

GIUSEPPE CAFORIO/MARINA NUCCIARI

TABLE 4

Percentage of blank and void votes for classes



- 157 -

MILITARY UNIONISM: THE ITALIAN SOLUTION

On closer examination, the voters percentages graphs' trends together with blank/void vote percentages reveal a trend of greatest disaffection in the second general elections of 1982.³

When these data are placed in the context of the meetings of the Military Representative Bodies, a number of hypotheses can be suggested. First of all, it appears especially from the proceedings of the first level bodies - that many units' commanders had an early negative reaction towards the new institution. A second cause of the phenomenon -revealed also by some articles published on the internal military press- seems to be the gap between the level of expectations held by military personnel about the new institution and the actual results obtained in the first biennium.

The first point was given serious consideration by the military hierarchy and by the Minister of Defense himself. Both of them, in fact, invited commanders -through many internal circular letters- to consult and involve representative bodies. This direction seems to have obtained some effect on both the participation in subsequent elections and the void and blank vote percentages. This last phenomenon, in fact, tends to reduce by a few percentage points, without, however, returning to its early level.

The phenomenon of disaffection as such is more relevant for career personnel, NCOs and long-term volunteers in particular.

3. Delegates elections occur every two years -every three since 1990- for all categories of personnel (general elections), and every six months for the draft personnel representatives.

b. The composition of the Central Representative Council (COCER).

A statistical survey of personal data of the Central Representative Council members along the five mandates provides an ideal-type of the COCER delegate for each class. The typical delegate of regular officers comes from the South of Italy, is of medium rank (from captain to lieutenant colonel), does not seem to belong to the most motivated officers' group, is in the upper age range for his rank, has a level of civilian education which is higher than the average of the class, and is married. The typical NCOs' COCER delegate shows similar traits, but with an important difference: he does not seem to come from the fringes of his class.

The above findings confirm the data stemming from a previous and more detailed study conducted on intermediate representative councils (COIRs) for the first mandate -1980- (see Caforio 1984). From those data it appeared that "the unionist officer belongs preferably to two different hierarchical and generation levels: the first, lieutenant-colonel (38% of the total) over 46 years of age, already evaluated at least once for the next rank and not promoted; dedicated more to civil studies than to military ones (high percentage of members with degrees - 26%; low percentage of officer with a diploma of the Staff College - 6,6%), with a southern birth location. The second is a captain (40% of the total), over 31 years of age, belonging to the limited career category or the detained reserve; he is also markedly from the centre-south, and more likely to have a secondary high school diploma. These two typologies have a certain 'social-marginality' dimension in common: the lieutenant-colonel is marginal because, being older, he stagnates at a rank and pay level which is much lower than that of other people of the same age

employed in other sectors of public administration. The captain also often occupies a marginal role, due either to having less security in his position or for lack of future opportunities. On the whole, it is interesting to point out that the representative institution hasn't been assimilated by the professionally more highly motivated officers' group, with better career prospects.

The unionised non-commissioned officers show somewhat opposed characteristics compared to those of the officers...."the most interesting observation is that the NCOs seem to have employed their best men in the Military Representative Bodies."

The long-term volunteer COCER delegate is characterised by two profiles according to whether he belongs to a police force or to a true armed force.⁴ In fact, as the first reveals a profile quite similar to that of the NCOs delegate, the second is nearer the ideal-type of the rank and file delegate. However the latter has a lower level of civilian education.

Draft delegates (reserve officers and rank and file) are concentrated, of course, in the lower age-classes (under 30), are mainly unmarried, and they show a level of civilian education greatly higher than that of their electorate (for rank and file delegate, 51% of graduate versus 5,5% of their base). As far as job performed is concerned, operational jobs appear to be under-represented, especially for the professional classes.

4. In Italy there are three Corps with police functions structured in a military way: for two of them, Carabinieri and Customs Guard, representative function is included in that of true Armed Forces. The third, the Warders Corps, has on the contrary a separated representative body.

In contrast technical and logistical jobs are highly overrepresented. By considering the trend along the five mandates we can see that, in the past, these figures of under- and over-representation were even greater.

By considering the COCER composition and its changes along the mandates, a noticeable turnover of delegates is evident, so that many of them did not succeed in ending their term of office, notwithstanding its short length (two years until 1989, three years since 1990). A relevant turnover can be found also among COCER chairmen: in fact, three of the four already expired terms of office saw a change of three chairmen during the biennium. Of six substitutions which occurred, four are due to voluntary resignation, and two of them are explicitly motivated by the impossibility of carry out the function of chairman while continuing to perform service duties.

Another phenomenon revealed by the analysis of COCER composition over time is a trend towards a professionalization of the representative function. In fact, despite a prohibition of immediately re-election, there is a tendency to alternate the reiteration of the charge: in some classes in particular we have found a reiteration rate of 50%.

c. Topics dealt with by the Representative.

An analysis of the proceedings of COCER meetings along the various mandates shows that the following topics were discussed. They are listed in their rank order of importance:

- remuneration
- legal status
- norms on Military Representative
- moral and legal protection
- social security service
- lodging
- socio-cultural promotion
- health service.

If we consider the topics dealt with by draft delegates, we can see some meaningful differences in the rank order. As a matter of fact they placed first "moral and legal protection", with "norms on Military Representative" second, while "remuneration" drops to fourth place.

d. Focused interviews to a sample of COCER members.

The survey consisted of structured interviews, including open as well as closed questions, orally administered by an interviewer. The sample comprised 16% of the COCER delegates. The most significant findings of the interviews are described in the following.

Mutual agreement between standing delegates and possible candidates for the following election appears to be quite widespread as a mean of cooptation among people of the same ideological view.

The true electoral system is considered adequate to meet representative needs; some respondents propose in any case to adopt a universal suffrage for the elections at all levels. Despite the fact that the majority of COCER delegates asserts that the military hierarchy usually gives some facilities to perform their representative duties, a number of them report the difficulties in gathering information and documentation, in communicating with the base, in having enough available time.

Most of the interviewees consider that expertise and competence of COCER members are rather low. The main claims concern a lack of knowledge of laws and procedures, a poor understanding of role content together with poor links with the base. In order to meet these needs, the main suggestions are:

- training and information seminars for newly-elected members,
- creation of a specific studies and documentation bureau,
- possibility to be immediately re-elected,
- increase in the length of the term of office,^b
- representative function as a sole job for delegates.

The overall judgement on the representative function in the decade 1980-89 is generally one of inadequacy. The main reasons for this are viewed as the members inexperience and in the military hierarchy's lack of interest (or even hostility). Some negative influence was exerted also by normative constraints and by a lack of political and mass media attention. Nevertheless COCER

5. This goal has been reached in 1990, and now the term of office covers three years (for COCER only).

delegates think they have achieved some important goals in the following areas:

- remuneration,
- legal status,
- norms on Military Representative,
- importance of an enduring presence,
- moral and legal protection.

Among the various and most far reaching actions performed to obtain these results the majority of interviewed indicate:

1. meetings with Minister of Defense,
2. meetings with Parliamentary committee,
3. diffusion of problems and proposals through the press.

Moreover, the laws governing military representatives are generally considered to be inadequate and need substantial improvement.

The military representative bodies are conceived by a majority of the interviewees as a means offered to military personnel to improve the institution and to protect their own interests - two different roles perceived as one. Only 15% identify representative bodies as a true military union.

The above claim about the lack of media attention is confirmed by the answers to a specific question, where the attention paid by mass media to this topic is judged to be inadequate.

A related inquiry that we conducted on the Italian daily press from 1984 to 1989 shows a low attention degree on the matter, which ranges from a minimum of 0,9 article per month to a maximum of 4 articles per month, with a mean value of 1,8.

Another finding of this inquiry concerns the distribution between national and regional newspapers: the latter provide 68% of articles, most of them being issued in Rome. This fact is clearly related to the town where the COCER has its seat.

3. THE OPINIONS OF THE BASE: SOME SURVEY'S RESULTS.

The survey was conducted in 1990 through a structured postal questionnaire sent to a random sample, representative of the military personnel belonging to all ranks for the three armed forces. 3992 questionnaires were sent and 2175 were processed. The questionnaire comprised 53 questions, of which only 3 were open-ended; it covered the following areas:

- electoral behaviour,
- opinions and judgements over the representative bodies and its functioning,
- evaluations of the actions of representative bodies,
- propensity to unionization,
- opinions concerning suggested normative changes,
- sample statistical data.

Answers related to the electoral behaviour confirmed what has been already expressed in par. 2.a.

With regard to the second area, the evaluation of the representative system in Italy appears to be generally uncertain: a high percentage (54%) judges it partially adequate, while the 20% thinks it partially inadequate. The actions performed by the representative bodies along the decade are not considered as fulfilling the needs of personnel by 59%. This negative evaluation is stronger among officers (67%) and NCOs (64%) (see Tab.20). A more detailed analysis of the reasons for

such a negative evaluation reveals that the most important is the lack of expertise and experience of delegates. In second place is the lack of interest of military hierarchy; third, the lack of interest of politicians. In particular, officers also claim the military leadership is hostile. As for the importance given by respondents to the topics dealt with by representative bodies, the scaling is as follows:

1. norms on Military Representative,
2. legal status,
3. remuneration,
4. health service,
5. social security service,
6. moral and legal protection,
7. socio-cultural promotion,
8. lodging.

The scaling of the degree of satisfaction about the effective protection of the above mentioned topics is quite different from the scaling of the importance, especially for remuneration, which is here only at the fifth level.

With regard to the opinions about the actions of representative bodies, it must be said that notwithstanding the generalised dissatisfaction, the large majority of respondents (73%) thinks that the representative bodies are the best way to solve the personnel's problems. A relative minority (22%) thinks that such problems should be solved through the hierarchy and only 5% would turn to political parties or trade unions. The most effective actions performed by the representative bodies are considered to be meetings with the Parliamentary committees and with the Minister of Defence. Besides, we noticed a sharp polarisation of opinions concerning the effect of using the press in order to raise and debate problems and proposals: 41% judged

this course of action to be useful against the 51% thinking it not to be useful. With respect to the actions which should be performed in the future, respondents show the following scale of preference:

1. meetings with Parliamentary committees,
2. diffusion through the press of claims and proposals,
3. sharper and more effective actions of the representative bodies,
4. stronger cooperation with the hierarchy,
5. more frequent meetings with the Minister of Defence,
6. deeper and wider base involvement.

With regard to the fourth area, the majority of respondents (61%) is against unionization of the military: the greatest hostility is shown by career officers, while those more favourable to unionization are NCOs (18% of "yes" and 26% of "probably yes").

Among those who are in favour of unionization, a substantial number favours a specific union for military personnel (23% for a strictly military union and 11% for a trade union specifically oriented towards military personnel). In addition, it is important to note the percentage of respondents who would join the civilian trade unions (19%). If we disaggregate for classes, we notice that the professional classes are more oriented towards a specific military union, while draft classes show a preference for civilian trade unions. An analysis of the conditional frequencies of the COBAR members in comparison with the base of respondents does not reveal substantial opinion differences about military unionization.

With regard to suggested normative changes, those proposed were:

1. to give to the COCER a bargaining power,
2. possibility for delegates to be immediately re-elected,
3. free relations COCER-press,
4. distinct representative function by classes or categories (professional vs. draft).

The first proposal is approved by 91% of respondents; the second is seen favourably by 73%. As mentioned above, concerning free relationships with the press, there is a sharp division between 58% favourable and 42% of unfavourable. The percentage is similar to that reporting the information given by media to be inadequate. As to the fourth proposal, a large majority is favourable to a distinct representative: most in favour are officers.

The prevailing orientation towards a distinct representative has encouraged us to search for meaningful differences between career personnel and draft personnel. These differences are shown in Tab. 5. Among them we can stress a greater fear by career personnel that representative action could endanger the public image of the military and its internal discipline. On the other side, draft personnel are more inclined to consider the representative bodies as military unions and to distinguish the representative function by categories; besides it is also less satisfied with the level of internal information on representative matters.

TABLE 5

COMPARISON OF OPINIONS BETWEEN CAREER PERSONNEL AND DRAFT PERSONNEL

(percentage computed over each subsample)

	Career personnel	Draft personnel
Representative Bodies cooperate with	13.1	9.1
Representative Bodies are a military union	4.4	8.0
Representative Bodies are adequate to the function	67.4	63.3
R.B. actions seen as: Rightly incisive	20.5	16.3
Dangerous for Armed Forces image	5.0	2.7
Dangerous for inside discipline	4.5	2.4
Rather satisfied with information on representative matters given to the base	58.6	47.7
Preference for a distinct representative function	66.9	73.4
Bargaining functions given to COCER separately for career and draft personnel	34.4	43.3

4. PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES.

The research on the Military Representative Bodies in Italy reveals a substantial dissatisfaction with the structure and functioning of this institution; this dissatisfaction is shared, although for different reasons, by all those involved. The military leadership is dissatisfied as has been explicitly stated by a General Chief of Staff.⁶

Dissatisfied are both COCER delegates⁷ and peripheral delegates⁸ as well as the base of military personnel,⁹

6. See for instance the statement by a General Chief of Staff at a hearing to the Deputy Chamber, 27.7.1988: "Nobody more than you, members of the Commission, could have realized the dissatisfaction for the obtained results of the ten years of activity of the Military Representative... This frustration does exist and it is shared by the hierarchy, because the Representative effects have not been so relevant nor adequate to expectations."

7. Such feelings have been expressed by the COCER on many occasions. Lastly, on 23.5.1990, the COCER Chairman, in a Lecture at the Defense High Studies Centre, expressed his threefold dissatisfaction, for the regulations in force, for the Representative structure, and for the relationships with the hierarchy.

8. Where, for instance, statements like the following can be found: "...we felt it necessary to denounce through this document the whole 'B' class of the RMTE (Military Region of Emily and Tuscany) distrust for the non-existent information flow COCER-COIR-COBAR", and, thereafter: "Again, RMTE NCOs' representatives cannot but recognize that after ten years since the institution of the Military Representative Body, the feeling remains as though such bodies would not be completely functioning yet." (Annex to the Resolution no. 7/1990 by RMTE COIR).

9. The military personnel standpoint reveals in fact a critical attitude, noticed both directly -through an opinion poll done by the authors- and undi-

either for the paucity of clear effects and for the lack of internal information. Finally, Parliament is dissatisfied.

In the wake of these dissatisfactions tensions have emerged in the various components of the representative function. A number of law-suits between the military leadership and the Central Representative Council arose and these have increased over time. Since the beginning both sides have appeared to perform the roles of party and counter-party in supporting the interests of the military personnel. These roles are not firmly based in law and are also inconsistent with the logic of the situation. Military Representative requests normally require an intervention of the political power at the central level in its twofold role of executive and legislative power holder.

The dissatisfaction reported on above was manifested in:

- a) the various electoral trends;
- b) the partial disengagement of the leading class elite of armed forces - career officers - from an active participation in the Representative system;
- c) the frequent resignations of COCER members and of its prestigious and high-ranking chairmen in particular.

rectly -through the electoral behavior-. Analysing the electoral behavior, the rise in blank and void vote percentages after the first election seems to express, using the words of the Minister of Defense in office at that time: "a symptom signalling that the electorate accepts (or undergoes) the election in principle, but questions (or refuses) the adopted mechanism for the representative".

Looking at the disfunctional aspects documented and analysed in our research, the question arises, as to the kind of interests that the Military Representative should protect. First of all there is a problem of dichotomization between career personnel and draft personnel, and this is also evident from some objective differences, such as a different ranking of importance assigned to the topics dealt with by Military Representative, different electoral behaviour (especially as far as the 'protest vote' is concerned), the necessary difference in the term of office, and a substantial difference in the delegate ideal type.

Such a dichotomy had been already pointed out, anyway, by the hierarchy in official statements such as: "The problems of the draft personnel, as far as they relate to performances asked by the State to citizens, cannot be solved within the Representative Body internal to the military institution", or considering as dysfunctional "An improper evaluation of the draft problems" ... which has driven "to consider personnel in draft service in the same way as career personnel".¹⁰

Secondly, the research has provided evidence concerning vertical differences between interests and protection procedures of armed forces on the one side and armed corps on the other (such as Carabinieri and Customs Guards, but also Warders, as long as they maintain their military status).

Thirdly, the research has also revealed an internal, even though less sharp, segmentation among career personnel (officers, NCOs, long-term voluntary personnel).

10. General Chief of Staff Hearing at the Deputy Chamber, 27.2.1988

Another dysfunctional factor stemming from our research is concerned with the controversial nature and structure of Military Representative. These aspects pertain mainly to the COCER, owing to the peculiar relevance of the Central Council in comparison with that of peripheral levels, both basic and intermediate.

Two different positions on the nature of the COCER are in fact confronting each other: one considers the Central Council (and even the Representative as a whole) as a body internal to military institution, keeping the hierarchy as its privileged reference; the other, on the contrary, considers the COCER as a body fulfilling a representative function for the hierarchy itself and keeping the power to have immediate and autonomous external relationships (with the government, the press). As far as the structure of COCER is concerned, a disproportionate rate for the various classes, armed forces and armed corps -and even within some specific class- is confirmed by statistical findings.

A third dysfunctional factor revealed by our research refers to the difficulty encountered by delegates in accumulating a fount of experience and knowledge relevant to the function: this is particularly evident for the Central Council, where the complex and wide scope of the topics should require specific cultural resources and political abilities which cannot be improvised. The phenomenon is actually consistent with the regulations in force up until 1990: these in fact contained (and currently contain) several limitations to the accumulation of experience and knowledge in the domain of the representative function, such as the prohibition to immediate re-eligibility of delegates, and the short term of office (meanwhile prolonged).

At a more general level, and considering the problem of military representation in the framework of labour relationships in Italy, we could say,¹¹ as is also maintained by other European scholars,¹² that the display of vested interests by military professionals can be framed in the more general process of unionisation of social groups until recent decades untouched by collective forms of action in defence of group interests.

It can be said, moreover, that in Italy the historical process leading to some forms of interest protection for military personnel began, as in other European countries, with the acquiring of representative functions and responsibilities by already existing or created ad hoc military personnel associations. Such a process in Italy has been prevented and stopped at the political level by the adoption of a body of norms in-

11. For the 'white-collars' unionization process, see, among others, J. Kocka, *White Collar Workers in America, 1890-1940: A Social-political History in International Perspective*, Sage, London, 1980; A. Prezworki and M. Wallerstein, *The Structure of Class Conflict in Democratic Capitalist Societies*, in "American Political Science Review", LXXVI, 1982, n. 2, pp. 215-38; B. Elliot, F. Bechhofer, D. McCrone and S. Black, *Bourgeois Social Movements in Britain: Repertoires and Responses*, in "Sociological Review", XXX, 1982, n. 1, pp. 71-96; L. Boltanski, *Les cadres: la formation d'un groupe social*, Les Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1982; R. Crompton, *Approaches to the Study of White-Collar Unionism*, in "Sociology", X, n. 3, pp. 407-28; and, for Italy in particular, A. Accornero, *La terziarizzazione del conflitto e i suoi effetti*, in G.P. Cella and M. Regini (eds.), *Il conflitto industriale in Italia*, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1985; A. Pizzorno, *Il sistema pluralistico di rappresentanza*, in S. Berger (ed.), *L'organizzazione degli interessi nell'Europa Occidentale*, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1983, pp. 351-413.

12. See Manigart, 1984.

roducing a representative form which have not spontaneously matured in the different groups' milieus. The natural bipolar clash between employer and employee has been actually replaced by a tripolarity, which has led to an increase in conflicts (confirmed by the law-suits which occurred in the decade between COCER and Defence Administration) and to a confusion of roles.

This evaluation has been recognised also at the political level, when, for instance, a Senate member said that "the Law No. 382 of 1978 appears to be the output of a compromise between progressive and conservative issues. As in every compromising solution, however, that law has revealed since the beginning some not completely clear aspects".¹³ The same opinion is expressed also by the better documented daily press.¹⁴

It must be said that the structure given to the Military Representative according to the Law 382/1978 to the RARM, while considering it an internal body of military institution, gives to the Central Council a number of powers which no doubt have some external relevance (the possibility of presenting to the Minister and to Parliamentary Commissions); this fact can intrinsically produce -and it has actually produced- conflicting situations with the senior ranks of the military hierarchy.

To conclude, and also to open some perspectives leading to the solution of the envisaged problems, it must be

13. Sen. Luigi Poli, in 'Atti della Commissione Difesa del Senato' (Senate Defense Commission Proceedings), 20.12.1988.

14. See, for instance, the article "L'ufficiale chiede rispetto" (The Officer claims for respect), "Il Sole-24 Ore", March 8th, 1990.

said that the actual representative opportunities of military personnel interests today are of only two kinds: those which are actually existing in other countries similar to Italy, and those which actually represent the historical experience of the European continent.

The first kind is a representative function performed exclusively by the military hierarchy, to which the ruling class allocates adequate powers and means. So it seems to be the case for USA, Great Britain and France.

The second kind fully recognises a unionist function of elected delegates of the various classes of military personnel, giving them the necessary powers and juridical relevance. This is the case of Scandinavian countries, FRG, The Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Austria. The choice between the two kinds is basically a political choice, which the social scientist can inform by providing only and above all, a contribution of knowledge.

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Rut Clara Diamint

THE MILITARIZATION OF ARGENTINIAN POLITICAL CULTURE:

THE WORSHIP OF SAN MARTIN

C O N T E N T S

Emergence of the San Martín Myth

Social Construction of San Martín Myth

The Army Performing the Role of
Nationalism's Social Actor

Instruments of San Martín Worship:
School and Military Service

Nationalism's Ideological Success

Peronism and the Year of San Martín

Military Legacy of the Worship of
San Martín

EMERGENCE OF THE ST. MARTIN MYTH

Argentine society entered the XX century proud of a strong liberal modernism and the promise of social progress. However, this promising future was confronted with the realities of demands to broaden political participation from the lower sectors of society, unrest from labour unions; the massive influx of immigrants and the spread of socialist principles amongst the population. Sectors of the leading elites together with groups within Army and catholic interests, responded to these challenges by focusing on nationalism, characterised by an emphatic anti-liberalism; a strong integralism and a view of society couched in terms of hierarchy, order and respect for tradition.

Nationalism was intended to correct liberalism deviations in a context where the conservative sectors had lost control of the political game which was now regulated by electoral market laws. The core of nationalist ideas comprised a fight against free thinking in the basic sectors of society: the church and the military. Anything that did not obey such nationalist precepts was considered anti-patriotic, or anti-national. In order to popularise these nationalist values and paternalist systems of authority, a source of legitimacy was required; this was found in the father figure of the country and the creation of a General San Martín.

The foundations of the San Martín myth were laid from 1908 onwards through the works of intellectuals and politicians such as Ricardo Rojas, Leopoldo Lugones later, by Julio Irazusta, Joaquín V. González, by numerous members of the military, the Church and the education system. By 1943, the San Martín image had grown into a ritual: the worship of San Martín. In 1950, as a result of a vigorous campaign, focusing on

the celebration of the hero's hundredth anniversary this hero worship was formalised. Many years later, it would enter the discourse of all military attempts to regenerate society and, today it constitutes a basic myth at the heart of national education and Argentine political culture.

The image of social progress fostered by politicians of the 1880s as the driving force of social life, turned into a menace for the elites. Desires for colonisation expressed since the middle of the XIX century became a nightmare years later. Political society started to withdraw from liberalism, became intolerant and responded to complex social, political and cultural changes with racist, anti-democratic and anti-jewish attitudes, thus giving birth to a new form of xenophobia. Ricardo Rojas echoes this frame of mind in *The Nationalistic Restoration*, wondering:

"Argentine? - what are its origins and what is its destiny? - it is good to know the answers to these questions. Before the answers fill us with embarrassment, let's hasten and temper anew the Argentine fibre and endow its traditional core with vigour. Let's not tempt death any further, in our cosmopolitanism with no History and our school with no Patria."¹

1. Ricardo Rojas, *La Restauración Nacionalista*, Buenos Aires, Peña Lillo editor, p. 107. We don't translate the word "Patria" because the English word "Fatherland" doesn't have the meaning given by Spanish and French tradition, neither by the German word "Volkgeist", in the sense pointed out by Alain Finkielkraut, *La derrota del pensamiento*, Anagrama, Barcelona, 1988.

Fear of the foreigner spreads amongst the Argentine political oligarchy. Consequently, there is a greater emphasis on the meaningfulness of the native. A national civic consciousness was cultivated, stemming from the figure of San Martín. Sociologist Dario Cantón warned on the effects of such an **official history**:

"Now, the lesson of San Martín's life, in the eyes of the most common official ideology statements, used in homages, anniversaries and school celebrations, as well as repeated in innumerable papers and books, is that San Martín was a successful general who, for the sake of patriotism, chose to give up everything rather than get involved in civil wars, or become the nation's strong man. What I now wish to point out is the persuasive effect that such a figure, can exert on those who are educated to be his disciples, carrying an already constructed and popular mythology".²

National states need to rely on a system of beliefs that provide a set of ideals for its citizens. A set of symbols, rites, ideas and traditions allow continuity whereby each nation can recognise a common history that gives it a distinct identity in international relations. Within this context, the San Martín myth functions as a legitimation of the national state and nationalist political strategies.³

2. Darío Cantón, *Notas sobre las Fuerzas Armadas Argentinas*, en T. Di Tella y T. Halperín Donghi, *Los Fragmentos del Poder*, Ed. Jorge Álvarez, Buenos Aires, 1969, p. 363.

3. See Jean Pierre Sireneau, *El retorno del mito y lo imaginario socio-político*, mimeo, México, 1974; en Langer Marie, *Fantasías eternas a la luz del Psicoanálisis*, Buenos Aires, Hormé, 1966; en García Pelayo, Manuel, *Los mitos políticos*, Ed. Alianza - Universidad, Madrid 1981, Herman Heller, op.cit.

The country's political elites gradually became aware of the need to legitimise their power through the control of ideas and to integrate the different nationalities under their hegemony, they fostered the creation of a civic culture. In the XXth century, nationalism is closely related to the problems of order and change together with attempts to freeze authority relations between dominant and subordinate groups through an emphasis on a mythical social unity of the past. Following Hegel's ideas, as revised by Weber, the State provides cohesion through a combination of market interests as well as the norms and conventions that mould civilian society.

The official version of national history stated that the nation had been created by liberal groups, who had succeeded in transforming it into a modern state. "The culminating moment of Argentine history was then, the founding of nationality by the liberal groups, and the consolidation of independence with General San Martín's effort".⁴ For these founders of the nation regional and movements centred on political bosses from 1820, until the fall of Rosas at Caseros, constituted a deviation from national history. From its exile position, the true liberal tradition had been building an institutional frame that would lead to the flourishing of the country.

As a result of the crisis of oligarchic democracy another kind of history was constructed, a nationalistic one and not the history of the liberal republic. San Martín was the only hero that could provide a focus of legitimacy for both histories.

4. Carlos Smith, *Los deberes morales del oficial y las grandes escuelas del carácter de San Martín y Belgrano*. Bs. As., Circulo Militar, 1927.

As a San Martín National Institute historian put it: "That is why San Martín rather than being the 'hero of the sword' that we already worship at military level, is a model of wisdom and spotless civic virtue and a creator of useful men for the Nation. Argentiniens should take from him the flesh, bones and soul of nationality."⁵

By emulating, and following a behaviour attributed to San Martín, the decadence introduced into the Argentine soul by liberalism and positivism, could be removed. Thus in face of the urban rabble, and fueled by news of communist revolts in Berlin and Munich, bloody fighting in Russia and the fall of the great monarchies in Europe, the Mexican revolution, reports of frenzied crowds taking revenge on their previous rulers, the response was to purify the national spirit.

Intellectuals and politicians admired the new trends of thought and, in many cases, through their continuous visits to Europe could be in direct contact with them as, for instance, with the militant catholicism of "L'Action Française" of Charles Maurras representing the French counter-revolutionary ideas of Burke and De Maistre. Democracy was considered as a kind of anarchy that led to classes fighting amongst themselves rather than a form of government. The struggle for nationality entailed an attack against the levelling effects of democracy, which undermined the natural social hierarchy. Such views were held by the men who carried out the 1930 revolution. As Uriburu said:

"We'd rather talk about republican principles than democratic ones, since that is the term used in capital

5. Alberto Daniel Faleroni, "Una Lección de moral en la historia de José de San Martín", en *Revista San Martín* No. 11, 1946, p. 74.

letters by the Constitution, and whereas democracy in capital letters has no meaning for us."⁶

Chaotic administration would be solved through an alliance between officers and the national intellectual group which made up the best a political elite. They argued that the rules of social life could only be restored by defending order and hierarchies; that is why they made close alliances with the army and the church since these institutions guaranteed a harmonic whole. The Nation became the sacred legitimizer of the new social order. On behalf of this new God a project would be imposed. This has been lucidly depicted by Herman Heller:

"Nationalist ethics emphasised the morality of violence in the era of high capitalism. Nationalism created a cold-blooded and predatory ethic with the pretension of realism. Mingled with Sorel's myth, it constitutes an unstable mixture of adventurism, anti-bourgeois and predator values with mass romanticism and a *raison d'Etat* which god attributes to the nation. The contradictions were resolved when reserving to the dictator superman and for a small, chosen elite, the monopoly of *raison d'état*, leaving to the people the duty of praying to a sanctifying god of State."⁷

This political conflict was followed by a national war of salvation. As Lugones has argued:

"In contrast with civil wars in Russia, Spain or Italy where there are homogeneous populations, in Argentina war was inspired by foreign rebels and the schemes of a

6. Cited by Cristián Buchrucker, *Nacionalismo y Peronismo*, Sudamericana, Buenos Aires, 1987, p. 54.

7. Herman Heller, *Escritos Politicos*, Alianza, Madrid, 1985, p. 62.

foreign government, wars against foreigners are always national, not civil wars".⁸

And the army is called upon to defend the values of fatherland and nationality.

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SAN MARTIN MYTH

The basic foundation of the nationalist myth was the role model of San Martín. He was endowed with features that enabled the popularising of militaristic and hierarchical ideas.

These ideas expressed a very partial historical perspective making San Martín a demi-god, in whose name a second religion was to arise in order to accomplish in the civilian order what the other one does in the spiritual realm. The goal of sanctifying had a double purpose: On the one hand, it removed liberal and free masonry elements from a figure who was supposed to become a paragon of national virtue; and on the other hand, it recovered religious values, which constituted essential elements in order to combat moral disbelief and the growth of materialist values.

The military would regulate democracy in the same way that San Martín achieved independence. They would place themselves above everybody else. Theirs was a supra-social and suprapolitical mission. The idea of military corporatism would convey a military image synonymous with nationality. The San Martín myth provided legitimacy for society and for the military institution.

8. Leopoldo Lugones, *Antología de la prosa*, Buenos Aires, Centurión, 1949, p. 364.

Myths provide an ideological means of integrating beliefs into a meaningful whole; so much so, that, whoever raises doubts on any aspect of dogma is, in fact, threatening dogma as a whole. In the myth, the particular father figure confronts the destroyers of the nation. The latter would include foreigners, external ideologies, those who fail to value national traditions, the jews, communists, agnostics. As Lévy Strauss points out: "Nothing comes closer to mythical thinking than political ideology."⁹ Although a myth is not empirically demonstrable, it is based upon facts drawn from reality; it provides a plausible and systematic account of history. As Mussolini contended: "We have created a myth, myth is belief, passion. It does not necessarily have to be true."¹⁰ That myth was the Nation itself as a political value symbolically organised and established in a meaningful whole, provided with its own rules.

Modern societies look with nostalgie at the past and consider previous eras as nobler, happier, more fraternal than the present. This concept had already been successfully developed by Rousseau with the notion of a noble savage who had lived earlier in a heaven on earth. The myth's function as a means of resolving social conflict, as well as prevailing a promise of a better life, is a vision that has existed for a long time. Different Messianic projects used mythical devices in order to legitimise their actions. These symbols' might focus on their power to mobilise people which gives them legitimacy. Time and again, a certain obsession appears about the impurity requiring cleans-

9. Claude Lévy-Strauss, *Antropología Estructural*, EUDEBA, Bs.As. 1968, p.191.

10. Cited by Herman Heller, *op.cit.*, Alianza, Madrid, 1985, p.55.

ing, an evil needing to be exorcised or of a redemption to be ensured, as was the case in ancient civilisation and the same can be said in relation to the role of myth in the legitimation of totalitarian regimes.

Mythological systems are all related to social crisis: the sudden acceleration of historic evolution processes, sharp fractures of the social or cultural environment, the breakdown of solidarity and complementarity systems that rule the living together. Constantly, the analysis takes us to the Durkhenian notion of Harmony, in a more general sense, to the old distinction between critical and organic periods that so much preoccupied the XIX Century French sociological school: i.e. it is during the critical periods that political myths become more vividly reinforced, more intensely imposed and exert with greater violence their attractive power.

We are talking about a new way of political religiosity which was fashioned out of a relatively coherent system of collective values: the worship of Law, Justice, Freedom and Solidarity, the celebration of Patria, faith in human Progress, the growth of a new reason-based morality. Not to understand the role of this civilian religion would mean not to grasp the sentimental amoral history of our country.

In order to deepen these feelings, integrative rites connected with national values were boosted. Tangible expressions showing these feelings grew more numerous: monuments, remembrances, rituals, songs, festivities, readings, anecdotes, etc. The goal of this sort of representation was centred on the possibility of making the Armed Forces more legitimate as a branch of conservative interests in Society. But this took place behind a

generous attempt to strengthen patriotic feelings. Ricardo Rojas stated: "The worship of heroes is a form of true patriotism." It also designed the instruments that would enable to reinforce and fashion thought within the traditionalistic and patriotic schemes: To perpetuate in book, marble, bronze in the minds of current and future generations the memory of a servant illuminates and enhances the ideals of nationality.¹¹

Statues and monuments provide a focal point for images of the nation and the values of those who laid its foundations. Ricardo Rojas advised on the teaching of "the national" through what he called **Statue Pedagogy**, saying:

"What can be the use of the poor teacher's showing the children ever in moralising and enthusiastic attitude, their hero's iconography in the class or during school celebrations ..., if when at leisure or when enjoying a Sunday, the children will unsuccessfully look for Moreno's manly head. Alberti's ascetic visage, or Rivadavia's solemn figure. They will become doubtful of their teacher's truth ... when they find instead an usurper Garibaldi horse, at the best place a statue could occupy or the statue of Guisepe Mazzini facing the port where immigrants arrive, as if he stood there to welcome their fellow countrymen saying 'you have not arrived to a Patria but to a colony'."¹²

This is why nationalist groups who obeyed his warnings to the letter considered that Statue Pedagogy would result in excellent effects. It was then that they ex-

11. Gral José María Sarobe, "Los arquetipos argentinos en la ancianidad", *Revista San Martín* No. 12, 1946, p. 65.

12. Rojas, *La Restauración*, op.cit., p. 221.

aggerately turned heroes into custodians of all existent squares. San Martín had the first statue erected in his honour in 1862; in 1888 the second monument was decreed in the Andes Mountains and a third one was decided upon in 1895 when his Yapeyú house was declared as historical monument.¹³

In the city of Buenos Aires the second San Martín monument was built in 1941 and subsequently 17 more monuments were erected. 1950 was declared "the Year of San Martín". No other hero has been honoured with similar amount of monuments. The last three have been built since 1978 during the last military regime. More than twenty honorific bronze plates were placed in other squares. There are also promenades that bear his wife's and his daughter's names. Such statues and busts largely outnumber the ones devoted to other national heroes. In addition, we must add the large number of San Martín statues erected in the rest of the country since 1935.

San Martín has not only been represented in monuments but in other ways, too: A railway line (since 1948), two streets in Buenos Aires only,¹⁴ the National School Hospital, the City Cultural Center,¹⁵ and a neighborhood founded in 1955, all bear San Martín's name, not to mention all the main streets and squares in most

13. Data drawn from "Barrios Calles y Plazas de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires", Instituto Histórico de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, 1983.

14. "Av. del Libertador" bears this name since 1950, by decree 1919/50; while "Ave. San Martín" does so since 1895. The "San Martín Street" refers to Saint San Martín de Porres.

15. Created in 1963.

RUT CLARA DIAMINT

towns in the rest of the country. San Martín is patron of classrooms, and provides the name of several towns and schools.

The worship of San Martín also extends to the national currency. The first bill issue carrying the Captain's sphinx came into use in 1943. The first national coin with San Martín's relief was issued in 1950.¹⁶

The honouring of heroes in this way is no political accident but rather part of a nationalist strategy to present the history and prospects of nationalism as a coherent unity and to provide a model of social and political action.

THE ARMY PERFORMING THE ROLE OF NATIONALISM'S SOCIAL ACTOR

The conservative party which, following a traditional policy, might have mobilised new social groups and their corresponding demands, did not view itself as electorally capable of achieving broad support. Cornblit emphatically points to the conservatives' inability to form alliances with other sectors, as the cause of their electoral unsuccessfulness, they failed to obtain allies similarly oriented in order to offer a program that would satisfy social demands. That is why it is considered that the conservatives' failure in the electoral game was brought about by: "The steady fracture of the right which seems unable of articulating its conflicting demands through policies and programmes

16. Cunietti-Ferrando, Arnaldo, "Monedas de la República Argentina", Ed. Asociación Numismática Argentina. Buenos Aires, 1965.

THE MILITARIZATION OF ARGENTINIAN POLITICAL CULTURE

broad enough to allow the formation of a solid party of the politically liberal right".¹⁷

Conservatism failed to become a modern party able to face the challenges of an industrial society. As Oscar Terán points out, even though the nationalists repeatedly failed in their restoration attempts, they were far more successful in the area of ideological conquest.

"But although nationalism of the right inscribed itself within a globally impracticable restoration project, there exists at least a double level of analysis in which its discourse and performance achieved relative successful results. This is so, because to begin with, it showed a remarkable capacity to program a national ideal distinct from liberalism..., it successively took sectorial state and civil society areas: culture, chancellery, justice, catholic church, the armed forces, standing out as one of the most dynamic forces of hegemony encouraged by a comparatively reduced intellectual group".¹⁸

The nationalists' first precarious initiative related to the conjunction of catholic forces centered in the Union Popular Católica Argentina (Argentine Catholic Popular Union) and the political sectors gathered by the Liga Patriótica Argentina (Argentine Patriotic League), opposing the radical administration which had been elected by the recently introduced system of uni-

17. Oscar Cornblit, "La opción conservadora en la política argentina", en Desarrollo económico No. 56, Bs. As., 1975, p. 633.

18. Oscar Terán, El nacionalismo sin nación, en "La Ciudad Futura" No.4, 1987, p.21.

versal suffrage. The trigger of this united action was the 1919 workers strikes, known as the Tragic Week. The violence of confrontations between workers and civilian groups linked to the Army and the Navy, together with young nationalists and conservatives, resulted in four hundred casualties. These groups considered the government's action unsatisfactory and decided to take action into their own hands.

In order to stop anarchist advance, the Argentine Patriotic League sought to enhance "the humanitarian feeling of society so that the idea of patria would become a worship." And a member of the League added: "Social struggle has turned patriotism into a vital issue for the existence of society as a whole, in a heroic medicine, an antidote that shall neutralise the ruthless corrosive anarchist".¹⁹

The nationalism of the 30s permeated important institutions concerned with the transmission of ideology. However, it failed at political level. Buchrucker understands that its mistake was to stay in the past: "The past values - Patria, Faith, Family, Tradition and Race - were steadily glorified by the movement's literature"²⁰ "without including mass movements. Terán agrees that neither Lugones, nor the first Maurras and Maetzu readers, impressed by fascism, could have attained social consensus."²¹ The action of those groups,

19. See Acts del 4e Congreso de la Liga Patriótica Argentina, Buenos Aires, 1923, p. 224, introduction and in the same time Pablo Heredia, La cultura argentina, p. 211.

20. Cristián Buchrucker, "Nacionalismo y Peronismo", Ed. Sudamericana, Bs. As., 1987, p. 125.

21. Oscar Terán, op.cit., p. 22.

linked at first with the church, was indeed effective in transmitting nationalistic concepts, but lacked equal success in staying in power. The modernist industrialist variable of 1943, was able to carry out its project by including in its proposal the heterogeneous mass that had been excluded in the 30s.

The Army was summoned by the nationalists in speeches and in actual practice encouraged by current European models, it found it easy to obey the call to the political arena. San Martín's Lodge became the leading center where that role was organized. It sought to provide a solution to the sectorism and inefficiency caused by president Yrigoyen's administration within the institution. Colonel Lieutenant Luis G. Garcia, lodge director, pointed out:

"When I arrived back at my country, once I had finished my term as military attaché in Belgium and the United Kingdom, I was able to see the disorder and lack of organization in which our institution was immersed".²²

San Martín's Lodge at first attempted to solve mere institutional issues, which in any case reflected a struggle for power within the Army, but it later reached beyond the military sphere and had an effect on broader institutional context. Colonel Francisco Laprida tries to explain the 1930 revolution by blaming president Yrigoyen's administration. He says:

"The 1930 revolutionaries are represented by liberally and nationalistically oriented officers. The movement was originated and led by military groups with an active involvement of civilians belonging to the political opposition to the radical government. The movement

22. Cited by Orono Juan V., "La Logia militar que derrocó a Castillo", Edición del autor, Buenos Aires, 1965, p. 14.

RUT CLARA DIAMINT

leader was a military figure of great prestige among officers. The movement aimed at taking over control from the hands of the radicals and going back to more orthodox liberal forms that responded to conservative groups that had been left aside in 1916."²³

In this tense atmosphere, the Lodge accounted for its action by stating: "It is painful and unfortunate having to talk of reconquering that old undeniable prestige that existed in our institution when the idea of *Patria* was really felt",²⁴ making reference to the explicit argument: to professionally institutionalise the Armed Forces; but at the same time suggesting Colonel Laprida's explanation: the political aim of confronting radicalism whose principles did not coincide with their own.

Military messianism involves the idea that the army is the nation's moral support and occupies a more central position because of inefficient governments and political errors, it is the guarantee of the continuity of nationalist, catholic and hispanic traditions. It thus emerges as the spiritual custodian of the Nation. The idea behind such concepts is to identify the birth of the nation, its enhancement, and its brightest glories with the actions of the military. This stands in contrast with the widespread idea that politicians are the ones who are the source of corruption and social disintegration. By drawing a link between San Martín tradi-

23. Col Francisco N. Laprida, "Los grupos dentro del ejército", Secretaría de Guerra, Comando de Institutos Militares, Centro de Altos Estudios, Curso Superior de Estrategia, Bs.As., 1966, p. 4.

24. Logia San Martín, Bases; documents appendix presented by Orona, Juan V., op.cit. p. 102.

THE MILITARIZATION OF ARGENTINIAN POLITICAL CULTURE

tion and the army's heroic mission, it identifies the brave fighting for independence with prospective task regenerating the nation taken over by the army as from the 1930s.

The military saw its role as strengthening society and, as part of this objective, generated a discourse which presupposed that the role of the army was within the general interest and that patriotic concepts should be regarded as universal truths. The objectives of the *Revista del Suboficial* (The Subofficer's Magazine), make it explicit as they inform that:

"... and it is the headquarters the most efficient tribune and it is the subofficials, because of their closeness and action with the troops, the ones that constitute the authorised vehicle for patriotic and militaristic propaganda".²⁵

Such ideas are restated by Cnel. Carlos Smith in front of his colleagues:

"... politics is the most terrible venom that can intrude in its veins (the Nation's). The military, our hope of redemption, shall vow to brighten the path that the country is mistaking".²⁶

Cnel. Balza assigned a central role to the lack of credibility in the natural hierarchy when accounting for factionalism and disintegration of the Armed Forces. This fact, present again in recent *carapintada* uprisings, brought about greater involvement of politi-

25. Véase Cabo Chiaro, "El deber Militar", *Revista del Suboficial*, Buenos Aires, Circulo Militar No. 22, Oct. 1920.

26. Smith, C. "Los deberes morales del oficial y las grandes escuelas del carácter de San Martín y Belgrano, Bs.As., Circulo Militar, p. 304.

al officers and a remarkable decline in the professional role of the military corporation. In his paper on the San Martín Lodge Balza pointed out that:

"Hierarchy of members in which no superior officers appear, is an indication that the group of young officers no longer trusted their superiors, making this the actual cause of the Lodge".²⁷

Colonel Laprida drew different conclusions on the aftereffects on the Lodge:

"The San Martín Lodge was organised by middle ranking officers apparently aiming at doing away with politics that had intruded into the Army as well as reinforcing discipline. In the practical field it took sides, became anti-radical and, paradoxically enough, contributed to sharpen political infiltration in the Army once dissolved by getting involved, through his men and ideas, in the 1930 revolution".²⁸

The military life model, by definition based upon discipline, and hierarchy gradually militarised political life, with the intention of imparting discipline to social behaviour. This enabled the men of arms to impose their rules of the game, if they succeeded in proving that their objective was to defend the national spirit itself. Instruments of democracy lost their value in the face of the idea of Patria. Patria belonged to a group that placed it before the nation.

27. Cnel. José Cruz Balza, "El Círculo Militar", Secretaría de Guerra, Comando de Institutos Militares, Centro de Altos Estudios, Curso Superior de Estrategia. Bs.As., Nov. 1966, p. 2.

28. Laprida, Francisco N., "Los grupos dentro del ejército", Secretaría de Guerra, Comando de Institutos Militares, Curso Superior de Estrategia, Bs.As. 1966, p. 3.

INSTRUMENTS OF SAN MARTIN WORSHIP: SCHOOL AND MILITARY SERVICE.

Nationalist ideas permeated the educational system, a crucial instrument for influencing young minds. The Consejo Nacional de Educacion (National Council for Education), in which nationalist supporters were placed, functioned as a powerful organism that centralised, controlled and created public opinion and civic consciousness. It unified primary studies throughout Argentina since "various interpretations by sometimes antagonistic authorities, in teaching methods as well as in the way of celebrating our festivities, or in their appreciation of our nation's history facts, bring about deviations that echo in the students' spirit".²⁹

The standardisation was one of its most important tasks. The new Curricula put forward by the Council were based on the idea that "teaching orientation is indeed nationalistic, patriotic and moral" and one in which "the figure of those men who, in different times of history, had an outstanding performance is highly thought of".³⁰ A path was traced that all youth should travel by and in which any deviation was considered a communist - jewish - masonic plot. In order to conjure up such evil forces, a figure of salvation was called for:

"San Martin has got his ideology and moral, his creed and dynamism, his sense of Patria which, if correctly

29. Monitor de la Educación Común, órgano oficial del Consejo Nacional de Educación, Feb. 1935, p. 115.

30. Curricula for elementary school, approved by Consejo, modified 1910 curricula, in Monitor de la Educación Común, Feb. 1936, p. 159.

RUT CLARA DIAMINT

handled by trustworthy patriotic educators, are the ones that will and do enable the Argentines of today and the future to become tutelage elements of the new ethnology for a better humanity that is now foreseen as the utmost consolidation on this side of the Plata river".³¹

In order to accurately disseminate San Martín's doctrine, the Instituto Sanmartiniano (San Martín Institute) was created, aiming at making known both, studies on San Martín and his life. Nevertheless, its objective has been more than purely educative; it also has functioned as an ideological instructing center. The institute's aims stated that:

"What we intend to do is to fashion a militant education, as our nationality and tradition laws demand it, as well as the overall interests linked to both".³²

This constituted a call to create a nationalistic precept-based ideology, framed by catholic guidelines and counting on an acting, militant military core, so as to be able to impose itself on society. One of the articles of the government decrees establishing the San Martín Institute points out that: "It will publicly rectify by means of communiqués, papers, lectures or broadcasting, any mistake expressed by publications, works, lectures, etc., having to do with the historic truth of San Martín's life and events in which he became involved". This way, the paternity of the father of the Nation was assigned to a group of nationalistically oriented men, closely linked to the military

31. José P. Otero, "San Martín, pináculo de la argentinidad", Revista del Instituto Sanmartiniano, Sept. 1936, p. 3.

32. Instituto Nacional Sanmartiniano, Boletín No. 7, Bs. As., 1983.

THE MILITARIZATION OF ARGENTINIAN POLITICAL CULTURE

milieu. As masters of an authorized and prophetic voice, these men possess a monopoly of legitimate knowledge concerning historic trends interpretations. Even new evidence would need to be authenticated or rejected depending on whether it suited the official version.

Another interesting item is the selection of authorities. Being, supposedly, a historic academy it is quite remarkable that the voting members should be: five holding the rank of general, five of the rank of admiral, five historians, two archbishops named by the ecclesiastical tribunal, and five officials from different ministries.³³

Such emphasis laid on the designation of authorities leads us to believe that the task at hand was not simply ensuring intellectual accuracy because of the involvement of members of institutions whose task is other than the study of history and far from academic activity. The Institute publishes the San Martín Magazine which constitutes a bible for the civil state religion whose priests hold ministry, school, military headquarters posts, spreading out the Nation savers' word. The worship turns into religious dogma, allows no discussion, and the Institute is power, the truth revealing authority.

Until the beginning of this century, society used to work out its disagreements at elections, through competition amongst political parties, even though it sometimes resorted to revolution in which men of arms were never absent. The Armed Forces were linked to such processes, but did not behave as a corporate pro-

33. Decree 22.131, Aug. 1944.

tagonist. The effects accomplished by the Compulsory Military Service Law and the military professionalization on the regulation of the nation's life surpassed the pages of its instigators.

Representative Demaria expresses the spirit of the military service Law when saying:

"We can attain corporate spirit, since the recruit has been instructed in a regiment that is fixed, permanent, stable in a point ..., while at that same regiment his father, brothers and friends have served the nation and a worship of the regiment has been carved out in the people; thus can we achieve corporate spirit ..."³⁴

Adding later:

"Many people have received the Argentine baptism at the headquarters and in the shade of the flag whose colors they ignored. Finally, along their passage through the army ranks, many today citizens have there felt for the first time the stimulus and the benefits of fraternity and equality whose statements were as unknown to them as the worthiness of their rights and the reason for their duties".³⁵

The imposition of compulsory military service, the creation of military specialisation schools, the increase of regiments, professional and social services, the military enterprises, completed the professionalizing project of Armed Forces, from which they rose strengthened and full of prestige.

34. Rodríguez Molas, "El Servicio Militar Obligatorio", op.cit.

35. Cnel. Rodolfo Martínez Pits, "El ejército de una democracia", Revista del Círculo Militar, Jun-Jul 1916, p. 347.

NATIONALISM'S IDEOLOGICAL SUCCESS

While pursuing the goal of spreading nationalism within the military, the Unification Work Group arose as the Army's internal Lodge, which promoted the 1943 coup d'état. Its action was first aimed at its own institution, seeking nationalistic and moral consensus:

"It is after the creation of a 'military mysticism' within the body of troops which otherwise remain machinelike. It has an effect on the spirit of Chiefs and Officers, as the only means of creating a "collective soul" that can make the institution come alive and vital. It intends to develop a mentality that fits the time and allows to design patterns of its own and unveils the way to greatness through the forces of spirit and stoicism".³⁶ Many of the arguments produced echoed the words of post-lugonian nationalists. Among their thinkers, Jordan Bruno Genta deserves being mentioned. Alain Rouquié considered him as the G.O.U. "philosopher".³⁷ A militant view of action and history is produced which presumes that:

"A decisive fact in order to increase, expend and keep in shape the body of troops was the sanction of the Compulsory Military Service at the beginning of the century. This meant the annual mobilisation of 20 year old Argentine youth to learn about the honour of serving, suffering and dying at the only patriotism teaching school that neither school secularism nor University Reform could make disappear: the quarters".
38

36. Robert Potash, "Perón y el GOU. Los documentos de una logia secreta." Ed. Sudamericana, Bs. As., 1984, p. 157.

37. Alain Rouquié, Poder Militar..., op.cit., p. 31.

In Jordán Bruno Genta's work we find the legitimate right of army fully expressed: "The nation is a military reality" and "virtue has taken refuge in the quarters",³⁹ that is the caste called to morally lead the future of the nation. Jordan Genta reorganises through his discourse the trend of thought of a militarist and authoritarian right, which had found a source of domination and acculturation in the worship of San Martín. His intolerant and sectarian frame of mind concealed behind the glorification of the military was far from being only a set of images, it later developed into concrete military intervention, legitimised, according to the Military Magazine, by San Martín's legacy:

"Christ is to the Christian in the religious feelings order, Our Father, what San Martín is for the Argentinians in the patriotic sentiment order, Father of the Patria".⁴⁰

The worship was magnificently secured: it stemmed from a heroic mythical figure who had been a military figure and gave to the Army guidelines which flowed from his messianic ideas.

The 1943 government constituted the triumph of militarism over democratic politics in Argentina. As Rouquié points out, the 1943 government wanted to rule the

38. Genta, Jordán B., "Guerra Contrarevolucionaria, Doctrina Política Antisubversiva", 1971, en *Acerva de la Libertad de Enseñar y de la Enseñanza de la Libertad*, Ed. Dictio, Bs.As., 1976, p. 562.

39. Genta, "La formación de la inteligencia ético ...", op.cit., p. 37.

40. Unsigned note, *Revista San Martín* No. 11, 1946, p. 121.

country as it ruled the quarters: "the garrison-State pretended to rule over everything from the length of hair to the minor activities, the content of newspapers, the conduct of workers unions, radio conductors language, its paternal tutelage allowed nothing to escape".⁴¹ So Rouquié wonders about the nature of the government:

"Was it totalitarian? No, it was simply militarism, together with that moralising conformism making the charm of officers clubs".⁴²

Militarism did not simply mean the assignment of men of arms to government posts, but also a style of governing, a way of ruling civilian society, of executing orders, of conceiving differences, of unifying commandments and beliefs. Armed forces officers as well as nationalists agreed upon such style.

The undenied paternity of the Nation was in the hands of the body of officers developed during their military life. President Gral Ramírez put it this way:

"... I contend that the Armed Forces patriotically and unselfishly carry out a noble and an anonymous task in their quarters and on the ships, the true sanctuaries for civic virtues. It is there where citizens learn, in the best of atmospheres, that the worship of our hero's tradition can only be comparable to the one we render to God and the Patria".⁴³

41. Alain Rouquié, *Poder Militar...*, volumen II, p. 30.

42. *idem*.

43. Speech delivered by Presidente de la Nación, Gral Pedro P. Ramírez, in the Annual Lunch of Comradery, *Revista Militar*, Jul 1943, p. 179.

PERONISM AND THE YEAR OF SAN MARTIN

The men who carried out the 1943 revolution, drew on two trends of nationalist thinking. The first was centered on the building of the Armed Forces as a political force. Nationalist theorists, following Leopoldo Lugones' concepts, see men of arms as the only means of regenerating a society undermined by corrupt and inefficient politicians. Armed Forces themselves constituted an aristocracy born from unity of action, supported by their corporative spirit and their respect of hierarchy; also highly prestigious because of their organisation and their capacity to plan tasks.

The second trend had some connection with the former, but its political expression was different. The Nation's pre-eminence in the world had to be ensured by military dominance. Military confrontations showed that external force could not be relied upon to guarantee the supply of resources. It was therefore necessary to develop a basic national industry in order to strategically and sufficiently supply the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. This also brought about benefits to the country: a greater need of instruction for the workers, the defence of sovereignty, the use of energy materials in the hands of the State, the development of industry, the boosting of economic processes and legislation that would ensure such means.

Guided by the military caste's efficiency and cunning, the country would rapidly reach the level of the leading nations.

The peronist doctrine was influenced by both of these trends. It followed the popular nationalism line, encouraged by its union sectors, linked to similar movements in Latin America, but adding other features that

General Peron synthesised in his Third Position (tercera Posicion).

Peron introduced military concepts into his party: vertical and functional systems of command. This model was extended afterwards throughout State and society. The mass media monopoly made it possible - according to Miguel Scenna - to silence the opposition and to maintain steady propaganda offensive, which merged the interests of the Nation together with those of the Peronist movement. For that purpose, once again San Martín provided the symbol of legitimacy:

"Young Argentines: we once again reach this historic square, to glorify in bronze the archetype of our nationality. .. San Martín's life constitutes the most glorious of all Argentine in history. San Martín's life cannot simply be told: it is meant to be emulated, to serve as example for the Argentine".⁴⁴

The government crowned the highest expression of the worship of San Martín: the celebration of his death through the declaration of the Year of the Leader of independence, during which the San Martín's prayer was recited as if it were a religious salm, and writing on a page at school, together with the date, the statement decreed by the government through the 13.661 Law: Year of the Father of the Nation General José de San Martín.

The Church willingly responded to the dispositions, and the archbishop of Buenos Aires stated that the above mentioned law held for all comunicués of the Church and that he would ask the Holy Seat, together with the government, that this commemoration be acknowledged.⁴⁵

44. Discurso del Presidente Juan D. Perón, "La Nación", Aug. 18, 1948, p. 1.

The Commission in charge of the commemoration decided to publish letters, regulations, orders, papers on San Martín, together with the issuing of guidelines on anthologies, poetry, singing, portraits, drawing contests and all types of homage.

In 1950, Perón referred in different ways to the event, profiting from each of those opportunities to reinforce the doctrine:

"If there are good reasons to say that San Martín belongs undeniably to the people and is worth of them, it is also logical and similarly reasonable to declare that our people is a creation magnificent and worthy of San Martín".⁴⁶

Little by little, the Peronist doctrine became interspersed with references to San Martín, as it proposed to identify the concepts attributed to the Captain with Perón's own doctrine: Peoples' worship of Peronism was linked to San Martín. A mechanism was once again used, which had been highly successful in the task of standardising the rituals involved:

"I know that while doing so I comply with the General José de San Martín's implicit commandment; he in his glory, will feel interpreted by a soldier who, if lacking genius, full of inspiration, attempts to emulate the example with the unavoidable duty of holding the flag of tradition very high, fighting to offer both the

45. Revista Eclesiástica del Arsobispado de Buenos Aires y del Obispado Sufragáneo de Asul, Feb. 1950, p. 51.

46. Speech delivered by Presidente Juan D. Perón, "Proclamación del Año del Liberador General San Martín", in Faculty of Law, Revista San Martín No. 28, 1950, p. 159.

Argentina and the future the blessing of having a fair, free and sovereign Patria".⁴⁷

By the end of 1950, many San Martinian followers felt slightly disappointed, San Martín was not the father of the patria that they had founded, it was now the Father of the fair, free and sovereign Patria: The Patria that San Martín saw from his dreams' summit is the one that we have already perceived in current reality.

The Armed Forces, which have done all what was necessary for the Nation to be what it is today, can stand in proud dignity before the spirit of San Martín.⁴⁸

Nationalist peronist doctrine became compulsory subject at the Military School and the War College in 1954. High ranking officers obeyed orders so as not to jeopardise their military careers, but among the youngest ones a feeling of discontent started to develop. The navy opposed such manifestations and resented the re-naming of two war vessels with the name of the president and his wife Eva Duarte. "Evita" would be the controversial source of disagreement and the element most strongly rejected by the military. This was not only because her person became intolerable to the bigoted military mind but also because she was the first admirer of general Perón. She viewed her husband as the most important figure in the Nation, attempting even to dismantle the efforts of creating a national hero. Eva said:

"I speak on behalf of women and workers. I conjure up

47. idem. p. 145.

48. Gen. de División D. Juan D. Perón, Revista Militar, Circulo Militar, Aug.1950.

the might of such representation to convey their feelings. And today they feel that Peron is the direct heir of the people's mission and of San Martín's spirit! ... They feel that San Martín's people have come alive in Peron's people, after a long century of silence. And they feel, finally, that San Martín's spirit becomes extensive in Peron's spirit".⁴⁹

Now the Army was no longer the heir of San Martín, but only one of their men, acting on their behalf. At this moment he would become the Dictator, the one who had expropriated flags and misused the same resources. While some felt deprived of their symbols, others cheered that it was no longer San Martín but San Perón.

MILITARY LEGACY OF THE WORSHIP OF SAN MARTIN

Retired Division General Benjamin Rattenbach few days after the 1950 Revolution, which ended with the peronist government, wonders what happens to the Armed Forces when a revolution takes place in which they have been involved. He says that "no state institution suffers greater internal commotion as they do. This is due mainly to the sudden loss of balance that arises within them between doctrine and reality, theory and practice. The fact is that, - unlike what happens in the rest of the institutions and in the people - in no other sector is there an equally steady preaching against political involvement and any kind of subversive movement, as in the Armed Forces. And then such preaching crumbles down, giving way to confusion, perplexity and disturbance".⁵⁰

49. Speech pronounced by Mrs. Eva Perón, Revista San Martín No. 29, 1952, p. 138-139.

However, these words could not suffice for the officers to go back to their quarters. Not only were they to "free us from the tyranny", they had also come to show the steps that society must follow. Once again we must learn the official version of history, written by the true army for us. Thus, each and every coup d'état to come was meant to reconstruct Argentine society regaining the path traced by the army, which constituted a paragon of greatness and morality for the Patria. The government of the Proceso de Reorganización Nacional (1976) renewed the homage to San Martín, while it was destroying the country.

During the recent transition to democracy, the nationalist-catholic sector inclined towards *coup d'état* has created a deep breach within the army. A *carapintada* leader pointed out: "We strive for the old army values. We fight for honour, courage and loyalty".⁵¹ Nevertheless, such contents seem contradictory for an institution that instigated several attacks against constitutional power.

The legalist sector, apposing the *carapintada*, hold similar views. The Chief Commander of the Army, General Caridi, proposed "a revitalisation of force on the basis of principles that derive from San Martín's military ethic: honour, loyalty, respect, austerity, sense of sacrifice, modesty and the love for service"; he later adds:

"I remind my fellow countrymen that this is "their army, of us all, the same one that fought throughout

50. Gral Benjamín Rattenbach, "El Telón", Revista Militar No. 633, 1955, p. 6.

51. Cnel Aldo Rico, "La Nación", 1988.

America to free our brothers' nations, the same one that was covered of glory in Cahacabuco and Maipú, and sacrificed the setbacks of Vilcapugio and Cancha Rayada; the same one that together with the rest of Argentina society has shared right moments and mistakes, triumph and unsuccessfulness".⁵²

In this speech, a message had been concealed under the army's **celebrity**, but that has been the basis for the Armed Forces' power: there was only one glorious army, the one that fought for Independence. It was with the support of such ancient honour that it overcame failure and errors. The Army intruded into Argentine politics shored up by the glory of the first half of the XIXth century, leaving aside its specific professional activities. It determined national identity and faced down its opponents by claiming its fatherhood over the nation. Fatherhood that had been acquired through simple family heritage: **San Martín Father of the Patria** was a military figure. But this heritage was discredited and instead of repeating the general's statement ("I have lived up to my promises to countries where I have fought: achieve their Independence and free to their hands the choice of their own government") rather than defending **Institutions and the Constitution**, it imposed itself as the only guarantee of nationality. The Argentine Army's mystified glory could serve its purpose of keeping it for its professional tasks but not for the function of **warrantor of patriotism** dictated by their interpretation of the national interest.

52. La Nación, May 30, 1987, p. 4.

And if military victory occurred more often than the civilian rule, this was because of the failure of the Argentine bourgeoisie to articulate a counter-revolutionary project under conditions of capitalism and democracy. Its inability to legitimise its domination as beneficial to society as a whole once confronted to the halo of security and respect for national interests that surrounded the military. It gave credit to the latter, leaving the former to stand as incapable. But it eventually cut both ways, as Carlos Marx brilliantly explained it, long time before in "The 18th Brumaire of Luis Bonaparte":

"... And quarter and bivouac, periodically set over French society in order to smash its brains and make of it a calm being; sabre and mousketoon that once and again reconstruct justice and administration, exerted tutelage and censure, performed the tasks of police and guards, bigotry and military jacket which periodically became imposed as supreme wisdom, as rulers of society didn't they all - quarter and bivouac, sabre and mousketoon, bigotry and guerrera - have to end up considering that it was better to save society once and forever, by proclaiming its own regime as the highest one and completely stripping bourgeoisie society of the care of governing itself?"⁵³

The spreading of the worship of San Martín, the mystification of patriotic symbols and a determined revision of history were the principles on which a culture of dogmatism was built. This mythology's potentiality lies actually in the introduction of a fragmentary meaningful universe. These convictions' strength was not rationality but the potency of their scope, sought

53. Carlos Marx, "El dieciocho brumario de Luis Bonaparte", Editorial Anteo, Bs. As., 1975, p. 36. (The underline is ours.)

through an iterative and omnipresent transmission. All penetration and persuasion resources were set to work so nothing could escape ideological tutelage.

The model presented, the way Francisco Laprida's interesting work points out, worked as a stereotype:

"All nationalistic programs need to show a stereotype of virtues and behaviour that lead the individual to view himself on the basis of that stereotype. This is the only way to achieve the unity claimed by the Nation as supra-empiric political entity".⁵⁴

The diversity and tolerance necessary to develop a democratic system, which naturally imply a less stable order than the autocratic dominance of one sector, do not agree with the one dimensional nature of the nationalistic worship: "Nationalism does not make friends with diversity, it needs to unify the group, acts as an iron that gives uniformity to everything so as to fashion it according to the assumed features of the group ... Its cultural purpose is by nature monolytic and ends up always in a beatified caricature of cultural reality".⁵⁵

Leading elites designed a new political power bloc. The reconstruction of the political order required a new consensus and rationality. According to that logic, San Martín's myth reinforced authoritarian, militaristic and nationalistic contents and maintained people within a symbolic universe. Nationalistic discourse thus proposed a mirror on which to see a destiny; one of

54. Francisco J. Laprida, "Violencia, Nación, Autodeterminación", *Leviatán*, Revista de hechos e ideas, Madrid, No. 34, 1988, p. 62.

55. *idem*, p. 60.

greatness for us reserved as long as we did not deviate from that rationality.

Through the imposition of this imaginary assumption by the nationalistic groups Argentine society was led along the paths of integration and intolerance. We do not consider symbolic orders as the only structuring items in reality. Ludolfo Paramio mentions that we must avoid falling into determinisms. He warns: "... in the Western left a curious oscillation has taken place between the old deterministic materialism, which takes for granted the economic bases and where material restrictions determine a symbolic discourse structure, and a new idealism which considers all reality as discursive, that symbolic structure is the real determiner of social evolution. The theoretical kernel of this new idealism is the statement that in social practice - understood as discourse practice - stable, hard, and meaningful nucleus do not exist".⁵⁶

Avoiding determinism stressed by Paramio, we cannot forget the weight of sacralization of political principles as absolute truth, as an only profile which admits exclusively a unique order for beliefs, events and which eventually ends up being a sectorial and totalitarian regime.

We think that there exists a variety of individual and collective unconscious processes that may become dangerous political weapons. Democratisation of a society greatly polluted with authoritarian ideologies becomes a long run project, in which not only political forms

56. Ludolfo Paramio, "Del radicalismo reivindicativo al pluralismo radical", Lechner Norbert, comp., *Cultura Política y democratisación*, Flacso, Clacso, Ici, Bs. As., 1987

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must be changed but also, and specially, social mentality. The criticism of the worship of San Martín and the political cosmogony of which this is an element is not simply an attempt to correct the historical record; rather it is to remind us of the past institutional ruptures and the scorn of constitutional rules that provided the starting point from which an intolerant institutional system was built. In our case it was legitimised by ultra-right winged nationality. It was on behalf of national interests, which were always arbitrarily defined, of our traditions and the integrity of the Patria that it was possible to develop a deeply intolerant and antidemocratic culture.

John A. Ballweg / Li Li

HEALTH STATUS AND STRESS AMONG U.S. MILITARY WOMEN

This is a revised version of the report presented to Research Committee 01/ISA: "Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution" at the XIIth WORLD CONGRESS OF SOCIOLOGY in Madrid, July 1990. Funds for this research were provided by grant #057-435872 from the Women's Research Institute. Findings, views and opinions contained in the report are those of the authors and should not be construed as an official U.S. Department of Defense position, policy or decision.

C O N T E N T S

Abstract
Introduction
Methods
Results
Discussion
Bibliography

ABSTRACT

This research addresses occupational characteristics associated with military women's psychological well-being and health status. Specifically, stress at work and family life as well as health status are examined with respect to the roles military women play. Consistent with the general expectation, results show that job dissatisfaction is associated with high levels of stress at work and poor health. However, whether a military woman is assigned to a traditional female job or to a nontraditional female job does not make difference in her job satisfaction. Moreover, although single mothers in the military report more stress in family life, they are not likely to report more job dissatisfaction, nor are they more likely to report more stress at work than others. Furthermore, results reveal that quantity of multiple roles military women play is not significantly related to their reported stress and health status. Theoretical interpretations of the findings are discussed.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Armed Forces, representing one of the largest employers in American society, consisted of relatively few women until the past two decades. From 1948 to 1972, women in the military represented less than two percent of armed forces personnel, and a majority of them were restricted to roles in medicine and administration (Goldman 1973; Holm 1982; Rustad 1982). In 1972, under pressure from the women's movement and facing a possible shortage of male volunteers, the Pentagon decided to increase the proportion of women in the military. Since then, the United States has witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of

women in its armed forces. By 1986, a total of 220,250 women were on active duty with the military service, comprising about 10.2 percent of the total armed forces (Stanley and Segal 1988). The number and proportion has steadily increased since then. In September 1989, the number of women in the armed forces increased to 229,000 or 10.8 percent of the force (Bond 1990).

The latest expansion in the number of women in the military service has taken place largely in traditionally male military jobs. Compared to 1972, for example, when less than 10 percent of enlisted women were assigned to nontraditional jobs, the percentage grew to over 40 percent in 1976, and 45 percent in 1983 (Binkin and Eitelberg 1986, Hoiberg 1984).

Not surprisingly, women's increasing participation in the military has become a major subject of controversy in recent years (Binkin and Bach 1977; Moskos 1985; Rustad 1982; Schneider 1988; Segal 1982; Tuten 1982). This paper attempts to provide an original contribution to the field by examining military women's health status and stress at work and in family life. In order to gain an insight on the issue, it is necessary to examine the major roles military women play.

Different occupations expose women to various pressures from job tasks, and certain occupational groups are apparently subject to more stress than others. There is little doubt that there are many challenges associated with work assignments for women in the military. Since the military has been traditionally male-dominated, national attitudes toward military women and their roles are ambivalent (Binkin and Bach 1977; Rustad 1982). When military women attempt to fulfill roles as soldiers and as women simultaneously, they encounter two conflicting traditions: female socialization and tradi-

tional male military culture (Rustad 1982). Because of the special demands, military jobs, especially non-traditional positions for women, require military women to undergo radical adaptations (Schneider 1988). This adaptation may be associated with increased stress at work which manifests itself in the health problems military women encounter (Bishop 1984). Hoiberg (1984) found that military women assigned to nontraditional jobs had higher injury rates than women assigned to traditional occupations. The hospitalization rates of Navy enlisted women were reported to be double that of their male counterparts (Hoiberg and Thomas 1982). Bishop (1984) examined daily health reports of military personnel. Findings indicate that women reported more health problems than men did and that women assigned to combat support units reported twice the number of medical symptoms (Bishop 1984). Regarding the relationship between women's occupational stress and their health, it is also emphasized that role satisfaction may have an important effect on health (Coverman 1989; Spreitzer, Snyder and Larson 1979; Verbrugge 1982). Usually, military women who are dissatisfied with their jobs feel more stress and adopt unhealthful life styles; thus risks of illness and injury increase (Verbrugge 1982).

Based on the previous studies and their theoretical framework, the first hypothesis in this study is that military women who are in nontraditional female occupations are more likely to experience stress at work and encounter poorer health than those in traditional women's jobs. The second hypothesis is that military women who are satisfied with their job assignments are more likely to encounter less stress at work and better health than those who are dissatisfied with their jobs.

Like military life, a family also requires a great deal of commitment in time and energy. The conflicts between military demands and family obligations have been described in a number of studies. There is evidence indicating that the characteristics of the military lifestyle, including risk of injury or death, geographic mobility, and residence in foreign countries, are associated with great pressures directly on family life (Bowen 1989; Hoiberg and Ernst 1980; Schneider 1988; Segal 1989).

From another point of view, it has been argued that marriage is associated with better health because it offers companionship, affection, and care, which may enhance daily habits and reduce the risks of stress. It has been found in the literature that married women report better health than single, separated or divorced women. Among the unmarried, never-married women were healthier than those who were divorced or separated (Nathanson 1980; Renne 1971; Verbrugge 1979; 1983). The third hypothesis in this study is that military women who are currently married are likely to have less stress in family life and better health than single or previously married women.

Research evidence is inconsistent about the relationships between motherhood and women's stress as well as health. While some studies report that child rearing has some positive effects on women's health, other results show that the mother's poorer psychological well-being is influenced by an increase in the number of children (Marcus 1981; Nathanson 1980; Woods and Hulka 1979). These inconsistent results may be partially due to the fact that, on the one hand, child rearing provides feelings of worth and constant intimate contact. On the other hand, since the role of mother is associated with a range of obligations, being a mother

may be the most important source of stress in a woman's life (Verbrugge 1982).

It is estimated that a woman in the military is six times as likely as her male counterpart to become a single parent and bear the responsibility for the daily care of the child (Bowen 1987; Orthner and Bowen 1982). To be a mother, a military woman needs more time to take care of her children; to be a single mother because there is no other parent to share in child care responsibilities, makes adjustment to military life more difficult. As Schneider described, "being a single parent in the military is a hard row to hoe." (Schneider 1988, p. 216). Thus, the fourth hypothesis is that military women who are single parents are more likely to experience greater stress and report poorer health than others.

In addition to being soldiers and officers, many military women are married but childless, some have children as well as a spouse, and some are single mothers. They play multiple roles. Faced with different demands from husbands, children and job requirements, women with multiple roles must assume more duties and provide a greater time commitment. One of the questions posed by this study is how combinations of these roles relate to military women's health and psychological well-being.

The relationship between multiple role involvement and stress is a matter of controversy. Generally speaking, there are two major conflicting hypotheses about this relationship. On one hand, it has been argued that people with multiple roles gain more privileges and feelings of security and self-esteem. Their social involvements and achievements can enhance their feelings of satisfaction (Sieber 1974; Spreitzer 1979). There-

fore, multiple role involvement may reduce stress and have a positive effect on health (Gove and Tudor 1973; Spreitzer et al. 1979; Thoits 1983; Verbrugge 1982).

On the other hand, multiple role involvement is viewed as a source of psychological stress since it can be associated with role conflict and role overload (Goode 1960; Marks 1977). Role overload and role conflict are overlapping but distinct concepts. The former refers to too many role demands and too little time to fulfill them and the latter to incompatible expectations from one's various roles (Coverman 1989; Verbrugge 1982). Because an individual's time and energy are exhausted by multiple role involvement, both role overload and role conflict lead to role strain and influence psychological well-being (Barnett and Baruch 1985; Goode 1960).

The fifth hypothesis in this study is that the more roles military women assume, the more likely they are to experience more stress at work and in family life, and have poorer health status.

METHODS

Since 1980, the Department of Defense has conducted four world-wide surveys of U.S. military personnel on substance abuse and health behaviors. This study used data collected during the 1988 World-wide Survey of Substance Abuse and Health Behaviors Among Military Personnel. The sampling universe included all active military personnel except recruits and students at military academies.

The World-wide Survey involved two sampling stages. In the first stage, sampling units were stratified by four service branches (Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force) within four geographic regions of the world (America, North Pacific, other Pacific and Europe). In the second stage, sampling units were based on personnel rosters of the organizational units selected during the first stage (Bray et al. 1988).

Data collection involved two stages. In the first stage, questionnaires were administered to selected individuals at military installations. The second stage of data collection consisted of mailed questionnaires to a subsample of selected personnel who did not participate in the first stage of the survey. Under the direction of field teams, about 81.4 percent of personnel selected completed the questionnaires, resulting in a total of 18,673 completed surveys (Bray et al. 1988).

Of a total of 18,673 in the sample, 1,747 were female military personnel. The ages of the military women ranged from 17 to 69, and about 86.6 percent were in the 21 to 40 age range. A majority (65.9 percent) of the female personnel had attended college or graduated from college. More than half of the female personnel (51.6 percent) were currently married, while 30.9 percent were single and 16.8 percent were separated, divorced, or widowed. About 61.6 percent of the sample were white, and about half (49.9 percent) were in higher (E5-E9) enlisted ranks. More than half (53.9 percent) of the female military personnel had no children, while 46.1 percent had one or more children. More than half of military women (56.5) in the sample served in the Americas, 17.7 percent in Europe, and 26 percent in the Pacific areas.

Health status (HEALTH) was measured by an index composed of six questions. The first question asked how respondents would describe their own health. The second question intended to determine how much worry was caused by health. The third question concerned the extent by which respondents have control over their future health. In addition, health status was also measured by the number of illnesses, number of physicians' visits, and the number of days hospitalized during the preceding 12 months of the survey. By adding the six items, a twenty-six point scale was constructed in which the highest number indicated the best health status, while the lowest number indicated the poorest health. Cronbach's alpha was used to test the reliability of the index. The alpha reliability coefficient was .61.

Stress (STRESS) was measured by two questions. The first question was about how much respondents experienced stress at work or while carrying out their military duties. The second one asked about the stress that respondents experienced in their family life. Responses to each question ranged from one (a great deal) to five (none at all).

Traditional and nontraditional women's jobs were determined according to the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) (Department of the Army, 1989). Traditional jobs are defined as those jobs historically available to women such as administrative, medical, and service specialties; nontraditional specialties include those jobs traditionally held by males such as military police, mechanic, or heavy equipment operator (Bishop 1984). Because of the lack of information on other branches, analysis of traditional versus nontraditional jobs is limited to army personnel.

Job satisfaction was determined by the response to the question of how satisfied or dissatisfied the respondent was with his or her work assignment. The responses ranged from very dissatisfied to very satisfied.

RESULTS

The relationship between military women's stress and their health status was initially examined by using Pearson r . Overall, there exists a negative and significant relationship between stress and health among female military personnel, with a correlation coefficient of $-.31$. In order to obtain more details, stresses at work and in family life were examined separately (Table 1). It should be remembered that health status is a cumulative score and that a higher score indicates better health. The lowest group mean for health status (19.98) was associated with women who reported high work stress, while the highest group mean (20.94) belonged to those women who reported no stress at their work. Similarly, women under high level stress in family life reported the lowest mean of health index (18.64), while the highest mean (21.37) was associated with women who reported no stress in family life. The results of Table 1 suggest that the more stresses military women experience in their work and family life, the poorer their health.

The comparison of stress levels between women in traditional and nontraditional jobs is limited to army enlisted women. While it might seem logical to assume that women in nontraditional female jobs would more likely experience greater stress at work, the expected relationship did not appear. As shown in Table 2, when group means of stress were compared between two types of jobs, the traditional and nontraditional female

jobs, it was found that there was no significant difference in the stresses experienced either at work or in family life.

Table 1

Comparison of Group Means in Health Status by Stress Levels at Work and in Family Life Among Military Women

Group	N	Group Means of Health Index	Significance of F
<u>Stress at Work</u>			
Women under no stress at work	94	20.94	.000
Women under low level stress at work	738	20.41	
Women under high level stress at work	888	18.98	
<u>Stress in Family Life</u>			
Women under no stress in family life	305	21.37	.000
Women under low level stress in family life	896	19.75	
Women under high level stress in family life	518	18.64	
<u>Grand Mean</u>		<u>19.70</u>	

It may be as important to know how satisfied military women are with their jobs as what those jobs are. To explore the relationship of job satisfaction to stress at work, military women were divided into two categories: women satisfied with their jobs and those dissatisfied with their jobs. As shown in Table 2, there were significant differences in both stress at work and stress in family life between those categories. More specifically, women who were satisfied with their job reported lower level stress at work (3.33) compared to those who were dissatisfied with their jobs (4.03). This finding indicates that women who are dissatisfied with their jobs, no matter what job they have, are more likely to encounter greater stress at work than those satisfied with their jobs.

Figures in Table 2 also show a relationship between marital status and stress. Consistent with expectations, the level of stress in family life was related to marital status. Of the three groups, separated or divorced women had the highest group mean of stress in family life (3.08), and the group mean for currently married women (2.92) was higher than that for single persons (2.65). This result indicates that high levels of stress in family life are more likely to be associated with separated or divorced women.

In this study, single parents include those who are separated, divorced, and widowed as well as unmarried women who have one or more children. Consistent with previous studies and expectations, single parents were found to have the highest mean stress in family life (3.10). However, it is interesting to note that there is no significant difference in the levels of stress at work between single parents and other military women.

Table 2

Comparison of Group Means in Stress at Work and
in Family Life Among Military Women

G r o u p	Group Means of Stress		Group Means of Stress in	
	at Work	F test	Family Life/F test	
In traditional jobs	3.51	.796	2.08	.582
In nontraditional jobs	3.48		2.05	
<u>Grand Mean</u>	<u>3.50</u>		<u>2.07</u>	
With job satisfaction	3.33	.000	2.77	.000
With job dissatisfaction	4.03		3.10	
<u>Grand Mean</u>	<u>3.53</u>		<u>2.87</u>	
Married	3.56	.153	2.92	.000
Separated/divorced	3.58		3.08	
Single	3.45		2.65	
<u>Grand Mean</u>	<u>3.53</u>		<u>2.86</u>	
Married without children	3.57	.483	2.69	.000
Married with children	3.55		3.05	
Single without children	3.47		2.68	
Single with children	3.56		3.10	
<u>Grand Mean</u>	<u>3.53</u>		<u>2.86</u>	
Soldier/officer	3.60	.973	2.79	.000
Wife and soldier/officer	3.57		2.69	
Single parent and soldier/officer	3.57		3.61	
Mother, wife and soldier/officer	3.55		3.06	
<u>Grand Mean</u>	<u>3.56</u>		<u>2.93</u>	

HEALTH STATUS AND STRESS AMONG US MILITARY WOMEN

It is hypothesized that the more roles military women assume, the more obligations they face, the more likely they will experience more stress. In order to test this hypothesis, four different role patterns were defined:

- (1) one-role occupation, consisting of single women who are childless;
- (2) two-role occupation, consisting of women who are wives without children in addition to the military role;
- (3) single parents; and
- (4) three-role occupation, including currently married mothers.

Regarding stress by multiple roles, no significant differences were found in stress at work for different role patterns. Furthermore, by examining each particular role instead of the number of roles, it was found that single parents are more likely to be associated with the highest level of stress in family life (3.61) than childless wives (2.69), even though both groups have two-role occupations.

Similar to the case for stress, being assigned to a traditional or nontraditional female job failed to produce significant differences in health status (Table 3). Although the group mean of health status was slightly higher for women in nontraditional jobs, the difference is considered to be attributable to chance. The hypothesis that military women who are in traditional female jobs report better health than those in nontraditional female occupations was not supported in the study.

Not surprisingly, the relationship between job satisfaction and health status tended to be similar to that reported earlier for stress. When examined in terms of

job satisfaction, the means of health index appear significant differences. The higher group mean (19.94) of the health index was associated with women who were dissatisfied with their jobs, and women with job satisfaction were related to the lower group mean (19.05).

This finding supports the hypothesis that military women who are satisfied with their jobs are more likely to have better health than those dissatisfied with their jobs.

There were also significant differences in health index regarding marital status. As shown in Table 3, single women reported better health status (20.26) than those currently married and separated or divorced women (19.41 and 19.49, respectively). Also, single women without children showed the best health status (20.89), and single mothers reported poorer health (19.28) than other women. The differences were again significant.

Since both single parent and job dissatisfaction are related to higher levels of stress and poorer health, it may be argued that single mothers reported more stress and poorer health because they are less satisfied with their jobs. Are single parents in the military less satisfied with their jobs than others? Results presented in Table 4 provide a negative answer. Although a higher percentage of single mothers reported that they were very dissatisfied with their jobs (15.0), the highest percentage of women who were satisfied with their jobs was also associated with single parents (22.0). Overall, whether or not one is a single parent does not appear to make a difference in job satisfaction.

Table 3

Comparison of Group Means in Health Status
Among Military Women

Group	N	Group Means of Health Index	Significance of F
In traditional jobs	302	19.83	.694
In nontraditional job	204	20.00	
<u>Grand Mean</u>		<u>19.90</u>	
With job satisfaction	1228	19.94	.000
With job dissatisfaction	480	19.05	
<u>Grand Mean</u>		<u>19.69</u>	
Married	898	19.41	.001
Separated/Divorced	287	19.49	
Single	533	20.26	
<u>Grand Mean</u>		<u>19.69</u>	
Married without children	351	19.40	.001
Married with children	546	19.41	
Single without children	576	20.89	
Single with children	244	19.28	
<u>Grand Mean</u>		<u>19.69</u>	
Soldier/officer	115	20.04	.543
Wife and soldier/officer	351	19.40	
Single parent and soldier/officer	49	19.22	
Mother, wife and soldier/officer	546	19.41	
<u>Grand Mean</u>		<u>19.47</u>	

Based on the analyses above, multiple regression was employed to examine the impact of each independent variable on stress and health status when other variables were controlled. In the analyses, a number of dummy variables was used:

- 1) MARRIED : currently married = 1,
otherwise = 0;
- 2) CHILDREN : with children = 1,
otherwise = 0;
- 3) TRADITJOB: in traditional female job = 1,
otherwise = 0;
- 4) JOBSA : job satisfaction = 1,
otherwise = 0.

The impact on stress is examined in two multiple regression models presented in Table 5. When stress at work was examined, it was found that job satisfaction had a great negative and significant effect (-.306), while the effects of whether or not one is in a traditional female job were trivial and negligible (-.008). These findings are consistent with our bivariate analyses. When predicting stress in family life, it was found that job satisfaction again provided a significant impact (-.133) when other variables were controlled. Furthermore, whether the respondent has children or not also showed a significant impact on stress in family life. Women who have children experience more stress than those who are childless. The effects of marital status on stress both at work and in family life was negligible and not statistically significant.

Table 4

Job Satisfaction by Marital Status and
With/Without Children Among Military Women

<u>Groups</u>	<u>J o b S a t i s f a c t i o n</u>			
	Very Dissatisfied/	Dissatisfied/	Satisfied/	Very Satisfied
	N / %	N / %	N / %	N / %
Married without children	34/9.7	57/16.3	193/55.3	65/18.6
Married with children	55/10.2	92/17.0	283/52.4	110/20.4
Single without children	58/10.1	103/17.9	293/51.0	120/20.9
Single with children	37/15.0	46/18.7	109/44.3	54/22.0
<u>Total</u>	<u>184</u>	<u>298</u>	<u>878</u>	<u>349</u>
	$X^2 = 9.98$		$P < .35$	

DISCUSSIONTable 5Standardized Regression Coefficients of Stress and Health Status Among Military Women

	<u>Stress</u> <u>at work</u>	<u>Stress in</u> <u>family life</u>	<u>Health</u>
MARRIED	-.043	+.005	-.026
CHILDREN	+.014	+.115*	+.036
TRADITJOB	-.008	+.042	-.012
JOBSA	-.306***	-.133**	-.041
STRESS	.00	.00	-.273***
R ²	.095	.035	.071

-
- * P < .05
 ** P < .01
 *** P < .001

Although it was found in the bivariate analyses that marital status and job satisfaction were related to health status, the effects of marital status and job satisfaction on health were not significant in multiple regression. In the model predicting health status, only STRESS (including stress at work and in family life) exhibited a significant effect (-.273). It can be assumed that the effects of marital status and job satisfaction on health status were mediated by stress.

Given the fact that the military is a traditionally male-dominated institution, the consequences of women's participation in the military have attracted controversy from both politicians and scholars. Like women in other occupations, military women experience problems and stresses. The present report provides a number of insights into the characteristics of military women's social roles and the relationships between those characteristics and military women's health status and psychological well-being. To summarise these results:

1. There were no significant differences in stresses at work and health status between military women assigned to nontraditional and traditional female jobs.
2. There were no differences in job satisfaction between military women in traditional female jobs and nontraditional female jobs. However, job dissatisfaction was associated with more stresses at work and poorer health.
3. Separated or divorced women were more likely to report more stress in family life, and poorer health than currently married and single women.
4. Single parents in the military reported poorer health than other female military personnel; they reported more stress in their family life, but not at their jobs.
5. The number of roles assumed by military woman was not significantly related to stress and health status.

With the expansion of female roles in the armed forces, the debate on the position of women in the military has not mitigated. According to Mitchell (1989), the presence of women in the military has dangerously weakened, or "feminized" national security. For Stiehm (1989), equal opportunity and the righteous demands of women are more important than military effectiveness. Segal (1982) made great effort in emphasizing both citizen equality and military effectiveness, suggesting that physiological and psychological characteristics of women may not handicap but benefit women's performance in traditional male-dominated positions such as combat units.

Although the question of whether or not women should be in the military is beyond the scope of this study, it may shed light on the explanations of the findings. For women, being able to join the military is quite different from being successful in the military. The extent of success may be reflected by self-evaluation in terms of job satisfaction. An earlier study found that women who work in female-type occupations are more satisfied with their jobs (Hodoson 1989). This finding is parallel to common sense and indirectly supports the argument that it is difficult for women to adjust to military life. In the present study, however, having a traditional women's job in the military was not associated with greater job satisfaction. This suggests that military women now accept nontraditional jobs as a challenge and they are successfully adjusting to the work and social pressures of military life.

As Segal (1989) stated, the proportion of married persons in the military has increased. Since both the military and the family require a great deal of commitment, loyalty, time, and energy, the conflict between them seems unavoidable. Nevertheless, if we only focus

on the presence of marriage among military women, we may over-simplify the matter. The present study finds that single women in the military are least likely to report higher levels of stress and poorer health; however, those who are most likely to report greater stress in family life and poorer health are single parents. Due to the fact that there is no other parent to share child care, single parents bear more family responsibilities and demands, which may cause stress in their life and influence their health conditions. Moreover, to be a single mother is more difficult in the military because of the characteristics of military life, including frequent moves and excessive job demands. Nevertheless, single mothers' stresses in their family life do not necessarily weaken the readiness of troops. Single mothers have often been viewed as a problem by military leaders who are concerned with their commitment to military service (Bowen 1987). The present study, however, provides evidence that single parents are not likely to report more job dissatisfaction, nor are they more likely to report more stress at work than other military women. The result is consistent with the findings among air force single mothers (Bowen 1987; Orthner and Bowen 1982), suggesting that most single mothers in the military are coping well with the conflict between work and family life and showing higher commitment to their military careers. There is little doubt that military policy and regulation concerning the family situation and demands of single parents, such as adequate day care for children, are likely to benefit both job performance and family commitments. It has been widely assumed that it is difficult for women to combine several roles; however, a number of studies has gradually suggested that the difficulty involving multiple roles for women has been exaggerated (Barnett and Baruch 1985; Spreitzer et al. 1979; Stewart and Malley 1987; Verbrugge 1982). On one

hand, some researchers argue that, because human energy is limited, one's psychological well-being is impaired by conflicts among multiple roles. Other scholars emphasise the advantages of multiple role involvement. Both sides are limited by their focus on the number of roles assumed. The present study reveals that military women's stress and health status are not specifically related to the number of roles assumed but on the quality of a particular role and the way by which different roles are combined. The experience of a woman who assumes the two roles of soldier and wife, for instance, may differ from that of a woman who is a soldier and a single parent. Also, the experiences within each role and how much the woman enjoys each role may result in different psychological and physiological consequences from multiple role involvement. The discussion of women in military service is likely to continue. If any generalisation can be drawn from the present study, it is that women appear to be adjusting better to military life than the military is adjusting to the presence of a significant number of women. The rapid transition from a basically male institution to one in which both sexes are involved will require additional structural and service adjustments.

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Florence R. Rosenberg

**THE YOUNG ARMY WIFE:
LIFE SATISFACTION, PROBLEMS AND ATTITUDES**

C O N T E N T S

RESEARCH DESIGN

MAJOR THEMES

1. Demographics
2. Similarities between the Posts
3. Differences between the Posts
4. Role of the Army Wife
5. Stress
6. Social Interaction
7. Social Support
8. Variations in Life Style
9. Coping
10. Expectations, Perceptions and Attitudes
11. Instrumental Support - The Crucial Need

ONE YEAR LATER: FOLLOW UP INTERVIEWS OF FIRST TERM WIVES

1. Methodology and Sample
2. Reinterview Schedule
3. Results

RESEARCH DESIGN

This report presents the results of a study of wives of first term enlisted soldiers at two Army posts (called Fort Grant and Fort Winston in this report). The respondents were selected from lists of married first term enlisted men at each post. Since we did not have home addresses, we obtained phone numbers either by contacting the soldier husband or through local phone directories or information. Each woman was then contacted by phone and a personal interview was arranged at her home. There were very few refusals; those who did refuse did so on the basis of lack of time, usually even before the nature of the study was explained to them. The total number of respondents was 44, 24 at Fort Grant and 20 at Fort Winston.

The research method consisted of personal semi-structured interviews lasting about one to one and a half hours. The interviews generally covered a wide range of topics including the following: attitudes toward military life and toward the Army; husband's service; perceived role of the Army wife; family status; employment status; housing and community; general well being; problems; social support; and background data. The interviewer asked questions on each topic but did not provide pre-categorised responses and allowed ample opportunity for comments, questions, etc. by the respondent. The only exceptions to this technique were three scales which were completely structured: general well being, self esteem and locus of control or mastery. Every respondent completed the interview and most expressed appreciation that the Army was showing some interest in their life, problems and adjustment.

Approximately one year after the initial interview, respondents were contacted by telephone for a brief re-interview. A total of 34 women (over 77% of the original sample) were reached. The second interview focused on change in terms of life events, adjustment and general well being.

The major results of this research are described below. They are described in terms of themes or generalisations that emerged from these interviews. It must be noted that because of the small sample and the fact that it was not a probability sample, these results cannot be generalised to the total Army. However, they do provide insights that represent useful hypotheses for subsequent more rigorous research. In fact, at present we are conducting a survey of a sample of first term wives largely based on this pilot study.

Following the description of major results is a brief report on the re-interviews.

MAJOR THEMES

1. Demographics

In terms of demographic characteristics, both sets of respondents (those at Fort Grant and Fort Winston) can be described as follows:

- a. Almost all are young; over two-thirds are under 25 and only two women are over 30.
- b. Most of the respondents come from working class or lower middle class families (in terms of father's or mother's occupation). They represent all regions of the country and the majority grew up in small towns.

- c. In terms of ethnicity, nearly 80% of the respondents are white but the group includes seven Blacks, three Hispanics, one Asian and one Native American woman.
- d. About two-thirds of the respondents have children; the majority have only one child. A substantial group (seven) were pregnant at the time of the first interview.
- e. Most of the respondents (two-thirds) are not employed; among those who are working, the majority are engaged in baby sitting in their own home. Most of the women indicate that they plan to work sometime in the future.

2. Similarities Between the Posts

There are considerable similarities in general attitudes between the two sets of respondents. In terms of both overall attitudes toward the military and attitudes toward specific life domains, (e.g., housing, finances, neighborhood), most respondents express mild satisfaction but little enthusiasm. Over half of the women show positive attitudes toward military life but only eight are enthusiastic. The remainder are either ambivalent or mildly dissatisfied while only two are highly dissatisfied. Over half of the women would like their husbands to make the Army a career, twelve respondents want their husbands to leave the Army and the remainder indicate that the decision is entirely up to their husbands. Attitudes toward military life and toward the Army as a career are highly consistent; if a woman is positive toward Army life, she is likely to favour an Army career while those with negative attitudes want their husbands to leave the Army. Almost all respondents report that their husbands enlisted for economic reasons (e.g., job security, benefits, civilian unemployment, etc.) and many wives are positive

toward the Army and military life for providing these economic benefits. It is perhaps noteworthy that only one respondent cited patriotism as a reason for enlistment.

3. Differences Between the Posts

There are, however, certain noticeable differences between the two posts and the two groups of respondents. In terms of background, the respondents at Winston reflect somewhat greater variation in several ways: they cover a wider age range and several have been married before. Almost all of the Winston wives have children and very few are employed. At Fort Grant, the respondents split fairly evenly between those with and without children and nearly half are employed, usually in a baby sitting capacity. However, there is apparently no relationship at either post between family status and employment status. Finally, at Winston, several respondents reflect military backgrounds in terms of either parents' occupation or prior marriage.

There are several important differences between the two posts, differences which may affect wives' attitudes. Fort Grant consists only of support troops while Fort Winston is basically a centre for combat troops, chiefly artillery and infantry. This produces certain differences in terms of soldiers' work conditions as well as the general military presence. At Grant, most soldiers work a "normal" day and week with occasional night duty and short field trips. At Winston, there is considerable variation as a sizeable group works long hours (60 or more per week); field duty is frequent and long (two weeks to a month) for many soldiers. In fact, field duty is a highly salient issue for wives at Fort Winston; they tend to introduce the subject im-

mediately, indicating that they like Army life despite field duty or that it is a major source of stress in their lives. On the other hand, at Fort Grant where field duty tends to be shorter and less frequent, it is usually accepted as part of work life and most wives indicate they are adjusted to it.

The major difference between the two posts is the greater salience of the military presence at Fort Winston. Wives there show greater awareness that they are in military environment; they are more knowledgeable about their husbands' work, they use military expressions and, despite some variation, tend to have more unit contacts than their counterparts at Fort Grant. Possibly because of the greater unit presence, Winston wives tend to experience more interaction across ranks with several first term wives reporting friendships with wives of NCOs and officers. At Fort Grant, few wives had much contact with NCO or officers' wives.

The higher visibility or salience of the military at Fort Winston is not due to the housing or community context. Most first term families at Winston live off post in a variety of housing arrangements and locations. The modal unit for first termers is the trailer park consisting of fairly minimal housing and rather bare surroundings (e.g., lack of paving, trees or playground facilities). Housing on-post or in off-post apartments and town houses tends to be comfortable and attractive. However, the private housing is expensive and usually exceeds the housing allowance. At Fort Grant, almost all respondents live on post, in a single housing community which is the centre for their daily lives, social interaction and friendships. To the extent that wives at Grant have developed a sense of common interest and consciousness of kind, it is rooted in

this housing community of lower rank enlisted soldiers occupying very similar apartments.

This contrasts sharply with the scattered and variable type of housing and communities found at Fort Winston. Despite this, the latter group of wives seem to reflect a greater sense of common interests than do the wives at Grant; these feelings seem to be rooted in the unit as well as in the community of residence. It should be pointed out that the apartment complexes and trailer parks around Fort Winston are overwhelmingly military in terms of residents.

4. Role of the Army Wife

Although one of the central points of interest in the research was the concept of role, we found little evidence at Fort Grant that the first term wife perceives her behaviour in terms of a role; in fact, in certain instances (such as interaction across ranks), some wives explicitly reject any idea of prescribed or expected behaviour and attitudes. However, despite this, respondents implicitly expressed a "consciousness of kind," a recognition that they share a common situation and that they would like group activities and interaction based on this shared status. At Fort Winston, we found a similar rejection of prescribed behaviour across ranks. However, there was somewhat greater awareness and response with respect to role. Most responses were in terms of behaviour toward one's husband (e.g., supportiveness) or qualities such as independence that it is necessary for the wife to develop as a coping strategy.

5. Stress

These respondents represent a group considered highly vulnerable to stress on the basis of a number of demographic characteristics: they are young, not highly educated and many of them are spending most of their time at home with infants or preschool children. In terms of life events, all of them have experienced at least some changes in the recent past while most have undergone multiple life events. These include leaving school or a job, marriage, pregnancy and/or childbirth and leaving the family of origin as well as the geographical area in which they grew up. For many respondents, their basic social identity has changed, e.g., from high school student to wife and mother. At the same time that these multiple events have occurred, these young women have been separated from their usual sources of social support such as parents, siblings and friends. Thus, they face a new community, new social status as well as additional stresses associated with their husband's Army duties, e.g., long and/or unpredictable hours, extended absences from home on field duty, etc. In addition to these stressors, many of the respondents have limited coping skills (social and intellectual) due to youth and inexperience. To sum up, we see a group that is peculiarly vulnerable to stress. To what extent, stress will lead to psychological distress may be influenced by the individual's experience in terms of social interaction and social support in her new environment.

6. Social Interaction

Most respondents apparently meet people and make friends within the Army community. At Fort Grant, this is done chiefly within the post community in which most

first term wives reside. At Fort Winston, the source of interaction and friendship may be rooted in the unit as well as in the residential area. It is clear that casual interaction (e.g., chatting, having coffee together, going shopping) is very important to these young women. One wife described how she and a group of other wives in her trailer park stay up all night drinking coffee and feeling sorry for themselves while their husbands are in the field. She emphasised that the fact that everyone is in the same position is a great source of comfort at such times. The importance of friends can be seen most sharply among those who have failed to make friends. There is among the respondents a small group who seem socially isolated. They generally have withdrawn, claiming they do not want friends. This attitude tends to follow a negative experience(s) of feeling rebuffed or betrayed by others. In a few cases, the respondents describe suffering when good friends have moved (an inevitability in the military) and the desire to avoid such experience in the future. In one case, social experience was so traumatic that the respondent broke into tears whenever the subject was brought up; the nature of the experience was never described but had obviously affected all her interactions with others. In some cases, the respondent clearly was not reporting the true cause of her social isolation (e.g., the woman who "wants her privacy"). Among this group, several respondents volunteered that social isolation was a new experience for them, that they had had no difficulty in the past and attributed their present problems to the nature of the military community (e.g., unfriendliness, lack of trust, etc.)

7. Social Support

Both posts have a fairly well developed network of formal support agencies and personnel. Fort Winston has the more extensive support system including a Spouse Centre established for families. Furthermore, wives at Fort Winston seem to be more aware of these resources than are their counterparts at Fort Grant. However, most wives apparently derive social support from informal, rather than from formal sources. As mentioned above, friends made through the unit or residential area represent the major sources of support. At the same time, many respondents indicate that their major support continues to be their family, usually their mother, a fact reflected in large phone bills. Mentoring represents an important support phenomenon. Several respondents describe a mentoring relationship - this may be with an assigned individual (such as a unit NCO or NCO wife), a relative on post or a neighbour. In these cases, there is a continuing relationship with someone more knowledgeable and experienced in the military community who helps with information, emotional support or provides someone to talk to. Respondents enjoying such a relationship feel they can call upon this individual when they need help or simply for social reasons. Respondents who have had a mentor seem to have made particularly effective adjustments to military life. In terms of formal support agencies and personnel, respondents vary in terms of their awareness as well as their willingness to use such official sources. Apparently, they will consult formal agencies in times of crisis (e.g., marital, financial, etc.) but prefer to rely on their families and their new friends in the community.

8. Variations in Life Style

There is variation among respondents in a number of ways, in addition to attitudes toward military life. Some live in busy households where the phone is ringing, neighbours are dropping in, children are playing. Others seem lonely and isolated with only the TV for company. At Grant, living quarters are basically similar (the majority of respondents live in one neighbourhood) but vary on two dimensions:

neatness --- disorder
 bareness --- personalization

Personalization refers to the extent to which the apartment reflects the interests and personality of the respondent (e.g., as indicated by pictures, plants, ornaments, collections, etc.) The neatness-disorder dimension does not appear significant except in the case of two women who appeared to be under severe psychological distress; in both instances, the disorder verged on the pathologic and, in fact, in one case has been brought to the attention of the Army. However, the degree of personalization does seem a very rough indicator of general mental health. Although basic furnishings are very similar in most apartments, the variation in personalising one's surroundings seems to indicate whether the woman cares about herself and her environment, whether she is trying to make a life for herself and her family, rather than simply existing. After a while, it was possible to make a general prediction of the GWB Score on the basis of this factor.

This type of analysis cannot be applied to Fort Winston because of the greater variability in residences. Housing on post is very pleasant with spacious, cheerful units. The trailer units are generally somewhat cramped

and, as indicated elsewhere, set in depressing surroundings. Other housing off post varies but is mostly quite pleasant. Apartments and trailers differ in the degree of personalization; however, the trailers tend to be extremely cluttered if there are many personal objects around while the rest look relatively bare. It must be pointed out that nearly all trailer residents are on the post housing list and thus see their quarters as temporary.

9. Coping

The importance of individual coping resources must be emphasised. Most respondents are of lower or working class origin but several, on the basis of education and parental background, are clearly middle class. Despite the fact that they are deviant in terms of background and present context, the middle class respondents are among the best adjusted women. They are better able to cope in terms of meeting their own social and other needs, often outside the military community. For example, at Grant, two live off post and one has developed friendships at work, outside the military community. It should be noted that two of the middle class respondents are also among the oldest which may partially explain their superior coping resources.

At Fort Winston, several of the wives have some kind of military background and this familiarity with military life does produce an acceptance of certain conditions, such as field duty.

10. Expectations, Perceptions and Attitudes

In order to understand respondents' attitudes, it is necessary to take into account perceptions and expectations. Most of the wives manifest both general satisfaction as well as satisfaction with specific life domains (although satisfaction appears to be moderate, rather than enthusiastic). We must compare their present situations with earlier experience in terms of finances, housing, social interaction, etc. Thus, although they have modest incomes, the security and benefits compare favourably with their civilian experience. Furthermore, their reference group tends to be either people in similar circumstances (other enlisted men's families) or those in less favourable circumstances such as civilian friends in economically depressed areas. Furthermore, most respondents are optimistic, perceiving their present life conditions as temporary and expecting improvement in the future. These factors all help to explain the relative satisfaction found among this group.

The results on the Mastery scale showing high internal locus of control must also be understood within the context. Although it would seem that the military directs much of their lives, most first term wives feel they have control. Apparently, they accept certain limits and, within those parameters, feel they can direct their own lives.

11. Instrumental Support - The Crucial Need

Finally, the results of this research show at Fort Grant the general ineffectiveness of official or formal sources of support in terms of delivery of services. Although they are available, many respondents have only

a vague awareness of them and use them only when in severe difficulties (such as financial crises). Respondents do indicate a desire for greater support especially at the beginning (e.g., orientation activities). However, in most cases they seem to have developed effective social support through informal means, chiefly in their neighborhood. It is interesting that the single largest group of respondents cite their husbands as the major source of support in their initial adjustment to military life.

At Fort Winston, the situation is somewhat different. The formal support resources appear to be better developed and more active than at Grant (e.g., the outreach program of ACS). More wives report welcoming and support activities on their arrival at the post and there is generally greater awareness of support programs and agencies. However, there is still wide variation among the wives, from those who work as volunteers at support centers or actively participate in unit wives' programs to those who do not know that a Spouse Center exists or that transportation is available to wives both on and off post. Some of this may be due to individual differences in personality and temperament such as energy level, ease in new social situations, etc.

At both sites, the importance of instrumental support, the need for wives to have access to knowledge and information, emerges strongly. At Grant, it was clear that many wives were vague about military resources as well as the general community. At Winston, while more knowledgeable, many respondents were critical of the way information is disseminated. In both cases, the importance of teaching the new wife to find things, to get around, to seek assistance was emphasized; moreover, this should be done when she first moves to the

post. At present, while many resources exist on both posts, there is no sure systematic way that the first term wife learns about them.

This research revealed strikingly the need for instrumental support as a way to improve the life of the first term wife, especially at the beginning. Basically, she needs information: she needs to know where stores are located, where the hospital is, how to get on the list for post housing, how to find a baby sitter, etc. Eventually, most wives learn these things on their own; however, it would make life easier if they received this information soon after arrival on post. Ideally, a sponsor assigned to each new wife would be best; however, group meetings, tours, supplemented by literature is also effective. A number of respondents stressed that sending information indirectly through the husband is not a reliable method of communication. While most wives eventually learn their way around, their entry to the post and military life could be eased. It should finally be noted that their initial attitudes do affect their continuing perceptions and feelings about military life and the Army.

ONE YEAR LATER:

FOLLOW UP INTERVIEWS OF FIRST TERM WIVES

1. Methodology and Sample

The initial research plan called for follow-up interviews of each of the 44 respondents in the original study. Wherever possible, we obtained names, addresses and telephone numbers of relatives or friends who would be likely to know the respondent's whereabouts in case she moved. (Usually, the "contact" person was the mother or parents of the respondent.) Consequently,

about a year after the initial interview, we attempted to reach each respondent by telephone. The interval between initial and follow-up interviews ranged from ten to fifteen months but the average was about one year.

Overall, over three-quarters (77%) of the original respondents were reached for the reinterviews. The rate of success, however, differed between the two posts. At Fort Grant, a total of 17 of the original 24 respondents were reinterviewed (71%) while at Fort Winston, the success rate was 85% (17 of the original 20 respondents). This difference may be explained by two factors: several respondents at Fort Grant had not been willing to identify contacts and thus were impossible to trace after moving; in addition, there was generally a somewhat longer interval of time between the first and second interviews at Grant than at Winston so that more women had moved or changed other life circumstances.

Of the ten respondents who could not be reached for reinterview, seven had moved and had either not named a contact person or the person named was unreachable due to death, moving, or a disconnected phone number. One respondent had moved overseas and her relatives either could not or would not tell us her address or phone number. Finally, two women who apparently had not moved were unreachable despite repeated attempts to contact them.

2. Reinterview Schedule

The follow up interview differs from the original interview in several respects: it is conducted by telephone; it is usually much briefer than the initial interview; it is less structured than the first inter-

view; although similar content is included in each follow up, the questions are tailored to the particular respondent and, in some cases, we refer to responses in the initial interview. In general, however, the following content is included in each of the reinterviews:

1. Changes in life circumstances
 - a. Moves (to new post, OCONUS, within same area, etc).
 - b. Employment status
 - c. Family status (separation, divorce, new baby, pregnancy)
 - d. Husband's service (MOS, promotion, overseas duty, reenlistment, left service)
2. Changes in attitudes toward military life, reenlistment
3. Health
4. Finances
5. Friends
6. Major problems
 - a. Coping methods
 - b. Social support sources (friends, relatives, unit, military agencies, etc.)
7. Role of Army wife
8. Summary of life since original interview (life satisfaction, GWB, etc.)

3. Results

The major results of the reinterviews are summarised below. It should be emphasized that these generalisations apply only to those respondents we were able to reinterview. However, it is difficult to identify any common factor among the respondents we could not reach that might bias the results that are described here.

- a. As indicated earlier, these respondents represent a group that has experienced a number of life events in a relatively short period. Changes in residence, marital and family status, employment and husband's service have all occurred.
- b. Attitudes toward the Army and military life do not show much change. Most respondents on reinterview are moderately positive toward the military but few show much enthusiasm. Most either favour reenlistment or feel it is the husband's decision. In a number of cases, reenlistment apparently depends on certain circumstances such as changing MOS, entering a training program, assignment nearer home and family, etc.
- c. Despite longer experience in the military community, the role of the Army wife continues to be unclear to most wives. Where they are responsive to this concept, they tend to answer in terms of attitude and behaviour toward their husbands, i.e., support, understanding and patience.
- d. During the initial interview, most respondents tended to be optimistic, feeling that their lives would improve and that certain problems would be solved. This optimism apparently was justified. A smaller proportion now describe serious problems;

finances represent the problem cited most frequently during the second interview. Most of the life events described above have had positive effects: the birth of a baby, pregnancy, moving to a new residence almost always result in greater satisfaction. It is noteworthy that with one exception, all the women who are or have been overseas enjoy the experience, in some cases manifesting considerable enthusiasm. Almost half of the husbands have been promoted, resulting in improved finances. Finally, several respondents describe themselves as happier because of improved marital relations and the development of friendships in the community. Nearly half of the respondents describe their lives as better since the first interview. Among the remainder, most were fairly happy at the initial interview and say little has changed. Where women describe their lives as less satisfactory or up and down, they tend to be undergoing stress due to a specific life event such as marital disruption, financial stress, etc.

e. In terms of social support, although respondents still rely considerably on husband and family, they are more likely to identify current friends and neighbours as well as unit personnel and spouses as sources of support. Formal military support agencies and personnel are most likely to be used in cases of crises or severe problems. Generally, respondents are more knowledgeable about these support facilities than at the initial interview, whether or not they have actually used them.

f. Finally, most respondents seem to be coping adequately with military life. Many explicitly state that they had to get used to certain things, to develop patience and understanding about the demands on their husbands, to learn their way around, etc.

Experience as well as positive life events have contributed to general adaptation and improved quality of life in most cases.

Mary P. Tyler / Robert K. Gifford

**FATAL TRAINING ACCIDENTS:
PATTERNS OF STRESS AND RECOVERY**

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government (para 4-3, AR 360-5).

C O N T E N T S

Abstract
Introduction
Close friends of the deceased soldier
Injured survivors
Soldiers separated from their unit
Leaders
Unit medical personnel
Summary and conclusions
References

ABSTRACT

Investigation of five fatal training accidents suggests characteristic patterns of stress and support. Several groups of soldiers are usually affected. Of these, bereaved friends receive the most intense support, and play a symbolic role in unit recovery. Survivors receive somewhat less support. Soldiers separated from the unit are often overlooked. Leaders and health care providers experience serious professional stress, but receive little help in coping, particularly if their own leaders are not part of the affected unit. Findings have implications for other types of military deaths, and for catastrophic events in civilian organisations.

INTRODUCTION

When a fatal accident occurs during military training, the entire unit is subjected to intense stress. The training exercise is transformed into a scene of horror as soldiers struggle to rescue fellow soldiers from burning or upturned vehicles. In the aftermath, friends grieve their lost comrade, rescuers and onlookers recover from trauma, the injured recuperate, leaders confront their sense of responsibility, and the entire unit returns to duty with equipment like that involved in the accident.

The United States Army Medical Research Unit-Europe has studied five fatal accidents involving American soldiers stationed in West Germany. Our research (Tyler & Gifford, in press-a) suggests that the unit provides a recovery context (Figley, 1988) which facilitates the healing of its members. However, the pattern of stress is complex, and some affected members tend to be supported more effectively than others. This paper will

summarise our principal findings with regard to two issues: the types of stress experienced by subgroups of unit members, and the efficacy of the unit in recognising and responding to the needs of those soldiers.

Our data base and methods have been described elsewhere (Gifford, Tyler & Przybelski, 1990; Tyler & Gifford, in press-a). All accidents involved armoured tracked vehicles, and occurred during realistic military training. They occurred in all-male combat units with an immediate readiness mission. Ordnance was involved in three accidents; in the other two, vehicles turned over and crushed their occupants. Each accident resulted in 1-3 fatalities and additional casualties. In each situation, most members of the company-size unit (about 60 members) were present or nearby at the time of the accident or soon after it. Our principal research methods have been semi-structured interviews (206 in all), and observation of unit members in natural environments such as the motor pool or barracks. In some studies, more formal measurements have been conducted as well.

Although a fatal training accident is stressful to some extent for all members of the affected unit, our research has delineated five groups of soldiers with special needs because of the roles they played in the accident. These include close friends of the deceased, survivors from the same vehicle, leaders, soldiers separated from the unit, and soldiers who provided medical treatment to the deceased. For the sake of clarity, we will discuss the five groups separately, but it should be kept in mind that in actual situations there is often overlap among them. For example, a leader may be a friend of the deceased or a survivor

from the same vehicle. Similarly, medical corps men and survivors may be friends of the deceased, and initial rescue or first aid attempts may be made by the survivors from the vehicle.

CLOSE FRIENDS OF THE DECEASED SOLDIERS

Though individuals differ in their response to bereavement (Wortman & Silver, 1987), the loss experienced by best friends can resemble the loss of a family member to sudden death. When soldiers live and work together 24 hours a day, at a long distance from relatives, civilian friends, and other sources of support, they often form deep emotional bonds. As one soldier described his relationship with his deceased friend, "When you're over here and don't have no family around, all you got is your friends. He was more than a family." The intense grief felt by close friends is all the more painful for being completely unexpected.

Even though the closest friends may suffer intensely, their needs are usually recognised immediately, and their resolution of grief is facilitated by strong support from peers and leaders (Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Gifford, in press-a, in press-b). Most soldiers are so well aware of their unit's social structure that they are able to identify the potentially bereaved as soon as they know the bumper number of the affected vehicle. Usually, these soldiers are held and comforted while the victims are still being extracted from vehicles and given first aid.

Later, the closest friends receive expressions of condolence and support. Patterns of comforting reflect a perceived hierarchy of bereavement, with those seen as most bereaved receiving visits and offers of consolation from the less bereaved. In addition to verbal expressions of concern, soldiers offer support through gestures such as accompanying a bereaved friend to the dining facility and coaxing him to eat.

Informal rituals in the unit facilitate the recovery of bereaved friends. Beginning the first night after the death, friends of the deceased sit in informal groups and reminisce about him. Often the friends participate in informal rituals such as polishing the dead soldier's boots before they are displayed at the memorial ceremony. Sometimes they gather photographs and other mementoes to share with the bereaved parents, or collect small gifts to be buried with their friend. Peers and leaders take care to ensure that the best friends are visited by the chaplain.

Numerical data from one study (Tyler, 1990) illustrate the extent to which the needs of the best friends are better recognised than those of other affected soldiers. In one company, all members were asked individually to list the five soldiers they thought had been most affected by a fatal accident. The two best friends of the deceased soldier were included, respectively, in the responses of 84% and 76% of the soldiers. This uniformity is particularly noteworthy in light of the fact that virtually everyone in the unit had been affected to some degree. Most unit members had liked and relied on the deceased soldier, and had been nearby when his tank burned. Five unit members had had near-death experiences as victims or rescuers, with two

requiring extensive hospitalisation afterward. The two best friends, however, were the primary focus of the unit's concern.

The best friends are not only recognised and supported, but also can play a special role in the recovery of the entire unit. Formal rituals such as the memorial ceremony are experienced more positively by all members if the close friends play a central role through speaking, reading, or participating in the honour guard. If the friends are omitted from planning and executing the ceremony, unit members typically feel angry and frustrated, and perceive the ceremony as a "show" for the senior commanders' benefit rather than for their own consolation. The best friends also have a special license to forgive fellow soldiers who are feeling guilty over their inability to rescue or resuscitate the dead soldier, and to urge the unit on in its return to duty.

INJURED SURVIVERS

An accident serious enough to kill one member of a vehicle crew usually injures fellow crew members to some extent. In the accidents we studied, the medical needs of injured soldiers ranged from brief treatment for shock to long-term hospitalisation and extensive surgery. In addition to their injuries, soldiers from the same crew suffer the psychic trauma of being at the point of disaster - feeling themselves engulfed by a fireball, or flying through the air in an overturning vehicle. All have a near escape from death.

Our observations of fellow crew members suggest that close proximity to the dangerous event is a serious source of stress. Our results are consistent with Weisaeth's (1989) investigation of an industrial disaster, in which he found the degree of proximity to the explosion to be closely related to the extent of the individual's traumatic stress symptoms. For some soldiers, the trauma is supplemented by physical injury, hospitalisation, and consequent separation from customary sources of support.

Fellow soldiers, however, are somewhat less apt to recognise the needs of injured survivors than the needs of bereaved friends. As noted above, in a study of soldiers' perceptions of their fellow soldiers' responses to an accident, the two best friends of the deceased were mentioned as seriously affected by 84% and 76% of the soldiers, respectively (Tyler, 1990). In contrast, two other soldiers, who had narrowly escaped death, had been hospitalised, and who were still convalescing six weeks later, were mentioned by only 47% and 23% of the soldiers, respectively. Furthermore, those who mentioned the injured soldiers often referred, in explaining their choices, to the closeness of their personal or professional ties to the deceased soldier rather than to the seriousness of their injuries or the trauma they had experienced.

Soldiers' relative inattention to the needs of the injured does not reflect a lack of caring. Their solicitude toward the bereaved suggests that they are deeply concerned for one another. However, most soldiers seem to find bereavement easier to understand, and to respond to with empathy, than the stress associated with injury and exposure to trauma. The difficulty of empathising with the injured is usually compounded if the injured soldier must be hospitalised.

Without the opportunity to observe him and talk with him, his friends find it even more difficult to arrive at an understanding of his experiences.

Though the injured do not typically receive as much support as the closest friends of the deceased, some of their peers usually understand their needs and support them. The injured are also well able to empathise with each other, and can, if they are together, provide one another with understanding and encouragement.

In addition, the needs of survivors from the vehicle interact with the needs of other unit members in a way that is beneficial for both groups. Unit members not in the affected vehicle typically experience a strong need for information about how the accident happened. They need this information to resolve the trauma cognitively (McCammon, Durham, Allison & Williamson, 1988), and they also have a realistic concern about safety as they resume duty with similar equipment. Thus, the injured, who are typically the only soldiers available to relate "what really happened," find themselves telling their story over and over to an audience of concerned peers. This interaction forces them to abreact and work through the experience, whether they had intended to or not. As one injured survivor put it, "They don't ask me, but I know they really wanted to know about what happened... Every time I talk, it helps get it out because it was all bottled up. It helped me feel better."

SOLDIERS SEPARATED FROM THEIR UNIT

Separation from the unit at the time of the accident, or during the period of recovery, takes place for a variety of reasons. As noted above, fatal accidents often produce non-fatal injuries requiring hospitalisa-

tion. In addition, it is not unusual for a few soldiers to be left back in garrison when the unit travels to the field for exercises. Some have duty in the rear, while others are left back because of illness or family emergencies. Soldiers may be out of town on leave, or attending residential military schools.

Unlike bereaved friends and the injured, the separated are rarely mentioned by peers and leaders as a source of concern. In fact, they often appear to be forgotten in the commotion surrounding an accident. When they are remembered, it is frequently with the assumption that they are lucky to have been sheltered from the stressful event and its aftermath.

However, our observations suggest that separated soldiers should be a source of concern (Tyler & Gifford, in press-a). Our findings are consistent with those of Hough et al. (1990) in their investigation of community response to a mass murder. They found that it is not necessary to witness traumatic death in order to be affected by it; the knowledge that such an event occurred within one's own personal sphere can be very distressing for some individuals.

Separated soldiers often learn of the accident in a particularly upsetting way, for example, "Some guys from the battalion were cleaning out SGT B's room. I asked what they were doing with SGT B's stuff, and they said, 'SGT B is dead.'" Having learned of the event, they receive little help in coping with it. If they feel grief for the deceased, anxiety about the injured, or fear for their own safety, they lack similarly affected peers with whom they can discuss these feelings. They may not be able to participate in formal or informal unit rituals. A soldier who is deeply affected by the death is not able to obtain the support and con-

solation which others receive from these experiences. Conversely, a soldier who is not particularly affected by the accident may find himself isolated when he finally returns to a group in which everyone else is deeply concerned with something he did not experience.

The needs of the separated can be met by either returning them to their unit, or, if that is impossible, arranging for visits by fellow soldiers. We observed that when leaders remembered the separated soldiers, and took these measures on their behalf, the results were very positive.

LEADERS

Leaders experience special stress in the aftermath of a fatal training accident (Gifford, 1990; Gifford & Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Gifford, in press-a). In addition to facing the same trauma as other unit members, they must attend to the morale of surviving soldiers and return the unit to full mission capability. Typically, they have to do this in the midst of investigations, and while under public scrutiny. Most feel deep grief, often compounded by a sense of guilt and personal responsibility. In some cases, leaders face the possibility of being relieved of duty or incurring criminal charges as a result of the accident. The requirements generated by the accident lead to grueling work schedules, which leave leaders exhausted physically as well as emotionally.

The pattern of social support for leaders is a complex one. Their suffering is not as widely perceived as that of others such as friends of the deceased. They are less likely than other unit members to be comforted or to receive other forms of direct support. However, they

receive support from several mechanisms which are less direct and more subtle than those experienced by other unit members.

The lack of recognition of leaders' stress stems in part from a self-imposed ethic of setting a strong example. Unfortunately, when leaders attempt to inspire their subordinates by hiding their own grief, their followers often misperceive them as simply not caring. Even when followers are aware of the leader's feelings, they find it difficult to offer consolation. The normal expectation is that leaders will care for followers, but not the reverse, and it is often difficult for a follower to console a leader without running the risk of insubordination.

Some subordinates do, however, find creative ways to provide social support to their leaders without violating the role requirements imposed by the rank structure. We observed junior officers who, without openly comforting their commanders, found just the right moment to convey - usually in one sentence - that they understood that the colonel was grieving too and that they valued his leadership and caring. Some commissioned and non-commissioned officers were very skilled in determining when their superiors needed to have someone "cover for them" by assuming extra responsibility when pressures reached a critical level. This support, usually offered without any overt acknowledgement by either party, was important for the leaders in letting them know both that their subordinates cared and that they could trust others to carry some of the burden.

Unlike junior soldiers, who receive support from their leaders and peers within the unit, leaders have few, if any peers in the same unit, and there are often com-

prising reasons for not discussing the accident with colleagues from outside the unit. Further, in the aftermath of an accident, leaders experience several barriers to communication with their own higher level leaders. First, senior leaders are extremely busy, and though they may actually be anxious to help, subordinate leaders often hesitate to bother them. Second, leaders are reluctant to say anything to their bosses that might appear to be an expression of weakness. Finally, the fatal incident may be the object of a criminal investigation. If this is the case, the senior leader is caught in two conflicting roles. He is both the mentor of the subordinate leader and the individual who may have to decide what charges, if any, should be brought against him.

Despite these barriers, most leaders reported having received at least some support from their own higher level leaders. When offered, this support was experienced as very meaningful and helpful. Personal comfort was important, and expressions of confidence in their leadership perhaps even more crucial to them.

In view of the tremendous burden on leaders and the relative lack of social support given to them, it is remarkable that leaders cope as well as they do with the stresses generated by fatal training accidents. We observed that leaders drew support and strength from several sources. Probably most important is the positive effect that comforting and caring for their soldiers has on leaders. The battalion commanders we interviewed, and leaders at several other levels as well, told us that they had been sustained by the process of caring for their troops. In various ways, leaders described a symbiotic process in which they led the unit through the grief process and in turn were comforted by the response of the soldiers to their grief

leadership. Leaders drew comfort not only from talking personally with grieving soldiers, but also from planning memorial ceremonies and other activities to facilitate their soldiers' recovery. Even when not directly involved, they found it heartening to observe that their soldiers were caring for one another and recovering from their trauma. Thus, while overt social support tends to flow from leader to follower and from peer to peer, there is a more subtle process by which leaders draw support from the reactions of those they lead.

Though there are barriers to communication within the chain of command, military chaplains are usually able to serve as confidants and comforters in ways that other soldiers cannot. Because comforting is part of their role, and they are expected to keep personal information in confidence, their intervention is experienced as appropriate. In addition to chaplains, wives were reported as key sources of support by most of the leaders in our sample (Gifford, 1990). It should be noted, however, that leaders' wives were burdened by heavy responsibilities of their own as they participated in notifying and caring for the wives of the dead and injured soldiers. Some leaders were reluctant to discuss their feelings with their wives because they wanted to shelter them from the more gruesome or otherwise troubling aspects of the accidents.

In summary, then, leaders' suffering is not as widely perceived as that of others, and they lack ready access to support from peers and leaders. Nevertheless, they cope well, finding other sources of help and receiving personal benefits from their own leadership. While the leaders we talked to were still grieving long after the fatal accidents, all had continued to function well and exercise positive leadership. We believe that this

ability to cope while receiving minimal social support probably reflects both the intrinsic character of those selected for leadership positions and the effects of the military training and other socialization processes which prepared them for leadership.

UNIT MEDICAL PERSONNEL

At the same time we studied the response of combat soldiers to five fatal training accidents, our colleague, Robert Przybelski, investigated the effects of the same accidents on the battalion's health care providers (Gifford, Tyler & Przybelski, 1989; Przybelski, 1990). These soldiers, medical corpsmen supervised by a physician's assistant, are typically the first to provide emergency medical care to the accident victims, and are often also involved in rescue attempts.

Przybelski found many similarities between these health care providers and other soldiers affected by the accident. Though they are not assigned to the line company affected by the accident, they usually have strong personal and professional ties within the unit. Participation in formal and informal rituals along with members of the line company is helpful to them, and they benefit particularly from the special license of the best friends to forgive those who were unable to save the deceased.

However, soldiers who have provided medical care also have unique needs associated with their professional role. They often feel guilty and responsible after a death, even though an objective evaluation might rate their emergency care as having met or exceeded normal professional standards. In order to resolve their experience of the accident, they need what Przybelski

(1990) has termed a "medical debriefing." This involves meeting with their supervisor and talking frankly about what was done, and, when appropriate, what could have been done better. Further, they need information from the receiving hospital, for example autopsy reports, to give them a better understanding of the reasons why they were not able to prevent the death from occurring.

This form of support tends to occur naturally within groups which work together on a regular basis, for example the physician's assistant and the corpsmen under his supervision. However, in the events studied, support for the physician's assistants from their supervisors and medical consultants outside the unit was minimal (Przybelski, 1990). It appears that professional people working in a hospital at some distance from the unit often fail to realise that unit medical personnel need their assistance in resolving professional stress after a fatal training accident. Thus the physician's assistant, like other unit leaders, is often left to care for his subordinates without receiving support from his own supervisory chain.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Friends, survivors, soldiers separated from the unit, leaders, and medical personnel all suffer specific types of stress in a fatal training accident. The grief of the best friends is the most widely recognised form of stress, and the friends receive considerable personal and institutional support. They also have the opportunity to play important roles in the unit's recovery process. Injured survivors receive less understanding than the closest friends, but other members' need to obtain information from them encourages them to talk through their stress in a supportive setting.

Those separated from the unit are often left to cope on their own, without the assistance of fellow unit members or group rituals.

Leaders and health care providers experience significant professional stress in addition to the stresses shared by other soldiers. The higher the leaders or medical personnel are in their own chain of command, the less support they receive, since subordinates find it difficult to comfort their superiors, and support from outside the organisation is, for various reasons, difficult to obtain. Leaders, however, draw strength from the process of comforting their subordinates and facilitating the unit's recovery.

Though our data are derived from the study of fatal training accidents in combat units, we have observed that our findings have implications for the understanding of military units' reactions to other kinds of unexpected death, and for civilian work groups' responses to fatal industrial accidents. Despite the differences between training accidents and such tragic events as traffic fatalities, accidental drownings, death in war, or accidents in the workplace, many of the individual and group reactions are similar, and there are parallel social support processes. Thus, we believe that our findings can be helpful to those concerned with facilitating the recovery of bereaved organisations in a wide variety of settings, and have elsewhere advocated an approach which supports the leaders of grieving groups and strengthens the group's capacity for healing its own members (Gifford & Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Gifford, in press-b).

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