

CULTURE, GENERATION, VALUE CHANGE,
AND SECURITY

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AND SECURITY

Part I.

Attitudes of the Young and their Parents
in Italian and German Metropolitan Areas.

by
Heinz-Ulrich Kohr & Hans-Georg Räder
(SOWI, Munich) and
Marina Nuciari & Guido Sertorio
(University of Turin)

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Preface

VOLUME 15 of the FORUM International series presents the results of a genuine cross-national research cooperation between the University of Turin and the SOWI.

The empirical study addresses the complex relationship between culture, generation, and value change on the one hand, and attitudes towards security and the military on the other. A common questionnaire was developed and administered to samples of young people (16 - 25 years) and their parents in Turin/Italy and in West German metropolitan areas. The results of the study contribute to better understand that problems of acceptance and legitimacy of defense issues and security policies in Western European countries are largely influenced by the rapid change of political paradigms, the change of the individuals' social and political consciousness, and the alteration of threat perceptions.

Policy making in the field of security and defence has proved to be a difficult task. This will remain so, particularly if it is aimed at broad democratic acceptance. Thorough knowledge of the kind provided in this comparative analysis will definitely be helpful in this respect.

As the editor of the FORUM International series, it is my privilege to present VOLUME 15 to an international audience. I want to express my appreciation for the complicated and time and energy consuming work to the four authors Heinz-Ulrich Kohr, Marina Nuciari, Hans-Georg Räder and Guido Sertorio. I also extend my thanks to Martin Davies from the University of Leicester for reading and reviewing the manuscript in order to bring it into proper English.

While this book goes to press, the authors are preparing the second part of their study to be published under the title "Culture, Modernization, and Value Change: Concepts and Analyses".

Munich, June 1992

Bernhard Fleckenstein
Director and Professor

Opinions expressed in the articles are solely those of the authors

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Sozialwissenschaftliches
Institut der Bundeswehr
Winzererstraße 52
8000 MÜNCHEN 40 - FRG
Phone (089) 120 03-1

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1. Introduction

In a series of empirical studies (public opinion polls), conducted at the German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research (SOWI) since 1981, the close relationship between general sociopolitical and socio-moral orientations of the young on one side and their orientations towards security policy and the military on the other was demonstrated (cf. Kohr & Räder, 1983, 1985, 1990, 1991; Kern & Räder 1989; Räder 1991; Kohr 1991).

In 1985 a joint venture with Guido Sertorio and Marina Nuciari of the University of Turin, Faculty of Economics, started. Its objectives were twofold: the replication of the German studies in the Italian context, and the cross-cultural study of the topics indicated above.

The perspective of the joint research is influenced by theoretical concepts and ideas of psychology, philosophy, sociology and political sciences. One of our main concerns is to take into account the interaction between social reality and the individual consciousness. Following the ideas and findings of the cognitive developmental approach in psychology (Piaget; Kohlberg), we are interested in the conditions that influence and change an individual's reasoning, attitudes, orientations, and values. Naturally, these processes are dependent on political and societal change. The change of values, which Inglehart and others (cf. e.g. Klages & Kmiecik 1984) have described and proclaimed as a major source of and pressure towards behavioral modification, is not a genuine phenomenon but an epiphenomenon of societal and political change. While accepting Inglehart's notion of materialism and postmaterialism (and his index to "measure" them) as crude descriptions, we think that his attempts to theoretically explain the phenomena are not adequate (cf. e.g. Böltken & Jagodzinski, 1985).

Instead of Inglehart's concepts we prefer the theoretical position of Joachim Raschke, 1980 a,b. He suggests that our society (i.e. the Federal Republic) currently is in a phase of a change of political paradigms. After World War II the paradigm of distribution ("Verteilungsparadigma") was predominant. It refers to the system of beliefs that economic growth and profits

are absolutely essential, because the distribution of these guarantees the survival of society and social peace. This paradigm includes a centralistic conception of politics. The preservation of the status quo dominates. Economic power and growth are central sources of political legitimation. They allow the system to avoid or diminish socio-political conflict by taking care for an adequate distribution of financial and social resources. It is apparent that Inglehart's notion of materialism is, so to say, a subset of the paradigm of distribution, and the correlations between the pertinent indices confirm this.

By way of contrast to this traditional paradigm, Raschke conceives a new, innovative paradigm, which he calls the paradigm of lifestyle ("Lebensweiseparadigma"). It summarizes the beliefs that, in the case of a conflict, material advantages have to be given up in favour of the preservation/ restitution of a socially and physically humane environment, even at the expense of profits and economic growth. This paradigm is individual-centered, decentralistic, and at the same time holistic. To fulfil human needs and to provide humane conditions of living for all human beings are seen as ultimate political tasks. The legitimacy and adequacy of policy is judged with reference to these criteria. In case of conflict between economy and ecology, technological, scientific, economic, and societal problems and processes are evaluated under the criteria of the new paradigm and judged accordingly. It is reasonable to assume that Inglehart's concept of postmaterialism can be regarded as a consequence of the more general political paradigm of life-style.

The citizens in the Federal Republic currently are oriented towards both paradigms, i.e. only minorities take part in exclusively one of the paradigms while rejecting the other. Most citizens either cannot recognize or perceive a conflict between the two paradigms, and thus accept both paradigms. Without being aware of contradictions (or not taking them seriously), they choose, so to say, the best of both worlds, as our empirical research shows. While the contradictions either are not clearly perceived or not accepted by the majority of citizens, they are reflected in the political rhetoric and action of minorities, and of political elites in particular.

Table 1 summarizes the theoretical concepts being

related to the two paradigms in section A. Characteristic socio-political orientations being linked to the traditional and the innovative paradigm are shown in sections B and C. While section B of the table describes general social and political orientations, section C focusses on orientations towards security policy and the military. This part of the table is based on results of empirical studies of the SOWI, but in this condensed form it inevitably also represents a simplification.

Table 1: Concepts, Orientations, Values, and Preferences Associated with the "Traditional" and the "Innovative" Paradigm

| "TRADITIONAL" | "INNOVATIVE" |
|--|---|
| <u>A. Theoretical Concepts with similar (empirical) Correlates</u> | |
| - Materialism: INGLEHART | - Post-Materialism: INGLEHART |
| - Paradigm of Distribution (Verteilungsparadigma): RASCHKE | - Paradigm of Lifestyle (Lebensweiseparadigma): RASCHKE |
| - Pre-Conventional and Conventional Sociomoral Reasoning: KOHLBERG | - Post-Conventional Sociomoral Reasoning: KOHLBERG |
| <u>B. General Socio-Political Issues</u> | |
| - economic growth; prosperity; stable prices; stable economy; | - dominance of ecological considerations; self-realization; individuality; |
| - fight against crime; maintenance of order; | - more say on job and community; less impersonal society; |
| - priority of economic and physical security; | - priority of quality of life; eventual renouncement of economic growth; |
| - conservative-traditional political orientation; | - unconventional (new) left political orientation; |
| - authority, order, achievement; | - participation/equality/solidarity; |
| - political participation is primarily seen as instrumental action | - political participation is instrumental, but also an expressive social interaction. |
| <u>C. National Security Issues</u> | |
| - strong defense forces with (high) attack capability; | - defense forces limited toward defense of own territory; |
| - military superiority/balance of power; | - common security/security partnership; |
| - modern armament necessary; disarmament problematic; | - disarmament orientation; |
| - unilateral disarmament unacceptable/problematic; | - unilateral disarmament acceptable; |
| - (limited) acceptance of nuclear arms; | - radical abolishment of nuclear arms; |
| - enemy image important; fear of overkill capabilities; | - fear of overkill capabilities; enemy image of secondary importance; |
| - military service accepted, but service without enthusiasm; | - military service problematic; tendency toward rejection/conscientious objection; |
| - peace movement: indifference or acceptance | - peace movement: acceptance or identification |

If we look at the relative preference for each of the two paradigms, operationally defined as the most accepted of the two, the data - in line with the theoretical expectations - show the following:

1) In the total population of the FRG, equipreference for both paradigms is held by the majority. The preference rate for the traditional paradigm is smallest; a substantially larger section of the population prefers the innovative paradigm (cf. Kohr & Räder, 1990, p. 82). In the Italian sample the trend is similar, although the section of those who prefer both paradigms is smaller (one third of the total sample) and the relative majority prefers the innovative paradigm. Data from the FRG furthermore indicate that the preference for the innovative paradigm has been growing since 1981, while the preference for the traditional paradigm was substantially larger at this time, the year of the first poll. These results support Raschke's theoretical concept of change of paradigms;

2) in the FRG as well as in Italy young people (aged between 16 and 25 years) seem to be more receptive to the innovative paradigm than the elder sections of the population. Whilst the difference to the generation of their parents is not very substantial, the contrast to the generation of grandparents (as far as German data are concerned) is relatively large. It thus seems reasonable to assume that the internalization of the paradigms is influenced by generational learning and socialization (cf. Kohr & Räder 1991).

3) The degree of formal education is a summary indicator of a person's way of life and the opportunities open to him, thus also of current social status and status aspiration. Looking at the relationship between education and the affinity to the paradigms, the data in the Italian as well as German research reveal that high educational status is associated with the paradigm of lifestyle, and low status with the paradigm of distribution. These results are in line with the assumption that internalization of the innovative paradigm is - ceteris paribus - more probable if an individual has learned to deal with cognitively complex issues and situations, has acquired sensitivity to the conflicts and contradictions of a society in which risks like environmental pollution, nuclear devas-

tation etc. cannot be ignored anymore. As a consequence of particular conditions of everyday life, the innovative pattern of learning and experience is more probable for those who are not yet engaged in a job, who are still in the phase of post-adolescence (Keniston, 1977). In the age group 16-25 years, which has been analysed in several studies in Germany and in Italy, high school, college and university students are typical representatives of post-adolescents; in contrast to their peers already having a job, they clearly prefer the paradigm of lifestyle. Once the innovative paradigm has been adopted and has sustained the period of post-adolescence, it is probable that the resultant perspectives will also have an influence during the following period of professional/vocational life. Since their social and educational background usually is relatively high, the chances of those, who sympathize with the innovative paradigm, to gain influence in society are comparatively high too. Their agenda setting potential may thus contribute to a further spread of the innovative paradigm. Finally the structural change toward a "risk society" (Ulrich Beck) is likely to lead to a dominance of the innovative over the traditional paradigm in the long run. However, this process is very much dependent on the general social and political situation in a society, and in particular upon general economic welfare. Should there be a substantial decline (or the fear of such a process) the paradigm of distribution would again assume relevance.

2. The Research Questions

Up to now, our research over the last decade in summary has shown that the change of values, respectively the change of political paradigms, is an empirically substantial phenomenon in the Federal Republic. It has a concrete impact on political problems and issues, and on the way the citizens perceive and evaluate policies and their makers. The two areas in which the new paradigm probably was most visibly influential are orientations towards ecology, and towards security policy and the military. While the influence on ecology is rather obvious - ecology is a central element of the new paradigm -,

the clear relationship to security and the military outlined in Table 1 is less evident. The innovative paradigm is linked to these areas of policy via a different allocation of political priorities, a "post-materialistic" set of values, a different concept of security (referring to ecology, environment, social problems), and different ethical reasoning, the core of which is reciprocity (putting oneself into the others position) and generalization (claim of validity for all human beings). In these respects, the paradigm of lifestyle is related to post-conventional socio-moral reasoning (cf. Kohlberg 1976, 1984). This set of values, beliefs and orientations leads to the conviction that military power has to be reduced to a minimum, and to be used for defense only. It is a logical consequence of this mindset that a nuclear war represents the most extreme form of counter-ecology conceivable, since it implies the devastation of natural and social life opportunities. Also war in general is perceived as an inhumane, useless form of attempts to solve problems, which must be solved by means of communication, economy, and policy. Thus the military and military reasoning is accepted only under the strict precedence of defense.

In the context of our long-term research program three central questions now arise. Firstly if the two paradigms are culture specific, i.e. if they only exist in the Federal Republic, but not in other states/societies having a comparable degree of industrialization, a democratic power structure, and a similar culture. It is obvious, that this question can only be studied in international comparative research.

Secondly, if the paradigms as such were not culture specific, there would still be a need to prove empirically that a comparable link between the paradigms and general socio-political orientations of the generations exists in the culture we use for our comparison, i.e. in Italy.

And finally there is a need to study the relationship between the paradigms and orientations towards the military/security policy. Only if the same linkages can be empirically demonstrated, despite the different cultural/ national context, it is plausible to assume, that the emergence of the innovative paradigm is a quasi necessary outcome of societal change which is more or less similar in all highly industrialized

Western democratic societies.

Such a finding would have a very important political impact, because it advances the idea that the decline of the legitimation of the traditional military and security policy in the western European democracies is a consequence of societal change/societal evolution, not - or at least in the long run to a minor degree only - an outcome of policy making. This, in turn, would mean that traditional national security, and the military as the pertinent societal institution, would be subject to pressures towards change in the direction of more correspondence to the new political paradigm.

3. The Common Research Project

The cooperation with Marina Nuciari and Guido Sertorio, University of Turin, Institute of Sociology and Cultural Anthropology, dates back to the early 80s, when an Italian communication network of social scientists, who are interested in the study of the relationship between society and the military, the group "Forze Armate e Società", was founded.

Our interests at the SOWI in Munich and the interests of a part of this group was to set up a joint research project dealing with the impact of value change on the military and security policy. We had the chance to present our results to the group and to publish them thanks to the assistance of our Italian colleagues in their language (cf. Kohr & Räder 1985). The group, to which we were associated, made the decision to translate the questionnaire which was used in that research, and to adapt it to the Italian cultural context.

Since funding of research is at least as complicated in Italy as it is in Germany, it took a lot of effort and time of our Italian colleagues until a grant was available. Marina Nuciari and Guido Sertorio presented and discussed their ideas about the project at the SOWI in spring 1988. At this time we were thinking about a new approach to the empirical study of value change and its impact on military and security policy related orientations. The approach, which we all finally accepted, was to study the thesis of value change via the extended perspective of change in political paradigms. We further agreed upon the central

research questions already outlined above.


Few of the studies we know in the research field of value change have addressed the problem of generational value change, i.e. the communalities/ differences of values and orientations within families (cf. Bertram 1983). The study published by Jennings & Niemi 1981, "Generations and Politics. A Panel Study of Young Adults and their Parents", (1965 and 1973 panels), is a fascinating source of insight into the perspectives and problems of panels and generational comparisons, but its focus are political attitudes and behavior, and the cultural context of the study is not comparable. We therefore agreed to set up a design, in which the data of adolescents/young adults can be compared to those of their parents, which allows intra-family comparisons (see Figure 1).

In an ideal world of ample resources, a long-term panel would be best suited to test the theses of value change. However, these resources are not available, and there is good reason to assume that they will never be. Therefore we chose the compromise of inter-familial comparisons. Although our design is cross-sectional, it has the definite advantage of taking the family situation into account. This enables the testing of the hypothesis of socialization of values via transmission/tradition more directly against the hypothesis of change of values via generational learning and experience than this test is possible in the usual cross-sectional approach of the poll type.

Since the financial resources were rather limited, we had to decide on what samples we could base our comparison; there was no chance of obtaining a grant which would allow a representative Italian sample. Given these restrictions, we discussed the options available and agreed that the best possible solution would be the gathering of data in Turin and its metropolitan area.

Figur 1: DESIGN OF SURVEY

Design of Survey



| Aggregated Level | Concrete Socialization Situation |
|------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| "culture", "generation" | family = child & parent |
| 89 YGER German juveniles | 92 Torino families |
| 89 AGER German adults | 89 German families |
| 92 YITA Italian juveniles | 181 families in big cities |
| 92 AITA Italian adults | |

The sample should be representative - as far as possible - for adolescents/young adults (16-25 years old). Of course, sampling represents a severe problem under these criteria.

This age group typically is highly mobile in general and in particular in a centre of administration and industry such as Turin with a high student population and many other young people in this age group who were born in other areas. To interview the parents of these young people would have been an enormous financial and organizational problem. The interviews thus were concentrated on those of the young, whose parents live in the metropolitan area. But even under this limitation the representativeness of the sample could not be solved in a fully satisfactory way, since naturally not all parents, whose daughters or sons were interviewed, agreed to participate in the study.


Summarizing all these problems, the sample clearly is not representative in the sense of traditional public opinion polling. On the other hand, there is no concrete reason to assume that the systematic bias of the sample invalidates the data. Random selection of interviewers was met by the sampling institute, and many interviewers were used to gather the data. While the sample of single subjects who have been interviewed was considerably larger, only the data of intra-family pairs (n= 92) are included in the following analyses. The original German sample was comparatively large (n= 1786 cases; autumn 1988). For the purpose of this comparison, all single cases were excluded. As the second step, we selected all pairs of which the adolescent/young adult lived in a metropolitan area in the FRG (Berlin not included). This stepwise selection led to a sample of n= 89 intra-family pairs. As to the question of representativeness of this sample, the problems and objections mentioned for the Italian sample are more or less equally valid. Coping with these problems is inevitable in studies of this type. Finally it should not be overlooked, that the notion of representativeness is only meaningful if there is a well defined population (cf. Kohr 1989). This, however, is somewhat artificial and meaningless in the study of intra-family pairs.

3.1. Empirical Findings and the Level of Analysis: Introductory Remarks

In the following section we intend to briefly summarize the results of our study. This summary is preliminary insofar as it mainly refers to the aggregated level of the study. It does not take into account the analyses by means of complex indicators and family constellations. This will follow in a further report, which concentrates on detailed analyses. This section only comments on the overall structure of findings; it is meant as a basic description of the data (see figure 2). We will here lay the basis for more analytical approaches. After the description of the single variables in the study, we intend to summarize the findings with respect to national or cultural differences versus generational differences. As a first approach to the question of an ongoing value change it can be suspected that the generational differences are of special relevance. As will be seen, however, in the detailed analyses, this is only a rough assumption which needs elaborated analytical tools as well as theoretical explanations. All this is postponed here; we do not refer very much to statistical results of comparisons, to tables and numbers. The tables to this report are placed in the annex.

figure 2: VARIABLES IN THE SURVEY

Variables in the Survey



Comparable Variables for TORINO and Germany

4. Inter-Generation Comparisons

The following text is based on comparisons of the young and their parents in the Italian and in the German sample, i.e. we simply and directly tested the hypothesis of generational change by comparing the differences of data distribution by means of cross-tabulation with the following variables:

- general socio-political orientations and values;
- orientations towards work and job;
- expectations concerning future living circumstances;
- socio-moral issues of everyday-life;
- and orientations towards the military and security policy.

4.1. Young Italians and their Parents

a) general socio-political orientations and values

With respect to socio-political and value orientations, the "Inglehart-Index" (cf. Inglehart, 1979) clearly shows that postmaterialism in its 'pure' form is more widespread among the young than among adults, that is more among children than among their parents, while the opposite is true for 'pure' materialism; the two 'mixed' sub-groups, the mixed-materialist and the mixed-postmaterialist show the same tendency. It must be recognized, however, that those showing a postmaterialistic outlook to some extent are a majority in both sub-samples of young and adult Italians. Looking at the contents of these value orientations, generational differences are also evident: young people are less concerned with economic problems, the fight against rising prices, the maintenance of order in society, a stable economy. And they prefer the post-material value aspects freedom of speech, participation in decision-making, the dominance of ideas over money, a more humane society and environment. Money seems to play a minor role (while not at all being irrelevant) in the value set of juveniles: the large majority disagrees with the assumption that "personal success is measured by income", and a better income is the second "least important factor to improve personal quality of life". At the same time, they are more in favour of paying higher taxes for environmental protection (and they would pay more for this more than their parents),

and also of introducing new environmental legislation implying individual costs for citizens.

As to the ability of society to cope with major problems, scepticism is more widespread among the young than their among parents, particularly with regard to the possibility of abolishing environmental pollution through technological advancement; pessimism is also typical of the young regarding the probability of destruction of the environment by industrial plants and chemical industries, and they more frequently think that in the future there will be an increase of scarcity of resources, economic crises and shortage of food supplies. All in all, their parents are rather optimistic as far as technological development is concerned: the only perspective where both share the same frequency of pessimism is towards the eventual abolishment of nuclear arms in Europe, which is considered improbable or impossible by the majority of both sub-groups. The value orientation measured according to the paradigm model shows a less sharp distinction between children and parents than in the case of the Inglehart instrument. Socio-political orientations in fact relate to the distribution/traditional paradigm, to the life-style-innovative, or to the transitional paradigm in a very similar distribution, showing a relative majority of the innovative paradigm and a minority of the traditional one in both groups. The young are more frequently innovative than their parents (and less traditional as a consequence), but the difference is only slight.

b) orientations towards work and job

Work is an area in which the young show attitudes being different to those of their parents. For the overwhelming majority of young people the most important characteristics of the job are the improvement of quality of life and the possibility of self-actualization while parents are divided among self-actualization and economicistic elements such as "very good pay" and job security. Children prefer more than their parents a comfortable life even if this would mean less success in the job. Among these "comforts" they highly esteem culturally interesting and attractive programs in the community, less environmental pollution and better social services. Their parents are more attracted by an improvement of social services together with a less polluted environment. As it was

reasonable to expect, the young are more externally oriented as far as leisure time is concerned. Their main activities are to stay with friends, to go to movies and cultural events, and sports. Leisure time activities are very different for parents: to stay at home, and housekeeping are the more frequent activities, followed by seeing friends, and hobbies at home.

c) socio-moral issues of everyday-life

The morality index, i.e. the level of socio-moral orientation in the sense of the Kohlbergian approach, shows a very similar frequency distribution of the three moral levels (preconventional, conventional and postconventional) among young Italians and their parents: half of the two sub-samples are conventional, one third is postconventional and the rest is preconventional. Looking at the specific themes on which everyday-life morality has been measured, young Italians more frequently than their parents perceive that taking advantage of abstract institutions (that is, not doing harm to concrete persons) is either no moral problem, or should not be done because of the risk to be punished. Examples of the different contents of moral judgments are travelling free on public transport, defrauding insurance companies, finding a wallet with substantial amount of money in the street without handing it to the police, taking time off work without really suffering from a disease. All those are more frequently evaluated by a pre-moral or preconventional morality criterion, while a postconventional reaction is related to unloading of garbage not in a litter box but in the countryside.

d) political orientation and involvement

Interesting differences can be found in the domain of political orientations and involvement: young Italians in general are closer to the left than their parents, and more frequently declare a positive attitude toward new social movements such as the peace movement, environmentalists, opposition to nuclear power plants; political activity is very rare, while interest (high and low) is for both sub-groups the main choice. For young people, regional, national and transnational attachments are differently shaped: they are less frequently attached to the community or region in which

they live and more attached to Europe or the world in comparison to their parents, while national attachment is more or less the same.

e) orientations towards the military and security policy

The last theme of the intergenerational comparison deals with military attitudes and perception of military threat. With respect to this, the young are in general more sceptical and critical than their parents toward the military and security policy. The intensity of communication in the family or with friends about military matters is higher for young Italians. Among those who often pay attention to mass-media communication on military matters the young are more frequent than the adults (while the opposite is true for those who never care about these matters). As far as the security paradigms are concerned, the young more frequently reject the traditional paradigm of threat by the East and the traditional enemy image while the opposite is true for the 'overkill' paradigm (with which the majority of the total sample agrees anyway). To some extent this attitude coincides with the structure of threat perception: the East is not seen as a danger anymore (but among those who still consider it a large threat the young outnumber the adults), and the danger of a war in Europe is seen as rather low by the large majority of both sub-samples (but more by adults than by young). In the small segment of those who perceive a rather high danger are more juveniles than adults. In general the percentage of acceptance of the new paradigm of an unspecified threat from nuclear overkill capabilities, which does not refer to a concrete enemy, is higher.

The complex variable which could be described as "willingness to defend one's country" shows some generational distinctions. When the risk is not clearly specified, the acceptance of a military defense as a reply to a military attack to the country is higher amongst adults, while doubts and negative positions are more frequent amongst the young. When the risk is specified and implies defense and military operations in the national territory, then there is a shifting of opinions: the number of those in favour decreases, and the number of those being uncertain or unfavourable increase (the young tending towards uncertainty, the adults towards opposition). The risk of the use of

nuclear arms on one's own territory represents, in effect, the turning point between acceptance and opposition. If such a risk is implied, the large majority of both adults and juveniles do not accept military defense. Looking at the various combinations of answers to the three indicators of the "willingness to defend" reveals that the number of those who would never accept a military defense or do not know is higher amongst the young, while the number of those accepting military defense but excluding nuclear arms is higher amongst the adults. With respect to nuclear defense of the West, the young are clearly more sceptical, even regarding the necessity of security to be guaranteed by USA protection. They less than their parents accept NATO and its role for the protection of Western Europe, and they less frequently support the increase of conventional armament in order to decrease the dependency on nuclear arms. While the degree of scepticism of the young is higher than their parents', the quoted differences do not mean a generalized rejection of the military and defense. The frequency of acceptance and affirmation is substantially smaller, but still close to the majority as long as no nuclear weapons are implied, and under the premise of the military as a strictly defensive force.

4.1.1. Preliminary conclusion

Summarizing the evidence being additionally based on the analysis of a complex indicator of value change, which includes the levels of education, morality, formal education, socio-political paradigms, and post-materialist orientation, it is evident that among the three subgroups thus obtained (the highly traditional, those in transition and the highly post-traditional) the majority of the young is post-traditional (and shows this pattern of orientations more frequently than their parents), the adults are more traditional, while the frequency of "transitionals" is not markedly different in the two sub-groups. Compared to their parents, young Italians are closer to the paradigm of life-style, and they support the orientations being in line with the paradigm of distribution less frequently than their parents.

4.2. Young Germans and their parents

a) general socio-political orientations and values
 With respect to the Inglehart index, young Germans and their parents do not differ in the frequency of pure materialists, which are a clear minority in both sub-groups. They tend more frequently towards postmaterialism, while their parents mainly are categorized as mixed types. The contents of these value orientations is different for the two generations: adults indicate order, protection from pollution, stable economy and dominance of ideas over money as main political priorities, while their children prefer participation in decision-making, free expression of ideas, dominance of ideas over money, stable economy, and protection from pollution. The large majority in both groups agrees with the assumption that personal success is measured by income, but an improvement in the amount of money available is not chosen very much amongst factors to better the individual quality of life. To enhance the latter, less environmental pollution and a self-realizing job are important for both generations. There is not a great difference in the willingness to pay more taxes for environmental protection among the two sub-groups, nor in the agreement towards an environmental legislation implying individual costs for citizens (in this instance, there is a higher amount of adults who do not agree). Problems of society in the future are seen in a rather pessimistic way by the young and their parents, with slight differences in the sense that usually the young are more radical in their pessimism, while the parents prefer more "probabilistic" answers, particularly for the possibility of the abolition of environmental pollution through technological advancement (where the young are less pessimistic than their parents), the probability of destruction of the environment by industrial plants and chemical industries, or the idea that future will increase scarcity and economic crises and shortage of food supplies. The young and their parents show the same opinions about the eventual future abolition of nuclear arms in Europe: this is judged as a highly improbable occurrence. At the socio-political paradigmatic level, the life-style paradigm is favoured by the majority in both generational groups (but more frequently by children than parents), and the option towards the distribution paradigm (anyway a minority)

is higher amongst adults.

b) orientations towards work and job

Orientations to work differ according to generation: for a relative majority of young Germans, the most important aspect of a job is self-actualization, followed by a second large section preferring security aspects such as secure workplace and very good pay. A relative majority of adults chooses job security and good income, while one fourth of this subsample indicates self-actualization as the most relevant aspect. A rather instrumental orientation to work is evident in both sub-groups, since a large majority thinks that a job is just a means to secure one's existence. Consistently, both prefer a comfortable life to a successful but stressful job. Amongst these comforts, young Germans place less environmental pollution and a self-realizing job, while their parents share the same preferences in smaller frequency.

Leisure time shows a diversification of preferences: young Germans prefer to spend their leisure time mainly with friends, e.g. at home, in coffee shops, in pubs, at sports, while their parents prefer to deal with their hobbies at home, to see friends, to go to movies or cultural events. The participation in groups and associations, being chosen by a minority only, is more frequent among the young than among adults. However, the aim of the group is important. The percentage of the young who declare themselves to be politically active in movements or political parties is drastically lower than that relating more strongly to leisure time groups and associations.

c) socio-moral issues of everyday-life

As to the level of socio-moral orientation, there is an evident link to age: even if the numbers show a similar distribution (a majority of conventional judgments, followed by postconventional and pre-conventional) in the two sub-samples, the young are more frequently pre-conventional than the adults, and less frequently conventional or postconventional. Concerning the specific issues which were used to assess everyday-life morality young Germans do not feel morally involved in a number of actions such as traveling free on public transport, real estate speculation, taking time off work, defrauding car insurance, to a not very high but significant degree, and in any

case much more than their parents. In general, substantial sections of the young react pre-conventionally. Exceptions are dislodging garbage in the countryside rather than in a rubbish dump, keeping a found wallet, and trying to sell a car but hiding its defects. Here a relative majority reacts with post-conventional answers (in any other but the "garbage" case, adults show higher frequencies of post-conventional responses than the young).

d) political orientation and involvement.

Juveniles and adults do not differ very much in the political domain, as far as their involvement is concerned: the large majority feels interested but not personally active (more adults than juveniles). Differences are evident in the left-right spectrum of political preferences; adults are more middle-right and right oriented than the young, while the large majority of the young prefers the middle and, less frequently, the middle-right. Left and middle-left orientations are a minority and similarly frequent in the two age groups. The generalized indicator of "sympathy/indifference/antipathy towards" social movements shows different distributions in the two age groups: the young more frequently are pro peace movements, pro movements against nuclear power plants, and pro environmentalists than their parents, whose majority favours the environmentalist movement but is against the other two. While the segment of those claiming a "cosmopolitan attitude" is relatively small, the young are more cosmopolitan than the adults. Even if the large majority feels attached to the city or the region where they live (but less than adults), they show European or World attachment in a relatively higher frequency.

e) orientations towards the military and security policy

Concerning military attitudes and orientations, the young are less positive and more pessimistic than adults; as expected, the young speak about military matters more frequently than their parents (but not generally not very often), and they pay attention to communication about military matters in the mass media a little more than the adults. Adults agree more to

the traditional security paradigm than the young, but a relative majority in both groups does not seem to be able to make a clear choice between the options. In general, agreement with the new paradigm is more widespread amongst the young, whilst the traditional image of the enemy is much more typical of the adults. In summary, the overkill perspective is preferred in both generations. The traditional paradigm of threat is to some extent reflected by the perception that the East represents a continuing danger, but one considered to be small. This perspective is more frequently shared by the adults. On the other hand, the fear of a danger of war in Europe is more frequent among the young. Compared to adults, a larger number of the young thinks that such a danger is rather high. Looking at the variable indicating the "willingness to defend one's country", the difference between the young and their parents is substantial. Even if the risk is not specified, a lower number of the young agrees to the necessity of military defense. If the risk is described more clearly (defense implying war on the own national territory, and defense implying nuclear weapons), the willingness to defend decreases particularly when the use of nuclear weapons is implied. The trend is similar for adults, especially with respect to the use of nuclear weapons, but clearly more adults than young are in favour of a military defense. Summarizing and combining the answers to the three single questions, a relative majority of the young is opposed to defense, while the relative majority of the adults accepts defense as long as no nuclear weapons are implied. A second substantial group is formed by those adults who reject military defense in any case, and by those of the young who reject the application of nuclear weapons and who are undecided with respect to the other two defense options. In summary, the young are very cautious and sceptical concerning military defensive solutions. It seems plausible to assume that the dominance of the overkill paradigm, where "war in itself" and not "an aggressive other" is felt as a concrete menace, is linked to this orientation. As to a European defense, security guaranteed by US protection is generally favoured (much more by adults than by the young), and NATO membership is considered to be positive or at least indifferent. Also in this respect, adults are more frequently in favour than the young. As to the

inevitability of nuclear arms for Western defense, and the increase of conventional armaments to prevent the early application of nuclear weapons, a relative majority of both age groups disagrees, but the young are more sceptical than their parents.

4.2.1. Preliminary conclusions

In accordance with the analysis of the Italian sample, the complex indicator of value change, which includes the degree of formal education, the level of socio-moral orientation, the position towards the socio-political paradigms, and materialism/postmaterialism, shows that the young are closer to the post-traditional and the transitional segment mindset ("transitional" means the intermediate positions concerning the scale of scores in the four indices), whilst adults are closer to the transitional and the traditional set of perspectives and interpretations. All in all, it seems that there is not a great distance between the two generations; the intermediate "transitional" positions are dominant in both groups.

4.3. Generational Value Change: Discussion of Results

4.3.1. Italian sample

Looking at the sample of the Italian families (that is, considering "pairs" of children and adults), the data shows some differences between the two generations. These differences do not indicate a sharp generational gap, since the young and their parents do not differ very much in their value orientations. In both subsamples, a relative majority is postmaterialistic, prefers the life-style paradigm, and agrees with the overkill paradigm of military threat. Preferences along the left-right scale do not differ very much at the global level, but the young are more close to the left than their parents. The combined indicator of value change, which includes the level of formal education, the position towards the socio-political paradigms, materialism/postmaterialism, and the level of sociomoral reasoning suggests the use of a general indicator of value change with three levels: traditional, transitional and post-traditional. Regarding

this indicator, a relative majority of the young is post-traditional while a relative majority of their parents is traditional. According to the hypothesis of Inglehart, this could be attributed to age, but this explanation is not convincing at all, since there was no direct correlation between age and the variables mentioned above. The level of formal education was taken as the main explanatory variable, and its capacity in this respect is shown by the data in a rather clear way. At the macrosocial level, social change and technological development have been considered as causal variables, but - if at all - this seems to be more adequate at a logical than an empirical level, since both variables cannot be tested directly at the empirical level. Trying to translate/ operationalize social change and technological development empirically, variables such as "place of birth" and "place of living" were taken as indicators of a more or less advanced technological environment, causing and posing new problems to people, and thus inducing a wide range of experiences, and forcing people to select or construct adequate solutions. The Italian sample was drawn in a highly industrialized metropolitan area, namely in Turin. A large majority of the young in the sample was born and grew up in this metropolis, while the adults stem from a variety of environments (from Turin less than half of the adults, the rest from rural areas of the South or the East of Italy. These are areas in which industrialization and technological development arrived later than in the North-Western regions, or as in the South is regionally very unequally distributed. The southern and north-eastern rural regions of Italy were traditionally areas of migration to the North-Western regions, where Turin (together with Milan) was the main pole of attraction. Thus it can be said that parents and children experienced very different environments during their primary socialization, at least in one half of the sample of pairs of children and parents. The level of education is also differently shaped: the young are relatively better educated than the adults, and families where children have a higher level of education than the interviewed parent are in a relative majority. Since one main aspect of the present research is the intergenerational comparison, it is of basic interest to look at intra-family differences concerning the area of value change. Looking at the main variables

indicating value change, our concentration is on the socio-political paradigm, the menace paradigm, the complex index of value change, and the related attitudes towards the military. As for the socio-political paradigm, the inter-family comparisons lead to the following results: Three different groups of "families" can be described. The first group consists of those pairs where child and parent show the same paradigm, regardless of the type of the paradigm, and we call them "homogeneous families". The second group is formed by those pairs where the young and the adults hold different paradigms but the child is more advanced in the sequence from traditional to innovative paradigm than his/her parent. We name these "mixed families". The third and last group is the opposite of the second one, i.e. the parent is more advanced than the child; we thus call them "reversed families". Figure 3 shows the number of families in the three groups.

Figure 3: Number of "homogenous", "mixed" and "reversed" parent-child patterns of paradigmatic orientations (orientation towards paradigm of distribution; transitional; orientation towards paradigm of life-style).

| HOMOGENEOUS | | MIXED | | REVERSED | | | | | | | |
|-------------|-------|-------|----|----------|-------|---|----|-------|-------|---|----|
| Y | A | Y | A | Y | A | | | | | | |
| 3 | and 3 | = | 22 | 2 | and 1 | = | 9 | 1 | and 2 | = | 8 |
| 2 | and 2 | = | 11 | 3 | and 1 | = | 7 | 1 | and 3 | = | 3 |
| 1 | and 1 | = | 5 | 3 | and 2 | = | 9 | 2 | and 3 | = | 10 |
| Total | | = | 38 | Total | | = | 25 | Total | | = | 21 |

Legend:

- 1 = Distribution orientation
- 2 = Mixed, transitorial Orientation
- 3 = Life-style Orientation
(=socio-ecological perspective).

We can also count families according to the paradigm, thus having 22 families with a clear life-style orientation, 29 families where life-style paradigm coexists with the other two, 11 families with the transitional paradigm, 17 families where transitional and traditional paradigms coexist, and 5 families in which both parent and child show the traditional paradigm.

The results of similar calculations made for the paradigm of threat are shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Number of "homogenous", "mixed", and "reversed" parent-child patterns of orientations towards the paradigms of threat (traditional paradigm with enemy image; equi-preference; overkill paradigm)

| HOMOGENEOUS | | MIXED | | REVERSED | |
|-------------|--------|-------|-------|----------|-----------|
| Y | A | Y | A | Y | A |
| 3 | 3 = 53 | 2 | 1 = 3 | 1 | 2 = 1 |
| 2 | 2 = 5 | 3 | 1 = 8 | 1 | 3 = 1 |
| 1 | 1 = 1 | 3 | 2 = 5 | 2 | 3 = 1 |
| N | N = 3 | 1,2,3 | N = 6 | N | 1,2,3 = 5 |
| Total | = 62 | Total | = 22 | Total | = 8 |

Legend:

- N = neither accepting the traditional Enemy-Paradigm nor the Overkill-Paradigm
 1 = Traditional enemy paradigm preference
 2 = No preference for any of the two paradigms
 3 = Overkill Paradigm

It is evident that the perception of military threat is rather concentrated around the overkill paradigm; all the other types of answers represent a relatively small minority only.

It is interesting to note the structure of discussion within the family, investigated via a number of discussion themes of potential everyday interest. Factor analysis of the presence/ absence of each theme leads to two main factors, which may be called the "post-materialist factor" and the "materialist factor", due to their respective composition. In the first factor there are themes such as politics in general, ecological problems and pollution, military matters, civil rights, peace and disarmament, and the risks and dangers implied by nuclear energy, current and future technology and nuclear weapons; in the second factor, the themes forming the bulk of intra-familial discussion are unemployment and job security, economic and familial problems, crime in society, social politeness, sport, AIDS. In the Italian families, topics of

everyday relate controversial discussion usually to the second group, that is to say that these topics are those which are stated to be discussed within the family by the majority of the sample. Conflictual discussion about these themes is not very widespread; where a certain amount of conflict is declared by children or parents or both is everyday problems such as school or job, economic and family problems, politics in general and social politeness. It does not seem that, even when existent, difference in values or in socio-political paradigms be cause of quarrel within the family, unless (but it cannot be demonstrated here) quarrel over the mentioned matters of everyday life be sustained by differences in somewhat 'background' elements like values.

Where the difference of conflict evaluation over the various theme is higher is in the following: school and/or job matters are considered conflictually by a majority formed in rather equivalent amount by children, parents, and both; political matters produced a certain discussion, declared mainly by children and parents together; conflict over job security and unemployment is declared mainly by children, while family financial problems are considered to be a source of conflict, when existent, mainly by the parents; the other theme where divergence exists is social politeness and related matters. Here again opinions are differently shaped, and parents declare conflict more than children.

The consideration of the Value Change Indicator, including level of education, socio-political paradigm, morality level and post-materialism, shows a continuum of positions ranging from a traditional orientation (formed by people with low education, distribution orientation, preconventionality and materialistic orientation) to an innovative orientation (formed by people with high education, life-style orientation, postconventionality and postmaterialistic orientation). The two polar subgroups are minoritarian, but the highly traditional minority is smaller than the highly innovative one.

Considering this set of positions in relation to attitudes towards the military, it can be said that, generally speaking, there is link between the position along the traditional-innovative orientation and the positive-negative attitude towards the military. Given that a less affirmative attitude is demonstrated by

the sample for young people than for their parents, in any event there is a trend towards the least positive position in accord with a shift from a traditional to an innovative value orientation. A similar distribution is found when considering the attitude towards the military according to socio-political paradigm (the distribution paradigm is linked to a more positive attitude towards the military than the life-style paradigm), and the trend is the same as for as the materialistic-postmaterialistic orientation. A different kind of link is found when considering the attitude towards the military according to the morality level and the level of education: the three morality level subgroups differ in their attitudes, as would be anticipated, but in a less sharp way, which suggests that the morality level has a lower discriminatory power than the other variables; the level of education show a clear link between high education and less affirmative attitudes towards the military, but the relation seems to be a non-linear relation. The least affirmative attitude towards the military is also clearly related to a sharp "leftist" political orientation, becoming more and more positive as long as the political orientation shifts to the "right" of the political spectrum. There is also a connection with active political behavior, which is present only in the anti-military minority. Those who are more anti-militaristic are also more cosmopolitan, in that they have Europe and the world as a declared geographical identification, while "localism" is related to a positive attitude towards the military. Finally, there is no generational difference with regard to military information (the two generational groups show the same -rather low- level of information about military matters), which is also not influenced by sex or by the level of education, and not even by political orientation.

5. Inter-Cultural Comparisons: Italy versus Germany.

5.1 Italian Youth versus German Youth.

Comparisons between the two generations in two different countries would not be justified without an intra-generational comparison between young Italians and young Germans (and between Italian and German parents).

After having demonstrated the existence of a value change according to the generation, and the differences shaping these changes, it is noteworthy to elicit new insights through a comparison of the two young generations in relation to their behavior and attitudes. The attitude towards work, for instance, shows some difference: young italians evaluate work and success in work less in terms of income and money than their German peers do; self-realization plays a major role in defining a "good" job, that it is seen in a non-instrumental way (not as a mere means to survive). This datum is in a way in counter-tendency to the current national research on the Italian young generation, where attitudes towards work show a mix of "images" where income and security do play a major role, even if differentiated according to the social position (students and upper class young chose "interesting job, possibility to learn new things" together with the level of salary, while lower class and unemployed young stress salary and job security; cf. Cavalli & De Lillo 1988). Our sample is formed by a majority of students, who could have an "idealized" image of work, and who live in a metropolitan highly developed socio-economic milieu, where the labour market currently presents a much better situation than in other parts of the country (where the situation is drastically bad, particularly in the South).

At a general cultural level, another explanation could be proposed, referring to a rather low "moral status" given to money and wealth: this low morality judgement could be linked to the two main ideological sources shaping Italian collective consciousness (thus playing here their true role of "false consciousness"), that is marxism on the one side, and catholic religion on the other. This does not mean, of course, an aware ideological position, but simply the weight of "secularized" ideological values coming from two different ethics both considering money and wealth as an evil or

a danger for human beings (a traditional proverb says that "money is the devil's flour"...). At a comparative level, it must be said that there is a congruent link between the high frequency of "pure" postmaterialism demonstrated by young Italians and their attitudes towards money and work.

The German sample, being more differentiated, gives coherently a more differentiated attitude set, what is probably much nearer to the reality of the young generation. Being anyway one of the main problematic issues for both young Italians and Germans, ecology reaches a higher level of awareness among the latter. Indeed the most important factor improving personal quality of life for Germans is stated to be a less polluted environment, while young Italians are more diverse in their attitudes towards the environment: a self-realizing job, the improvement of social security services, and more participation in cultural events. On the other hand, young Germans chose increasing income and better housing amongst their preferred factors of good conditions of living (after environment and a self-realizing job). The least important factor in improving quality of life for young Italians is better housing, and for young Germans participation in cultural events.

Taking the choice structure as an indicator of need structure, a certain difference is evident, but it is not easy to classify it: both groups show a mixture of "post-materialistic" and "materialistic" needs, and the specific differences are probably owed to individual preferences within the composition of the two "baskets".

To some extent, the structure of leisure time is congruent with the structure of needs: young Italians mainly stay with friends at home and go to the cinema and other cultural entertainment, while young Germans stay with friends at home and in public places such as bars and the like. Active political participation is also low in both groups; an interest in politics is declared more frequently by young Germans.

Young Italians seem to be more "leftist" than their German peers, who identify to a higher degree with centre and centre-right political positions; but a positive attitude towards movements (peace movement, antinuclear and environmentalist movements in particular) is widespread in both groups. Issues of personal morality show a high level of similarity amongst the

two peer groups: both show higher majorities of conventional judgments (Germans also have a relatively higher number of pre-conventional choices), and in certain situations they commonly use no moral or pre-moral criteria. Examples of the contents of these last "moral judgments" are using public transport without payment, defrauding insurance companies, and falsely reporting illness to employer. Their post-conventionality is related to discarding garbage not in a garbage dump but in the county side or in the evaluation of keeping a found wallet; they differ over the issue of selling a car with hidden defects and working but not declaring it for tax purposes. Here a relative majority of young Germans gives post-conventional answers for the first example (being in that way different from young Italians, who do not consider them to be moral questions or consider them at a pre-conventional level), and pre-moral or amoral answers to the second situation, where on the contrary Italians are prevalently post-conventional. This last difference is congruent with the more "sacred" work orientation shown by Italians, as already noticed above, and it could be explained as a consequence of the general negative opinion expressed by the manifest public opinion about moonlighting. Often moonlighting is viewed as "stealing" potential work from the unemployed - particularly young people.

All in all, young Germans show a more realistic outlook towards topics involving contradictory situations (for instance as to the problem of quitting a work environment even if this means the loss of jobs, or when one's career could be harmed by keeping true to one's convictions), whilst young Italians show to a greater degree "moralistic" answers. Compared to their German peers, amongst Italians there is a higher number of answers to the above problems mentioned above is "in line" with their post-materialistic value orientations. For the young Italians, to be post-materialistic and to show a high post-traditional value orientation means to agree with the fact that "in spite of harm to one's career someone must follow his convictions", or to decide to quit an environmentally dangerous job despite the loss of one's job; for the Germans, these positions are less frequent, and do not have the same strong relation with the position in the value orientation continuum.

There is a recurrent feature giving the impression of a greater polarization between Traditional vs. Innovative within young Italians than within young Germans; the latter are less traditional and more in mixed positions. This is the case even as far as the image of future is concerned, where Italians have a greater number of "true optimists" and a greater number of "true pessimists" when compared with their German peers, who are, on the contrary, more in intermediate and pessimistic positions.

As far as military matters are concerned, both groups are in general sceptical and critical toward the military and security policy. The degree of communication in the family or with friends about military matters is higher in intensity for young Germans, but the degree of attention paid to massmedia communication on military matters is rather similar (occasional and rare rather than frequent).

As far as the security paradigms are concerned, young Italians more clearly reject the traditional paradigm of threat by the East, the traditional enemy image, whilst young Germans do not seem to be able to make a striking choice among the options. In general, agreement with the new paradigm is widespread among both groups, but more for Italians whilst unclear positions over the traditional as well as the overkill paradigms are frequent in the German group. The dominance of the traditional menace paradigm is to some extent demonstrated by the perception of the East as a danger, which still exists - but is considered to be small - more by the German young generation; on the contrary, the fear of the danger of war in Europe is rather low in both groups (but those who think it is rather high are more frequently Germans than Italians).

The complex variable which could be described as "willingness to defend one's country" presents some intragenerational distinctions. When the risk is not clearly specified, the acceptance of a military defense as a reply to a military attack against the country is higher amongst Italians, while doubts and negative positions are more frequent in the German samples. When the risk is specified more concretely implying defense and military operations over the national territory, then there is a shift of opinions, in the sense that those in favour decrease and those dubious or unfavourable increase, but in general the percentage of those who accept a military operation is higher amongst

young Italians, and this remains true, though at a much lower level, for nuclear defense. Considering the variable looking at the various combinations, the number of those who never would accept a military defense or do not know is similar in both groups, whilst the number of those accepting military defense but excluding nuclear arms is higher among young Italians. With respect to nuclear defense of the West, Italians clearly do not think it to be inevitable, nor do they think it necessary to increase conventional NATO armament in comparison with their German peers. Likewise young Italians are less convinced of the necessity for security to be guaranteed by US protection and the role of NATO in protecting Western Europe. The attitude towards the military and official security policy has some significance. Affirmative positions towards the military are more frequent amongst young Germans. (However, the two sub-samples of the young generally are more distant than affirmative). The positions are related to the type of menace: in general, those who are distant have the "Overkill image of enemy" with no intragenerational difference. The link with the value change is strong, in that the more post-traditional the young are the more distant to the military they feel, so it can be said that value change from traditional to post-traditional orientations has an impact on the positive or negative attitude towards military matters and official security policy.

5.2. Italian Parents versus German Parents.

Perhaps the greater differences between the two cultures are those between the two parents' sub-samples. Here, the more advanced outlook of German adults is appreciable. At a phenomonic level, Italian parents appear to have a more principled attitude towards work (it should be self-actualizing, not a mere means of survival); German are more instrumental and seem to stress the security aspects. However, in assessing how to improve the personal quality of life slightly different need structure arises: better social services and less environmental pollution for Italians, less pollution and self-actualizing job for Germans. Leisure time includes more active activities (indoor

hobbies, friends and movies) for Germans and passive (staying at home, friends and housekeeping) for Italians.

At a political level, preferences are centre-right oriented for Germans and centre-left oriented for Italians, who differ also in their sympathy for peace movements, nuclear power opposition groups and environmentalists. Are these differences linked to -and a consequence of- fundamental difference in the value set?

The general indicator of value change shows a majority of traditional orientation among Italians and a stronger inclination towards transitional and innovative orientations among the Germans, but the specific indicators are differently shaped: Italian parents are divided into two polarized groups, the pure post-materialistic and the materialistic/mixed-materialistic, while German parents are in the majority mixed-postmaterialistic and postmaterialistic; life-style paradigm (which represents a relative majority in both groups) is slightly more frequent in the German subsample and the distribution paradigm is relatively more frequent in the Italian subsample.

No difference is present in the distribution of the three socio-moral orientation levels, but they are differently composed: a substantial number (in some cases one fourth of the subsample) of Italian parents do not consider as moral questions taking advantage of unnecessary taking time off work because of claims of illness, to defraud to insurance companies, making false insurance claims in the case of a car accident, having a second job tax free, and hiding defects in selling a car. The only situations where a certain number of German parents give pre-conventional moral judgments is in the case of real estate speculation and false car insurance claims; for the remaining behaviors the structure is highly fragmented in both samples along the three levels of moral judgment.

As far as military matters are concerned, Italians are less interested than Germans, and their preference for the traditional enemy or the Overkill image is clearly defined: generalized disagreement for the former and generalized agreement for the latter, whilst Germans are more concentrated in the unclear group.

As a consequence, Italians do not think that the East represents a threat for the West, whilst Germans are

more dubious (but to a considerable extent this is related to the period of polling, 1988 for Germany and 1990 for Italy).

In general, noticed also in the subsamples of the young, Italian parents are more cooperative towards acceptance of a military defense in case of an attack, but insofar as the risk becomes specified and leading to nuclear defense they follow the same trend to a rather strong non acceptance. The attitude towards the military and official security policy is rather clearly related to value orientation for Italian parents, where a post-traditional value set is linked to distance and traditional value set to the positive pole; this clear-cut situation is not found with the same evidence in the German sample.

5.3. Value Change and Culture: Discussion of Results

5.3.1 Italian-German intra-family comparisons

The comparison between the two national family samples gives rise to a number of differences. In general terms the two national groups could be described the same way: a relative majority is post-materialistic (more the young than the adults), it prefers the life-style paradigm (again more children than parents), it agrees with the overkill paradigm of military threat. But looking at the relative frequencies, "pure" post-materialism is less diffused in the German than in the Italian sample, whilst the mixed-post-materialist are more frequent in the German than in the Italian sample. Generally speaking, German families more frequently have some postmaterialistic values in their orientations. The same could be said about the preference for the life-style paradigm, but not for the military menace, which shows a higher frequency of traditional enemy image and of "mixed" image (especially among adults) in the German families when compared to the Italian sample.

As far as value change is measured through the combined indicator, the traditional families are less frequent in Germany than in Italy, and the mixed group is also greater in the German sample: all in all, German families show a more advanced change in their value orientation. The position along the value change con-

tinuum means a different attitude towards military and security policy: in Italian families, the affirmative position towards the military is less frequent than in Germany, and the connection with value orientation is clearer: in the Italian sample the distance towards the military increases and the positive attitude decreases with the tendency towards post-traditional/innovative orientation. This is less clear-cut in German families. Differences are also found in the set of themes concerning everyday discussion in the family. In German families politics, environment/ ecology, military matters, peace and disarmament. The danger of nuclear power and arms, AIDS and dangers of technology are much more debated than in the Italian families sample.

Even though we restricted this report to the description of the aggregated groups of juveniles and parents in Turin and in German metropolitan areas, it may be justifiable to take into account some aspects of more detailed analyses. Here we will shortly point to the interfamilial constellations. If the juvenile and the adult both take the same stance in the child-parent interaction, we call this "concordance". The "discordance" then is differentiated as to whether the child's or the parent's reaction is stronger.

The least concordance between young people and their parents in Turin as well as in German cities concerns the educational level: only a few parents are above the educational level of their children whilst most children tend to gain at least the same or a higher educational status than their parents. A non-trivial observation is that low concordance also exists in socio-moral perspectives: it is often mentioned that the socio-moral orientation is correlated with educational level.

In the family cases, however, the parents tend to argue at a higher level than their children, that is: The the fixed "climate" of familial developmental rather than external educational processes seems to set the level of socio-moral argumentation. (This especially is visible for German families.) Real discordant aspects within families seem to be the attitudes/stances towards the military or security policy. In about 40% of the families the parents are closer or more affirmative to military stances than their children.

In the case of the military threat paradigm, however, the families are rather concordant. The corollaries drawn from the military threat paradigm seem to be divergent among generations. Whilst for the youth this is correlated with an opposition towards the military, for their parents this does not hold true necessarily. Why these differences? In a speculative manner one could argue that in contrary to questions of every day life (or socio-moral postures) military matters are not really central for the families. They are "free-lancing" issues within the socialization climate of families and the deviation of his/her child does not bother the socializer.

Intercultural differences between families in Turin and comparable German cities can be seen in the materialism-postmaterialism posture as well as in the anticipation of the future. In both aspects an intergenerational conflict exists in Italy but less in Germany. The value orientation within families is more likely to be concordant than discordant; and if it is discordant, it is more likely that the children tend towards a post-traditional attitude. Italian and German cases differ insofar as intergenerational conflict on value positions is stronger in Italy than in Germany. While the extreme groups in the value position are clearly concordant within German families, the Italian youth more than their parents tends towards the post-traditional value position.

6. Inter-Paradigm Comparisons: Traditional versus Mixed versus Innovative Orientation in Italy and Germany.

6.1. Inter-Paradigm Comparison: Discussion of Results.

Some general statements can now be drawn from the evidence presented to the above points. To this purpose it is necessary to deal with some general indicators, useful to give synthetic descriptions. The general indicator used here is formed by a number of variables which have shown a high correlation level, thus supporting the idea as being part of a common set of orientations, with high probability of presence in the same subjects. (The full description and discussion of this indicator will be part of the next volume of this report.)

According to the set of hypotheses implied by the present research, the choice of a socio-political paradigm and the position over the materialist/post-materialist scale should be highly correlated; this combination is linked to the level of education (according to Inglehart's thesis), which is also related to the level of socio-moral judgement (moral reasoning development is related also to the possession of more or less developed and differentiated abilities and knowledge giving an adequate background to further learning and abilities to deal with new experiences). The synoptic indicator of value change has been thus formed by these four indicators, giving rise to a threefold type of value orientation: the position called traditional (formed by all those with low education, distribution paradigm orientation, materialistic orientation and preconventional level of moral reasoning), is polar to an innovative position, where individuals have a high education, incline towards the life-style paradigm, the post-materialist orientation and the post-conventional level of moral judgement. This bi-polarity is considered to be developmental, thus giving rise to a number of intermediate positions which can easily be measured through the numerical values assumed by each variable. In the continuum, the grouping of intermediate positions has been called Mixed position. The distribution of the two cultural samples shows a large majority in the intermediate positions, but looking at the two extreme positions, the Innovative pole is larger for Italians than for

Germans. Conversely the German sample is concentrated around the innovative pole with values over the average. The result in general is a more advanced position of Germans compared to Italians along the value change continuum. The generation seems to have a discriminatory capacity, in that youth are more advanced than adults (with no gender difference), but this very link could be spurious, influenced by the level of education, which is generally higher for young than for adults in the two samples. The position in the value set has been investigated in order to see if the level of education of the family (that is, the level of the child and the parent and its disparities) has some influence over the youth value change. A clear relation has been found in the influence of "cumulate" education, that is to say that the post-traditional orientation of children increases as much as the family education increases, but the higher the education of the young the more he/she is posttraditional. The effect of education is also demonstrated by the fact that considering families where post-traditional orientation is present in at least one of the members, where the parent has a higher education he or she is higher than the child in post-traditional orientation, and when the child has a higher education than the parent, then he/she is higher than the parent in the post-traditional value orientation.

We have seen that value change is linked to the attitude towards the military and military matters in general. Considering both family samples, post-traditional orientation means also a distant attitude towards military and official security policy, while a traditional orientation coexists with a positive attitude. This is true in general, but it is clearer in Turin families, where the affirmative position decreases and the negative position towards the military increases with the tendency from traditional to innovative value orientation, and this is true also for children and parents separately. In the German big cities' families this link, although it does exist, is less evident, especially among adults. Looking at other relations amongst variables, Italian and German families differ as regards the stronger link between the affirmative/negative position towards the military and the type of socio-political paradigm: for Italians, the affinity towards the military decreases with the shift from the distribution towards the life-

style paradigm; for German the relation is not so clear-cut. Looking at the trend of each variable forming the value change complex indicator (that is, the socio-moral level, the materialism/post-materialism index) the link is similar, with the exception of the level of education for Italian families, where it is less clear. Political positions have the expected influence, in that in both subsamples the more distant from the military the more left-oriented and the more politically active or interested people are. A similar tendency is reflected in the link between attitude towards the military and geographical identification: in both groups, the more distant from the military the more cosmopolitan they are. But the relationship to military matters is not the same in the two family national groups. The level of information concerning interest in such topics is rather low in Turin families, if compared with the situation in German families, and it does not seem to be influenced by variables such as age or even education or political position. It seems not to be a central issue in daily life, since the number of families where the military, war and peace and related matters are the subject of discussion or conflict are a minority. When asked about their position towards the military and their eventual participation in their country's defense, Italians (both youth and adults) are relatively more affirmative than Germans, but they agree much more with the overkill paradigm than with the traditional enemy image in comparison with Germans. Thus a preliminary conclusion could be drawn, that in Turin families (keeping these observations strictly related to this "special" situation) military matters are not everyday problem at all. They become concrete problems only when the individual is personally touched in his/her everyday life, otherwise such positions suffer from a kind of abstraction, which allows an individual antimilitaristic orientation "as a matter of principle".


7. Summary of findings at the aggregated level

7.1 Explanation of plots

The description of the data did follow the basic design of the study which is determined by the subgroups of juveniles and their parents in German big cities and in Turin/Italy. By this design we are dealing with two "effects": namely "culture" or "nation", and "generation". This was reflected in the topics of the description. As a summary this aspects will be treated in a more analytical manner. The question is, which of these aspects differ more strongly: the cultural or the generational ones?

In order to come to an answer for many variables or aspects at one glance, we developed a graphical presentation for aggregated data in form of plots.

One dimension in these plots shows the difference between the German and Italian subgroups, the other the difference between the juvenile and adult subgroups. The location of variables/aspects within this plot gives information on to whether there is a cultural difference (or "effect"), a generational difference, or combined "effects" (e.g. "aspect ... is especially widespread amongst Italian youth").



7.2 Cultural and generational differences in leisure time activities


If we look at the leisure time activities in these kind of plots, then we see that generational as well as cultural/national differences appear.

The generational difference is that adults prefer to stay at home whilst juveniles are out of the house more. Between German and Italian juveniles the preferred character of activities is different: whilst Italian juveniles more often go to the cinema or concerts, their German counterparts more often visit pubs or bars.

"Relaxation at home" in the Italian sample also includes housework. This is why the difference between German and Italian adults is exaggerated.

We do not want to overemphasise the information in this plot of a single aspect. It simply should demonstrate the logic of the approach.

Leisure time activities
Graphic Summary for Nation and Generation "Effect"



Locations at capital letters of description

7.3 Issues of the communication within families


The next plot is not so trivial, but somewhat distorted because Germans gave systematically higher rates for communication issues than Italians did. If this is adequate to their communicative reality must be doubted. This difference is probably caused by a different wording in the questions: While Germans were asked to report on the topics of their intra-family communication in general, Italians were asked about the topics of last week.

The plot shows, however, which topics are extremely highly rated by Germans in contrast to Italians. The comparably narrow range of generational differences is due to the fact that the question was about communication within the family.

Remarkable in our context is that there is a group of topics, of which Germans claim to speak while Italians do not. This group has an coherent logic which could be characterized as the topic which became titled "risk society" (In Germany the sociologist Ulrich Beck coined the notion "Risikogesellschaft" in the academic debate, but the German public already vaguely talked about the same issues). This thematical group consists of the issues "technological risks", "nuclear energy and its dangers", "environmental pollution" as the core. Interesting is that the military issues are connected to this topic ("military", "nuclear weapons", and "peace and disarmament").

The plot tells us that the notion and meaning of "risk society" obviously exists in Germany but not in Italy. While in the German context the concept of "risk society" was promoted especially by the post-traditional spectrum and is connected with the value position, this does not seem to hold true for the Italian context. At least with respect to the conception of a "risk society" we may suspect that the political dimension of postmaterialism is not quite the same in Germany and in Italy.

Issues in communications
Graphic Summary of Nation and Generation "Effects"



7.4 Attributions of instrumental values

We call instrumental values a list of criteria for everyday conduct which also could be called "virtues". The question was, who should learn which aspect of behavior. There were two different dimensions, namely either valuation (everybody vs. nobody) or stereotyped attribution (Germans vs. Italians). In order to find out which aspects had been rather stressed or stereotyped in the attributions of the respondents, multivariate models with either the value dimension or the nation dimension had been run. The documentation of the results should improve the understanding of the plot.

Attributions of instrumental values of conduct in a multivariate model in which the occurrence of the aspects is dependent on the value orientation

MODEL NESS(1-11)=CONSTANT+CEVALUE

MODEL TUT(1-11)=CONSTANT+CEVALUE

| Aspects | Nobody should learn | | All should learn | |
|--------------------------------|---------------------|-------------|------------------|-------------|
| | Mean | Beta(Value) | Mean | Beta(Value) |
| to be economic/save money | .215 | .270 | .451 | -.075 |
| obligation & responsibility | .058 | .069 | .517 | .062 |
| to work diligently & precisely | .105 | .176 | .451 | .009 |
| self-contention | .215 | .168 | .500 | -.049 |
| caring for others | .044 | -.073 | .715 | .052 |
| good manners/politeness | .076 | .087 | .677 | .044 |
| non-conformism | .282 | -.223 | .416 | .167 |
| less materialism | .070 | -.116 | .602 | .038 |
| to be relaxed/have more fun | .206 | -.209 | .358 | .116 |
| develop new life forms | .265 | -.163 | .497 | .189 |
| obedience to authority & law | .102 | .155 | .535 | -.121 |

The mean in this case of dichotomized variables is identical with the percentage of occurrence amongst 344 respondents (.290 = 29%).

The beta value is the standardized regression coefficient in the model. The minus indicates that the aspects are rather attributed by traditionally value oriented than by posttraditionally value oriented persons.

By these results we can say that in the German and Italian cases the subset of traditional "virtues" consists of "to be economic/save money", "to work diligently and precisely", "selfcontention", and "obedience to authority and law". The subset of post-traditional "virtues" consists of "non-conformism", "to be relaxed/have more fun", "develop new life-forms", and

"less materialism". These aspects were viewed under the valuation perspective by the respondents. While all aspects experience valuation (=all should learn), these subsets find as well specific traditional or post-traditional devaluation. Which of these aspects/"virtues" serve specifically for the description of national characters or stereotypes of national deficiencies?

Attributions of national deficiencies of conduct in a multivariate model

MODEL TED(1-11)=CONSTANT+NATION

MODEL ITA(1-11)=CONSTANT+NATION

| Aspects | Germans should learn | | Italians should learn | |
|--------------------------------|----------------------|--------------|-----------------------|--------------|
| | Mean | Beta(Nation) | Mean | Beta(Nation) |
| to be economic/save money | .064 | -.197 | .185 | -.043 |
| obligation & responsibility | .044 | -.165 | .290 | -.163 |
| to work diligently & precisely | .036 | -.137 | .354 | -.151 |
| self-contention | .141 | -.269 | .064 | -.129 |
| caring for others | .169 | -.399 | .033 | -.096 |
| good manners/politeness | .058 | -.110 | .119 | -.134 |
| non-conformism | .191 | -.296 | .047 | -.069 |
| less materialism | .232 | -.467 | .033 | -.096 |
| to be relaxed/have more fun | .290 | -.516 | .050 | -.156 |
| obedience to authority & law | .041 | -.156 | .287 | -.279 |

The mean in this case of dichotomized variables is identical with the percentage of occurrence amongst 362 respondents (.290 = 29%).

The beta value is the standardized regression coefficient in the model. The minus indicates that all aspects are rather attributed by Germans than by Italians as "national characteristics".

The stereotyped images of Germans and Italians become clearer by this result.

The stereotypes, mainly stemming from Germans, hold that Germans demonstrate deficiencies

- in caring for others,
- of being relaxed,
- and of too much materialism.

The Italian image is dominated by a deficiency

- to work diligently and precisely,
- of a sense of obligation and responsibility,
- and of obedience to authorities and law.


The attribution of national deficiency was recoded as blaming the deficiency on ones own or the other's "national characteristics". The hypothesis is that

this attribution of national deficiency is related to the respective geographical identification.

The empirical evidence shows only a slight tendency in favor of this hypothesis, if we look for the combined German and Italian cases. These kinds of attributions, however, were clearly different in the German and Italian context. In contrast to Germans, people from Turin/Italy are rather hesitant to lay the blame on German deficiencies and are more eager to blame own shortcomings.

While in Italy the balance between blaming own and German deficiencies in conduct is generally distorted towards "self-blaming", amongst Germans "blaming others" (i.e. Italians) is more probable for the personal identification with Germany, and "self-blaming" is more probable for the transnational perspective of an identification with Europe or the world.

Attributions of national deficiencies



Beta coefficients • means
 Model TED(1-11)•CONSTANT•NATION

The structure of national stereotypes and stereotyping now can be explained quite easily:

Germans (especially adults) not only blame own national deficiencies, but also those of Italians. Germans as well as Italians agree to a certain amount in the description of Italian shortcomings as a lack of:

- obedience to authority and law
- obligation and responsibility
- working diligently and precisely
- being economic/saving money

While some Germans also blame Italians for a lack of good manners and politeness, the Italians - at least with respect to stereotyping - show this "virtue" insofar as they do not blame German shortcomings. The description of German deficiencies mainly stems from Germans.

Independent of generation, Germans are described as too materialistic and less willing to care of others. Young - rather than adult - Germans criticize a German lack of non-conformism, of self-contention, and of being relaxed/having fun.

The structure of valuation (or de-valuation) is more bound to the generational dimension in a very complex way. Juveniles more than adults think that being economic/saving money is unimportant. Young Germans in particular oppose to the "virtues" of "working diligently and precisely", "good manners/politeness", and "obligation and responsibility" whilst the opposition of young Italians is especially against "self-contention" and "obedience to law and authority". The Italian adults, however, in particular are opposed to the ideas of political engagement for new life-forms, non conformism, and "to be relaxed/have more fun". The latter obviously is a part of a generational conflict in Italy, but not so much in Germany: the Italian generations differ very much in their evaluation of "being relaxed/have more fun". The generational conflict on instrumental values in Germany rather refers to the "industrial virtues" of "working diligently and precisely" and "being economic/saving money". The difference between juveniles and adults in the generational conflict on instrumental values is stronger within the Italian sample.

Simple structure of within-groups percentages

Value Attribution: De-valuation

| | Unimportant / Nobody should learn | | | |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------|--------|------|
| | Juveniles | | Adults | |
| | YGER | YITA | AGER | AITA |
| work diligently & precisely | 21.4 | 9.8 | 7.9 | 2.2 |
| good manners/ politeness | 13.5 | 4.4 | 9.0 | 5.4 |
| obligation & responsibility | 12.4 | 3.3 | 5.6 | 1.1 |
| caring for others | 7.9 | 1.1 | 7.9 | 2.2 |
| less materialism | 7.9 | 7.6 | 7.9 | 5.4 |
| to be economic/save money | 30.3 | 31.5 | 13.5 | 13.0 |
| obedience to authority & law | 9.0 | 16.3 | 9.0 | 8.7 |
| self-contention | 12.4 | 35.9 | 13.5 | 22.8 |
| develop new life forms | 25.8 | 20.7 | 23.6 | 35.9 |
| non-conformism | 18.0 | 26.1 | 24.7 | 42.4 |
| to be relaxed/have more fun | 7.9 | 10.9 | 12.4 | 51.1 |

Stereotyping: Either Germans or Italians should learn


| | stereotyped for | GERMANS | | ITALIANS | |
|--------------------------------|--------------------|---------|------|----------|------|
| | | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA |
| obedience to law & authority | ITA | 42.7 | 40.5 | 14.1 | 18.5 |
| obligation & responsibility | ITA | 34.8 | 38.2 | 21.7 | 21.7 |
| good manners/ politeness | ITA | 15.7 | 16.9 | 9.8 | 5.4 |
| to work diligently & precisely | ITA | 34.8 | 50.6 | 25.0 | 31.5 |
| to be economic/ save money | ITA | 18.0 | 22.5 | 15.2 | 18.5 |
| self-contention | ITA | 5.6 | 13.5 | 2.2 | 4.4 |
| to be relaxed/ have more fun | ITA | 5.6 | 11.2 | 1.1 | 2.2 |
| to be economic/ save money | GER | 9.0 | 13.5 | 1.1 | 2.2 |
| obligation & responsibility | GER | 6.7 | 9.0 | 1.1 | 1.1 |
| less materialism | GER | 41.6 | 44.9 | 5.4 | 2.2 |
| caring for others | GER | 31.5 | 32.6 | 2.2 | 2.2 |
| develop new life-forms | GER | 12.4 | 12.4 | 0.0 | 1.1 |
| non-conformism | GER | 32.6 | 29.2 | 9.8 | 5.4 |
| self-contention | GER | 27.0 | 20.2 | 6.5 | 3.3 |
| to be relaxed/ have more fun | GER | 60.7 | 44.9 | 8.7 | 3.3 |

Stereotypes/Attributions
Graphic Summary for Generation and Nation "Effect"

LEGEND: Question " Who should learn which aspect of behavior?"
(VALUE ATTRIBUTION) (NATIONAL STEREOTYPE)

| Aspect of attribution | unimportant/ nobody should learn ... | | everybody Germans Italians should learn ... | |
|--------------------------------|--|---|--|---|
| | a | A | L | l |
| to be economic/save money | a | A | L | l |
| obligation & responsibility | b | B | M | m |
| to work diligently & precisely | c | C | N | n |
| self-contention | d | D | O | o |
| caring for others | e | E | P | p |
| good manners/politeness | f | F | Q | q |
| non-conformism | g | G | R | r |
| less materialism | h | H | S | s |
| to be relaxed/have more fun | i | I | T | t |
| obedience to authority | k | K | V | v |

Stereotypes/Attributions: All aspects together



7.5 Work and Achievement Orientation

As to the work and achievement orientation we find tremendous cultural but less generational differences. The cultural differences stem especially from the German perspective that money is a measure of individual success, and that work is only a means of survival. This may indicate a depression from the "protestant work-ethic" to a kind of "self-alienation within work" as a tendency in German metropolitan areas.

Italians, however, are more inclined to expect self-realization in work. The latter especially holds true for young Italians. Adult Italians rather than the younger strive for an improvement of social security, while German adults view job security as an important aspect of work. In contrast to this security aspect of the adults, the juveniles are inclined to point out that life is more than working. Together with the stronger notion of self-realization in work this suggests that the so-called "subjectivication" process is stronger amongst youth than amongst their parents.

These results at the aggregated level deserve a closer inspection at the level of family-constellations.


Simple structure for work and achievement orientation

| | Italians | | Germans | |
|--|----------|------|---------|------|
| | YITA | AITA | YGER | AGER |
| <u>YITA</u> | | | | |
| Achievement yes :culture | 18.9 | 3.4 | 7.9 | 7.9 |
| Youth > Adults | | | | |
| Achievement yes :selfrealisation in work | 23.3 | 14.8 | 21.4 | 16.9 |
| "Life is more than working" | 69.8 | 58.0 | 69.8 | 58.6 |
| Work = :selfrealisation | 65.2 | 48.9 | 41.6 | 25.0 |
| Achievement no :better income | 23.8 | 15.7 | 12.5 | 6.8 |
| <u>AGER > YGER</u> | | | | |
| Achievement yes :social security | 22.2 | 34.1 | 3.4 | 11.2 |
| Achievement no :better housing | 45.0 | 33.7 | 23.9 | 33.0 |
| Achievement no :selfrealisation in work | 5.0 | 6.0 | 4.6 | 11.4 |
| Work= :secure job | 13.0 | 16.3 | 16.9 | 33.0 |
| Work= :nice colleagues | 1.1 | 0.0 | 7.9 | 17.1 |
| <u>Germans > Italians</u> | | | | |
| Achievement yes :better income | 6.7 | 4.6 | 18.0 | 15.7 |
| "Money is measure for individual success" | 12.5 | 17.1 | 81.8 | 77.3 |
| "Work only provides means for living" | 32.6 | 35.2 | 59.1 | 57.5 |
| Achievement yes :less environmental damage | 24.4 | 26.1 | 40.5 | 37.1 |
| <u>YGER</u> | | | | |
| Achievement no :social security | 5.0 | 3.6 | 14.8 | 6.8 |
| <u>AITA > YITA</u> | | | | |
| Achievement no :culture | 17.5 | 38.6 | 43.2 | 37.5 |
| Work= :good payment | 6.5 | 22.8 | 18.0 | 13.6 |
| Achievement yes :better housing | 4.4 | 17.1 | 9.0 | 11.2 |

within groups percentages
permutation due to matrix clustering

Work and Achievement Orientation
Graphic Summary of Generation and Nation "Effect"

| | |
|---|---|
| Most important aspect of work | |
| n3:payment for hard work | a |
| n3:secure job | b |
| n3:colleagues | c |
| n3:self-realization in work | d |
| n3:much leisure | e |
| n3:easy income, no hard work | f |
| Items concerning attitudes towards work | |
| n5:money=measure of success | g |
| n6:work only means for living | h |
| n12:life=more than work | i |
| Most important elements in improvement of life quality | |
| n10:better housing | k |
| n10:better social security | l |
| n10:less environmental damages | m |
| n10:self-realization in work | n |
| n10:better income | o |
| n10:cultural possibilities | p |
| Least important elements in improvement of life quality | |
| n11:better housing | q |
| n11:better social security | r |
| n11:less environmental damages | s |
| n11:self-realization in work | t |
| n11:better income | u |
| n11:cultural possibilities | v |



7.6 Orientations towards politics and the military

Looking at the simple structure of political and military orientations, we again find strong cultural but also considerable generational differences. Here the cultural differences coincide with the political left-right spectrum. Implicitly a trust or distrust of institutionalized politics seems to be involved: Whilst amongst Germans the frank confession of no political interest is rare, it is more frequent in Italy. The stance towards non-established social movements on the other hand is marked by higher aversion in Germany and higher rates of sympathy in Italy. The political position in Turin is dominated by the left spectrum (especially amongst youth) while in German metropolitan areas a political right orientation is found especially amongst adults.

Another big cultural difference is indicated by ecological concerns which are high in Germany and low in Italy. In Germany "ecology" has gained the status of an accepted political issue and no longer meets resistance in institutionalized politics. It is a matter of attention within the German public, but not so much within the Italian. This also holds true for the attention to military matters (not withstanding with the attitude towards the military).

The attitude toward the military shows clear generational differences:

Whilst the young are rather distant to the military, the adults are more affirmative. The adults rather share the traditional enemy perspective as a military threat paradigm, whilst the juveniles rather share the overkill-perspective. The "acceptance of military defense", however, finds less difference between generations (and cultures); but still here, the acceptance of military defense is lower amongst juveniles and higher amongst adults.


Simple structure of political and military orientations

| | | Italians | | Germans | |
|----------------------------------|------------|----------|-------|---------|-------|
| | | YITA | AITA | YGER | AGER |
| Cultural differences: | | | | | |
| Political orientation: | LEFT | 73.85 | 56.06 | 30.34 | 24.72 |
| Sympathy for social movements | HIGHSYM | 65.22 | 60.87 | 44.94 | 26.97 |
| Military threat paradigm | OVERKILL | 84.52 | 71.08 | 69.33 | 58.02 |
| Attention to military matters | LOW | 40.22 | 45.65 | 15.73 | 12.79 |
| Ecological concern | OEKLOW | 40.91 | 52.94 | 14.29 | 17.50 |
| Political interest: | NONE | 15.38 | 22.83 | 4.55 | 4.55 |
| Generational differences: | | | | | |
| Political interest: | yes | 47.26 | 52.17 | 69.32 | 79.55 |
| Geographical identification | REGION | 35.87 | 44.57 | 56.82 | 61.80 |
| Attention to military matters | HIGH | 19.57 | 17.39 | 53.93 | 55.81 |
| Ecological concern | OEKHIGH | 14.77 | 15.29 | 45.24 | 43.75 |
| Sympathy for social movements | LOWSYM | 7.61 | 16.31 | 33.71 | 49.44 |
| Political orientation: | RIGHT | 6.15 | 9.09 | 29.21 | 47.19 |
| Generational differences: | | | | | |
| Acceptance of military defense | HIGH | 15.22 | 19.78 | 7.87 | 12.64 |
| Military threat paradigm | ENEMY.TRAD | 3.57 | 15.66 | 5.33 | 23.46 |
| Attitudes towards the Military: | AFFINITY | 14.29 | 28.74 | 22.78 | 37.18 |
| Generational differences: | | | | | |
| Acceptance of military defense | LOW | 25.00 | 20.88 | 30.34 | 24.14 |
| Ecological concern | OEKMID | 44.32 | 31.76 | 40.48 | 38.75 |
| Attitudes towards the Military: | DISTANCE | 41.76 | 25.29 | 36.71 | 17.95 |
| Political interest: | LOW | 37.36 | 25.00 | 26.14 | 15.91 |
| Geographical identification | EUROWORLD | 40.22 | 35.87 | 25.00 | 14.61 |

within groups percentages

Orientation towards the Military and Politics
Graphic Summary of Generation and Nation "Effect"

| | | |
|----------------------------------|---------------|---|
| Attention to military matters | low | a |
| | middle | 1 |
| | high | A |
| Attitudes towards the Military: | Distance | b |
| | Middle | 2 |
| | Affinity | B |
| Military threat paradigm | Enemy - Trad. | c |
| | Mixed | 3 |
| | Overkill | C |
| Acceptance of military defense | low | d |
| | middle | 4 |
| | high | D |
| Political interest: | no interest | e |
| | low interest | 5 |
| | interest | E |
| Political orientation: | Left | f |
| | Middle | 6 |
| | Right | F |
| Sympathy for social movements | none or low | g |
| | middle | 7 |
| | high | G |
| Ecological concern | Low | h |
| | Middle | 8 |
| | High | H |
| Geographical identification with | Region | i |
| | Nation | 9 |
| | Europe/World | I |



7.7 Value Orientations

As to the value related orientations we find mainly generational differences. These are constituted by enormous educational differences between the juveniles and the adults. (We have to remember that this is the aggregated level of children and parents.)

Another generational difference is suggested concerning the anticipation of the future, which is rather pessimistic amongst juveniles and rather optimistic amongst adults (especially Italian adults).


Whilst the single value related aspects of the socio-moral orientation and the political paradigmatic orientations do not show up with very impressive generational and cultural differences, the combined indicator for value orientation does. Since education is implied in this indicator, one might suspect that this is only due to educational status. (The next volume of this report, dealing with the construction of the indicators and detailed analysis, has to show that this is not the case.) A further indicator for value orientation was independently built up by the instrumental orientations in everyday life conduct. (See "Tradit" and "PostTradit" in the final discussion of indicators.) This alternative indicator (which is independent of educational status) even enhances the findings of traditional and posttraditional value orientations: Whilst juveniles are rather post-traditional in their value orientation, adults are rather traditional. The "traditionalists" are especially widespread amongst Italian adults, while the "post-traditionalists" are widespread amongst juveniles independently of the culture/ nation. The Inglehart-type of "postmaterialists" is strongest amongst Italian youth. The Germans -independently of generation- especially show up as "mixed postmaterialists" in the sense of Inglehart and are dominant in the "mixed" group of our value indicator.

The generational conflict between traditional and post-traditional value orientations is sharper in the Italian metropole of Turin than in German metropolitan areas. This especially holds true for the conflict between "materialists" and "postmaterialists" in the sense of Inglehart as well as for "traditionalists" and "posttraditionalists" in the valuation of virtues for everyday conduct. The conflict between the politi-

cal paradigmatic orientations of "distribution" and "life-style" is more elaborated in Germany than in Italy. Thus one might say that the transformation of the value conflict into a political conflict was more successful in Germany than in Italy, and one could speculate, if this is due to different conceptions of politics in Germany and in Italy. This kind of explanations, however, is far beyond the frame of our description.

Value Orientations
Graphic summary for Generation and Nation "Effect"

| | | |
|-------------------------|----------|---|
| GENDER | male | a |
| | female | b |
| EDUCATIONAL LEVEL | ed-low | c |
| | ed-mid | d |
| | ed-high | e |
| POL. PARAD. ORIENTATION | distrib | f |
| | parmix | g |
| | lifestyl | h |
| SOCIOMORAL ORIENTATION | preconv | i |
| | convent | j |
| | postcon | k |
| INGLEHART INDEX | mat | l |
| | mixmat | m |
| | mixpost | n |
| | postmat | o |
| VALUE ORIENTATION | trad | p |
| | mixval | q |
| | posttrad | r |
| ANTICIPATION OF FUTURE | optimist | s |
| | mixfut | t |
| | peessim | u |



7.8 Final Summary
Condensed description by means of indicators

Without an explanation of the construction of indicators (which is given in detail in the second volume of the report) we will describe generational and cultural/national differences in a condensed form. This description was analytically prepared in a double sense: first the information of single variables had been stacked into indicators, then all indicators had been analysed for **simple structures** contrasting either national/cultural or generational differences. The latter needed an iterative approach, in which two "heaps" were singled out and optimized, one for cultural and one for generational simple structures. A simple structure organises data as well as criteria according to their similarity/dissimilarity. Two cases of similarity of criteria are interesting in our context:

1) young and adult Italians are similar and also young and adult Germans are similar, but both similarities are different from each other. This clearly can be called a **culture or nation effect**.

2) young Germans and Italians are similar and also adult Germans and Italians are similar, but both similarities are different from each other. This clearly can be called a **generational effect**.

If the aspect can be organized in a way which gives the sharpest contrast between the criteria, this is called a **simple structure**.

This procedure can be applied for aggregated data as well as for individual cases. If it is applied for aggregated data, it is a kind of meta-analysis.

This meta-analysis was done iteratively: In the first step those aspects were eliminated as "residuals", which did not fit into the cultural/national structure. The next step investigated the "residuals" for a generational structure and eliminated there all non fitting aspects. Finally the equi-distant aspects (the "turning points") within each structure were taken out for clarity. The result is given in the table "Simple structures of nation and generation at the level of indicators". The final structures were combined and plotted in the described manner.

The plot reveals that we find three "dimensions" at the level of our indicators:

- 1) a national/cultural effect
- 2) a generational effect
- 3) a combined cultural-generational effect

The national or cultural dimension

The aspects which unfold on the cultural dimension are:

- * an ecological concern, which is high in Germany ("Ecolhigh") and low in Italy ("Ecolow");
- * the political interest or attention to politics, which is high in Germany ("Polyes") but low in Italy ("Polno");
- * the stereotyping of "national characters", which is "self-blaming" in Italy (" $<$ " in plot) and "others-blaming" in Germany (" $>$ ");
- * the work and achievement orientations with some limitations:
the post-traditional positions in the work and achievement orientation are more widespread in Italy than in Germany ("Achpost", "2").
The extreme post-traditional work and achievement orientation is more typical for Italian juveniles ("Achpost").
The traditional work and achievement orientations are more typical for Germans ("Achtrad", "4"). The extreme form ("4") is independent of generation but less frequent, while the more frequent is not so sharp in its typicality ("Achtrad").

The generational dimension

The aspects which unfold on the generational dimension are:

- * The educational status, which is high amongst youth and lower amongst adults ("Eduhigh", "Educlow");
- * the attitude towards the military, which is coined by distance amongst youth ("Mildist") and by affinity amongst adults ("Milaffin");
- * the value orientation which is posttraditional amongst youth ("Posttrad") but rather traditional amongst adults ("Trad");
- * the orientation towards instrumental values,

- which is especially post-traditional amongst Italian youth ("Posttradit") and especially traditional amongst Italian adults ("Tradit");
- * the postmaterialism in sense of Inglehart, which is higher amongst youth than amongst adults especially in Italy ("Postmat");
- * the anticipation of future, which is more pessimistic amongst youth ("pessim") and more optimistic amongst adults ("Optimism");
- * the political paradigmatic orientation, which is rather distribution-oriented amongst adults and rather life-style oriented amongst youth.
The generational difference is herein constituted by the stronger life-style orientation of the German youth.

The cultural-generational dimension

The aspects which unfold on the combined cultural-generational dimension, i.e. having a cultural as well as a generational impact, are:

- * The political left-right position, which is more left oriented in Italy than in Germany as well as (within the nations) amongst youth more left oriented than amongst adults. The political right-orientation is more frequent in Germany and there more frequent amongst adults than amongst juveniles.
- * The stance towards social movements is more sympathetic in Italy than in Germany as well as (within the nations) more sympathetic amongst youth than amongst adults. No sympathy or aversion is more frequent in Germany and here especially amongst adults.
- * The work orientation is more traditional ("Worktrad") in Germany than in Italy as well as more traditional amongst adults than amongst the juveniles.
Vice versa holds for the posttraditional work-orientation ("Workpost"): it is more frequent amongst Italians than amongst Germans and especially widespread amongst Italian youth.

Simple Structures of Nation and Generation
at the level of indicators

1. National differences

| Aspects | GERMANY | | ITALY | | TOTAL |
|--|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | |
| Sympathy for all social movements | 44.94 | 26.97 | 65.22 | 60.87 | 49.72 |
| Political Position: Left | 30.34 | 24.72 | 73.85 | 56.06 | 43.37 |
| Work-Orientat.: Post-Traditional | 12.64 | 10.34 | 52.27 | 38.37 | 28.45 |
| Work&Achievem-Orient.:extr.post-trad | 13.48 | 6.74 | 40.22 | 29.35 | 22.65 |
| Political interest: low | 26.14 | 15.91 | 37.36 | 25.00 | 26.18 |
| Work&Achievem-Orient.:post-tradition | 19.10 | 29.21 | 38.04 | 30.43 | 29.28 |
| Self-blaming in national stereotypes | 30.34 | 28.09 | 41.30 | 45.65 | 36.46 |
| Ecological concern: low | 14.29 | 17.50 | 40.91 | 52.94 | 31.75 |
| Political interest: none | 4.55 | 4.55 | 15.38 | 22.83 | 11.98 |
| | | | | | |
| Social movements: single issue | 17.98 | 28.09 | 4.35 | 11.96 | 15.47 |
| Work&Achievem-Orient.:extr.tradit. | 19.10 | 19.10 | 5.43 | 10.87 | 13.54 |
| Social movements: no sympathy | 15.73 | 21.35 | 3.26 | 4.35 | 11.05 |
| Blaming others in national stereotypes | 16.85 | 29.21 | 3.26 | 2.17 | 12.71 |
| Political Position: Right | 29.21 | 47.19 | 6.15 | 9.09 | 25.24 |
| Work-Orientat.: Traditional | 40.23 | 54.02 | 9.09 | 22.09 | 31.32 |
| Ecological concern: High | 45.24 | 43.75 | 14.77 | 15.29 | 29.38 |
| Work&Achievem-Orient.:traditional | 48.31 | 44.94 | 16.30 | 29.35 | 34.53 |
| Political Interest: Interest | 63.64 | 75.00 | 43.96 | 48.91 | 57.66 |

2. Generational differences

| | Juveniles | | Adults | | TOTAL |
|--|-----------|-------|--------|-------|-------|
| | YITA | YGER | AGER | AITA | |
| Military threat paradigm: tradit.enemy | 3.57 | 5.33 | 23.46 | 15.66 | 12.07 |
| Anticipation of future: optimism | 16.30 | 7.87 | 15.73 | 27.17 | 16.85 |
| Polit.Paradigm: distribution | 21.11 | 17.24 | 21.43 | 24.42 | 21.04 |
| Affinity towards the military | 14.29 | 22.78 | 37.18 | 28.74 | 25.37 |
| Educational status: low | 31.52 | 22.47 | 44.94 | 42.39 | 35.36 |
| Value Orientation: traditional | 33.71 | 20.93 | 30.95 | 49.41 | 33.72 |
| Instrumental Values: traditional | 28.26 | 20.22 | 35.96 | 59.78 | 36.19 |
| | | | | | |
| Polit.Paradigm: life-style | 44.44 | 54.02 | 45.24 | 41.86 | 46.40 |
| Postmaterialism (Inglehart) | 54.95 | 42.05 | 31.46 | 40.66 | 42.34 |
| Anticipation of future: pessimism | 51.09 | 48.31 | 41.57 | 30.43 | 42.82 |
| Educational status: high | 51.09 | 48.31 | 30.34 | 25.00 | 38.67 |
| Value-orientation: post-traditional | 43.82 | 41.86 | 29.76 | 25.88 | 35.47 |
| Distance towards the military | 41.76 | 36.71 | 17.95 | 25.29 | 30.75 |
| Instrumental Values: post-traditional | 44.57 | 26.97 | 20.22 | 11.96 | 25.97 |


The numbers represent within-groups percentages.

The groups are; YGER = juvenile Germans YITA = juvenile Italians

AGER = adult Germans AITA = adult Italians

The above simple structure was the result of an iterative matrix clustering on the aggregated data in search of simple structures for national and generational differences, done by the permutation of aspects and groups.

Graphic summary of Generation and Nation "Effect"



Abbreviations are explained in the text
Locations at capital letters of description

8. Interpretation of findings

We found clear signs of a value conflict in Italy as well as in Germany at the aggregated level of juveniles and adults. The common research study was designed in order to get a better insight into processes of value change.

Our attempt to separate cultural from generational differences was one important part of this task. But this kind of separation provides no guarantee to find the variables which are connected to value change. Instead of this, we found hints that people in Turin and in German metropolitan areas live in contexts of different stages of value change which must reflect modernization processes of societies.

Processes of value change are processes to provide oneself for the future, thus for individuals it is connected with hopes and expectations.

The other part is adaptation to an (even as bad) experienced reality. Within this perspective our findings at the aggregated level of Italians and Germans, juveniles and adults, are ambivalent. The value conflict between Italian juveniles and their parents seems to be stronger than the conflict in Germany, i.e. the Federal Republic of 1988. The Italian conflict is stronger especially in the questions of everyday life. This situation in many respects resembles the German situation in the beginning of the 80ies. Whilst in Germany, however, the value conflict became a political conflict which found its turning point in the nuclear catastrophe of Czernobyl, the value conflict seems to have got stuck in the family sphere in Italy. Thus other modes of conflict resolution seem to be dominant in Germany and in Italy. The politicization of the value conflict in Germany could have resulted in cutting the sharp profile of this conflict (which at least is fostered by our time series). Hopes and fears seem to be differently mixed up in the German and in the Italian sample. As to the situation in Turin (as an Italian metropole) and in German metropolises, the situation in Turin seems to be rather dominated by achievement orientations, while in German metropolises the struggle against decline began.

The vague everyday life conceptions of society in Turin seems to point to an advanced industrial society whilst in Germany this perspective is shadowed by the

rising awareness of the risks of such a society. The alienating forces of such economic systems are acknowledged by Germans - either cynically or with sorrow- whilst especially for young Italians there still exists the hope for gains in subjectivity. This may be due to the Italian feelings of social restrictions at the conventional or family level but German feelings of restrictions at the systemic level of economy and bureaucracy.

In other words: Italians and Germans seem to look at different sides of the same coin. Whilst young Italians still have the hope that this brings about some emancipation for them, amongst young Germans a kind of despair is spreading, that this emancipation may be exhausted.

8.1 Limitations of this description and preview to the next report

Finally we have to stress some limitations of our results and of this description. At the same time this should give a preview to the next volume of this report.

1) In this part of our report we have confined ourselves to the description at the aggregated level of generations and nations. This is the usual perspective of opinion research and many readers may be content with it. Nevertheless this kind of description -beyond its necessity as a baseline of analysis- is not suited to perceive the sideconditions of problems. The aggregation implies the definition of units and these units then are treated as homogenous. Speaking of "Germans", "Italian juveniles" etc. means abstractions, though everybody has clear ideas about them. This problem is just the same as what was described in the passages on stereotyping.

Analytical tasks, however, imply the destruction of such self-evident units and their reconstruction as relatively homogenous units due to relevant criteria. Thus differentiation is not pre-given and self-evident, but a result of analysis. And good or successful analysis provides new differentiations, which are practically relevant. (The search for simple structures in our description in this sense had been analytical, insofar as the differentiation was applied to the aspects of description.)

Here we stayed at the level of pre-given units as they were sampled. The second part of our report rather will consist of analyses which seek new units of description.

2) The sampling was inconsistent insofar as we have a relative homogenous sample of the Turin area, but some variation in the experiential environments in the German metropolitan sample. This does not mean that the "classic" sampling criteria are violated, but that in comparisons the variation of (possible) sidecondition is different. This problem will be reduced but not eliminated when we explicitly analyse for the

sideconditions. It cannot be eliminated since the samples are too small to control the variation of the sideconditions. This argument is stronger than the normal logic of representativity which mechanically treats people as dices. This is why we will concentrate in the second report on the statistical tradition of Tukey.

3) In this first part we neglected the fact, that we not only referred to the aggregates of "juveniles" and "adults" but to concrete pairs of juveniles and one parent. Our comparison of generations had been stronger than the normal aggregational approach suggests. The second part will explicitly take into account such child-parent interactions. These in our opinion are the hardest data for a test of the hypothesis of a process of value change.

4) Except for the straight forward assumption of generational conflict and cultural conflict we did not deal with any theoretical assumption or construction. Insofar as this report is a purist one (which has some merits just because of purism), it deserves purist interpretation only. Very often, complex theories or assumptions are drawn from poor data. We want to enhance the complexity of assumptions as well as analysis in the next volume of the report.

5) As to our description above, we sometimes ran into a dilemma when we left the level of the questionnaire (the "simple" meaning of question and answer) and spoke about indicators or stacked variables as a kind of "reconstructed meaning". Either we should have omitted this kind of description or we should have explained the construction of the indicators. Since we decided to produce the report in two volumes and the first part to be a straight forward description, the reader sometimes must "cross-read" to find the details. For the sake of simplicity and clarity we took into account this disadvantage.

6) The description above fairly consists of text without any reference to tables or numbers. This improved the readability but reduced the control of the description. In order to allow control over descriptions and interpretations the questionnaire as well as the tables are placed into the annex to this report.

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10 . ANNEX

The ANNEX gives the following information:

* The questionnaire listing provides the information which comparable variables had been included into the analysis (see also figure 2 in the text). The notation of variables mainly follows the number of questions in the Italian questionnaire (variable N15 is question (15) in the Italian questionnaire).

The listing shows the extracted version of the Italian questionnaire (questions and response categories) on the left side, and the according German questionnaire on the right. The order of presentation in the listing corresponds to the Italian version.

* In order to reach comparability, some categories for some of the variables had to be reordered or recoded. Their meaning is shown in the categories of the tables.

The tables are constructed as systematic cross-tabulations based on the aggregated subgroups of the design of the study (cf. figure 1 in the text). Reported are the column percentages within these groups.

* Sometimes references are made to indicators/indices. The construction of these indices is reported in the tables as well as in the short description of indicators. The exact construction of indicators will be shown in the next volume.

10.1 Short description of indicators/indices

10.2 Systematic tables for aggregated subgroups

10.3 Listing of Italian and German questionnaire

10.1 Short Description of Indicators

| Abbrev. | Description | Construction |
|---------|---|---|
| PARAD | Political Paradigmatic Orientation | Preference N1 vs. N2 |
| | distribution orientation | N1(A) > N2(B) |
| | transitory /mixed | N1(A) = N2(B) |
| | life-style orientation | N1(A) < N2(B) |
| LEVEL | Socio-moral Orientation | modal level of arguments |
| | | N25 MOR(1-12) |
| MATPMAT | Materialism-Postmaterialism | Inglehart-Algorithm |
| CHVALUE | Value Orientation | VALC= REDUC+PARAD+LEVEL+MATPMAT |
| | post-traditional | minimum to lower hinge incl. |
| | mixed | within spread |
| | traditional | upper hinge and above |
| VALINST | Instrumental Value Orientation | N50(1-11) "unimportant" |
| | traditional | Old Values > New Values |
| | mixed | Old Values = New Values |
| | post-traditional | New Values > Old Values |
| WINDR | Work Orientation | dichotomized Evaluation of Work |
| | | WIND=N5+N6+N3(1)+N3(2)+N10(5)-N3(4)-N10(4) |
| | post-traditional | minimum to lower hinge incl. |
| | mixed | within spread |
| | traditional | upper hinge and above |
| CLREV | Work & Achievement-Oriented | Result from Cluster-Analysis |
| | | N3,N5,N6,N10,N11,N12 dichotomized |
| | extremely post-traditional | Cluster 3 |
| | post-traditional | Cluster 1 |
| | traditional | Cluster 2 |
| | extremely traditional | Cluster 4 |
| OERTYP | Ecological Concern | |
| | | OER=N8+N22+N23+N10(3)-N11(3)+Issue(6+14+16) |
| | low concern | minimum to lower hinge incl. |
| | medium concern | within spread |
| | high concern | upper hinge and above |
| INFAMIL | Information/Communication about | |
| | military matters | MINF=N26inv+N27inv + Issue(10+13+18) |
| ATTMIL | Attitude towards the Military | MAT= complex sum and count |
| | a) acceptance of military defense | |
| | b) acceptance of enemy description | |
| | c) rejection of overkill description | |
| | d) acceptance of official descript.of security policy | |
| | e) positive evaluation of NATO | |
| | f) military strength amongst political priorities | |
| | g) military threat by East: yes, great | |
| | h) threat of war in Europe: yes | |
| | | ATTMIL= categorized by stem & leaf |
| | DISTANCE | minimum to lower hinge incl. |
| | mixed | within spread |
| | AFFINITY | upper hinge and above |

The categorization/ computation of upper & lower hinges was done by the SYSTAT stem-and-leaf procedure.

10.2 Tables

Cross-tabulations of single variables or indices with the subgroups of the study (=VERSION).

The subgroups are the following:

- * German youth (n=89; age 16-25) = YGER
- * German adults/parents (n=89) = AGER
- * Italian youth (n=92; age 16-25) = YITA
- * Italian adults/parents (n=92) = AITA

| VERSION (absolute) | | | | | |
|--------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------------------|
| GERMANY | | | ITALY | | TOTAL |
| YOUTH | ADULTS | | YOUTH | ADULTS | |
| YGER | AGER | | YITA | AITA | |
| 1 | 89 | | | | 24.59 young Germans |
| 2 | | 89 | | | 24.59 adult Germans |
| 3 | | | 92 | | 25.41 young Italians |
| 4 | | | | 92 | 25.41 adult Italians |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 362 |

TABLE OF N3 (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
Most important aspect to evaluate own job

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------------------------------------|
| 1 | 17.98 | 13.64 | 6.52 | 22.83 | 15.24 very good pay but stress |
| 2 | 16.85 | 32.95 | 13.04 | 16.30 | 19.67 secure workplace |
| 3 | 7.87 | 17.05 | 1.09 | .00 | 6.37 sympathetic colleagues |
| 4 | 41.57 | 25.00 | 65.22 | 48.91 | 45.43 self-actualization possible |
| 5 | 6.74 | 3.41 | 7.61 | 5.43 | 5.82 job allowing much leisure time |
| 6 | 8.99 | 7.95 | 6.52 | 6.52 | 7.48 good income without stress |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 |

TABLE OF N5 (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
sucess is measured by income

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------------------|
| 1 | 18.18 | 22.73 | 87.50 | 82.95 | 52.84 disagreement |
| 2 | 81.82 | 77.27 | 12.50 | 17.05 | 47.16 agreement |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 |

TABLE OF N6 (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
job is just a means to secure ones existence

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------------------|
| 1 | 40.91 | 42.53 | 67.39 | 64.77 | 54.08 disagreement |
| 2 | 59.09 | 57.47 | 32.61 | 35.23 | 45.92 agreement |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 |

TABLE OF N8 (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
do you inform yourself about ecological problems ?

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-----------|
| 1 | 85.39 | 87.64 | 63.74 | 54.95 | 72.78 yes |
| 2 | 14.61 | 12.36 | 36.26 | 45.05 | 27.22 no |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 |

TABLE OF N10 (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
increase of personal quality of life: most important aspect

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------------------------------------|
| 1 | 8.99 | 11.24 | 4.44 | 17.05 | 10.39 | better, more comfortable appartement |
| 2 | 3.37 | 11.24 | 22.22 | 34.09 | 17.70 | better social services |
| 3 | 40.45 | 37.08 | 24.44 | 26.14 | 32.02 | less environmental pollution |
| 4 | 21.35 | 16.85 | 23.33 | 14.77 | 19.10 | job allowing self-actualization |
| 5 | 17.98 | 15.73 | 6.67 | 4.55 | 11.24 | better income |
| 6 | 7.87 | 7.87 | 18.89 | 3.41 | 9.55 | better cultural program |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N11 (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
increase of personal quality of life: least important aspect

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------------------------------|
| 1 | 23.86 | 32.95 | 45.00 | 33.73 | 33.63 | appartement |
| 2 | 14.77 | 6.82 | 5.00 | 3.61 | 7.67 | social services |
| 3 | 1.14 | 4.55 | 3.75 | 2.41 | 2.95 | less pollution |
| 4 | 4.55 | 11.36 | 5.00 | 6.02 | 6.78 | job allowing self-actualization |
| 5 | 12.50 | 6.82 | 23.75 | 15.66 | 14.45 | better income |
| 6 | 43.18 | 37.50 | 17.50 | 38.55 | 34.51 | cultural program |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N12 (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
comfortable life is more important than a stressing job
and professional success

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------------|
| 1 | 30.23 | 41.38 | 30.23 | 42.05 | 36.02 | disagreement |
| 2 | 69.77 | 58.62 | 69.77 | 57.95 | 63.98 | agreement |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N13 (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
Behavior in leisure time. Frequently I am (not) at home because...

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------------------------------|
| 1 | 8.99 | 2.25 | 8.70 | 6.52 | 6.63 | groups, associations etc. |
| 2 | 15.73 | 5.62 | 13.04 | 2.17 | 9.12 | sports |
| 3 | 31.46 | 19.10 | 40.22 | 13.04 | 25.97 | friends |
| 4 | 26.97 | 6.74 | 5.43 | 5.43 | 11.05 | being in coffee shops, bars etc. |
| 5 | 5.62 | 14.61 | 18.48 | 6.52 | 11.33 | movies, culture events |
| 6 | 10.11 | 34.83 | 5.43 | 11.96 | 15.47 | hobbies at home |
| 7 | 1.12 | 16.85 | 6.52 | 30.43 | 13.81 | at home, want to be undisturbed |
| 8 | .00 | .00 | 2.17 | 23.91 | 6.63 | faccende domestiche |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N15 (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
political activity/political interest

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------------------------|
| 2 | 5.68 | 4.55 | 3.30 | 3.26 | 4.18 | politically active |
| 3 | 63.64 | 75.00 | 43.96 | 48.91 | 57.66 | interest, but not active |
| 4 | 26.14 | 15.91 | 37.36 | 25.00 | 26.18 | low interest |
| 5 | 4.55 | 4.55 | 15.38 | 22.83 | 11.98 | no interest |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N16 (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
left-right in political spectrum (not fully comparable)

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|---|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|---------------|
| 1 | 2.25 | .00 | 13.85 | 3.03 | 4.21 | extreme left |
| 2 | 10.11 | 5.62 | 38.46 | 27.27 | 18.45 | left |
| 3 | 17.98 | 19.10 | 21.54 | 25.76 | 20.71 | middle left |
| 4 | 40.45 | 28.09 | 20.00 | 34.85 | 31.39 | middle |
| 5 | 23.60 | 35.96 | 6.15 | 9.09 | 20.39 | middle right |
| 6 | 4.49 | 8.99 | .00 | .00 | 3.88 | right |
| 7 | 1.12 | 2.25 | .00 | .00 | .97 | extreme right |

TABLE OF GROUP(3) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
stance towards peace movement

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------------|
| 0 | 42.70 | 56.18 | 9.78 | 13.04 | 30.11 | no sympathy |
| 1 | 57.30 | 43.82 | 90.22 | 86.96 | 69.89 | sympathy |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF GROUP(4) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
stance towards nuclear power plant opposition

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------------|
| 0 | 43.82 | 64.04 | 25.00 | 30.43 | 40.61 | no sympathy |
| 1 | 56.18 | 35.96 | 75.00 | 69.57 | 59.39 | sympathy |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF GROUP(5) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
stance towards environmentalists

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------------|
| 0 | 17.98 | 23.60 | 10.87 | 16.30 | 17.13 | no sympathy |
| 1 | 82.02 | 76.40 | 89.13 | 83.70 | 82.87 | sympathy |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N18 (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
INGLEHART 1.1 priority of political tasks

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------------------------------|
| 1 | 20.22 | 31.46 | 13.04 | 17.39 | 20.44 | maintenance of order |
| 2 | 35.96 | 28.09 | 15.22 | 20.65 | 24.86 | more say on political decisions |
| 3 | 13.48 | 13.48 | 6.52 | 20.65 | 13.54 | fight against rising prices |
| 4 | 30.34 | 26.97 | 65.22 | 41.30 | 41.16 | free expression of opinion |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N19 (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
Inglehart 1.2 second priority of political tasks

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------------------------------|
| 1 | 20.22 | 28.09 | 19.78 | 23.91 | 22.99 | maintenance of order |
| 2 | 33.71 | 22.47 | 37.36 | 25.00 | 29.64 | more say on political decisions |
| 3 | 14.61 | 22.47 | 17.58 | 21.74 | 19.11 | fight against rising prices |
| 4 | 31.46 | 26.97 | 25.27 | 29.35 | 28.25 | free expression of opinion |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N20 (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
attachment to geographical regions

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-----------------------|
| 1 | 56.82 | 61.80 | 35.87 | 44.57 | 49.58 | city/region of living |
| 2 | 18.18 | 23.60 | 23.91 | 19.57 | 21.33 | Italy resp. Germany |
| 3 | 25.00 | 14.61 | 40.22 | 35.87 | 29.09 | Europe/the World |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N22 (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
willingness to pay higher taxes for the environmental protection

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------------|
| 1 | 16.85 | 18.39 | 22.83 | 33.70 | 23.06 | nothing |
| 2 | 15.73 | 20.69 | 11.96 | 16.30 | 16.11 | + |
| 3 | 28.09 | 20.69 | 20.65 | 13.04 | 20.56 | ++ |
| 4 | 15.73 | 16.09 | 22.83 | 15.22 | 17.50 | +++ |
| 5 | 17.98 | 17.24 | 18.48 | 15.22 | 17.22 | ++++ |
| 6 | 5.62 | 6.90 | 3.26 | 6.52 | 5.56 | other amount |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N23 (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
pro introduction of environmental legislation

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|------------|
| -1 | 16.85 | 23.86 | 20.65 | 32.61 | 23.55 | no |
| 0 | 23.60 | 22.73 | 23.91 | 21.74 | 22.99 | don't know |
| 1 | 59.55 | 53.41 | 55.43 | 45.65 | 53.46 | yes |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N24(1) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
 priority of political tasks (Inglehart 2.1) 1st priority

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--|
| 1 | 10.23 | 9.09 | 11.96 | 17.58 | 12.26 | high level of economic growth |
| 2 | 3.41 | 1.14 | .00 | 1.10 | 1.39 | strong defense forces |
| 3 | 2.27 | 7.95 | 14.13 | 14.29 | 9.75 | more say in job and society |
| 4 | 11.36 | 15.91 | 13.04 | 15.38 | 13.93 | protection of cities from pollution |
| 5 | 7.95 | 10.23 | 6.52 | 16.48 | 10.31 | stable economy |
| 6 | 4.55 | 4.55 | 14.13 | 14.29 | 9.47 | fight against crime |
| 7 | 12.50 | 18.18 | 18.48 | 14.29 | 15.88 | more humane society |
| 8 | 47.73 | 32.95 | 21.74 | 6.59 | 27.02 | society in which ideas count more than money |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N24(2) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
 priority of political tasks (Inglehart 2.2; see above) 2nd priority

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--|
| 1 | 4.55 | 3.37 | 8.70 | 3.26 | 4.99 | high level of economic growth |
| 2 | 5.68 | 6.74 | .00 | 1.09 | 3.32 | strong defense forces |
| 3 | 14.77 | 12.36 | 11.96 | 17.39 | 14.13 | more say in job and society |
| 4 | 17.05 | 15.73 | 31.52 | 19.57 | 21.05 | protection of cities from pollution |
| 5 | 20.45 | 23.60 | 4.35 | 9.78 | 14.40 | stable economy |
| 6 | 13.64 | 6.74 | 13.04 | 14.13 | 11.91 | fight against crime |
| 7 | 9.09 | 12.36 | 17.39 | 23.91 | 15.79 | more humane society |
| 8 | 14.77 | 19.10 | 13.04 | 10.87 | 14.40 | society in which ideas count more than money |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N24(3) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
 priority of political tasks (Inglehart 2.2; see above) 3rd priority

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--|
| 1 | 5.68 | 5.62 | 3.30 | 5.49 | 5.01 | high level of economic growth |
| 2 | 1.14 | 4.49 | 2.20 | 2.20 | 2.51 | strong defense forces |
| 3 | 21.59 | 10.11 | 6.59 | 10.99 | 12.26 | more say in job and society |
| 4 | 18.18 | 21.35 | 23.08 | 18.68 | 20.33 | protection of cities from pollution |
| 5 | 20.45 | 11.24 | 13.19 | 12.09 | 14.21 | stable economy |
| 6 | 11.36 | 14.61 | 17.58 | 19.78 | 15.88 | fight against crime |
| 7 | 4.55 | 13.48 | 13.19 | 16.48 | 11.98 | more humane society |
| 8 | 17.05 | 19.10 | 20.88 | 14.29 | 17.83 | society in which ideas count more than money |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

LEVEL OF MORAL PREFERENCES ON "EVERYDAY" EXAMPLES OF MORAL PROBLEMS (MOR 1-12)
 TABLE OF MOR(1) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
 GER: car damage; ITA: tax fraud (not directly comparable)

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | LEVEL OF MORAL PREFERENCE |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------------------------|
| 0 | 4.49 | 1.12 | 4.35 | 5.43 | 3.87 | no problem/even if illegal |
| 1 | 31.46 | 37.08 | 13.04 | 19.57 | 25.14 | preconventional |
| 2 | 13.48 | 14.61 | 23.91 | 29.35 | 20.44 | conventional |
| 3 | 50.56 | 47.19 | 58.70 | 45.65 | 50.55 | postconventional |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF MOR(2) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
 misuse of public housing

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------------------------|
| 0 | 6.74 | 4.49 | 5.43 | 4.35 | 5.25 | no problem/even if illegal |
| 1 | 10.11 | 8.99 | 23.91 | 27.17 | 17.68 | preconventional |
| 2 | 37.08 | 34.83 | 14.13 | 13.04 | 24.59 | conventional |
| 3 | 46.07 | 51.69 | 56.52 | 55.43 | 52.49 | postconventional |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF MOR(3) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
free riding in public transportation

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------------------------|
| 0 | 10.23 | 1.14 | 23.91 | 8.70 | 11.11 | no problem/even if illegal |
| 1 | 52.27 | 48.86 | 47.83 | 41.30 | 47.50 | preconventional |
| 2 | 18.18 | 20.45 | 3.26 | 15.22 | 14.17 | conventional |
| 3 | 19.32 | 29.55 | 25.00 | 34.78 | 27.22 | postconventional |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF MOR(4) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
insurance fraud

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------------------------|
| 0 | 10.11 | 3.37 | 15.22 | 11.96 | 10.22 | no problem/even if illegal |
| 1 | 46.07 | 41.57 | 35.87 | 26.09 | 37.29 | preconventional |
| 2 | 16.85 | 15.73 | 8.70 | 20.65 | 15.47 | conventional |
| 3 | 26.97 | 39.33 | 40.22 | 41.30 | 37.02 | postconventional |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF MOR(5) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
real estate speculation by means of confidential information

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------------------------|
| 0 | 19.10 | 17.98 | 6.52 | 8.70 | 12.98 | no problem/even if illegal |
| 1 | 43.82 | 39.33 | 35.87 | 31.52 | 37.57 | preconventional |
| 2 | 6.74 | 12.36 | 18.48 | 19.57 | 14.36 | conventional |
| 3 | 30.34 | 30.34 | 39.13 | 40.22 | 35.08 | postconventional |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF MOR(6) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
"cure vacations"

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------------------------|
| 0 | 7.87 | 2.25 | 16.30 | 20.65 | 11.88 | no problem/even if illegal |
| 1 | 20.22 | 12.36 | 38.04 | 26.09 | 24.31 | preconventional |
| 2 | 37.08 | 42.70 | 13.04 | 14.13 | 26.52 | conventional |
| 3 | 34.83 | 42.70 | 32.61 | 39.13 | 37.29 | postconventional |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF MOR(7) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
false declaration of being ill

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------------------------|
| 0 | 13.48 | 8.99 | 4.35 | 10.87 | 9.39 | no problem/even if illegal |
| 1 | 22.47 | 12.36 | 33.70 | 30.43 | 24.86 | preconventional |
| 2 | 38.20 | 35.96 | 22.83 | 19.57 | 29.01 | conventional |
| 3 | 25.84 | 42.70 | 39.13 | 39.13 | 36.74 | postconventional |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF MOR(8) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
garbage brought into the environment, not at deposit

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------------------------|
| 0 | .00 | 1.12 | .00 | 2.20 | .83 | no problem/even if illegal |
| 1 | 23.60 | 28.09 | 28.26 | 35.16 | 28.81 | preconventional |
| 2 | 13.48 | 14.61 | 18.48 | 13.19 | 14.96 | conventional |
| 3 | 62.92 | 56.18 | 53.26 | 49.45 | 55.40 | postconventional |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF MOR(9) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
keeping found wallet

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------------------------|
| 0 | 8.99 | 3.37 | 11.96 | 6.59 | 7.76 | no problem/even if illegal |
| 1 | 17.98 | 15.73 | 21.74 | 16.48 | 18.01 | preconventional |
| 2 | 4.49 | 8.99 | 14.13 | 10.99 | 9.70 | conventional |
| 3 | 68.54 | 71.91 | 52.17 | 65.93 | 64.54 | postconventional |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF MOR(10) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
fraud of car insurance

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------------------------|
| 0 | 13.48 | 10.11 | 29.35 | 26.37 | 19.94 | no problem/even if illegal |
| 1 | 33.71 | 32.58 | 38.04 | 34.07 | 34.63 | preconventional |
| 2 | 15.73 | 11.24 | 9.78 | 8.79 | 11.36 | conventional |
| 3 | 37.08 | 46.07 | 22.83 | 30.77 | 34.07 | postconventional |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF MOR(11) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
black work, second job tax free

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------------------------|
| 0 | 7.87 | 6.74 | 11.96 | 15.22 | 10.50 | no problem/even if illegal |
| 1 | 48.31 | 37.08 | 20.65 | 21.74 | 31.77 | preconventional |
| 2 | 31.46 | 37.08 | 22.83 | 20.65 | 27.90 | conventional |
| 3 | 12.36 | 19.10 | 44.57 | 42.39 | 29.83 | postconventional |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF MOR(12) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
selling car and hiding defects

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------------------------|
| 0 | 6.74 | 1.14 | 27.17 | 25.56 | 15.32 | no problem/even if illegal |
| 1 | 30.34 | 31.82 | 29.35 | 25.56 | 29.25 | preconventional |
| 2 | 5.62 | 7.95 | 9.78 | 22.22 | 11.42 | conventional |
| 3 | 57.30 | 59.09 | 33.70 | 26.67 | 44.01 | postconventional |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N26 (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
communication in family/with friends about military etc.

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------------|
| 1 | 20.22 | 9.20 | 13.04 | 9.78 | 13.06 | frequently |
| 2 | 33.71 | 42.53 | 40.22 | 25.00 | 35.28 | occasionally |
| 3 | 39.33 | 37.93 | 32.61 | 45.65 | 38.89 | rarely |
| 4 | 6.74 | 10.34 | 14.13 | 19.57 | 12.78 | never |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N27 (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
mass-medial reception of military/security policy etc

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------------|
| 1 | 23.60 | 26.44 | 23.91 | 16.30 | 22.50 | frequently |
| 2 | 38.20 | 37.93 | 29.35 | 39.13 | 36.11 | occasionally |
| 3 | 33.71 | 26.44 | 32.61 | 27.17 | 30.00 | rarely |
| 4 | 4.49 | 9.20 | 14.13 | 17.39 | 11.39 | never |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF TRAD (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
 traditional paradigm of threat: enemy image, the East

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------------|
| 1 | 45.57 | 28.75 | 76.09 | 61.11 | 53.96 | disagreement |
| 2 | 43.04 | 48.75 | 9.78 | 17.78 | 28.74 | unclear |
| 3 | 11.39 | 22.50 | 14.13 | 21.11 | 17.30 | agreement |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF OVERK (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
 new paradigm of threat: overkill capabilities

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------------|
| 1 | 10.84 | 10.71 | 9.78 | 13.33 | 11.17 | disagreement |
| 2 | 31.33 | 41.67 | 20.65 | 25.56 | 29.51 | unclear |
| 3 | 57.83 | 47.62 | 69.57 | 61.11 | 59.31 | agreement |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N32 (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
 threat by the East ? (GER:1988 ITA:1990)

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------------|
| 0 | 12.36 | 9.20 | 23.91 | 20.65 | 16.67 | don't know |
| 1 | 12.36 | 13.79 | 4.35 | 1.09 | 7.78 | yes, large |
| 2 | 48.31 | 55.17 | 14.13 | 21.74 | 34.44 | yes, but small |
| 3 | 26.97 | 21.84 | 57.61 | 56.52 | 41.11 | not at all |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N34 (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
 danger of war in Europe (GER:1988 ITA:1990)

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------------|
| 1 | 14.61 | 8.05 | 6.52 | 4.35 | 8.33 | rather high |
| 2 | 13.48 | 8.05 | 22.83 | 19.57 | 16.11 | don't know |
| 3 | 71.91 | 83.91 | 70.65 | 76.09 | 75.56 | rather low |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N36 (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
general acceptance of military defense (no risk specified)

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|------------|
| 1 | 24.72 | 19.54 | 27.17 | 21.74 | 23.33 | no |
| 2 | 35.96 | 28.74 | 22.83 | 17.39 | 26.11 | don't know |
| 3 | 39.33 | 51.72 | 50.00 | 60.87 | 50.56 | yes |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N37 (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
acceptance of military defense (defense on own territory)

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|------------|
| 1 | 43.82 | 32.58 | 28.26 | 29.35 | 33.43 | no |
| 2 | 31.46 | 25.84 | 27.17 | 20.65 | 26.24 | don't know |
| 3 | 24.72 | 41.57 | 44.57 | 50.00 | 40.33 | yes |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N38 (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
acceptance of military defense (high risk, nuclear arms on territory)

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|------------|
| 1 | 75.28 | 69.66 | 67.39 | 65.93 | 69.53 | no |
| 2 | 19.10 | 20.22 | 19.57 | 21.98 | 20.22 | don't know |
| 3 | 5.62 | 10.11 | 13.04 | 12.09 | 10.25 | yes |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N40(1) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
security of Western Europe can only be guaranteed by US protection

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------------|
| 1 | 34.83 | 21.35 | 44.57 | 35.87 | 34.25 | disagreement |
| 2 | 12.36 | 4.49 | 13.04 | 5.43 | 8.84 | don't know |
| 3 | 52.81 | 74.16 | 42.39 | 58.70 | 56.91 | agreement |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N40(2) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
nuclear arms are inevitable for Western defense also in future

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------------|
| 1 | 67.42 | 56.18 | 72.83 | 53.26 | 62.43 | disagreement |
| 2 | 4.49 | 3.37 | 17.39 | 18.48 | 11.05 | don't know |
| 3 | 28.09 | 40.45 | 9.78 | 28.26 | 26.52 | agreement |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N40(3) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
conventional armament of NATO must be increased to prevent early nuclear use

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------------|
| 1 | 52.81 | 47.19 | 61.96 | 44.57 | 51.66 | disagreement |
| 2 | 14.61 | 12.36 | 23.91 | 32.61 | 20.99 | don't know |
| 3 | 32.58 | 40.45 | 14.13 | 22.83 | 27.35 | agreement |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N41 (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
evaluation of NATO membership

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------------|
| 1 | 50.56 | 62.92 | 54.95 | 71.91 | 60.06 | positive |
| 2 | 31.46 | 25.84 | 19.78 | 8.99 | 21.51 | indifferent |
| 3 | 17.98 | 11.24 | 25.27 | 19.10 | 18.44 | negative |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N42 (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
inspite of harm to his career, someone follows his convictions

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--|
| 1 | 8.99 | 12.36 | 5.43 | 7.61 | 8.56 | completely unrealistic |
| 2 | 2.25 | 4.49 | 1.09 | .00 | 1.93 | I am indifferent/ don't care |
| 3 | 34.83 | 40.45 | 20.65 | 28.26 | 30.94 | princip.ok, but doesn't solve any problem |
| 4 | 34.83 | 28.09 | 32.61 | 28.26 | 30.94 | good, induces reflection upon own position |
| 5 | 16.85 | 13.48 | 39.13 | 30.43 | 25.14 | strive to do it the same way |
| 6 | 2.25 | 1.12 | 1.09 | 5.43 | 2.49 | don't know |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N43 (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
 despite of loss of work places, someone quits production of a product
 being dangerous to the environment

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---|
| 1 | 20.22 | 19.10 | 5.62 | 13.04 | 14.48 | completely unrealistic |
| 2 | 5.62 | 3.37 | .00 | 1.09 | 2.51 | indifferent/ don't care |
| 3 | 21.35 | 25.84 | 26.97 | 32.61 | 26.74 | principally ok, but solves no problem |
| 4 | 33.71 | 35.96 | 34.83 | 34.78 | 34.82 | good, induces reflection upon own position |
| 5 | 12.36 | 13.48 | 22.47 | 9.78 | 14.48 | good, strive to do it the same way |
| 6 | 6.74 | 2.25 | 10.11 | 8.70 | 6.96 | don't know |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

ANTICIPATION OF FUTURE N44(1-5)
 TABLE OF N44(1) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
 technological advancement will abolish environmental pollution

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------------|
| 1 | 5.75 | 8.14 | 3.26 | 16.30 | 8.40 | certain |
| 2 | 41.38 | 36.05 | 41.30 | 43.48 | 40.62 | probable |
| 3 | 35.63 | 40.70 | 29.35 | 28.26 | 33.33 | improbable |
| 4 | 17.24 | 15.12 | 26.09 | 11.96 | 17.65 | certainly not |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N44(2) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
 in Europe the nuclear arms will be abolished on both sides

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------------|
| 1 | .00 | 2.35 | 4.35 | 7.61 | 3.69 | certain |
| 2 | 25.30 | 22.35 | 35.87 | 39.13 | 30.97 | probable |
| 3 | 36.14 | 43.53 | 40.22 | 39.13 | 39.77 | improbable |
| 4 | 38.55 | 31.76 | 19.57 | 14.13 | 25.57 | certainly not |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N44(3) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
industry and chemistry will destroy the environment

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------------|
| 1 | 28.24 | 12.94 | 12.09 | 14.13 | 16.71 | certain |
| 2 | 35.29 | 43.53 | 45.05 | 29.35 | 38.24 | probable |
| 3 | 27.06 | 37.65 | 34.07 | 43.48 | 35.69 | improbable |
| 4 | 9.41 | 5.88 | 8.79 | 13.04 | 9.35 | certainly not |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N44(4) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
scarcity of resources, economic crises, shortage of food will appear in future

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------------|
| 1 | 14.77 | 10.71 | 10.87 | 6.52 | 10.67 | certain |
| 2 | 44.32 | 48.81 | 40.22 | 26.09 | 39.61 | probable |
| 3 | 27.27 | 28.57 | 35.87 | 52.17 | 36.24 | improbable |
| 4 | 13.64 | 11.90 | 13.04 | 15.22 | 13.48 | certainly not |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N44(5) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
unemployment will vanish, adequate workplaces for everyone in future

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------------|
| 1 | .00 | 1.23 | 2.17 | 4.35 | 2.01 | certain |
| 2 | 8.33 | 8.64 | 7.61 | 7.61 | 8.02 | probable |
| 3 | 27.38 | 33.33 | 39.13 | 28.26 | 32.09 | improbable |
| 4 | 64.29 | 56.79 | 51.09 | 59.78 | 57.88 | certainly not |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N45 (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
further education a personal perspective ?

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-----------|
| 0 | .00 | .00 | 2.17 | 23.92 | 6.69 | no answer |
| 1 | 60.23 | 2.30 | 69.57 | 5.43 | 34.54 | yes |
| 2 | 22.73 | 4.60 | 18.48 | 15.22 | 15.32 | probably |
| 3 | 17.05 | 93.10 | 9.78 | 55.43 | 43.45 | no |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

THEMES OF COMMUNICATION/DISCUSSION IN FAMILY (THEM(1-18))

TABLE OF THEM(1-10) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
not fully comparable: GERMANY generally/ ITALY last week

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|---|--|-------|-------|-------|-------|--|
| | Percentages only for "yes" occurrences | | | | | |
| 1 | 91.01 | 94.38 | 92.39 | 91.30 | 92.27 | school/work |
| 1 | 85.39 | 86.21 | 65.22 | 63.04 | 74.72 | politics in general |
| 1 | 71.91 | 83.15 | 54.35 | 60.87 | 67.40 | unemployment |
| 1 | 54.02 | 62.92 | 31.52 | 30.43 | 44.44 | house squatting, demonstrations, strikes ITA. different wording |
| 1 | not asked | | 68.48 | 69.57 | 69.02 | economic problems of the family |
| 1 | 88.76 | 96.63 | 50.00 | 58.70 | 73.20 | environmental pollution/ecology |
| 1 | 76.14 | 82.02 | 75.00 | 78.26 | 77.84 | crime |
| 1 | 84.27 | 86.52 | 79.35 | 73.91 | 80.94 | modest behavior/ how to behave adequately |
| 1 | 43.18 | 59.55 | 28.26 | 28.26 | 39.61 | religion |
| 1 | 66.29 | 69.66 | 17.39 | 19.57 | 42.82 | armed forces and military problems |
| | ... to be continued ... | | | | | |

THEMES OF COMMUNICATION/DISCUSSION IN FAMILY (THEM(1-18))

TABLE OF THEM(11-18) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
not fully comparable: GERMANY generally/ ITALY last week

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|---|--|-------|-------|-------|-------|---|
| | Percentages only for "yes" occurrences | | | | | |
| 1 | 71.91 | 73.56 | 51.09 | 45.65 | 60.28 | sports |
| 1 | 56.18 | 70.79 | 45.65 | 42.39 | 53.59 | equal rights for all/ abolishment of priviledges |
| 1 | 76.40 | 86.36 | 33.70 | 43.48 | 59.56 | peace and disarmament |
| 1 | 80.90 | 79.78 | 16.30 | 25.00 | 50.00 | danger of nuclear power |
| 1 | 73.03 | 76.40 | 45.65 | 42.39 | 59.12 | AIDS |
| 1 | 64.04 | 71.91 | 23.91 | 22.83 | 45.30 | dangers of technology |
| 1 | 61.80 | 75.28 | 44.57 | 48.91 | 57.46 | unsocial interactions / "elbow society" |
| 1 | 74.16 | 79.78 | 18.48 | 29.35 | 50.00 | threat by nuclear arms |
| | Percentages only for "yes" occurrences | | | | | |

INSTRUMENTAL VALUES/BEHAVIORS (N50(1-11) to learn: who should?
TABLE OF N50(1) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
to save money/to be economic

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-----------------------|
| 1 | 8.99 | 13.64 | 1.23 | 2.86 | 7.01 | Germans should learn |
| 2 | 17.98 | 22.73 | 17.28 | 24.29 | 20.43 | Italians should learn |
| 3 | 42.70 | 50.00 | 45.68 | 55.71 | 48.17 | all should learn |
| 4 | 30.34 | 13.64 | 35.80 | 17.14 | 24.39 | unimportant to learn |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N50(2) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
feeling of obligation

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-----------------------|
| 1 | 6.74 | 8.99 | 1.32 | 1.37 | 4.89 | Germans should learn |
| 2 | 34.83 | 38.20 | 26.32 | 27.40 | 32.11 | Italians should learn |
| 3 | 46.07 | 47.19 | 68.42 | 69.86 | 56.88 | all should learn |
| 4 | 12.36 | 5.62 | 3.95 | 1.37 | 6.12 | unimportant to learn |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N50(3) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
to be industrious

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-----------------------|
| 1 | 5.62 | 6.82 | 1.23 | 1.27 | 3.86 | Germans should learn |
| 2 | 34.83 | 51.14 | 28.40 | 36.71 | 37.98 | Italians should learn |
| 3 | 38.20 | 34.09 | 58.02 | 59.49 | 46.88 | all should learn |
| 4 | 21.35 | 7.95 | 11.11 | 2.53 | 10.98 | unimportant to learn |
| 9 | .00 | .00 | 1.23 | .00 | .30 | |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N50(4) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
to be content with things and situations as they are

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-----------------------|
| 1 | 26.97 | 20.45 | 7.89 | 3.95 | 15.50 | Germans should learn |
| 2 | 5.62 | 13.64 | 2.63 | 5.26 | 6.99 | Italians should learn |
| 3 | 55.06 | 52.27 | 46.05 | 63.16 | 54.10 | all should learn |
| 4 | 12.36 | 13.64 | 43.42 | 27.63 | 23.40 | unimportant to learn |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N50(5) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
to take the others needs more into account

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-----------------------|
| 1 | 31.46 | 32.58 | 2.38 | 2.35 | 17.58 | Germans should learn |
| 2 | 5.62 | 4.49 | 2.38 | 1.18 | 3.46 | Italians should learn |
| 3 | 55.06 | 55.06 | 94.05 | 94.12 | 74.06 | all should learn |
| 4 | 7.87 | 7.87 | 1.19 | 2.35 | 4.90 | unimportant to learn |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N50(6) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
good manners

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-----------------------|
| 1 | 7.87 | 8.99 | 7.59 | .00 | 6.25 | Germans should learn |
| 2 | 15.73 | 16.85 | 11.39 | 6.33 | 12.80 | Italians should learn |
| 3 | 62.92 | 65.17 | 75.95 | 87.34 | 72.32 | all should learn |
| 4 | 13.48 | 8.99 | 5.06 | 6.33 | 8.63 | unimportant to learn |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N50(7) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
to break through conventions and restrictions

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-----------------------|
| 1 | 32.95 | 29.55 | 11.54 | 6.02 | 20.47 | Germans should learn |
| 2 | 4.55 | 7.95 | 3.85 | 3.61 | 5.04 | Italians should learn |
| 3 | 44.32 | 37.50 | 53.85 | 43.37 | 44.51 | all should learn |
| 4 | 18.18 | 25.00 | 30.77 | 46.99 | 29.97 | unimportant to learn |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N50(8) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
not to think materially only

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-----------------------|
| 1 | 42.05 | 45.45 | 6.10 | 2.50 | 24.85 | Germans should learn |
| 2 | 3.41 | 6.82 | 2.44 | 1.25 | 3.55 | Italians should learn |
| 3 | 46.59 | 39.77 | 82.93 | 90.00 | 63.91 | all should learn |
| 4 | 7.95 | 7.95 | 8.54 | 6.25 | 7.69 | unimportant to learn |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N50(9) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
to take it easy/to live spontaneously

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-----------------------|
| 1 | 60.67 | 44.94 | 11.59 | 3.75 | 32.11 | Germans should learn |
| 2 | 5.62 | 11.24 | 1.45 | 2.50 | 5.50 | Italians should learn |
| 3 | 25.84 | 31.46 | 72.46 | 35.00 | 39.45 | all should learn |
| 4 | 7.87 | 12.36 | 14.49 | 58.75 | 22.94 | unimportant to learn |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N50(10) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
to find new ways/forms of living together

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-----------------------|
| 1 | 12.50 | 12.36 | .00 | 1.25 | 7.12 | Germans should learn |
| 2 | 6.82 | 8.99 | 9.09 | 7.50 | 8.05 | Italians should learn |
| 3 | 54.55 | 55.06 | 62.12 | 50.00 | 55.11 | all should learn |
| 4 | 26.14 | 23.60 | 28.79 | 41.25 | 29.72 | unimportant to learn |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N50(11) (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
obedience to law and authority

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-----------------------|
| 1 | 7.87 | 6.74 | 1.16 | 1.16 | 4.29 | Germans should learn |
| 2 | 42.70 | 40.45 | 15.12 | 19.77 | 29.71 | Italians should learn |
| 3 | 40.45 | 43.82 | 66.28 | 69.77 | 54.86 | all should learn |
| 4 | 8.99 | 8.99 | 17.44 | 9.30 | 11.14 | unimportant to learn |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF N51 (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
Differences between Germany and Italy, respectively young and adults. Larger between ...?

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------------------------------------|
| 1 | 20.63 | 23.08 | 35.16 | 30.00 | 28.16 | G versus I in general |
| 2 | 20.63 | 30.77 | 47.25 | 52.22 | 39.81 | young versus adults in general |
| 3 | 11.11 | 4.62 | 6.59 | 3.33 | 6.15 | young Germans versus young Italians |
| 4 | 47.62 | 41.54 | 10.99 | 14.44 | 25.89 | adult Germans versus adult Italians |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF SEX (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
Gender

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| 1 | 51.69 | 42.70 | 35.87 | 47.83 | 44.48 | male |
| 2 | 48.31 | 57.30 | 64.13 | 52.17 | 55.52 | female |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF REDUC (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
groups constructed according to level of education

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| 1 | 22.47 | 44.94 | 31.52 | 42.39 | 35.36 | low |
| 2 | 29.21 | 24.72 | 17.39 | 32.61 | 25.97 | medium |
| 3 | 48.31 | 30.34 | 51.09 | 25.00 | 38.67 | high |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF COMP (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
life situation, living together with (not completely comparable)

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|------------------------------------|
| 1 | 10.23 | .00 | 5.43 | 1.09 | 4.16 | Single/WG |
| 2 | 1.14 | 3.37 | 5.43 | 4.35 | 3.60 | with partner |
| 3 | .00 | 73.03 | 1.09 | 80.43 | 38.78 | with partner+child |
| 4 | 1.14 | 13.48 | .00 | .00 | 3.60 | with partner, child + relatives |
| 5 | .00 | 10.11 | 3.26 | 11.96 | 6.37 | with child, no partner |
| 6 | 87.50 | .00 | 81.52 | .00 | 42.11 | with parents |
| 7 | .00 | .00 | 3.26 | 2.17 | 1.39 | Altro |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF PARAD (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS) *DERIVED INDICATOR*
 paradigmatic political orientation INDEX OF PREFERENCE OF POLITICAL PARADIGMS

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------------------------|
| 1 | 17.24 | 21.43 | 21.11 | 24.42 | 21.04 | distribution-traditional |
| 2 | 28.74 | 33.33 | 34.44 | 33.72 | 32.56 | transitory-mixed |
| 3 | 54.02 | 45.24 | 44.44 | 41.86 | 46.40 | life-style-innovative |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF LEVEL (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS) *DERIVED INDICATOR*
 socio-moral orientation INDEX OF SOCIO-MORAL PREFERENCE

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|------------------|
| 1 | 22.47 | 16.85 | 17.39 | 16.30 | 18.23 | preconventional |
| 2 | 48.31 | 50.56 | 50.00 | 50.00 | 49.72 | conventional |
| 3 | 29.21 | 32.58 | 32.61 | 33.70 | 32.04 | postconventional |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF MATPMAT (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS) *DERIVED INDICATOR*
 Materialism - Postmaterialism (INGLEHART-INDEX MATPMAT)

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------------------|
| 1 | 3.41 | 3.37 | 6.59 | 17.58 | 7.80 | materialistic |
| 2 | 15.91 | 21.35 | 16.48 | 21.98 | 18.94 | MixMat |
| 3 | 38.64 | 43.82 | 21.98 | 19.78 | 30.92 | MixPostMat |
| 4 | 42.05 | 31.46 | 54.95 | 40.66 | 42.34 | postmaterialistic |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF CHEVALUE (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS) *DERIVED INDICATOR*
 level of value orientation REDUC + PARAD + MATPMAT + LEVEL

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-----------------|
| 1 | 20.93 | 30.95 | 33.71 | 49.41 | 33.72 | traditional |
| 2 | 37.21 | 39.29 | 22.47 | 24.71 | 30.81 | mixed |
| 3 | 41.86 | 29.76 | 43.82 | 25.88 | 35.47 | posttraditional |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF FUT (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS) *DERIVED INDICATOR*
anticipation of future (recoded count of negative anticipations 0-5)

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|------------|
| 1 | 7.87 | 15.73 | 16.30 | 27.17 | 16.85 | Optimists |
| 2 | 43.82 | 42.70 | 32.61 | 42.39 | 40.33 | |
| 3 | 48.31 | 41.57 | 51.09 | 30.43 | 42.82 | Pessimists |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF MEN (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS) *DERIVED INDICATOR*
paradigm of military threat/menace DOMINANT THREAT PERCEPTION

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------------------|
| 1 | 5.33 | 23.46 | 3.57 | 15.66 | 12.07 | tradit enemy image |
| 2 | 25.33 | 18.52 | 11.90 | 13.25 | 17.03 | mixed |
| 3 | 69.33 | 58.02 | 84.52 | 71.08 | 70.90 | overkill-perspective |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF VBKONF (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS) *DERIVED INDICATOR*
configurations of acceptance of military defense CONFIGURATION OF THE VARIABLES (N38-N37-N36)
conf= nucl.defense - on own territory - unspecified

| conf | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------------|
| 111 | 21.35 | 13.79 | 20.65 | 16.48 | 18.11 | no.no.no |
| 113 | 11.24 | 9.20 | 4.35 | 5.49 | 7.52 | no.no.yes |
| 122 | 12.36 | 4.60 | 8.70 | 5.49 | 7.80 | no.?.? |
| 133 | 11.24 | 19.54 | 27.17 | 29.67 | 22.01 | no.yes.yes |
| 333 | 4.49 | 8.05 | 9.78 | 9.89 | 8.08 | yes.yes.yes |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

only configurations with at least one within-group perc. >10% reported

TABLE OF VBCORR (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS) *DERIVED INDICATOR*
Acceptance of military defense sum of n38+n37+n36, categorized
VBCORR = nucl.defense + on own territory + unspecified
cf. configurations of acceptance of mil. defense

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| 1 | 30.34 | 24.14 | 25.00 | 20.88 | 25.07 | low |
| 2 | 61.80 | 63.22 | 59.78 | 59.34 | 61.00 | middle |
| 3 | 7.87 | 12.64 | 15.22 | 19.78 | 13.93 | high |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF INF MIL (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS) *DERIVED INDICATOR*
 Attention towards military matters frequency of communication on military matters

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| 1 | 15.73 | 12.79 | 40.22 | 45.65 | 28.97 | low |
| 2 | 30.34 | 31.40 | 40.22 | 36.96 | 34.82 | middle |
| 3 | 53.93 | 55.81 | 19.57 | 17.39 | 36.21 | high |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF ATT MIL (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS) *DERIVED INDICATOR*
 Attitude towards the military index based on evaluations of military matters

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------|
| 1 | 36.71 | 17.95 | 41.76 | 25.29 | 30.75 | distance |
| 2 | 40.51 | 44.87 | 43.96 | 45.98 | 43.88 | mixed |
| 3 | 22.78 | 37.18 | 14.29 | 28.74 | 25.37 | affinity |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF WINDR (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS) *DERIVED INDICATOR*
 index of work orientation (wind = $n_5+n_6+n_3(1)+n_3(2)+n_{10}(5)-n_3(4)-n_{10}(4)$)
 categorized

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|------------------|
| 1 | 12.64 | 10.34 | 52.27 | 38.37 | 28.45 | post-traditional |
| 2 | 47.13 | 35.63 | 38.64 | 39.53 | 40.23 | mixed |
| 3 | 40.23 | 54.02 | 9.09 | 22.09 | 31.32 | traditional |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF CLREV (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS) *DERIVED INDICATOR*
 Work & Achievement Orientation empirically derived clusters,
 characterized as ... orientation

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------------------------|
| 1 | 13.48 | 6.74 | 40.22 | 29.35 | 22.65 | highly post-traditional |
| 2 | 19.10 | 29.21 | 38.04 | 30.43 | 29.28 | post-traditional |
| 3 | 48.31 | 44.94 | 16.30 | 29.35 | 34.53 | traditional |
| 4 | 19.10 | 19.10 | 5.43 | 10.87 | 13.54 | highly traditional |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF GROUPK (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
Configuration of sympathy for new social movements

DERIVED INDICATOR
configuration: peace/anti-nuke/environment
denotes ...

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------------------------|
| 0 | 15.73 | 21.35 | 3.26 | 4.35 | 11.05 | no sympathy |
| 1 | 16.85 | 26.97 | 1.09 | 4.35 | 12.15 | only environment |
| 10 | .00 | 1.12 | .00 | .00 | .28 | only anti-nuke |
| 11 | 10.11 | 6.74 | 5.43 | 4.35 | 6.63 | anti-nuke & environment |
| 100 | 1.12 | .00 | 3.26 | 7.61 | 3.04 | only peace |
| 101 | 10.11 | 15.73 | 17.39 | 14.13 | 14.36 | peace & environment |
| 110 | 1.12 | 1.12 | 4.35 | 4.35 | 2.76 | peace & anti-nuke |
| 111 | 44.94 | 26.97 | 65.22 | 60.87 | 49.72 | all |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF GROUPS (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
Sympathy for new social movements

DERIVED INDICATOR
number of positive evaluations of groups
indicating structure of sympathy

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------------|
| 0 | 15.73 | 21.35 | 3.26 | 4.35 | 11.05 | none |
| 1 | 17.98 | 28.09 | 4.35 | 11.96 | 15.47 | single issue |
| 2 | 21.35 | 23.60 | 27.17 | 22.83 | 23.76 | selective |
| 3 | 44.94 | 26.97 | 65.22 | 60.87 | 49.72 | general |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF LIRE (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS)
political position in terms of left-right

DERIVED INDICATOR
N16 categorized

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| 1 | 30.34 | 24.72 | 73.85 | 56.06 | 43.37 | Left |
| 2 | 40.45 | 28.09 | 20.00 | 34.85 | 31.39 | Middle |
| 3 | 29.21 | 47.19 | 6.15 | 9.09 | 25.24 | Right |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF POLINT (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS) *DERIVED INDICATOR*
political interest N15 categorized

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------------------|
| 0 | 4.55 | 4.55 | 15.38 | 22.83 | 11.98 | desinterested |
| 1 | 26.14 | 15.91 | 37.36 | 25.00 | 26.18 | low interest |
| 2 | 63.64 | 75.00 | 43.96 | 48.91 | 57.66 | interested |
| 3 | 5.68 | 4.55 | 3.30 | 3.26 | 4.18 | politically active |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF OEKTYP (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS) *DERIVED INDICATOR*
ecological concern index describing interest in problems of ecology

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| 1 | 14.29 | 17.50 | 40.91 | 52.94 | 31.75 | low |
| 2 | 40.48 | 38.75 | 44.32 | 31.76 | 38.87 | middle |
| 3 | 45.24 | 43.75 | 14.77 | 15.29 | 29.38 | high |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF VALINST (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS) *DERIVED INDICATOR*
valuation of instrumental values in everyday conduct index based on the answers to N50(1-11)
characterizing predominance of ... instrumental values

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|------------------|
| 1 | 20.22 | 35.96 | 28.26 | 59.78 | 36.19 | traditional |
| 2 | 52.81 | 43.82 | 27.17 | 28.26 | 37.85 | mixed |
| 3 | 26.97 | 20.22 | 44.57 | 11.96 | 25.97 | post-traditional |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

TABLE OF DEFNAT (ROWS) BY VERSION (COLUMNS) *DERIVED INDICATOR*
national stereotyping index based on the answers to N50(1-11)
concerning deficits of conduct of Germans resp. Italians

| | YGER | AGER | YITA | AITA | TOTAL | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|------------------|
| -1 | 30.34 | 28.09 | 41.30 | 45.65 | 36.46 | "self-blaming" |
| 0 | 52.81 | 42.70 | 55.43 | 52.17 | 50.83 | none |
| 1 | 16.85 | 29.21 | 3.26 | 2.17 | 12.71 | "blaming others" |
| TOTAL | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |

10.3 Listing of Italian and German questionnaire

Italian version

(1) Ci sono oggi differenti sugli obiettivi politici che dovrebbero essere raggiunti prima di tutto, sulle cose su cui i politici dovrebbero maggiormente impegnarsi, sui traguardi politici per la nostra società.

Legga l'opinione qui formulata. Considerando questa opinione, Lei si sente complessivamente: (porgere la cartella n. 1, Posizione "A")

1. In totale disaccordo
2. In largo disaccordo
3. In leggero disaccordo
4. In leggero accordo
5. In largo accordo
6. In totale accordo

German version

(16) Es gibt heute verschiedene Auffassungen darüber, was "Politik" vor allem erreichen soll, wofür sich die Politiker einsetzen sollten, was letztlich das Ziel der Politik in unserer Gesellschaft sein soll.

Wie stehen Sie zu der Position, die in der Liste 6 beschrieben ist.

Lesen Sie sich bitte die Meinung in Ruhe durch und beurteilen Sie bitte den Grad Ihrer Zustimmung bzw. Ihrer Ablehnung anhand der unten auf der Liste stehenden Antwortmöglichkeiten.

INT.: LISTE 6 vorlegen

- 1 völlige Ablehnung
- 2 weitgehende Ablehnung
- 3 leichte Ablehnung
- 4 leichte Zustimmung
- 5 weitgehende Zustimmung
- 6 völlige Zustimmung

CARTELLA N. 1, Posizione A:

I politici devono preoccuparsi prima di tutto che tutto vada bene, che lo standard di vita attuale venga mantenuto o migliorato. Per questo deve essere favorita la crescita economica e lo sviluppo, perchè solo così lo Stato può fornire importanti servizi sociali e mantenere alto il nostro livello di vita.

Dal momento che la crescita dipende essenzialmente dal fatto che le nostre merci possono essere vendute all'estero e che le aziende italiane ottengono le materie prime di cui hanno bisogno, deve essere impostata e condotta una politica estera adeguata; inoltre, i politici devono assicurare che il progresso tecnico e le capacità finanziarie delle nostre imprese siano mantenuti elevati. I politici devono provvedere affinché il profitto ottenuto venga ripartito nel modo più equo possibile tra tutte le parti sociali secondo la produzione ottenuta e la posizione personale raggiunta.

La società deve provvedere attraverso una ben sviluppata rete di servizi sociali affinché coloro che sono in miseria, senza loro colpa, vengano sostenuti ed aiutati, e affinché sia assicurato un reddito per le esigenze degli anziani.

LISTE 6: Position 1

Die Politik muß vor allem dafür sorgen, daß es uns allen gut geht, daß der bisher erreichte Lebensstandard erhalten oder verbessert werden kann. Dazu muß das wirtschaftliche Wachstum durch die Politik gefördert werden, denn nur so kann der Staat wichtige Sozialleistungen bereitstellen und unseren Lebensstandard erhalten.

Weil wirtschaftliches Wachstum wesentlich davon abhängt, daß unsere Waren auch im Ausland verkauft werden können, und daß unsere Gesellschaft die Rohstoffe bekommen kann, die sie braucht, muß eine entsprechende Außenpolitik betrieben werden. Ferner muß die Politik sicherstellen, daß der technische Fortschritt und die finanzielle Kraft in unserer Gesellschaft möglichst hoch sind.

Es muß dafür gesorgt werden, daß der erwirtschaftete Gewinn möglichst gerecht an alle Gruppen der Gesellschaft verteilt wird, wobei die erbrachte Leistung das wesentlichste Kriterium darstellt. Durch ein gut ausgebautes Netz der sozialen Sicherheit muß die Gesellschaft dafür sorgen, daß diejenigen, die unverschuldet in soziale Not geraten sind, unterstützt werden und daß die Altersversorgung in Form von Renten usw. gesichert ist.

(2) Consideri ora la posizione espressa nella cartella n.1, Posizione "B". Lei si sente complessivamente:

1. In totale disaccordo
2. In largo disaccordo
3. In leggero disaccordo
4. In leggero accordo
5. In largo accordo
6. In totale accordo

CARTELLA N. 1: I politici devono provvedere affinché l'attuale qualità della vita venga mantenuta o migliorata. A ciò appartiene essenzialmente il fatto che gli esseri umani si sentano bene nel loro ambiente sociale e naturale. L'azione politica deve fare in modo qualità della vita non sia subordinata alle esigenze della tecnica. Modi di produzione e prodotti che mettono in pericolo la salute o la vita sociale degli individui devono essere impediti o eliminati attraverso l'azione politica. La natura e le materie prime fondamentali per l'esistenza umana devono essere salvaguardate, anche se così facendo si rischia di rallentare lo sviluppo economico, o di mutare l'attuale standard di vita. L'attuale azione politica deve tenere presente che le generazioni presenti hanno anche la responsabilità per le generazioni future. Punto di riferimento dell'azione politica dovrebbe essere non tanto la capacità produttiva in

(17) Und wie stehen Sie zu der Meinung auf Liste 7? INT.: LISTE 7 vorlegen

- 1 völlige Ablehnung
- 2 weitgehende Ablehnung
- 3 leichte Ablehnung
- 4 leichte Zustimmung
- 5 weitgehende Zustimmung
- 6 völlige Zustimmung

Liste 7: Position 2

Die Politik muß vor allem dafür sorgen, daß unsere Lebensqualität erhalten oder verbessert werden kann. Dazu gehört wesentlich, daß sich die Menschen in ihrer sozialen und natürlichen Umwelt wohl fühlen. Die Politik muß also dafür sorgen, daß das Leben der Menschen nicht dem untergeordnet wird, was technisch möglich ist. Produktionsweisen und Produkte, die die Gesundheit oder das soziale Leben der Menschen gefährden, sind durch die Politik zu verhindern bzw. rückgängig zu machen.

Natur und Rohstoffe als Existenzgrundlage der Menschheit müssen geschont werden, auch wenn sich daraus Einschränkungen des wirtschaftlichen Wachstums und des momentanen Lebensstandards ergeben.

Die heutige Politik muß berücksichtigen, daß sie auch die Verantwortung für die kommende Generation trägt.

Der Bezugspunkt der Politik muß weniger in der

termini di quantità, ma soprattutto la cultura, la conoscenza e il miglioramento della qualità della convivenza sociale.

(3) Qui di seguito sono alcune caratteristiche che la gente di solito considera importanti riguardo al proprio lavoro.

Quale tra queste caratteristiche è per Lei la più importante?

(se l'intervistato è ancora studente) Quale tra le seguenti caratteristiche Lei considera più importanti per decidere riguardo al Suo futuro lavoro?

(Se l'intervistato è in pensione) Quale delle seguenti caratteristiche era per Lei più importante nel suo passato lavoro?

1. Un' ottima retribuzione in modo da non dovermi preoccupare del problema denaro, anche se ciò comporta di lavorare molto
2. Un lavoro sicuro senza rischi di licenziamenti o di disoccupazione
3. Un lavoro in cui si abbiano dei colleghi simpatici
4. Un lavoro importante che permette di sentirsi realizzati nelle proprie capacità e aspirazioni
5. Un lavoro che consente di avere molto tempo

Leistung und Produktion liegen, als vielmehr in der Art und Weise, wie die Menschen in einer Gesellschaft gut zusammenleben können.

(9) Was ist für Sie der wichtigste Gesichtspunkt zur Beurteilung der eigenen Arbeit? Wir haben dazu einige Gesichtspunkte zusammengestellt, die in diesem Zusammenhang gewöhnlich bei Befragungen genannt werden. (LISTE 6 vorlegen)

Bitte suchen Sie nun den Gesichtspunkt heraus, der für Sie persönlich bei der Beurteilung der eigenen Arbeit am wichtigsten ist.

(INT.: Falls der Befragte noch in der Ausbildung ist: "Bitte suchen Sie nun den Gesichtspunkt heraus, den Sie für die Auswahl ihrer künftigen Arbeit am wichtigsten finden.")

INT.: Falls der Befragte nicht mehr in einem beruflichen Arbeitsverhältnis ist: "Bitte suchen Sie nun den Gesichtspunkt heraus, der für Sie persönlich bei der Beurteilung Ihrer eigenen Arbeit am wichtigsten war.")

1. Eine ausgezeichnete Bezahlung, so daß ich mich mir um Geld keine Sorgen machen brauche, auch wenn ich dafür viel arbeiten und leisten muß
2. Einen sicheren Arbeitsplatz ohne das Risiko der Kündigung oder Arbeitslosigkeit
3. Eine Arbeit, bei der man sympathische Kollegen hat
4. Eine Arbeit, die es erlaubt, daß man sich selbst verwirklichen kann
5. Eine Arbeit, die einem viel Freizeit erlaubt

libero

6. Un lavoro che permetta un buon guadagno senza doversi affaticare troppo

(5) Il successo di una persona si misura in denaro.

Considerando questa affermazione Lei si sente:

1. In totale disaccordo
2. In parziale disaccordo
3. Non saprei
4. In parziale accordo
5. In totale accordo

(6) Il lavoro è soltanto un mezzo per guadagnarsi da vivere.

Considerando questa affermazione Lei si sente:

1. In totale disaccordo
2. In parziale disaccordo
3. Non saprei
4. In parziale accordo
5. In totale accordo

6. Eine Arbeit, die ein gutes Einkommen ermöglicht, ohne daß man sich viel anstrengen muß

10. Bitte geben Sie nun an, wie Sie persönlich zu folgender Aussage stehen:

"Der Erfolg eines Menschen wird letztlich am Geld gemessen".

Wie ist da Ihre Position? (Bitte ankreuzen)

1. Völlige Zustimmung
2. Eher Zustimmung
3. Weiß nicht
4. Eher Ablehnung
5. Völlige Ablehnung

11. Und wie beurteilen Sie die folgende Aussage:

"Die Arbeit ist lediglich ein Mittel, mit dem man sich das Geld verdient, das man zum Leben braucht" (Bitte wieder ankreuzen)

1. Völlige Zustimmung
2. Eher Zustimmung
3. Weiß nicht
4. Eher Ablehnung
5. Völlige Ablehnung

(8) Di solito Lei cerca di informarsi di più su questioni e problemi ecologici?

1. Sì
2. No

(10) Quale tra i seguenti elementi Lei considera più importante per migliorare la Sua personale qualità della vita?

1. Una casa più comoda e confortevole
2. Più servizi sociali e maggiormente accessibili
3. Minore inquinamento ambientale (nell'aria, nell'acqua, nei cibi ...)
4. Un lavoro in cui poter meglio realizzare le proprie capacità
5. Un lavoro più redditizio
6. La possibilità di aumentare la propria partecipazione ad eventi culturali

(11) E quale è per Lei il meno importante? (stessa lista)

(12) Vita piacevole e tempo libero sono più desiderabili che lavoro stressante e successo nel lavoro.

Considerando questa affermazione Lei si sente:

1. In totale disaccordo
2. In parziale disaccordo

Offene Frage:

Informieren Sie sich über ökologische Fragen und Probleme? Falls ja, wie informieren Sie sich? (INT: Antwort notieren:)

(11) Was von dem in der folgenden Liste genannten würden Sie für sich auswählen, um Ihre persönliche Lebensqualität zu steigern und zu verbessern?

a) Was wäre für Sie davon am wichtigsten?

(LISTE 8 übergeben) - Nummer -

b) Und was davon fänden Sie am wenigsten wichtig?

1. eine bessere, komfortablere Wohnmöglichkeit
2. mehr und besser zugängliche Sozialleistungen
3. weniger Umweltverschmutzung (sauberes Wasser; gesundes Essen; reine Luft)
4. eine Arbeit, in der ich mich selbst verwirklichen kann
5. ein besseres Einkommen
6. ein besseres kulturelles Angebot und bessere Möglichkeiten zur Nutzung dieses Angebots

12. "Ein angenehmes Leben und viel Freizeit sind wichtiger als anstrengende Arbeit und Erfolg". Wie stehen Sie persönlich zu dieser Aussage? (Bitte ankreuzen)

1. Völlige Zustimmung
2. Eher Zustimmung

3. Non saprei
4. In parziale accordo
5. In totale accordo

- 3 Weiß nicht
- 4 Eher Ablehnung
- 5 Völlige Ablehnung

(13) Pensando a quello che Lei fa di solito nel tempo libero, ossia fuori dall'orario di lavoro, quale delle seguenti affermazioni corrisponde maggiormente alle Sue attività più consuete?

1. Sono spesso fuori casa perché collaboro attivamente ad un gruppo o associazione (di tipo politico, culturale, con finalità sociali e simili)
2. Sono spesso fuori casa perché pratico uno o più sport
3. Sono spesso fuori casa perché vado a trovare amici e conoscenti
4. Sono spesso fuori casa per stare in luoghi dove posso incontrare altra gente (al bar, all'osteria, in locali di ritrovo)
5. Sono spesso fuori casa perché vado spesso al cinema, a teatro, a concerti, a visitare mostre e musei o per altri intrattenimenti culturali
6. Sto perlopiù in casa ad occuparmi dei miei hobbies preferiti
7. Rimango volentieri in casa a riposarmi

(12) Wenn Sie einmal an das denken, was Sie außerhalb des Berufs/Arbeitsbereichs (also in Ihrer Freizeit) tun - welche der Aussagen auf dieser Liste trifft für Sie am ehesten zu? (LISTE 9 übergeben. Nur eine Nennung!)

1. Bin öfter nicht zu Hause, weil ich in einer Gruppe/ in einem Verein/in einer Organisation etc. aktiv mitarbeite
2. Bin öfter nicht zu Hause, weil ich mich in meiner Freizeit überwiegend sportlich betätige
3. Bin öfter nicht zu Hause, weil ich häufig zu Freunden/Bekanntem gehe
4. Bin öfter nicht zu Hause, weil ich mich gern mit Leuten treffe (z.B. in einem Lokal, einer Kneipe, einem Cafe, etc.)
5. Bin öfter nicht zu Hause, weil ich gern ins Kino, ins Theater oder ins Konzert gehe, Museen oder Ausstellungen besuche, oder an anderen kulturellen Ereignissen teilnehme
6. Beschäftige mich vorwiegend zu Hause mit Dingen, die mir Spaß machen
7. Bin am liebsten zu Hause, möchte meine Ruhe haben

(15) Riguardo all'attività politica, in quale delle seguenti posizioni si riconosce?

1. Faccio politica attiva come militante in un partito o sindacato
2. Faccio politica attiva in un gruppo o movimento
3. La politica mi interessa, ma non faccio politica attiva
4. La politica mi interessa solo un po'
5. La politica non mi interessa per niente

(16) Nelle questioni politiche si parla di "destra", "sinistra", "centro". Come colloca la Sua posizione in questo elenco?

1. Estrema sinistra
2. Sinistra
3. Centro-Sinistra
4. Centro
5. Centro-Destra
6. Destra
7. Estrema destra

(35) Was Ihre politischen Aktivitäten und Interessen betrifft: Welche der folgenden Aussagen trifft auf Sie persönlich am ehesten zu? (Liste 20 übergeben. Nur eine Nennung!)

1. Ich bin politisch aktiv in einer etablierten Organisation (Partei, Gewerkschaft etc.)
2. Ich bin politisch aktiv in einer informellen Organisation (Initiative, Soziale Bewegung, Gruppe etc.)
3. Politik interessiert mich, aber ich bin nicht politisch aktiv
4. Politik interessiert mich nur wenig
5. Ich interessiere mich überhaupt nicht für Politik

(36) Jeder hat ja eine bestimmte politische Grundhaltung, die man gemeinsam als eher recht oder eher links bezeichnet. Wie ist das bei Ihnen, wo würden Sie sich auf dieser Skala einordnen? Sagen Sie mir bitte Ihre Position. (Liste 24 vorlegen)

1. Betont Links
2. Links
3. Mitte-Links
4. Mitte
5. Mitte-Rechts
6. Rechts
7. Betont Rechts

(17) Ecco un elenco di gruppi attivi nella società italiana. Può indicare che cosa pensa di ciascuno di essi? (porgere la Cartella n. 2)

CARTELLA N. 2:

3. Movimento per la pace
4. Movimento antinucleare
5. Lega per l'Ambiente, Italia Nostra, WWF e simili

1. Questo gruppo mi è indifferente
2. Questo gruppo mi piace molto
3. Non ne faccio parte ma sostengo l'operato di questo gruppo
4. Faccio parte di questo gruppo
5. Sono contrario a questo gruppo
0. Non so, non conosco questo gruppo

(18) In politica non è sempre possibile realizzare tutte le cose che si desidererebbero. Sulle seguenti schede può vedere una serie di obiettivi politici. Se Lei potesse scegliere, quale sarebbe per Lei l'obiettivo più desiderabile?

1. Il mantenimento dell'ordine nel paese
2. Dare alla gente maggiore potere nelle decisioni politiche
3. Combattere l'aumento dei prezzi
4. Proteggere la libertà di espressione, di pensiero e di parola

(24) Ich nenne Ihnen gleich einige Gruppen, die versuchen, auf gesellschaftliche Entwicklungen Einfluß zu nehmen. Wie stehen Sie zu den einzelnen Gruppen? Ihre Antwortmöglichkeiten stehen auf der Liste 19. Es reicht, wenn Sie mir den Buchstaben vor der Antwort nennen.

INT.: LISTE 10 vorlegen; Antwort ankreuzen
Friedensbewegung/ Kernkraftgegner/ Umweltschützer
LISTE 10: Wie stehen Sie zu den einzelnen Gruppen?

- A Ich rechne mich selbst dazu
- B Gehöre nicht dazu, stehe dieser Gruppe aber nahe
- C Die Gruppe finde ich nicht so gut
- D Bin gegen diese Gruppe
- E Die Gruppe ist mir ziemlich egal/ interessiert mich nicht

(15) In der Politik ist es nicht immer möglich, all das zu bekommen, was man sich erhofft. Auf dieser Liste sind einige politische Ziele aufgeführt. Wenn Sie wählen könnten, was erscheint Ihnen davon am wünschenswertesten?

INT.: Liste 11 übergeben, 1. Priorität ankreuzen
Und welches Ziel kommt dann?
INT.: 2. Priorität ankreuzen.

- A Aufrechterhaltung der Ordnung im eigenen Land
- B Verstärktes Mitspracherecht der Menschen bei wichtigen Regierungsentscheidungen

(19) E quale sarebbe il secondo obiettivo più desiderabile?

(20) A quale dei seguenti ambienti geografici Lei sente di appartenere prima di tutto?

1. Il luogo o la città in cui vivo
2. La regione in cui vivo
3. L'Italia in generale
4. L'Europa
5. Il mondo in generale

(22) La protezione dell'ambiente può richiedere dei costi aggiuntivi per i cittadini. Quanto Lei sarebbe d'accordo di pagare sotto forma di una tassa speciale anti-inquinamento? (Per favore, consideri le somme seguenti come importo mensile):

1. Niente
2. Fino a 5.000 lire
3. Fino a 10.000 lire
4. Fino a 20.000 lire
5. Più di 20.000 lire
6. Altro importo (specificare)

(23) Sarebbe favorevole all'introduzione di una legge che obblighi ad attrezzare ogni abitazione privata di un dispositivo per la depurazione delle acque domestiche o per il riciclo dei rifiuti? (con spese a carico di ciascun utente)

1. Sì 2. No 0. Non saprei

C Kampf gegen steigende Preise

D Schutz der freien Meinungsäußerung

6. Welcher der folgenden geographischen Bereiche fühlen Sie sich vor allem verbunden?

INT.: Liste 4 übergeben, nur eine Nennung!

1. Dem Ort oder der Stadt, worin ich lebe
2. Der Gegend/Region, in der ich lebe
3. Der Bundesrepublik insgesamt
4. Deutschland insgesamt
5. Europa
6. Der Welt insgesamt

(35) Der Schutz der Umwelt kann für uns alle zusätzlich Kosten bedeuten. Wenn es dazu eine besondere Umweltschutzsteuer/Abgabe gäbe, wieviel wären Sie bereit dafür zusätzlich im Monat zu zahlen?

1. Überhaupt nichts
2. bis DM 10,--
3. bis DM 20,--
4. bis DM 30,--
5. auch mehr als DM 30,--
6. anderes (bitte angeben)

(34) Würden Sie einem Gesetz zustimmen, das jedem privaten Haushalt zur Auflage macht, Einrichtungen zur Reinigung des Trinkwassers oder zum Abfall/ Müll-Recycling (erneute Nutzung der enthaltenen Rohstoffe) anzuschaffen?

1. Ja 2. Nein 3. Weiß nicht

(24) Attualmente si discute anche in Italia su quelli che dovrebbero essere gli obiettivi politici da perseguire nel nostro paese per i prossimi anni. Sulle seguenti schede Lei può trovare delle brevi descrizioni di alcuni di questi obiettivi.

Scelga, per favore, le tre schede che contengono i tre obiettivi politici che Lei ritiene i più importanti.

Adesso mi dica, per favore, quale di questi tre è per Lei il più importante, ossia è quello per Lei prioritario?

E quale, dei due rimasti, è quello più importante?

Ora, per favore, mi dia quello che per Lei descrive la terza priorità.

1. Assicurare un elevato livello di crescita economica
2. Fare in modo che l' Italia abbia un esercito forte ed efficiente
3. Vedere che la gente conta di più nel proprio lavoro e nella società
4. Proteggere le città, e l' ambiente dall' inquinamento e dal degrado ecologico
5. Un' economia stabile
6. La lotta contro la criminalità
7. Il progresso verso una società più umana e meno anonima
8. Il progresso verso una società dove le idee cotano più del denaro

(19) Es gibt im Augenblick eine Reihe von Diskussionen, was die Ziele der Bundesrepublik in den nächsten Jahren sein sollten. Auf diesen Kärtchen sind einige Ziele aufgeführt, denen verschiedene Leute den Vorrang einräumen würden. (INT.: Kärtchen A - H übergeben) Bitte wählen Sie nun die drei Kärtchen mit den Zielen, die für Sie persönlich am wichtigsten sind. (INT.: restliche 5 Kärtchen weglegen) Bitte sagen Sie mir jetzt, welches der drei Ziele für Sie am wichtigsten ist. (INT.: 1. Priorität ankreuzen.) Und welches Ziel kommt dann? (INT.: 2. & 3. Priorität ankreuzen)

Kärtchen (A-H)

- A Erhaltung eines hohen Grades von wirtschaftlichem Wachstum
- B Sicherung von starken Verteidigungskräften für die Bundesrepublik
- C Verstärktes Mitspracherecht der Menschen an ihrem Arbeitsplatz und in ihren Gemeinden
- D Kampf gegen Verbrechen
- E Fortschritt auf eine humane, weniger unpersonliche Gesellschaft hin
- F Fortschritt auf eine Gesellschaft hin, in der Ideen mehr zählen als Geld
- G Eine stabile Wirtschaft
- H Schutz der Umwelt vor weiterer Verschmutzung und Zerstörung

(25) Nella lista seguente ci sono delle brevi descrizioni di esempi di comportamenti che sono più o meno indesiderabili o criticabili. Per favore, indichi per ciascun tipo di comportamento, quale dei seguenti sette commenti (porgere la lista) Lei ritiene personalmente come il commento più rilevante riguardo questi comportamenti:

1. Un individuo non dice il vero sui propri redditi per frodare il fisco quanto più è possibile
2. Un individuo continua a vivere nelle case popolari anche se il suo reddito è aumentato ed egli non ne avrebbe più il diritto
3. Un individuo non paga mai il biglietto sui trasporti pubblici
4. Un individuo richiede un rimborso assicurativo falso per guadagnarci
5. Un impiegato comunale apprende, grazie al suo lavoro, che verranno stanziati dai fondi per lo sviluppo di un certa area, e acquista delle proprietà laggiù in modo da poterle poi rivendere con grandi profitti
6. Un individuo approfitta della propria assicurazione sanitaria per ottenere un soggiorno in una località termale che da un punto di vista medico non è effettivamente necessario
7. Un individuo cerca di ottenere da un medico un certificato falso per avere un permesso di assentarsi dal lavoro per malattia
8. Una persona scarica i propri rifiuti in un bosco vicino invece di portarli in una discarica legale

(14) Im folgenden lese ich Ihnen eine Reihe von Verhaltensweisen vor, die in unserer Gesellschaft mehr oder weniger deutlich abgelehnt werden. Bitte geben Sie mir jeweils aus dieser Liste an, wie Sie dazu stehen. Es reicht, wenn Sie mir zu jedem Grund die entsprechende Nummer auf der Liste angeben.

INT.: LISTE 10 vorlegen, Vorgaben vorlesen.

1. Jemand fährt beim Ausparken eine Beule in ein nicht mehr ganz neues Auto. Da es niemand gesehen hat, fährt er einfach davon.
2. Jemand nutzt die Krankenversicherung aus, indem er sich unnötige Kuraufenthalte verschafft.
3. Jemand fährt regelmäßig schwarz.
4. Jemand wohnt in einer Sozialwohnung, obwohl er nach seinem Einkommen längst keinen Anspruch mehr darauf hat.
5. Jemand meldet der Versicherung einen Schaden, der nicht wirklich entstanden ist, um die Versicherung auszuschöpfen.
6. Jemand hat die nicht öffentlich zugängliche Information, daß aus einem Grundstück demnächst Bauland werden wird. Er kauft das Grundstück und verkauft es später mit großem Gewinn.
7. Jemand läßt nach einem Unfall auf Kosten der Versicherung des anderen Schäden an seinem Auto mitreparieren, die nicht beim Unfall entstanden sind.
8. Jemand vertuscht beim Verkauf seines Autos schwerwiegende Mängel.
9. Um nicht arbeiten zu müssen, läßt sich jemand von einem Arzt "krankschreiben".

9. Una persona trova un portafoglio con una notevole somma di denaro. Per quanto l'indirizzo del possessore sia nel portafoglio, egli tiene per sé il denaro

10. Dopo un incidente di macchina una persona fa riparare la propria auto includendo danni che non sono stati causati da quell'incidente, sapendo che l'assicurazione avversaria pagherà il tutto

11. Una persona che non dice il vero sui propri redditi per cercare di ridurre in parte (p.es. del 20%) il proprio carico fiscale

12. Una persona che ha già un lavoro stabile, lavora in nero per eludere la normativa del lavoro e previdenziale

13. Un individuo che vuol vendere la propria auto ne nasconde i principali difetti

LISTA DEI COMMENTI: Le persone non dovrebbero seguire questo comportamento perchè:

1. Colui che agisce così potrebbe venire colto sul fatto e punito.
2. Colui che agisce così sarebbe malvisto dai suoi amici e vicini.
3. L'ordine sociale sarebbe messo in pericolo se molti agissero così.
4. Così facendo viene violato un accordo sociale che va a beneficio della collettività.
5. Un tale comportamento offende la mia coscienza.
6. Non ho niente contro questo comportamento perchè non mi sembra che sia pericoloso per nessuno.

10. Jemand arbeitet "schwarz", um Lohnsteuer zu sparen.

11. Jemand findet eine Geldbörse, die eine größere Summe Bargeld enthält. Obwohl auch die Adresse des Besitzers darin ist, nutzt der Finder die Gelegenheit, um sich einige Wünsche zu erfüllen.

12. Jemand bringt seinen Sperrmüll in den nahegelegenen Wald, nicht in die weiter entfernte Müllkippe.

LISTE 10:

Der für mich wichtigste Grund zur Ablehnung eines solchen Verhaltens ist:

1. daß man erwischt und bestraft werden kann
2. daß man dann von Personen, die man gut kennt, schief angesehen wird
3. daß die soziale Ordnung zusammenbricht, wenn das viele tun
4. daß damit ein gesellschaftliches Übereinkommen verletzt wird, das der Allgemeinheit nutzen soll
5. daß man das nicht mit seinem Gewissen vereinbaren kann
6. eigentlich nichts, weil es im Grunde niemandem schadet
7. eigentlich nichts. Selbst wenn es ungesetzlich wäre, hätte ich nichts dagegen

7. Non ho niente contro questo comportamento perchè non ho niente da obiettare anche se esso è illegale.

(26) Con quale frequenza nella Sua famiglia, nella Sua cerchia di amici e conoscenti o tra colleghi, si parla delle Forze Armate, della difesa o di argomenti connessi?

1. molto spesso
2. spesso
3. qualche volta
4. raramente
5. mai

(27) Lei segue notizie diffuse da quotidiani, periodici, radio e TV, riguardanti le Forze Armate, la difesa e argomenti simili?

1. regolarmente
2. spesso
3. qualche volta
4. raramente
5. mai

(37) Wie oft wird in Ihrer Familie, Ihrem Freundes- und Bekanntenkreis oder unter den Kollegen über Bundeswehr, Verteidigung und damit zusammenhängende Fragen gesprochen?

1. ständig
2. häufig
3. gelegentlich
4. selten
5. nie

(38) Wenn in den Massenmedien (Zeitungen, Zeitschriften, Radio, Fernsehen) über die Bundeswehr, Verteidigung und damit zusammenhängende Fragen berichtet wird, verfolgen Sie dann diese Berichte?

1. regelmäßig
2. meistens
3. gelegentlich
4. selten
5. nie

(29) Attualmente si sentono molte opinioni differenti circa le minacce esistenti per la nostra sicurezza. Legga per favore l'opinione formulata sulla scheda A. Qual è il Suo atteggiamento verso questa posizione?

1. La respingo completamente
2. La respingo in gran parte
3. La respingo in piccola parte
4. La condivido in piccola parte
5. La condivido in gran parte
6. La condivido completamente

SCHEDA A: Dalla fine della Seconda Guerra Mondiale l'Unione Sovietica cerca costantemente di estendere il proprio potere e la propria influenza. Ne consegue che l'Europa Occidentale - e in particolare l'Italia - verranno minacciate politicamente e militarmente perchè i comunisti vogliono arrivare ad ottenere il dominio del mondo e a costringere l'Occidente libero sotto il controllo sovietico.

Al contrario della NATO, che ha carattere difensivo, il Patto di Varsavia ha caratteristiche chiaramente aggressive. I missili sovietici hanno come unico scopo quello di portare l'Europa sotto il controllo dell'Unione Sovietica.

(27) Man hört unterschiedliche Auffassungen darüber, wodurch heute unsere Sicherheit vor allem bedroht ist. Lesen Sie bitte die Meinung auf Liste 21 durch. Wie stehen Sie persönlich zu dieser Ansicht, die in dieser Liste beschrieben ist? Sagen Sie mir das bitte anhand der Antwortvorgaben, die unten auf Liste 12 stehen.

INT.: LISTE 21 vorlegen

- 1 völlige Ablehnung
- 2 weitgehende Ablehnung
- 3 leichte Ablehnung
- 4 leichte Zustimmung
- 5 weitgehende Zustimmung
- 6 völlige Zustimmung

Seit dem Ende des 2. Weltkrieges versucht die Sowjetunion ständig ihre Macht und ihren Einfluß auszudehnen. Man muß also davon ausgehen, daß West-Europa - und insbesondere die Bundesrepublik - auch weiterhin mit politischen und militärischen Mitteln bedroht werden wird, denn die Kommunisten wollen letztlich die Weltherrschaft erreichen und den freien Westen unter ihren Einfluß zwingen.

Im Gegensatz zum defensiven Charakter der NATO trägt der Warschauer Pakt eindeutig aggressive Züge. Die Sowjetischen SS-20-Raketen dienen einzig und allein dem Zweck, Europa unter die Kontrolle der Sowjetunion zu bringen.

(30) E considerando l'opinione espressa sulla scheda B, qual è il Suo atteggiamento?

(stessa lista come sopra)

SCHEDA B: Dalla fine della Seconda Guerra Mondiale le due superpotenze, USA e URSS si sono impegnate nella corsa agli armamenti. Le armi atomiche già esistenti basterebbero a distruggere varie volte l'intera umanità.

In Europa, dove i due blocchi contrapposti confinano direttamente, si ha la massima concentrazione di armi atomiche. Questa situazione è già di per sé una minaccia, perchè basta un errore o un guasto per scatenare la guerra atomica.

La costruzione e installazione di armi atomiche sempre più sofisticate, come mezzo per raggiungere la sicurezza attraverso la dissuasione, crea invece una sempre maggiore insicurezza. La minaccia deriva dall'esistenza stessa delle armi atomiche: in fin dei conti non ha nessuna importanza chi sarà a scatenare la catastrofe.

(28) Lesen Sie nun bitte diese Meinung durch. Wie stehen Sie persönlich zu der Ansicht, die in dieser Liste beschrieben ist? Benutzen Sie bitte wieder die Antwortvorgaben, die unten auf Liste 22 stehen.

- 1 völlige Ablehnung
- 2 weitgehende Ablehnung
- 3 leichte Ablehnung
- 4 leichte Zustimmung
- 5 weitgehende Zustimmung
- 6 völlige Zustimmung

Seit dem Ende des 2. Weltkrieges haben insbesondere die zwei Weltmächte USA und Sowjetunion im Bereich der Atomwaffen ständig aufgerüstet. Inzwischen kann die Menschheit allein durch die schon vorhandenen Atomwaffen vielfach vernichtet werden.

In Europa besteht die höchste Atomwaffendichte. Diese Situation ist allein deshalb schon bedrohlich, weil auch technische Fehler oder menschliches Versagen zum Atomkrieg führen können. Das Bestreben, mit immer mehr und technisch verbesserten Atomwaffen Sicherheit zu schaffen, führt letztlich zu immer größerer Unsicherheit. Die Bedrohung geht also in erster Linie von den Atomwaffen aus. Es ist letztlich egal, wer oder was die Katastrophe auslöst.

(32) Secondo Lei, oggigiorno l'Italia è minacciata militarmente dall'Est (Patto di Varsavia)?

1. Sì, e la minaccia è grave
2. Sì, ma la minaccia è modesta
3. No, non c'è alcuna minaccia
0. Non saprei

(34) Come valuta il rischio che in Europa si arrivi ad una guerra tra Est ed Ovest, tra il Patto di Varsavia e la NATO?

1. Sì, ed il rischio è forte
2. Sì, ma il rischio è lieve
3. No, non esiste alcun rischio
0. Non saprei

(36) Secondo Lei, ci si dovrebbe opporre con le armi ad un attacco militare contro l'Italia?

1. Sì
2. No
0. Non saprei

(37) Secondo Lei, ci si dovrebbe opporre con le armi ad un attacco militare contro l'Italia anche qualora si dovesse usare il territorio italiano come campo di battaglia?

1. Sì
2. No
0. Non saprei

(38) La NATO ha a disposizione anche armi nucleari. Secondo Lei, ci si dovrebbe opporre con le armi ad un attacco militare contro l'Italia anche qualora si dovessero impiegare armi atomiche sul territorio italiano?

1. Sì
2. No
0. Non saprei

(39) Was meinen Sie, wird die Bundesrepublik heutzutage militärisch vom Osten bedroht? Ist die Bedrohung groß, eher gering, oder gibt es keine Bedrohung aus dem Osten?

- 1 ja, und zwar ist die Bedrohung groß
- 2 ja, aber die Bedrohung ist eher gering
- 3 nein, es gibt keine Bedrohung
- 4 weiß nicht

(40) Halten Sie die Gefahr, daß es in Europa zu einem Krieg zwischen Ost und West, also zwischen Warschauer Pakt und NATO kommen könnte, eher für groß oder eher für gering?

1. eher groß
2. eher gering
3. weiß nicht

(41) Sind Sie der Ansicht, daß sich die Bundesrepublik einem militärischen Angriff auf ihr Gebiet mit Waffengewalt widersetzen sollte?

1. ja
2. nein
3. weiß nicht

(42) Sind Sie in jedem Fall für eine Verteidigung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland gegen einen militärischen Angriff, auch wenn der Krieg vor allem auf dem Gebiet der Bundesrepublik ausgetragen würde?

1. ja
2. nein
3. weiß nicht

(43) Der NATO stehen für den Kriegsfall unter anderem auch Atomwaffen zur Verfügung. Sind Sie für eine militärische Verteidigung der Bundesrepublik, wenn dazu auch Atomwaffen auf dem Gebiet der Bundesrepublik eingesetzt werden müssen?

1. ja
2. nein
3. weiß nicht

(40) Qui di seguito può leggere alcune dichiarazioni riguardanti la politica di difesa, come vengono di solito espresse nelle dichiarazioni politiche ufficiali. Che cosa pensa di ciascuna di esse?

* La sicurezza dell' Europa Occidentale non può essere garantita senza la protezione degli Stati Uniti.

* Anche in futuro per la difesa dell' Occidente saranno necessarie sia le armi nucleari che le armi convenzionali.

* E' necessario un aumento delle armi convenzionali della NATO per ridurre la possibilità di pressioni verso l' impiego di armi nucleari.

(41) Come Lei sa, la NATO è il patto di alleanza per la difesa tra i paesi occidentali. Lei ritiene che per l'Italia l'appartenza alla NATO sia un fatto:

1. Positivo
2. Indifferente, non mi interessa
3. Negativo

(31) Nachfolgend haben wir einige Aussagen zur Verteidigungspolitik zusammengestellt, wie sie sich in offiziellen Darstellungen oder politischen Erklärungen finden lassen. Wie stehen Sie persönlich zu diesen Aussagen? Benutzen Sie bitte in Ihrer Einschätzung diese Liste. INT.: Liste 7 vorlegen!

Die Sicherheit Westeuropas ist ohne militärischen Schutz durch die USA nicht zu gewährleisten

Auch in Zukunft sind Atomwaffen ebenso wie konventionelle Waffen für die westliche Verteidigung unerlässlich

Eine Verstärkung der konventionellen Kräfte der NATO ist erforderlich, um für die NATO den möglichen Zwang zum frühzeitigen Einsatz von Nuklearwaffen zu vermindern.

(45) Die NATO ist ja das westliche Verteidigungsbündnis. Finden Sie es gut, daß die Bundesrepublik Mitglied der NATO ist; oder ist es Ihnen gleichgültig, oder finden Sie es nicht gut?

1. gut
2. gleichgültig
3. nicht gut

(42) Nonostante un certo comportamento possa causare svantaggi personali, una persona si mantiene fedele alle proprie convinzioni. Come giudica questo comportamento?

1. E' completamente non realistico
2. Mi è indifferente
3. Può essere giusto in linea di principio, ma non risolve nulla
4. E' un comportamento giusto, che conduce a riflettere sui propri comportamenti
5. Personalmente cerco di comportarmi in questo modo
6. Non so

(43) Un' azienda, o un individuo, decide di porre termine ad una produzione che è pericolosa per l'ambiente, anche se questo causa la perdita di molti posti di lavoro. Come giudica questo comportamento?

1. E' completamente non realistico
2. Mi è indifferente
3. Può essere giusto in linea di principio, ma non risolve nulla
4. E' un comportamento giusto, che conduce a riflettere sui propri comportamenti
5. Personalmente mi comporterei proprio così
6. Non so

(8) Wie finden Sie folgende Verhaltensweisen?

Jemand setzt sich für seine Überzeugung ein, obwohl das wahrscheinlich seiner Karriere schadet
LISTE 5: Dieses Verhalten ...

1. Ist völlig unrealistisch
2. Ist mir gleichgültig
3. Ist zwar gut gemeint, bringt aber im großen und ganzen nichts
4. Finde ich gut/regt zum Nachdenken über das eigene Verhalten an
5. Würde ich selbst auch so machen/mache ich selbst auch so
6. Kann damit nichts anfangen/weiß nicht

Eine Firma/ein Unternehmer stellt die Produktion eines für die Umwelt gefährlichen Produktes ein, obwohl dadurch viele Arbeitsplätze verloren gehen

LISTE 5: Dieses Verhalten ...

1. Ist völlig unrealistisch
2. Ist mir gleichgültig
3. Ist zwar gut gemeint, bringt aber im großen und ganzen nichts
4. Finde ich gut/regt zum Nachdenken über das eigene Verhalten an
5. Würde ich selbst auch so machen/mache ich selbst auch so
6. Kann damit nichts anfangen/weiß nicht

(44) Per quanto riguarda il nostro futuro esistono diversi punti di vista. Secondo Lei, quanto probabili sono le seguenti eventualità?

1. Lo sviluppo tecnologico risolverà il problema dell' inquinamento ambientale
2. In Europa le armi nucleari saranno abolite da entrambe le parti (Est e Ovest)
3. La chimica e la tecnica distruggeranno l' ambiente
4. Le materie prime diventeranno sempre più scarse, scoppierà una crisi economica e aumenterà la miseria
5. Tutti avranno un posto di lavoro: la disoccupazione scomparirà

(40) Consideri i seguenti argomenti. Di quali si è discusso nella sua famiglia nelle ultime settimane?

1. Scuola/lavoro
2. Politica in generale
3. Disoccupazione, sicurezza del posto di lavoro
4. Scioperi e dimostrazioni
5. Problemi economici familiari
6. Inquinamento e problemi ecologici
7. Delinquenza, criminalità
8. Comportamenti ed educazione
9. Argomenti religiosi
10. Forze Armate e questioni militari

(23) Es gibt verschiedene Meinungen darüber, wie unsere Zukunft aussehen wird. Inwieweit werden die folgenden Ereignisse Ihrer Meinung nach in der Zukunft eintreten? INT.:Liste 17 vorlegen (bestimmt/wahrscheinlich/wahrscheinlich nicht/bestimmt nicht/ weiß nicht).

- * Technischer Fortschritt wird die Umweltverschmutzung beseitigen
- * Die Rohstoffe werden immer knapper, Wirtschaftskrisen und Hungersnöte werden ausbrechen
- * In Europa werden die Atomwaffen auf beiden Seiten abgeschafft
- * Technik und Chemie werden die Umwelt zerstören
- * Es wird für alle einen angemessenen Arbeitsplatz geben, Arbeitslosigkeit verschwindet

(1) Ich lese Ihnen jetzt einige Fragen und Themen vor, über die die Menschen heutzutage reden. Sagen Sie mir bitte anhand dieser Liste, ob das jeweils bei Ihnen zu Hause kein Thema ist (A), ob darüber bei Ihnen öfter geredet und diskutiert wird (B) oder ob es darüber auch hin und wieder zwischen Eltern und Kindern Meinungsverschiedenheiten und Konflikte gibt (C).

INT.: Liste 1 vorlegen! Vorgaben vorlesen!
Jeweils nur eine Nennung (A,B oder C)

1. Schule/Beruf
3. Sport
4. Religion, Religiosität
5. Demonstrationen/Hausbesetzungen usw.

11. Sport
12. Diritti civili ed eguaglianza sociale
13. Pace e disarmo
14. Energia nucleare e suoi rischi
15. L' AIDS e il modo con cui i pubblici poteri affrontano il problema
16. Pericoli della tecnologia attuale e futura
17. Arrivismo ed egoismo diffuso
18. Pericoli delle armi atomiche

(49) E su quali degli argomenti da Lei indicati si sono verificate divergenze di opinione o conflitti tra genitori e figli?
(segnare sulla col. corrispondente, seconda fila)

(50) Questa intervista viene svolta anche in Germania. Eccole una lista di modi di essere e di comportamenti: quali tra essi Lei pensa che Italiani, Tedeschi, adulti e giovani dovrebbero imparare, perchè ne sono mancanti?

Scelta della risposte:

1. Gli Italiani dovrebbero imparare questo
2. I Tedeschi dovrebbero imparare questo
3. I giovani, italiani e tedeschi, dovrebbero imparare questo
4. Gli adulti, italiani e tedeschi, dovrebbero imparare questo
5. Tutti dovrebbero apprendere questo
6. Non è importante per nessuno

6. Politik ganz allgemein
7. Arbeitslosigkeit/Arbeitsplätze
8. Bundeswehr/Sicherheitspolitik
9. Zunehmende Umweltbelastung (Nahrungsmittel, Luft, Wasser usw.)
14. Umgangsformen/ was sich gehört
15. Verbrechen/Kriminalität
16. Gleiche Rechte für alle; Abbau von Benachteiligungen und Privilegien
17. Gefahren der Kernkraft
19. Gefahren der Technologie (Computer, Gentechnik usw.)
20. Zunehmender unsozialer Umgang miteinander, "Ellbogengesellschaft"
21. Frieden/Notwendigkeit von Abrüstung
22. Bedrohung durch Atomwaffen
24. AIDS; staatliche Maßnahmen dagegen

(16) Ich lese Ihnen jetzt verschiedene Eigenschaften vor. Sagen Sie mir bitte anhand dieser Liste, ob das jeweils Deutsche oder Italiener oder beide lernen sollten, oder ob das Ihrer Meinung nach nicht so wichtig ist.

Liste 12 vorlegen!

- 1 = Das sollten vor allem Deutsche lernen
- 2 = Das sollten vor allem Italiener lernen
- 3 = Das sollten sowohl Deutsche als auch Italiener lernen
- 4 = Das zu lernen ist nicht wichtig

Vorgaben vorlesen!

1. Fare economia, pensare a risparmiare
2. Avere senso del dovere e sentirsi responsabili
3. Lavorare diligentemente e con precisione
4. Accontentarsi di quello che si ha
5. Essere disponibili ai bisogni del promisso
6. Comportarsi con educazione
7. Non essere conformisti, ribellarsi alle convenzioni
8. Non desiderare solo cose materiali
9. Divertirsi di più
10. Impegnarsi attivamente per le proprie idee politiche
11. Obbedire alle leggi e all' autorità

(51) Considerando in complesso la lista precedente, pensa che ci sia più differenza:

1. Tra Italiani e Tedeschi in generale
2. Tra giovani e adulti in generale
3. Tra giovani Italiani e giovani Tedeschi
4. Tra adulti Italiani e adulti Tedeschi

- A. neue Lebensformen finden
- B. aus Sachzwängen ausbrechen
- C. lockerer, spontaner leben
- D. mehr auf andere Menschen eingehen
- E. mit dem Gegebenen zufrieden sein
- F. nicht nur an materielle Dinge denken
- G. gute Umgangsformen
- H. sparsam sein
- I. Ordnung und Sauberkeit
- J. Pflichtgefühl
- K. Fleiß

(17) Bitte lesen Sie sich diese Liste durch. Was glauben Sie, welcher Unterschied ist da größer?

- A. der Unterschied zwischen Deutschen und Italienern, egal ob Jugendliche oder Erwachsene
- B. der Unterschied zwischen Jugendlichen und Erwachsenen, egal ob in Deutschland oder Italien
- C. der Unterschied zwischen jungen Deutschen und jungen Italienern
- D. der Unterschied zwischen den Generationen der Erwachsenen in der Bundesrepublik und in Italien

(53) Sesso dell' intervistato

1. M
2. F

(54) Età dell' intervistato

1. 16 - 25 anni
2. 40 - 60 anni

(56) Composizione del nucleo familiare

1. Singolo
2. Coppia
3. Coppia + figli
4. Coppia +figli+genitori/altri parenti
5. Separato/a, divorziato/a, vedovo/a + figli
6. Con i genitori
7. Altro

(57) Titolo di studio

1. Senza titolo + alfabeti senza titolo
2. Licenza elementare
3. Licenza media inf. e affini
4. Diploma istituti professionali
5. Diploma istituti tecnici
6. Maturità (Licei)
7. Studi universitari non terminati
8. Laurea
9. Non risponde

(46) Geschlecht des Befragten:

- 1 männlich
- 2 weiblich

(47) Würden Sie mir bitte Ihr Alter angeben?

..... Jahre

(51) Leben Sie allein, zusammen mit Ihrem Partner, mit Ihren Kindern, mit Ihren Eltern oder anderen Verwandten?

- 1 Allein/Single
- 2 in einer Wohngemeinschaft
- 3 mit meinem Partner
- 4 mit meinem Partner und Kind/Kindern
- 5 mit meinem Partner, Kind/Kindern und Eltern/anderen Verwandten
- 6 mit Kind/Kindern, bin jedoch ohne Partner (z.B. getrennt, geschieden, verwitwet)
- 7 mit meinen Eltern/mit einem Elternteil

(56) Welche Schule haben Sie zuletzt besucht? Ich meine, welchen Schulabschluß haben Sie?

- 1 Volksschule (und Berufsschule) ohne Lehre oder Berufsausbildung
- 2 Volksschule mit abgeschlossener Lehre/Berufsausbildung
- 3 Mittelschule/Oberschule ohne Abitur/mehrjährige Fachschule/Handelsschule
- 4 Abitur
- 5 Hochschule/Universität

(59) Luogo di nascita

1. Nord-Ovest
2. Nord-Est
3. Centro-Nord
4. Centro-Sud
5. Sud
6. Isole
7. Altro (estero)

(60) Caratteristiche del luogo di nascita

1. Centro rurale
2. Piccola città
3. Capoluogo di provincia
4. Capoluogo di regione
5. Polo metropolitano

(61) Caratteristiche dell' area di nascita

1. Area rurale
2. Area periferica
3. Area industriale/centrale

(62) Caratteristiche del luogo di residenza abituale

1. Centro rurale
2. Piccola città
3. Capoluogo di provincia
4. Capoluogo di regione
5. Polo metropolitano

(4) In welchem Alter (ungefähr) haben Sie in welcher Umgebung gelebt? Sagen Sie mir bitte für jeden Zeitabschnitt, den ich Ihnen vorlese, die entsprechende Nummer auf dieser Liste (Liste 3).

- Geburt - 6 Jahre
- 7 bis 10 Jahre
- 11 bis 16 Jahre
- 17 bis 20 Jahre
- 21 bis 25 Jahre
- 26 bis 30 Jahre
- 31 bis 40 Jahre
- 41 Jahre bis heute

LISTE 3

- 1 Einzelgehöft/Weiler
- 2 Dorf in rein ländlicher Umgebung
- 3 Dorf in der Nähe einer mittleren Stadt oder Großstadt
- 4 Ländliche Kleinstadt (bis 30.000 Einwohner)
- 5 Industrielle Kleinstadt (bis 30.000 Einwohner)
- 6 Stadt mittlerer Größe mit wenig Industrie (bis 100.000 Einwohner)
- 7 Stadt mittlerer Größe mit viel Industrie (bis 100.000 Einwohner)
- 8 Kleine bis mittlere Großstadt (bis 500.000 Einwohner)
- 9 Vorort einer Großstadt
- 10 Große Großstadt (über 500.000 Einwohner)

(63) Caratteristiche dell' area di residenza abituale

1. Area rurale
2. Area periferica
3. Area industriale/centrale

(5) - Welche Postleitzahl hat Ihr Wohnort?

(6) - Und welche Postleitzahl hat der Ort, an dem Sie arbeiten/zuletzt gearbeitet haben bzw. zur Schule/Universität/Ausbildung gehen?

- entfällt ; bin nicht in einem Arbeitsverhältnis; (z.B. Hausfrau, in Rente)

THE AUTHORS

- | | |
|--------------------|--|
| KOHR, Heinz-Ulrich | Diplom-Psychologe, Dr. German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research (SOWI) Munich/FRG |
| NUCIARI, Marina | Prof.Dr. Università degli Studi di Torino, Facoltà di Economia e Commercio Centro Studi di Sociologia e Antropologia Culturale Turin/Italy |
| RÄDER, Hans-Georg | Dr., M.A. German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research (SOWI) Munich/FRG |
| SERTORIO, Guido | Prof.Dr. Università degli Studi di Torino, Facoltà di Economia e Commercio Centro Studi di Sociologia e Antropologia Culturale Cattedra di Sociologia Turin/Italy |