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In most countries armed forces have to meet the challenges of a rapidly transforming world. They must adapt to a totally different global political-strategic landscape. Former dictatorships have to redefine the status of their military forces on democratic lines. VOLUME 16 of the FORUM international contains 13 articles on the problems and demands which the military will face in the years ahead. These contributions result from the 1992 Valparaiso Interim Conference held by the Research Committee 01 "Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution" of the International Sociological Association (ISA).

In den meisten Ländern treffen die Streitkräfte auf die Herausforderungen einer sich wandelnden Welt. Sie haben sich auf eine völlig veränderte politisch-strategische Landschaft einzustellen. Frühere Diktaturen müssen ihr Militär demokratiekonform gestalten. Band 16 der Reihe FORUM international enthält 13 Artikel zu den Anforderungen, denen sich die Streitkräfte in den nächsten Jahren gegenübersehen werden. Die Beiträge sind Ergebnis der 1992 in Valparaiso durchgeführten Interim Conference des Research Committee 01 "Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution" der International Sociological Association (ISA).

Opinions expressed in the articles are solely those of the authors
Die Verantwortung für den Inhalt liegt bei den Autoren

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PREFACE

VOLUME 16 of the FORUM international series is a collection of papers presented at the 1992 Valparaiso Interim Meeting of the I.S.A. Research Committee 01 "Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution".

There were two remarkable features related to the conference: The Valparaiso event was the first international congress on military-related social research ever held on Latin American soil, and it was the first major scientific gathering of the Research Committee 01 after the two years of dramatic shifts in world politics following the end of the Cold War in 1990.

Consequently, the conference was designed to reflect on and to respond to the new situation under the main title "Global Perspectives on the Future of Security, Conflict Resolution, and the Military Organization". From the roughly 30 papers, which were presented and discussed during the conference, 13 have been selected for publication in the following. Their common denominator is the challenge of redefining the status, role and structure of the future armed forces.

The 1992 Interim Conference was sponsored by Chilean academic institutions as well as the Chilean Navy. On behalf of the I.S.A. Research Committee 01, I would like to express my gratitude and appreciation to all involved in the preparation and execution of the meeting. I would also like to thank the authors for their contributions. Finally, I am grateful to Jürgen Kuhlmann, David Segal and Heidi Fleck for their enduring efforts to put this book together and to get it ready for print. I take pride and pleasure in presenting FORUM 16 to the international audience.

Munich, May 1994

Bernhard Fleckenstein
Director and Professor

Bernhard Fleckenstein

*Approaching the Third Millennium:
Reflections on the Future of War and Peace
in a Global Perspective*

Abstract

On a global outlook for war and peace, it is argued that the actual number of crises and conflicts will continue to increase. The capabilities and potentials to promote and enforce peace will not keep pace with bellicose developments all over the world. Three arguments support the above contention: (1) The sheer quantity of conflicts and the extremely high cost for peace keeping and peace enforcing favor the tendency to look on from the sidelines instead of getting involved, (2) the quality of conflicts, which mostly are and will be civil wars, has proven highly resistant to international arbitration, and (3) there exist neither the appropriate actors nor a suitable international law to deal effectively with armed conflicts and to maintain peace on a world wide scale. These conditions are not likely to change. The vision of a "New World order" has already faded. War is still a harsh global reality and will long remain one.

* * *

I should like to share some thoughts with you on the global outlook for war and peace. The issue I shall address is whether it is realistic to assume that the close of this millennium in a very few years will also herald the passing of the bellicose "Iron Age" of war. In other words, may we dare to hope that we are evolving towards a more peaceful age? And if so, will the future mean that nations will less frequently resort to the use of force and seek instead to resolve conflicts by more peaceful means than at present?

I cannot conceal my grave doubts with regard to future developments. We will assuredly not enjoy eternal peace in the foreseeable future. On the contrary, there is every indication that the actual number of wars and armed conflicts will continue to increase. Moreover, there are compelling grounds for expecting that peacekeeping capabilities and potentials, indeed the actual effectiveness of initiatives for dealing with armed conflict will not keep pace with international developments. In

fact, may I put forward the proposition that we are heading for involvement in more, not fewer, wars than at present. Consequently, we may expect to enjoy even less peace in future. And we may have to get used to the fact that civilization and barbarism exist closely next to each other. However, let us take a look, one by one, at the factors supporting the above contention.

The world has not become more peaceful although the East-West confrontation which lasted for decades has finally come to an end. Unfortunately, the demise of the old bipolar world order has brought with it the eruption of any number of volatile trouble spots. On the one hand, an outbreak of militant nationalism has led anew to major regional conflicts. Similarly, the growth of fundamentalist movements in many places has accelerated the retreat of their adherents into a political Dark Age. There are dozens of states with minority problems. Each and every one of the newly free or recently re-established Eastern European countries has this sort of potential conflict. And there exist innumerable contested border questions all over the world.

As always, the international arms trade is flourishing. In recent years even weapons of mass destruction, including sophisticated launching systems, have been available on the world market. Thus armed and equipped, a tinpot dictator can grow into a global threat. Roughly 20 so-called third-world countries either already possess arsenals of nuclear as well as chemical and biological weapons or may have acquired them within 5 to 7 years. Many societies have developed into what is termed "bellicose cultures". Such societies are characterized by intolerance and a tendency to allow conflicts to escalate into violence.

In the last analysis, states of this type may even go so far as to sanction and actively engage in terrorist acts.

On the other hand, democracy, too, has become more widespread and this is indeed a hopeful sign. Studies in conflict theory and the origins of war have taught us that democratic states -- and evidently only democracies -- tend to entertain peaceful relations with one another.

Nevertheless, of the world's roughly 180 states, the democracies are still in the minority. In addition, it is doubtful whether the worldwide growth in democratic government will continue at the present rate. The trend might even be reversed, particularly if it is not accompanied by rapid economic gains. Latin America, for instance, is remarkable for a cyclical alternation between democracy and dictatorship, a phenomenon peculiar to the region. Yet a similar pattern might well emerge elsewhere. Most fledgling democracies do not rest on firm political foundations. Nor do such burgeoning states have a tradition of a civil society. In other words, democracy is not rooted in such states. They lack the social institutions which, of necessity, are the concrete expression of the value system they have only recently absorbed. Such institutions alone can propagate and disseminate democratic values. Moreover, many of these new democracies are beset by the 'classic' global problems of poverty, famine and insufficient development. They are burdened with debt and inflation, weakened by overpopulation and plagued by a heavily polluted environment.

Such a deplorable state of affairs can only give rise to volatile situations and engender conflicts. Unfortunately, the means available to the organs of international crisis management for coping with conflicts have become increasingly inadequate. In substance, I believe there are three reasons for this deficiency.

First, there are currently too many conflicts across the world which should be dealt with now. But the real cost of doing so would be disproportionately high in terms of both personnel and matériel. The UN already burdened with a debt of 2 billion dollars, is currently deploying some 40,000 troops at 11 flashpoints on three continents - a number never before reached in the UN's history. The annual cost of deploying and maintaining such forces runs to about 3 billion dollars. However, UN peacekeeping forces are urgently needed at 20 other trouble spots: in Georgia and Afghanistan, in Sri Lanka and Somalia, in West Sahara and Moçambique - just to mention a few. But no one has the means or

even the desire to cover such deployment expenses. Any way you look at it, peacekeeping operations are extremely expensive. And the cost of peace enforcement is astronomical. The Gulf war, for instance, cost between 60 and 70 billion dollars. Indeed, simply because of what they cost, operations of this nature cannot be repeated in the near future. Consequently, even states which constitute a serious threat to world peace will be able to face the prospect of military sanctions with impunity.

Second, the overwhelming majority of armed conflicts are basically domestic upheavals. They are either rebellions against incumbent regimes or armed conflicts involving ethnic groups, tribes, rival clans, factions within clans or religious communities. Of the 160 wars which have been fought between 1945 and 1990, 119, that is 70 per cent, have been internal conflicts. The salient characteristic of civil wars is that the demarcation between the fronts is blurred. In addition, there are no clear-cut distinctions between right and wrong. Therefore, there can be no broad-based consensus among the members of the international community on the political purpose of a direct military intervention in such domestic conflicts.

Moreover, civil wars have generally proven highly resistant to international arbitration. Civil war tends to have one of two possible outcomes. On the one hand, a civil war may end in a revolution, which may or may not entail the loss or enforced secession of territory. Or a state of civil war may smoulder for quite some time until it simply sputters out after the country has been thoroughly destroyed and the opposing factions have exhausted themselves, only then peace gets a chance. And this is what currently happens in Cambodia. In any case, major civil disorder is only very rarely settled by the peaceful reconciliation of the warring factions. Even in Northern Ireland, where an almost forgotten state of civil war has been festering since 1969, reconciliation has not taken place.

Intractable factions, like intransigent individuals, are best left alone. Why indeed should onlookers get involved and mired in no-win situations?

Third -- and this is the last point I want to make in this connection -- there is, very simply, a dearth of parties willing and able to promote and enforce peace. Serving as a global police force would overtax the capabilities of any one state. Even the US, which is the sole remaining superpower, is no longer willing and, moreover, no longer able to assume the role of global policeman. Instead, it is turning inwards to address urgent domestic issues. The CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) on the other hand has no effective common foreign policy. Russia is in dire need of international assistance and is no longer a superpower with the authority to negotiate and enforce terms for global peacekeeping. China in turn has perpetrated serious violations of human rights. Finally, the other two permanent members of the UN Security Council, the United Kingdom and France, lack not only political power but also the necessary capabilities.

Nor are the various international institutions able to assume the role of guardians of the peace on an effective, long-term basis. As things stand, the United Nations is not a democratic institution and urgently needs radical reform. Moreover, it suffers from a chronic lack of financial resources.

The CSCE (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe) has swelled to a body of more than 50 member states, of which seven are Islamic nations. Expansion has only meant increased burdens, which the CSCE is unable to deal with effectively. The CSCE has in fact become a Eurasian replica of the old League of Nations. As a result, it functions as ineffectually and indecisively as the League of Nations did in its day.

The European Community does not yet have common foreign and defence policies. Germany and France have taken the initiative in forming a Franco-German corps. However, this step should not camouflage the fact that Europe lacks the decisive capabilities for handling

major regional conflicts: aerial reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities, troop transport capabilities, facilities for in-flight refuelling and a commensurate command structure. It will be a long time before Europe is really up to effective crisis management, even if developing such a comprehensive capability for dealing with crises were at present a politically attractive or even acceptable option.

The only operative overarching organization which at the moment can provide an adequate institutional framework for such tasks is NATO. Naturally NATO is not a supranational organization charged with keeping order and enforcing peace on a global scale. NATO is a purely defensive alliance consisting of 16 sovereign member states which have promised to come to each other's assistance in the event of an attack. It does not have the purpose of collective security for all.

The newly formed NATO Council for Co-operation provides a forum for collaboration with the nations of Central and Eastern Europe. Although the Council is an additional stabilizing factor, it is not authorized to act single-handedly to enforce peace and resolve conflicts.

Taking all the above into consideration, what, then, are the prospects for the much mooted "New World Order"? One might more accurately refer to it as the "New World Disorder", as Willy Brandt recently put it. During the period between 1945 and 1985, the world was without war for only 26 days. Then from 1985 Gorbachov attempted to reform the communist system from the top down. His efforts lead to sweeping changes in global politics. The West's most cherished and lofty political ideals have prevailed: democracies have been established, human rights guaranteed and free market economies have become widespread. Nonetheless, the actual number of armed conflicts has not decreased. Nor does this seem at all likely to happen. In addition to old unresolved conflicts, a host of new ones has flared up, conflicts which lay dormant during the "cold war".

At the same time Western willingness to intervene in order to keep or restore peace is at a low ebb. There will be no "crusades for democ-

racry". Pacifist tendencies in the West render such operations unlikely. The buzzword now making the rounds is "Fortress Europe". The growing numbers of migrants fleeing across Europe are perceived as a threat to social stability and internal security.

The growth of xenophobia could force governments to reconsider barriers to migration to prevent uncontrolled movement. Opinion polls in both Europe and North America show unequivocally that domestic issues have been accorded priority over challenges in the foreign policy sector. There is a growing tendency to look on from the sidelines rather than intervene. The terrible war that is going on in what used to be Yugoslavia is indeed great cause for concern. Yet West European governments are even more concerned at the prospect of sending citizens of their countries on a mission of military intervention. For one thing, military budgets are under pressure to shrink as taxpayers look forward to benefiting from the "peace dividend" they feel they have earned. Consequently, in future fewer resources are likely to be available, even for defending the vital interests of peace, democracy and human rights. The prevailing dichotomy between the politics of interest and lingering idealism will ultimately be resolved in favour of political behaviour motivated largely by interest.

Even were it was to meet with widespread approval, a "New World Order" would conflict with the tenets of "classical" international law, should actual attempts be made to implement it. There is no legal framework for sanctioning and regulating the preventive stationing of peacekeeping forces. Not prevention but reaction is the order of the day.

The guiding principles of sovereignty, integrity and non-intervention, as written into the CSCE final document, may indeed protect states from incursions launched by other states, but they have no validity to shield a nation from a domestic despot. On the one hand, it is a much discussed issue whether even more fundamental and far-reaching values than sovereignty, integrity and non-intervention may exist, such as, for instance, self-determination and minority rights. However, a

clear majority of states is against an institutionalized "right of humanitarian intervention" and this attitude is not likely to change. Consequently, there will always be regimes which can repress their religious and ethnic minorities with impunity.

The only likely -- and albeit limited -- possibility for countering this state of affairs might well be for Europe to enact and implement a progressive body of legislation with supranational jurisdiction governing its domestic and foreign affairs. But even such a development seems fairly unlikely when one recalls the fact that the European Parliament is an institution which has hitherto had no definitive say in foreign affairs or regional security.

Even the European Community continues to conduct foreign affairs and security policy purely on the basis of national interest. The very idea of transferring national sovereignty to a central institution can still mobilize stubborn resistance.

The CSCE, too, has gained very little ground in this sphere. The terms of the Prague formula of "consensus minus one", approved in January 1992, prevents an individual member state from blocking a vote of censure with a veto. Nevertheless, an unruly member state would still be exposed to no more than verbal censure. It certainly need not fear an act of intervention, for intervention would constitute a violation of "classical" international law as it still stands.

The vision of a "New World Order", cherished and promoted in a similar way in 1919 and again in 1945, has faded. When George Bush, the President of the United States, used the term for the first time in October 1990 at the United Nations, he linked it with the vision of a "lasting age of peace" and "more democracy, prosperity, peace and arms reduction". And he went on to add that: "The century has ten years to go. Ten years, during which we can leave the wars of the 20th century behind us for ever. Ten years, during which we can cement new bonds, a new partnership, among nations."

But not much remains of the optimistic mood which prevailed less than two years ago. War is still a harsh global reality and will long remain one. Mars, the god of war, who has held this century under his sway, will continue to command a large following on into the next millennium.

Alejandro Medina Lois

The New Dimensions of Security -

How Do We Define Our Security Needs ?

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I. INTRODUCTION

The primary requirements of human beings, since primitive men, were expressed as basic needs of survival. They evolved with the development of mankind, passing through the family, the tribe and the nation itself, to arrive at the current concept of security. A first question arises: What is Security?

Many answers have been given in search of a proper definition, applicable to national and international levels. So it is convenient to take into consideration the meanings of the Spanish Language Dictionary¹ textually: "*Security: quality of being secure*"; "*Secure: free and exempt of any danger, harm or risk*"

With this definition from the Spanish language as a starting point, it is necessary to establish the concepts in the context of a broader framework, such as the United Nations, to confront them with today's situation, expressed as "new dimensions" resulting from world evolution.

We propose that this international frame needs a national adaptation, to be able to establish security needs, as a result of a diversity of risks, menaces, or simply insecurity elements, through a rational, complete and highly dynamic procedure. However, it is essential to consider a method, useful to different nations, that would produce common results in some cases or different results in other events, according to analytical criteria, in world, region or neighborhood frames. Results among nations should be based in two essential elements: National Objectives and the values assigned to their National Powers. National Objectives - the interpretation of the natural will of a national community - produces a natural confrontation, and enables us to deduce and foresee conflict during future efforts of those nations to attain them.

So we arrive at two perspectives on the Security concept to be used by each country; first, from the viewpoint of its survival as a State-Nation;

¹ Dictionary of the Spanish Language, XIX ed. 1970, Real Academia Española.

second, as a capacity to support Development, through the highest possible degree of attaining the National Objective.

With this definition of the problem, the real needs of Security can be determined. To begin, the highest probability of conflict can be found in the struggle to attain development in the political, economic, social and cultural fields, not only internally in every nation but also in external relations, and eventual radiation of influence. The other option, the disappearance of a nation as a result of the action of another nation to destroy or absorb it, appears less possible given the international community reaction, demonstrated recently in the case of Kuwait and Iraq. However, for internal reasons - such as ethnic separatist movements or others - a nation can be destroyed from within giving birth to new entities, as in the recent cases of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the Yugoslav Federation.

Another source of insecurity is Nature itself, with catastrophies or emergencies due to natural disasters, periodically affecting different regions and resulting in death, destruction and suffering. They are larger the less preventative measures to cope with their had been taken.

The basic unit to define security needs is the independent state, and the scope of insecurity elements necessarily covers three different fields: *External Security, Internal Security, Security against catastrophies.*

For analytical purposes, in the process of defining problems and possible solutions, a method must be used to face the insecurity elements as determined, with the National Objective of each country, through a Global Security Estimate. This estimate should be divided in the three fields of external, internal and catastrophies security, to have a clear concept and to simplify the work.

This rational process, at the highest level, should take into consideration the current situation of National Power with all its elements, political, military, economic and social, to deduce strengths and weaknesses, in order to use them effectively, getting the most of the first and improving the second. This procedure would produce a set of forecasts and actions for nations to employ in the development of a National Security Plan. It would

include a set of three plans, for external, internal and catastrophic contingencies.

My thesis is that Security Needs are defined at the national level, taking into consideration different opinions at the global, regional and neighborhood levels, to make it possible for a country to attain its National Objective - under reasonable security conditions - through application of elements of its National Power to the anticipated scenarios of the future. Nothing could be worse for a nation than to believe that a change in the world situation -such as the end of the Cold War - would automatically provide a level of security by a superpower, and so to make it unnecessary to watch for its own security. Events are demonstrating that at the end of bipolarity, a multiple polarity has emerged of dynamic evolution not yet consolidated, in which wars appear simultaneously in different areas of the world, with the end of a global war hypothesis, and that notwithstanding good will declarations, there is no such thing as a new world order.

II. SECURITY IN THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION

A. Antecedents

The United Nations Charter ² establishes in the Preamble that: "We, the people of the United Nations, resolved: "To preserve the future generations from the war, that twice during our lives has inflicted inexpressible suffering to the humankind. ...And with such purposes: ...To join our strengths for the peace maintenance and international security, to ensure, through the acceptance of principles and the adoption of methods, that the armed forces shall not be used but in service of the common interest", and..Chapter I, "Purposes and Principles" states at Article 1 that: The Purposes of the United Nations are:

² United Nations Chart, Office of Public Information of the United Nations, N.Y., 1964.

1. To maintain peace and international security, and with that end: to adopt collective effective measures to prevent and eliminate menaces to peace; and to attain through pacific means, and accordingly with the principles of justice and international right, the settlement or arrangement of controversies or international situations susceptible of leading to peace breaking; 2. To foster among nations friendship relations, based in the respect of the principles of right, equality and the free determination of the peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen the universal peace.

Among the main organs of the United Nations is the Security Council, the Composition, Functions and Powers, Voting, and Procedures of which are defined in articles in Chapter V. Chapters VI and VII establish the rules for "Pacific Settlement of Controversies" and "Action in case of Peace Menaces, Peace Breaking or Aggression Acts." Chapter VIII, "Regional Agreements" states that there is no opposition "to the existence of agreements or organizations of regions whose purpose would be to hear the subjects related to the maintenance of peace and international security, and liable to regional action, in the event that those agreements and organizations, and their activities, are compatible with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations."

B. Analysis

The concept of "international security" appears from the Preamble of the United Nations Chart, as one of the bases of the organization of States. However, it is separated from the concept of "peace maintenance", because they are different in spite of their close relationship. "International security" has a broader scope and it requires - to be effective - foreseeable actions and the functioning of systems to eliminate peace menaces, and only as a last resort, the employment of force, if pacific solutions have failed.

The Principle of "sovereign equality of all the members" of the Organization, unfortunately is affected in the Charter itself by the composition of the Security Council: permanent members are the five Great

Powers victors of the World War II, and they have veto power in Council voting: the Charter states that the decisions of this organization should have the "affirmative vote of all the permanent members".

The importance of this rule lays on the fact that the Security Council will determine the threats and make recommendations or decide the measures to be adopted. Among them is "the necessary action to maintain or restore the peace and international security", through means of air, naval or ground forces; also it has responsibility for plans for the employment of armed forces, with the help of the Staff Committee, integrated by the Chiefs of Staff of the five permanent members.

On the other hand, the political will of the Charter on peace maintenance and international security does not mean an absolute pacifism, as it pragmatically acknowledges "the immanent right of legitimate defense, individual or collective, in the case of an armed attack...till the Security Council has taken the necessary measures to maintain peace and international security".

Finally, there is recognition of the capability of regional decentralization in the task of peace maintenance and international security, stating there is no opposition to "the existence of agreements or regional organizations" with such purpose, with the condition that "those agreements and organizations, and their activities, should be compatible with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations."

World evolution has resulted in an important change in the role of those five Great Powers, all with nuclear weapons of independent development, giving them an important element of power and subsequent capacity of coercion and pressure; it is also true that this nuclear monopoly does not appear now so exclusive, and it is estimated that around twenty countries have the technological capacity to develop nuclear weapons. Another fact is that the three Powers defeated in World War II- Germany, Japan and Italy - now belong to the exclusive club of the world's economic Greats and their power cannot be ignored, not only in this field but also in their military capacity, developed with the support of the United States, as part of a system

of alliances and contention to Soviet expansion during the Cold War period. It is possible to think that the big issue would be the reform of the United Nations Charter, related to the composition of the Security Council, appraising the change of status of the great Powers, to include Germany and Japan.

The Gulf War experience taught the significance of United Nations intervention, with the decision of the Security Council to give free hand to the United States - leading a group of countries - to compel Iraq's obedience to their resolutions on Kuwait, proceeding initially with economic sanctions imposed with a blockade - with no results - and later to military action, that ended with Iraq's defeat and its acceptance of certain conditions.

The disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, the changes in the countries of Eastern Europe including the USSR, and German reunification, have produced a highly dynamic situation - not resolved yet - with regard to the existence of the European Community and the Future of NATO. NATO, with a new role, represents the United States' interest for presence and military influence in Europe, with a new definition of functions and structure, that could be interpreted to be according to the frames of the United Nations rules on agreements and regional organizations.

However, there are different trends, such as the creation of an Army Corps made up of French and German troops, available for quick intervention; different groupings of countries integrating European regional entities which are already states, and their different politic, economic and military features, in a realignment still confusing after the end of the bipolarity.

Agreements on weapons and force reductions are being executed, with fewer forces and the destruction or transfer of equipment. On the other hand, increased economic pressures to reduce the great defense spending needed for bipolar confrontation have produced political decisions to reduce forces and limit defense budgets together with the sale of weapons and efforts to maintain defense industries through international partnerships, joint projects and sales to Third World countries.

It can be concluded that the tremendous concentration of military power, characteristic of bipolar confrontation, is changing to new structures of forces, with smaller size, great mobility and complex technologies, whose international organization is not consolidated, and so reinforces independent national views, with great differences from one country to another. Also it is producing a displacement of modern weapons to other world areas of potential conflict, for internal economic reasons, as in the case of the new states born out of the former USSR.

General John Galvin's concepts, in a lecture at the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies on 10 March 1992, shortly before his retirement of the US Army and relief as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), on the theme of a new strategy for Nato, whose forces were under his command, are very enlightening.³ He stated that after the previous strategies of "massive retaliation" and "flexible response", the new strategy adopted in Rome on November 1991 did not have a name yet, but it could be addressed as "a strategy of crisis response", as a reaction of NATO to a world in transition with a high degree of instability. Its goal should be "to facilitate these transitions without crisis, to prevent crisis and the capacity to resolve any crisis if they cannot be prevented." "That means that in peacetime the forces must be capable of deterrence, they must show solidarity - that is why we have made them multinational forces - and they must provide for stability and the prevention of crisis". "The political use of military forces in a crisis is a very complex matter, as it must not exacerbate the crisis, but actually bring down the level of tension." It is not true that simply doing nothing is the way to respond to a crisis. However, if war is inevitable then we must be able to fight in a modern, high intensity, three-dimensional, multinational and highly mobile war. "The amount of instability that might result from the enormous transitions - the end of Cold War, the end of communism, the end of the Soviet Union, the end of its external relationships, but transition goes on in China as well, in the Muslim states and even in Europe with its move

³ International Defense Review 4/1992.

toward unity and German unification. I am concerned that in our rush to declare a beautiful world we may fail to recognize all that has to be done, not only military, in order to maintain stability."

III. THE SECURITY CONCEPTS IN FORCE

A. Antecedents

The Group of Government Experts, nominated to make a broad study on Security Concepts, presented its Report to the General Secretary of the United Nations on July 19, 1985.⁴ It states their opinion on Security Concepts as detailed, with their definition and purpose, summarized as follows:

1. Balance of Forces:

It is the general character of an international system, in which the States, lacking a superior authority to regulate their relations, pursue security through the creation of force arrangements that would reduce the risk of being attacked.

2. Deterrence:

Its goal is to convince a possible foe not to initiate a war, through the menace of using force to prevent the attainment of his objectives by military means, or to punish him if he tries to resort to them. It is an attempt to persuade that the risks and costs of aggression acts will exceed any gain that could be obtained as a result of those acts.

⁴ "The Security Concepts". Report, Department of Disarmament Subjects, U.N. 00361, Feb. 1986 - 875, LSBN 92 - 1342401-2.

3. Equality on Security Matters:

It is a principle for a bilateral negotiation on the subject of weapons, in which there could be agreement among the parties. It does not guarantee sufficiently the security of small and medium states.

4. Collective Security:

It is based on a global compromise for peace and international security, assumed as a judicial obligation by all nations. It assumes the acknowledgement that security is indivisible, protects national interests and sovereignty in a collective way and leads to strengthening of international security.

5. Neutrality:

It is one of the main means to foster National Security, aside from military alliances. It is applicable only during war time, as it is a judicial condition of a State in its relation with belligerents during armed encounters.

6. Non-Alignment:

It is not simply a policy of Governments, but also a movement of non-aligned countries, born with new independent nations as a group to protect themselves from consequences of the Cold War. It expresses not only the will to stay aside, but also is a means to attain goals related to security, in an international system dominated by competitors' political and military alliances.

7. Pacific Coexistence:

It is destined to mitigate the conflicting interests among States, that does not refer simply to passive coexistence but also an active cooperation and understanding among all States, on the basis of equality and common benefit.

8. Common Security:

It is a concept based in the supposition that, in a time of interdependence, no nation can attain security by itself. The goal of common security is to begin positive proceedings that, in the long run, will lead to peace and disarmament. It is based in two preferences: For International rather than national means to obtain security, and for pacific rather than other means based on the use or threat of force.

B. Analysis

The enumeration of Security Concepts by a group of experts of different nationalities, of international prestige, raises the possibility of using a common language in an accepted interpretation of the meaning of each term, as a way to contribute to mutual understanding and confidence at international meetings and agreements on problem that affect security. Some of these concepts might be more important and useful than others in different situations, while others should have permanent use. With this criterion we could establish that the Concepts of "Deterrence" and "Collective Security" would be of permanent validity, while those of "Balance of Forces" and "Equality on Security Matters" should be used in situations of bilateral negotiation. The concepts of "Neutrality" and "Non-Alignment" would represent positions to be used in the event of war or bipolar encounters, while those of "Pacific Coexistence" and "Common Security" represent positions on a global basis, more as hopes than realities, as desirable alternatives facing the risk of a nuclear holocaust, and so they have use in the multilateral field rather than in the national level. After a comparison of the Security Concepts with the rules on force from the United Nations Charter and the recent experiences of international and regional crises, we can arrive at some conclusions, as a consequence of the world evolution and instability brought by the changes.

The preliminary conclusions would be:

1. Security is a condition such that the States consider there is no danger of

a military attack, political pressure nor economic coercion, and so they can freely proceed in their way to development and progress.

2. International Security is the result and sum of the security of all and each one of the States in the international community. However, security is more a relative than an absolute concept, and National and International Security should be considered as matters of degree.
3. The Security Concepts are the bases for trust for individuals, States and International community. Security policies are the means to promote security.
4. The different Security Concepts have as a common goal the protection of National Security. They include different elements, like military capacity, economic power, social development, technological and scientific advance, and also economic cooperation through the use of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, including international organizations. In the Security Concepts, priority can be given to any of these elements or a combination of them. Traditionally there has been an emphasis on unilateral measures to diminish national vulnerabilities through military defense.
5. All Nations have the right to maintain military forces for their National Defense, and to decide on important subjects related to their own security. The security of a state demands a balance of military and non-military elements, and also of national and international interests.
6. All States have a legitimate right to security that includes not only to be free from war and from threat of war, but also from every form of intervention, open or covert. National security definitions that demand subordination or subjugation of other States or people lack legitimacy.
7. The United Nations Charter acknowledges and reaffirms the right to use military force in legitimate defense, and military preparation remains as ever a basic characteristic of any national policy. However, the use of force to obtain security at the expense of other States is not acceptable.
8. Security Policies cannot refer to peace, merely defined as the absence of war, but must also go into the broader and complex matters of the relationship of military and non-military elements, being indispensable to

consider the basic political, social and economic problems. It is essential to look into security in a broad view, due to the growing interdependence of political, military, economic, social, geographic and technological elements. Security has importance at the international and national fields, and should be guaranteed at both levels.

IV. A REGIONAL CASE: HEMISPHERIC SECURITY

A. Antecedents

The Security, or initially the defense of the hemisphere, was born with the independence of the American republics; the spirit of solidarity of the revolution against Spain made possible a common action that converged in Perú, with a southern drive from Argentina and Chile, and a northern one coming from Colombia. It inspired the Panamá Congress of 1826, and the Treaty of Union, League and Confederation signed at that opportunity, with the absence of the United States of America, due to the isolationist concept of the Congress of that country in the application and interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. Another antecedent is found in the Treaty of Lima in 1864, after the occupation of the Chinchas Islands by the Spanish fleet, moving the concourse of Chile, Perú, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela into a compromise of not alienating part of their territories nor accepting any protectorate.

1. Interamerican Mutual Assistance Treaty (TIAR) of 1947⁵

The end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War led to the Interamerican Mutual Assistance Treaty (TIAR) in 1947 at Rio de Janeiro, as part of the alliances policy of the U.S.A. to counter Soviet expansion,

⁵ Interamerican Mutual Assistance Treaty. *Tratados Internacionales* (Recopilación TCL. (E.M.) Fernando Hormazabal Díaz, 1977).

through so-called "hemispheric defense". It was put into effect on December 3, 1948 with the ratification of the 14th country, later reformed on July 26, 1976 at Costa Rica, but not in effect because it has not been ratified by the necessary number of States.

2. The Charter of the American States Organization: "Charter of Bogota" - 1948⁶

At the Ninth American International Conference, held in Bogota, the Charter of the American States Organization was signed, on April 30, 1948, and went into effect on June 5, 1953, with the 17th State ratification. The following articles referring to Security have been selected:

Chapter I. "Nature and Purposes"; Article 1 states that the American States have developed this international organization "to have an order of peace and justice, foster solidarity, strengthen collaboration and defend its sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence."

Article 2 establishes the following essential purposes:

- a. To guarantee the peace and security of the continent.
- b. To prevent the possible causes of difficulties and insure the pacific solution of controversies that would emerge among the States Members.
- c. To organize their solidarity action in case of aggression.

B. Analysis

After considering the applicable dispositions on Hemispheric Security, based in the Charter of the American States Organization and the Interamerican Mutual Assistance Treaty (TIAR), there is historical evidence of the different concepts of the new States born out of independence of Spain and of the United States of America. They had divergent views, reflected in the Monroe Doctrine and Bolivarism, leading finally to the failure of Latin-

⁶ "The Chart of the American State Organization" *Tratados Internacionales* (Recop.) TCL. (E.M.) Fernando Hormazabal D., 1972.

Americanism and also of the transformation of the Monroe Doctrine into a continental alliance.

Hemispheric defence, as it was conceived with solidarity at the beginning of independent life of the Latin-American States, would not work or appear again till 1939, with World War II.

During this period, the U.S.A. developed a policy of protection, police and intervention, adequate to their interest, expressed in different ways through the years, with names, such as: "Monroe Doctrine" and Roosevelt's Corollary in 1904; "Manifest Destiny"; "Policy of "Big Stick"; "Dollar Diplomacy"; "Policy of "Good Neighbor"; "Panamericanism"; "Interamerican Mutual Assistance Treaty (TIAR)"; "Organization of American States",. There were also projects that failed, such as "Alliance for Progress" and "Nixon Doctrine".

We arrive at the present situation, with the TIAR as a failure in its implementation, and with a Reform of 1976 that still has not been ratified by enough States to go into effect. The American States Organization has been non-functional in all problems that have affected Hemispheric Security, as it has been recently at Nicaragua, Grenada, Panamá, Malvinas and Haiti.

It can be concluded that there is a common perception of the limitations of the Inter-American System, and loss of confidence in the role of the United States; also a general perception of the security problems that affect Latin American as a whole, and each individual nation.

Jack Child, in his book,⁷ shows the existence of six different types of conflict in America: Territorial; Ideological; Boundaries; For influence; Resources; Based on migration. He adds in Annex 6 of his book that there are 20 situations of potential conflict in Latin America.

The TIAR meets the concept established in the American States Organization Charter, Article 28, that The measures and proceedings

⁷ Jack Child, "Geopolitics and Conflict in South America. Quarrels among Neighbors" (Praeger Special Studies. Praeger Scientific, New York, USA, 1985)

established in special treaties in force on the subject" will be used when referring to situations of armed attack or other types of aggression. There have been 19 convocations based on Article 13 of TIAR, due to conflict situations - still without any solution - and it is probable that they will be renewed in the future.

In 1982 Argentina requested the application of the TIAR, and the XX Consulting Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, on April 26, 1982 issued a Resolution pressing the United Kingdom to an immediate end of hostilities, as well as any other act that could affect the peace and the inter-American security; the same was requested of Argentina to avoid damaging the situation, and acknowledged Argentina's right to the Malvinas Islands.

The discrepancies between the United States and Latin American on the subject of Hemispheric Security evolved from a peak, in the period from the end of World War II to 1964, to a decline in 1975 with the application of sanctions on Cuba; since then - with the crisis of the Malvinas as a grievance - there has been very little coincidence of strategic interest and of security between Latin America and the U.S.A. The U.S.A. gave Latin America a low strategic priority, mistakenly considering her as "unconditional" in the face of other more urgent menaces, and Continental Security was "of and for the U.S.A.", due to a high degree of dependence of the Latin American nations, without free political action level. The Inter-American Security System proved that the central principles adopted were only myths: first the idea of "Occidental hemisphere", and second, the supposed "equality" of the States members of the System.

From the previous analysis we can arrive to the following *preliminary conclusions*:

1. The Interamerican Security System is today at its worst moment, if we consider an evident mistrust since 1982 between the main actor and these that are secondary.
2. The specific interest of Latin-American security has been traditionally postponed or ignored by the U.S.A.

3. The defense of the U.S.A. interest in the frame of the TIAR, has been made at Latin-American and Caribbean territories, with an overwhelming armed confrontation with other member States of the system (Grenada and Panamá).
4. The OEA is the main institution of the Inter-American System, and as such, has played a role, with the solution of some conflicts among the member States.
5. It is utopian to think that in the future the U.S.A. would not intervene in Latin-American affairs, or would not take part in the alliance.
6. The situation of Superpower that the USA now has, after the end of bipolarity, tends to give an accent to the protagonist role of the USA in the Inter-American Security System.
7. The evolving situation at the world level, with the USA as the only Superpower, tends to accent the low strategic priority assigned to Latin America and to place a higher priority on the attainment of their interests through growing intervention.
8. The TIAR is in crisis as it does not guarantee the principles of self determination, non intervention and economic security of the Latin-American States.
9. The failure of the Inter-American Security System portends a higher probability of conflict in the region, with each State responsible for its own security, and facing risks that could be found in their regional differences.

V. THE OTHER NEEDS OF SECURITY

Depending on geographic characteristics and internal situations, each country should consider the insecurity elements that may appear in two additional areas to the External Security: Internal Security and Security against Catastrophes.

A. Internal Security

An internal conflict can endanger the State itself, if it comes to violent expressions that alter the peace in an extreme situation.⁸ In a world of social inequality that is increasingly integrated through communications, countries are aware of their bad situation and the poorest are stimulated to understandable hopes of improving their disastrous situation. Unfortunately the solution to the endemic problems of underdevelopment find serious obstacles, difficult to overcome; that is the reason why the so-called Third World countries are in a situation highlighted by political, economic and social instability. The developed countries - that in some cases have contributed to palliate certain afflictive situations in the poor countries - do not solve deep problems and they maintain high dependency levels.

Beside these external elements there are many others reasons for internal disorder, like excesses due to antagonism among highly ideologized political groups in their struggle for power, creating demagogic expectancies of impossible gains in the most deprived population groups. We can add the pressure of organized groups with political significance, for social and economic conquests, out of proportion with the available resources and unjust to the majority of the citizens. Finally we must consider the weight, in the internal situation, of material and ideological support from foreign countries to the action of extremist elements, whose fighting methods include subversion and terrorism, with the "revolution export" from Cuba, affecting many countries in Central and South America.

All this contributes to political, economical and social instability, a great internal menace to social peace and potentially to institutions, if there is violence that may surpass the capacity of the public forces. When subversive-terrorist actions - favored by a situation as described - drift to demonstrations of guerrilla or armed fight, there are circumstances that alter seriously the

⁸ "La Seguridad Nacional", Academia Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos, Santiago de Chile, 1991.

development of a country: the economic-productive body, a tired attitude of the population, with indifference and lack of hope, and also a picture of anarchy and misgovernment. In such conditions, society is on the threshold of a civil war.

Every State develops laws to endorse a National Security System, in order to prevent problems that could affect Internal Security, and if they occur to take measures to guarantee public order and peace, needed for activities. According to the particular situation, each country might encounter one or more of the following menaces to Internal Security: *Regional separatism, racial, ethnic or religious conflicts, subversion, terrorism*. The perception of those menaces that affect national unity, institutions and internal public security, makes it possible to take corrective measures toward the General Common Good of the population of each country.

B. Security against Catastrophes

Natural catastrophes are violent expressions of Nature, with effects, sometimes disastrous, to the lives and properties of the affected societies.⁹ Phenomena like earthquakes, droughts, floods, hurricanes, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, etc., are a periodic reality in all the regions of the world. The natural phenomena to which a country is exposed will depend on its geographical characteristics. Many disasters can be foreseen, with enough time to adopt measures that would allow the population to meet them on better terms, as is the case with hurricanes and other similar climatic emergencies. Others, like earthquakes, are not yet possible to foresee with precision. As they have a high degree of probability, and even if the moment of occurrence cannot be determined, States can adopt measures to minimize their effects and help solve part of the problems they provoke, in order to return to normality in the shortest time. There is a need to perceive those

⁹ "La Seguridad Nacional", Academia Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos, Santiago de Chile, 1991.

menaces of death, suffering, paralysis and destruction of the economic-productive body; so the State develop laws to endorse a National Security System, in order to conduct studies, develop alarm systems, organizations and efficient procedures to face the emergencies.

Also, another type of catastrophes, of human origin, related to the destruction of the natural environment, altering the ecological balance and producing contamination levels harmful to human and animal existence, in water, ground and air can be considered. As a result, it is not enough to have national laws and organizations, and there is a growing awareness of the need to adopt measures of universal validity, which may interfere with development and also involving costs that nobody wants to assume, as it was shown in the recent Earth Summit at Rio de Janeiro.

C. Analysis

The insecurity elements stated, in the Internal and Catastrophe fields, are pre-eminent worries in many countries, as they are more realistic and urgent menaces than those of the External Security field. All of them require the use of a methodology of National Security Planning, in the triple areas of External, Internal and Catastrophes. Beginning with the study of the National Objective the real menaces that affect a country are deduced; the current situation of the different elements of National Power is appraised, and is included in the determination of the most advisable measures to prevent those risks from growing into menaces first, and into actions later. Actions to oppose them also are determined, just in case the preventive actions had not been successful. If there is a clear concept of National Planning, as a rational means to obtain accomplish goals and objectives, of such complexity that rational leadership is mandatory, it is feasible that all available capacities could be used, with organization, resources, priorities and execution in time and space.

In order to have a modern State, able to perform the political functions of National Development and Security in an integrated and coherent way,

national Planning is required, with changes from one country to another according to their particular situations, political organization, traditions, levels of development and objectives.

As a conclusion to this problematic, with all the variables that may exist among the different countries, a modern State must consider as a minimum the following:

- A National Policy to determine the National Objective.
- A National Strategy to employ the National Power and attain the National Objective.
- A National Doctrine to orient the National Policy through a National Strategy, using the National Power to obtain or maintain the National Objective.

Thence the importance of the concept of National Planning, basically designed for the following purposes:

1. To set the political leadership of the State at the proper level, in order to enable it to guarantee the attainment of welfare and security of the national community, in spite of adverse elements that form the current problematic of the world.
2. To facilitate the execution of National Development and Security Policies, in a convergent and integrated way.
3. To execute the harmonious integration and coordination of actions that should be accomplished in each one of the fields of National Power, in order to insure the attainment and maintenance of the National Objectives.

The existence of planning, with certain basic suppositions, implies that plans should be periodically updated; also, before ordering execution they should be compared with the current situation, probably different from the moment the planning was done, in order to adjust the means and actions, maintaining the objectives. This requires flexibility to modify the "How", "When" and "Where", without changing the "What for", among the so-called "co-ordinates of action".

VI. CONCLUSIONS

The great changes in the world's situation require a modification of the international frame, not yet consolidated, that undoubtedly would produce serious reforms to the international system in the years to come, with a trend that contrasts the "new world order" proposed by the USA, as the sole superpower after the end of bipolarity, of a "Pax Americana" with a reality of latent confrontations out of a multipolarity. Consequently, the so-called "new dimensions" of Security - valid at world level - don't have great significance to the majority of the countries, who perceive that for them there are no changes in their security needs, because the international system - based on the United Nations Charter, and for Latin America on the Chart of the O.E.A. - maintain their effects, with relative efficiency in the task of peace and international security.

The problematic of Latin American countries is different in relation to their security needs, because there is a political, social and economic crisis in the zone, with geopolitical and geostrategic variations, that make this area as a whole "unstable" as compared to others, adding to the problems among neighbors for territorial reasons. The definition of security needs in Latin America has not changed substantively, maintaining the triple field; to face conflicts with neighbors in External Security; political instability, inadequate growth, social unrest, narcotraffic, subversion and terrorism in internal Security; in some countries public calamities of natural origin, such as earthquakes, floods, droughts, etc. and those of environmental destruction, loss of ecological balance, contamination, etc., due to human action, in the filed of Security against Catastrophes.

Each national State has its own definition of security needs, according to its particular problematic, and requires a methodology of study, definitions and actions, that corresponds to a concept of National Planning, in order to execute the political functions of National Development and Security in a coherent and coordinated way, in pursuit of the National Objective, employing the elements of National Power and with proper respect to the

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international community. The trends toward integration and internationalism are difficult to execute, without losing the sense of nationality and of individual interests. They can produce more problems, with evident risks to peace and security than if they did not exist. This should not prevent initiatives of international coordination on selective subjects, that are of common interest, from working. The lack of equity in international economic relations produces a new horizon for security problems, with a realignment defined as North against South - developed and underdeveloped countries - whose social and economic urgencies can not wait, and so they produce political instability and a trend to demagogic adventures, attractive to people who feel that they have been marginalized in the race for progress and welfare.

That and no other is the cause of greater insecurity !

David R. Segal

Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Societies

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Colloquium on The Role of the Military in Democratic Societies sponsored by the Government of Canada and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Le Château Montebello, Quebec, February 2-5, 1992. This presentation was prepared during the author's tenure as S.L.A. Marshall Chair at the Army Research Institute. The views in this paper are the author's, and not necessarily those of the Army Research Institute, the U.S. Army, or the U.S. Department of Defense.

Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Societies

Western theories of civil-military relations are products of the Cold War period. Major theories applicable to Western democracies were developed in the 1950s by Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz. Major theories applicable to communist and socialist societies were developed the following decade by the same theorists and adapted to help understand other authoritarian but non-communist regimes.

This recency is not because nobody had thought of the nature of civil-military relations before. When the framers of the U.S. Constitution, for example, specified that the Congress would raise an Army, and maintain a Navy, and specified that the President would be Commander in Chief of the armed forces, they presumably had some notion of what sort of relationship between the military and the state was desirable.

Nonetheless, our current theories, like modern social science itself, are products of the last half century. The 1950s and 1960s were decades of theoretical development. The 1970s and 1980s were decades of theoretical refinement, influenced strongly by the end of the Vietnam War and the end of military conscription in the United States, and the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. The 1990s will be characterized by theoretical reformulation, driven by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and the withdrawal of most forward-deployed troops by the industrial nations of the world.¹

Military organizations built or expanded during the Cold War will decrease in size, and seek or be assigned other missions. The United States armed forces may return to the model of wartime mobilization and peacetime demobilization that they followed before World War II, or alternative

¹ David R. Segal, "From Convergence to Chaos: Theoretical Perspectives on the Transformation of Industrial Societies." *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change*, vol 14 (1992), pp.1-11.

manifestations of the decline of the mass armed force may prevail.² The Cold War period was a deviation from this model. Priorities will change. And civil-military relations will be altered in both the West and the East. At the same time, attention will be increasingly focussed on civil-military relations in areas of the world other than Western Europe, including less developed regions that have been characterized at times by authoritarian, and frequently military, regimes, and on the nations of post-Warsaw Pact Eastern Europe, where we may see the emergence of authoritarian rather than democratic regimes in some nations, even in the absence of communism.

The quality of our social and political theorizing during this period will ultimately be judged by how well the theories that evolve help us understand and explain civil-military relations across the range of nations in the world system -- something none of our existing theories can yet do -- and provide guidance to public officials and senior military commanders on how to help engineer the institutional structures between the military and the polity that we seek.

The central issue in theories of civil-military relations is that of civilian control of the military. I want to focus on three aspects of this issue.

- First, I want to address how Western theorists have conceptualized civilian control of the military in the West.
- Second, I want to discuss how Western theorists have conceptualized civilian control of the military in Eastern and Central European states during the Cold War period, and how they have seen this as different from the Western case. I will not presume to speak about theories of civil-military relations in socialist states that evolved in Central and Eastern Europe during the Cold War period. I also want to address the applicability of these models to authoritarian regimes that are not communist.

² See for example David R. Segal, *Organizational Designs for the Future Army*. Alexandria: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1993.

- Third, I want to anticipate the models that will evolve during the 1990s. Here, I assume that the post-Cold War period will be characterized by a more limited range of models that was the case previously. However, we will not settle on a single model: there is no one model appropriate for all nations. And to the extent that there is any convergence among models of civil-military relations, we are approaching it from very different starting points, reflecting different national histories.

With regard to the Western case, theories of civil military relations that evolved at the end of the 1950s assumed that the major task of armed forces was to defend society from external enemies, and to project force in support of foreign policy externally. The military was presumed not to be a major actor in the domestic polity, although most Western militaries did have domestic missions, and was assumed to be responsive to civilian control on a non-partisan basis. However, there was disagreement between two major theoretical approaches on how civilian control was to be executed. The political approach, rooted in the work of Samuel Huntington,³ assumed that a formal body of laws and regulations, and a formal chain of command, would make the military responsible to its host society, given that a civilian head of state served as Commander in Chief, a civilian legislature approved it budget, and that the head of state and the legislators, as elected officials, represented the will and the interest of the people more broadly, with checks and balances existing between government departments. A more sociological approach, rooted in the work of Morris Janowitz,⁴ by contrast, asserted that civilian control of armed forces is best realized when the military is integrated with and woven into the broader social fabric.

This difference is consequential. Huntington argued for insulating the military from civilian influences outside of the normal chain of command

³ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957.

⁴ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*. Glencoe: Free Press, 1960.

that might undermine discipline and effectiveness. He espoused and inward-looking military force to guarantee the operation of the formal chain of command and the formal regulations, and checks and balances that presumably maintain civilian control. Janowitz, by contrast, argued for a permeable boundary at the civilian-military interface, so that, for example, officers might be commissioned through civilian colleges rather than military academies, military personnel might live in civilian communities adjacent to military posts rather than in garrisons, and the families of military personnel might attend civilian schools, churches, and clinics. Civilian control of the military would be realized on the basis of social networks. Citizen-soldiers, either conscripts or reservists, would link the military to its host society through their civilian roots. Huntington preferred professional military forces. Janowitz preferred citizen soldiers. Pragmatically, the operation of civil-military relations in the West reflects aspects of both models.

The Western theories of civil-military relations in Central and East European systems that emerged in the 1960s and later were also rooted in the work of Huntington and Janowitz.⁵ However, they differed from conceptions of civil-military relations in Western democratic societies in four important respects. It is worth identifying these differences, because they are areas in which we would expect to see change as the Central and Eastern republics move toward democracy. It is also worth noting that these models were thought to apply to authoritarian regimes generally, regardless of their ideological coloration. Thus, even in the absence of communist ideology, elements of them may remain relevant should Eastern European nations move in an authoritarian rather than democratic direction.

First, where the primary missions of armed forces in Western democra-

⁵ See for example Jonathan R. Adelman, "Toward a Typology of Communist Civil-Military Relations," pp. 1-15 in Jonathan R. Adelman (ed.), *Communist Armies in Politics*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1982; and Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volges (eds.), *Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1978.

cies are external, armed forces in Central and Eastern European societies were regarded as fulfilling internal social control functions: the defense of the regime against internal enemies. One might regard as a litmus test of democracy the ability of a political system to survive without a supportive military establishment. Authoritarian regimes generally cannot pass this test. This is not to deny that some Central and Eastern European armies were formally regarded as early echelon forces in the Soviet order of battle, but rather to assert that the internal social control roles were primary. This function has also been primary in some Latin Europe and Latin American nations under authoritarian regimes.

Second, where the military in democratic states has been regarded as apolitical, the military in the Eastern European nations was a major institutional actor in the state. Indeed we could argue that three central institutions in these societies were inextricably intertwined: the economy, the polity, and the military. One might hypothesize that the economic crises in both superpowers that were fueled, if not caused, by the Cold War, caused collapse in the Soviet Union and not in the United States only because the level of institutional interpenetration in the Soviet Union made it impossible to insulate political and military institutions from the consequence of economic collapse.⁶ In the United States, by contrast, economic collapse in a presidential election year may be consequential for the polity, but this is not certain. And the military is relatively insulated, although it is subject to budgetary pressures. In the Latin countries, the military was highly intertwined with the state, but economic problems could less clearly be attributed to arms race expenditures.

Third, where models of civil-military relations in the West assume not only an apolitical military, but a nonpartisan military, the military in Central and East European states is presumed to have been penetrated by civilian

⁶ Gregory McLaughlin, "The End of the Cold War as a Social Process," pp. 49-74 in Louis Kriesberg and David R. Segal (eds.), *The Transformation of European Communist Societies*. Greenwich: JAI Press, 1992.

political organization, resulting in a fusion of army and party leadership. This fusion has been reflected in phenomena such as the establishment of political administrations within the military,⁷ and the presence of military officers on governing bodies in the state. In the currently ongoing transformation, the role of political officer has been abolished. The relationship between the role of soldier and that of political office holder is probably one that has yet to be resolved. The military in non-communist authoritarian regimes had probably been no less partisan, but may have been significantly less monolithically ideological.

Fourth, where theories of Western civil-military relations see the military as an agent of sovereign states, theories of relations in Central and Eastern European nations acknowledge that in these nations, the armed forces were, to varying degrees, instruments of an external state, its governing party, and its military structure. One of the fundamental changes of the current period is the reestablishment of sovereignty. This has not been problematic in other authoritarian states.

Before I leave my discussion of the Central and Eastern republics, two points need be emphasized. First, we recognize important variants in the evolution of armed forces and civil-military relations among these republics. In particular, in the USSR and Yugoslavia, communist armed forces were organized indigenously, and subjected to the control of indigenous communist parties. In the six non-Soviet Warsaw Treaty states, on the other hand, external forces to varying degrees helped organize and supervise the armed forces.

Second, Western theories of civil-military relations in Central and East European states are not in agreement on how much autonomy the armed forces in these states wielded in their relationships with the party. For example, Kolkowicz saw the army having a different value system from the

⁷ Michael J. Dean, "The Main Political Administration as a Factor in Communist Party Control over the Military in the Soviet Union." *Armed Forces & Society*, vol. 3 (1977), pp.295-324.

party, and functioning outside it as an interest group.⁸ By contrast, Odom saw this relationship as more consensual, with the army and the party having similar value systems.⁹ And Colton argued that in the Soviet Union in particular, the military was a participant in the state through mutual interpenetration between the party and the armed forces.¹⁰ These three interpretations probably hold for other authoritarian regimes as well.

This variation notwithstanding, the relationship between the military, the party, and the state in communist societies is an element of the baggage of history with which the Central and Eastern republics will have to deal as they move toward democracy. These voyages will reflect the individual histories and institutional arrangements of these societies. And to the extent that authoritarian regimes prevail in these nations, we may see the Latin Americanization rather than the North Americanization of these societies, even in an era in which authoritarian military regimes in Latin America have become increasingly rare.

Let me now turn to my third general point -- the evolution of civil-military relations in the 1990s. What I want to do is highlight some general principles, point to some lessons learned in the West over time, and suggest problems that will have to be addressed in all of our nations in the post-Cold War world.¹¹

The first principle is that democracy is not a dichotomous variable, and it

⁸ Roman Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967.

⁹ William Odom, "A Dissenting View on the Group Approach to Soviet Politics." *World Politics*, vol. 28 (July 1976), pp.542-568.

¹⁰ Timothy J. Colton, *Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979.

¹¹ See David R. Segal, "National Security and Democracy in the United States of America." *Armed Forces & Society*. Vol. 20, no. 3 (Spring 1994) pp. 315-393.

is not an existential state. It is an ideal toward which human societies work: a process.

Second, I believe that over time and across nations, higher levels of democracy have in fact been achieved by larger numbers of society. As part of the natural history of human organization, I believe that there is an ongoing democratic evolution, and perhaps a democratic revolution, far broader in its scope than the industrial revolution. This revolution is being played out not only in the political sector, but in the economy as well, through movement toward industrial democracy. Thus, we see movement toward greater equality and worker participation in the work place. This element of the revolution is consequential in discussions of civil-military relations to the degree that we regard military service as a form of employment.

Third, I believe that the realization of democracy may be more difficult when we focus on the relationship between the military and the state than is true with regard to other institutional areas. One of the cultural contradictions of the modern democratic state is that its defense almost invariably requires either that the ideals that it embodies be compromised, or that its means of defense be constrained by those ideals, rendering the defense less effective. A democracy must either prepare for and fight its wars with one hand tied behind its back, or it must become a bit less democratic in the interest of effectively defending itself. Work place democracy will evolve more slowly in the armed forces than in other work places.

By way of example, let me discuss several areas that have been problematic in civil-military relations in democratic states in the past, and will continue to be problematic in the future.

First, the issue of military conscription. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, many analysts in America argued in favor of maintaining conscription, rather than changing to an all-volunteer military force, out of a concern that replacing the conscript – the prototype of the citizen-soldier – with a volunteer would produce either a praetorian army or a mercenary army, and that this would fundamentally alter the nature of civilian control of the military. I believe the experiences of the U.S.A., Canada, and Great Britain with

volunteer forces has demonstrated that one can have a volunteer military that is neither praetorian nor mercenary, and the continuation of military conscription is being broadly questioned in Western democracies. The transition does alter the nature of civil-military relations, and these alterations need be attended to. They accelerate industrial democracy in the armed forces, and if the citizen-soldier disappears along with conscription as armies become increasingly professionalized, the risk of praetorianism may increase as well.

Second, one of the changes that has taken place in the militaries of the three nations I just mentioned – and it reflects what is likely to happen elsewhere – is an increase in gender integration in the military. Military service has traditionally been a masculine domain, but as part of the ongoing democratic revolution, which calls for extending citizenship rights and obligations to previously excluded groups, women in these countries have demanded, and been granted, increased opportunities in the military. Interestingly, the tension between national security and democracy that I mentioned earlier has been reflected in the debates on the participation of women in the military. Advocates have argued that it is the right of women, as citizens, to serve. Opponents have argued that the presence of women in the military undermines military effectiveness and therefore threatens national security.

Third, there is a tension between democracy and the rule of law, particularly in wartime. It is not unusual for legal principles to be at variance with perceptions of national security needs, and several American presidents, in times of war, have exceeded their legal authority, and apologized later – or sometimes not apologized. And sometimes such decisions are made at lower levels. When the United States invaded the island of Grenada, there were women in the crews of Air Force planes that landed at Point Salinas airport under fire, although federal law at that time precluded women from flying combat missions. The war plans had assumed that the airport would be secure, but the war plans were wrong, and in executing the military mission the law was violated. And although the combat exclusion laws and regulations were still in place when the United States invaded Panama, American

David R. Segal

Army women were in combat in that operation, not in violation of the letter of the law, which does not deal with Army women, but potentially in violation of the spirit of the law. The rule of law can get lost in the fog of war.

Finally, one of the most contentious areas of civil-military relations in a democracy is the role of the mass media. Democratic debate and discussion of policies and philosophies assumes a free press for the dissemination of information. However, in wartime, one country's news is another country's intelligence. Since the Vietnam War, the U.S.A. has been wrestling with the issue of fulfilling the public's right to know while maintaining the rights of the soldiers on the battlefield not to be compromised and put at unnecessary risk by the news media of their own country. This in fact is another example of tension between the rule of law -- in this case a constitutional principle -- and national security needs.

Carina Perelli

Challenges to the Military Institutions of Latin America

C O N T E N T S

Armed Forces at the Threshold of the 21st Century

The Big Changes in the Regional Context.

The Latin American Armed Forces: Finding a New Role in the New Context

**The International Context:
Armed Forces at the Threshold of the 21st Century**

In Latin America the decade of the Eighties was notable for transitions toward democracy. For their part, the armed forces entered a series of negotiations which resulted in power being handed back to the electorate's representatives. However, the main objective of this process was to relocate the military in a changing scenario with new game rules.

The advent of the Nineties sees the armed forces in each nation endeavoring to adjust to an institutional system whose rationale and legitimation is based on criteria different from those that prevailed before. A task difficult enough in itself has been made even more complex by the profound changes that have taken place in the international and regional context. These changes are regulating the emergence of new global game rules and redefining the mission of the military in peripheral countries.

The change in reference parameters shapes the specific make-up of the military and brings about changes in its ethos. The first question that has to be asked in this article is what it means today to be a member of the military in Latin America. In other words, we shall attempt to explain what meaning these professionals attribute to what they do and how they perceive themselves doing it.

The disappearance of a world conceived in bipolar terms; the defeat of "real socialism" as a genuine alternative; the emergence, in economic and communications terms, of a "global village" superimposed upon an increasingly fragmented whole; the advent of a "Fortress Europe" bent on internal unification but increasingly entrenched behind borders that are beleaguered by new migrations of "barbarians"; the emergence of the US as the victorious hegemonic power intent on imposing a pax americana upon the world, while at the same time struggling with internal difficulties that are beginning to be viewed as real security problems; all these factors have shattered the automatic alliances of a

world in which conflicts were defined in terms of the confrontation between the West and East Blocs.

New, more makeshift groupings, that define a new sense of "us" -as opposed to "them"- are gradually beginning to emerge amid a climate of growing hostility and mistrust.

The specter that looms ahead is one of a powerful, arrogant North in conflict with a South that it no longer needs. This South is crumbling under the weight of economic, social and political problems that the burdens imposed upon it by the First World merely exacerbate.

The cataclysm that overtook the East Bloc signified much more than an ideological victory for the West. For the first time in the Twentieth Century - since 1917 but particularly since the end of World War II - the entity known as the West has no clear, common enemy. With the disappearance of the concept of the West (or, to use a less radical expression, with the advent of an idea of the West that is diminished by its very triumph), the countries of Latin America¹ have lost a space that had served as the point of reference for their relations with the First World. The vanishing of the shared referent also signifies the end of a sense of identity that encompassed the armed forces of all the countries involved in the struggle against the common enemy. This idea of a Western "WE" was particularly important to the region's armed forces since it placed them in the same camp as the countries and military institutions from whom they took their lead.

Another consequence of the collapse of the East Bloc has been the defeat of "real socialism" as a credible alternative and the falling into disrepute -for the next several years at least- of marxist and socialist

¹ This region had been defined by the important European political scientist and ambassador Alain Rouquié as "the Far West" in the same sense one talks about the "Far East". See: Alain Rouquié: Amérique Latine: Introduction à l'Extrême Occident. (Paris: Du Seuil, 1987).

thinking. This, in turn, makes itself felt in a profound existential crisis among left-wing parties and sectors throughout the world.²

In terms of this region in particular, one manifestation of this crisis has been the renouncement by the left of highly rational projects and programs with universal applications. The voice of the left has become particularized and provincialized; the echoes of internationalism are being drowned out by highly nationalistic rhetoric or vague talk of man and social justice. The traditional enemy of Latin American armed forces appears to be beating an ideological retreat, although paradoxically left-wing groups in some countries in the region have made significant electoral gains.

Just as the disintegration of the Soviet camp precipitated a crisis of left-wing doctrines and identity around the world (and particularly in Latin America where this ideology was heavily influenced by the ideas of "real socialism"), the fragmentation of some East Bloc countries and the dismemberment of a large part of the Soviet "internal empire" has brought two explosive issues to the fore: firstly, nationalism and the definition of the nation--state as a problem; and secondly, racism and xenophobia.

The reemergence of nationalism as particularism underscores the weakness of the State structure. This structure is currently under attack from both neoliberal economic doctrines that want to reduce the State to the role of mere tax gatherer and the forces of anarchic conservatism à la Nozick³ that seek to contract it to what they call the "minimal State."

² This existential crisis deepened with the defeat of social democracy in the 1991 Swedish elections. The Swedish model was perceived in Latin America as a form of "civilized", democratic socialism, a valid alternative to the "real socialism" of the East Bloc and Cuba.

³ See Robert Nozick: Anarquía, Estado y Utopía, (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1988).

It is the triumph of community, tradition, language, religion and the peace, over the universal criteria of citizenship. Paradoxically, this particularistic splintering occurs at the very moment when supranational models such as the European Economic Community are becoming a reality -albeit still problematic- and regional integration processes such as NAFTA and MERCOSUR⁴ are getting underway. On the other hand, as a result of technological breakthroughs, the world is beginning to be conceived in media terms as a "global village": events are witnessed almost while they are still happening.

There is still another important side-effect to the violent disintegration the Soviet internal and external empires: migration. Already on the rise in recent decades, this phenomenon is now gaining momentum. Massive movements of population are taking place, as both economic refugees and people fleeing the conflicts ignited by the violent dissolution of States try to reach the haven of the affluent countries. This new outpouring of emigrants -basically toward the European Economic Community nations and the US- will exacerbate the already difficult situation in the countries in question. European nations feel that they have reached saturation point as far as multi-culturalism is concerned, while the US is coming to grips with recession and unemployment and struggling to reconcile the tensions between its minorities.

Any further contraction of Fortress Europe and the US vis-a-vis immigration is bound to affect the Latin Americans who emigrate to the advanced world. A hardening of the frontiers of the First World could increase the pressures on already weakened state structures, weigh heavily on economies struggling toward recovery and generate unsolvable social tensions within peripheral societies which would thus be deprived of an important escape valve.

⁴ NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement. MERCOSUR: South American Common Market, in Spanish, Mercado Común del Sur.

Were the issue of immigration to be perceived as a matter of national security in the advanced world, the nations of the First World in general (and the US as the hegemonic power in particular) might attempt to foist this mission upon the armed forces of Latin America, as they have already done in the case of narco-traffic.

The collapse of communism has also led to the enthronement of the United States of America as the unquestioned military power, imposing its will either by force (hard power) or by pressure, persuasion, dissuasion or admiration (soft power). In Latin America, these include the Initiative for the Americas, at the hemispheric level, but also the proposed demilitarization of Latin America and pressure to place the fight against narco-traffic, legislation on patents, and changes in computer technology policy on the political agenda of many countries in the region.

The 1991 Gulf War and its aftermath demonstrated that this new Rome was prepared to dispatch its legions to impose the pax americana. The Gulf War showed that no Third World army is capable of challenging the technological might which the nations of the advanced world can muster when sufficient political will and consensus exists for them to do so. The 1982 Falklands War was an important antecedent. The fact that it was limited to a military conflict in a sparsely populated region meant that its significance in world terms was less clear than that of the war against Iraq in 1991.

In short, the collapse of the East Bloc signified the end of certainty. New specters have emerged to replace communism as the enemy to some extent. Some of these -such as the rebirth of nationalism in Europe- still only impact Latin America tangentially. Others, such as the growing awareness of the threat of ecological disaster, affect the region directly. In every case, however, the change of direction and the revolution in the global game rules call for a repositioning of the actors involved. In the case of Latin American armed forces, the change is

even more complex given the profound shifts that are taking place in the region.

The Big Changes in the Regional Context.

At a time when the Eastern European map is becoming more and more fragmented, Latin America seems to be bent on realizing its old dreams of integration.

This shift in US policy has already had one result: the setting up of a Free Trade Zone between the US, Canada and Mexico. Having in the past so often acted in international politics as the paladin of the Latin America cause, under this treaty Mexico's focus of interest switches to the North American continent. As they attempt to assimilate their nation's integration with a country which hitherto had been defined as its great historical enemy, the Mexican armed forces will have to come to terms with an existential crisis as serious as that facing a number of other Latin American militaries.

Chile has signed an agreement with Mexico for the progressive reduction of import tariffs -which will be reach zero between 1996 and 1998- and is intent upon creating a Free Trade Zone with Argentina by 1995. Finally, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay have signed the Treaty of Asunción to bring into existence the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) which calls for the creation of a Free Trade Zone between these countries leading, in stages, to the so-called "zero tariff" by March 1, 1995. These movements toward regional integration are taking place at a time when Latin America is experiencing some important economic recovery after four years of stagnation.

These developments have significantly altered the shape of Latin America. Paradoxically, the Leftist dream of the '60s and '70s of "tearing up the map and redrawing it"⁵ is now being realized through

⁵ Words of a protest song sung by Mercedes Sosa and often heard at left-wing demonstrations of the time.

trade, investment and productive integration. At this point, it is unclear what the precise impact of this integration process will be. There is some uncertainty among First World decision-makers as to the political bent this process of integration will adopt. It is feared that these attempts at integration could be used to create regional powers which would consolidate their supremacy in the region. There is some concern that Brazil could be elevated to a role of leadership among the countries in the region and that this process would result in the enthronement of a discourse that embodies the growing hostility between North and South. The degree of support which the advanced world -and particularly the US- lend to these initiatives will therefore depend on the way in which the Latin American elites respond to the situation.

The new context will also lead to a significant reevaluation of the role of the armed forces and perceived threats to security. The implementation of integration treaties invalidates the old hypotheses of traditional conflicts, whose protagonists were usually neighboring countries. Indeed, if these agreements are successful and permanent supranational institutions develop, a debate on what type of armed forces and defense policy are called for under the new conditions will become inevitable.

This enormous movement toward integration, however, is not the only new regional process currently underway. Accused by neoliberals of having grown fat but not strong, the old interventionist and welfare states are now under attack from a number of sides. A wave of privatization has already chipped away at many state functions and powers regarded as non-essential. And this movement comes on top of public expenditure cuts and fiscal deficit reductions, unavoidable conditions for the renegotiation of the external debt in every country concerned. Adjustment processes and the deregulation of economic activity especially impact the subordinate and dependent sectors of formerly preeminent state structures.

As far as security in particular is concerned, a debate on defense policies and law and order—even though often not explicitly articulated—takes place each time budgetary issues are discussed in these countries. There is consensus on the need for professional forces to maintain law and order and curb growing urban violence, and this despite the fact that public expenditure cuts often mean that security forces are not assigned sufficient resources. Also, the police forces which carry out this task in practice lack credibility due to their lack of professional training and widespread corruption in many countries in the region.

In addition, the very existence of the armed forces is often questioned by many political and social sectors which view them as a drain on the state coffers of poor countries which are hard-pressed to find the resources needed to meet other, more urgent, needs. Indeed, the meager resources available for national budgets and the multiplicity of demands made on the State mean that, even in countries where such radical criticisms are not leveled against the military, the authorities find themselves forced to divert resources originally earmarked for defense. Military expenditure is usually allocated—and the ensuing cuts in defense budgets made—without any discussion of an issue regarded as taboo: what are Latin America's armed forces for?

The military institutions which emerged in the wake of the transition processes were—and to some extent, still are, despite all the changes being carried out— an anomalous political actor. Their independence is never called into question, nor their capacity for generating the violence on which that independence is based. As an independent actor which regards itself historically as the founder of the nation and the ultimate incarnation of the State, the military defines its destiny as indissolubly linked to that of the nation it serves. The armed forces thus feel they have to intervene whenever the nation they serve is under threat (real or perceived.)

However, the armed forces constitute a political actor which is unable to secure sufficient legitimacy as such within the demo-liberal

system that Latin American republics use to legitimate their political regimes. Nor is such a role compatible with the professional standards of military organizations in the First World. As a result of this twofold contradiction, the armed forces occupy an ambiguous place in the political system, a sort of no man's land: they cannot be openly acknowledged as a political actor by the other actors involved without violating the principles of the demo-liberal system, nor can they identify themselves as such without introducing a strong cognitive dissonance regarding the universally accepted definition of the professional role of the military.

But there they are, latent, feared, often regarded as a sword of Damocles. Therefore, while budget reductions are a fact of life as far as adjustment policies are concerned, they are also used as an indirect means of curbing the institution's power. In extreme cases, this can give rise to an erosion of the armed forces' power through inanition.

Unexpected support for this policy of curbing the power of the military actor is coming from the US, which is promoting the demilitarization of the region as part of its new policy aimed at stabilizing the area. The identity crisis being experienced by many senior-ranking Latin American military officers stems in large measure from their realization that their traditional ally has now turned on his one-time associates and wishes to convert them into a militarized police force, limiting their activities to the suppression of narco-traffic, narco-terrorism and environmental defense.

This last issue is becoming a particularly sensitive one as far as relations between some Latin American countries and the First World are concerned, and an explosive problem for the military organizations responsible for the defense of national territory and sovereignty. The proposed internationalization of Amazonia as an ecological reserve of humanity; the attempts to use the territory of some countries in the region as dumps for the trash which the First World produces in abundance or the toxic waste which nobody wants; and the pressures to

halt the development of nuclear technology in the region; these are only some of the most publicized issues which are regarded as serious encroachments on the sovereignty of Latin American states.

But the ecological issue is not the only one in which US interference is evident. The invasion of Panama, the collapse of the East Bloc and the fragmentation of Yugoslavia and the internal Soviet empire all appear to herald a new era in which the US -and First World nations in general⁶- feel that they have a right to intervene openly in the internal politics of countries which, in their view, could create problems for regional or world security. Other less violent forms of interference (such as the pressure brought to bear by embassies for the enactment or repeal of certain laws that affect economic interests⁷ or the demand for free access to resources as a non-negotiable counterpart to market access for products) have become an ongoing, rather than an occasional, feature of international relations.

Not all Latin American countries respond to foreign interference - and in particular US interference- in the same way. It is fair to say that the response of most countries ranges somewhere between the positions of Argentina and Brazil, respectively.

The Argentine stance assumes that, since Argentina has no other choice but dependence, the country's best bet is to increase its dependence to the point where it actually becomes the spokesperson for the hegemonic power in the region. To some extent, this position could be summed up as: only by being truly dependent will we become really

⁶ To give but one example, Spanish Foreign Minister Francisco Fernández Ordoñez was reported by the Spanish newspaper *Tribuna* on September 30, 1991 as stating that: "Fortunately, the idea of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries is being discarded".

⁷ This is the case of legislation on pharmaceutical patents and computer technology, to mention only two of the currently most sensitive issues.

prosperous, and therefore able to enjoy some measure of freedom and hope⁸.

Brazil's position, on the other hand, calls for both controlled confrontation with the North -and in particular the US- and the attainment of supremacy over the region. To cite a historical analogy, its aim is to restate the *barganha leal*⁹ which would permit Brazil to become the region's interlocutor with the advanced world.

It is in this context that the issue of the existential crisis¹⁰ among Latin American armed forces should be addressed. This is manifested in a profound reexamination of the hitherto "natural" military identity and ethos; a restatement of the very essence of the professional role by the most lucid analysts; a generalized uneasiness or malaise among the officer corps and even NCOs; and the abandonment of the military profession by its most dynamic and promising members.

The Latin American Armed Forces: Finding a New Role in the New Context

The Sixties and Seventies witnessed a considerable expansion in the role of armed forces in the region, stemming from what Alfred Stepan calls their new professionalism.¹¹ This in turn was a direct result of the

⁸ Rather frivolously the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs stated in 1991 that his country's policy vis-a-vis the US should be "of a carnal nature" and, if necessary, "abject".

⁹ Term coined by Golbery do Couto e Silva in his book *Geopolítica do Brasil*, (Rio de Janeiro, Jose Olympio, 1967) meaning constant negotiating between the US and Brazil involving haggling over positions.

¹⁰ This term was coined by the Brazilian Admiral Fernando Ferreira Vidigal.

¹¹ See: Alfred Stepan: "The new professionalism of internal warfare and military role expansion", in Alfred Stepan (ed.): *Authoritarian Brazil*:

campaign against guerrilla movements and the much broader struggle against subversion. During those years, through a long and complex process, military institutions became independent political actors, assuming responsibilities and acquiring the skills of the civilian spheres of activity -to the point where they took over the public administration and in some cases became highly politicized.¹²

The armed forces' intervention in the day-to-day running of public affairs or the specific activities through which they maintained control over the populace was born out of the expansion in their role. This expansion meant that they added new tasks and roles to traditional military functions. In many cases, the new duties ended up eroding and even swallowing the assignments of the old "job description."

During the Eighties, period in which most of the transitions to democracy took place in the region, the armed forces first initiated and then participated as an institution in the negotiations, thus ensuring both a smooth transition of political power and an appropriate insertion for their organization once the new democratic government had taken office.¹³

Over the past three decades, then, Latin America's armed forces have enjoyed a high profile and played a key role in national affairs. As an organization they also enjoyed considerable privileges during the period

Origins, Policies and Future (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977).

¹² See: Juan Rial, "The Armed Forces as a 'substitute political party'" in Augusto Varas (ed.), Democracy under siege (Greenwood Press, 1990) and Louis Goodman, Johanna R. Mendelson & Juan Rial (eds.) The Military and Democracy (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington, 1990).

¹³ For a view of the transition from the military standpoint see Carina Perelli, Desde los cuarteles: el discurso militar sobre la transición en América del Sur (Montevideo: PEITHO, Working papers).

of military rule, when the only limits on their power were those which the institution itself chose to impose. Throughout this long period the military grew accustomed to their role as soldier-politicians, defenders of the nation and supporters of the State. They later became the guarantors of democracy during the period of apertura and transition.¹⁴

During these three decades the armed forces felt the impact of the changing posture of their international allies, particularly the US. Often praised for their efforts during their war against guerrilla movements, the military organizations were supported when they brought off a coup d'état and during the first years of military government. Thus, the military were at first surprised, and then outraged, when the advanced world in general and the Carter Administration in particular condemned their regimes' repeated human rights violations. They interpreted the fact of being excluded from the community of so-called Western nations as an act of bad faith on the part of their former allies who wanted the Western way of life to be defended without daring pay the cost of it.

These experiences shaped the way in which different generations of the military came to view the world. They led to characteristic ways of thinking, attitudes and goals. Following Mannheim,¹⁵ we might say that these shared experiences created political generations within the armed forces whose experiences, translated into worldviews, were incorporated into the doctrines in which their successors were then socialized.

¹⁴ See: Juan Rial, Las Fuerzas Armadas. Soldados-Políticos garantes de la democracia (Montevideo: EBO, 1986).

¹⁵ See: Karl Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982). For the application of the concept of political generations to the military institution, see: Alfred Stepan, "The Concept of Generations in Military Institutions: Brazil and Peru Compared", in Richard J. Samuels (ed.), Political Generations and Political Development (Lexington Mass.: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Co., 1977).

The military worldview stressed the importance of the armed forces as a stabilizing factor in society, both in terms of the monopoly of legitimate violence they exercised and as a coherent, consistent organization with a unified purpose and doctrine and a transcendental objective: to protect the countries of the region from the onslaughts of the communist foe and keep it in the camp of Western nations.

And while the military accepted their subordination to the civilian authorities under normal conditions, they also reserved the right to intervene when a vacuum of power occurred and when chaos threatened to destroy the very essence of the nation. The armed forces were a living boundary that prevented the destruction of the Western way of life in the region by its very existence.¹⁶

For the military, the aim was to preserve the existing order, not to create or re-found a new one. In doing so it became necessary to eliminate -in many cases in a literal and radical way- the causes of disorder. Only then could political power be handed back to civil authorities. This concept was indelibly impressed upon an entire generation. The vestiges of this worldview still color the ways in which events are interpreted by senior personnel as well as by some of the middle-ranking officers. In many cases, this philosophy brought them to the bargaining table. It also underlaid the process in countries where the transition was negotiated.

Whenever they had to sit down at the negotiating table to thrash out the terms for the conversion of political power, the military endeavored to ensure that the other actors committed themselves to honoring three conditions once the transition took place. First, the acceptance of the capitalist and Western systems as the prevailing models in Latin American republics was a *sine qua non* stipulation. Second, all actors had to renounce using violence as a way of solving political conflicts.

¹⁶ On this idea of a "living boundary", see Perelli, *Desde los cuarteles..* (op. cit.).

They thus accepted and reinforced the armed forces' monopoly of legitimate violence in these societies. Third, the acceptance of a series of postulates and premises regarding the military organization which reinforced its role as an autonomous actor was another prerequisite.

This seemed to be the best possible arrangement that the armed forces could expect to achieve. They thus held on to the ground they had gained during the period of the *de facto* regime, but withdrew from the day-to-day running of political affairs and public administration. Many officers felt that in these two areas there was a danger of the military giving up their own role entirely for that of a bureaucratic-political organization.

Some of the earliest crises in the institution were paradoxically the result of its strict adherence to the conditions that had been agreed upon. Unexpectedly, the greatest challenges to the ethos of the armed forces arose out of the efforts to fully institute the capitalist system in the region, the universalization of the capitalist model, and the repudiation of social change through armed action in many countries.

The triumph of the market ideology in the region led to a sort of assault on the State, an attempt to reduce it to a minimum. The officer corps is, by definition, an elite which obtains its privileges by forming part of a stable state and performing specific functions within the framework of that State. Therefore, when the structure of the State is dangerously weakened, the status of this elite is also undermined. Budget cuts impact the institution in terms of both its salary structure and the opportunities to perform its professional duties.

The military is affected by the downgrading of the role of the state. This downgrading also has a strong negative impact on the way in which all State-managed activities are perceived. The middle-classes no longer view a military career as an attractive prospect; a uniform no longer offers prestige or economic security. Professionally speaking, the institution ceases to attract the best candidates. It becomes necessary to

lower the entry and evaluation standards of candidates to military academies and even those of conscripts, and to step up endorecruiting.

And while such recruitment problems may have serious implications for the future, the situation of military academy graduates in charge of the day-to-day running of the institution is even more pressing. Given the sociology of want, the paltry salaries and lack of professional satisfaction, many wind up being "part-time officers" or even resign their commission. The degree of frustration building up among unit commanders is a matter of record. The situation obliges them to schedule duties at military bases on a single-shift basis so as not to interfere with the other work commitments of their subordinates who cannot survive on their military pay alone. For their part, junior officers increasingly resent the fact that they belong to a parody of what a professional armed service should be.

Those who possess highly sought after technical expertise or who for some other reason manage to secure well-paid jobs in the civilian labor sector abandon the military before the age of retirement. The rest externalize their resentment within the institution, rejecting promotions if a new posting affects the income of their spouse or their own second occupation. The professional magazines they read also make them painfully aware of the enormous difference that exists between servicemen in the advanced world and the members of a Third World military institution.

They also face the hostility of civilians - a hostility which in most cases is inversely proportional to the fear which the institution inspires or inspired at one time - who regard even the present meager pay the military receive as too much. Often the military are asked to justify their demands (in itself a roundabout way of asking them to justify their very existence) in the face of more pressing demands in the health, education, housing and social security sectors.

Despite this, in many parts of Latin America the military still perceive themselves as belonging to a coherent, wellintegrated insti-

tution with a doctrine of its own, in sharp contrast to their fragmented society and a State that is in the process of being dismembered. In other words, they are members of one of the few stable organizations that remain in the region. For the current generation of middle-ranking and junior officers, NCOs, and cadets in the later stages of being trained at military academies, this paradoxical situation has become the frame of reference which determines attitudes and molds ordinary behavior.

According to Richard Millet,¹⁷ due to their state of penury and the hostility they face, the military resort to a strategy similar to that of a living organism subjected to temperatures that are below its tolerance threshold: hypothermia. In such a situation the armed forces gradually abandon their peripheral functions in order to preserve their nerve centers - those functions and values essential to the body's survival. The institution thus ensures its continued existence, even at the cost of losing certain parts of the organization which have to be sacrificed for the rest to survive.

For such a move to be successful, however, each branch and option of the military way of life must be carefully weighed. Also included in this process is a sweeping review of the value system which underpins the military's operations. Introspection of this kind, of itself and by its very nature, leads to serious self-questioning and not a few existential crises. When an institution in which different experiential cohorts - political generations, to use Mannheim's term - coexist is involved, this introspection becomes even more painful due to the different expectations and motivations of the various groups. Coexistence is also hindered by the difficulty of negotiating solutions to such problems within a formal institution which makes a virtue of hierarchy.

Set against the backdrop of the universalization of the West which deprives the armed forces of their frames of reference in the world context as far as their transcendental mission is concerned - this process

¹⁷ Verbal statement made during a meeting in Washington in 1991.

of introspection has a disturbing effect. It occurs amid the climate of international uncertainty surrounding the friend-enemy relationship.

With real socialism in total disarray, the intransigent sectors within the armed forces are struggling to shape new worldviews that will keep the enemy alive.

Some maintain that communism may no longer be a viable alternative for the world as a whole but that, given the backwardness of Latin America, it remains an option in those places where Castroism continues to exert influence. Others assert that the evolution of the left is merely the metamorphosis of communism, a ploy whereby it will be able to survive and subvert the West, with social democracy being regarded as the new wolf in sheep's clothing.

The purpose of these new theories is to perpetuate the crusading nature of the fight against the Left in the Sixties and Seventies so as to maintain a certain conception of the essential characteristics of the military ethos and insert the armed forces into what might be described as a "a Western military internationale". Even if the armed services are cut to the bone, so the argument runs, they remain, and should continue to be, a politicized, anti-left institution that retains all its powers of dissuasion and is capable of acting as the moderating power should the political crisis and chaos be repeated.

Besides the loss of domestic power and respect, those who advocate this policy fear that the disappearance of the common enemy may lead to a "balkanization" of military institutions which hitherto had a global point of reference. In a situation of this kind, the collective struggle becomes fragmented, provincialized and regionalized; the organizations involved lose the common links which bound them together.

Others resort to technocratic arguments in defining the characteristics of this "hypothermic" force. In their view, the institution should devote its efforts to raising professional standards - including the ability to handle the latest technologies - so as to better equip it for the tasks that Latin America's armed forces were designed to perform: the

dissuasion of conventional enemies and the maintenance of order. Given the inevitability of cutbacks, this could mean a reduction in the organization's overall size, but this measure would be offset by the higher quality of the members of the institution. This in turn would enhance the prospects for inserting retired servicemen into the civilian labor market.

Nevertheless, even allowing for a reduction in the size of the organization, this alternative is expensive in budgetary, human and political terms. The combination of a lack of resources and US pressure on various governments in the region have forced many militaries to accept unwillingly and with more than a little resentment - new functions such as combatting narco-traffic. This particular task is regarded by many militaries as a job for the police and not strictly a national problem.

Moreover, most members of the military feel that such activities expose the institution to the inevitable danger of corruption and internal division. In justifying this view they cite such factors as the enormous resources at the disposal of drug traffickers and the meager salaries paid to servicemen, and the sharp contrast between units engaged in combatting drug trafficking with expensive, US-supplied equipment and others performing traditional tasks with almost no resources. This could lead to the undermining of what the military generally regard as the essence of the military ethic: a long tradition of upholding values such as honor, esprit de corps, obedience and discipline.

This fear that the institution's internal coherence could be corrupted and destroyed through the daily exercise of political power (regarded by definition as corrupting) brought many military institutions to the negotiating table in the transitions of the Eighties. Some even regard it as an extremely tragic paradox.

Equally paradoxical is the subsequent victory out of seeming defeat achieved by the guerrillas. With peace being negotiated, the guerrilla groups renouncing violence, and the end of internal wars depriving

them of a tangible mission, one of the main reasons for the existence of the armed forces as a key institution has also been removed. Except in the case of Peru - where the virulent presence of Shining Path provides more than sufficient justification for the continuing existence of an armed force- the idea that change can be brought about through armed struggle is beginning to lose currency as a plausible alternative in countries in the region. This development also eliminates one means of practicing the military profession and a series of conceptions about what being a member of the military means.

A new era is dawning. The military profession as a practice and as an ethos is at a crossroads. A series of alternatives are opening up to it.

Some advocate the dissolution of an institution which, like the dinosaur, has fulfilled its purpose. This would leave Latin America's republics at the mercy of the hemispheric hegemonic power. Others have adopted a more dangerous attitude: fearing what might happen if the armed forces were to be abolished, they simply leave them to sort out their own problems while at the same time reducing their budgets. The organization is being allowed to bleed to death, but is struggling - desperately, to the last - to avoid this fate. Besides deepening the existential crisis in the institution, this strategy could lead to many conflicts; after all, no organization voluntarily agrees to commit suicide.

Others support the thesis that the military should evolve into a type of militarized police force whose duties would be limited to combatting drug trafficking and the administration of violence. This alternative combines the drawbacks of both the previous strategies, and in many cases is rejected and resisted even more strongly by many officers than the other two.

Finally, there is the option of integration, the coordination of forces that would operate in a regional setting, tackling common problems such as the ecological defense of Latin America, the suppression of drug trafficking and narco-terrorism, the control of fishing activities in ocean regions over which they exercise sovereignty, and equipment- and

training-sharing activities. This alternative would give the military a dignified role to play, insert it into a regional context and oblige all the institutions involved to raise their technical-professional standards.

For the present, all these doors are open. The decision as to which course is to be followed rests with Latin America's politicians and legislators, though it is also contingent upon the existence of an international climate sensitive to the region's problems.

Virgilio R. Beltrán

Looking for New Roles for Latin American Armies

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6. Epilogue

1. The Change in the Strategic Paradigm¹

International relations in the security sphere prior to the end of 1989, which could be called the Cold War regime, had features that were unique in history.

- a. A political and strategic polarization affecting practically the whole world. The two super powers (USA and USSR) were in confrontation along all power dimensions (military, political, psychosocial, diplomatic, economic, technological, etc.

Although the confrontation was centered on the Euro-Asian continent, it permeated international relations and internal conflicts almost all over the world.

- b. All international and internal conflicts, even those of purely endogenous origin, ended up aligned around the main conflict, which gave them an order, a direction, and restricted their escalation
- c. The ever-present danger of a nuclear catastrophe regulated conflicts and kept them from escalating to the use of atomic weapons, prevented direct military confrontation between the two super powers, and in the end came to be a stabilizing factor.

This order ended formally with the Joint Declaration of the Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), signed in Paris on 19th November 1990.

¹ In this section, in general I follow the lines of argument of J.J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War", *International Security*, N°15, 1990 pp.5/56 and the discussion of his thesis at the Special Round Table at the Biennial International Conference of the IUS, Baltimore, Md, Oct. 1991. See also Z. Brzezinski, "Selective Global Commitments", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.70, N°4, 1991.

Fortunately, the Cold War ended without a hot war between the blocs, due to the decline of one of the contenders, which was unable to meet the economic, scientific and military challenges of its rival.

The new world order is still evolving² and, in the throes of the change, looks more like disorder when compared with what went before. The following are its general features:

- a. The collapse of the USSR leaves only one world military super power in a still undefined context in which it must compete with Japan and the European Community.³ Lacking the cohesive power its bloc derived from the Soviet threat⁴, its ability as world leader is limited⁵, even though it still has military resources far superior to those of its competitors.
- b. With the disappearance of the main conflict on which East-West relations hinged, conflicts tend to become disorganized, so those arising from misjudgment or miscalculation seem more feasible. On the other hand, a possible lack of control over the spread of nuclear technology could be a threat if it gets into the hands of

² "Hoy todos saben lo que la nueva era no es: se acabó la guerra fría. Nadie sabe aún lo que es". M. Grondona, *La Nación*, Bs.As. 12.7.92 Also J.S. Nye, "What New World Order?", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.71 N°2, 1992.

³ S.P. Huntington, "America's Changing Strategic Interests", *Survival*, Vol.XXXIII, Jan/Feb, 1990; J.C. Moneta, "Mitos y Realidades del Nuevo Orden Mundial", SELA, Capítulos, N°29, April, June, 1991.

⁴ "Huérfano de enemigo, Occidente ya no sabe a qué atenerse", M. Grondona, loc. cit.

⁵ "The U.S. remains a super power in military terms, but it occupies a less than commanding role in the international economy. Hence, the unipolar model is dubious", L. Freedman, "Order and Disorder in the New World", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.71, N°1, 1992.

relatively less developed nations, though those who have achieved such technology or are close to doing so do not have sufficient quantity, power, or means of projection.

- c. Greater importance is now attached to matters associated with the quality of people's lives, such as poverty, underdevelopment, political stability, health, education, human rights, etc.
- d. New dimensions of the conflicts -some apparently revived from the 19th century- take on importance, such as ethnic, nationalist, territorial and religious issues, which restate matters in terms of "them" and "us". Other new ones appear or are intensified, such as those of an ecological nature, undesired migrations and drug trafficking (sometimes associated with terrorism as in Latin America).

Faced with the disruptive elements in this still infant order, the areas of the Center (the highly industrialized countries) play the role of controllers of the system: the USA in the vanguard, because of its military capacity, and the other members of the Group of 7.

The controlling powers are those international actors that have the effective capacity to 1) establish the norms for the system, either by themselves or in association with other regional actors who carry some weight, 2) interpret such norms with regard to their scope, and how and when to apply them, 3) enforce them by their political and military capacity and their ability to shape international public opinion.

The controllers constitute a central "ring of nations" which seek to stabilize and consolidate the status quo. For them "History" has apparently "ended"⁶ while the periphery would appear to be still enmeshed in History.⁷

⁶ In the terms of F. Fukuyama, "¿El final de la Historia?", *Revista Occidental*, Año 8, N°2.

⁷ N. Ceresole, "Argentina y el Ocaso de los Poderes Hegemónicos de la Política Mundial", ILCTRI, Bs.As., 1992, Ch. VI.

The rest of the world would appear to be oriented by the controllers so as to avoid, regulate or de-escalate conflicts which are otherwise affected:

- a. By the limited logistical and resource mobilization capacity of the contenders.
- b. By the type of armaments and equipment to be used, bearing in mind the lack of access to means of mass destruction and modern military technologies.
- c. By the possible damage to the central powers' vital interests (e.g. oil).⁸
- d. By the action of any regional sub-controllers.

The North-South Agenda ⁹

The disappearance of the ideological challenge and the marked reduction in the military threat from the ex-socialist camp (the Second World) has caused a loss of identity in the Third World, which -without ever having become so- offered itself as a different option and a balance between the two formerly conflicting blocs. As already mentioned, old problems appear in new guises and others take on a heightened significance in the North-South dimension. These are:

⁸ "... peripheral conflicts in areas without strategic value and strategic resources, like Yugoslavia, will only be supervised and contained by Europe". J. Joffe, "Collective Security and the Future of Europe: Failed Dreams and Dead Ends", Survival, Spring, 1992.

⁹ See E.J. Mortimer, "New Fault Lines: Is a North-South Confrontation Inevitable in Security Terms?", Adelphi Papers, N°266, 1991-1992.

a. Environmental Conservation

The industrial nations have realized that the earth's natural resources are finite and degradable. Their enormous potential endangers the very existence of many of the goods available in the world and they wish to conserve those with reserves in the South, where so far societies do not have the capacity to consume or damage them. The South considers that the pressure to conserve the environment comes to a large extent from the North's intention to preserve those resources for their exploitation in due course for the benefit of the industrialized nations, by refusing to allow them to be used straight away by the region that is precisely the least able to destroy them. The increasing need on the part of the industrialized regions to get rid of nuclear and other toxic waste of all kinds should not be forgotten. A likely destination for them is the non-industrialized periphery.

b. Migrations to the North

The pressure of migration from the poor regions -which are also those with the highest demographic growth- on the rich regions is enormous and difficult to control. There is a constant flow from Asia, Africa and Latin America to Europe and North America. After usually taking up the most modest jobs in the labor market, immigrants demand goods, services and welfare of a much higher quality than they were familiar with in their countries of origin, that are produced by the recipient society and that the latter considers it only fair to keep for its citizens-taxpayers.

c. Proliferation and Transfer of Technology for Possible Military Use

The North makes the transfer of sensitive technologies a non-negotiable issue of self-protection, thus widening the technological gap between the two regions and blocking developments (e.g. nuclear and missile) that could also be competitors for their companies in the world market.

d. Terrorism

Although terrorism seems to be endemic in certain parts of the North (Basque Country, Ireland, Germany, etc.), it is more widespread in the South as the methodology chosen by the weaker party in the conflicts that occur in this region. International security in transport, persons and installations is an unavoidable cost of this threat. The frequency of the attacks has decreased and the countries supporting them have reduced their backing for this activity, but the danger is still there and the possibility that terrorists may gain access to sensitive technologies reinforces the zeal to maintain control over them.

e. Narcotics

Illegal consumption strikes a heavy blow at the human potential of industrial societies, is an inexhaustible source of corruption and delinquency, and generates huge expenditures to control and for the recovery of addicts. The measures adopted to reduce supply have produced scant or no results. Blockades have been evaded. Repression in the areas of production is difficult, particularly in the light of the tactical drug-guerrilla-terrorist alliance and due to the lack of policies for crop substitution or subsidies to the farmers producing the raw material. According to E. Mortimer, if the situation continues along these lines, a reverse opium war is conceivable in which one or more industrialized powers make military attacks on the production areas or the traffic points in order to restrict or eliminate supply.

f. Trade

The countries of the North not only have financial, technological, marketing etc. advantages beyond the reach of the societies of the South, but also they do not practice the free trade doctrine they preach ideologically. They politically regulate international trade in their favor and subsidize primary products that compete with the South.

These problem areas, except perhaps for terrorism and the drug trade, are very unlikely to produce military conflicts between North and South. In all cases, the non-industrialized countries lack the capacity to initiate this kind of conflict, unless due, of course, to irrational behavior.

3. Regulation by International Organizations

There are at least four empirically verifiable trends indicative of the will to effectively control military conflicts in the non-industrialized periphery and at the same time rule out possible threats to the industrial societies.

3.1 The Decisions of the United Nations Security Council

Since the Gulf War, the United Nations have acted as a worldwide collective security system, as originally envisaged, ready to enforce the Security Council's decisions, by military force if necessary.

The Organization's previous peace keeping, mediation, observation etc. operations have for the first time given way to a peace enforcing operation via a military coalition headed by the United States, supported by dozens of other countries and financed in part by others such as Germany and Japan.

This effective application of the United Nations Charter and the development of the pertinent executive, intelligence, military planning etc. bodies, under the authority of the Security Council and the Secretary General are a foretaste of so far unprecedented (except Korea, 1950) possibilities.¹⁰

¹⁰ See B. Urquhart, "The UN: From Peace-Keeping to a Collective System" and Chang Heng Chee "The UN: From Peace-Keeping to Peace-Making", Adelphi Papers N°265, 1991-1992. J.S. Nye, op. cit. in Note (2).

3.2 Restriction on the Spread of Technologies

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Missile Technology Control Regime seek, with a fair degree of success, to maintain a certain monopoly over technologies that can be used in the construction of weapons of mass destruction. Various decisions and agreements also restrict the export of military matériel and know-how of a certain degree of complexity to the countries of the periphery, apart from exceptional cases. As there is no longer a Soviet counterpart, as in the model case of the Middle East prior to the debacle of the USSR, this restriction is effective.¹¹

3.3 Humanitarian Intervention

Since the Security Council's Resolution N°688/91 in favor of the Kurdish minority in Iraq, there has been a steady international trend legitimizing intervention by United Nations armed forces in serious cases of "violation of human rights endangering peace" (Arts. 55 and 56 of the Charter).¹² These are interventions of a protective nature, with or without an invitation by the country concerned. Equally unprecedented are the measures for missile disarmament and removal of possible nuclear capacity imposed on Iraq by the United Nations.

¹¹ See Y. Sayigh, "Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries", *Adelphi Papers*, N°251, 1990. L.A. Dunn, "Containing Nuclear Proliferation", *Adelphi Papers*, N°263, 1991. B. Roberts, "Chemical Disarmament and International Security", *Adelphi Papers* N°267, 1992. J.S. Nye, *op. cit.* in Note (2).

¹² A. Roberts, "International Law and the Use of Force, I" and R.N. Gardner, "International Law and the Use of Force, II", *Adelphi Papers* N°266, 1991-1992. T.G. Weiss and K.M. Campbell, "Military Humanitarianism", *Survival*, Vol. XXXIII, N°5, Sept., Oct., 1991. J.S. Nye, *op. cit.* in Note (2).

3.4 Financial Regulation

The World Bank recommends that Third World countries reduce their military expenditure to "optimum levels" in order to be considered for financial facilities. An official report says that special consideration will be given to those countries that spend less than 2% of GNP on their "security sector".¹³

This would appear to be a distribution of the security work through the calculated management of the spread and transfer of technology applicable to the development of means of mass destruction, of sophisticated military matériel and of the technical and organizational abilities connected with them.

Provided the members of the "troika" (USA, Europe and Japan) hold firm on the restriction on the export of weapons, matériel and technology, and unless there are unforeseen situations that reopen supply, the armed forces of Latin America will gradually disarm due to obsolescence, unless they can find alternatives in line with their defence needs. In this respect, only the production or acquisition of intermediate military equipment and technology would enable the armed forces of Latin America to retain some degree of significance in the handling of possible regional conflicts, as long as such operations were relatively short and low-key.

The relative disorganization of the international system seems to lead the controlling powers to press for the disarmament of the nations of the periphery and at the same time for the respective financial resources to be used for health, education and development in general.

Perhaps the idea is that the South should undertake a "civilizing" process that will allow a peaceful resolution of conflicts due to the military constraints on the possible contenders, and will consolidate

¹³ R.S. McNamara, "The Post-Cold War World and the Implications for Military Expenditure in the Developing Countries", *World Bank. Annual Conference in development Economics*, 1991. See Note (16).

market mechanisms for the distribution of goods and natural resources in the context of their free international flow and a peace guaranteed by international bodies. These conditions and the profound change in the situation and in strategic praxis should stimulate the development of new concepts in the region. On the one hand, it is obvious that only properly organized armed forces, prepared for all kinds of commitments, in line with the situation prevailing in each country, can ensure the necessary protection for the interests of their peoples. On the other, military thinking encounters technological and international policy barriers that are difficult to overcome, limited budgets and the lack of a clear threat to shape planning.¹⁴

As will be seen later, it is necessary to become aware that there are various levels of commitment to security: those exclusive to the country and those deriving from today's internationalization of security problems.¹⁵

4. Strategic and Use of Force Concepts to be Considered in Latin America

Bearing in mind the above mentioned factors, which are restrictive but at the same time stimulating, it would not be idle to explore the possibilities of a new strategic conceptualization for the region, adapted as required to each country's realities and needs since, as is known, the

¹⁴ See J. Roper, "Shaping Strategy Without Threat", Adelphi Papers N°257, 1990-1991.

¹⁵ "There will always be small-scale operations that a single country undertakes by itself in support of secondary interests, but the truly vital interests are collective, and they will require a collective response". L. Freedman, "Escalators and Quagmires: Expectations and the Use of Force", *International Affairs*, 67, I, 1991.

resources allocated to defence depend on the community's perception of the threats that may affect it.

The changes in the strategic paradigm and the constraints referred to suggest changes in the organization, doctrine, training and use of armed forces so they can face the new and old challenges.

It is not simply a question of a turnkey acquisition of a set of ideas, but of taking them as a guide for our own thinking based on each nation's actual circumstances. Just as all security structures have become obsolete in this period, which many consider a period of transition, there is a similar situation in the American hemisphere with regard to an archaic security system (OAS, Rio Treaty).

In short, re-thinking basic strategic concepts and deriving practical consequences from them is a challenge Latin Americans cannot afford to ignore.

4.1 The Region

On this issue, the area can be described succinctly as follows:

- a. Latin America already has only limited means of violence which in all probability will not be markedly extended in the foreseeable future, not only because of arms control but also because of its own economic and technological constraints.¹⁶

¹⁶ Average military spending in Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1972-1988 period was 2.3% of Gross National Product, very low in comparison with the world average in the same period (during the Cold War) of 16.5% of GNP. The exceptions at this time were Cuba with 11.7%, Guyana with 7.2% and Chile with 6.7%. D.P. Hewitt, "Military Expenditure: International Comparison of Trends", IMF, Fiscal Affairs Dept. WP/91/54, 1991. This document advises the exercise of pressure on Third World countries so that IMF financial aid is not used for military expenditure. Also by the same author "Military Expenditure: Econometric Testing and Political Influences", IMF, Fiscal Affairs Dept. WP/91/53, 1991.

- b. Modern cultural development and the values suggested by the mass media mean that civilian society, particularly in urban areas, shares a scale of values in which security and defence issues are not dominant.
- c. There is also an increasingly more widespread acceptance of UN internationalist humanism and a more or less firm confidence in regional and world diplomatic peace keeping mechanisms. The enormous cost of aggression for those who are not controllers - post Gulf War - is also quite clear.
- d. In the last half of this century the region has shown a low level of international conflict -though internal tensions are in some cases significant - which tallies with the pacifist, legal and political tradition of the Latin American nations.
- e. Security agreements in the hemisphere, led by the United States, have defined the enemies of the leading power as enemies. During the Second World War these were the Axis powers and in the Post War period, the communist bloc. Now that these dangers have disappeared, there is no certain, specific and/or possible extra-continental threat.¹⁷
- f. Almost an absolute majority (except for Cuba and Haiti) of the Latin American countries have democratically organized governments, with leaders accountable to the electorate.

Therefore, the chances of a surprise attack by one on another seem unlikely.¹⁸ When there has been an interruption of constitutional

¹⁷ See D.F. Caffrey, "The Inter-American Military System. Rhetoric vs. Reality", included in G. Fauriol, (ed), "Security in the Americas", National Defense University Press, Washington, 1989.

¹⁸ R.L. Schweller, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?" World Politics, Vol.44, N°2, Jan. 1992. Also A. Hurrell,

proceedings (e.g. Peru), this has been only partial and it is foreseeable that any others that may occur in the future will maintain the facade.¹⁹

4.2 Reformulation of Military Thinking

If the statements made are correct, conditions in Latin America could give rise to the reformulation of military thinking in the region on some of these premises.²⁰

- a. Existing security structures in the hemisphere are not in line with current strategic reality and should be reworked on a consensus basis by those involved, or new ones should be evolved.
- b. Nowadays, domestic and international security overlap and are closely interrelated, so they can only be considered at the same time and in conjunction.
- c. The concept of national sovereignty is undergoing rapid change. Its dimensions are increasingly less territorial. The threats to a particular country come from economic, technological, financial, foreign trade, etc. sectors, which do not always correspond to a traditional

"Latin America in the New World Order: A Regional Bloc of the Americas", International Affairs 68:1 (1992).

¹⁹ It should be borne in mind that in Latin America today there is a wave of discontent with regard to the incumbents of political roles, accused of inefficiency and corruption. For different reasons, Brasil Colombia and Venezuela are undergoing significant crises at the moment. The difficult situation in Peru has already been referred to. On the other hand, the OAS is trying to foster the laying down of sanctions within the hemispheric system in the event of non-constitutional changes of government. Disturbing data gathered by Samuel Fitch and still unpublished, show that in Ecuador, for example, over 60% of the population surveyed would approve a military takeover of the government.

²⁰ I follow J. Chipman, "The Future of Strategic Studies", Survival, Spring, 1992.

geographical reference.²¹ It is therefore obsolete to define security interests in predominantly geographical terms.

- d. States do not enjoy an unlimited capacity for coercion of their own citizens or inhabitants. Human rights are of international interest.
- e. The military structures of each nation do not always prepare for a specific threat, but should be versatile enough to face the unexpected, have new rules of military engagement and changed criteria for the use of force.
- f. Important problems of security, where the most significant interests of the political units are at stake, are matters for collective military action, which acquires legitimacy at the highest levels (e.g. UN, regional pacts), is economy of resources and facilitation of international consensus. This does not presume the exclusion of military organizations with the capacity to face traditional threats, protect natural resources and the jurisdiction of the State, explore unaccessible regions, engage in low-intensity conflicts, participate in the creation and maintenance of confidence building measures etc.
- g. Control over the transfer of weapons and military technology, not only in relation to weapons of mass destruction but also rather sophisticated conventional equipment, will set a "ceiling" on the operational capacity of the Latin American armed forces.
- h. Support from national and international public opinion is increasingly necessary to obtain acceptance both by the tax-payer who has to maintain his armed forces and by the international public in legitimizing military actions.

²¹ This change is also reflected in nations' new intelligence interests. See S. Turner, "Intelligence in a New World Order", *Foreign Affairs*, Fall, 1991.

4.3 The Armed Forces Model

If it can be deduced from the foregoing that there is:

1. a set of societies with a low likelihood of war, at least with reference to conventional war;
2. the chance of obtaining material based on intermediate military technologies, appropriate to each country's capacity;
3. armed forces in societies undergoing general modernization, it might be less risky to think of a Latin American armed forces model with some features of the kind in "Warless Societies", proposed by C. Moskos.²²

Such a model assumes armed forces:

- a. Based on a professional cadre on active service and quickly and easily mobilized reserves. (For the moment, Europe has a mixed system. The voluntary-professional average in the NATO countries is 45.5%).
- b. Strongly oriented to civilian values and subordinated to the political power.
- c. Led by cadres of officers and non-commissioned officers highly trained not only in the professional military sphere, but also at the tertiary and university level. Discipline will not be predominantly authoritarian or based on class differences, but will be achieved as a function of the missions to be carried out.
- d. Limited in size, but very flexible, versatile and mobile. Suitable for joint operations and combined operations with the armed forces of other countries.

²² C.C. Moskos, "Armed Forces in a Warless Society", paper based on luncheon address to the IUS, Baltimore, Md., 1989. Cif. also in: Jürgen Kuhlmann/Christopher Dandeker (ed.), *Armed Forces After the Cold War*, Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, FORUM international, volume 13: München 1992.

- e. Equipped according to the mission, partly with some degree of technological complexity and partly with conventional technology (conventional missions).
- f. With a broad recruiting base, and with promotions and positions allocated exclusively on criteria of merit.
- g. With less reference to purely institutional values, that is to say in greater accord with the general values of society, but always keeping intact the hard core of the rules of military behavior,²³ based on their mission of applying State violence in combat.

4.4 Criteria for the Use of Military Force

Along the same line of reasoning, it would also be possible to try to introduce modern criteria for the use of military force in line with the new conditions in the region, the values accepted by the international community and with the interests of each nation. The guidelines suggested for the use of armed forces in the region might be as follows:

²⁴

²³ For a general view of the issue, see C.C. Moskos and F.R. Wood, "The Military: More Than Just a Job?", Pergamon Brassey's, 1988. B. Boëne, (ed), "La Espécificité Militaire", Armand Colin, Paris, 1990.

²⁴ In the following proposals I follow M. Janowitz, "The Professional Soldier", Free Press, Glencoe, 1960, Ch. VIII, "Towards the Constabulary Concept". G. Däniker, "Wende Golfkrieg. Von Wesen und Gebrauch künftiger Streitkräfte", Verlag Huber, Frauenfeld, 1992, in the transcription and summary submitted in H.J. Schweizer-Meyer and R. Meyer-Schweizer, "Swiss Security Policy and its Reception by Public and Parties", paper given at the IUS Biennial Conference, Baltimore, Md., Oct. 1991; cif. also in: Jürgen Kuhlmann/Christopher Dandeker (ed.), *Armed Forces After the Cold War*, Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, FORUM international, volume 13: München 1992.

There are similar concepts in Plan Directeur de l'Armée, Réport du Conseil Fédéral aux Chambre Fédérales, 1992. The adaptations to the

- a. Preparedness covers all possible contingencies: peace commitments, low intensity conflicts, disaster relief, conventional war, crisis management, ecological emergencies, support for the security and police forces (under the control of the civilian authorities) etc. The main concept is that the use of military force is a supplement to negotiations (diplomatic or between the conflicting sectors) and ceases as soon as such negotiations can be reopened. Military force acts as a stabilizing factor in crises and attempts, as far as possible, to avoid escalations in crises or conflicts.
- b. The criterion to be employed in all cases is to use the minimum force necessary to achieve the proposed objective. Victory is increasingly a tactical objective, the strategic aim is to achieve broad-ranging and long-lasting peace agreements. Therefore, the purpose of combat is not to annihilate the opponent, but should be the imposition of a penalty or a price (dissuasion), which will tend to neutralize him or undermine his combat morale, bring about his disarmament, etc. The final objective has to be reconciliation, so every battle plan should aim as far as possible at minimizing the side effects and unnecessary enemy casualties, so that it will later be easier to achieve international relations or relations between social groups that are viable and long-lasting.
- c. The soldier's attitude will thus be protective and not destructive. His missions in the 21st century, according to Däniker will be "to protect, aid and avoid suffering". That is, to keep peace and maintain security. For these reasons also, true combat functions will not be the most frequent in a soldier's life.²⁵

Latin American context and to what has already been said in this paper are my responsibility.

²⁵ Neither are they in the armed forces as known up to the present. The soldier spends most of his time on training, instruction, exercises, etc. It could not be otherwise.

- d. Flexibility and multifunctionality will be as important as fire power and mobility on the battlefield. Commanders should have the versatility and training to cover a wide range of missions.

5. Latin America

5.1 Strategic Importance

The region has emerged from the dialectics of the Cold War. A new democratic context means there is less likelihood of a return to the proverbial military governments. Competition for leadership and the arms race have declined or disappeared (the Argentina-Brazil case is the most obvious one). In this decade, policies of economic stringency aimed at the free market and at the reduction in the role of the State have become widespread. At the same time, marked economic and social inequalities persist within the societies of the region and the democratic institutions are not entirely consolidated either.²⁶ In short, the area's strategic importance, from an international standpoint, is no longer significant. There is also debate regarding its value for United States interests.²⁷ The continuing guerrilla activity has not only declined markedly, but it operates without the outside support the subversive movements once enjoyed from the socialist camp, either

²⁶ See J. Rial, "Las Fuerzas Armadas de América del Sur y su Relación con el Estado en el Nuevo Contexto Democrático, en un Mundo en Cambio Constante", PEITHO, Doc. de Trabajo N°70, Montevideo, 1991. C. Perelli, "El Nuevo Ethos Militar en América Latina: la Crisis Existencial de las Fuerzas Armadas de la Región en los 90", PEITHO, Doc. de Trabajo N°80, Montevideo, 1991.

²⁷ See Purcell S. Kaufman, "US Policy Towards Latin America After the Cold War", Adelphi Papers, N°256, 1990-1991.

directly or via Cuba.²⁸ In Colombia and particularly in Peru, guerrilla warfare and terrorism have become extremely dangerous due to their alliance with the narcotics trade, thereby threatening the very stability of these States.

The role as rear guard and territorial security played by the Latin American armed forces in the United States' 1950's defence mechanism, as guarantors of clear communication routes, the provision of some raw materials and rejection of Soviet penetration, began to weaken and lose substance during the 60's and 70's, at a time when the threat from subversion and terrorism reached its height.

With the change of enemy (from the axis powers to the communist bloc and guerrilla organizations), supplies of arms and military equipment from the USA to the armed forces of Latin America gradually changed from World War II surplus to light material, communications equipment, helicopters, etc. suitable for the counter-insurgency warfare.

This made the gap in military technology that worked to the detriment of the countries of Latin America even wider and more evident. In the 60's and 70's, some countries (mainly Argentina and Brazil) speeded up the development of domestic military industries and obtained their combat equipment from new suppliers, mainly in Europe.²⁹ These alternatives are now in retreat, due to the international arms control referred to, the Latin American actors' own limitations and the recession in the regional military equipment market. Even though it

²⁸ For a general view of the issue in the 80's, see G. Fauriol, (ed), "Latin American Insurgencies", Georgetown Univ. CSIS, Washington, 1985.

²⁹ This diversification in the sources of supply of military equipment enabled Argentina to attempt to recover the Malvinas/Falkland Islands in 1982.

is a quasi-structural peace area, as has been stated, it is still possible to detect some possible causes of conflict³⁰ connected with:

- a. Border issues, which have been frequent in the past. There are many badly marked borders, although in most cases they have been resolved pacifically through treaties or the hemispheric dispute-solving system.
- b. Natural resource issues. These have been or are being resolved through mechanisms similar to the above.
- c. Decolonization. In Latin America and the Caribbean there are still territories in the possession of extra-continental powers, over which the countries in the area allege they have well-founded rights.
- d. Spill over of domestic conflicts. A "domino" effect is always possible. (At this point, July 1992, Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) is involved in a terrorist offensive in Peru and the drug trafficker Escobar Gaviria has the government of Colombia in difficulties).
- e. Conflicts arising from the North-South antagonism.
- f. Unforeseen conflicts, which obviously cannot be identified, but which require trained armed forces ready to go into action at short notice.

5.2 The United States of America

"The existence of an hegemonic power in the continent is simply a matter of fact. As is its ability to influence the countries of the area and dictate international rules for control in that area. Hence the roles allocated by the USA to the continent's armed forces, in line with its view of the world strategic context, cannot be ignored".³¹

³⁰ An excellent analysis of the topic for South America can be found in J. Child, "Geopolitical Conflicts in South America", in G. Fauriol, "Security in the Americas", National Defense Univ., Washington, 1989.

³¹ V.R. Beltrán, "Marco General para el Estudio de la Reorganización del Ejército", mimeograph, 1991.

This country is undoubtedly the only military super power left. However, it is facing disturbing domestic issues, such as its fiscal deficit³² and its foreign trade imbalance, at the same time as it is feeling the pressure of the economic and technological competition from Japan and, secondly, from the European Community.

The disappearance of its main enemy has unleashed strong internal pressures for reductions in defence spending and the transfer of these funds mainly to social welfare for a not inconsiderable impoverished sector of its population. Hence also its intentions not only of competing with, but of sharing its "controlling" responsibilities with the European Community and Japan.

The USA has the greatest nuclear dissuasion capacity to prevent possible disruptions in the international system that may affect its interests. This is no longer directed mainly at the successors of the USSR -though the nuclear sites in their territories are being closely watched- but constitutes a possible response to the threats from extremist countries (Libya), nuclear "sanctuaries" protected until now by the principle of territorial sovereignty (North Korea) or terrorist groups with contingent access to sensitive technologies. It will also maintain sufficient military power for individual or collective global reach and the capacity for "surgical" military intervention in very specific objectives, trying to minimize side effects.³³

³² The federal fiscal deficit is close to 400,000 million dollars, i.e. 6% of Gross Domestic Product and a quarter of total fiscal expenditure.

³³ For a view of this point from official sources, see Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Military Net Assessment", 1991; Association of the U.S. Army, "The Army Budget for Fiscal Years 1992-1993", 1991; P.W. Stone P.W. and G.R. Sullivan, "Strategic Force, Strategic Vision for the 1990's and Beyond", House of Representatives, Washington, 1991; Joint Chiefs of Staff, "National Military Strategy of the United States", Washington, 1992.

The general outlines of the USA's security interests with respect to Latin America can be taken from current literature from the same source.³⁴

³⁴ The sources we have been able to study are as follows:

a. Academic Documents

a.1. G. Marcella and F. Woerner, "Strategic Vision and Opportunity: The US and Latin America in the 1990's", Discussion Draft, Feb., 1991.

a.2. National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies. Latin American Development Shop, Fort McNair, Wash., Sept., 1990.

a.3. National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies. Office of Regional Studies, "Refining US Interests in Latin America", Washington, 1992.

a.4. M.G. Wilson, "Towards the Next American Century: Building a New Partnership with Latin America", Background, The Heritage Foundation, 1992.

a.5. G. Marcella, "Military Participation in the Democratic Process", in G. Fauriol, op. cit. in Note (30).

a.6. R.B. Goetz, "US Security Interests in Latin America", M. Falcoff, "Military and Strategic Issues in Latin America", G. Fauriol, "Social and Economic Challenges to Hemispheric Security", all in P.J. Garrity, J.E. Endicott and R.B. Goetz, (eds), "Regional Security Issues", National Defense University, Institute of Higher Defense Studies", Washington, 1991.

a.7. A. Varas A. (ed), "Hemispheric Security and U.S. Interests in Latin America", Westview Press, Boulder, Co., 1989.

b. Special Programmes

In particular, the International Service School, College of Law of Washington University and Foundations such as the National Democratic Endowment, McArthur, etc. Studies stressing civilian-military relations and the training of Latin American civilian officials to manage military affairs, defence of human rights, etc.

c. American Armies' Conferences

At the XIXth Conference held in Washington D.C. in November 1991, the topics proposed by the Permanent Executive Secretariat (SEPCEA Document N°32/ 91) as challenges for the (Latin American) armies

Looking for New Roles for Latin American Armed Forces

These are:

- a. Control of insurgency and terrorism.
- b. Support for the battle against illegal drug trafficking.
- c. Social and economic development, understood as the struggle against the conditions giving rise to insurgency, via civic action by the Latin American armed forces to relieve the conditions of poverty in the region.
- d. Support for democratic governments, which includes the reformulation of civilian military relations. Where necessary, support for "nation building".

On the other hand, not everywhere do the following topics appear:

- a. Make the OAS more efficient for stabilizing the region.
- b. Support "peace missions" in the Hemisphere.
- c. Support the setting up of regional security systems.
- d. Foster combined military or naval exercises with the various Latin American countries (of the "Unitas" type).
- e. Control natural disasters, using the armed forces' organizational capacity and equipment.

These guidelines for hemispheric security policy have obvious consequences for the equipment, doctrine, organization and training of the armed forces of Latin America and lead to several types of reaction:

1. The implications for the military equipment of the Latin American armed forces are clear and are added to the constraints on the transfer of matériel and technology by the industrialized countries

were: 1. Political violence. 2. Drug trafficking. 3. Economic and social conditions in Latin America. This document refers only tangentially to "classical" military missions, such as the defence of national territory and countries' vital interests, as concerns of the Latin American armies.

and to the decisions that the nations in the area have already taken for themselves.³⁵

2. The new conditions reigning in the world and in the hemisphere are not always adequately perceived by the political and military bodies who have to study and decide on the inevitable changes in the format of the Latin American armed forces and their missions. On the one hand, civilian officials do not always show enough knowledge of or interest in the National Defence area and, on the other, the military maintain a kind of monopoly on these affairs that the politicians do not always want or are unable to break.
3. The military officials in charge must face the natural personal and institutional resistance to change and the well-founded fears that any change in the format of the Latin American armed forces will always mean a reduction in personnel (as is the case all over the world).
4. Many military officials, especially those belonging to the most important Latin American countries, have been educated and trained

³⁵ Thus, among the most recent examples:

1. Brazil and Argentina agreed on 28.11.90 to give up production or acquisition of nuclear arms and submit their nuclear installations to mutual inspection.

2. The XIIth General Assembly of the OAS (Sgo. de Chile, June 1991) met to consider the topic "Cooperation for Security in the Hemisphere" and made important statements on the defence of democracy, mechanisms for collective security, arms control and restrictions on arms for mass destruction (07.07.91).

3. On 05.09.91, Argentina, Brazil and Chile agreed not to produce, own or use chemical or biological weapons.

4. On 13.12.91, the Presidents of Argentina and Brazil signed nuclear safeguard agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency and placed their nuclear installations under the agency's control, etc.

On this point, with reference to Argentina, see R.C Diamint, "Cambios en la Política de Seguridad en la Argentina en Busca de un perfil No Conflictivo", mimeograph, January, 1992.

in the military doctrine of the large-scale operations of the Second World War kind and have until now not been forced to think of new roles for their armed forces, in the post-Cold War strategic situation. They do not seem resigned to accept roles they consider of less importance than the planning of operations at Theater, Army Corps or equivalent levels.

5.3 Traditional Roles and Possible New Roles of the Armed Forces of Latin America

The first proviso, though obvious not to be ignored, is that Latin America is a continent with wide economic, political and social diversity. Its external relations too, particularly with the United States of America, are different in each case. Likewise, each national unit has its defence needs and its security interests in relation to its neighbors, its internal situation and its relations in the hemisphere. Therefore, the assumptions set out above and the following suggestions should be considered in the light of each nation's political will, needs and possibilities.

In principle, three types of general missions can be envisaged for the armed forces of the area:

- a. The traditional or conventional activities in defence of national sovereignty, of the country's vital interests and natural resources. To these are added the general surveillance over the country's territory and borders, the defence of legitimate governments, the exploration and occupation of inaccessible areas (deserts, jungles, polar areas, etc.).
- b. Participation in regional defence combined military missions, when viable collective security systems are established in the region.
- c. Peace-keeping, mediation, humanitarian, surveillance, etc., missions, or peace-enforcing missions outside the country under international aegis (UN).

5.3.1 Re-Structuring of Traditional Missions

If some of the propositions in point 4. are acceptable, the strategic conception of the armed forces of Latin America could be guided by the principle of defensive sufficiency, i.e. that there should be the capacity necessary to deal with the missions mentioned in point 5.3.a. above, but not the ability to mount a significant surprise attack on another country or achieve deep, large-scale penetration in a neighboring territory.³⁶ National idiosyncrasies will mean that some countries in the area give priority to low-intensity conflicts or border surveillance or the protection of natural resources or navigation routes or the occupation of inaccessible areas, etc.

In general terms, the armed forces committed to this modernization process should be thinking of measures related to:

- a. The organization of very versatile, flexible military units suitable for making up larger units, of the "task force" type, ready to carry out the varied missions they may be assigned. One or more units or structures (Engineers, Communications, Psychological Action, Counter Insurgency, etc.) would be the backbone thereof, depending on the commitment to be met.
- b. Arms and equipment would be conventional. The most up-to-date possible in line with public resource allocation and the personnel's ability to incorporate and handle them.
- c. The drawing up of new Rules of Engagement for each case, according to the concepts in point 4. that may be applicable.
- d. The forces would not be spread out over the territory, but concentrated in bases and instruction centers, with sufficient mobility for them to be used at any location in the territory. A counter-subversion campaign would be a clear exception to this principle.

³⁶ See J. Walker, "New Thinking About Conventional Arms Control", *Survival*, Vol. XXXIII, N°1, Jan., Feb., 1991; V.R. Beltrán "El Concepto de Suficiencia Defensiva", *Seguridad Estrategica Nacional*, N°1, 1992.

Greater fire power and means of mobility and support should offset the reduction in the number of personnel.

5.3.2 Participation in Collective Security Systems

A collective security system is an international regulatory system that prevents and controls intra and extra system conflicts and is prepared to provide a flexible response to predictable or unpredictable events that may adversely affect it.

An organization of this type assumes that:

- a. The members share general viewpoints, i.e. they share certain basic values.
- b. Each one of the members receives benefits in line with its individual interests.
- c. All members should somehow be vulnerable to collective measures.
- d. Each State belonging to the system is in control of its internal political system.
- e. No member raises basic objections to the system.
- f. If it is a regional sub-system, its provisions, actions and sanctions are compatible with the world order (UN).³⁷

5.3.2.1 Viability of a Security System for the Hemisphere

A brief analysis indicates that the chances of a security system with this scope at the moment are remote.

- a. In the first place, a consideration of the problem of collective security at the hemisphere level highlights the North-South antagonism therein. The diversity of interests and the dialectics of the opposition on the agenda described above force consideration of some kind of levelling (as well as in the legal sphere, which is the theoretical but not the practical assumption behind existing instruments) between

³⁷ V.R. Beltrán, "La Seguridad Hemisférica y el Nuevo Orden Internacional", to be published in *Military Review*, Spanish Edition, Sept., Oct., 1992.

the hegemonic power and its close Canadian ally and the rest of the continent. That is, a marked drive to development and modernization for the weaker elements, so it becomes easier to identify the common interests of the members who are to join the system.

- b. As has been said, in a collective security system, all members should somehow be vulnerable to the collective measures to be taken legally to prevent conflicts, sanction violations and maintain the security of all.

In the American hemisphere the power of the USA is of such a magnitude, in relation to the rest of the countries, even taken together, that all vulnerability to a collective sanction can be ruled out.

- c. The extraordinary magnitude and power of the USA makes it unlikely that it will act in such a system other than in pursuit of its own vital interests. This has been demonstrated in Grenada and Panama.
- d. If one of the essential objectives of a collective security system is to preserve the status quo, making members' conduct predictable, the situation to be preserved at the present time is clearly unsatisfactory for a large part of the region, which leads to the deduction that the interest of the least favored would, at the very least, be precarious.
- e. Any project aimed at the organization of a security system for the hemisphere should be compatible:
 - e.1. With the interests of the hegemonic power of the continent. This does not mean leaving the initiative exclusively in its hands. It involves coordinating and reconciling among all members interests that are not always easy to reconcile.
 - e.2. With the economic, technical, political, etc., capacity of each of the members. They must start from an acceptable minimum to participate actively in the system.

- f. The collective security system should also demonstrate that it is more efficient than other more general agencies (UN) that protect legal security, the rule of international law and reject aggression.
- g. The Rio Treaty (1947) is an alliance against an unnamed extra-American enemy, which could only be the ex-USSR, to align the countries of the continent and the USA in the Cold War, and it should be replaced by another international instrument of a similar level with the consent of all states on the continent.
- h. In this last respect, there is an observable move to give new life to the OAS via a similar executive body to the UN Security Council, adapted to the needs of the Hemisphere. Its members could be appointed on a rotary system, without the oligarchic system of permanent membership, with the implicit power of veto, of the UN Security Council. This could also involve giving an effective role to the Inter-American Defence Board, as a military planning body of the OAS.

5.3.2.2 Regional Security Systems

Understood as "security areas" that can be based on existing undertakings such as the Mercosur, the Andean Pact or the Caribbean Basin Initiative, etc., with the characteristics defined in 5.3.2. and with a combined military mechanism for the protection of the overall defence interests.

This possibility has been understood as a higher, ore advanced stage of the prevailing economic and political agreements among the current members, at the military level.

It does not seem to have the disadvantages of a possible hemispheric system and assumes it is possible to achieve a reasonable degree of interoperability³⁸ among the involved military forces and a system of com-

³⁸ The concept of interoperability can be seen in U.S. Department of the Army. Army Regulation 34-1, "International Military Rationalization, Standardization and Interoperability", Washington, 1985.

mand and political responsibility functioning at a higher coordinating level, with the necessary authority.

One of the advantages to be taken into account is what could be called the "scale economies" in defence spending on the part of the member countries and the added technical capacities for its use on research and development in common for application to military purposes. As a disadvantage, the theoretical difficulty of thinking out a strategy without having a pre-defined adversary.³⁹

A collective security system, particularly in the area under consideration, would always be subject to the economic and political vicissitudes of its members, since it requires a certain degree of compatibility or complementarity in their economies and in the control of their internal political order by each member State.

The missions of a collective security system can also be extended to the supervision of maritime areas, fishing zones, ecological issues, sky control, external space, etc.

In the Southern Cone of Latin America significant studies have begun on the possibility of implementing a collective security system among the countries of the Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay). From 22nd to 26th June 1992 the VIth Symposium of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Mercosur countries was held in Vicente López (in the outskirts of Buenos Aires), with representatives of the Chilean armed forces as observers. The paper given by the Joint Chief of Staff of the Argentine Armed Forces under the title "Is a Collective Defence System Viable in the Southern Cone in a Context of Regional

³⁹ "The old theory of strategic planning based on a war with a particular enemy has become unrealistic"... "We need a military power without determinisms or pre-established enemies". J.O. Ferrer, Admiral, Chief of the Argentine Navy General Staff. Lecture given at the Inter American Defense College, Fort McNair, Washington, 19.10.91. Also J. Roper, op.cit. in Note (14).

Integration in Progress?"⁴⁰ marks a notable advance in the study of such possibilities, as a future step in the integration of the countries of the Mercosur.⁴¹

Finally, it should be remembered too that the creation of regional security systems would undermine the setting up of an Interamerican Intervention Force under the control of the Organization of American States, a project unlikely to be accepted by the Latin American countries.

5.3.2.3 Other Measures for Consolidating Peace on the Continent

Although the possible regional security systems may contribute to the establishment of "security areas" and therefore to peace in Latin America, there are other conventional means of keeping the peace already in existence or that can be implemented in the future.

- a. The diplomatic mechanisms within the OAS and the UN are known to be valuable and in many cases, those of the OAS particularly, have been effective.
- b. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) (Paris, 19.XII.90), the experience of the Council on Security and Co-

⁴⁰ Prepared by A.J. Deimundo Pifeiro, R.F. Domínguez, A.J. Herrera and H. Lobaiza, all retired senior officers of the Argentine army.

⁴¹ Other important papers have been prepared that tend in the same direction Otaño F. Hernández, C.E. Ladlaw and E. Lusso, with the same title and topic as the previous one, published in Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra N°504, Buenos Aires, Jan., Mar., 1992. The authors are also senior officers of the Argentine Army. Another, M. Donadio, G. Druetta and L. Tibiletti, "Los Nuevos Conceptos Sobre Seguridad Estratégica Regional", Seguridad Estratégica Regional, N°1, Bs.As., 1992. Another view favourable to the setting up of regional security systems, in S. Rubino, "La Reconversión Militar en América del Sur", Revista Española de Defensa, Año 5, N°51, May 1992.

operation in Europe and the "Helsinki tradition" hold useful principles and concepts that can easily be extended to Latin America. The communication of military movements, the setting up of a Center for Conflict Prevention and Crisis Processing in neutral countries (in relation to those who have disputes pending in the area) merely examples of paths to be explored.⁴²

- c. The areas of military cooperation in Research & Development, co-production of arms and equipment, combined exercises, are also accessible means, not only of cutting costs but also of extending mutual trust among the countries in the area.

5.3.3 Missions Under International Authority

"The military option of multinational forces will undoubtedly constitute the most legitimate response...to the disturbers of world order and coexistence... Every nation should have a moderate sized projection force in line with each State's potential permanently organized and prepared ...A projection contingent... should be multipurpose, ensuring that, with merely a change in the type of arms and equipment, it can take part in intervention, peace-keeping, observation or humanitarian aid forces, as necessary".⁴³ That is, that one sector of the armed forces should be in a position to act under international authority and be interoperable with the armed forces of the industrialized countries, be compatible with regard to doctrine, organization, language, communications frequencies, calibre of arms, etc. Conditions that are not easy to

⁴² See J. Walker, op. cit. in Note (36). For Central America see J. Child, (ed), "Conflict in Central America: Approaches to Peace and Security", St. Martin's Press, New York, 1986 and J. Child, "Cómo Verificar los Acuerdos de Paz y Fomentar la Confianza en América Central", *Geopolítica*, Vol. XV, N°39, Bs.As., 1989.

⁴³ J.O. Ferrer, loc. cit. in Note (39).

meet if we remember, for example, the difficulties in the Franco-German Brigade and in the internal peace force the Commonwealth of Independent States is preparing.

The problems are not only technical, since forces that take part in multinational operations should, at least in part, share cultural and social norms. On the continent, in the last few years Argentina has made the first steps,⁴⁴ which consolidate an earlier trend, by sending two frigates to the Operation for restoring independence to Kuwait in 1991 and a Battalion to serve with the UN Peace Force in Yugoslavia (April, 1992).⁴⁵ On 21.04.92, the Secretary for Military Affairs of the Argentine Ministry of Defence, Ferreira Pinho, requested the UN to set up a center in this country for training troops for peace-keeping operations. Argentina is also sending 75 members of its National Gendarmerie to Kampuchea and is studying the possibility of a greater participation of peace-keeping forces in that country.

In the official publication of the Argentine Army, peace-keeping missions under international authority are in second place, after only the mission of having "a credible (conventional) dissuasion capacity to discourage threats affecting vital interests".⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Acting as observers and verifiers of agreements for the UN, there are 6 officers in Palestine, 7 in Angola, 6 in Iraq-Kuwait and 15 in the Sahara. Another 29 Officers and NCOs, with fast boats, were in the Gulf of Fonseca (now in El Salvador to supervise the agreements with the guerrillas).

⁴⁵ The Chief of the Argentine Army General Staff, Lieutenant General M. Balza, said at the time that mission was: "...the most important overseas peace operation carried out by the Force".

⁴⁶ "Verde Oliva", N°2, June 1992.

Virgilio R. Beltrán

6. Epilogue

This paper can probably be seen as belonging to the field of science fiction or strategy fiction, since it is based on trends one believes are there, but that no-one can be sure will continue in the direction they currently indicate.

Perhaps too great a stress has been placed on the importance and the consequences of the technological gap between the industrialized countries of the Center and the rest of the world and its effects on international security relations, but this relationship seems to be the variable with the greatest explanatory capacity in the context of this paper.⁴⁷

Although it may appear arrogant to project current experience into the 21st Century, in such a changing world and hemispheric situation. But theoretical conceptualizations occasionally serve to provoke debate and orientate changes in reality. If so, they fulfil a positive function which I have ventured to try.

⁴⁷ P. Kennedy, "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers", Vintage Books, New York, 1989. The author stresses the relationship between industrial power and political and military power. On pp.150/157, for example, he points out the equalizing capacity among nations of industrial development.

Fernando Bustamante

The Latin American Armed Forces and the Return of the National Question

C O N T E N T S

Abstract

Introduction:

The Military as Modernizers in a Pluricultural Environment

Order and Chaos, Civilization and Barbarism

A Turn Towards Military Discourse as a Rhetoric of Sociability

National Identity as Built Upon Contests About its Meaning

Concluding Remarks: The Resources of Pluriculturalism

Abstract

Since the late XIX century the central concern of Latin American military establishments has been national sovereignty and territorial defense. After 1917 the struggle against communism became at least as important for officer corps around the region. But in these successive reshapings of priorities, older sources of threat and conflict seemed to get lost. This paper argues that the question of national unity, state formation and ethnic relations was a central and dominant issue in Latin American societies before the onset of modernization and military professionalization. Latin American states have not fully solved nor eliminated cleavages and centrifugal processes which may yet threaten the XIX century project of a state-centered nationhood. In fact, the retreat of communism and the gradual defusing of conventional border disputes may generate renewed struggles about national, regional, ethnic and identity claims. Thus, the illusion of a finished process of nation-building may soon be dispelled, much in the same way as in Central and Eastern Europe. These potential challenges to the authority of the centralist state may look particularly threatening and repugnant to local armed forces whose "raison d'être" and institutional ethos has been centered around the worship of the rational-legal form of the republican state. However, from a different perspective, this latent,- and in some cases already overt challenge- may be a valuable opportunity for civilian elites and military establishments to rethink the adequacy of the classic jacobin idea of the state and republican values.

We want to oppose the current military "common sense" regarding their organizational role vis-à-vis national identity and the nature of potential or actual challenges to it. This common sense may be seen as consisting of 1) prevalent arguments regarding a vision of the destiny and the telos of national political community, and 2) a discourse on the means and the role of the military in securing such ideas and desires. The military may come to see the nation as a series of open possibilities to be realized as "fate" or "destiny". The moral being of the officer

depends on this practical commitment to making those possibilities real. A redefinition of national identity and of what the military ought to defend may mean opening the rhetorical space of national security discourse to new possible "fates".

I explore the importance and relevance of national and ethnic questions for state security and for the military as an institution in post-Cold War Latin America. However, this concern will clash against the fact that in existing threat-perceptions and hypotheses guiding preparedness, the role of internal factors has been seen as resulting or conditioned by the impact of ideological struggles and rarely as independent aspects able to derail state-building on their own. It will become increasingly difficult to perform this connection. Thus, the role of sub-national security threats is bound, at least for some time, to function as a rather disorderly zone for defense intellectuals and policy-makers in the continent¹. My particular purpose is to make a contribution to the emerging awareness of the unresolved status of struggles and cleavages that the putative success of nation/state-building and the prominence of ideological and class conflict have obscured for many decades². This debate can be connected to the issues of **identity** and of **citizenship**, and with the discussion about the nature and domain

1. Roberto Calvo; La Doctrina Militar de la Seguridad Nacional; Caracas; Universidad Católica Andrés Bello; 1979; Joseph Comblin; La Doctrina de la Seguridad Nacional; Santiago; Vicaría de la Solidaridad; 1979.
2. See Alexandre de Souza Costa Barros; The Brazilian Military: Professional Socialization Political Performance and State Building; Ph.D. Dissertation; University of Chicago; 1978; Alfred Stepan; "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion"; in Alfred Atepan, ed.; Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies and Future; New Haven; Yale University Press; 1973.

of the post/jacobin state³. It is also linked to the topic of the overlap between the discourse of nationality and nationhood and of other types of perhaps submerged and non-ideological sources of political and social allegiance. When I speak about symbolic resources in the fringes as resources available for a new and more resilient nationhood I have in mind such activities as unrecognized linguistic and discursive centers, popular culture, regional identities, ethnic memories and histories, and a number of life-worlds that have to be denied, hidden and masked by Latin American states at the cost of becoming such states, in a manner legitimate to the eyes of the foreign possessors of the control of the post/revolutionary myths and symbols of nationality and statism⁴.

In the past, the common sense of state-builders (the military among them) has been that their task must consist of constructing order out of the threatening frontiers of disorder and the belief in that the identity and substance of the nation-state must be the result of the production of a homogeneous civilization⁵. Maybe it is time to consider this claims more seriously and ask whether the heroic attempt at imposing order as

3. On this see Hugo Frühling; Augusto Varas and Carlos Portales; Estado y Fuerzas Armadas; Santiago; FLACSO; 1982. For the Brazilian case: Edmundo Campos Coelho; Em Busca da Identidade: O Exército e a Política na Sociedade Brasileira; Rio de Janeiro; Forense Universitaria; 1976.
4. On the role of the myth of "european" identity in the formation of early military establishments in Latin America; see Frederick Nunn; "An Overview of the European Military Missions in Latin America"; in The Politics of Anti-Politics; Brian Loveman and Thomas Davies eds.; Lincoln; Nebraska; Nebraska University Press; 1978.
5. Costa Barros; op. cit.; Campos Coelho; op. cit.; P. F. Castro Martinez; Fronteras Abiertas: Expansionismo y Geopolítica del Brasil Contemporáneo; México; Siglo XXI; 1980; Goldbery de Couto e Silva; Geopolítica do Brasil; Rio de Janeiro; Editorial José Olympio; 1967.

equal identity or sameness may be the condition of perpetual reproduction of a threatening internal environment. The very nature of the object of military sociology may have helped silence the complex web of complicities and linkages that exist between statist centralization and the reproduction of disordered marginality, and this marginality may yet become a serious limit to the consolidation of stable republican government and national unity.

Introduction:

The Military as Modernizers in a Pluricultural Environment

The view of the Latin American state as not only a set of institutions and actors ordered according to the western matrix of the nation/state, but as an ecological system of culturally pluralist life-worlds, which interact in a disorderly form and in a disorder-reproducing fashion with the rational-legal organization of citizenship, has a number of implications: 1) for the nature of the state-institutions involved; 2) for the nature of the resources to which, as organizations, they can have access in order to achieve stability and resilience; and 3) for their ability to perform their perceived tasks. Thus, before turning specifically to a discussion of the nature of nationhood and ethnicity in Latin America, I would like to make some remarks concerning the nature of the military role in this context, and about the relationship between the military sense of order and social discipline and its more disorderly and de-centered surroundings.

There are many ways in which we can define the military as an institution or organization⁶. From the perspective of the formation and

6. For an overview: Stanislav Andreski, *Military Organization and Society*, London; Routledge and Paul Klegan; 1968; Rafael Banon y Jose Antonio Balmada; *La Institución Militar y el Estado Contemporáneo*; Madrid; Alianza; 1985. Charles Moskos and Frank Wood; *The Military: More than Just a Job*; Elmsford Park; New York; Pergamon Press; 1987.

reproduction of a national community, we may choose to define the armed forces by their situation in a communication and interaction network. We may assume that in its capacity as a putatively rational, universalistic, rule-bounded collective actor, the military organization is forced to legitimize itself by continuously providing a justified(able) account of its actions and purposes to others when required to do so, or at least to possess and produce a stock of latent accounts of its functionality within a society that sustains them as a result of its desire and effort to become part of modernity⁷. In fact, we must remember that the contemporary military establishments in Latin America were created by governments to wishing to "produce" modernity and become part of the coveted history of progress⁸. A professional military force was part of their attempt at becoming "civilized nations"⁹. Therefore the Latin American military bear the permanent burden of being answerable to

7. Here we loosely draw from Habermas and his concept of communicative acting as developed in J. Habermas; *Communication and the Evolution of Society*; Boston; Beacon Press; 1979; and in J. Habermas; *The Theory of Communicative Action I: Reason and the Rationalization of Society*; Boston; Beacon Press; 1984.

8. L. North; *Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile and Peru*; Berkeley, California; Institute for International Studies; 1966; Alain Joxe; *Las Fuerzas Armadas en el Sistema Político Chileno*; Santiago de Chile; Editorial Universitaria; 1970; Frederick Nunn; *The Military in Chilean History*; Albuquerque; New Mexico; University of New Mexico Press; 1976; Augusto Varas and Felipe Agüero; *El Proyecto Político Militar*; Santiago de Chile; FLACSO; 1984; Augusto Varas; *La Política de las Armas en América Latina*; Santiago de Chile; FLACSO; 1988.

9. Frederick Nunn; *Yesterday's Soldiers: European Military Professionalism in South America 1890-1940*; Lincoln; University of Nebraska Press; 1983.

this movement towards modernity¹⁰. The military are part of this strained effort to belong in the West and of producing nationhood as understood in the West.

As part of this self-conscious and insecure, voluntaristic, induced, fabricated quest for civilization, they have to provide institutional accounts that tell a story about their origins and fate. This story must be narrated in the language and in the terms of free rationality that properly belongs to the normal discourse of the post-revolutionary nation-state. They are required to devote considerable effort to posing "valid reasons" for the existence of their job and its situated performance. This, however is not sufficient. The military cannot be content with describing themselves or allowing others to describe them as a mere instrumental means to some task that once performed will justify discarding or reducing the organization. Military institutions generate a discourse that will posit them as ends in themselves, as the collective moral equivalent of a kantian person.

For the military image to be consistent, it must be described as endogenously motivated. The "good" reasons behind the existence and the survival of the military in Latin America have to stress the theme of autonomy¹¹. Military institutions can and must exist over and above all other components of the state. They must have privileged links with moral entities, not with specific persons or other organizations. They can depend of and serve only universal values, but not concrete actors. In this sense the military have to gain recognition of their ontological

10. On the nature and structure of military professionalism as a part of political modernization, see Bengt Abrahamson, Military Professionalism and Political Power, Beverly Hills, California; Sage, 1972.

11. On military autonomy in Latin America; see Augusto Varas, La Autonomía Militar en América Latina; Caracas, Nueva Sociedad; 1988.

connection with values that don't depend on their organizational links to other wills¹².

Military autonomy is not an accident or a deviant mishap of the process of building a professional identity; it is a transcendental condition that enables the military to provide a rational account of their identity and role¹³. They can't give an account based in their instrumentality to groups, because groups are in themselves targets for their task. The real, concrete human associations in the territory they control are not yet "reasonable", civilized, ordered. Therefore, they can't be the moral or pragmatic bosses of a self-respecting officer corps¹⁴. The military are brought into this chaotic scene in order to act as civilizers, as those who are to teach the barbarians within how to become "normal" and disciplined citizens. But the barbarian is not only the gaucho or the cangaceiro, he is also deeply imbedded in the day to day mores and undertakings of the civilizer himself. Therefore, the task of modernization involves also a rigorous and anxious self-vigilance to detect and uproot the intra-subjective heathen, the Indian we all carry (or may carry) within ourselves. After all, colonial experience brought all castes and races together in the "casa patronal", introducing in the life of Spaniards and Creoles all the habits, mores and practices of the non-European subject.

12. Moskos and Woods, op. cit.; also Fruhling, Varas and Portales; op. cit.; A. Polloni; Las Fuerzas Armadas de Chile en la Vida Nacional: Compendio Cívico-Militar, Santiago de Chile; Ed. Andrés Bello; 1972.

13. Augusto Pinochet; El Día Decisivo. 11 de Septiembre de 1973; Santiago de Chile; Ed. Andrés Bello; 1979, and Carlos Prats González, Memorias: Testimonio de un Soldado; Santiago de Chile, Pehuen Editores; 1985.

14. Liisa North; "Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile and Peru"; Politics of Modernization Series; No.2; Berkeley; Institute of International Studies; 1966.

The Latin American military have therefore to be perpetually on guard against not only the 'others' outside the barracks or the state, but also against the 'other' inside. The enemy is society itself: it must be policed for its own good and redemption; but worse, the ranks can also be the enemy inside, and have also to be regarded with suspicion.

Civilization and autonomy appear as founding pillars of the Latin American military-justifying discourse. Civilization because society outside was created and is continuously recreated as a mission, as a place where there is no other legitimate justification than the eternal and self-reproducing process of teaching "others" how to be civilized, of rescuing someone from barbarism. This crusade must not eliminate the external, but perpetuate it as something which is being incorporated but can not and will never be fully and permanently fused with the civilizing nucleus. Autonomy because the civilizing mission has to be free from instrumentation, because actors are actual or potential bearers of barbarism and barbarian desires or habits. Society is not -in this perspective- the roots or "infrastructure" of military activity, but a target, a raw material, something that has to be acted upon and shaped from outside¹⁵.

It is thus important to discover how the strangeness of the surroundings are reworked in military discourse, for instance to see how judgments are structured about what is familiar or unfamiliar, obvious or open to discourse, similar or dissimilar, strange or commonplace, repugnant or awesome etc. It is also crucial to understand how military ethos in Latin America divides the world among ends and means, transcendental values and entities that can not be used for other goals, who is to be taken seriously and who is not, who can be ignored and

15. Frank McCann; *The Brazilian Army and the Problem of Mission 1939-1964*; *Journal of Latin American Studies*; Vol. 12; part 1; May 1980.

who can be dismissed or despised and so on¹⁶. It is very important to understand that military life is still to a high degree a frontier activity, something that is lived not only in terms of the topography of borders, but in terms of a moral cartography that exists only insofar as it is possible to reproduce the threatening/threatened presence of someone out there in the borders.

The military in this region will continuously try to demonstrate to their audience that the essence and core of their autonomy and ontological stand depends heavily on a certain ethical relationship with the civilian world¹⁷. This specific "ethnicity" of their relationship to their environment will define the types of actions and situations in which they can fulfill a significant role. In fact, it will define certain values and moral places as the preserve and the specific domain of military performance¹⁸. The place of other ethnic groups in the events surrounding the progress of missionary modernity will be derived from a scale of where each group stands in the unfolding of this drama. The self-validation of the officer corps requires the construction of social "others" that can perform as the privileged clientele of their teachings.

This is why the military will define so eminently their link to education and will almost everywhere put a pressure on civilian institutions to have them recognized and include the barracks as crucial educational locus of youth, and especially young people coming from

16. G.Munizaga; *El Discurso Publico de Pinochet: Un Análisis Semiológico*; Buenos Aires; CLACSO; 1983; C.Perelli; *Convencer o Someter. El Discurso Militar*; Montevideo; Ediciones la Banda Oriental; 1987.

17. Polloni; *op. cit.*; Prats; *op. cit.*; Stepan; *op. cit.* 1973

18. A.Ruiz Noboa; *La Misión del Ejército*; Bogotá; Imprenta de las Fuerzas Armadas; 1960; A.Ruiz Noboa; *El Gran Desafío*; Bogotá; Ediciones del Tercer Mundo; 1965.

culturally heterogeneous populations not fully assimilated to the idealized sameness of the centralizing state¹⁹.

But, if the importance of the military mission depends to an extent on finding someone to modernize (civilize), it is important also to accept that the consequences of this process have to be serious. Either it is crucial to "make citizens" or it is crucial to prevent the rejection of proper citizenship from undermining the coherence and survival of the civilizing nucleus. The military need to show that the lack of "integrating" efforts will have deleterious impacts on the nation or that the persistence of difference will negate the ultimate moral telos of political order. However, this will make the notion of citizenship not a cluster of formal rights and duties, but will tend to equate true and proper citizenship with the ability to master the habits and cultural equipment of a given civilization. In order to be a citizen, the "other" must be able to behave, think, feel and look like a proper and well-trained member of the civilizing eurocentric nucleus. Citizenship becomes more than just a form of political and juridical participation. It is a spiritual, physical, aesthetic and ethical partaking of a common cultural heritage. Insofar as the non modern populations reproduce their own civilizational autonomy they are to be denied the status of full and rightful participants, unless, of course they accept a certain degree of tutelage by state-centered actors, including the armed forces. Citizenship is seen not as a mere way of organizing the peaceful survival of differences, but as a certain "moral community" centered around a perfectionistically defined ethical life, in which people are enjoined to indefinitely pursue the most excellent mastery of the art of being properly cultivated.

19. Carlos Maldonado; "Sobre la Doctrina y Función de las FFAA Chilenas: el caso del Servicio Militar Obligatorio"; in *Cuadernos ESIN-4*; Instituto para el Nuevo Chile; Santiago; 1985.

I don't intend here to go into a detailed phenomenology of how this is achieved in everyday institutional life. I just want to point towards the nature of the task and insist on the fact that this search for identity and its reproduction is an ongoing and arduous undertaking, which leaves all sorts of traces in practice, discourse and doctrine²⁰. In order to achieve this organizational stasis, the armed forces have to work hard to reproduce the political and social conditions that undergird their sense of mission, and that includes a certain commitment to guiding ideas about modernity, authority, order and autonomy²¹. This burdensome nature is particularly clear and evident when the breakdown of social order and of routine politics threatens the peculiar way in which military life relates to civilian environments²². But it is also evident when certain typical breakdowns and stresses cease to function as a guide to military activity. The end of the East/West conflict as structured after 1917 is such a case. The threat consists now in the fact that the peculiar underlying "agon" of military life seems on the verge of losing its sense and reality, and military life is organized around agonistic premises.

20. Munizaga; *op. cit.*; Perelli; *op. cit.*; Stepan; *op. cit.*; 1973

21. About this see, from different theoretical perspectives: Samuel Huntington; *Political Order in Changing Societies*; New Haven; Connecticut; Yale University Press; 1968, and Morris Janowitz; *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis*; Chicago; Chicago University Press; 1964; Amos Perlmutter; *The Military and politics in Modern Times*; New Haven; Connecticut; Yale University Press; 1977; Jacques Van Doorn; *The Military Profession and Military Regimes*; The Hague; Mouton; 1969; Norbert Lechner; *Estado y Política en América Latina*; Mexico; Siglo XXI; 198; Augusto Varas; *op. cit.*; 1988.

22. See Huntington *ibid.*; and Morris Janowitz and Jacques Van Doorn; *On Military Ideology*; Rotterdam; Rotterdam University Press; 1971 and Jacques Van Doorn; *The Soldier and Social Change*; Beverly Hills; California; 1975. L. North; *op. cit.*

The issue of civilizational clash may easily take its place, especially since it points back toward a deeper and older layer of institutional historic experience²³. But it also may bring forth new and renewed efforts to reshape the current doctrines in order to reconstitute a military telos in terms of opposition and struggle against the internal uncivilized, just when world events and cultural currents are giving ample proof that the questions of ethnicity and national identity are far from being "dead issues". The experiences of Central and Eastern Europe can easily be taken by new contestatory elites as an invitation to mobilize relatively dormant issues about national identity and the nature of the national state. If the Ukrainians can successfully challenge a status quo which goes back to the XVII century, there is nothing, in principle, that forbids the Andean native ethnic groups to attempt a similar challenge, albeit in vastly different modalities.

Order and Chaos, Civilization and Barbarism

The "national" fact and ethnicity have been up to the present conceptualized as emanating from some sort of "natural" source. In the discourse of nationalism, identity has tended to be elaborated as the result of a will to organize something that pre-exists as a matter of objective fact, independent from any constructivist will to create the grounds of community²⁴. I claim, however, that little in human affairs is directly derived from a putative natural state, from a pre-social and pre-symbolic reality. Human beings create the roots of their circumstances, and ethnicity is such a creation. The images of national identity are a second nature, the result of processes of signification and rationalization

23. See Alfred Vaghts, *History of Militarism, Romance and Realities of a Profession*; New York; Norton; 1959. F.Nunn, *op. cit.*;

24. Campos Coelho; *op.cit.*; Munizaga; *op. cit.*

of desires and practical considerations. In this way, societies and people can be said to be responsible for how they live. To do this, humans must not only institute certain ways of being, but also create stable mechanisms of learning and relearning. We may find it useful to retain Bateson's concept of deuterolearning: a type of knowledge about the ways in which we choose to learn; "metalearning". The question of the change of values, self-images and national/ethnic identity is not only linked to the values we believe in, but also to the types of interactions that will create opportunities for new ways of learning to arise. It has to do with correction and with procedures of correction. The question is then: how can we think of ways in which the defense establishments in ethnically pluralist societies can learn to generate new procedures for relearning their environment and reshaping their organizational culture in ways that are compatible with the peaceful and universalistic cohabitation of this differences?

Organizations able to perform this feat may have their actions fit with those sanctioned by the "other" and may be seen by the latter as expression or presence of a "free existence". Potential challengers will accept interaction if the state-oriented actors become accountable to their own sense of identity. The only way in which we can envision the long-term maintenance of national identity is by continuous interaction and its discursive regulation of countless everyday transactions at the borders between different socially constructed types of social life.

We can also bring into the discussion the results of the work by physicists like Prigogine which have shown that the second law of thermodynamics works differently for systems which maintain a flow of continuous interaction with their environment²⁵. Thus, for this type of system the predicted tendency for a slide into increasing disorder or chaos is checked under specific conditions. They will proceed from

25. IPrigogine and IStengers; *Order Out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue With Nature*. New York; Bantham Books; 1984.

disorder and instability toward increasing order and stability. But this type of so-called **dissipative structures** have the additional "virtue" of being able to create in their environment the conditions for their own reproduction and extended survival. Dissipative structures result from ceaseless activity at the boundaries and they create their own suitable environment.

If we apply this finding to military institutions we suggest that their stability and existence are not best secured by isolation and refusal to enter into significant interactions with the national community²⁶. Their stability and the stability of the national state will be better promoted if they engage in "boundary" re-building at their limits, and they will also be able to reshape the ethnic milieu in which they function, so as to create the kind of national identity that may resist the internal challenges of a newly assertive infra-nationalism. But this interaction can not be the mere imposition on the "other" of values and symbols that are preserved inside the barracks as sanctuaries of some original and ontologically untouchable "national essence"²⁷. The new stability entails an engagement in working together at re-learning what statehood and its defence may mean if the needs and symbols of the non-eurocentric populations are taken seriously into account.

In using the idea of interactively created and maintained structures (Prigogine)²⁸, I am trying to exploit such insights to understand a

26. Take for instance the typical attitudes prevailing in many South American armies as studied by Genaro Arriagada; El Pensamiento Político de los Militares: Estudios Sobre Chile, Argentina, Brasil y Uruguay, Santiago-Chile, CISEC, 1981.

27. Good examples of this way of thinking about the nature of the nation can be found for instance in: Augusto Pinochet; Geopolítica; Santiago; Andrés Bello, 1974; or, from a different political perspective in, F.Lansdazabal Reyes; La Integración Nacional; Bogotá; Planeta, 1987.

28. I.Prigogine and I.Stengers; op. cit.

potential "new way" military establishments may become relevant for a peaceful reconstruction of the symbols of national identity which seemingly are becoming vulnerable to ethnically-based questioning.

This implies taking seriously the relevance of discourse and of the phenomenology of everyday cultural intercourse as shaped in routine confrontations of the armed forces with their internal frontier. A structure of civilian-military relations that denies certain participants the possibility of fully recognizing themselves in the process of boundary building and that can not offer them a certain form of ownership of military symbology can not be stable and resilient to challenges from within. A political system that isolates the military from their actual and symbolic surroundings, allowing their constituent institutional meanings to be formed in a way that doesn't recognize the ontological needs of the "other," is not a reasonable and legitimate national political order.

The arguments that a sense of order can be only elaborated by confrontation with images of chaos, disorder, spontaneity, the physical, "natural", preliterate, can be found in authors such as Bakhtin, Huizinga and Vygotsky²⁹. However, the exclusive concern of the military and military sociology with the issue of order and modernity have obscured discussion of the rationally necessary fear of disorder and playfulness that underlies the structure of civility and order-building discourse in the barracks. The emphasis on security covers up the systematic ways in which insecurity and spontaneity are constructed and projected on actors that have to be symbolically nurtured in order to be able to sustain a certain identity-giving sense of mission and "well-ordered-civility"³⁰. Ideas about what national security and progress are, about what civilized

29. M.Bakhtin; Rabelais and His World; Cambridge; MIT Press, 1965. J.Huizinga; Homo Ludens; London; Routledge and Keegan Paul; 1949; L.S.Vygotsky; Thought and Language; Cambridge; Massachusetts; MIT Press, 1962.

30. Campos Coelho; op. cit.; McCann; op. cit.; Maldonado; op. cit. 1985

order is and how it must be promoted and defended are part of a half-perceived effort to exorcise the threatening negativity of an "anarchic state of nature" as symbolized by the Indian or the African. Our disciplinary discourse has tended to silence this original fact and has rather tended to discuss whether the military have chosen the right instrumental concepts in the search for progress and civilizational advances. The issue has centered on whether these conceptual and doctrinaire means have been consistent with the avowed goals of nation-building and preservation of order/stability³¹.

A Turn Towards Military Discourse as a Rhetoric of Sociability

We have to look at new and innovative ways in which we can lift the, in terms of a discourse that meets the "other" on her own terms. Contemporary military institutions can be seen as extreme expressions of a "Cartesian will" and of the epistemic "panoptic" model described by Foucault³². In this vein the moralities of social life have to be secured through permanent surveillance of the minute details of behavior and attitude. This surveillance is aimed at assuring that a target population, which is seen as a pure passive object waiting to be transformed by the active rational-instrumental agent, conforms and internalizes a lifestyle that is morally secured by the operations of the "cogito". These moral principles and lifestyles can be seen as permanent universals that must be secured against and in the midst of rejected pluralistic manners. The ways and mores have to be disciplined and controlled from a privileged moral vantage point that can be in some way expressed in terms of the ratio: numerically organized and mechanically articulated.

31. Costa Barros; *op. cit.*; Frank McCann; "Origins of the New Professionalism of the Brazilian Military"; *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*; Vol.21; No.4; November, 1979.

32. M.Foucault; *Vigilar y Castigar*; Mexico; Siglo XXI, 1983.

Ethnic differences and particularism question this ratio by the sheer display of their gratuity, variety and whimsical allure. Recuperating interaction with the internal "other" means recuperating interaction with those variegated social worlds and with those recesses within subjectivity that provide their underpinnings. This means a friendly reevaluation of the civilizational contents so far rejected into the realms of the irrational or unprogressive. More strongly, it means- though it seems farfetched from our perspective of present military sociability- recapturing a sense of the subjective which incorporates the bodily as aesthetics and as expression of style, manners and rhetoric³³. In a way, the military may have to rethink social bonds in terms not of mechanical intellect and calculus, but in terms of display, panache and the festive.

In brief, I propose a historic shift which implies a break with the effort of building security and order as a Cartesian exercise in limiting the role of forms of participatory consciousness in building state-legitimacy. This implies self-reconstruction of the image of the barracks and of the frontier as a panoptical enterprise of disciplinary surveillance, but also self-reconstruction of the military ethos so as to assimilate and incorporate the styles of thinking, feeling and judging that are more consistent with the so-called "barbaric" stage of civilization. This may be seen as a call for a renewal of the ethos of the warrior and the swordsman against that of the professional bureaucrat in uniform³⁴. Of

33. M.Billig; *Arguing and Thinking: a Rethorical Approach to Social Psychology*; London; Cambridge University Press; 1987.

34. In the literature on military sociology, the dominant paradigm is concerned with understanding the nature of military professionalism as part of the process of modernization and of rationalization. A useful treatment of these issues can be found in B.Abrahamsson; *Military Professionalism and Political Power*, Beverly Hills, California; Sage; 1972; Rafel Banon and Jose antonio Balmeda eds.; *La Institución Militar y el Estado Contemporáneo*; Madrid; Alianza; 1985; S.Huntington; *The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*; Cambridge, Massachusetts; Harvard University Press, 1957; Sam

course, I am not suggesting that an unmediated return to Cyrano will do. I propose that symbolic resources harking back, for instance, to baroque "panache", may be reworked into the fabric of modern military organization and professional ethos as part of an effort to create a meaningful rhetoric community with non-eurocentric populations and ethnic groups.

As an illustration, I wish to show how the Cartesian cognitive style is reworked into professional militarism, and how it may be re-interpreted in discursive exercise targeted at reconstructing state-centered identities so as to make them less foreign to potentially rebellious internal groups. The Cartesian "mind" can be seen in its military garb in the following:

a) Systematic doubt is translated as systematic suspicion and worst case analysis of intentions: the hobbesian attitude towards alter. Doubt about the truth of ideas and sensations is replicated in suspicion about all environments not under direct hierarchical command in the military organization: the logic of permanent omnidirectional surveillance of others who are bound to be potentially "untrue", that is treacherous, covetous, aggressive, greedy. Humanity itself can only be boarded through the gate of critical doubt applied to the realm of practical reason.

b) Reality is composed of atoms which in turn conform to laws of mechanical motion. Foucault has shown how this framework was worked into XVIII century military tactics and strategy³⁵. Military movements are geometrical operations in n-dimensional space. The

Sarkesian; Beyond the Battlefield: The New Military Professionalism; New York; Pergamon Press; 198; Edward Feit; The Armed Bureaucrats: Military Administrative Regimes and Political Development; Boston; Houghton Mifflin; 1973.

35. M.Foucault; op. cit.

proper environment of military dynamics is space and time, and the military mind works continual permutations of these dimensions. More important, if reality is atomistic, and atoms are ultimately irreducible realities, then social "atoms" (agents, actors, states, parties etc.) are seen as ultimate, unchanging "solid" billiard balls which may move differently according to vectors of force, but can not be ontologically decomposed further or seen as something other than "rock bottom" entities. Social life and military sociability may also be seen as the "movement" of ultimate particles that can be affected by forces in different directions and shapes, but whose essential reality is ultimately unchangeable or unknowable. Behavior is a result of force-driven conditioning. This in turn will warrant a manipulatory conception of interaction.

c) The world is pure external objectivity and is devoid of any mental content. The world lacks "mind", and can be deprived of all moral being and treated as such. Likewise, in military terms, the object of action, allies or enemies, potential or actual foes or just bystanders, populations or publics, are understood as lacking any relevant claim to being considered moral "minds". They can be helpful or harmful, facilitators or obstructions, but they are faced as pure *res extensa*: as external to the participatory structures of human interaction. Once a person or group enters strategic analysis it ceases to be a personality and become sheer mindless object. Some repressive "pathologies" witnessed in the seventies can be understood as the outcome of this ideal modality which is the result of the fact that "otherness" can only appear as pure objectuality once it becomes a military target or element of military calculation: bodies and minds that become such mindless natural entities can not be treated as "human" and as endowed with inherent rights. Torture is just another form of objectual manipulation whose only accountability is to be seen in terms of its efficacy in producing certain results: information, behavioral modification, psychological deterrence.

d) Scientific (respectable) knowledge has been **methodically** proven to be true. What counts is not what is said, but that it is said according to some specified method. Likewise, the Latin American military ethos will emphasize a procedural concept of value and worth. For instance, displays of courage or initiative can only be appreciated and accepted as canonical models of conduct insofar as they conform to certain "methodology" of military manners: the fetishism of due process and "conducto regular". What makes something a meaningful, acceptable, valid, legitimate part of military life, is the mechanism, the steps, the codified protocol in which it is inserted. A heroic or commendable deed is only accepted as such if compatible or contributing to the reinforcement of the "right" military method. Thus, the same act can be labeled as "foolhardy indiscipline" or "heroic sacrifice" depending on the processual method of its performance. As a consequence, there must be one and only one right way of making things and of being a rightful human being or soldier.

e) Knowledge is a "possession" and we can become its owners. In this sense we can interpret the way in which military organizations will see information as an esoteric value to be protected from outsiders. True security-related knowledge can only be produced by the methods proper to the organization and it must be retained within its boundaries as secret. Any effort to disperse and socialize this knowledge will be seen as a dangerous and destabilizing betrayal. This applies even if we know that most of that knowledge can be easily obtained by other military establishments. But finally, it seems, it is more acceptable that potential enemy armed forces know than that laypeople, "gentiles" get access to that information. Therefore, military secret is not only instrumentally useful knowledge to be shielded from competitors or potential foes, but also, and maybe more basically, the retention of control over esoteric values. In a similar vein, discussion of military matters with civilians will be resented as a devaluation of the secluded and unpolluted nature of the owned esoteric knowledge, unless of course, as a means of

educating and indoctrinating an "other" which can only be linked to knowledge as a trainee, public and passive object of teaching.

f) Any disagreement is a symptom of error. This can be extended to the ways in which opinion is treated in military practice: in professional matters there must be one right doctrine, and disagreement is threatening because it opens the possibility of eroding the legitimacy of command, which is based on the idea that disagreement can be only a methodological step. Once true knowledge has been produced, disagreement can only be the result of non-cognitive interests bent on destroying the authority of command which is based on the correct administration of institutional "savoir faire". Similarly, in the organizational relationships with the "outer" world, the assumption is that there is only one and unique civilized "way". Plurality of manners, mores and habits may be a symptom that the right civilized know-how has not been found or has not been duly recognized. In relating to other ethnic groups, the assumption is that cultural traits that appear to differ from the modern eurocentric canon must be somehow "wrong", imperfect and must be corrected, reshaped and eradicated. This has been particularly clear in the experiences of conscription, civic action and supported colonizations. In some cases military officers have even tried to teach ethnic civilians the "right" hairstyle or wearing western dress etc.

There is an alternative way of facing the "other", especially the ethnic or national **internal foreigner**. This alternative emerges as a result of a critique of the limits of Cartesian ways of knowledge³⁶. This critique can only have currency insofar as the target populations may resist and be resilient against the imposition of a form of national state-centered modernity. Their rebellion in Latin America has, to the present, not been within that modernity, but against it and past the

36. For instance, see P.J.Davies and R.Hersh; *Descartes Dream: The World According to Mathematics*; Sussex, Harvester, 1981.

Cartesian system of values and ideas. The question therefore is whether there is some other cultural *habitus* that will enhance the ability of national armed forces to obtain support or buy peace from these groups without resorting to pure physical coercion in the East and Central European mode.

In that direction it can be argued that the alternative mirror image of the Cartesian mode should be:

a) Science is not based on doubt, but on the common assent to a narrative possessing a certain rhetorical force (Lyotard)³⁷. In terms of the epistemology of the military mind, vis a vis the non eurocentric world, a persuasive attitude should be constructed out of the suspension of Hobbesian fear and suspicion and out of the active search for a narrative, story, or myth which can be elaborated persuasively in interaction with the "other". In this case, the military should strive not for prudence and security against threats, but as convincing and compelling displays of symbolic resources that can capture the imagination of the internal stranger. In dealing with wild animals, guns and bonfires are a typical "western" strategy. However there are alternative symbolic means: the magic flute for instance, offers the image of a hero which can handle threat and fear by fascination and art. This implies a transformation of armed institutions from a defence based on vigilance to a defense based on creating the symbolic equivalents of the magic flute: the military task of fascinating the potential foe into accepting peace and community out of the rhetorical (not cognitive or intellectual) force of the physical, aesthetic, narrative and symbolic resources enacted by the organization.

b) As both Prigogine and Giddens have illustrated, social life is a continuous flux of activity composed of zones of both chaos and self-

37. J.F.Lyotard; *The Post-Modern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*; Manchester, University of Manchester Press; 1984.

reproducing order³⁸. In the Cartesian mode zones of chaos can only be seen from without and the relationship that can be established with them is a manipulation that attempts to force them into a certain order or (mechanical and mathematical) pattern³⁹. In an alternative mode the "right" epistemic position vis-à-vis otherness and "chaotic" (deviant, barbaric, anomic, undisciplined) fluxes of social activity (i.e. life in the shantytowns in Lima or Rio de Janeiro) is to see them not as alternatives to order, but as a reservoir of as yet uncodified resources with which order is being constructed. This non-eurocentric, "organic" lifeworld may be seen as a primeval broth in which nuclei of organization are actively reinventing and recreating as yet unrecognized forms of cohesion and order. Rather than being limits to order, they may be seen as nutrients for order and for the reinvention of order.

c) The only adequate way in which state actors (like the military) can creatively interact with this fused complex of order and chaos is by refusing the temptation to see disordered zones of activity as pure physical entities to be controlled, but as zones which can only be influenced from "within them". This means rejecting the model of the outsider intervening in a group, and accepting a dialectic of mutual modification. The military can hope to gain the loyalty of the barbarian only insofar as it becomes involved with him/her and develops "impure" complicities with the areas of disorder.

d) In a non-Cartesian mode, and as Rorty has insisted, the relevant social knowledge we propose belongs to "practical reason" and is of a moral nature⁴⁰. The kind of knowledge the military need to deal with the

38. A.Giddens; *The Constitution of Society*; Cambridge, Polity Press, 1984. I.Prigogine and I.Stengers, *op. cit.*

39. See Davies and Hersh; *op. cit.*

40. R.Rorty; *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*; Oxford; Blackwell; 1980.

internal foreigner cannot be analytically deduced from a constituted "scientific" doctrine: it has to be practically proven in meaningful interactions with the counterparts. It is not science but a "social art" or a moral endeavor.⁴¹

e) Knowledge is not "owned" like we own a car. Knowledge is embodied, it is lived, it exists in ourselves. The piano player doesn't "know" piano playing; piano playing is incorporated in his/her somatic and neurological being. As Bhaskar has shown, knowledge is a matter not only of epistemology but a matter of ontology⁴². Present training practices intuitively accept this. Soldiering involves more than learning a certain theory or information, it involves creating the "bodies" of soldiers and the "bodies" of commanders. Knowledge is in-corporated.

a. Relinquishing information is not equivalent to giving ourselves away. The same information the military possess is useless in hands that have not gone through the process of true in-corporation. b. The only sense in which we can learn about the "others", the potentially rebellious national groups, is not through the collection of "intelligence", but by the process of bodily co-participation in their own patterned ways of life. The Latin American military may learn to become the "other" in order to establish a new (national) community with the "other". c) Finally, the model of knowledge as systems may have to be modified. In fact a more adequate image will be that of an argument in which participants question each other's formulations. Perhaps the best way of facing the national question could be to see it as a discursive search of "common places", rather than as the discovery of a natural preestablished

41. E.L.Duhalde; El Estado Terrorista Argentino; Buenos Aires; Ediciones el Caballito; 1983 and Michael Klare and Peter Koornbluh, eds.; Low Intensity Warfare; New York; Pantheon Books; 1988.

42. R. Bhaskar; Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation; London, Verso; 1986.

ontological identity⁴³. National being can be seen as the common places resulting from the process of arguing about who we are and what we want to do together. But in that case we are talking not of preordained essences or of preestablished destinies, but have to become open to a continuous discursive flow of alternative stories about national identity, and stories must be -perhaps paradoxically - permanently open to incorporating those who dwell in what we perceive as chaos or beyond the limits of accepted civilization.

You can only convince those who share your same epistemic universe. In confronting other cultures, conviction is a form of violence. In inter-cultural dialogue, persuasion becomes the crucial tool. Persuasion refers to multiple strategies which can be used to achieve assent in specific audiences. Conviction is related to the deduction of necessary consequences from accepted universal premises. It refers to what all rational individuals can accept as true by application of method⁴⁴. The problem arises when there is no such common sense of what a rational individual is and what those universal procedures and axioms are. The question is how to face people who may not be convinced, because their modes of knowledge, their epistemic equipment, is vastly different from that embodied into the eurocentric, modernizing state.

For many of these populations the emotional and the aesthetic have not gone through the debasing that they have suffered in the hands of the western logos. They have retained to a larger extent the sense that the "body knows". A strategy of rationalistic, ideological, pedagogical

43. See Jose de Meira Matos; Brasil, Geopolítica e Destino; Rio de Janeiro; Olympio; 1975.

44. W.Booth; Modern Dogma and the Rethoric of Assent; Chicago; Chicago University Press; 1974.

hegemony can not reach the core of this type of subjectivity⁴⁵. These populations are best at handling other sorts of epistemic resources, which tend to be more rhetorical-poetic, participatory, somatic and kinesthetic. In that context the art of persuading can be a non-despicable nor epistemologically debased art of seduction and involvement.

Modern ideology has obscured the fact that the arts of scientific deduction are useless when decisions have to be taken under real conditions of information scarcity and time-constraints, and when the structure of the problem or the situation blocks the possibility of rational calculation, when there are no commonly accepted first truths or universal epistemologies. In these cases something has to be done, and actors will necessarily fall back on the arts of persuasion. Thus, the role of the military as agents of internal order could be seen as three-fold: the application of physical force, the function of ideological hegemony within modernity and of aesthetic persuasion vis a vis non-ideological, non-modern, sub-national groups.

The allegiance of a sub-national group, then, is not obtained by a cost-benefit rational calculation by the group or by its acceptance of the correct theoretical grounds for respecting the state, but by the provision of plausible practical reasons why the persons involved should, in specific situations, assent or comply or obey. They do not demand that people become believers⁴⁶, but they invite belief by providing agreeable grounds to contemplate and by enticements based both on their rhetorical form and their libidinal content⁴⁷. The question is how an internal national security doctrine can incorporate and institutionalize rhetorical and erotico-aesthetic pragmatics towards the non-modern

45. For the meaning in which I use the concept of hegemony here: A.Gramsci; *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*; London; Lawrence and Wishart; 1971.

46. W.Booth; *op. cit.*

47. See K.Burke; *op. cit.*

worlds within and the non-modern components of the subjectivity in eurocentric actors, including, of course, the military themselves.

Interestingly, one possible conclusion is that dealing with the "other" may entail accepting a mode of preparedness which lowers the profile and importance of "certainty" and control of the unexpected in order to maximize the capacity for improvisation and full bodily participation in the unexpected. This implies accepting that there is not and need not be preestablished formal definitions of what behaviors or cultural traits are acceptable, or of what is compatible with state-ruled modernity. Maybe it is time to resurrect an appreciation of the full value of "phronesis", the Aristotelian art of prudent and situationally cogent action⁴⁸. It also seems possible to give more acceptance to the idea of virtuoso improvisation of what is acceptable and adequate.

Though it may seem shocking and counterintuitive, no organization can hope to establish a codified and explicit answer to what must be the right security doctrine in facing inter-cultural conflicts. One can only point to what is done at actual points of contact (i.e. in jungle garrisons near colonists or indigenous people), and to what prudent officers improvise at these points. Regulations are unable to fully comprehend the prudent practices that are always to some extent violations of pre-codified doctrine. From the point of view of institutional logic all successes are deviations.

Thus, there is a need to give away the self-image of the military organization as the institutional realm of formality, regulations and preestablished control of outcomes⁴⁹, and simply accept that like any other pragmatic interaction the relationship between the officer and the local populations is sustained between breathing and desiring humans,

48. Aristotle; *Nicomachean Ethics*; Trans. J.K.Thompson; Harmondsworth; Penguin Books; 1976.

49. Andreski; *op.cit.*; Banon y Balmeda; *op. cit.*

who, as they are able to incorporate certain habits and knowledge, are also able to pass judgment on the value and adequacy of each others' activities.

Obsession with control and certainty may detract the officer corps from investigating the nature of people, because that is a non-controllable nor regulable realm. The unpredictability of "humanity" may tempt the military ethos to misconstrue people as "machines" because that is the only way in which they can be treated as objects subject to universal nomological regulation.

Vico has shown that there is a connection between acting out of principle and general axiomatic knowledge and the tendency to apply violence to human relations⁵⁰. Violence is the last resort once the general verities of abstract thought have proven unable to handle the complexities of place and circumstance and the intricate web of life. Therefore, military institutions should judge the question of nationhood and of the relations with ethnic and national internal groups not in terms of how in theory they should be, but in terms of how in the everyday practice of contact they become. Likewise, the ways in which each day is negotiated between local commanders and populations should be seen not as regretted departures from preestablished routines, codes and regulations, but as sources of a creativity that can powerfully contribute to organizational learning and adaptability of the military itself. The point is to accept actual practice as a core component of doctrine rather than as an exceptional or accidental or marginal second best to full compliance with preestablished plans. This is something that great military commanders and political leaders have always understood.

50. For the thought of Giambattista Vico see: G. Vico, "The Order of Our Inquiry", in G. Vico, *Selected Writings*, ed. and trans. by L. Pompa, London; Cambridge University Press, 1982; and G. Vico, *The New Science of G. Vico*, ed. and trans. T.G. Bergin and M.H. Fisch, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1970.

National Identity as Built Upon Contests About its Meaning

We have intimated that national identity and nationhood are open concepts, and this may raise interesting and disturbing questions regarding their content. How are we to identify **nation** or **motherland** and what recognition technique may we specify that will give us a non-problematic idea of what it consists of. We may discover that there are: a) classes of objects which we can recognize in a specified manner, i.e., a right angle or a point in Cartesian space; b) objects which we can define in a performative mode, i.e., we can describe how they can be produced or achieved, such as a recipe; but c) there are entities which we can intuitively identify as what they are, that can be known when encountered, but which we can not descriptively define nor can we specify a procedure for its construction, i.e. love or sadness.

There is no relationship which permits an exhaustive experience of all the love or all the sadness there is or may exist, nor there is any sure indicator that will provide an unambiguous recognition of their nature. This characteristic is shared by the products/outcomes of organized or semi-organized human activities revolving around affection, beauty, the sacred, power, desire, truth and experience. These are essentially contested concepts because it is in their nature to exist only as a field of contested meanings. There is no "objective" way to settle either by definition or by argument what their full extension and nature are. Nationhood and identity claims can be conceived as being such ideas.

However it is possible to sustain a reasonable discussion about what they are and about the evidence that may support such claims. The proper nature of national identity involves an open-ended history of debate about what it is about, about what it means and how different people may be situated regarding it. While I don't want to go into further details here, I want to mention a few conditions that give rise to this unresolvable dispute. In the first place, the worth of the nation must be ascribed to it as a totality, but on the other hand, it must be possible to

make sense simultaneously and non-exclusively of pluralistic accounts of its expression, manifestation and specific achievements. There must be nothing senseless in different descriptions of what is more or less important in shaping nationhood (histories, race, culture, economy, different symbols). While the nation's inner nature can be vague and polymorphous, it must be open to a whole array of different destinies, futures and outcomes. There is no single best way of figuring out national fate.⁵¹ There is no sure way of ordering the different possible images of the future of any particular political community. In such a situation the only reasonable reaction by partisans is to concede that their preference can be questioned. To sustain a contested identity concept means to be ready to defend it against alternative accounts or to try to show it as the (provisionally) best account.

But this is not enough if we want to specify a sustainable concept of nationality as a contest about meaning. Two additional conditions must be fulfilled: the participants or competitors must believe that they are struggling to define the meaning of the same thing, and they must believe that winning is a worthy achievement. Thus, it is necessary that the idea of nation be derived from an original exemplar, from some "founding" archetypal image that is commonly accepted by the participants in the debate. There must be some basal notion of what the "original" founding nation or model nation was. There must be an our-nation placed in mythical time-space, of which historicized nationhood is just a derivation, instance or avatar⁵². In this sense nationality is a sub-set among identitarian totemic religions as those studied by Eliade⁵³ in his research about initiation rites among Australian peoples. But not only must we posit some kind of "time of the founders", of identity in "illo tempore", but participants must accept that the supra-temporal

52. Hernan Vidal; *op. cit.*; L. Kolakowsky; *La Presencia del Mito*; Buenos Aires; Amorrortu Eds.; 1975.

archetype of the nation be developed and enriched through its temporalization and historical deployment. This means that nationality has to be conceived as a never ending tale, and not as a once-and-for-ever ideal event that became fixed in the origins of history. Therefore the nation as meaning must be allowed to continuously acquire new fates and futures which are the outcome of the discursive contest between its participants. These participants must be able to put to practice their own experience of identity and must be allowed to attempt to win cultural power in the search for consensus around their own images of national destiny. Here we find ourselves very far from a bureaucratically centralized "discovery" of national goals that then have to be professionally implemented by specialists of national security⁵⁴.

Matters of identity are essentially open-ended struggles for meaning, and by extension the relationship between nationhood, citizenship and democracy can be subsumed under the same type of analysis. In fact the idea of democracy is itself a vague and contestable notion. Instead of striving to find the "right" definition or the "right" democratic institutions, I see democratic archetypes as just fluid symbols that can spawn arborescent experiences of meaning. Therefore, the question of citizenship, political community and national identity form part of the same symbolic field which can be seen as an unending debate that must not be closed if it has to retain its value and sacredness.

54. Calvo; *op. cit.*; Edward Feit; *The Armed Bureaucrats: Military-Administrative Regimes and Political Development*; Boston; Houghton Mifflin; 1973; Guillermo O'Donnell; *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism in South American Politics*; Berkeley, California; Institute of International Studies; 1973; Augusto Varas; *La Autonomia Militar en América Latina*; Caracas; Nueva Sociedad; 1988; Robert Wesson; ed. *The New Military Politics in Latin America*; New York; Praeger; 1986. Amos Perlmutter and Valerie Plave Bennett; *The Political Influence of the Military*; New Haven; Yale University Press; 1980.

However, we may ask in what sense the recognition and acceptance of the nature of nationhood as competition for the control of meaning can somehow result in enhancing national security, stability and the quality of institutions. There is a first sense in which the competition for meaning is not useful. It is not an efficient information tool to settle the claims of different theories. Through discussion certain paradigms cannot be methodologically unmasked as false. Therefore, we shall get used to living in the midst of the partial, unfinished, ongoing. In fact, the military could consider the possibility that it is only through some kind of (hopefully peaceful) contest that different claims can contribute to the building of a national identity that can encompass even potential ethnic and regionalistic challengers. Each discourse about fate and identity can only make sense vis-à-vis that of the "other".⁵⁵

But the consequences of this approach are heavy, because a gradual development of national identity by inter-cultural contests for meaning entails the inherent risk of *metamorphosis*. Dealing with the stranger implies the risk of awaking one day as someone other than who you were the night before. This implies accepting the risk of incorporating otherness and the possibility of suffering transformational development of an unsystematic kind. The changes of national image here envisaged go beyond the mere systematic adaptation and development of dominant or common sense received wisdom about what the essence of the nation is. The call to incorporate the "other" in national society implies more than just achieving a frail compliance with the forces of law and centralized order. It implies becoming in some way "mongrelized".

This way of seeing the struggle for the meaning of national identity requires that the professional military abandon any desire to eliminate (both culturally or factually) the internal stranger, and evolve in the direction of increasingly becoming intellectuals in the realm of persuasive

55. Jose J. Brunner and Gonzalo Catalan; *Cinco Estudios sobre Cultura y Sociedad*; Santiago de Chile; FLASCO; 1985

discourse aimed at securing non-violent resolution of cultural conflicts. They would have to develop the desire to secure channels for open-ended participation with the "other". Even further, the internal groups that constitute the diversity and plurality of Latin American culture may not necessarily be seen as an obstacle or an imperfection in the road towards constituting an "accomplished modern state", but maybe those differences and their variegated open-ended reproduction as discussants can provide a powerful resource in the form of raw material for innovation, adaptation and invention on a world scale. Maybe internal cultures should be seen not as remnants of the past or as imperfect civilizations, but as "biodiversity": as a pool of potentially crucial reserves of which the national state could make creative use.

Cultural democracy may be seen as a potentially crucial foundation concept. It contains the conditions for its own effective implementation: the right and the need for sociability centered around onmidirectional arguments about its meaning and about identity. However, a democracy of nationalities requires much more than just the recognition of freedom for individuals. People can live their lives and their selves not only, nor necessarily, nor univocally, as atomistic egos. It is not enough to talk about the political rights of the individual, because the notion of the individual and his nature presupposes settlement of the question of what personhood is about and what the individual is. This may seem trivial from a perspective of eurocentric-modernity, but it is not from the point of view of other cultural experiences. Thus, securing the liberties of the citizen unwittingly may become a way of mutilating and scorching the concrete liberties of alternative structures of subjectivity constructed on different grounds.

The new Latin American national security can be interpreted as consisting of those democratic arrangements that allow for the expression of mutually contested and contesting ideas about identity and about the nature of our historically situated subjectivity. It must be a procedural arrangement which doesn't presuppose that all contestants are

equally constituted forms of subjectivity, but accepts other forms of self as endowed with a right to voice and to discourse.

This is also a way of suggesting that national power can be based in the ability of the state to empower and enhance the expression of pluralistic cultural pools. Power has a huge symbolic component made up of energies related to meaning and of the ability to enliven fantasy, the imaginary and desire, and this is only accessible through the resource to collective elaboration of the forces of the sacred which hark back to the reenactment and the elaboration of tales about shared origins in mythical space-time⁵⁶. Open and unrepressed elaboration of these sacred realms of collective meaning can be the best single way to prevent their return as racist, genocidal and ethnocentric movements.

I am not calling for an elite (whether civilian or military) to enforce a scheme that will secure an orderly discussion of ideas among different peoples. This assumes an untouchable state that fixes from above the rules of the game, much in the same way as neo-liberal economists fantasized about the "neutral" or "minimalist" role of the state. We have learned how invasive and repressive this "minimalist" liberal state can be. In the same way, the imposing of any cultural policy enforcing ideological debate, even if it is some sort of ideal Millian liberal community, would be contrary to the position presented in this paper. In a true national community, as in a real democracy, people ought not to be ruled by self-appointed experts. Everybody should be assumed to be able to exert self-determination and responsibility: the natural capacities to become part of the multilogue through which they build their lives and which requires that whatever they have to say is taken seriously, even if it sounds absolutely absurd from some other vantage point.

56. Kolakowsky, *op. cit.*; Roger Callois, *El Hombre y lo Sagrado*, México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1984

Again, I am not assuming a "natural" free-market of ideas and identities, nor that the self-interested, rational, monadic individual provides a useful description of inter-cultural subjectivities. This activity is not about making decisions, or deals or contracts or about choice and utility: it is connected to the open question of building a life together between vastly different types of persons, who can use these differences as a resource for their own self-actualization.

Concluding Remarks: The Resources of Pluriculturalism

The process of nation-building in Latin America has involved the suppression, disenfranchisement and denial of huge segments of the populations formed in colonial times. Modernization and its agents - the military among them - involves the need to suppress the specific place that these pre-national, non-eurocentric groups achieved in pre-Columbian and colonial times. Military professionalization was seen as part of a process of eliminating the "barbarism" of the traditional world. XIX century armies were seen as the expression of this "barbarism" (i.e. Sarmiento)⁵⁷, and military modernity was a program that required the dissolution of the visceral connections between non-eurocentric populations and the region's armies⁵⁸. Elsewhere I have attempted to show how early republican military establishments were closer to the lower

57. This perspective has its classic and foundational expression in D.F. Sarmiento; *Facundo*; s.e. where the latin american military strongment are violently criticized from the perspective of liberal, burgeois values.

58. See for intance for the venezuelan case, Angel Ziemis; *El Gomecismo y la Formacion del Ejército Nacional*; Caracas, Ateneo de Caracas; 1979; Fernando Bustamante; *Consideraciones sobre Algunos Factores Relevantes en la Profesionalizacion Militar en Cuatro Paises Latinoamericanos*; FLACSO; Santiago, 1990; Carlos Maldonado and Patricio Quiroga; *El Prusianismo en las FFAA Chilenas: Un Estudio Histórico 1885-1945*; Santiago, 1988;

classes, and that these classes were strongly defined by their ethnic and cultural difference vis-à-vis white Creole and Spaniard elites⁵⁹. The history of professionalization starts with the efforts of educated, enlightened elites to tame the unruly and ethnically suspect military ranks⁶⁰. Professionalization was also a process of forgetting and chaining the older traditions of the rural, popular and racially mixed soldier⁶¹.

The purpose of military modernization was to replace such traditions with the models and archetypes of the technocratic, "scientific" officer⁶². But this meant that the barracks had to become machines producing modern citizens according to a typical bourgeois pattern⁶³.

In this sense, all non eurocentric and putatively pre-modern populations and groups within the borders are collapsed into a despised and threatening sameness. They became the screen on which the fears and insecurities of modernizing elites are projected. Their morality and existence are seen as ballast that has to be removed by force and pedagogy in order for the idealized self-image of the urban modernizer to assert itself.

59. Fernando Bustamante, Estudio Histórico Comparativo del Temprano Desarrollo Profesional de las Fuerzas Armadas de Ecuador y Colombia; Documento de Trabajo; FLACSO-Santiago; 1989. Also, Augusto Varas, Felipe Agüero and Fernando Bustamante; Chile, Fuerzas Armadas y Democracia; FLACSO-Chile; 1981; Fernando Bustamante; op.cit.; 1990

60. Bustamante; op. cit.; 1989

61. Ibid.; F. Bustamante; op.cit.; 1990; George Blanksten, Ecuador. Constitutions and Caudillos; University of California Press; Berkeley; 1951

62. J.C.M. Baynes; The Soldier in Modern Society; London; Eyre Methuen; 1972.

63. Maldonado; op. cit.; 1985

But on further examination, a more sophisticated anthropological account can easily discover a bewildering array of forms and nuances, of variegated worlds and possibilities, but also that it is not just a passive, inert and fossilized remnant of a dying past, but a vital, productive undercurrent which is continually creating new cultural constellations and forms. These ethnic inner realms not only refuse to become fully identified with canonical modernity but are continuously interacting and striving to bend it to their own relatively autonomous needs.

However, a few common topics can be found in the world of sub-national ethnicity. One of them may be the fact that their primary or most characteristic form of cultural creation is strongly connected to the body, to feelings and to the language of aesthetics and the erotic-expressive. The language of rationality and intellectual universalism may be of little relevance in the world of feast, carnival, umbanda, popular religion and arts, in narrative and music, as well as in family and community life. This rich substratum of cultural activity is only partially recognized in official elite culture. However, it has enough vitality to produce a rich flow of meanings that could nurture a renewed process of identity-formation with the more officially recognized strata of national life.

The question for the national security establishments in the region is how to move people into wanting/desiring to stay or become a fused national community. This question is connected to persuasion and not to the rationalistic issue of ideology or hegemony and persuasion is the realm of rhetoric, of affectivity and of seduction⁶⁴. The challenge for the military is to find ways of enticing potentially disaffected sub-national groups into establishing an open-ended process of exchange with the state and its agents. In short, it is a problem of common imaginary/emotional places, or *topoi*, rather than a question of common ideas or laws. But encountering the "other" on the level of this *topoi* entails

64. K. Burke; op.cit.

being ready to accept the possibility that such persuasion or seduction or enticement works both ways, since unilateral influence destroys the commonality of exchange and ends up in sheer manipulation and dominance.

This communicational space has to be created in full knowledge that it means opening up the question of national identity, and that engaging in such types of exchanges entails the possibility that the idea the military presently have of what they ought to defend (the concept or notion of the "national") may emerge seriously transformed. Changing the internal foreigner into a full and willing member of desired national society may also mean changing the military and its self-image as bulwarks of a non-problematic modernity and of an unreflected model of professionalism⁶⁵. The military resolution of the national question in many pluri-ethnic Latin American countries may end up involving the creation of a post-professional military establishment. This post-professionalism may involve recapturing the realms of display, passion and aesthetics, as well as non-shameful rhetorical practice.

The national security establishments in the region may find that it is not economic growth or democracy in its procedural, formal and legal sense that will generate the will of the people to support the present state and the notion of nation it embodies. The real source of this desire to support and love may be found in this "carnival" of emotions and desires that constitute the real history of everyday life. Maybe the disenchantment of many electorates with democracy is the result not of its failure to provide growth or stability, but of its failure to provide enjoyment and to be lovely, amusing and pretty. Maybe the question is that the drab search for efficacy and instrumental success precludes the development of a sense of enchantment with the political regime,

65. Huntington; *op. cit.*; 1957 and Perlmutter, *op. cit.*; Stanley Hilton; "The Brazilian Military: Changing Strategic Perceptions and the Question of Mission"; *Armed Forces and Society*, 13; Spring 1987; 329-359. Alfred Stepan; *op. cit.* 1973

something which may be more important for populations who often are not properly molded by the enlightenment ethos of what a "good government is". But then, disenchantment is also felt in the core of the modern world. Could it be that the same hollowness and emotional vacuity is also secretly resented by the citizens of the developed democracies? Maybe we are talking about a more universal phenomenon, and the question of national security and the stability of the national state is everywhere connected to the question of the frontier interaction between the state and the submerged/forgotten/obliterated everyday needs of people who are more than just rational kantian citizens or economic rationalizers. I wish to leave this question open, but it may generate a new field of studies and ideas about the modern state and its consolidation.

If we recognize that groups may be interested not only in wealth or services, but also in being entitled to an aesthetically and emotionally fulfilling life, we could expand the sphere of meaningful political life. We must remember that the desire for honor and love can be as important in shaping people's motivations as can more "materialistic" interests. The regional states and their military establishments must understand that this distinct form of moral respect and recognition can prove in many cases, and especially in inter-ethnic relations, stronger as links and as bridges among differentiated populations. Questions of honor and respect may become more crucial for the consolidation of national democratic states than those of income and welfare. Military and civil state bureaucracies may have to start confronting this issue in their dealings with ethnic groups.

When dealing with the question of national or ethnic identity we are not dealing with who gets what and when, but with a contest with others about the nature of our being. When struggling with these questions, we are defining what kind of persons and what kind of community we are or ought to be. This has not been fully solved in the century-old drive for modernity promoted by the state and its military organizations. That is

why recovery of other political and communicative traditions, of other dimensions of public interaction besides flat and linear discourse of rationalization may be every day more urgent, and become an important project in times such as the present, of both increasing ethnic alienation, popular disgust and generalized disenchantment with republican institutions. We are just beginning to understand that institution-building is much more than just the setting of "structures". It is necessarily involved in the construction of identities and basic perceptions of who people are. Building nations and states implies building persons, but in the past the processes of institution-building has been supported in a false and counterfeit notion of bureaucratized professionalism which may in the short term buy a semblance of rationality and order, but which in the long run may debase the Big Ideas it is purported to serve by depriving them of the charm and the appeal that would make them more than just mechanistic manipulations of popular will. Rethinking the role of the military as professionalized and modern agents of nation-building will contribute to reshaping their role and identity so as to establish them as a useful resource in the further cultural improvement of our societies and the increased and open-ended solidarity between our very real and resilient ethnic and cultural internal communities.

Thomas Scheetz

*Two Types of Military Reform:
Crisis-Driven Restructuring versus Alternative Defense
in Argentina*

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Two Types of Military Reform in Argentina

"I also came to realise that to most admirals the respective value of battleships and aircraft was not basically a technological issue, but more in the nature of a spiritual issue. They cherished the battlefleet with a religious fervour, as an article of belief defying all scientific examination. The blindness of hard-headed sailors to realities that were obvious to a dispassionate observer is only explicable through understanding the place that the 'ships of the line' filled in their hearts. A battleship had long been to an admiral what a cathedral is to a bishop." B. H. Liddell Hart

1. Introduction

1.) Rapidly increasing military expenditures was one of the chief causes triggering perestroika in the Soviet Union. Defense outlays in the United States continue to weigh heavily on the fiscal deficit. If the two rivals of the Cold War could not sustain the growing level of expenditures required for their defense, most Less Developed Countries (LDCs) are even harder pressed to equilibrate their increasingly voracious defense apparatus with their diminishing pocketbooks. Succinctly, in both developed and underdeveloped countries we are witnessing a relatively new phenomenon in which the supply costs associated with the military apparatus are outrunning the ability to pay for them. What might be termed "military malthusianism" confronts slight increases in treasury receipts with geometrically increasing defense costs. In the LDCs this is occurring in a period of severe fiscal constraints. The situation is such that in the medium run military reform in most LDCs will become an absolute necessity.

Since World War II military equipment costs have accelerated at geometric rates.¹ The existence of regional arms races throughout the Third

¹ Kaldor (1982, p.77) states that "since world War II, unit costs for tanks had risen by 4 percent a year, compared with an average of 20 percent for other types of weapon systems." Gansler (1989, p.7) claims that the US has faced "an increase of around 5-7 percent per year in the unit cost of each new generation of equipment (even after adjustment for inflation and for the higher unit prices

World inevitably created a significant and sustained demand for advanced military technology. Through the mid-1970s, given expanding Gross Domestic Products (GDPs), and later by increasing levels of external indebtedness (until about 1982), Third World countries were more capable of absorbing real increases in military budgets. However, by the mid-1970s these rising defense expenditures started to crowd out other fiscal outlays, most frequently in health, education and public investment, all of which play a major role in economic development (Scheetz, 1992a). At least in the Southern Cone of Latin America military costs have become the single largest functional budget outlay, often greater than all social expenditures combined. Moreover, this process tended to accelerate when military regimes came to power. For a variety of reasons a vicious circle has developed in which the military bureaucracy grows, militarily useless and ever more costly arms are acquired, crowding out public social and investment spending, civilian-military frictions grow, and internal repression (and narcotics control) becomes the de facto residual role of the armed forces because they are incapable of providing a genuine external defense. One of the fundamental causes of this is that the panoply of weapons systems required is beyond most LDCs' technical and economic capacities.

The Malvinas War demonstrated this increasing futility of the LDC military, associated with operating a significant but incomplete military machine capable of sustaining conflict with fewer and fewer rivals and for reduced periods of warfare. Since World War II electronics have radically changed the nature and costs of war. Notably, even with enormous arms acquisitions in hand, the Argentine Armed Forces were unable to wage war on modern terms (except for their haphazard use of Exocet missiles). The British, on the other hand, were capable of taking ample advantage of their technical dominance. As currently structured, militaries like that in

associated with the reduced quantities typically purchased today)." The issue of defense inflation exceeding the Implicit GDP Deflator is also developed by Beckstead (1982).

Argentina cannot hope to provide the external security that they are paid to provide.

2.) The reform of the Argentine armed forces is indispensable and urgent for three fundamental reasons. First, the armed forces lack the professional aptitude and technical capacity to fulfill the function for which they were created, namely the external defense of the country. Second, as currently structured they represent a budgetary burden which the country cannot possibly bear, given demands placed on the Treasury by foreign and domestic creditors and by a relegated populace impatient with increasing underdevelopment. Third, though greatly weakened, the military continue to threaten political stability. These three reasons derive from our view that almost all LDC governments face what might be described as three interrelated military imperatives: technological, economic/fiscal, and operational. Each of these three imperatives standing alone would be sufficient to underscore the urgency of military reform. But as they are intertwined, the argument for reform is magnified. First, **technologically almost no LDC is capable of purchasing the increasing breadth of equipment necessary to compete in a modern war.** For example, to be able to project naval power a country would require an aircraft carrier, taskforce-protected and supplied by electronically equipped surface ships, nuclear submarines, and satellite information. Almost no LDC can afford this. And partial acquisitions leave open a very vulnerable flank in this naval weapon system. But the argument becomes even more convincing if one looks at the breadth of skill requirements necessary to operate the technology. For example, for every pilot in the air, from 50 to 70 highly skilled technicians are backing him up on the ground (Kaldor, 1982). Even if these skills can be found and hired by the defense sector, this will deprive the most dynamic civilian productive sectors of the most critical elements of their workforce.

Second, if economically they are incapable of meeting the fast-mounting costs of modern defense, **LDCs are also being faced with fiscally competing demands** (public investment, social expenditures like health and

education, debt service, etc.) which deeply affect development, that deeper source of security. In the Southern Cone the tendency has been for military expenditures and debt service to crowd out other fiscal outlays (Scheetz, 1992). Defense has become the single largest functional outlay. As a result, growth suffers and social tensions rise. Yet surprisingly international organizations pushing for structural reforms have steadfastly avoided confronting the issue.

Third, the Argentine military apparatus has entered a period of severe decline, characterized by a marked shift from external to internal security concerns, corruption and bureaucratization. For this additional reason the armed forces are increasingly incapable of providing convincing external defense. So they have tended to turn inward on themselves, taking on the characteristics of a political corporation, focusing more and more upon what has come to be called "the national security state" and further increasing the bureaucratization of command structures (and decreasing operational capacities, reflected in the increasing ratio of officers to troops and the number of officers without operational commands). Beyond these factors, there is practically no inter-service coordinated planning. Joint operations are unthinkable, as Malvinas demonstrated.

3.) With few exceptions the 1990s find Latin America burdened by debt (much of it arms related)² and little or no growth. Development, the ultimate basis for a country's security, is a goal that seems to have fallen by the wayside. The reform of the state, supported by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, generally includes all fiscal aspects except defense. And ironically defense is the single largest budgetary function, at least in the Southern Cone. Following an unprecedented economic crisis in 1989-1990, Argentina is presently engaged in what appears to be a serious attempt at economic stabilization. The centerpiece of the stabilization program is fiscal reform. And while other aspects of public sector

² From 20 to 25 percent of Argentina's foreign debt appears to be of military origin.

expenditure (public enterprises and public sector salaries have been favorite targets), for its size and impact defense expenditures should be looked at.

Military expenditures (miles) purportedly provide the nation with the service "security" against foreign aggression. But do they really offer this service in Argentina or in most LDCs? And how do miles affect growth in the rest of the economy, or in other government functions? Clearly the rationalization of the State ought to be carried out in this area also.

Given the current fiscal situation in Argentina, severe restrictions in the defense budget are inevitable in the medium term. In such a situation one might be tempted to suggest that, since they cannot provide the service for which they were hired, the armed forces' contract ought to be rescinded. The difficulty with this is that the LDCs often do have legitimate needs for an external dissuasive defense. The question then becomes, can the country afford to defend itself? And if so, how to accomplish that defense? The answer suggested below is the adaptation to the LDCs of what has come to be called "Alternative Defense."

4.) In the second section this article will show how Argentine miles interact with the rest of the economic system, presenting the impact of defense outlays on the Argentine economy as a whole (GDP, savings/investment, and on balance on current account). Then we will demonstrate their crowding-out effects within the public sector. And finally we examine the size of arms purchases. These ideas provide the argumental foundations for the need for a cost-effective and genuinely efficient defense apparatus. The third section will briefly describe the ideas underlying what has come to be known as Alternative (or Non-Provocative) Defense. In section four we will present the official military reform initiative as currently presented by the three branches of the Argentine Armed Forces. We will conclude with a projection of the probable internal/external, short run/long run political, military and fiscal effects of the current reform program versus those produced by an alternative defense restructuring.

2. The Macroeconomic Impact of Defense Expenditures

The last fifteen years have witnessed an academic debate about the macroeconomic effects of milex in LDCs. Although nuanced differences in conclusions regarding countries and regions are obvious, we now know grosso modo that milex have a negative effect on economic growth. Using locally generated fiscal data, we have recently completed a research project on the topic covering Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Peru (Scheetz, 1991a). Our econometric results support and extend those of international researchers. The general results of our research are presented below in order to undergird the argument that military reform is economically unavoidable.

$$(1) \text{RRGGDP} = 0.23 \text{NSR} - 0.53 \text{M/GD} - 0.26 \text{B/GDP} + 0.15 \text{RGAG} + 0.09 \text{RG} \\ (3.10) \quad (1.95) \quad (1.62) \quad (4.02) \quad (2.06) \\ [\text{D.W.} = 1.56 \text{R}^2 = 0.26]$$

$$(2) \text{NSR} = 0.15 + 0.33 \text{RRGGD} - 0.56 \text{M/GDP} + 0.01 \text{RIGDPDEF} \\ (6.44) \quad (2.06) \quad (1.25) \quad (2.81) \\ - 0.26 \text{GN/GDP} + 0.0001 \text{LPCYO7} + 0.22 \text{LAGB} \\ (3.71) \quad (4.95) \quad (2.08) \\ [\text{D.W.} = 1.10 \text{R}^2 = 0.51]$$

$$(3) \text{B/GDP} = -0.50 \text{M/GDP} - 0.00001 \text{LPCYO} + 0.005 \text{RIGDPDEF} \\ (2.40) \quad (3.12) \quad (1.87) \\ + 0.04 \text{D75} + 0.45 \text{LAGB} \\ (1.58) \quad (4.47) \\ [\text{D.W.} = 1.87 \text{R}^2 = 0.53]$$

$$(4) \text{M/GDP} = 0.01 \text{F} + 0.07 \text{GN/GDP} + 0.01 \text{TENS} + 0.58 \text{LAGM} \\ (3.76) \quad (5.24) \quad (3.68) \quad (7.75) \\ [\text{D.W.} = 2.21 \text{R}^2 = 0.81]$$

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RRGGDP:	real rate of growth of GDP (endogenous)
NSR:	net domestic savings rate (endogenous)
M/GDP:	millex divided by nominal GDP (endogenous)
B/GDP:	balance on current account divided by GDP (endogenous)
RGAG:	real rate of growth of agricultural product
RG:	real rate of growth of government expenditure
RIGDPDEF:	annual average inflation, Implicit GDP Deflator
GN/GDP:	government expenditure (net of millex) divided by GDP
LPCYO7:	level of per capita income, in constant US dollars of 1977, official rate
LPCYO:	level of per capita income, measured in current US dollars, official rate
LAGB:	B/GDP lagged one year
D75:	International Comparisons Project index, using 1975 base year data ¹
LAGM:	M/GDP lagged one year
F:	Dummy variable, 0 for years when a democratic government wrote the budget, 1 for years when the military did
TENS:	Dummy variable, 0 for peace, 1 for tension from imminent external defense threat or internal guerrilla
POP:	population measured at mid-year
RGPOP:	population growth rate

¹ International Comparisons Project index was taken from Summers and Heston (1984), using the "price level for gross domestic income". The figures for 1981 - 1987 were estimated.

We employed a four equation model (see above), adapted from that of Saadet Deger (1986) and Deger and Smith (1983). We derived the results reported by pooling data for 19 years over the four countries, and using 2SLS. In spite of the inherent difficulties in working with LDC national accounts, fiscal and

military data,³ our results with the pooled data are rather good. The total derivatives, with direct and indirect impact (current year) multipliers all indicate milex's very negative macroeconomic effects:

$d RRGDP/d M/GDP$	=	-0.573
$d NSR/d M/GDP$	=	-0.747
$d B/GDP/d M/GDP$	=	-0.497

From 1969 - 1975 milex consumed an average of 2.9 percent of GDP. During the "Proceso" (military dictatorship lasting from 1976 - 1983) the armed forces consumed an average of 5.4 percent of GDP. And since that time (1983 - 1987) they have spent an average of 3.8 percent annually. The fact that even with the return to "civilian austerity" milex was a higher plateau than prior to the dictatorship is a good example of what we referred to as "military malthusianism." Given current military planning, the long run tendency is for milex to expand its share in GDP.

Viewed within the context of fiscal expenditures, milex averaged 14 percent of National Administration between 1970 - 1975. During the "Proceso", the armed forces allocated to themselves an average of 31 percent of budget outlays. After the return to democratic government that average fell to 16 percent (1983 - 1990), with a tendency to rise since 1988 (see Table next page). Defense is by far the largest single functional expenditure, greater than health and education combined since 1973. Actually, between 1973 and 1975, defense expenditures in all Southern Cone countries began to surpass all national government social outlays. Once again "military malthusianism" occurs. The data also tend to indicate that social entitlements are supported by a political constituency weaker than that of the armed forces.

³ We worked meticulously on each of these three areas in each of the four countries involved. No international data sets were adapted. A description of the methodology and data sets can be found in Scheetz (1985, 1987, 1989, 1991a, 1992).

ARGENTINA: Defense Imports, Milex, and Total Treasury Outlays

	Arms Acquisitions Defense 1970-1990 US \$ millions of 1982	MILEX US \$ millions of 1982	MILEX as % of Total Treasury Outlays
1970	247	899	14,2
1971	352	950	16,5
1972	653	965	16,6
1973	587	992	13,5
1974	808	991	10,7
1975	1570	1278	13,5
1976	1192	2293	23,1
1977	626	2483	28,7
1978	1274	2699	34,8
1979	1225	2814	35,7
1980	1072	2561	36,3
1981	1514	2700	36,8
1982	924	2203	32,9
1983	996	2499	21,4
1984	208	1980	17,0
1985	169	1681	13,3
1986	146	1760	14,2
1987	64	1899	13,2
1988	92	1832	19,8
1989	44	1461	18,2
1990	23	1050	18,4
Total	247	35479	14,17 ¹

¹ Average 1970-75: Avg. 1976-83: 31,21. Avg. 1984-90: 16,30. Sources: Gargiulo (1988). Ministerio de Hacienda (Milex and arms acquisitions)

Between 1970 and 1987 the rise (or fall) of real milex is associated by an opposite movement in social expenditures in 11 out of 18 years. If we add in national government (non-military) real investment this milex crowd-out effect occurs in 16 out of 18 years. Evidently human and physical capital investments compete with milex for treasury funding, and these development variables have been gradually eroded over the last twenty years.

As is the case with other LDCs, with ever-increasing fiscal effort Argentina can purchase a selection of modern weapons platforms. But neither the budget (nor at times the human capital stock) permit acquiring entire weapon systems that are electronically linked for combined use (e.g., an aircraft carrier with its support and defense fleet, air arm, submarines and satellite intelligence). Even in the regional war projected against Chile in 1978, both sides only had munitions for five days of modern warfare.⁴ Indeed if even munitions stocks are not available, this too is because in the medium term the Treasury is increasingly incapable of responding to modern defense demands as currently structured in almost all LDCs. The divergence of the two tendencies: rapidly increasing milex (or arms costs) versus more slowly increasing Treasury receipts, I term "military malthusianism." This military malthusianism is most clearly revealed by arms import tendencies.

In the case of Argentina one should begin by stating the relative weakness of arms import data. The basic problem is the accounting of secret (extra-budgetary) imports during the dictatorship (1976-1983). Foreign exchange was used from several state-owned banks, while simultaneously imports were not listed in the commercial balance. These funds have been variously calculated as between US\$9,572 millions (current dollars summed from 1977-1982) and US\$13,196 millions (current dollars summed from 1976-1983).⁵ The most conservative estimate of extra-budgetary arms

⁴ Information from an interview with a retired Argentine Army colonel.

⁵ The first figure is taken from Arriazu et al. (1988, p.309) and the second from Frenkel et al. (1988). The former source appears to better disaggregate the data.

purchases is given by ex-Budget Secretary of the Ministry of Defense, Gerardo Gargiulo (1988, p.94) as US\$7.207 billion (1976-1983). The SIPRI Yearbook 1984 (p.100) cites Central Reserve Bank sources as listing US\$5 billion in arms related external indebtedness at the end of 1982.⁶ Undoubtedly some of these loans were budgetarily registered (see Gargiulo, 1988, p.94), though their amortization and interests payments were largely passed on to the Treasury in 1982 and 1983, before the military handed over the government to civilians. Gargiulo's presentation, deriving as it does from internal Ministry of Defense sources, seems to be the safest choice.

The following table (see page) lists, together with overall milex and total Treasury outlays, our rather cautious estimates of arms imports. Up through the Malvinas War the rapid expansion of both milex and arms imports was reaching a level where it became fiscally unsustainable. Modern equipment was acquired in order to confront Chile. Nonetheless, this materiel was insufficient when the moment came to coordinate its use against the British force of coherently structured complete weapons systems. Even so, the piecemeal purchase of these uncoordinated weapons platforms had a great

Nonetheless, though Arriazu et al. claim that the major part of that sum is arms procurement, we are unable to separate out the part which represents unregistered capital flight. Moreover, our problems do not end there. Other state enterprises may also have been pressured by the Armed Forces to assume loans that were detoured to arms expenditures. These latter are simply uncapturable. Furthermore, the interest payments attributable to these loans (if one were to estimate them at US\$10 billion at 10 percent annual interest) would add another US\$1 billion to milex all through the 1980s, as these loans were passed to the Treasury, but by and large never repaid. This would expand Argentine milex by approximately 50 percent annually! We have not included interest payments in Argentina (but do so in Paraguay, Peru and Bolivia), except as officially accounted.

⁶ In La Voz (20 January 1984) then-President of the Banco de Provincia de Buenos aires, Also Ferrer listed US\$1.7 billion in arms import debt channelled through this other state-owned bank.

deal to do with the debt crisis of 1982, when after the War it was recognized as unpayable. Costs outran security needs in malthusian fashion. With the war lost and the economy in shambles, the military government was forced to give way to civilian governments which have spent the last ten years in various attempts at stabilizing the economy. That stabilization implied recognizing that arms acquisitions and millex could not possibly continue at their ever-increasing level. The defense budget was severely cut, but still leaving it greater in real terms than it had been a decade earlier, and at approximately the same budgetary share as prior to the dictatorship. Moreover, even today it is almost always the largest functional outlay of the National Administration, larger even than all social expenditures put together. Nonetheless, there is widespread discontent among the military, and the operational capabilities of the three forces are presently at an extremely low level.⁷ Current military expenditures allow for little more than paying salaries and the relatively privileged retirement benefits. Arms procurement has become an unaffordable luxury.

Currently the entire defense production sector is undergoing privatization or direct closure (Luzuriaga, 1992), supposedly to be completed by December 1992. For the Army-controlled *Dirección General de Fabricaciones Militares* alone losses in 1991 amounted to US\$ 702 million,⁸ with internal and external debts summing US\$ 500 million, to be assumed by the Treasury. All funds received from defense privatizations are earmarked for the "modernization" of the three service branches.⁹ The entire defense sector has a net

⁷ *Clarín*, 17 May 1992. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is reported to have documented in detail how the country is not presently defended, that the armed forces are completely unprepared.

⁸ This breaks down into Treasury subsidies of US\$202 million, and US\$580 million for debt service (*Clarín*, 22 January 1992).

⁹ Once again irrationality will apply. Each branch will receive the funds from its own privatizations. Arms will be imported with no coordination of their use. The

current patrimony value of US\$ 5.6 billion (Ministerio de Defensa, 1991). It is hoped that privatization will yield US\$ 700 million (*Clarín*, 6 October 1990), a notable difference. The steel producer, SOMISA (the crown jewel among the military enterprises), had a net patrimony in 1990 of US\$ 2.153 billion (Ministerio de Defensa, 1991). The multinational enterprise, Techint, won the licitation for 80 percent of the shares of the steel company, paying US\$152 million (*Clarín*, 27 November 1992). At the same time SOMISA's sizeable debts (US\$ 677 million at the close of 1990 (SIGEP, 1991)) will be passed to the Treasury. And the World Bank will loan the Treasury US\$ 159 million to pay for voluntary retirement of 6250 workers. Clearly, even the exit costs are high. The defense sector seems to have been bad business for the Treasury from beginning to end.

3. Alternative Defense Strategy for Argentina

The fundamental position underlying this paper is that the only economically and militarily feasible defense for many developing countries like Argentina is alternative, or non-provocative, defense. In fact, even the political and military disadvantages confronted by its proposed use in NATO countries (Gates, 1987)¹⁰ do not exist in the Southern Cone.

1.) The advocacy of a defensive force posture runs up against almost all military strategists of the last 200 years. From the time of Napoleon and Clausewitz, *politico-military doctrines have been overwhelmingly biased towards strategic offense. . . There is very little convergence between a*

armed forces have no overall guiding concept of what the reform is intended to achieve.

¹⁰ First, in NATO the Warsaw Pact had logistical depth, lacking in LDCs. Second, in Argentina there would be no need for regional force coordination as in NATO. And third, alternative defense proposes to trade space for time. In any probable scenario Argentina would have more of both (than would Western Europe confronted by a Warsaw Pact armor attack).

defensive national policy and the doctrine of waging war as an 'instrument of policy.' The latter implies multiple sets of options, of which war is but one. On the other hand, there are no options to defence (especially territorial defence) of nation states, except capitulation". (Singh, 1989).

But the actual history of warmaking tells a different story. Strategic advantage has flowed back and forth between attacker and defender, depending on the available military technology. The fortress gave the advantage to the defense until the invention of the cannon. Napoleonic citizen armies represented the state of the military art until the invention of the machine gun, which relegated the human wave attack to the trenches in World War I. With World War II the penetrating thrust of armor and aviation again passed the advantage to the offense. Today the use of electronics (principally precision guided munitions, or PGM's) have shifted the burden significantly, permitting the defender more cheaply and effectively to resist attack. On the other hand, effective offensive military action has become prohibitively expensive.

2.) The literature on alternative defense grew out of the Western European security context. Theorists (Canby, 1980; Dean, 1987/88; ter Borg and Smit, 1989; Clark and Lilley, 1989; Boserup and Neild, 1990; etc.) claim that advanced military technology (based on the micro-circuit) could give a margin of tactical advantage to the defender using it. An aggressor confronts a credible defense provided at a much lower cost than that supported by his attacking force.¹¹ The use of certain weaponry (especially short range "smart" munitions), and the non-acquisition of

¹¹ The extreme case might be the sinking of a US\$1 billion Nimitz-class aircraft carrier by an Exocet missile valued between US\$250 thousand and US\$500 thousand. This is what the English feared in Malvinas. But very advantageous cost-benefit ratios are also present with the anti-tank missile (US\$10 thousand to US\$50 thousand) versus the cost of a modern tank US\$1 million to US\$2 million) or anti-aircraft missiles (US\$100 thousand versus a US\$35 million F-16).

others more offensive (e.g., aircraft carriers, long range missiles, fewer tanks and attack aircraft) permits a more diffuse troop deployment that is less threatening (and less targetable) to a potential enemy. All potential for power projection over distance would be eliminated (i.e., the above-listed weapons). The crux of non-provocative defense is the building up of confidence in potential adversaries that they will not be attacked. And were they to initiate an attack, they would not achieve their aims. This implies dissuasion through very convincing defensive force, rather than through offensive capability to strike back by invasion. Ter Borg and Smit (1989) define non-provocative defense as „ *a military posture in which the strategic and operational concepts, the deployment, organization, armaments, communications and command, logistics and training of the armed forces are such, that they are in their totality unambiguously capable of an adequate conventional defence, but as unambiguously incapable of a bordercrossing attack, be it an invasion or a destructive strike at the opponents territory.* “

3.) Viewed in very general terms, alternative defense coordinates elements of coastal, air and territorial defense: The first line of land defense are scattered light infantry armed with anti-tank and anti-aircraft hand-held (or fairly light-weight) "smart" missiles. In Argentina we propose three operational brigades (each between 1500 - 2000 men): one near the Chilean frontier, one strategically located with respect to Brazil, and one air-transported for rapid deployment to wherever they might be needed. The scattered light infantry brigades would take advantage of the mountain and forest terrain on the Chilean border in the deployment of anti-tank PGMs. The national parks on the Brazilian frontier offer similar cover for forces there. Where this natural cover does not exist, reforestation should be supported by the government. Conscription would be eliminated as both economically and militarily damaging (Scheetz, 1991b).

The air forces would be unified (presently each service branch has its own). The much cheaper interceptor would be used instead of the longer range fighter-bomber. A much larger fleet of helicopters would be used to

rapidly deploy a reduced number of professional soldiers and to repel an enemy armor thrust. Sea defense would be assured by the use of shorter range attack submarines,¹² fast patrol boats and mobile shore batteries armed with short range missiles, along with the capacity to airdrop mines on short notice to stop possible invasions. The policing of the Argentine maritime economic zone would be handed over to the Prefectura Naval (coastguard), thus virtually obviating the need for a surface naval fleet. Due to their offensive character, the marines would also be eliminated.

And most importantly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (under the Minister of Defense) would become the genuine central planning and operational authority. The Armed Forces would unify logistics, command, control, communications, intelligence.¹³ For this latter purpose an increased use of satellites would be given a certain budgetary priority.

4.) In the context of South America such a military restructuring would reduce regional tensions and open a gap for diplomatic initiatives, which in turn would stimulate the nascent movement towards economic integration. After having experienced decades of official documents signed by governments in the region, we believe that the transparency of force deployment with alternative defense is the only sure path to genuine regional disarmament. Potential enemies would be invited to review the eminently defensive deployment of Argentine forces. At the same time they would be convinced of the costly futility of any confrontation. Such logic would lead

¹² Various relatively cheap alternatives to the diesel-powered or nuclear submarines are becoming technologically available: Air-independent propulsion, the Stirling engine (Sweden), fuel cells (West German Type 205 submarine), closed-cycle diesel engines (Holland and Italy), and low-power nuclear powered submarines (Canada). These will cheapen the purchase price and/or eliminate the noisy qualities of the diesel (Arnett, 1991).

¹³ Intelligence operations would be unified under one command and dedicated exclusively to external intelligence. Only the Policia Federal would be authorized to perform internal intelligence.

them to adapt their own forces to those of Argentina, leading to a gradual scale-down of military hardware, in other words gradual disarmament.

Our contentions are, first, that most of the arms acquired by LDCs are militarily sufficiently obsolete, or fall short of constituting a complete weapons system, so as to be useless in a war with a wealthier foe. The tank, bomber and surface ship are all extremely vulnerable to much cheaper PGMs. Secondly, nonetheless these same technologically outdated weapons are the symbols by which the army, navy and air force define their service's role. For example, if one were to suggest to an Argentine admiral that the entire surface fleet be scrapped, he would be horrified (see introductory quote by Liddell Hart). The navy conceives of itself in terms of ships (ships which are extremely costly and add very little to external security). *Mutatis mutandis*, the same is true for the other services. Obviously we are not affirming that modern technology has no role to play in defense. Clearly the opposite is true. But the selection and coordination of the weapon systems chosen is all important (both tactically and fiscally). Thirdly, even at present levels LDCs possess neither the financial capacity to weave together all the complex elements required to sustain a modern armed force, nor can they bring together the width of technician expertise required to maintain these weapon systems. Furthermore, where local military forces do attempt to provide these technical services, skills are drained from the growth requirements of the economy. What occurs then is that, given declining security (in areas like GDP per capita, education, health, infrastructure, employment, exports, etc.) increased defense outlays provoke an even further decline in economic security. As presently configured, the military cannot defend us, and we can no longer afford their services.

5.) On the issue of the relationship between defense establishment and its economic and technological effects the classic work is *Baroque Arsenal* by Mary Kaldor (1982).¹⁴ Her book presents two main hypotheses in this

¹⁴ Jacques Gansler (1985) uses other language, but expresses many of the same ideas as does Kaldor.

regard. The first maintains that the multiple technical changes related to advances in electronics have made modern weapon systems obsolete,¹⁵ and the structure of the armed forces aligned with the defense industry (in the developed countries) maintains these baroque systems. These "dinosaur" weapon systems are basically the bomber, the tank and the surface ship, all of which are relatively easy targets for PGMs.¹⁶ Kaldor claims that these arms are "baroque", i.e., overelaborated and decadent. "Baroque technical change represents 'improvements' to successive weapon systems which can pass through the phases of invention, innovation and integration without disturbing the social organisation of the users of the weapon system, although it can and does disturb the organisation of developers and producers" (Kaldor, 1986). These weapon systems, ever more complex and costly, are nevertheless more and more vulnerable to PGMs, as was amply demonstrated in Malvinas by the Exocet, on the one hand, and the fear of the Argentine Navy to set to sea on the other. The obvious question is, if these weapons are not militarily useful, why bother to manufacture or import them? Why not concentrate on the production and importation of PGMs (as the Argentines were doing with the Condor II missile project)? After all, these electronic weapons are cheaper and require fewer personnel to maintain and use them. The answer to this question, according to Kaldor, is that both the military industries and the armed forces have an interest in blocking this response. To adapt themselves to the new technology would

¹⁵ According to Kaldor (1982, p.12), "The weapon system combines a weapons platform: ship, aircraft or tank; a weapon: gun, missile, or torpedo; and the means of command and communication." Kaldor goes on to say, "The weapons system implies the existence of an entire supporting cast—scientists to invent the weapons, workers to build them, soldiers to use them, and technicians to repair them."

¹⁶ Some handheld anti-tank weapons achieve a testing ground kill rate of 75 percent, i.e., 4 firings kill 3 tanks. A similar kill rate was achieved with the surface-to-air Stinger missile in downing Soviet aircraft in Afghanistan.

imply a genuine "modernization" of the armed forces, a radical change in the size and organization of each service branch, together with a change in military tactics which would give priority to defense over offense.¹⁷ It is also obvious that such a reorientation would totally change the local (and international) arms industry. Moreover, such a change would radically challenge the principal role symbols (the tank, airplane, and ship) defining almost all LDC armed forces. But to continue down the path of the present baroque tendencies will soon lead to a situation where no country will be able to bear the costs of its armed forces. It has been (ironically) calculated that, projecting aviation costs, in the year 2020 the United States Air Force will be able to purchase just one airplane (Augustine, 1975).

The second Kaldor hypothesis relates foreign trade decadence to the inhibiting limitations implied by the arms industry. For example, "American preeminence in aircraft and electronics is due, in part, to the sheer volume of military resources. And yet the military orientation of these industries—and indeed the military market as a whole—impedes current and future commercial developments which provide the economic basis for military spending" (Kaldor, 1982, p.95). According to Kaldor, at the beginning of the twentieth century Great Britain had the capacity to mass-produce the automobile and the airplane with military support. But such support did not translate into commercial diffusion. At that time, the Americans, with fewer defense-industrial ties, captured markets. The Japanese are doing the same thing today with the electronics market. Baroque defense production undercuts the

¹⁷ An ex-military planner for NATO, Steve Canby, initiated the now extensive debate over alternative (or defensive) defense. According to Canby (1980) PGMs make possible an alternative defense for Western Europe. It would have combined regular troops with irregulars (residents of the frontier regions), these latter armed with light weapons and PGMs. Such a strategy would obviously give priority to the defense, but it represented a much cheaper alternative for the defense of West Germany. Of course, it also meant giving arms to frontier residents.

advantages that technological advancement should provide to a nation's growth.

For Kaldor the system of Western modern weaponry has developed bonds (alliances, joint operations, war colleges, military aid) throughout the world. Simultaneously, these ties create subsidiaries of the military-industrial complex in every country (even in the ex-Soviet Union), replicating the American military system. In the end military "modernization" comes to be a synonym for westernization. The resulting arms races compromise development. When one joins the Kaldor views on the "baroque arsenal" to our three imperatives (technological, fiscal/economic, and operational) facing the Argentine Armed Forces, the policy choice between genuine military reform and relegation to a decadent pretorian guard function becomes unavoidable. There exist no other possibilities.

4. The Current Official Argentine Restructuring

As far as one can judge from limited published sources,¹⁸ the current restructuring of the Armed Forces really represent three separate and partial reforms. Most importantly there seems to be no underlying conception of the role of either the Armed Forces as a whole, the usefulness of each of the service branches, or their coordinated use in case of war. Such a conception is absolutely required if arms are to be acquired and deployed. Where to deploy, and for what purpose? These shortcomings represent failures on the part of the political authorities (for not presenting a guiding vision for reform) and on the part of the services themselves for stubbornly maintaining their traditional separation of command, control, and planning.

¹⁸ Everything has been managed in secrecy. Other countries (England in the 1920s and Australia in the 1980s come to mind) have submitted their military reform packages to public debate and scrutiny. Because the armed forces are paid for by the taxpayers, sacrificing other public expenditures, citizens have a right to participate in the debate.

Their *de facto* unifying political premise would seem to be the preservation of as much bureaucratic power as possible in each of the branches. Much of the reform seems to be based in the selling off of defense industries and unnecessary properties, with the political guarantee that the funds will be used to purchase arms.¹⁹

The Army (presently 6000 officers, 21000 petty officers, and 10000 conscripts, to be gradually reduced over twenty years to 5000 officers, 17000 petty officers, and between 20000 and 30000 conscripts or volunteers) plans to transform the present four Army Corps and twelve brigades to about ten divisions, each located in its areas of strategic operation. One of these divisions, based in Córdoba, will be air transported. These ideas represent a movement in the right direction, i.e., a reduction in bureaucracy, an improvement in the "teeth to tail" ratio, and the inclusion of an air mobile division. However, the doubt remains about how 42000 soldiers can fill the ranks of 10 divisions together with the rest of bureaucratic positions. Others have suggested that the Army should be limited to only three brigades.²⁰

The Navy reportedly feels that the fundamental aspects of its restructuring were completed during the late 1970s. It sees its role as both military and police. In this latter role it has recently displaced the Prefectura Naval (coastguard) in the vigilance of coastal waters between 12 miles and the 200

¹⁹ The resultant funds are also to be used to capitalize the military retirement fund according to sources, currently requiring a Treasury subsidy equivalent to 1 percent of GDP annually). But if we project funds available from privatization amounting to between US\$800 million and US\$1 billion, and the retirement fund (IAF) can be roughly projected as requiring between US\$10 billion and US\$20 billion to be thoroughly capitalized (i.e., to be able to pay benefits from interest earned), it is hard to see how income will be sufficient to cover either arms acquisitions or capitalization.

²⁰ See Perlinger (1985) and repeated declarations by Col. (ret.) Gustavo Caceres, a man with experience in two attempts at Army reforms during the governments of General Onganía and Raul Alfonsín.

mile patrimonial limit, and the control of fishing fleets in this Argentine sea. The restructured navy would include (among other ships of the line) a small submarine force, an aircraft carrier (and its fleet of aircraft—part of the redeployed naval air arm), and the marines stationed in Tierra del Fuego. Our criticisms are threefold. First, the use of frigates and destroyers to control fishing poachers is not cost efficient. This job would better be done by the coastguard. The marines and aircraft carrier are offensive weapons. The marines duplicate efforts by the Army (e.g., the air transported division). And an aircraft carrier is beyond Argentina's fiscal possibilities to operate. It will be extremely vulnerable to enemy attack because it cannot possibly be surrounded with the weapons systems and intelligence sufficient to defend it. It is the best example available of the Liddell Hart quote cited at the beginning of the paper.

The Air Force plans to reduce the number of air brigades from the current nine to five. About 40 percent of its fleet was lost in Malvinas, having since acquired only a few Tucano and IA-63 Pampa trainers. The Air Force would like to acquire more modern fighter-bombers like the F-16, though they have only been offered the A-4M interceptor by the US government. The fact of the matter is that the lifetime costs of a fleet of 50 F-16s would be more than US\$ 5 billion,²¹ far beyond Argentina's fiscal ability to finance. The Air Force and the Army are also planning a joint force of rapid deployment, a very promising example of interservice cooperation.

Our criticism of the restructuration as we understand it is multi-faceted. Economically the military apparatus as currently designed is still way beyond the economy's ability to pay for it. Militarily, the Navy will not be able to defend its expensive assets (and so will have to return to port in case of attack, as happened during Malvinas), and the Army and Air Force are still over-extended, the former far too dependent on conscript troops which will be of little use in modern warfare. Furthermore, the Navy has assumed the

²¹ If one were to calculate the original cost of each plane at US\$35 million, and repairs and operation roughly double that price over the lifetime of the aircraft.

role of the coastguard (beyond 12 nautical miles). Its assets are such that this task will either be done poorly or its costs will be prohibitive. Stopping fishing trawlers with US\$ 250 million frigates is very expensive policing indeed. Diplomatically the announced intention of the acquisition or updating of offensive weaponry on the part of all the forces (even if it be admitted that Argentina is seriously underarmed today) will only stimulate a renewed arms race in the region and undercut efforts at economic integration. On the internal political front, the maintaining of a conscript force adds no genuine firepower component to the Armed Forces, at the same time as it is widely rejected (and correctly so—see Scheetz, 1991b—by the populace).

5. Conclusions

The skeleton argument of this paper runs as follows. First, as presently constituted, millex is harmful to growth and fiscally displaces social and physical investment. Both of these factors deeply affect security in a wide sense. Second, defense enterprises have not been, nor will they be in their privatizing phase, the solution to either financial, development or military operational problems. Third, internally the military corporation has historically displaced other sectors (at the very least at the budgetary level), and externally the natural attribution of best-case scenarios to one's adversary (i.e., interpreting his warmaking potential at a maximum) and a worst-case scenario to one's own country has repeatedly lead to unbearable arms races in the Southern Cone. If this continues it will ruin both regional economies and all hopes of economic integration. Fourth, technology is the central variable in warmaking. The LDCs cannot afford the baroque version. But in any case available technology has made defense cheaper than offense. This offers a way out of all the above predicaments. Nonetheless, the current Argentine military restructuring (with some positive aspects) has continued down the road of expensive and militarily useless baroque weaponry. In the short run an improving economy will be able to provide a partial set of weapons platforms. But Argentina can no longer afford complete weapons systems

that will eliminate all serious vulnerabilities. Thus, as long as the Armed Forces are not called upon for any defense task, those vulnerabilities may not be discovered by politicians. In the longer run Argentina will be able to purchase fewer and fewer of these weapons because of military malthusianism. At that point the only function open to the Armed Forces will be the assumption of a pretorian guard role. Once again it will intervene in internal security, because it will be incapable of fulfilling any other role. We see this already in the policing role assumed by the Navy beyond the 12 mile limit.

The only genuine alternative open to the Armed Forces is the adoption of an alternative defense posture as suggested above. Moreover, this posture meets all criteria: It provides serious dissuasive external defense, professionalizes the armed forces, eliminates conscription, removes the military from politics, improves their salaries, provides space for diplomacy to work out solutions for regional integration and disarmament, and fosters growth and improved social distribution of fiscal expenditure. All this provides a net increase in real external security.

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Carmen Gautier-Mayoral

*THE EFFECT OF THE UNITED STATES' WAR ON DRUGS
ON THE PROCESS OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE
SUBSIDIZED COLONIES OF THE CARIBBEAN*

C O N T E N T S

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U.S. War on Drugs and Caribbean Self-Determination

„The action of the United Nations [in protecting the right of self-determination]... should continue with as much efficacy as it did from 1960 to the present. But it must be understood that said action depends on the policies of the great Powers, or at least, is largely conditioned by them and by the negative interference of international economic [and military] interests directly or indirectly acting through the behavior of certain governments. Understanding this means ... realizing the existing limitations. What has been achieved heretofore is of such great importance that it is the best guarantee that what remains can, indeed, will be carried out. But for this very reason it is necessary to adequately plan the fulfillment of what should be the last stage in the history of decolonization ... „¹

„Diverse political situations in the Antilles generally condition the security policies in the Caribbean. One way to classify them is: a) Cuba; b) independent states with medium size armed forces and security - Haiti, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Guyana, Trinidad - Tobago and Surinam; c) micro states in the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System; and d) colonial territories“². Their metropolises are the industrial powers with the greatest security interests in the Caribbean.

* * *

1 Héctor Gross Espiell, *El Derecho a la libre determinación, aplicación de las resoluciones de las Naciones Unidas*, N. Y., United Nations, 1979 (E/CN. 4/ Sub. 2/405 /Rev. 1) p. 68, § 285, (my translation).

2 Cf. Jorge Rodríguez Beruff, *Perspectivas para la paz y seguridad del Caribe hacia el año 2000*, in Andrés Serbín et al., *El Caribe hacia el año 2000*, Caracas, Nueva Sociedad y UNITAR-INVESP, 1991, p. 126, (my translation).

INTRODUCTION

The future of security, conflict resolution and military organization in the emerging World Order, is at present under study due to the end of the Cold War. This paper shall address the problem of Caribbean Evolving Security in this same global context.

The Caribbean area has been considered a fourth frontier of the United States at least since the time of the Monroe Doctrine, and especially throughout the twentieth century. After the Grenada coup and the Nicaraguan revolutionary triumph in 1979, it was reappraised as an invaluable area of sea lanes carrying important raw materials (principally oil) to the US. It is also a prime area for shipping aid and troops to North America's allies in case of a European conflict.

Absent the Cold War, Cuba becomes a minimal problem for security, however high it may have been in the political agenda of President Bush or low in that of President Clinton. The principal security concerns of the US and the three other industrial powers with a military role in the Caribbean - France, Great Britain, and perhaps the Netherlands - seem at present to be: (1) to stop the illegal drug traffic; (2) to interdict the enormous immigration - principally of boat people - to their countries from the Caribbean; and (3) environmental concerns.³

But, in order to study both evolving Caribbean Security and how it affects the process of decolonization of the remaining Caribbean colonial territories, we must first examine the present policies of the great Powers in the area. I shall touch only briefly on the other three, the US having at present the greatest influence in the region under study.

³ The last two figure prominently as concerns for the foreign policy of the powers in the coming century: see Paul Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-first Century*, New York, Random House, 1993, pp. 21-46 and 95-121.

We shall look at U.S. foreign policy towards the Caribbean for the 1990s in the light of the enormous change in the international system brought about by the upheaval in Central Europe in the fall of 1989, the disappearance of the USSR in December of 1991, and the effects of these events on the region as a whole, but especially on the processes of self-determination in the subsidized colonies thereof, in view of General Assembly Resolution 43/47 of 1988 (declaring the period 1990-2000 as the International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism). The subsidized colonies are: Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands; the British Virgin Islands; Guadeloupe, Martinique, St. Martin and Guyane; and finally Aruba, Curaçao, Bonaire, Dutch St. Martin, St. Eustatius and Sabá. I shall cover Puerto Rico more thoroughly.

At the political level, there is a contradiction between the relative yet accelerated decadence⁴ of American economic hegemony in the world, on the one hand, and that superpower's every day more evident will to follow the recommendations of the *Santa Fé I Report*⁵ by returning to the Third Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine spelled out by President Theodore Roosevelt in 1904, regarding the Caribbean. Essentially, no new colonization by European powers was to be permitted in America. In order to avoid it, preventive intervention was allowed.⁶ It was easier to install the Marines as collectors of custom duties in Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua, and force those unfortunate countries to accept the status of protectorate, than to have

⁴ Accelerated by factors such as its trillionary debt and the multibillionary - possibly trillionary according to some journalistic sources - bail out of the Savings and Loan banks being carried out by the Federal Government.

⁵ Cf. American Security Council, *Santa Fé*, May, 1980. We shall be referring to the *Santa Fé II Report* later.

⁶ Cf. Alonso Aguilar Monteverde, *Panamericanism, from Monroe to the Present*, New York, Monthly Review, 1968, pp. 50-51.

to invade with regular infantry forces to pull out of the Antilles Germans or other Europeans who decided to settle in the region. This held for the first quarter of our century. America's barefacedly unilateral invasion of Panama in 1989, without even any formal regard for the fulfillment of the provisions of the 1933 Interamerican Treaty of Non-Intervention signed in Montevideo,⁷ and confirmed in the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed in Rio de Janeiro in 1947, seem to have carried out the recommended return to the situation of 1904.⁸

A second big contradiction occurs between the U.S. interest in controlling all of the Caribbean and Latin America as exclusive areas of U.S. trade and of development of twin plants for its transnationals (for which purpose, as well as to keep busy the troops returning from Europe, the war on drugs is very useful) on the one hand; and their continuous request that European countries and Japan help in the regional struggles, with funds for the change of crops in the Andean countries, or to offer economic aid to the countries of Central America and the Caribbean, providing funds which the US can no longer afford due to its three deficits: the now reduced trade gap, the multibillionary

7 At the time of the Good Neighbor Policy, this treaty was hailed as the interamericanization of the Monroe Doctrine.

8 It should be remembered that Guatemalan and Honduran mercenaries were used for the invasion of Guatemala in 1954; Colombian and Brazilian troops were added to U.S. ones in the Dominican Republic occupation in 1965; the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States through their spokeswoman the Honorable Prime Minister Mrs. Eugenia Charles, appeared on American television in October of 1983 thanking President Reagan for having listened to their plea and „liberated“ them by invading Grenada; and finally, that the US backing to the Contras in Nicaragua continued long after they considered invading Nicaragua in 1985, but never actually carried it out.

Savings and Loan bailout and the trillionary debt.⁹ This strategy, according to economist David Felix, would eventually cause Europe and Japan to complain about "a growing tendency from Washington beset by fiscal deficits and foreign debts of their own, to put their money where its mouth was."¹⁰

The 1990 adhesion of Haiti and the Dominican Republic to the Lomé II Convention, in order to enjoy the benefits offered by the European Community (EC) to their economically dependent countries (many former colonies) in the Pacific, Africa and the Caribbean, arose precisely out of the congressionally decreed cut in the U.S. sugar quota. Contrariwise, the pressure put by the US on Panamá since 1986, for being an important center of illegal drug trade, was able to frighten away from that country over US \$10 million dollars of Japanese investment, as well as the Japanese offer to build a sea level canal. At that time (December 1986) the Puerto Rican government plan to bring Japanese investments to Puerto Rico, attracting them by allowing Federal tax benefits solely enjoyed there by US transnationals, also failed.¹¹

9 For example, the Brady Initiative in 1989-90 joined US political leadership with Japanese financing when the US asked the World Bank and the IMF to contribute US\$12 billion each and Japan to contribute \$6 billion. Cf. Robert Pastor, *The Bush Administration and Latin America: the Pragmatic Style and the Regionalist Option*, *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* (Fall 1991), p. 12.

10 D. Felix, *Latin American Debt Crisis*, *World Policy Journal* VII, 4 (Fall 1990) 741, quoted in Pastor, p. 12.

11 The failure was due to State Department protests at a time of Japan Bashing by the US Congress.

PROBLEMS WITH U.S. POLITICAL HEGEMONY

It makes one sit up and take notice when the limits of political hegemony after the cold war were described with great clarity in January 1990 by its great defender during the Reagan era, former US Ambassador to the United Nations, Dr. Jeanne Kirkpatrick. This is what she said: „*The cold war is over - nearly. The postwar era is finished - absolutely. The structures through which international affairs have been conducted for the past forty years have been shaken to their foundations. Now comes the time of rebuilding. An American administration with an avowed aversion to "big think" (as one administration official called it) will likely be confronted with the most sweeping reorientation of U.S. Foreign Policy since 1947.*

If the cold war is over, the United States loses the related economic burdens and also its "superpower" status. It loses a good deal of the influence in Europe and Asia to which many Americans have become attached and accustomed. . . We will need to learn to be a power, not a superpower. We should prepare psychologically and economically for reversion to the status of a normal nation, still seeking to encourage democratic institutions, strengthen the rule of law and advance American interests.

*[Europeans] do not regard the United States as a European power. They have not invited the United States to join the EC and are not about to do so. ... They do not see the United States as a "partner" in this proces. ... It is also not likely that American taxpayers will accept a prolonged US presence in Europe in the absence of a persuasive Soviet threat.*¹²

What Kirkpatrick presents is totally in agreement with what has been pointed out by British historian from Yale University, Paul Ken-

12 Cf. J. Kirkpatrick, *Beyond the Cold War*, Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1989-90) Vol. 69, no. 1, pp. 1, 12 and 16, emphasis added.

nedly, in his book *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (1988).¹³ The decadence of empires in modern history has been principally due to over-extension in military expenses. This is precisely what Americans aim to cut in talking about the so called peace dividend.¹⁴

But the War on Drugs was also, before the War in the Persian Gulf, one of the ways designed by the Pentagon and the Department of State to slow down the reduction of military expenses. The Department of the Army, for example, had agreed to cut its troops from three quarters of a million in 1990 to only about 530,000 in 1995, in comparison with only 240,000 in 1939. Mr. Cheney, the Secretary of Defense, had already announced that he planned to use the boys brought back from Europe in the War on Drugs. It is also important to point out that the policy of closing superfluous US bases tended to exclude those in the US. The closing of some of its global bases does not seem to affect in any way its military presence in the Caribbean.¹⁵

13 An excellent discussion of both the authors proclaiming possibilities of U.S. revival by the application of proper methods, vs. those who consider decline more plausible although not necessarily inevitable is presented in Paul Kennedy, *Fin de Siècle America*, New York Review of Books, vol. 37, no. 11 (28 June, 1990) pp. 31-40.

14 See, for example, David E. Rosenbaum, *Pull of Politics Delays a Strategy on Military Saving, 'Peace Dividend' Elusive*, „Experts Worry that Hundreds of Billions May Be Wasted Without Foresight“, N. Y. Times (25 March 1990) p. 1.

15 See press report by EFE from Washington, on 18 November, 1990, on the closing of 151 installations throughout the world. On the other hand, a classified draft report from the Pentagon in the Spring of 1992, leaked to the New York Times and Washington Post, presented 7 possible scenarios of wars in which the US would have to intervene, usually at the head of a group of allies, except in the cases of possible coup d'etats in Panama and the Philippines. Cf. Barton Gellman, *Pentagon War Scenario Spotlights Russia. Study of Potential Threats Presumes U.S. Would Defend Lithua-*

Although recent announcements by the Secretary of Defense assure Panama that US bases will be ended there by the year 2000, Roosevelt Roads Naval Base in Ceiba, Puerto Rico, appears to have "a secure future" as the Navy's primary training facility in the Atlantic.¹⁶

PROBLEMS WITH US ECONOMIC HEGEMONY

It is important here to underline the fact that in spite of the US system's reading of the events in Eastern Europe as a triumph of capitalism - a gentleman by the name of Fukuyama retired from the State Department and wrote a book on "post history,"¹⁷ - the economic crisis of the world-economy, and more particularly of US capitalism based today on a trillionary debt, has not disappeared. What is happening is the almost truculent use of the weapon of privatization as a way to dismantle the welfare state, not only in the US and the rest of the industrially developed countries, but even in the Caribbean and Latin America. Privatization of governmental services was pointed out as far back as 1971 by James O'Connor¹⁸ as the next card which would be put in use to face the fiscal crisis of the State.

nia, Washington Post (20 Feb. 1992) p. 1 and chart of the 7 scenarios prepared by David Cook, p. 3 of the same paper. See also Patrick E. Tyler, Lone Superpower Plan: Ammunition for Critics, New York Times (10 March 1992) pág. A10.

16 Cf. Harry Turner Naval base in little peril of Defense budget cuts datelined Washington, San Juan Star (1 March, 1992) p. 8. Not so defense industries located on the island.

17 Cf. James Atlas, What is Fukuyama Saying and To Whom Is He Saying It?, New York Times Magazine, (22 October 1989).

18 The Fiscal Crisis of the State, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1971.

Curiously, even where there has been nothing which could be called a welfare state in the last 20 years - as in the majority of the countries of this hemisphere - the medicine of privatization is recommended and applied with a vengeance. Thus Collor de Melho, and Vargas Llosa - who, unfortunately, lost the election to Fujimori - had it in their programs, as well as Carlos Andrés Pérez and President Balaguer. Privatization of the public services is now commonly announced even in the island territories that have not yet gained self-determination.¹⁹

The cause and effect of the world economic decadence and the projections for the nineties were seen by a European economist in 1988 thus: „*The world economy is a fact of life. Its influence on international relations domestic policy and individual behavior is inescapable. The [then] socialist economies of the East, including that of the Soviet Union, have failed to escape from the exigencies of world economic development through planning as they sought. The Third World South, all its nationalism notwithstanding, is more dependent than ever on its participation in the world economy. The industrial economies of the West, including the strongest, those of the USA and Japan, have lost whatever autonomy they had in the face of the forces unleashed by the operation of the world economy, whose long-term development and short-term cyclical fluctuations are beyond anyone's control. Most economic and political policy, and many cultural atti-*

19 As has been the case of Puerto Rico with the telephone company as well as in the Netherlands Antilles with other utilities after the departure of the oil refineries. For a well thought out paper on the dangers of divestiture of utilities in small island economies, see Richard 77Weisskoff, presentation before the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress, C. B. I. Hearings, 1983.

*tudes and ideological positions are but ineffectual responses to world economic events.,*²⁰

Joyce Kolko underlines the ascending impotence of even the industrial states at the Center: „*The State is now both stronger and weaker in the economy. It is weaker in the sense that whole areas once under its control - money creation, exchange rates, international capital flows, foreign trade, and the like - are now outside the control of any State. ... Yet clearly, the State remains strong in other respects: military power, economic policy, social order, a context for international competition and rivalry, and assurance of access to markets and materials.*“

Developments in the world economy in the areas of money, debt, and trade, in large part beyond the control of States but to which they must relate, set the context for the competition between nations and for their restructuring policies. These policies, similar in essence, are introduced with varying degrees of success in the different regions of the world depending on the power of the various interests involved. . . Depending on its relative power, the State restructures the economy or is restructured by others to change its role in society.²¹

Nevertheless, the powerful State and the market interact to influence the distribution of power and wealth in the world economy. It also has an increasingly repressive role in keeping the public order. The small or weak state - as is the case of all of the Caribbean countries - will have the tendency to be restructured and impoverished. As a

20 André Gunder Frank, *East-West-South Relations in the World Economy*, in Koh Hadjor, Buenor, ed., *New Perspectives in the North-South Dialogue* (Essays in Honour of Olaf Palme), London, 1988, p. 79.

21 Joyce Kolko, *Restructuring the World Economy*, New York, Pantheon, 1988, pp. 189- 191.

result, it too will have an increasingly repressive role in keeping the public order.²²

Other economists find that the US economy is currently supported by a trillionary debt bubble. These bubbles have been ephemeral and self-destructive, for which reason the system, sooner or later, will stop functioning in its present form. Historically, this situation of loss of economic hegemony - as in the case of Britain after 1887 and until the US achieved economic hegemony in 1945 - has led to war, whereas when one industrial power dominates, the differences between the capitalist powers of the world system are kept under control.²³

Even without the depth of chronic crisis of the 1930s, we are moving in the '90s towards possible trade and currency blocs. Thus we see the American Accord²⁴ - now known as the North American Free Trade Area - which includes free trade and common market arrangements between Canada, the U.S. and México. Although the details of the Enterprise for the Americas initiative have not yet been announced, the European market of 1993 means that the US will try to control all of the people and countries of the Western Hemisphere. The second bloc will be precisely European - maybe later including Eastern

22 The new pro-statehood government in 1993 Puerto Rico is at present emphasizing police and National Guard control to lessen the prevalence of drug related crime.

23 On this point see Peter Phillips, *U.S. Caribbean Relations in Historical Perspective*, paper presented before the Caribbean Studies Association meeting held at Pointe-à-Pitre, Guadeloupe, in May of 1988.

24 Proposed already in the Santa Fé I Report of the American Security Council (1980).

Europe, and - who knows? - even the USSR.²⁵ The third would be Japan with China and Southeast Asia.

Thus, the US has a new need for hemispheric solidarity. Secretary of States Baker's March 1989 speech to Latin American leaders was an indication: „*We need each other now as we have never before. ... Latin America's democratic leaders are reaching out to the US to offer a new partnership. ... I am here on behalf of a new President. ... With our answer we are reaching back to you.*“²⁶

This is also reflected in the 21 June, 1990 Enterprise for the Americas initiative "to build the first fully free Hemisphere in all history" proclaimed by President Bush.²⁷ News articles in the summer of 1992 pointed out that this process of regionalism will occur one step at a time. First, the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA); second its link piece by piece to the Caribbean; and only third - if the first two work - will the Enterprise for the Americas reach out to the Andean Countries and Mercosur. Nevertheless, the new regionalism being carried out has the potential for being: "(a) the basis for a more prosperous world order; (b) a hemispheric counterweight to Europe and Japan; or (c) a fall-back option if the industrialized world retreats to regional blocs."²⁸

25 In October of 1992 the final accord of the European market was in some trouble, after the Danish negative, the Irish positive, and the French yes but, vote in September. But the unified market was born on schedule, on January 1, 1993.

26 James Baker III, Address... to the Carter Center of Emory University's Consultation on a New Hemispheric Agenda, Atlanta, Ga., 30 March (Press Release 56), Wash., D. C. US Department of State, quoted in Pastor, p. 13.

27 Cf. Pastor, p. 22.

28 Ibid, p. 3.

Nevertheless, in the 1990s, the retreat into blocs does not contain the seed of violent confrontation visible in the '30's. Although the U.S. is on the defensive - as it was then - the aggressiveness of the other actors is economic, both industrial and financial, and the power of the European and Japanese economies would be weakened if they tried to grow militarily. Therefore, the preponderant military superiority of the United States can be a millstone around its economy's neck. So as to be able to defend itself economically in the new age of competing industrial economic blocs, the US will need much less military power. Nuclear arms are not the only impediment which makes war less probable this time around.²⁹ The Clinton proposals to cut the US Armed Forces to a total of only 1. 4 million by 1997, show a beginning in this respect.³⁰

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE CARIBBEAN (IN THE 1990S):

According to Georges Fauriol of the Institute of Strategic Studies of Georgetown University, the Bush government had not yet developed a coherent 4 to 8 year policy towards Latin America and its interest in the Caribbean had almost evaporated by the end of 1989. This is entirely in agreement with what Juan Valdés Paz suggested in a 1990 article, i. e. that third world countries are daily diminishing in importance to the superpowers, and even to the other industrial countries in

29 Cf. Paul Sweezy, Monthly Review, vol. 41, no. 5 (Oct. 1989) p. 17.

30 Cf. Text of President's Address to a Joint Session of Congress, N. Y. Times (18 February 1993) p. A14, also proposed by Will Marshall and Martin Schram, eds. Mandate for Change, N. Y., the Progressive Policy Institute, Berkley Books, 1993, p. 309. For a recommendation to cut to 1. 2 million, see John Lancaster, Pentagon, O. M. B. May Battle in Wake of New Budget Plan Washington Post (12 February 1993), p. A2.

the Center.³¹ If one examines the section on the Caribbean of the Heritage Foundation's *Mandate for Leadership III*,³² one is surprised to find out that, excepting Cuba, not one of the island republics or colonial territories - the Antilles - is mentioned by name not only there, but in any part of the 927 page book.³³ This holds true for some of the South American countries as well.

The apparent emphases in Latin American policy in 1989 were: (1) a tenuous bipartisan consensus in the U.S. regarding Central American policy; (2) a belief that the debt problem in Latin America, if allowed to fester, would quickly shift from a giant accounting problem to one with political and security implications; (3) the immediate priority of U.S. relations with Mexico; and (4) the rediscovery of multilateral diplomacy by the new administration, with regional policy programs to cover illegal drug concerns and Panama, leading to the invasion in December of 1989.³⁴

31 Cf. *Notas sobre la Perestroika y el Tercer Mundo*, Cuadernos de Nuestra América, vol. VII, no. 14 (Jan-Je 1990) pp. 76-93. See also Irving Kristol, *The World Map has Changed*, *Wall Street Journal*, (3 January 1990), p. 6-A, where he says that two whole continents are now in the process of disappearing in the horizon, so far as the foreign policy interests of the superpowers are concerned: Africa and Latin America.

32 Cf. Charles L. Heatherly, and Burton Yale Pines, co-eds., *Mandate for Leadership III: Policy strategies for the 1990's*, Washington, The Heritage Foundation, 1989, pp. 538-551.

33 Grenada is mentioned on p. 464, but only to boast that the invasion caused „U.S. adversaries to hesitate to take actions undermining even peripheral U.S. interests.

34 Cf. Georges A. Fauriol, *The Shadow of Latin American Affairs*, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 69, no. 1, pp. 116-117.

At the beginning of the present decade, Latin America and the Caribbean "have become" synonymous with drugs; illegal immigration (now called OTM);³⁵ death squads; guerrillas; capital flight and U.S. intervention, according to Professor Fauriol. As a student and native of the Caribbean one fails to find any novelty in this appraisal.

He points out the economic opportunities opening up to the US in the Pacific basin and Central Europe, including the former USSR. Latin America, he says, "once the fertile ground for foreign investment and an encouraging example of development, is in the half-way house of international finance - attempting to beat its 'addiction' to more money, larger bureaucracies and institutionalized corruption."³⁶

The *Santa Fé II Report*³⁷ seems to have a solution to all of these problems. But it should be pointed out that one of the members of this egregious group, Dr. Konstantin Menges - President Reagan's representative at the 1985 inauguration of the former Governor of Puerto Rico - was dismissed from Reagan's National Security Council in 1986 because he was considered an extreme rightist by Col. Oliver

35 „Other Than Mexican“ is the name given to Central Americans entering through the Rio Grande, according to a *New York Times* editorial (end of April, 1990).

36 Fauriol, op. cit., pp. 117-118. *The America and the World 1990-91 Foreign Affairs*, vol. 70, no. 1, carried an equally inane comment on US-Latin American relations. According to Mark Uhlig's *Latin America: the Frustrations of Success*, „Washington's policy makers appeared content to sit back and enjoy the fact that for the first time in decades regional nations were lining up for America's blessing“, pp. 118-19.

37 *American Security Council*, *Santa Fé*, New Mexico, September 1988.

North and Admiral Poindexter.³⁸ The total absence of present United States interest in the Caribbean seems to be confirmed in the almost complete exclusion of any mention of the region or of Latin America, for that matter, in the chapter dedicated to US global leadership in the Progressive Policy Institute's January 1993 *Mandate for Change*.³⁹ The only exception is Mexico, in relation to NAFTA.

**THE POLICIES OF FRANCE, THE NETHERLANDS,
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, TOWARDS
THEIR CARIBBEAN TERRITORIES:**

Before discussing the war on drugs, a brief examination of the French, Dutch and British policies towards their Caribbean territories is in order.

In December, 1989, the European Council of Ministers in Strasbourg adopted the POSEIDOM program, to bring the **French Overseas Departments (DOMs)** up to the level of the European countries, socially, economically and culturally. This measure was discussed and approved in the French parliament on June 12, 1990. Although not contesting the good will of the Europeans towards the DOM, Guadeloupeans - at least - consider that the unique position of the French Caribbean territories makes this apparent boom a harsh blow to the French Antilles.⁴⁰ For example, when harbor dues are

38 Cf. his book, *The National Security Council*, New York, 1988, for a long lament on his dismissal and the injustice of not using his expertise, as well as for an interesting account of the NSC activities between 1981 and 1985.

39 Cf. Will Marshall, *U.S. Global Leadership for Democracy*, Ch. 13 of the aforementioned book.

40 For an up to date discussion of this problem, see Michel Bangou, *Guadalupe a 500 anos*, paper presented at the Fourth Meeting of the Caribbean

replaced by a tax levied on all goods irrespective of their port of origin in 1993, local production will diminish because of open competition from Europe. The local Assembly will lose its decision-making power with respect to the protection of local products.⁴¹ It is interesting to note that the object of the POSEIDOM program - to integrate the French overseas departments to the European system - has been the aim of France since the 1946 departmentalization decree.⁴² This will also be a blow to United States interest in maintaining the Caribbean and Latin America as its exclusive export zone.

There is a new arrangement or Statut proposed by the **Kingdom of the Netherlands** to its **Antillean territories** for discussion in March of 1990.⁴³ The situation after the 1975-83 consultations was that Aruba had been granted its **Status apart** from the other 5 Dutch Antilles, federated and governed from Williamsted, Curaçao. The remaining 4 islands tied to Curaçao together chose as many members to the

International Relations Working Group of CLASCO in St. Thomas, US Virgin Islands, 9-13 June, 1992.

41 Cf. Alexyna Mekel, *Guadeloupe and 1992*, Caribbean Contact (Bridgetown, February, 1990) p. 16.

42 Fourth Republic. Cf. also the 1958 French Constitution, Title XI, where under Article 74 the overseas territories of the Republic will have a special organization which will take into account their own interests within the context of the interests of the Republic; which organization is to be defined and modified by law, after previous consultation with the particular territorial assembly.

43 Cf. Cabinet for the Netherlands Antillean and Aruban Affairs, *Sketch of a Commonwealth Constitution for the Kingdom of the Netherlands*, The Hague, March 1990.

legislature as Curaçao. And Aruba was to have independence in 1996.⁴⁴

However, Aruba has been quietly requesting that independence is not what it wants, but keeping its special one-island relationship with The Hague. As of 1988, the Netherlands seemed inclined to postpone independence provided the island was willing to unite again with the 5 island Federation. In late 1989 it was considered that if Aruba becomes independent in 1996, the Netherlands will establish a British type Commonwealth and provide some type of external defense, of economic aid and perhaps some freedom of movement between the Antilles and Holland. In 1992 the idea of Commonwealth has already been thought of as a new status for Surinam (independent since 1975) and includes dual citizenship.⁴⁵

Nevertheless, Holland, which - like Britain - claims to want to get rid of its colonies, is faced with the fear of the Antilleans of losing the subsidies from the metropole, particularly given the high standard of living of their islands in comparison with the rest of the Caribbean. It also faces strong internal fears in the metropole of flooding their nation with Caribbean peoples, whom they consider to have corrupt politics and to make social services very expensive by their high rate of unemployment.

As to the U.S. **Virgin Islands**, the plebiscite scheduled for November of 1989 was postponed until September of 1993 due to the

44 Cf. Rita Giacalone, Freddy Martínez and Peter Verton, *Curazao y Aruba entre la Autonomía y la Independencia*, Consejo de Desarrollo Científico y Humanístico, Mérida, Venezuela, Universidad de los Andes, 1990, Chapter four.

45 Gert, Oostindie, *The Dutch Caribbean in the 1990's, Decolonization or Recolonization?* 5 *Caribbean Affairs*, No. 1 (Jan.-March 1992) p. 108.

extensive damage to the territory caused by hurricane Hugo.⁴⁶ Senator Virdin C. Brown, a status commission member considered then that: „*Holding a referendum now would find people with changed views because of the hurricane and what happened afterwards. The handling of emergency-relief operations and whether or not military police should have been sent in, as well as Governor Farrelly's role in requesting troops, all have caused questions and disquiet in V. I. residents mind. The answer to these questions will definitely affect the way people think of the situation and the type of status they have now, which permits that type of intervention.*“⁴⁷

The Governor and Senate president have decided to hold the status referendum in 1993.⁴⁸ According to Professor Dion Phillips of the University of the Virgin Islands in Charlotte Amalie, the effects of Hugo caused a diminution in the possible vote for some of the alternatives which were to be offered in the plebiscite.⁴⁹ Given the growth of clientelism due to the need and use of hurricane aid, it seems that no one seems to want free association or independence for example. It should be noted also that this Virgin Islands' referendum

46 September 17-18, 1989.

47 Cf. Abu Baker, Berry, Krigger: V. I. status issue ought to be put on hold, *The Virgin Islands Daily News* (October 11, 1989), pp. 1 and 12.

48 For a recent appraisal of the situation in the territory, see Charles Turnbull, *Advancement Toward Decolonization in the US Virgin Islands (1917-1992)*, paper presented at the Fourth Meeting of the Caribbean International Relations Working Group of CLACSO in St. Thomas, 9-13 June, 1992.

49 The seven alternatives which were to be offered and explained extensively by a University of the Virgin Islands education initiative, were: Commonwealth; Compact of Federal Relations; Free Association; Incorporated Territory; Independence; Statehood; and Status Quo - Unincorporated Territory.

was simply a popularity contest. The territorial government was to later negotiate with Congress - who holds sovereignty under Article IV of the U.S. Constitution - the real content of the status which the Virgin Islanders had voted. This type of referendum in no way fulfills the requirements of self-determination under Resolution 1514 (XV), and becomes instead what the Americans call a beauty contest.

Finally, the **British Virgin Islands** are still governed under the West Indian Act of 1966, which has already granted independence as soon as the legislature of the territory requests it. As territories heavily subsidized by the metropole, as well as dealing in hard currency, they also attract a lot of boat people coming from the independent anglophone Caribbean, particularly the smaller islands. They are considered foreigners and their work permits are carefully renewed on a yearly basis.⁵⁰

THE WAR ON DRUGS

What will an economy used to making its greatest profits in military expenditures do in an era where everything points to some disarmament, and when the only US hegemony which is still undisputed is its military superpower status? One alternative is to find a cause to need weapons and use them with the backing of the American public in what they consider their back yard. Another, as was seen in the Persian Gulf War, is to use its military superpower in the defense of an alliance which will repay its government for "maintaining order". "Lawrence Eagleburger, the previous Secretary of

50 Cf. Paul Leary, *Geography, Ethnicity and Political Affiliation: A Comparative Examination of Decolonization Issues in the British and US Virgin Islands*, paper presented at the Third Meeting of the Caribbean International Relations Working Group of CLACSO in Cancún, México, 28-31 January, 1991.

State, declared in 1991 before Congress that "The emerging new world order will rest on a 'sort of new intervention in diplomatic practice': others will pay the costs of American intervention in the maintenance of order."⁵¹

Since the end of the 1970s, the American government needed a new cause: something that would forever bury the so called "Viet Nam syndrome,"⁵² and enthuse the people as a sufficient reason to make it worth while for their boys to fight and die on foreign soil to "save" the country. Reagan tried to interest the public in Star Wars and the Strategic Defense Initiative and reopened the Cold War. The Viet Nam syndrome would not go away. But public opinion polls in the US since at least 1986 show that the use of illegal drugs, as well as the soaring crime rates ascribed to this use, have had a high place in the worries of the American people.

By the spring of 1990, after Secretary James Baker's speech before the special session of the U. N. General Assembly dedicated to narcotics, 5 days after the Cartagena anti-drug summit, it was already accepted in Washington that there was a new cause: the war on drugs. The new doctrine is, clearly, based on the declaration of war on drugs made in 1989 by President George Bush.⁵³ A 1990 New York Times-

51 Cf. El orden internacional del desorden mundial, Nueva Sociedad 119 (May-June 1992), p. 124-5 (my translation).

52 See Michael T. Klare, *Beyond the 'Vietnam Syndrome': U.S. Interventionism in the 1980s*, Washington, D. C., Institute for Policy Studies, 1981.

53 Cf. Waltraud Queiser Morales, *The war on drugs: a new U.S. national security doctrine?* *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 11, no. 3, (July, 1989), pp. 147-169; and on the subject of the intervention of the Pentagon in the war on drugs, see Georges Fauriol, *The Shadow of Latin American Affairs*, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 69, no. 1, 1990, pp. 116-134. Also his article in Georges Fauriol, ed., *Security in the Americas*, National Defense University

CBS poll shows that President Bush had a 67% backing among Afro-Americans since that declaration in May of 1989.⁵⁴

But let us briefly study the new doctrine which has been called "the epic against the illegal drug traffic." Clearly, the Achilles heel of President Bush's plan is that it offers no strategy to trap the corporate washers of money, the banks which *cleanse* the profits or the whole elite of groups receiving benefits from the drug traffic. The illegal drug commerce produced in 1989 from \$300 billion⁵⁵ to \$500 billion⁵⁶ dollars a year deposited in some of the banks of the seven large industrial states of the West which feel the weight of carrying the unpayable debt of the Third World countries in their accounts. It is not surprising, then, that experts from these seven large industrial countries meeting during the third week of September 1989 in Paris, France, opposed - under the leadership of the United States - the establishment of a tracing system for international bank transfers of *dirty money* emanating from the drug traffic.⁵⁷

Of all this bonanza, the so-called drug czars of the Medellín and Cali cartels, because of the war declared by Bush and Presidents Barco and Gaviria of Colombia, received a mere \$4 billion, that is 1.33% of

Press, Washington, 1989, which points out the possibility of interdicting both the drug shipments and the boat people with the same weapons.

54 Cf. New York Times (13 April, 1990), p. 1.

55 According to the United Nations Organization in 1989.

56 Calculated by INTERPOL the same year.

57 Cf. El País (Madrid, September 24, 1990, p. 10. Some of the analysis in this paragraph has already appeared in my article Will the War on Drugs Fail, Caribbean Contact (Bridgetown, January 1990), pp. 8-9.

what the UN reported or a measly 8% of the amount pointed out by INTERPOL.

As long as the traffickers are able to place US \$300 [or \$500] billion dollars annually through the channels of the international banking system, it is illogical to pretend that the production will decrease or that the demand for illegal drugs will be curtailed. In fact, the risk of corruption of all the legal institutions which manage this situation, be they the banks, the police or even the governments themselves, is greater every day.

Although drug consumption in the United States (the country with the highest demand for it) and in Puerto Rico, is certainly a very serious social illness - it kills thousands of young people, helps in the transmission of AIDS through the use of common hypodermic needles, appears in the newborn, and pushes the addicts to a life of crime to be able to afford the drug, which affects the whole society - it is very doubtful that the measures taken by the US government to declare war on such a grievous problem, will in fact solve it.⁵⁸ An objective of this doctrine seemed to be to obtain the backing of the American people - and if possible of the Latin American and Caribbean peoples as well - to intervene militarily and unilaterally in Latin America and the Caribbean and to kidnap foreigners in their countries of origin to take them to the US to be judged for the crime of drug trafficking, as the invasion of Panamá in December of 1989, the kidnapping of Mexican Dr. Alvarez Machain, and the recent US Supreme Court decision justifying this action, showed. However, President Bush last year promised President Salinas de Gortari, that there will be no more

58 The New York Times (24 September, 1989) p. 1 points out „that the victory on drugs proclaimed by Bush in mid-September will certainly not be achieved in this generation.“

foreign kidnappings,⁵⁹ and there are reports that although the war on drugs is not really achieving a lessening of demand in the US, treatment for addicts has substantially lessened the middle class snorters. This would leave the majority of the drugs, particularly Crack, in the ghettos. The main element missing in the present drug debate in the US is what should be done to reduce long-term hard-core drug use.⁶⁰

Before discussing the current military build up for the war on drugs in the U.S. bastion in the Caribbean - Puerto Rico - let us briefly examine the arrangements for drug interdiction in the remaining subsidized colonies of the region.

The French government jealously protects its Overseas Departments with its own military, and considers the naval access to its Caribbean colonies as an important geopolitical ingredient to its presence in the Atlantic. The French Antilles and Guyane are also conceived as a military transit location necessary to maintain a French stay in the Pacific, related with the development of their own nuclear weapons and a global military presence. French Guyane plays an important role in its space program through the Korou space center, keystone of the French and European space policies. The communications installations and harbor and airport infrastructures in Fort-de-France and Pointe-à-Pitre, are equally indispensable for stops on the way to the experimentation center in the Pacific.⁶¹ A French author on military affairs

59 Cf. Fernando Orgambides, Bush promete a Salinas que no habrá más secuestros en el extranjero, *El País* (Madrid, 20 July, 1992) p. 3.

60 Cf. Michael Massing, What Ever Happened to the 'War on Drugs'? *The New York Review of Books* (11 June, 1992), pp. 42-46.

61 Cf. Regis Menu, La France puissance Caraibe, *Defense Nationale* (Aug. - Sept. 1988) p. 100, quoted in Jorge Rodríguez Beruff, *Perspectivas para la paz y seguridad del Caribe hacia el año 2000*, in Andrés Serbín et al., *El Caribe hacia el año 2000*, Caracas, Nueva Sociedad y UNITAR-INVESP, 1991, pp. 120-1.

considers internal security in their Caribbean territories a security problem, and identifies the role of Lybia and Suriname as well as the independence movements in the colonies, as the principal threats to security. But arrangements with U.S. military forces for drug interdiction are done through US-French communication.⁶² Only in St. Martin do we have information of some agreement of the police with U.S. military forces.⁶³

The military arrangements of the Dutch government in the Netherlands Antilles are relatively modest. In Aruba and Curaçao they have a frigate, an amphibious combat detachment, and a reconnaissance one. On joint drug interdiction, the arrangements should be made via NATO.

The English speaking independent and colonial Caribbean does have close military relations with U.S. armed forces, either via training with the Puerto Rico National Guard, or directly with other American forces. The invasion of Granada showed that.

The Venezuelan armed forces had in 1990 one admiral permanently stationed at Roosevelt Roads Naval Station in Ceiba, Puerto Rico, although we do not know to what purpose.

THE MILITARY BUILD-UP AS A CONSTRAINT ON SELF-DETERMINATION

The destruction of the Berlin wall in November of 1989, the accelerated pace towards the reunification of Germany, the Ottawa accords of February 1990 about the cut in the number of Russian and

62 *Ibidem*.

63 Cf. St. Martin patrol boat to help fight drug crime, *San Juan Star* (17 June, 1990), p. 11, as to a patrol boat donated by U.S. military forces to the government of the territory.

American soldiers to remain in Europe, the petition of Poland and Hungary that Soviet troops leave their respective national territories, the breaking up of the USSR in 1991, all of these events seemed to indicate that, given the end of the Cold War, and of the Communist menace⁶⁴ it would no longer be necessary to use Puerto Rico as a US military bastion in the Caribbean. With no Soviet submarines or other fleet in the Caribbean to watch, how important are all the entrances to this *mare nostrum* which the US considers its own?

In view of the disappearance of the USSR and its civil and military aid to Cuba, the Salvadorean peace treaty, as well as Nicaragua's UNO government, why maintain so much military hardware in the smallest of the Greater Antilles? If there is not going to be a thermonuclear war, why contaminate our environment and endanger our population, by keeping nuclear bombs in submarines and airplanes at the Roosevelt Roads base in Ceiba?

A second look, however, points precisely to 1993, when all of Western Europe - and later possibly much of Eastern Europe as well - united to form one market, and one space without frontiers. The US considers it necessary to watch over its "natural markets" in the Latin American and Caribbean continent. Thus, the French decision to develop their overseas departments, Martinique and Guadeloupe, to the level of Western European countries socially, economically and culturally, may - if the world finally divides into trade and currency blocs - represent a threat to hegemonic US control at least in the Eastern Caribbean.

The geographic location of Puerto Rico - ideal for "overseeing" two of the principal entrances to the Caribbean Sea: the channel of Anegada east of St. Croix, and the Mona Channel on our own Western

64 See, among others, Fritz Stern, *The Common House of Europe*, N. Y. Review of Books (8 Dec. 1989) and, Stanley Hoffman, *A Plan for the New Europe* N. Y. Review of Books (18 Jan. 1990), pp. 18-21.

shore -⁶⁵ made us very attractive as a military bastion both to King Phillip II of Spain (1560) and his successors, and to the US Navy Department since before the invasion of 1898.⁶⁶

As recently as 1985, Professor Georges Fauriol underlined the strategic value of Puerto Rico to the United States thus: „*In an era of intercontinental war and communication, the strategic importance of Puerto Rico may seem secondary to some; but to that U.S. defense doctrine which begins to recognize the end of the century national security implications of low intensity conflicts, terrorism and insurrections, an adequate infrastructure in a region as vital as the Caribbean Basin has become crucial. In this context, Puerto Rico is strategically located in the northeast quadrant and entrance to the Caribbean Basin. More so, if there is a some uncertainty about the sovereignty of the US in relation to the present security arrangements in the region. The future status of Guantánamo at the end of the century is an open question. In the same manner, the traditional U.S.*

65 About this location and its significance in the island's history, see by the present author, *La nueva política exterior de Estados Unidos hacia el Caribe y sus efectos sobre las relaciones de Puerto Rico con Estados Unidos y con el Caribe*, chapter 4 of Gautier-Mayoral, C., A. I. Rivera Ortiz and Idsa E. Alegria Ortega, *Puerto Rico en las relaciones internacionales del Caribe*, Río Piedras, CLACSO-CIS-Huracán, 1990. On the military use of Puerto Rico in the last half of the XX century, cf. Rodríguez Beruff, Jorge, *Política militar y dominación: Puerto Rico en el contexto latinoamericano*, Río Piedras, Huracán, 1988.

66 See the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan, US geopolitician, professor of the Naval War College in the 90's of the XIX century, and a great influence on the Secretary of the Navy, later President Teddy Roosevelt.

*interests in developments in the Panamá Canal have changed after the treaties signed at the end of the seventies*⁶⁷

In his 1989 presentation before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the U.S. Senate hearings on a Status Referendum Act for Puerto Rico (S. 712), Brigadier General M. J. Byron, Acting Deputy Assistant Undersecretary of Defense (Interamerican Affairs), pointed out that the easiest way to maintain the national security and defense interests of the US on the island, would be under the statehood option. He underlined the importance of the island for the defense of the Caribbean and the South Atlantic, as well as its value as a training area for the Atlantic fleet.⁶⁸ These exercises are also very useful as showrooms to demonstrate the qualities of new weapons to the hemispheric fleet and air force admirals and generals. Should they be interested, the salesman will make a sure approach to the President of his country, provided the Pentagon allows it.

The affirmation of the role of Puerto Rico as both a strategic bastion and a training area, for the drug wars was amply demonstrated during Bush's stay in Cartagena in 1990. Precisely on the day of the Drug Summit between the presidents of Ecuador, Perú, Bolivia, Colombia and the US, - 15 February 1990 - the Pentagon announced that the radar reconnaissance AWACs planes would be roaming the Caribbean from the Roosevelt Roads Naval Air Base, in order to stop the drug

67 Georges Fauriol, *Puerto Rico and the United States. Understanding the Foundation of a Strategic Relationship*, Washington, Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, April 8, 1985, p. 17.

68 See Prepared Statement of Brigadier General M. J. Byron, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Inter American Affairs), Department of Defense, before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate, 11 July 1989.

traffickers.⁶⁹ This means that, despite the disarmament presented at Ottawa in relation to the NATO and Warsaw Pact forces as far back as February of 1990, Puerto Rico is still at the very center of the US military plans for the Caribbean region. The war against drugs and the interdiction of Latin American and Caribbean boat people will be carried out from that island.⁷⁰ It should not surprise us that the location of the head office of INTERPOL for the Caribbean is in San Juan, and that the US Army Corps of Engineers petitioned in September of 1989 for additional lands for military exercises in 16 forest areas.⁷¹ However, there is no public knowledge in 1993 of whether the US Army is still considering the use of additional lands on

69 Cf. M. R. Gordon, *US is Stepping Up Efforts to Seize Cargoes of Drugs... Caribbean Surveillance Rises...*, *New York Times*, (10 March, 1990), pp. 1 and 5. The AWACS are still flying the Caribbean to point out drug or suspicious shipments landing anywhere to interested governments.

70 Customs, Coast Guard to Open Intelligence Center, *San Juan Star* (17 June, 1990), p. 8.

71 These are: Bahía de Jauca, Lago Coamo, Lago Melania, Punta Borinquen, Bahía de Jobos, Muñoz Blanco/Descalabrado/Río Canos, Carite, Jájome, áreas adyacentes al Campamento Santiago, Toro Negro, Hacienda Húcar/Hacienda Julio/Sabater/Cimarrona, the Patillas airport, Buenavista, the Humacao airport, the Isla de Mona, and the Cerro las Tetras of Cayey. See letter from A. J. Salem, chief of the Planning Division of the Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville, Florida district, to all interested parties (20 September 1989) requesting opinions on the environmental effect of the proposed activities. He circulated it to 10 US and 24 Puerto Rican agencies, including, among others, the Governor, the Secretary of Natural Resources, the President of the Planning Board, the head of the Coast Guard, the Director of the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture, the Director of the U.S. Geological Survey, and two Navy commanders of the South Atlantic command.

the island as there is little mention in this election year of the war on drugs. Nevertheless, having been identified as a prime interest of US security concerns in the Caribbean, it remains to be seen whether this war shall be resumed full-scale under the Clinton administration.

This continuous and unexpected growth of the military use of this small island is an important **constraint on self-determination**, both from the increasing foreign military bases on the territory, and as a future destruction of the limited environment in our land space. The U.S. Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee included "unrestricted access to present and future territory for American military bases", under the independence alternative in their now tabled status referendum bills of 1990 and 1991. With 13% of the 3500 square mile land area already in the hands of the Department of Defense, 29,000 additional acres in the best forest areas are now requested.

Also, as the experience of the last twenty eight years has shown, this North American preoccupation with the Puerto Rican political status is all a game. Ever since the Decolonization Committee of the United Nations came into existence in March of 1962, the US executive and legislative branches have been playing at the game of "studying Puerto Rico's status in order to grant the island more powers" in whatever direction. As soon as Puerto Rico seems to be going in one direction, a Washington pronouncement of some sort changes the direction, and the game starts all over again. But in the eternal status discussions, as in the heavily dependent Puerto Rican economy, there is always room for a new gimmick, such as a non self-executing plebiscite or "beauty contest" which in no way fulfills the international requirements for decolonization, nor any other function than lip service to self-determination.⁷²

72 Such a plebiscite was held on the island in 1967. Proof of its futility lies in the fact that Puerto Ricans do not have a single additional power as a result of it. Another beauty contest referendum has been promised by the winning pro statehood party in Puerto Rico for November, 1993."

SIMILARITIES IN THE SUBSIDIZED COLONIES OF THE CARIBBEAN

Similar characteristics of size, subsidy, external migration of almost half of their population to the metropole, immigration from the poorer republics of the Caribbean in search of earning hard currency to send home, and military and commercial or financial use to their metropolises, keep the Caribbean dependencies profitable to their respective metropolitan powers - would have a great political cost if carried out in their home territory - and lacking substantial independence movements towards the end of this century.⁷³

When almost 29% of disposable income in Puerto Rico, for example, comes from US transfer payments, independence could mean an immediate shortfall of 1/3 of individual income. The same would be true for Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles, where aid donated by The Hague is one of the highest per capita in the world.⁷⁴ The 1990 sketch of a Commonwealth constitution for the kingdom of the Netherlands insures Dutch citizenship and the continuation of economic aid from The Hague, two of the main preoccupations of the voters.⁷⁵ Metropolitan transfers in the French DOMs account for almost 3/4 of the

73 For further discussion on these colonies, cf. from the present author, *La descolonización aplazada en las colonias subsidiadas del Caribe en el contexto de la economía global de los años noventa*, *El Caribe Contemporáneo* no. 24 (Mexico, Jan. -June 1992) pp. 61-76.

74 Cf. Giacalone, Martínez and Verton, *op. cit.*, Ch. 4.

75 Preoccupation related to the guarantee of democratic government, defense and protection against exploitation by international drug traffickers, and fear for the road followed by Surinam. See *New constitution proposed for the Netherlands Antilles*, *Caribbean Insight*, vol. 13, no. 5 (May 1990) pp. 6-7.

resources of these territories, against 1/4 coming from export of goods and services.⁷⁶

This apparent prosperity - compared to their independent neighbors - makes them extremely cautious at the moment of choosing a solution for their countries, in spite of the precariousness of life.

This general fear of independence means that the popularity contests which shall substitute for plebiscites in the coming years in Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands are, like the Constitution offered by the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and the Commonwealth Status like Puerto Rico now desired by Guadeloupe, forms of apparent, not real, decolonization. They shall be given a lot of publicity to leave the situation politically the same, and maybe economically impoverished.

CONCLUSION

For all the above reasons - the return of the world scene to the old international disorder; the problem with American hegemony in political and economic but not in military terms; security concerns of the powers in the Caribbean region in the post cold war world; the war on drugs together with interdiction of illegal boat migrants; and lack of any substantial independence movement in the remaining colonies of the region - any process of self-determination in the Caribbean dependencies will be apparent and not real. The security concerns of the powers will promote their subsidizing of these territories, and the terror of returning to bitter Caribbean poverty will keep the electorates faithful to the apparent decolonization. One could call this, the politics of immobility and the security of the interests of the powers.

⁷⁶ Cf. Daniel van Euwen, *Caribe francés, temores ante una mayor 'cercanía' europea*, Nueva Sociedad no. 110 (Nov-Dec. 1990) p. 42; and Felix Proto, *The Guadeloupe Region as it Stands*, Basse Terre, Guadeloupe Region Regional Council, Republic of France, 1989, Ch. 5.

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FAREWELL TO COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE ? Arguments against and for Compulsory Military Service in Times of Peace - The Case of Germany

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Farewell to Compulsory Military Service ?

The concept of compulsory military service - so far a characteristic feature of democratically legitimized armed forces in the Federal Republic of Germany - has become subject to ever more questions and doubts. The indications pointing to this fact multiply. As early as 1989, the Federal Chancellor had difficulties convincing his coalition partner of his arguments and those of the military: The proposed objective of extending compulsory military service by three months (justified by a predictable shortage of conscripts) was not achieved; the enlistment period of fifteen months was maintained. In October 1990 this period was even further reduced to twelve months as a result of the détente in East-West relations. Now that the two German nations and their armed forces have united and that the overall strength of the joint forces has been set at 370,000 men by contract, compulsory military service is again a controversial issue. It is certainly with a populist undertone that political factions demand that the period of military service should be further reduced to nine months. A growing number of people claim that there is no justification for compulsory military service in times of peace. All facts notwithstanding the official political position remains the same: „German history and our geographic situation lead me to the conclusion that no other military service system is desirable.“¹

On the Theory of the Decline of Mass Armies

There are indeed good arguments which make universal liability to military service appear rather questionable today. As early as in the mid-seventies, a lengthy and international discussion among scientists con-

¹ Former Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr, Admiral Wellershoff, see Schueler, p. 7

cerned with the military ended with the conclusion that the days of compulsory military service were numbered.²

In the near future, developed societies would no longer need traditional mass armies. Thus, the main reason for having a universal draft, namely to supply the armies with the required manpower at low cost, would cease to exist. The decline of mass armies was not so much expected as the result of a successful policy of détente and disarmament. Rather was it forecast as the inevitable result of predictable social and political developments and of progress in military technology.

Mass armies and compulsory military service whose rise were directly linked with the emergence of the nation-state would lose importance to the extent that democratic nations would grow into pluralistic societies: „The nation-state and its armed forces had entered into a close relationship: The nation was represented by its armed forces; the armed forces considered themselves to be the upholder of the nation-state concept and were often regarded as incarnations of the nation-state idea“.³

Today's social consciousness were determined by different values, by individualism, subjectivism and hedonism. The idea of „organizing society for collective purposes“⁴ would meet with increasing criticism among the population. Accordingly, the youth would find compulsory military service a nuisance which, according to van Doorn, may be seen as „an indication of the weakened legitimacy of the state“.⁵

² See Harries-Jenkins (1973); Janowitz (1971), van Doorn. A summary of the major reasons is given by Burk (1990), p. 5 ff. and Manigart, p. 40 ff.

³ Van Doorn, p. 56.

⁴ *Ib.*, p. 55.

⁵ *Ib.*, p. 56.

Progress in weapons technology, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, and the limited controllability of their effect, were bound to alienate developed societies from their weaponry. Such weapons systems, if at all, would only be tolerated as a defensive means, as a necessary evil. Nuclear armament was less and less appropriate as „a means to impassion the masses and to stir up ideological feelings“.⁶ Accordingly, the military as given a merely purpose-oriented role. The traditional tasks of the armed forces, such as being the „school of the nation“, assuming the „civic education of the citizens“, or personifying „male virtues“ were no longer reasons to justify compulsory military service.⁷

In addition, military technology and strategy were more and more ruled by specialized procedures and organizational systems. Therefore, military personnel would require higher professional qualifications. Accordingly, the amount of non-specialized military assignments would be drastically reduced. If the period of compulsory military service is short, it therefore may be assumed that conscripts can hardly be trained as thoroughly as required. The conscripts would be forced to take over simple military tasks, which would be as little demanding as those of unskilled „guest workers“ in industry.⁸

Compulsory Military Service in Bad Straits

Reading this sketchy analysis, one is inclined to believe that it is a description of the present legitimacy problems experienced by the armed forces in highly developed industrial societies. At first sight, however,

⁶ *Ib.*, p. 60.

⁷ *Ib.*

⁸ See *ib.*, p. 57.

the peacetime strength of the armed forces has not been considerably reduced; the predicted decline of the mass armies has not occurred. By the end of 1989 the peacetime strength of the Bundeswehr was still 495,000 men as contractually agreed with NATO. The current shrinking of the Bundeswehr in the unified parts of Germany to a maximum of 370,000 men (after 1994) is an immediate result of the partial dissolution of the East-West conflict and was not only caused by the briefly outlined technological and sociopolitical developments, although the latter contributed considerably to bringing about the current state of security policy.

Although the peacetime strength had remained unchanged in quantity until 1989, a knowledgeable observer could not fail to notice the quality erosion within the Bundeswehr. There was the permanent problem of recruiting enough regulars and/or temporary career volunteers so that the relation of soldiers with a longer period of service and conscripts was not as projected. In order to keep up the outward appearance of having an adequate peacetime strength, conscripts who had voluntarily extended their period of service by a few months (temporary career volunteers with a two-year term of service) were classed with the long-service soldiers without having been given their intensive military training. The official peacetime strength was also maintained by considering reservists and soldiers of the ready reserve as elements of the active forces and by counting in cadre units, i.e. only partly staffed military units.

Regardless of all quantitative considerations, the social importance and status of compulsory military service has changed significantly. Today, the armed forces are neither the only nor the most important means to embody a nation's will of self-assertion. Conflict management, which was originally an exclusive domain of the military, has now shifted to other areas of society too, such as the economic sector. On the basis of a secured military defense capability, „dialogue, disarmament, confidence

building measures, economic and other forms of co-operation ... contribute to safeguarding peace and our future“.⁹

Our society's concept of security has changed. The capability of military defense is increasingly complemented by the insight that security can only be obtained in co-operation with the antagonist. Security is no longer just a position-related asset. This implies that we see our own society and its relations to other societies as a risk-sharing community. Any risk reduction, even in the form of military disarmament, has, therefore, high sociopolitical priority.

The social task of „guaranteeing national sovereignty“ is more and more perceived by the public as competing with other sociopolitical objectives. Recent opinion polls disclose that military defense capability now ranks only fifth in importance, being surpassed by social security, housing, preservation of the environment and protection against the imponderables of chemical and nuclear large-scale technologies. Moreover, military-related characteristics, the so-called values of duty and acceptance, namely obedience, love of order, sense of duty, subordination - which the military likes to consider as virtues - have lost their attractiveness and are no longer held in high esteem.¹⁰ The social development described as „change of values“ led to emphasizing the independence of the individual, self-determination, self-realization - objectives which are rarely reached in the everyday life of conscripts.

In addition, military service is no longer a „rite of passage“¹¹ from youth to manhood; it no longer marks the end of youth and the beginning of adulthood. Officially, young men are already considered adults when they are drafted. And they feel and behave accordingly. Attempts

⁹ Wellershoff, p. 2.

¹⁰ See Haltiner, l.c.

¹¹ Janowitz/Moskos, p. 173.

by military instructors to educate young soldiers meet with skepticism at best; usually the conscripts' reaction is rejection.¹² Once an integral part of a young man's life, military service nowadays is frequently considered as an unpleasant interruption of one's personal plans. In view of this fact, the young man mainly makes his decision in favor of or against military service by making a personal cost benefit analysis. Commitments to society, nation and state play a secondary role- one believes that they have been met by paying the taxes.¹³

Finally, society as a whole does not grant the soldier a better social status, or a higher moral value than the conscientious objector. Approximately since 1985, conscientious objectors and young men doing civilian alternative service have clearly been given a positive rating by the public - as have the volunteers, who have experienced a similarly high approval by society since 1980.¹⁴ The tendency of the public to put military service and civilian alternative service more or less on an equal footing amounts to a de facto devaluation of the motives which might lead a conscript to do his military service in spite of an evident lack of legitimization of the military.

The Problem of Equity in Induction

Therefore, it is not surprising that military service contributed less and less to imparting a feeling of civic identity. Most young men are reluctant to do military service, but then only a fraction of them are actually drafted. „Many years of experience have shown that only about 50% (of the relevant age group called up for their pre-induction exami-

¹² See Braun / Fricke / Klein, l.c.

¹³ Lippert (1991), l.c.

¹⁴ See Vogt / Wiesendahl, p. 146.

nation; annotation by the author) are actually drafted for compulsory military service. The other 50% are not available for military service for reasons of medical fitness or because they are recognized as conscientious objectors or are exempted from military service for other reasons; or they serve as regulars or temporary career soldiers in the police forces, in civil defense and disaster control or in the development aid organization¹⁵ Considering this ratio, it is doubtful whether the „universal draft“ is truly universal.

The tendency towards a higher degree of inequity in induction will continue. If, from 1995 onwards, the Bundeswehr with a personnel strength reduced to 370,000 men call up sufficient conscripts to account for 41% of their total peacetime strength as nowadays projected, about 152,000 young men would have to reckon with the draft call every year. From a purely arithmetic point of view, this would roughly correspond to the actual number of young men apt and ready to do military service in Germany.

However, the issue of equity in induction would still not be settled because the Bundeswehr will probably hold substantially fewer positions for conscripts. Experts estimate that the number of useful positions for conscripts will at most be 100,000 per year.¹⁶ The already briefly outlined technical constraints will further necessitate the renunciation of compulsory military service. A prerequisite to handling future weapons technologies is the mastery of complex technical systems. Due to the computerization, automation and robotization of weapons systems „the

¹⁵ Parliamentary State Secretary to the Federal Minister of Defense in "Bundeswehr aktuell", 6 September 1990. For a graphic summary of "draft rules" and exemptions from military service see Ehlert (1990 a), annex 2, and Kuhlmann (1990 a), chapter 3.

¹⁶ See Manfred Opel.

fighting soldier becomes indeed more and more dispensable.¹⁷ Though warfare - according to van Doorn - „still involves hundreds of thousands of people, the modern battlefield appears to be quite empty“.¹⁸

At any rate, the current 12-month period of service is evidently not long enough for conscripts to obtain adequate training for demanding technical jobs. If compulsory military service is even further reduced to a period of nine months, for example,¹⁹ the problem of providing adequate training will be further aggravated.

Already now, even conscripts with relevant experience from their civilian jobs have to leave technical specialist work in the technical units to their NCOs and sergeants, because they are not or cannot be adequately trained on the weapons systems.

This trend induced by the seemingly inevitable logic of social and technical modernization is further strengthened by the constraints of military strategy and the resulting force structure. The relevant projected data suggest that the „Bundeswehr to be expected will be optimized to the point of being incapable of attacking, while having a - highly flexible - defense network“.²⁰ Due to their decrease in peacetime strength the Bundeswehr will have to streamline their branches and organization. Tasks which are usually done by conscripts will then mainly be found with the infantry, the engineers and comparable branches. Everywhere

¹⁷ Vogt/Wiesendahl/Mohrmann/Kutz/Baum, p. 39 f.

¹⁸ Van Doorn, p. 55.

¹⁹ As early as in 1973 the Naval Staff pointed out that "the employment of conscripts is not possible if the term of basic military service is shorter than 15 months ..., as this would not be long enough to train the soldiers adequately for the manifold assignments in their special field." Force Structure Commission (1972/73), p. 78.

²⁰ Opel, l.c.

else, they will more or less cease to exist. And - as a further conclusion- the more the infantry components are reduced in strength, the more the continued existence of compulsory military service will be at stake.²¹

Empirical evidence for the growing specialization of the Bundeswehr is easily produced. The statement that one combatant needs about nine „non-combatants“ to perform his combat mission, i.e. nine soldiers with combat support tasks or administrative tasks, has been considered a military commonplace for a long time. Meanwhile, this ratio has further changed to the disadvantage of the combatants. The share of non-combat tasks is steadily increasing. In the German Air Force, for example, only about five percent of the tasks are still traditional military duties.²²

The relative top-heaviness of the grade structure within the Bundeswehr - an „inflation of middle ranks“, as Janowitz has called this phenomenon - can be proved by statistics.²³ In 1964, there was one officer for nine rank and file draftees in the Bundeswehr, in 1984 the ratio was

²¹ See Van Doorn, p. 54. He argues that a reduction of forces is generally carried out at the expense of the army. Consequently, only a part of the conscripts would actually be drafted. The resulting inequity in induction would finally lead to the end of any compulsory military service.

²² In the Belgian army, for example, 75 % of the conscripts served in peripheral civilian non-combat functions, only 6.3 % performed combat tasks in the traditional military sense. See Manigart, p. 52 ff.

²³ As to the Belgian forces, Manigart has recently shown by means of statistics recorded since 1936 that the grade structure which used to have the form of a pyramid has now taken on the shape of a rhombus standing on a tip. See Manigart, p. 53.

1 to 5.²⁴ In 1988, the Air Force had an officer/NCO/rank and file ratio of 1 : 3 : 4, the corresponding ratio for the Navy was 1 : 3 : 3.²⁵

The conscript will increasingly play a marginal role within the military organization. So it is not surprising that conscripts often think they are nothing but „cheap labor“. A conscript aboard a man-of-war was asked one week before the end of his service in the Bundeswehr: „What is your daily routine?“ He provided a typical answer: „Actually, there isn't any. A rank and file member's routine is: military guard, cleaning deck (cleaning of quarters), rust scaling, painting with oil paint.“²⁶

Defense Mission and Peacetime Strength

A closer look at the correlation between defense mission and the forces' peacetime strength soon leads to the conclusion that the devil is in the nuts and bolts. It may be premature to assume that the peacetime strength of the Bundeswehr as agreed in the Caucasus will come down to 370,000 men by 1995 and remain on this level ever after. This figure appears to be the result of a political agreement first and foremost rather than being the logical consequence of a stringent analysis of strategic and politico-military aspects. Such an analytical reappraisal is long

²⁴ See MOD (1985), p. 241.

²⁵ MOD (1988), p. 13. This is evidently an international, armed forces-specific tendency. "In 1945, the final year of World War II, there were 710 soldiers for every officer above the rank of colonel in the Army or captain in the Navy. But as of last year (1988, annotation of the author), there were only 146 indians for one chief." Newsweek, 23 January 1989, p. 12. See also Hahn (1981), p. 32, who noticed a similar trend in the German logistic forces between 1866 and 1970.

²⁶ From a group discussion in August 1990.

overdue.²⁷ It remains doubtful, however, whether it can be done at all, for it is difficult in general to determine the security wants of society, and it is even more difficult to operationalize them. And to answer the question „How many soldiers are sufficient“? one would need to know first what functions society expects for the forces to fulfill.

- In summary, one can say that at present there are two partly complementary functions which society expects the military to fulfill. The first one is: in view of current developments which no longer allow us to define security mainly by military terms but require us to relate it first of all to „ecologic and demographic disasters with global border-crossing effects ... (such as) ... population explosion, climatic disasters, lack of resources“²⁸ the forces „in a non-military era“ are advised to undergo a change of paradigms. Military power potentials would have to be reduced to forces which due to their structure have no attack capabilities; they would, however, be armed and employed for the purpose of withstanding the new threats to security. The future tasks of the Bundeswehr would inevitably result from the predominant risks of the future. The relatively small remaining military tasks concerning basic security would be supplemented by tasks such as
- Military mediator functions and pacifying actions in areas of conflict and relaxed tension (promotion of peace by assuming a „constabulary“ function);
- Verification tasks in the course of the disarmament process;

²⁷ The personnel strength of the Federal Armed Forces (495,000) up to now was "in every respect a political quantity" and "not justified by military reasons." "Historically, it was based on the Protocol of the Paris Agreements on the Forces of the Western European Union (WEU) of 1954". Schmäling, l.c.

²⁸ Vogt, p. 17.

- Technical disaster relief during floods, earthquakes, forest fires, etc.;
- Humanitarian assistance in case of industrial and environmental disasters;
- Revitalization and improvement of environmentally damaged land and water;
- Control of protected large-area habitats like the virgin forests, the oceans, the Arctic/Antarctic.²⁹

A second pattern of reasoning is immediately linked with the one above. Participating in the accomplishment of tasks which are considered necessary and useful by society may help the Bundeswehr resolve its dilemma of public legitimation.³⁰ Dedicated to the common cause of protecting society from the risks of modernization, the Bundeswehr might win back some of the social approval (and acceptance) that it has lost in the course of rising criticism about its exclusively military-oriented defense system. Actually, the Bundeswehr has always brought its admittedly efficient technical assistance into focus when providing help in the wake of disasters at home and abroad; and it has done so with excellent publicity. However, this led to the result that the Bundeswehr has gained status in a field which cannot - at least not necessarily - be derived from the original objectives of the military.

By taking over secondary functions, the Bundeswehr would come closer to the image it is associated with by the public. In public perception primary military functions, namely military defense and maintenance of the status quo in power politics clearly play a minor role. In the view of the public social tasks like „assistance in the wake of natural and technological disasters“ come first, as do stereotypes like „getting the

²⁹ See Vogt, p. 80 ff.

³⁰ See Kohr/Lippert, p. 7, Kern, p. 23.

unemployed off the streets“ or „teach discipline and order to the youth“.³¹

Technically, there are, however, a lot of points against charging the Bundeswehr with non-military tasks. Basically, the military organization is appropriate for the fast and concentrated employment of large-scale technical equipment and extensive manpower, even for non-military purposes. But military work is still characterized by „order and obedience“ and still requires most soldiers to do their „duty“ in the military service which involves „the renunciation of a part of the civil rights.“ The restrictions of these basic rights that are guaranteed in our democratic constitution are justified by the idea that without these restrictions the military would not be able to protect democracy against threats from outside. But where tasks are concerned that can be mastered with less restrictive organizational patterns, military structures become obsolete, or at least need to be justified. To state the facts oversubtly: charging the Bundeswehr with other than military tasks would be equal to a socially controversial militarization of the social sectors and institutions concerned.

In political practice it would be difficult, anyway to charge the Bundeswehr with non-military tasks. As a matter of fact, the „socio-economic field has almost completely been taken over by civilian organizations which are constantly on their guard against interference from rival institutions.“³² In Germany, civil defense and disaster control services are provided by the Technisches Hilfswerk (Technical Emergency Service), a federal agency which, in turn, depends on young men

³¹ See Kohr / Räder, p. 13.

³² Van Doorn, p. 57. As to the structure of private and public welfare in the Federal Republic of Germany see Kuhlmann (1990 a).

doing their civilian alternative service, by private organizations³³ and by professional fire brigades. In the accomplishment of humanitarian tasks the Bundeswehr would, in addition, face competition from the central associations of private welfare and their member institutions.³⁴

Extending their activities beyond the key military missions and diversifying these missions would very likely expose the Bundeswehr to the reproach of acting with a view to further legitimizing military structures. „The adoption of non-military objectives by the military (would be) understood as the obvious attempt ... to keep alive an evidently superfluous and costly institution.“³⁵

So there are good reasons for the Bundeswehr to stick to its military last like the proverbial cobbler. This will probably include verification tasks in the wake of disarmament procedures and the integration of Bundeswehr units in international and multinational component forces. A „Center for Verification Tasks of the Bundeswehr“ has already been established. And it is probably only a question of time that the required constitutional basis for the employment of Bundeswehr units for peacekeeping tasks on behalf of the UN and outside the NATO area will be provided.

Whatever the definite structure of the forces required for military purposes will be, one thing is sure: the Bundeswehr's peacetime strength will further shrink - to a strength far below the figure of 370,000 men agreed by contract as of 1995. Though not yet widely talked about in public, a force level of about 200,000 to 125,000 men is conceivable. A

³³ Mainly: Arbeitersamariterbund (ASB), Deutsches Rotes Kreuz (DRK), Johanniter Unfallhilfe (JUH) and Maltheserhilfsdienst (MHD).

³⁴ Arbeiterwohlfahrt, Caritas, Diakonisches Werk, Paritätischer Wohlfahrtsverband, Deutsches Rotes Kreuz.

³⁵ Van Doorn, p. 57.

slimmed force („small is beautiful“) comprising about half of the currently projected strength could be a possible outcome.

In the context of our discussion the future numerical peacetime strength is, however, of minor importance. It is more important that the scaled-down Bundeswehr designed for safeguarding basic military security will depend on efficiency, and thus on highly qualified specialists, to an even higher degree than it used to. This means that tendencies already described above will continue to prevail: There will be hardly any useful assignments left for conscripts; at most, they will be of a symbolic military nature.

Cost and Benefit of Compulsory Military Service

When discussing advantages and disadvantages of military structures, it is often said that conscripts are „cheaper“ than enlistees. Supportive evidence is quickly supplied; and it seems reasonable at first sight. For example: if, in 1990, the budget of the Federal Republic of Germany had not included 211,000 conscripts serving as rank and file but temporary career soldiers of the same ranks, personnel cost would have increased by 2.8 billion DM.³⁶ However, such reasoning starts from several premises which need to be scrutinized one by one.

A first assumption is based on the idea that after conversion to volunteer forces the numerical strength of the conscript forces will be maintained: Each conscript will be replaced by one enlisted man. Doing so, evidently a similar military benefit is allocated to enlisted men and conscripts.

This premise was clearly opposed by the Force Structure Commission of the federal government as early as in 1973. The commission assumed that the conversion to volunteer forces would result in a reduction

³⁶ The figures are based on the 1990 personnel cost standards of MOD Armed Forces Staff.

of personnel strength. In accordance with the then applicable doctrines of military strategy and security, it was considered possible in 1973 to replace ten conscripts by eight enlisted men without impairing military efficiency.³⁷

Meanwhile, the then assumed replacement ratio of 10 : 8 may have further shifted to the disadvantage of the conscripts: The strategic concept of forward defense and comprehensive area coverage, which „does finally require ... (a lot of) ... soldiers“³⁸, has become obsolete after the reunification of Germany and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. The emphasis will shift from mass forces to functional forces. This is not made easier by the shortening of the basic military service, which at present lasts 12 months, three months less than in 1973. In particular, the system of quarterly call-ups with following training leads to the result that, e.g., in the Army only 50 percent of the conscripts are available as fully trained soldiers (seen over a year's period). Even when judging the situation optimistically, one must presently assume that as few as five enlistees have the same operational value as ten conscripts, whom they can adequately replace.

Another, still undisputed premise states that work performed by conscripts cannot be evaluated by the market price, but by the considerably lower soldier's pay. Conscripts are actually subject to a double taxation „in kind“. For, on the one hand, they sacrifice one year of their professional career to society, which generally leads to relative losses in their entire non-military income of the future.³⁹ On the other hand, they pay

³⁷ See Krelle, p. 357.

³⁸ *Ib.*

³⁹ See Zumpfort, p. 204. He quotes American sources stating that in the seventies the losses of American conscripts amounted to up to 4 % of their lifelong civilian income.

an additional price because during their service period they actually do without a normal civilian income, which would have been several times as high as their military pay.

But compulsory military service and a pay that is not in conformity with market conditions do not necessarily go together. This was proved by the recommendations of the American Gates Commission in 1970. This commission saw to it that from 1971 to 1973, when compulsory military service was abolished, the conscripts in the U.S.A. received a pay that was in line with market conditions. The idea was not to have the conscripts „pay a high financial price in addition to being submitted to the other strains of compulsory service.“⁴⁰

The arguments criticized in this context are exclusively based on the financial advantages for the federal budget derived from the lower personnel costs of conscript forces versus volunteer forces. However, the personnel costs shown in the federal budget only correspond to the funds made available by government for the conscripts' pay.⁴¹ Other compulsory military service costs which do not involve money spending on the part of the federal government are, of course, not listed under federal expenditure. One of these external cost items is the loss of benefit caused by the non-availability of conscripts on the market. The so-called opportunity costs arising for conscripts amount to „the difference between a fictitious market-oriented remuneration less the equivalent of governmental benefits in kind and the military pay“.⁴² With the end of compulsory military service such costs will no longer be incurred.

⁴⁰ Cooper, p. 2.

⁴¹ Including benefits in kind and fringe benefits.

⁴² "Opportunity costs are defined as the loss of such benefit or profit which could have been derived from a different use of scarce, economic goods", Oettle, p. 1. The added value of an economy would increase by the amount of the opportunity costs if young men were not compelled to do military

Other opportunity costs related to compulsory military service accrue because conscript armies generally entail a misallocation of work. The compulsory draft of soldiers by the government eliminates the mobility of labor, which is desired in a market economy. „There is no market mechanism ensuring an optimum distribution of the supply of labor to military and civilian areas of demand by a scarce labor pricing policy.“⁴³ It is, indeed, impossible for private industry working more efficiently than the military to „pirate“ conscript work force, even when offering higher salaries (thereby increasing the economic output as compared to employments in the military), because conscripts are put out of reach of the general labor market and are subject only to governmental demand.

Additionally, the price paid by government for conscript work is controlled by government itself in such a way that it does not reflect actual social scarcity. The almost inevitable result is waste of labor in the military: many of the services rendered in the forces can only be paid because conscripts are employed, who are comparatively cheap workers. If market rates were applied, such services would soon be dropped as they would be too expensive. Otherwise said: market-oriented military pay would reduce the amount of conscript work in the forces and rapidly canalize free labor to more productive employments of the civil economic sector.⁴⁴ During a discussion on military reform in the USSR, a

service but could work in their non-military professions. However, these costs are generally justified by saying that the military benefit of compulsory military service makes up for or even outweighs the opportunity costs. This thesis seems rather doubtful although it can neither be supported nor refuted by empirical evidence. As to the overall economic opportunity costs, refer to Krelle, l.c. and Zumpfort, l.c.

⁴³ Zumpfort, p. 205.

⁴⁴ As to the misallocation of military work see Aschinger, p. 718, and Neubauer, p. 462. Experts name a lot of areas where money is wasted: orderly ser-

head of division of the Soviet General Staff pinpointed this problem when saying: „But who else will then be preparing the meals for the staff? Who else will be cleaning the barracks' floors and be building firing ranges, in a word: who else will be serving?“⁴⁵

Consequently, compulsory military service involves higher costs than federal expenditure suggests. In principle, it is therefore inadmissible to justify the advantage of compulsory military service as compared to volunteer forces by federal budget estimates only.

The theoretical considerations about the actual total cost of compulsory military service to the Bundeswehr can hardly be substantiated in marks and pfennig by quantifiable data. Comparative, but equally speculative calculations for the Federal Republic of Germany were last submitted in 1973 by the then Force Structure Commission.⁴⁶ In the U.S.A., however, it was possible to watch the actual development of personnel costs⁴⁷ following the conversion of conscript forces to all-volunteer forces after 1973.

vice in officers' and NCOs' clubs; excessively staffed guard service; roll call training requiring more time than the roll call itself; cleaning duties where cleaning is hardly required; maintenance of weaponry and equipment to "kill time"; "fiddling the figures" when the visit of a superior or high-ranking guest is impending.

⁴⁵ Nikitin, l.c.

⁴⁶ The loss of profit experienced by conscripts as a loss of income may currently amount to an average of DM 14,000 per person (net earnings in the civilian profession less military pay and equivalent for subsistence) in Germany. For the 211,000 conscripts serving in 1990 this would result in a total loss of income of approximately three billion DM.

⁴⁷ Again, opportunity costs are not considered.

In 1980, the real per-capita personnel costs⁴⁸ of rank and file volunteers in the US services were lower than in 1964, which was the last year with compulsory military service before the Vietnam war.⁴⁹ While these figures cannot simply be applied to German conditions, they nevertheless prove for the US Forces of that time „that it is wrong to believe that compulsory military service is cheaper than volunteer forces“.⁵⁰

For a comprehensive evaluation of compulsory military service it is necessary to consider not only the cost but also the defense benefit. Apart from its doubtful lower cost the foremost reason advanced in favor of compulsory military service is that it counteracts any tendency of the forces to become „a state within the state“. This argument is discussed in the next chapter.

Furthermore, compulsory military service is considered a benefit because it can provide sufficient manpower reserves in a state of defense. Reserve duty training following the period of service would ensure that there is always an adequate number of well trained and motivated reservists available for the required augmentation in a state of defense. Whether this argument will hold true in the near future evidently depends primarily on the number of reservists considered necessary in addition to the peacetime strength of the Bundeswehr. Secondly, it will be of utmost importance that the reservists are actually trained for their assignments in their mobilization units. So far, the reservists have been a „comparatively cheap substitute for temporary career soldiers and regulars in a „model army“, which is structured and commanded like an army of regulars.“⁵¹

⁴⁸ Data adjusted for inflation.

⁴⁹ See Kelley, p. 71 f.

⁵⁰ As above, p. 72.

⁵¹ Schmäling, l.c.

The physical reduction of weapons and equipment, which has already taken place as a result of disarmament agreements and will probably be continued in accordance with future agreements, limits the scope of the forces' personnel strength. It is of no use to have more soldiers available than weapons and equipment. If, however, reservists were to fill the gaps resulting from the reduction of combat-ready soldiers, then the philosophy of physical disarmament, which is to induce a reduction of personnel by reducing weapons and equipment, would be undermined in the end.

In the future, it will no longer be very convincing that much smaller Bundeswehr still require draftees to meet their considerably lower demand of reservists. Alternatives for the recruitment of reservists are indeed easily conceivable. If, for example, volunteers with an enlistment term of four years were employed in the rank and file, a sufficient stock of ex-servicemen would soon be created - given the fluctuation in personnel - from which reservists could be recruited. An additional advantage would be that these reservists have completed a thorough military as well as technical training giving them know-how which is probably far superior than that of the former conscripts. Assigning to compulsory military service the function of being the sole guarantor of military (reserve) training for citizens is no absolute must: also volunteer forces can fulfil this task.

Cost-benefit considerations usually bring about a result which conclusively justifies the decision in favor of one of the alternatives. For lack of sufficient empirical or even quantifiable data, such a procedure seems little promising in this case.⁵² But an example taken from every-

⁵² The Force Structure Commission had stated as early as in 1973 that the economic efficiency of conscripts decreases with the shortening of their basic military service. If, according to the commission's findings, the basic military service were reduced to 12 months, a substitution of conscripts by volunteers would lower the cost for 92 % of the billets held by conscripts. For a nine-month period of basic military service the share of uneconomically

day life in the German Navy might illustrate how important the advantages and disadvantages of compulsory military service to be weighed here can be.

Given a twelve-month compulsory military service term, the conscript will only be available for duty aboard the weapons system „ship“ for some 154 days following three months of basic military training. Most of the conscripts, however, will not have the opportunity to experience all of a destroyer's or frigate's 120 days at sea as active crew members. Since regular working hours also apply to soldiers, days at sea can be fully compensated by days off. Consequently, the 154 working days are reduced to 77 days of duty aboard. During the remaining time the soldier has to be briefed about the weapons system itself, military life and military duties. Conclusion: Only during 31% of his total effective service time of 251 days can the conscript possibly be of „military benefit aboard“.

The already discussed concomitant features of the compulsory military service system cannot be expressed in figures, but they obviously increase the disequilibrium even further. On the one side, there are the drafted and underpaid conscripts with little motivation, little training and, due to lack of time, little chance of getting better training. On the other side, there are the volunteers, who have opted for a temporary career with adequate market-oriented payment and who are of sufficient benefit only because of their comparatively longer period of service and better qualifications.

One may conclude that from an economic point of view compulsory military service is no longer feasible. „Conscript forces are ... a misallocation of economic resources.“⁵³ They may be a „more comfortable so-

filled conscript billets would even rise to 95 %. See Force Structure Commission (1972/1973), p. 78.

⁵³ Krelle, p. 358

lution for the government“. But „it well befits a democracy to argue with more sincerity.“⁵⁴ „As an optimum solution, volunteer forces are to be preferred to any other force structure.“⁵⁵

All-Volunteer Forces - A State within the State ?

A central point in the discussion about the future of compulsory military service is its presumably greater affinity with democracy as compared with the armed forces structure in other constitutions. In a more differentiated context it is furthermore maintained that it is first of all compulsory military service which prevents the armed forces from isolating themselves as a state within the state or from tending to intervene in internal affairs.

Historically, such reasoning does not hold good, though. A brief excursion into history: compulsory military service has its roots in the French levée en masse of 1793.⁵⁶ But the duty of all men in France to do military service was already partly abolished in 1800 by pressure of the haute bourgeoisie. Whoever paid a deputy to step in did not have to serve.

A truly „general“ compulsory military service, that is without the possibility of sending a „deputy“ or of „buying“ the exemption, was suggested by the Prussian military reorganization commission headed by Scharnhorst, which King Frederick Wilhelm III had established. It was meant to initiate reforms, which, after the defeats at Jena and Auerstedt, had become necessary. „By calling up all male citizens and by entrust-

⁵⁴ Neubauer, p. 462.

⁵⁵ Zumpfort, p. 205.

⁵⁶ "The birth of compulsory military service is usually dated back to 1793, when L. N. Carnot formulated the compulsory military service act." Barth/Freundl, p. 239.

ing to them the task of defending the nation, the king for the first time recognized them to be fully-fledged citizens." But: „The introduction of an armed forces structure inspired by democratic ideas was not followed up by further steps to have the citizens participate in the government (at that time)“.⁵⁷

Consequently, the right to bear arms which goes with compulsory military service could, from the very beginning, only partly be related to the citizens' democratic emancipation from the absolute ruler or to the equation of „civilian and military nation“.⁵⁸ In later years it was repeatedly proven that compulsory military service neither prevents an army from developing into a state within the state, nor does it keep authoritarian political leaders from abusing conscript forces for their repressive purposes.

Conscript forces have been used for totalitarian purposes by Hitler, Mussolini and Honecker without considerable resistance from within. The forces that invaded France, Russia or Poland in World War II were conscript forces. On the other hand, there are a lot of democracies where compulsory military service no longer exists and where a decision has been taken in favor of the all-volunteer system (e.g. USA, United Kingdom, Australia). Actually, the interrelationship between force structure and form of government is rather indifferent. There is „no military service system that is exclusively tailored to democracy“.⁵⁹ The decision of how society organizes its forces is rather ruled by the socially predominant perception of threat and security needs.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Langkeit, p. 88.

⁵⁸ Messerschmidt, p. 4.

⁵⁹ Kister / Klein, p. 125.

⁶⁰ "Compulsory military service has nothing to do with ideology and weltanschauung, it is just a matter of convenience." Barth / Freundl, p. 240.

Compulsory military service is believed to be more compatible with democracy, because the conscripts assume the role of mediators between society and the forces. „They introduce elements of ordinary life into the forces as they remain associated with their social setting during their period of service while influencing military life at the same time.“⁶¹ This prevents the forces from getting isolated and detached from society. As „multipliers“ and „information carriers“ the conscripts make sure that society „concerns itself with“ the Bundeswehr.⁶²

This expectation is based on the assumption that without conscripts the armed forces are cut off from social changes within society and that it is first of all compulsory military service which promotes the integration of the armed forces into society. Several arguments speak against this.

First: in spite of rigidity, which is inherent in the Bundeswehr as it is in other large bureaucratic organizations, it is also correct to say that military life is a result of the division of labor in society. In a democratic state the structures of society are usually reflected in the armed forces, too. „The social and constitutional situation of today, the awareness and interests especially of the youth, and last, but not least, the integration of the armed forces into our constitutional state make it improbable that all-volunteer Bundeswehr would let their military leaders isolate them to form 'a state within the state'“.⁶³ The Bundeswehr is a governmental „executive body with adequate political control.“⁶⁴

⁶¹ Ehlert (1990 b) p. 55.

⁶² Geertz, l.c.

⁶³ Force Structure Commission, p. 156.

⁶⁴ Messerschmidt, p. 7.

Second, the frequency and intensity of contacts between upper and lower levels is overestimated in hierarchically structured military organization. Actually, social distance between officers, especially unit commanders, and conscripts, is remarkably high⁶⁵ and the influence exerted by conscripts on military commanders is correspondingly low.

Third, it is assumed that officers and NCOs are sensitive enough to realize and deliberately accept the social changes personified by the conscripts entering the armed forces, for the paramount objective in conscript forces is not to incorporate the values of (civil) society into military culture, to „democratize“ the armed forces or to attune them to democratic standards. It is rather intended to impose on little motivated conscripts the functional requirements of military service without resorting to authoritarian means of constraint (which would rapidly raise the question as to what sense such service to democracy would make). What is described as adaptation to social change or civil-military integration turns out to be a by-product of reasonable - that is effective - actions of control and command in the armed forces' own interest: In the long run, the system of order and obedience will not be accepted by conscripts, who have grown up in a democratic environment, unless their needs are considered.

Another major argument advanced in support of the compatibility of democracy with compulsory military service is the political and civic education young men obtain only when doing their military service. The armed forces serve as „the final-year class of the national school system.“⁶⁶ Just as emphatically, the Armed Forces Staff, for example, points out in the manual „Leadership and Civic Education“ that for a lot of young men the Bundeswehr provide the first and the last opportunity to learn about basic rights and the nation's ideals.

⁶⁵ See Kuhlmann (1990 c), p. 16 ff.

⁶⁶ Klausenitzer, p. 175.

These optimistic expectations can hardly be proven by empirical data which show unanimously that deliberate socialization during basic military service takes virtually no effect. Neither are the objectives of civic-political instruction achieved, nor does the Bundeswehr succeed in giving the conscripts a clear impression of what they represent and what their mission is. At the end of their tour of duty, conscripts usually do not understand the purpose of their service any better than in the beginning.

The reasons for the relative failure of political socialization in the Bundeswehr are manifold and interrelated. Besides an at best skeptical wait-and-see attitude shown by young men towards the military, besides a barely existent awareness of any military threat and besides a general loss of legitimization of the armed forces, there are structural peculiarities with regard to the pedagogic approach in the Bundeswehr.⁶⁷ Only the forced confrontation of conscripts with the state monopoly of power, hierarchical order and formal authority provoke reactions resulting in a sharpened consciousness of democracy.⁶⁸

Conscientious Objection - Civilian Alternative Service - Social Service

In the Federal Republic of Germany compulsory military service and conscientious objection belong together. Since 1984 young men who are fit for military service have a de facto, though not de jure choice between military service and civilian alternative service. The right of conscientious objection legally even takes precedence over compulsory military service, since this right was firmly established by the Basic Law

⁶⁷ Overly large classes, frontal teaching, inadequate training and motivation of the teachers. See Lippert/Vogt, l.c.

⁶⁸ See Lippert/Vogt.

in 1949, whereas compulsory military service was put on a legal basis in 1956 with the Compulsory Military Service Act.⁶⁹

Conscientious objection has become an increasingly aggravating problem in the Federal Republic. Up until the mid-1960s, the number of applications for recognition as a conscientious objector per calendar year was markedly below 6,000. As a result of the widespread discussion of the Vietnam War in the German public and the activities of the so-called extra-parliamentary opposition, the number of applications increased steeply later on. In 1973, the first „mass attrition of the conscience“ was reached when about 35,200 applications were recorded. The figures for the period of time from 1984-1987 (about 55,000 per year) were affected by the discussion about the arms race, the stationing of cruise missiles and the arguments of the peace movement. While the number of applications then kept steady at an annual level of about 77,000 until 1990 it nearly doubled in 1991 to the record level of 151,000 applicants (citizens of former GDR included) - about 4,500 of them being active soldiers.⁷⁰ Obviously the unification of both Germanies, the dissolution of the East-West confrontation and especially the 1991 Gulf War were of great influence. In general the continuous upward trend in the number of conscientious requests must be seen as the result of a discussion on security policy and military strategy by a discerning public and surely is an indicator for the dwindling legitimization of military defence among the young men liable to military service.

Everybody who objects to doing military service under arms has to do civilian alternative service, since 1973 called Zivildienst.⁷¹ Zivildienst, however, cannot exist by itself but remains „a compulsory military service done with other means and without the use of weapons“ according to a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court as the German Supreme Court.⁷² It is meant to create more justice, i.e., to balance the burdens between those doing military service under arms and those objecting to do so on grounds of conscience. Zivildienst is therefore just a different way of doing compulsory military service.

⁶⁹ Cf. for the following Kuhlmann/Lippert 1993.

⁷⁰ According to the Federal Constitutional Court anyone can cite the constitutional right to conscientious objection even if he already is or was a soldier.

⁷¹ For further alternatives of service see footnote 18 and Kuhlmann (1990 b), p. 129 ff.

Already, many private welfare associations cannot cope without these young men doing their civilian alternative service as male nurses. In some associations their number already exceeds the number of full-time employees. In general the social functions performed by young men doing Zivildienst would only be inadequately fulfilled or even be totally dropped if they were left to the laws of competition governing even a social market economy. Where the profit to be made remains low or cannot be financed by the fringe groups of society concerned, the obvious, because comparatively cheap, solution is to give social assistance the appearance of a service to the common welfare and enforce it by the state.

Conscripts and young men doing Zivildienst share the fate of not being paid in line with market conditions: both receive the same pay. Young men doing Zivildienst „are a low-waged and cheap work force for the social sector. All work that need not be done by professionals, for which they seem to be too expensive, can be carried out by young men doing Zivildienst. They can be employed anywhere according to need and ability without any restrictions imposed by labor law, and they have to work by order. Where certain activities become unattractive because no workers can be found and where shortages are being felt, young men doing Zivildienst can rapidly be employed.“⁷³

⁷² Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, vol. 48, p. 165 ff.

⁷³ Becker / Hoffmann, p. 77.

But contrary to the conscripts' work, the work of young men doing Zivildienst is paid by the recipients of such services in line with market conditions. In 1987, approximately DM 1.8 billion were paid as so-called cost reimbursements. These payments, however, did not result in real income for those rendering the service, but went into the budgets of Zivildienst associations. Every man doing Zivildienst brought the associations an average net profit of DM 33,000 in 1987.⁷⁴

It is easy to imagine what troubles private and public welfare associations in Germany would run into - especially concerning their budgets - if, together with compulsory military service, Zivildienst were given up. The persons entrusted to the care of approximately 90,000 young men doing Zivildienst would have to do without the previously rendered services. The budgets of the private associations would show an annual deficit of approximately DM 2 billion. „You may get the impression that compulsory military service must be maintained to supply an adequate number of young men doing Zivildienst in order to make up for the emergency situation in nursing and welfare work. But this would be a perversion of the actual legal context considering Zivildienst a substitute for military service. This grievance requires a political solution; by no means, however, can Zivildienst be used to legitimize compulsory military service in the future.“⁷⁵

If, in recent times, it has been increasingly suggested to replace compulsory military service, and thus Zivildienst, by a „general service to society“, then the point in question is not so much „the personal involvement which our society may also expect from young citizens“.⁷⁶ This concept is rather the reaction to the sobering insight that we will to

⁷⁴ See Kuhlmann (1990 a), p. 66 and the literature mentioned there.

⁷⁵ Ruez, l.c.

⁷⁶ Cronenburg, l.c.

an ever greater extent depend on the social services so far rendered by the Zivildienst on the one hand, while on the other hand such services can only be provided in an organizational setting which is acceptable from an economic point of view.

A general service to society could indeed offer appealing advantages if it were arranged appropriately. Social work performed as a general service to society could be defined on its own and need not be an alternative way to fulfill one's duties, like the current Zivildienst, for those who refuse to do military service under arms. The decoupling of compulsory military service and civilian social service could also further rational decisions with regard to maintaining compulsory military service. A political vote against compulsory military service and in favor of all-volunteer forces would not be overladen with the inevitable consequence to abolish the Zivildienst and with it the still needed social services.

It would be an issue of social and democratic consent to determine which options a general social service should offer in addition to the tasks performed by the Zivildienst and other public services which qualify for an exemption from compulsory military service. Like the law enforcement service of the police, the civil defense and disaster control service and the development aid service, nursing professions could be rated as a contribution to social service. It would be similarly justified to discuss to what extent other social services which do not show up in the national account and which are not being paid for, such as housekeeping, raising children, caring for dependents, could be considered a service to society which is actually rendered on the spot. Military service - done on a voluntary basis - will become one of several possible options. As such, the compulsory aspect of military service would no longer have to be justified by arguments overemphasizing the normative character as has been frequently done in the past. It would be left to those concerned to follow their own convictions.

It would befit a democratic society not to enforce social service - as it is described here -, but to leave it to the active solidarity or voluntarily

committed citizens.⁷⁷ In a society where material wealth comes first, a voluntary social service would have to offer a well-planned system of encouraging incentives. Whether a voluntary service will gain acceptance ultimately depends on how strong the incentives need to be in order to keep those concerned from choosing undesired alternatives like a professional training of their own.

When considering recent empirical findings, a general social service of men and women would certainly not fail because of the disapproval of the population. In December 1990, two representative samples of the young (16-25 years, total n about 900) were drawn in the former West-Germany and in the former GDR.

Among other items, the poll included questions concerning the acceptance of a general civic service (compulsory for all young men and women between 18 and 20 years old) with seven options.⁷⁸ In summary the results show that a substantial section of the young population tends to accept the (hypothetical) concept of an optional civic service, even if it should be *obligatory*. There is no large difference in the overall acceptance of the idea between young men and young women. A replication of the study (panel) in July 1991 lead to comparable results. Both polls disclosed the evidence that there is a potential interest of the young to engage in a societal service, dealing with an attempt to minimize the 'modern' risks young people consider substantial (environmental pollution, developmental aid, caring for children, the old, the handicapped). The traditional societal service, i.e. compulsory service as a conscript, is attractive for only a minority of young men (about 20%).

⁷⁷ See Kohr, p. 26 f., who justifies this point of view by referring to the change of values accepted by the youth in the Federal Republic of Germany.

⁷⁸ Cf. Kohr, Heinz-Ulrich.

Will Compulsory Military Service Survive?

Although there are few conclusive military, economic and social reasons for maintaining compulsory military service in its traditional and present form, the question about its future cannot be answered definitely. In view of the sharp denials coming from the Federal Government and the political parties compulsory military service seems indeed not doomed yet. The Federal Ministry of Defense pointed out that the entire new Bundeswehr planning is based on a 41% share of conscripts. Even additional „international obligations“ of the Bundeswehr would not jeopardize compulsory military service. Such official statements are very likely to have a certain prognostic value because the military command will have to devote its entire attention to reducing the Bundeswehr to the agreed total strength of 370,000 men by 1995. The time generally required for political decision-making rather suggests that compulsory military service will not be on the agenda before 1994.

One does not need a highly developed prognostic talent, however, to predict that in the years thereafter changes in the force structure of Germany and in compulsory military service will have to be made. As early as in 1973 the Force Structure Commission of the then Federal Government had recommended examination once more of „the issue of converting the Bundeswehr into volunteer forces if the security situation changed so drastically as to allow a considerable reduction of operationally ready forces.“ For „volunteer forces are efficient and cost-effective. They do not have the problems conscript forces have. There is no inequity in induction, and the right of conscientious objection is no longer relevant. Volunteer forces are the best possible solution for an industrial society based on the division of labor.“⁷⁹

But several prerequisites on which a fairly reasonable decision could be based are still missing. A military strategy for foreseeable threat sce-

⁷⁹ Force Structure Commission, p. 29.

narios is still in the conceptual phase. What future tasks the Bundeswehr will be devoted to - and for what purpose they will be employed - is still as uncertain as is the amount of public funds German society is willing and able to spend on its defense. Nor is there a political solution for the urgent problem of how to organize and fund the required social care and welfare in the Federal Republic of Germany in future - not only for the purpose of preventing the threatening collapse of the nursing system, but also with a view to decoupling a social service in the form of the existing Zivildienst from compulsory military service. Moreover, the future of general compulsory military service depends on the actual personnel strength of the armed forces after 1994. In this context it is doubtful whether Germany can evade the trend noticeable in almost every European country to considerably further reduce the total strength of the armed forces.

More and more often there are signs in public pointing to a force structure after 1995 which will actually abandon the traditional type of compulsory military service. „The defense system of the future will be dual“: a mixture of regular forces „composed of regular soldiers and temporary career volunteers, and a militia for home defense consisting of former members of the regular forces and of young men ... (and women?, annotation by the authors) ... who join the Bundeswehr because they want to and because they are attracted by material incentives.“⁸⁰

No matter whether military service is rendered within the framework of general social service or not, it will have to be adapted to the living and working conditions young citizens expect from their jobs. It goes without saying that this includes a market-appropriate payment from the very beginning. Obsolete and by now functionally useless parts of the so-called „internal and military order“ will have to be given up. As a first step, the Leadership Development and Civic Education Center suggested

⁸⁰ Kister/Klein, p. 127.

in its „Timetable 2000“ to „part with a whole series of old traditions“, which are still being cultivated at present, but will have to be done away with before long.⁸¹

In a force structure without compulsory military service the activities of regular soldiers and temporary career volunteers will also have to change if the „new“ Bundeswehr as a whole will prove successful from a sociopolitical point of view. The volunteer will no longer find his identity mainly by distinguishing himself from the conscript. A major factor for defining his future professional domain will be the non-military environment.

This means on the one hand that in practice the temporary career volunteer will already consider his future non-military job during his period of military duty. And it means that governmental authorities have to make sure that the transition from military to non-military profession is as smooth as possible. The Bundeswehr's Vocational Advancement Service continues to be of major importance.

On the other hand, the general features of the profession „soldier“ will, as in many non-military jobs, vanish behind the characteristics of the activity actually carried out in the military. Specialization and division of labor will increasingly determine the soldier's image. The ideals of uniformity and homogeneity of the military profession will gradually disappear.⁸²

⁸¹ See the critical attitude towards the principle of order-and-obedience (l.c., p. 202), the demand "to clear out" the military mission (p. 202), the criticism of "loafing" in the service - called motivation-impeding services here - (p. 213), the demand for more codetermination of soldiers (p. 222) and for more liberal dress regulations (p. 226).

⁸² As early as in 1977, Thomas Ellwein pointed to this actually paradoxical trend that a specialization of military activities weakens the basis of the homogenous military profession with joint values, attitudes and career patterns. See p. 54.

Finally, armed forces which are not based on compulsory military service may open the way for a fundamental reform of the entire Bundeswehr. So far, differences in military status recognizable by the ranks and the extent of integration into and commitment to the Bundeswehr were justified by defining the military profession as a profession for people with convictions. This approach made the educational mission of the armed forces seem necessary and useful. It justified the hierarchical organization of the military in the environment of a democratic society. And it made the tensions between uniformity of thinking and acting here and democratic pluralism there easy to bear.

Volunteers as professional agents of the organized use of state legitimized force would no longer have to resort to such an ideology and its inherent implications. An attitude which is no longer emotionally obscured by compulsory military service offers the opportunity of reconsidering and newly defining the possible consequences of a society's future expectations of military functions. It is very likely that the Bundeswehr will also experience what has been predicted for the Dutch forces for a long time: „The demilitarization or 'civilianization' of the Dutch forces seems to be inevitable and an absolute must if the armed forces are to survive as an integral part of society.“⁸³

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⁸³ Scheelen, p. 43.

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RETHINKING THE KOREAN MILITARY

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INTRODUCTION

One of the most debated issues during the 1987 presidential campaign concerned the exclusion of military intervention into civilian politics and the restoration of civilian supremacy. In the Sixth Republic since 1988, the military has striven to evade the imputed image of 'the military government' and its effort has been in fact realized.

With East-West detente, German unification, and drastic changes in the politics of Russia and East European countries, consequential development in inter-Korea relations appears to have contributed to making viable national unification issues. As the criticism against military intervention into politics has weakened, the military has encountered new challenges. Under these circumstances the role of the military has been called into question inside and out of the military community.

This essay briefly overviews the history of the Korean military, examines recent changes in the Korean military in terms of structural and institutional rearrangements and sociopolitical outlooks of military leaders, and explores controversies over the role of the military to be faced in the future.

THE KOREAN MILITARY:

A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE POLITICAL-MILITARY NEXUS

Over the last three decades Korea has been ruled by three consecutive soldiers-turned-politician. During this period the military no doubt has become one of the most powerful and influential groups in national politics. The protracted state of confrontation in the Korean peninsula has affected the status of military professionals and civil-military relations in Korea.

The first officer training school (the Military English Language School) started on December 1945 with a class of 60 candidates. The school was replaced by the South Korean Constabulary Officers Candi-

date School on May 1946. In 1948, the constabulary was transformed into the armed forces of the Republic of Korea. At the start of the Korean War, South Korea had about 100,000 servicemen on active duty. The war ended with a truce, and South Korea was obligated to maintain oversized armed forces. By 1954, the armed forces of South Korea entailed some 600,000 men organized into divisions.

Since 1954, Korea has enjoyed U.S. military aid under the terms of a mutual defense treaty. U.S. military aid to Korea from 1950 to 1979 amounted to nearly 6 billion U.S. dollars. The army, the largest and most powerful service branch in Korea, has about 520,000 men in uniform. Given its enormous power, the military has been increasingly courted by political leaders for support, and it has been often drawn into the whirlwind of Korea's highly volatile and transitional political environment.

Korea's first President, Rhee Syngman, was able to control the newly emergent military establishment through his personal charisma. His uncompromising anti-communist stance was concordant with the military mind, but he was eager to hold the military tightly under his control and tried to maintain its allegiance and control not only through personal favoritism, but through skillful manipulation of factional infighting.

Historically, various factions can be identified in the Korean armed forces. The different services had their own esprit de corps and priorities. Within the army, different backgrounds constituted the base of factional groupings. Groups, seldom formal and institutionalized yet governed by mutual trust, help, and obligation, were often formed on the basis of provincial and educational backgrounds. Most readily identifiable are the groups formed on the basis of provincial ties.

Provincially, the Kyongsang, south-eastern part of the Korean peninsula, produced twelve out of thirty Army chiefs of staff from 1948 through 1992. It was during Park's administration that Kyongsang replaced all other regions as the home district of five out of eight army chiefs of staff. As for educational background, Japanese training was

gradually replaced by Korean Military Academy training. Particularly influential were the eight and eleventh graduating classes of the Academy; both produced the core members of the coups in 1961 and 1979, respectively.

The Second Republic (1960-1961) marked a short period during which democracy was restored and civilian supremacy was secured but this period was politically unstable, socially chaotic, and ideologically fragmented. Military discipline seemed shaky as a result of the sudden collapse of Rhee Syngman's authoritarian regime. Young colonels demanded retirement of corrupt and politically minded generals who they believed had been closely allied with Rhee and his ruling Liberal Party. Within this restive atmosphere a military coup d'état was fomented by General Park Chung-Hee and his followers. The coup took place on May 16, 1961 and its leaders set up a junta to run the government. In October and November 1963, a new president and members of the National Assembly were elected, but the majority of junta leaders did not return to the ranks and joined the newly formed "civilian" government after retirement from active service. General Park took presidency and many other coup members were either elected to the National Assembly or appointed to high-ranking government positions.

In that Park was well aware of the reality that the mainstay of his power was in the military, he treated it paternalistically, rewarding his military colleagues and followers through his patronage. He endeared himself particularly to younger generals, who were more professionally trained than their seniors. These generals represented a new generation of the Korean military and were the first products of the Korea Military Academy (KMA) modeled after the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Though the military academy had existed since 1946, their regular training was disrupted by the Korean War. Thus, the four-year program began in 1952 and the first regular KMA cadets entered the Academy as the 11th Class, graduating in 1955 with their commissions as second lieutenants. When Park was assassinated in 1979, these younger,

professionally trained generals were in their late 40s as was General Chun Doo-Hwan, a front runner of the 11th Class, who eventually succeeded Park. Known for their loyalty to Park, they were politicized in his authoritarian regime, particularly under the Yushin (revitalization) constitution revised and promulgated in 1972. These generals were also to lead the "Koreanization" of the military, necessitated in part by possible reduction of the American military presence in Korea.

While Park's power base was more in the military than former President Rhee's, his control again lacked institutional backing. Although the military has increasingly become a dominant power group in the country and former high-ranking military officers have been heavily recruited into the government, it was constitutionally mandated to be politically neutral and to maintain professionalism. This discordance resulted in the development of an informal network of control and an untenable and uncertain locus of power. Park increasingly sought his chief military leaders from his home province of Kyongsang-do and treated the military with special care. Korea's civil-military relations still suffer from their uncertainty and paradoxical demands arising from transitional instability.

Under Park, many retired military leaders were appointed into the government as high-ranking officials or political leaders, but Korea lacked an institutional framework to maintain civilian control of the military and to keep the military politically neutral. The outcome has been the application of various "carrot and stick" measures and the cultivation of an informal network through a patron-client arrangement and through continuous surveillance.

We have to look at conflicts within the Korean armed forces as much as the perspectives of civil-military relations. Conflict among different factions have time and again surfaced within the military organization. The military itself has been subservient to political leadership. There were over 30 privately organized military groups as of November 1945. Their organizational purpose was to fill an administrative vacuum

caused by the abrupt withdrawal of the Japanese, to keep social order during the interim period immediate after independence, hoping to make contributions to laying corner-stones for establishing the armed forces as well as the emergent nation.

In April 1973, Major General Yoon Pil-Yong, commander of the elite Capital Garrison Command, was arrested for his alleged misconduct, put to a court-martial, and sentenced to 15 years in prison on charges of accepting bribes and other breaches of conduct. A dozen of his followers, including two brigadier generals were also charged on similar indictments. There are several versions for the reason behind this purge. The official announcement was that General Yoon had been brought to trial for violating military discipline and for conduct unbecoming a general. Another version holds that Lee Hu Rak, director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, maneuvered General Yoon's downfall in a power struggle. It was widely believed, however, that Yoon had used his influence to arrange promotions and assignments for his followers within the armed forces. There was common consensus among Academy graduates that they had been mistreated. General Chun Doo Hwan has been at the center of gravity ever since his company-grade officer years, followed by his juniors. It seems the more deeply engaged the military is in civilian politics, the weaker it becomes. There is still a sense of deprivation among military officers. Two-thirds of retired general and flag officers are unemployed. The government has often arranged their post-military employment, but there have been always more people than positions available. They are normally offered a three-year term position, which is vacated for more recent retirees after the three-year service.

Close ties of a faction of the military to political leadership were often criticized by other officers who had not gotten such opportunities. KMA graduates organized an alumni association, pukguksonghoe, and its leading members received special treatment in promotion and assignment. After General Yoon's incident, all the internal alumni organi-

zations with a vertical structure outside of the formal chain of command were ordered to disband.

Some senior generals were deeply concerned about the politically prone group of Army generals and senior officers, especially KMA graduates and it is reported that General Chung Seung Hwa intentionally selected non-KMA officers for his staff in Army headquarters. In fact, during the hardship periods of the 1950s when most Korean soldiers had to suffer from the lack of food, and equipment, and poor work conditions, KMA cadets were exceptionally well treated and fed. Once they were assigned to front-line units, they saw their senior officers looking as if they were trying to exploit their subordinates for their personal interests. Corruption was widespread in the late 1950s not only in the armed forces but in Korean society as a whole.

RESTORATION TO MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

Is there still a possibility for the military to intervene in civilian politics? In fact, there are issues remaining which are related to the Military Organization Law which was passed in the National Assembly in 1990. The most fervent issue, among others, was a suspicion expressed by opposition party lawmakers toward the plausibility of military engagement in politics. My view on this matter is in the negative due to the following several reasons. First, conflict between rank structure and age structure deeply embedded in military organizations prevalent before the 1970s were substantially reduced. In the early Korean Army, the officer corps was composed of diverse internal factions with respect to military background and provincial origin. Also there existed almost no age differences between flag rank and field-grade officers. The process of military formation in earlier periods and in the period of expansion facilitated inconsistencies in rank and age structure. If privileges general officers enjoy are substantially greater than those of low-ranking officers, grievances of junior officers against their seniors

should be evoked. It has been often pointed out that one of the major reasons of the Military Coup of 1961 headed by General Park Chung-Hee was dissatisfaction of field-grade officers toward general officers. Also the December Coup of 1979 is interpreted as stemming from the dissatisfaction of KMA graduates with their seniors.

Second, corruption in the military has been structurally reduced. Dissatisfaction of juniors against their seniors results from the belief that their seniors are engaged in corruption in one form or another. Under Rhee Syngman's administration, political corruption was widespread and the military was no exception. In the First Republic, scandals related to the military were common, as exemplified by the Gasoline Scandal of the 3rd Army District, the Coal Scandal of the 6th Army District, the Rice Scandal of the 1st Army District, the Depilation Soap Scandal, etc. Through the 1970s and 1980s, the soil where corruption takes root has been purified to some extent. As indicated above, when KMA graduates were first assigned as junior officers to their garrisons, the military they saw was a seedbed of corruption and injustice, and this became the reason for their perception of the seniors. Now the situation has changed.

Third, we may point out the historical lessons learned from the suffering of Chun Doo-Hwan's Fifth Republic (1981 - 1988) and its aftermath. One can come into power through a military coup, but it takes too much effort and sacrifice to correct a wrongly buttoned suit, so to speak. Chun's regime ended up in failing to secure legitimacy. Furthermore, in the process of a series of hearings in the National Assembly, the honor of military organization was critically damaged and irreversibly hurt. Pessimism of the success of military coups is widely shared among the military community as well as in society at large.

Fourth, changes in perceptions of military cadres should not be underestimated. The new professionalism that defines the role of the military in a more comprehensive and more flexible manner has been chal-

lenged by civilians and thus, the military has been forced toward a traditional way of defining military professionalism.

The role of the military has attracted attention from military leaders. Since 1989, much discussion has been focused on establishing the status of the military. On February 1990, General Lee Chong-ku, then Army Chief of Staff, stressed 'the newly defined role of the military'. In an Army Chief's memorandum issued to the commanders and general staffs at a battalion level or higher, General Lee ordered feasible measures to be carried out. In order to define the new role of the army, he emphasized careful reflection on the past and that painstaking selftransformation was to be sought. He further asserted that the Army had to earn firm trust and warm affection from the public and thereby more mature civil-military relations can be developed. In a similar vein, Defense Minister Lee Sang-Hoon stressed that military professionals have to devote themselves to national defense as a proper role of the armed forces and to eradicate other inclinations and behavior. He highlighted the proposition of political neutrality of the military, calling it a mandate of our time. Private circles or personal networks within the military and factional activities were reportedly terminated by his order of March 1990 in a commander's letter issued to commanders at a brigade level or higher. Ironically, a similar action had been taken in 1973 by the Army chief.

A series of actions taken by military authorities, and changes in the military in the late 1980s, are well reflected in public perceptions of the military. A nation-wide survey portrays the decrease of military influence over national politics. In 1988, the military marked the top among the 10 major groups that supposedly influence national politics, but in 1990 dropped to the fourth rank after lawmakers, students, and chaebol (conglomerates). The Military Organization Act and the Military Personnel Act have been revised in order to subsume such drastic changes.

Revision of the Military Personnel Act

The military has set in motion the restructuring of its personnel system. It revised service limits for retirement. Since the service limit comprises an age limit, a service limit at each rank, and the total service limit, one must leave active service whichever one comes first. Depending on how these retirement criteria are set up, the personnel problem becomes either serious or light. Several revisions have been made since 1962 when this system was first launched. Most interesting to us among these is Article 8 of the Military Personnel Act about the duration of active service. The first revision of this part was made in December 1980 right after the military coup of December 12, 1979, and the second revision was made in March 1989 (see Table 1).

The 1980 revision highlights that duration of rank was the same as before among field-grade officers, but reduced among general and flag officers. That is, at lieutenant general level the service limit was reduced from 6 to 4 years, at major general level from 7 to 5, and at brigadier general level from 8 to 5 years of service at that particular rank. Therefore, a high turnover was expected. This change simply reflects the perceptions of the so-called "new military power group" which was composed of regular Korea Military Academy (KMA) graduates headed by General Chun Doo-Hwan and his followers. Grievances among four-year KMA graduates were widespread against their senior generals who they believed never had regular military training, but for whom promotion was relatively faster than themselves. For example, deposed General Chung Seung Hwa, Army Chief of Staff and martial law commander at the time of the December military coup of 1979, serviced 18 years as a general officer out of a total of 31 years of active service. The phenomenon was common among officers who entered in the armed forces in earlier periods between 1946 - 1949, before the Korean War.

Table 1 Age, Service and Rank Limits by Rank

Rank	Age Limit		Service Limit at Each Rank		Total Service Limit	
	1989	1962	1989	1962	1989	1962
General	63	60	-	-	-	-
Lt.Gen.	61	60	4	6	-	-
Maj.Gen.	59	56	6	7	-	33
Brig.Gen.	58	54	6	8	-	31
Colonel	53	50	10 - 12	9	30	27
Lt.Col	49	47	9 - 10	8	26	24
Major	45	43	9 - 10	8	20	20
Captain	43	43	-	7	14	-
W/O	53	50	-	-	30	27
1st Sergeant	53	45	-	-	-	24

Rank restriction applied to field grade officers, will be gradually applied by the end of 1994. Source: Military Personnel Act Article 8 Paragraph 1.

Such revision was functional in the sense of smooth personnel flow and promotion, but dysfunctional in the sense of early retirement. Especially in the situation under which retired military officers face difficulties in being absorbed into the civilian sector due to resistance from the civilian side in the late 1980s, early retirement adversely influences military morale and professionalism. The years of service limit is too short to regard the military as a life-time career. Such views among the military led to the revision of March 1989, where at the major general

and brigadier general level the years of service limit increased from 6 to 7 years, and at field grade level officers increased by 1 - 3 years. For example, at colonel level it increased to 10 years in 1990, it increased to 11 years by the end of 1992, and will have increased to 12 years by the end of 1994.

Age limit was also adjusted in such a way to gradually increase 1 - 4 years by rank, and therefore, it will be set at 53 years of age at colonel level, 49 years at lieutenant colonel level, 45 years at major level, and 53 years at the first sergeant and warrant officer level. The minimum years of service for promotion in the present rank were also extended. For example, the minimum service for promotion to colonel is extended to 20 years, but during the interim periods by the end of 1998, lesser years of service are applied in order to avoid chaos from an abrupt introduction of the system. It is believed that a series of aforementioned revisions can solve problems coming from early retirement and also may contribute to establishing military professionalism. The dilemma of post-retirement employment in civilian sector make the military authorities solve the problem within the military institution.

Restructuring the Manpower System

To secure objectivity of promotion, a new personnel management system has been introduced. For selecting best qualified candidates for promotion, three screening panels, separately formed, review individual candidates without mutual consultation and then combine the results of reports submitted by each reviewing committee. Those who are recommended unanimously by all three committees are selected first.

The military seriously considers opening the door to women for ROTC and service academies. The Ministry of National Defense (MND) already extended the branches of service for women to absorb them as military police officers, computer programmers, quartermasters, etc. The structural proportion of officers and soldiers will be changed from the

current pyramid structure to a bell-shaped structure, in which the proportion of enlisted men will be reduced and that of officers increased (MND 1992).

In 1990, the military initiated structural changes. A hot issue was to strengthen the authority of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in commanding operations. Revision encountered strong resistance from both inside and outside the military. By the revision of October 1990, operational functions in three services are directed by the JCS Chairman except for a handful of units which are assigned special missions. The Chairman, who used to play only a subsidiary or advisory role to the Defense Minister, was introduced in the chain of command. The 1990 revision did not satisfy the criteria that the military establishment had originally planned because of the strong resistance of the opposition party and of disagreement between services; the Navy and Air Force were worried about their weakening in power relative to the Army.

Changes from "Joint" to "Combined" forces are strongly called for by the military bloc. Details are under review by military specialists, but they are mostly concerned with how to persuade people and civilian politicians. Without public acceptance, the program will likely be doomed to failure.

INSTITUTION VS. OCCUPATION

With the rising standard of living in society it becomes more difficult to recruit and keep quality personnel in the armed forces. The recent statistics show that the morale of non-commissioned officers has been lowered and an increasing number of NCOs has left the active service over the last several years. The military authorities reviewed the current conditions of professional NCOs in order to enhance their economic and job status in the meeting of chief NCOs in August 1991. The question was seriously raised by participants: "If everyone wants to leave the armed forces, who's going to serve for national defense in the future?"

Changes in people's views on better life appear in every corner of society. The situation of officers is not very different from that of NCOs. In recent years, applicants for the KMA have dropped drastically. For the 1993 Academic Year, the Korea Military Academy cut down the number of incoming cadets, which once peaked 350 in the 1970s and 1980s, to 250. Special training and education for employment in large business firms have been given to KMA graduates who had served at least five years on active duty (Chosun Ilbo, June 8, 1992).

The latest issue of the Defense White Paper states that as one of the issues to be tackled by the Defense Ministry in the 1990s, a new definition of the role and functions of 'advanced armed forces for the people' should be made. The military has to exert efforts "to securely guarantee the professionalism of officers and NCOs, and further, to consolidate military expertise, and thereby military cadres can be trusted and respected by the public (MND 1990, p. 24)."

In that Korean soldiers are drafted by a compulsory service system, the armed forces are not in competition with the civilian labor market. But professional officers and NCOs choose the armed forces as their career as do those in civilian occupations. If military service becomes less attractive and civilian job opportunities are abundant, they will surely leave the armed forces. In a normative sense, the military institution is expected to possess the "institutional" feature in Moskos' terms, and ask their members to stick to such a norm. Changes in social environments also call for an incorporation of the "occupational" norm (Moskos 1977, 1986). Traditionally, professional soldiers are expected to think of the military and the nation before personal interests. Commitment to the military organization is a fundamental virtue, and total rather than partial commitment is stressed. The military as an occupation, however, should be responsive to the changing social environment: not a unilateral and whole-hearted commitment, but rational decision-making follows when material and non-material rewards are guaranteed or at least

so expected. Without proper economic and social rewards, demand of commitment can be limited.

Although attitudes of NCOs toward military service are many-sided, negative and passive opinions are common. In an interview with Navy NCOs conducted in August 1991, long-term NCOs blamed no alternative job opportunities or their low educational level, while among junior NCOs their intention of discharge from active service is predominant.

Of course, passive attitudes toward the job is not solely applied to NCOs. It has become a common practice to leave the work-place in search for better pay and better, even slightly better, working conditions. In the academy and business communities, it has been reiterated that workers prefer easy-going jobs evading the so-called three Ds (dirty, difficult and dangerous) work. A survey with production workers conducted by the Korea Federation of Economic Organizations (1990) reveals that 29 percent of the workers responded that they think of their work-place as permanent, while 56 percent will move to a better place if available or plan to quit the job as soon as possible for starting their own business. Particularly among those in their 20s, only 20 percent thought of their job as permanent.

Insufficient economic rewards apply not only to professional soldiers, but to other civil servants; in other words, the public sector is, by and large, inferior to the private sector in regard to economic remuneration and other fringe benefits. According to data in 1990, for example, workers with high school education and with 10 years' experience earn an average monthly pay including wage, allowances, and bonus much more than Naval NCOs. The latter earn 73% of private firms and 83% of government-invested corporations. It varies by individual firms, for example, 65% of Daewoo Shipbuilding Co., 77% of Korea Tacoma, 79% of Dongyang Pipe Co. (Cho 1991).

More serious to them than economic deprivation, however, is social deprivation. Social deprivation is perceived by almost all military personnel. Deprivation of social opportunities includes losing opportunities

due to serving in the armed forces, particularly due to service on ships or in distant areas, frequent change of the tour of duty, among others. About half of their camp sites are located in small towns, in the countryside, or in mountainous areas not easily accessible from the outside. This percentage is much higher than that of the locales of other public sector or private industries (Chung et al. 1989). Such a deprivation of opportunities must be incurred not only by military professionals but also by their families. They suffer from the lack of information on property accumulation or purchase of housing.

Social deprivation emerges because they serve over a long period in an organization which is segregated from the outside world, they soon face difficulties in adjusting to civilian life on retirement from active duty. The proportion of housing ownership for military men is lower than the civilian sector. The 1989 data shows that only 20% of military professionals, both officers and NCOs, possess their own house, which is much lower than 80% of middle- and high-ranking (Class 5 and over) government officials and 45% of low-ranking (Class 6 and lower) officials (Chung et al. 1989).

How do soldiers identify themselves in terms of the social strata? Table 2 shows that 60% of officers identify themselves with the lower middle stratum, a higher proportion of NCOs and warrant officers with the lower middle or the upper lower stratum. In 1988, less than 4% of the total first sergeants filed their retirement, but in 1991 this percentage increased to 16% of the total number of first sergeants. Seventy-seven percent of those who wanted retirement indicated insufficient salary as a reason for retirement, followed by hatred of service on ships (Cho 1991).

ISSUES AT STAKE

Expecting that tension between North and South Korea will be weakened or alleviated in the near future, and observing that serious discussion on arms control proceeds between the North and the South

governmental authorities, one question is burgeoning among one part of the society as to the necessity of the military after national unification.

Table 2 Self-identified Social Stratum of Military Professionals in Comparison with Civilians, Unit: %

Stratum	Military ¹			Civilian ²		Production Workers ³
	Officer	NCO ⁴	Total	Coll.	High Sch.	
Upper	1	0	2	6	2	2
Upper Middle	26	4	22	46	23	19
Lower Middle	60	44	39	38	44	41
Upper Lower	12	44	25	8	23	28
Lower Lower	1	8	12	2	8	10

¹ Cf. Chung et al. (1991, p. 124).

² Cf. Economic Planning Board (1990, p. 297).

³ Cf. Korea Fed. of Economic Organizations (1990 p. 39).

⁴ The figures for NCOs include warrant officers.

Also a question has been raised about whether the defense budget, now occupying nearly 30 percent of the total government budget, should be kept at the current level or be reduced to a considerable extent (refer to Table 3). And, do we really need 650,000 servicemen in standing forces?

Two related issues as to military structure have to be scrutinized: the size of the standing army and the necessity of the compulsory service system. It is easily predicted that the size of the standing army will shrink. If so, the next questions arise of how to recruit qualified personnel into the armed forces, and of how to keep the equity of military service; i.e., who serves in the armed forces and who does not.

Civil-military relations in peacetime may have to consider two important aspects. Political neutralization of the military is regarded as a norm professional soldiers must abide by. Political neutrality is damaged by the military being induced into civilian politics, whether it be intentional or non-intentional. So is it when civilian politicians intervene in the arena where pure military decision is required. Both civilian and military leaders have to realize that without moral and ethical support from society at large, the military cannot put down its roots in civilian soil. What worries us most in civil-military relations is civilian intervention in military affairs where the military deserves its own voice, just as much as military engagement in the political role. Civilian politicians may frustrate and discourage military professionals.

The shrinkage of standing armed forces does not necessarily weaken combat readiness. Military occupational specialties have many things in common with civilian occupational activities. The government is considering an organic linkage between military and civilian sectors in order to convert technical specialists in industrial firms into combat soldiers in wartime and the other way around in peacetime, switching back and forth in an efficient way. In November 1990, export industries appealed to the government to allocate soldiers scheduled soon to be discharged from active duty for civilian industry as a way of solving the shortage of technical manpower in industrial firms.

Table 3 Percentage of Defense Outlays in the Government Budget by Fiscal Year

Year	%
1975 - 1979	33.1
1980 - 1984	33.9
1985 - 1986	31.2
1987	31.6
1988	32.8
1989	32.4
1990	30.4
1991	28.7

Periods 1975 - 1986 average percentages.

Source: MND (1992, p. 203).

FURTHER THOUGHTS ON THE KOREAN MILITARY

Despite all these points we are still worried about several things. First of all, an isolation of the military organization is likely to be emergent in both perceptions and institutional arrangements. Negative perceptions of civilians toward the military may arouse an isolation of the military from the outside world. With respect to institutions, there exists a widening gap between civilian and military organizations in accordance with industrialization and social development. In the 1970s, the rapid development of the civilian sector surpassed the military in terms of technology and managerial skills. Therefore, the military has become less attractive as a career. Individualism and opportunism of youngsters contribute to the lower attractiveness of the military. As already experienced by advanced industrial societies, there is the probability that the disadvantaged strata in the civilian labor market may be recruited into the military as career servicemen. If youngsters who have marginal status in civilian society flow into the military, its isolation from civilian society will be further facilitated.

Second, the question still remains of how to solve personnel problems that the military has traditionally encountered. To solve cumulative problems, such measures as massive forced retirement were time and again adopted, as revealed in the periods right after the Military Coup of 1961 and after the Coup of 1979. Such measures may be effective in the short-term, but in the long run, they cause another problem. Here the problem is openness and equity as well as lagged or delayed promotion. In order to eradicate corruption and injustice and to consolidate internally, the objective and rational execution of personnel management is mandatory. But the characteristics of military organization make it difficult to solve the personnel problem. Precarious or arbitrary decision making of commanding officers could be operating. Personal networks tend to also be important.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Over the last several years the military has struggled to change itself. The military has often become a scapegoat for the civilian side. In some sense, the utmost victim of the so-called military government is the armed forces themselves. Civilian politicians do not have to induce military professionals to meddle in civilian politics in order to let the military remain politically neutral.

The military tends to be conservative because it is not a prime mover for social change but an agent for maintaining the status quo. The flocking of military retirees, into the civilian sector is no longer feasible. In the general election of March 1992, six retired generals got elected to the National Assembly as opposition party members, which had been rare in previous elections.

Whatever measure is to be taken in the foreseeable future, the Korean military will face new challenges which they have never experienced before. The military has come to compete with civilian employers in the civilian labor market. Admittedly there is the specificity of the military organization, but the military ought to incorporate the incentives civilian organizations offer. It is true that loyalty to the nation and commitment are virtues that are very important and also should be emphasized, but the host society is changing too fast to hold their members to the armed forces solely on the basis of these virtues.

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Anton Grizold

*THE SHAPING OF NATIONAL SECURITY IN
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
THE SLOVENIAN CASE*

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DIRECTIONS OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM OF SLOVENIA

Abstract

The article analyses some aspects of the solution of the national security issue in Slovenia in the context of the processes and social changes which have occurred in ex-Yugoslavia, and in Slovenia in the last two years, as well as in the context of the basic determinants of modern cultural and civilizational conditions in the world which affect the content of the national security concept. Attention is focused on three basic problem areas: 1. Delineation of the content and terminology of security. 2. Security in contemporary international circumstances. 3. The transformation of the previous national-security structure into a new Slovenian national-security model.

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INTRODUCTION

The Yugoslav Crisis and the International Community

The economic, political, legal, national, and moral crisis facing the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from the beginning of the 80s, acquired, in 1991, a further military dimension. In this very year, the Yugoslav federal state, following its military intervention in Slovenia and the war in Croatia, reached its highest level of entropy. Attempts to settle Yugoslav problems by means of armed force and oppressive measures, which followed unsuccessful negotiations among the political leaderships of individual Yugoslav republics (involving the Presidents of the Republics), resulted in endeavors by the European Community to reach a cease-fire in the armed conflict in Slovenia through the signing of the "Brioni Declaration". This declaration was based on the assumption that the Yugoslav Presidency, constituted under pressure from the European

Community, would be capable of resuming its constitutional function and of acting as supreme commander of the Yugoslav Armed Forces.

Further developments in the settlement of the Yugoslav crisis unfortunately proved this assumption to be wrong. It turned out that it was not possible to solve the Yugoslav crisis in a peaceful way, without more clearly expressed involvement by the international community to restrain the Yugoslav Army, which was one of the most important political subjects involved in the crisis. This recognition was also given empirical confirmation by the increasing and ever more intensive intervention of the Yugoslav Army in the armed conflicts in Croatia which, in their first phase, were confined to conflicts between the Croatian forces (Croatian Militia and the National Guard) on the one side, and the forces of Kninska Krajina (a region in Croatia with a predominantly Serbian population, seeking to achieve autonomy within Croatia), which consisted of the police and territorial defence units of Kninska Krajina supported by para-military units of Serbian volunteers living outside Croatia, on the other.

Attempts to settle the crisis according to the Serbian model imposed, i.e. by the policy of "fait accompli" and by the use of the Yugoslav Armed Forces (YA), were also made possible because Western countries were at that time not well enough prepared for the dynamic and radical changes in Eastern Europe and in Yugoslavia. This statement can be substantiated, at least as regards Yugoslavia, by the following:

- first, the EC countries and other important protagonists in the international community (USA, SU, UN) did not take a firm stance in due time, i.e. did not recognize that disintegration of the Yugoslav federation actually meant a formation of new sovereign states based on the legitimate, permanent, and inalienable right of every nation to self-determination;

- second, the USA - through the State Department - continued to argue for unified Yugoslavia even as late as June 1991, thus encouraging the Yugoslav federal government to give its consent to the use of mili-

(ary force (YA) to obstruct forcefully the right of the Yugoslav nations to self-determination;

- and third, the EC was attempting to retard the process of political emancipation of individual Yugoslav republics, first through the Brioni Declaration (according to which Slovenia had to submit to a three month moratorium on its already democratically approved vote in favor of independence), and later with the rather cautious and delayed recognition of the sovereign states on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia.

Only by the end of 1991, mainly under the influence of Germany and partly also of Italy, did the EC take a more decisive and affirmative stance on the Yugoslav crisis and toward Serbia, which was very adept at retarding any political solutions of the Yugoslav crisis at the Hague Conference, while at the same time pursuing brutal military action on the territory of Croatia. The adoption of the Rome Declaration by the EC Ministers, (November 8, 1991), which envisaged sanctions against the whole of Yugoslavia, brought about a turning point in Serbian politics; through its extended limb - the rump presidency of the SFRY (actually consisting only of Serbian and Montenegrin members) - Serbia succeeded in involving the UN in the settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. With the engagement of the Security Council in the Yugoslav crisis, Serbia expected results which would be favorable to her, in the sense of support from this international institution in constituting a third Yugoslavia, with Serbia playing the leading role. The talks on the active involvement of the UN in the Yugoslav crisis contributed to a new agreement on cease-fire in Croatia (signed on January 3, 1992 in Sarajevo). This also created the realistic possibility for intervention by the UN peace-keeping forces in the war in Croatia, in order to ensure a more long-term cessation of hostilities and thus help to establish conditions for settling the Serbo-Croatian dispute and the Yugoslav crisis by peaceful (political) means.

However, the arrival of the UN peace-keeping forces was linked to the fulfillment of the following basic conditions: • ensuring a permanent

cease-fire between the hostile forces; • obtaining unanimous consent from all disputants regarding the arrival and territorial location of the UN peace forces in Croatia.

The arrival of the UN forces was delayed, mainly due to the persistent opposition of one of the most important elements in the war in Croatia, the self-governing autonomous region of Krajina (Knin) under the leadership of Milan Babic. With the adoption of Resolution No. 743 (February 21, 1992), the Security Council confirmed the decision of the UN to send over 14,000 military and other personnel to Croatia.

The Process of Slovenian Political Emancipation 1990-1992

Slovenia intensified its activities to break away from the "fortress of the Yugoslav Federation", first legally, (through the democratic elections in April 1990), and later, also legitimately, (through the plebiscite of 23 December 1990). At the same time, Slovenia - which was at that time still officially part of the SFRY - firmly established its interests, values and means of strengthening its identity as a nation-state.

The national will of the majority of people of Slovenia was conclusively expressed on 25 June 1991, when the Slovene parliament affirmed the Declaration of the Independence and Sovereignty of Slovenia. The Declaration stresses, among other things, that Slovenia will, upon agreement with the federal government and with the republics, take over the execution of all functions of power within its territory. The day after the official celebration of this declaration (27 June 1991), the Yugoslav Army, with the formal consent of the federal government, started its military intervention in Slovenia. The formal shielding of the federal government enabled the supreme command of the YA to claim the legitimacy of the intervention (referring to the Constitution of the SFRY and the federal law on Total National Defence) and to justify and ra-

tionalize its role as an autonomous political subject in Yugoslavia, in the Yugoslav and international community.¹

The three months deadline of the Brioni Declaration - by which Slovenia was obliged to freeze its endeavors towards the achievement of independence and the formation of its own state - expired on 7 October 1991. After that, Slovenia continued with the consolidation of its autonomous political identity, internally, through its legal, political and security- defence system, and externally through the talks on the legal international recognition of Slovenia by other sovereign states. After some months of endeavors and expectations, the formal international recognition process started on 15 January 1992. The process was initiated by Germany, and soon after Slovenia was recognized by the states of the EC, since then, other states have gradually followed suit.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUE IN THE NEWLY ESTABLISHED STATE OF SLOVENIA

One of the key elements for the formal and legal international recognition of any state is the establishment and exercise of power within its borders. To achieve this, two factors are important: political and realistic possibilities for ensuring national security. Thus Slovenia, as a state, has through its independence acquired not only the responsibility

¹ Two points in particular are important. First, following the first democratic elections on (April 1990), there appeared an ever increasing contradiction between the Constitution of the SFRY (1974) and the social, political economic and other changes in Yugoslavia. Therefore, any appealing to the Constitution was an anachronism. Second, the Constitution was the expression of Yugoslav political system, in which the YA was fully integrated and identified with the policy of the only official political power - The League of the Communist Party. The YA was completely controlled by the top-party leaders which further reduced the possibility to constitute a legal state in which the YA would effectively act in the service of the state rather than of the Communist Party.

of establishing its social values, but also the responsibility and obligation of contributing to international security. This requires the shaping of a Slovenian national-security strategy, i.e. the concept of national security. This concept should couple the strategic points of the internal development of Slovenia with those of its relation to other countries. These are intended to form the starting point for the design of the measures, instruments and mechanisms with which Slovenia can ensure security for its population against various sources of threat to the society as a whole. Although at the moment the concept of national security has not yet been formally adopted by the Slovene parliament, Slovenia disposes with certain mechanisms which systemically ensure the security of the whole society.

The aim of my further discussion is to deal with some aspects of the solution of the national-security issue in Slovenia in the context of the processes and social changes which have occurred in ex-Yugoslavia, and in Slovenia in the last two years, as well as in the context of the basic determinants of modern cultural and civilizational conditions in the world which affect the content of Slovene national-security identity. The analysis will focus above all upon three basic problem areas:

1. Delineation of the content and terminology of security.
2. Security in contemporary international circumstances.
3. The transformation of the previous national-security structure into a new Slovenian national-security model.

1. Delineation of the Terminology and Content Related to Security and Terminology of Security

1.1. Security

The great master of belles lettres, Aldous Huxley, once wrote that the essence of a new view lies in its variety; that there are many different eyes, which see different scenes. Different people explain the same event differently. And then there are also different disciplines (biology, chem-

istry, history, etc.). Each professional sees different aspects of an event; different layers of reality.² In the search for the truth, events or phenomena should be viewed with different eyes at the same time.

The ideas of Huxley's novel *Point Counterpoint* are timeless and are valid for any scientific activity for at least two reasons. First, they make us aware that life is far more complicated than our reason can comprehend, and second, that the recognition of entirety and interconnection on the one hand, and the relative autonomy of individual segments of life and work in society and in nature on the other is particularly important in the scientific search for the truth in multilayered life. An understanding of the complexity of social life, as well as of different phenomena in it, requires an interdisciplinary approach.

One of the problems that is immanent to the life of the individual and of society at large from the remote past to the modern days, the understanding of which requires an integrated approach, is security. An attempt to make at least one step forward towards a more complex definition of modern security is made in this section.

The problem of security, both in classic as well as in modern sociopolitical thought, is mainly dealt with either partially or in a rather general way. Consequently, the concept of security in its entirety has not yet been designed. An attempt to compensate for this lack is being made by defence science in Slovenia, where this discipline is one of the interdisciplinary social sciences which, considering other interdisciplinary approaches to security / defence sciences abroad, studies theoretically and empirically the problem of security throughout the development of human society (e.g. security activities, processes, and phenomena connected with these activities).

The notion of security nowadays refers to a series of different aspects of human existence and to activities in society and in nature. Therefore it is necessary first to define the content of this notion. Security can be

² Aldous Huxley, *Kontrapunkt življenja*, Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 1971, p.267. (Slovene translation of *Point Counterpoint*).

defined as the property of a state in which the balanced physical, spiritual, psychic and material existence of an individual and of the community is ensured in relation to other individuals, the social community and nature.

From the evolutionary viewpoint, security is embedded as a biological mechanism, as the tendency of an organism to survive, as an adaptation of the organism to the menace coming from the environment. Biologically speaking,³ security is the basic precondition for the operation of the basic life functions (eating, human reproduction, etc.). Security is thus a lever of development, a deliberate, conscious activity to restore a state of security (as a positive act) ever anew, which is similar to the tendency to reduce entropy. The conscious endeavor to establish the state of security is a civilizational as well as a cultural category, which embraces all aspects of modern security, i.e. economic, social, cultural, political, legal, ecological, defence, etc.; in other words, those forms of social life which are considered as social values. The forms of social organization include regional, national, international, and global (universal) security.

The above delineation of the notion of "security" does not describe an existing entity; it aims rather at describing an idealized state. The notion is defined in terms of the absence of certain elements (similarly to the definition of "health" which is generally defined as the absence of disease). However, a definition of security is necessary in order to derive

³ All living beings are equipped with mechanisms which make above all two things possible: first, protection of the integrity of an individual, and secondly, the reproduction of species. Their behavior is to a great extent conditioned by their motivation and emotional state. The former can be illustrated by hunger, thirst or pain. Such states direct living beings either to avoid harmful effects from the environment or to search for food. Emotional states, such as frustration, anger, fear etc. primarily direct living beings to avoid risks, to act in self-defence or to alleviate the untoward state or distress in which they find themselves. For more on this see: Percy Lowenhard, "Is War Inevitable", *International Journal on World Peace*, March 1991, pp.19-20.

from it a conscious endeavor to establish such a state, through an activity, and its organizational form, i.e. the system, through which this activity can be realized.

According to what has been said so far, security seems to be an immanent structural element of society, which involves a state or certain property of that state, as well as an activity or system. Security thus relates to the state/society as a whole, (national or internal, and external security), as well as to the international community - in this case we are speaking of international, global or universal security.⁴

1.2. National and State Security

The concept "state security" is of rather recent origin. Its elements can be found in the works of Madison, and a widely cited definition of national security can be found in Walter Lippman's work "US Foreign Policy" published in 1943.⁵ It was not until W.W. II that the term "national security" acquired its place in the "strategic" dictionary amidst the traditional terms, such as military affairs, external and military policy, etc. Since the notions of national security and state security are becoming increasingly synonymous, it seems necessary briefly to discuss their connection.

Whenever we speak about state security, the word security has two meanings. First, it means a state of security at the level of the whole

⁴ Compare: Brian L. Job (ed), *The Insecurity Dilemma* (National Security of Third World States), Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1992, pp. 14-17.

⁵ Besides Lippman, there are also other important American authors (e.g. Hartman, Kennan, Morgenthau, Kaplan, etc.) who in their theories on international relations focus on national security. National security is directly linked with the so called national interest. National existence, national security, independence, and territorial integrity are considered among the most important national interests. More on that can be found in the book by Andreja Miletic, *National Interests in the US Theory of International Relations*, Sarajevo, Beograd, 1978, pp.131-169 and 193-217.

state, i.e., in the sense of national security. Second, it pertains to safety measures as a complex of activities, a system with which the state ensures security at the level of the whole society. Even at the present level of social development, national security is related to a sovereign state, which is charged with the protection of its physical integrity and its territory. Let us examine some of the numerous definitions of "national security", found in social science literature, to illustrate, rather than to present the issue in its entirety.

Professor of international law Vojin Dimitrijevic identified five groups of values which he considers as the basic elements of national security:

1. Existence of the state as a political community, existence of the nation (which is not identical with the existence of a particular state) and the physical survival of its population;
2. Territorial integrity as the basic right of the state;
3. Political independence as an attribute of internationally recognized national status of the state;
4. Quality of life;
5. An open-ended definition of national security which would make the content of the national security policy as well as the actual conduct of states a reflection of the realities of the situation (of "vital interest").⁶

Another scholar who studies the security aspects of modern international relations is Dr. Mario Nobile from Zagreb. He defines national security ... "as an intricate interaction between political, economic, military, ideological, legal, social and other internal and external social factors through which individual states attempt to ensure acceptable provisions to maintain their sovereignty, territorial integrity, the physi-

⁶ Vojin Dimitrijevic, *The Concept of Security in International Relations*, Beograd, 1973, p.11.

cal survival of its population, political independence and possibilities for a balanced and rapid social development on an equal footing".⁷

Amin Hewedy, an expert in international relations, and a diplomat of long standing, defines "national security" as an activity of nation-states with which the states within the range of their social capacities at present and in future, considering global changes and development, protect their identity, existence and interests.⁸ This delineation of national security also entails various elements:

- specific activities (in trade and economy, culture, etc.), which individual states perform to protect and defend themselves against any kind of threat from the environment;
- security activities of the society, which must be in tune with its social capacities (otherwise they may lead to the opposite : Insecurity);
- these activities require long and short-term planning;
- they should be adjusted to global and regional changes in the world.

The content of national security involves: security of the national territory, (including air-space and territorial waters), protection of the lives and property of the population, existence and maintenance of national sovereignty, and exercise of the basic functions of the society (economic, socio-political, cultural, ecological, social, etc.).

However, it seems that the classical concept of national security needs revision. The processes of internationalization and globalization have in our times surpassed some postulates which are characteristic of

⁷ Mario Nobile, "The Concept of Security in the Terminology of International Relations", *Political Thought*, October-December, 1988, pp.72-73

⁸ Amin Hewedy, *Militarization and Security in the Middle East*, London: Pinter Publishers, 1989, p.16. On the notion of national security see also Harold Brown, *Thinking about National Security*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983, p.4, etc.; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., : "The Changing Nature of World Power", *PREGLED*, January, 1991, pp. 3-7; A. Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration*, Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1962, p. 86; Peter Mangold, *National Security and International Relations*, London/New York: Routledge, 1990, pp. 2-10, 18-22 etc.

a classical conception of the sovereignty of the nation-state. This type of sovereignty in fact assumes the almost complete control of the nation state over its territory, people, and natural resources. But the present level of social development has brought about a gradual loss of the monopolistic supremacy of the nation state. There is an increasing engagement by individuals, social groups, associations, and by the civil society, operating beyond and above the nation-states (e.g. the activities of supra-national ecological or peace organizations - Greenpeace, Amnesty International, PUGWASH, Professors World Peace Academy, etc.).⁹ The processes of internationalization and globalization have brought about a higher level of unification of the entire world order, compared to the systems of individual sovereign states.¹⁰ This will in the near future undoubtedly be reflected in the content of the national security strategies of the modern states.

1.3. International and Global or Universal Security

Whenever the state of security refers to the global international community we refer to it as international, global or universal security. International security not only signifies the total of individual national securities, it also means an option for values in international relations as well as in relations within the nation-states. National survival in an ever more interdependent world calls for a permanent international frame of generally accepted values as a basis for the regulation of the relations among international subjects.

International security reflects the intricacy and stratification of international relations, the levels of the processes of integration and globalization, the efficiency or inefficiency of the mechanisms for ensuring national and international security, the state of affairs in military, political,

⁹ More on that in Zdravko Mlinar, "Sovereignty, Interdependence and Menace", *Theory and Practice*, October-November, 1991, pp.1163-1174.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.1169.

economic and other relations among states, etc.¹¹ In this respect, international security would appear to be a bunch of measures which ensure the existence of all states, hence a *conditio sine qua non* for the existence and development of the international community.

The ideas of how to attain international security (as a goal) go far back into the history of international relations. A permanent international framework, within which international security could be ensured, was first created by the establishment of the Concert of European Forces in the nineteenth century and later by the League of Nations and its successor, the UN, whose primary aim is to preserve international peace and security. The main instrument for the protection of international security, first in the League of Nations, and today in the UN, is the conception of collective security. The basic characteristics of the instrument of collective security within the UN are that it represents a joint response by states to an aggressor-state (war as a means of foreign policy is outlawed, and preventive actions to obviate an outbreak of war are envisaged), and that it assumes that all states have an automatic and inalienable right to security.¹²

¹¹ Mario Nobile, *op. cit.* p.74.

¹² Collective security as designed by the League of Nations was not based on an absolute refusal of war as a means of foreign policy. Member states were obliged to settle their disputes by arbitration in the League of Nations and - in case of failure of arbitration - the members of the UN should refrain from their military operation for a period of three months following the arbitration. In this way, the legal norms of the LN did not ban warfare as a means of politics. Warfare could become legalized through the process of arbitration; The LN also did not dispose of an adequate mechanism to prevent aggression.

The Charter of the UN is a step forward in the endeavors to form more explicit mechanisms to prevent and obviate crises which could threaten international peace and security. Chapter VII of the Charter defines UN procedures and measures in the case of a threat to international peace and security, and states provisions for non-military and military sanctions against an

The national security policy of modern states in the post-W.W. II period rested upon the "strategy of balance of power". The essence of this strategy as a mechanism for securing peace and security in international relations lies in the endeavors of the states to maintain their independence in an unamiable or even hostile international environment by limiting the power of other states. The basic operating principle is that one state gains at the expense of another one. New elements in the modern world - which are the result of the present level of social development as well as of the radical changes in the international community over the last few years - limit in many respects the effectiveness of the strategy of the balance of power.¹³

aggressor. Some of the most important non-military sanctions are: economic blockade, cessation of scientific, technical, military or other cooperation, breaking off of diplomatic relations, etc. Military sanctions against an aggressor are of two types: a) punishment and defeat of an aggressor and coercion to make peace (i.e. peace-making operations) and b) cease-fire and maintaining peace (peace-keeping operations).

To carry out both types of measures, the UN have multinational military troops at their disposal (which consist of units drawn from the armed forces of the member states). Compare: Harry B. Hollins, Averill, L. Powers, Mark Sommer, *The Conquest of War (Alternative Strategies for Global Security)*, San Francisco: Westview Press, 1989, pp. 24-26.

¹³ Joseph S. Nye, Jr. lists four main elements (trends) in the present day world which significantly limit the use of military forces and the strategy of the balance of power as traditional instruments of a successful state security policy. These are: a) strengthening of economic interdependence among states (which in turn strengthens the need for establishing efficient communication among them); b) the process of modernization and urbanization as well as the development of communication systems in the developing countries (these encourage the transfer of power from state administration to the private sector); c) availability of military technology increases the power of underdeveloped countries; d) changed order of priorities in solving volatile international problems in world politics (the solution of many questions of transnational interdependence requires collective engagement

The solution of many economic, ecological and developmental problems requires cooperation among the states in order to gain a common benefit rather than to achieve an advantage by one state at the expense of another. An optimum level of international security can be achieved only when all members of the international community reach a consensus on the rules of conduct and on the practical implementation of these rules.¹⁴

Although the present system of collective security within the UN represents an important step forward from the traditional concept of security at the level of the nation-state, the elements of deterrence and competition among the nation-states - which ensure the security of one state at the expense of another - still prevail. Therefore, it is necessary to create in international relations the conditions for cooperativeness and trust in all spheres of the life and work of modern states. Only such relations can offer a realistic starting point for the creation of a new "cooperative model" of international security, which would be based on the participation of all states (including social groups, organizations and individuals) in achieving an optimum level of security within each individual state and with all of them together.

I.4. The National Security System

In the light of the previously determined content of security, it has to be noted, that security is not simply a matter of the absence of threat or of a controllable, low level of sources of threat in nature or society. It must also be understood as an activity through which the exercise of the basic functions of society (socio-economic, socio-political, psycho-social, cultural, ecological etc.) can be ensured. The securing and execution of

and cooperation among the states). Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "The Changing Nature of World Power", *PREGLED*, January, 1991, p. 5.

¹⁴ Ken Booth, "Steps Towards Stable Peace in Europe: a theory and practice of coexistence", *International Affairs*, January, 1990, pp. 27. Compare: Harry B. Hollins, Averill L. Powers, Mark Sommer, *op. cit.* pp. 141-148.

these functions represents a wider, positive aspect of security which goes well beyond mere absence of threat (negative understanding of security).¹⁵

Security is the opposite of insecurity or threat. The latter is the result of the operation of various sources of threat arising in nature, in a society or in the relations among societies. The sources of threat differ as to: the reason (subjective, objective), contents (natural forces, the interplay of circumstances and the consequences of human activities in society), level (presence, absence), place (within or outside of a particular social system), consequences (direct/indirect), etc.

Security is a primary structural element of the social system since all members of society are affected (threat and insecurity are a menace to every individual and to the society as a whole). Any social system tends to organize its individual spheres so that they operate interdependently and that they are structured in such a way as to comply with the need for security in society at large. In this respect, the security system of a society is aimed at ensuring security in its broadest sense for all members of the society. The basic principle - according to which any social system also provides for the realization of its security functions - derives from structural links between security and human needs which have existed throughout human history, right up to the present. In the circumstances of our present civilization, security has a universal content, which is clearly expressed in the totality of intertwining spheres of social life and work (economic, political, social, cultural, educational, military, etc.) and in the interrelationship and interdependence of all living beings and nature on our planet.

Despite the global dimensions of modern security, the nation-state dimension has still remained its fixed star. At this - national - level,

¹⁵ Nye differentiates between security as a primarily negative goal - i.e. absence of threat to the existence of the state, and security as a positive aim - i.e. a higher level of security, beyond mere survival. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *op. cit.* p.4.

modern states ensure the security of their citizens through the activities of their national-security systems. The efficiency of these systems nowadays reflects not only the capacity of the states to protect their basic social values against internal or external threats - i.e. to maintain peace and guarantee freedom, to prevent danger and fear - but also their ability to ensure economic, political, scientific, technological, and social development as well as the social, cultural, ecological, etc. well-being of their population.

The basic elements of the national security system are the operational activities of the society to ensure its security. The following national security elements seem to be common to our modern societies:

a) security policy in its broader or narrower sense. Security policy in its broader sense relates to any advance preparations against threats deriving from nature, society and relations among societies. The aim of security policy in its broader sense is to maintain and to protect the fundamental values of the society and to ensure security from all possible sources of threat. Security policy in its narrow sense entails a network of measures, activities and operations aimed at establishing a national security system. The aim of security policy in its narrow sense is to design instruments and mechanisms by means of which the internal and external security of a society can be ensured; it means an operationalization of the political, organizational, technical and other principles of security policy in its broader sense.

b) Security structure is the structure aimed at ensuring security at the level of the society as a whole and is specific to each individual state. However, most states have two elements in common: defence and internal security.¹⁶

¹⁶ Compare: Robert Rudney, Luc Reyhler (eds.), *European Security Beyond the Year 2000*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988, pp. 259-261., and *Swiss Security Policy in Times of Change*, Report 90 of the Federal Council of the Federal Assembly on the security policy of Switzerland, October, 1990, pp.34-52.

The functions of defence are:

- deterrence of a potential aggressor
- defence of territory in case of aggression
- protection of the population and of material goods, and amelioration of the consequences following an act of aggression
- organizing non-armed revolt against an aggressor
- ensuring the functioning of political and other social subsystems in times of war etc.

In order to carry out the above functions, defence as an element of the security system has two basic ingredients: armed forces and civil defence. The functions of internal security (in peace and wartime) are: maintenance of law and order, information gathering ("intelligence") and protection of the whole social infrastructure. The structural elements which carry out these functions are: the police, other agencies of control and the courts.

c) Security self-organization of civil society. In addition to institutionalized security provisions at the level of the state, modern states also have provisions to ensure security at the individual or community levels. These embrace spontaneous self-protection (self-defence) activities of individuals as well as various forms and levels of self-organization of social groups (interest groups, local communities). However, the security activities of civil society are still immanently linked with the security system of each particular society.

2. Security in Contemporary International Circumstances

2.1. Recent Changes in the International Community

In view of the radical changes in the international community, the period of the last two years can be considered a singular turning point in relations among modern states. The new relations among states, which are now being instituted, will have far-reaching consequences for individual states and for the world as a whole. Changes such as the end of

the cold war, the removal of the "iron curtain" which kept the states apart for several decades, the fall of communist system in the East, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, German Reunification, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and emergence of new sovereign states on the territories of these ex-states, and the institutionalization of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation (CESC) have all further strengthened the need to form, indeed to implement, a qualitatively new approach in ensuring security in the modern world. These and other changes in the international community have created favorable conditions for:

- overcoming the ideological-political antagonisms which have for decades divided modern states,
- defusing military controversies and conflicts;
- shaping new structures to ensure national and international security intended for the peaceful settlement of conflicts (within the states and among them);
- realization of the thus far utopian ideas and initiatives for a renewal of the military-defence systems of nation-states, which since the end of W.W. II have been based almost exclusively on the doctrine of armed threat and armed defence.

The accomplishment of the above-mentioned developments in the area of modern security can contribute to the consolidation of new civilizational circumstances in the world, in which the following seem to be of particular importance:

- military force, traditionally the central ingredient of the power of nation-states, is being increasingly superseded by other means such as: the communications, organizational and institutional capabilities of the modern state;¹⁷
- due to an ever greater interdependence between the states, the boundaries of national sovereignty - when overlapping with state

¹⁷ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *op. cit.*

borders - are becoming a hindrance to successful and democratic solution of numerous transnational problems of the modern world (ecology, epidemics, terrorism, etc.);

- democratic liberties and human rights are becoming established as the highest values of each society and of the international community as a whole, etc.

Concomitantly with the positive trends in the sphere of national and international security, some new tensions and threats have appeared in our present day multipolar world.¹⁸ These are:

- West-European integration processes which entail many unknowns and problems and which create new dangers (e.g. new forms of ethnic competition and confrontation, problems of the legitimacy of individual states and their governments);
- the changes in East European countries, which signal the transition from totalitarian social systems to pluralistic and democratic ones, have so far involved only political systems whereas socio-economic, national and other problems are growing increasingly more intricate;
- the whole structure of political power in the world has changed. At the top of the pyramid is the USA, with Germany and Japan very likely to join it there. In the case of Japan in particular, there exists an evident asymmetry between its economic-political role in the world on the one hand, and, on the other, its status in the decision-making process regarding most important world issues;

¹⁸ S.P. Huntington describes our present day world as "uni- multipolar world" dominated by a single superpower, the USA. Then there come six other states - the great powers - the Soviet Union, Japan, China, Germany, Great Britain and France. After them there are the newly arising powers of the Third World - with India being the most important among them at present which show a tendency towards regional domination. S.P. Huntington, "America's changing strategic interests", *Survival*, January-February, 1991, p.6.

- despite initial talks (in 1991) between the adversaries in the Near East, who have been in dispute for several decades, there seems to be no foreseeable end to threats and hostilities in this part of the world, at least not in the near future: the Israeli-Arab conflict, the Arab-Arab conflicts (Iran-Iraq, Iran - Syria, etc.), the Kurdish question in Iran, Iraq, Turkey, etc.
- Two huge states, India and China, are at the moment immersed in their internal problems, above all those of economic development. While in India, this question is linked to the country's unsettled relations with Pakistan, in China it is connected with regional imbalances.
- Developing countries (which in my view include most of the Third World Countries) remain an important factor for world peace and security. In addition to the specific problems which these states experience in contrast to other, richer ones (indebtedness etc.), they are also faced with huge problems inside their societies (ethnic and other conflicts in the states of Latin America, Africa, Asia).
- The reshaping of warfare and military doctrines in many states proceeds not so much in the direction of the abolition of the military, but rather in the direction of forming smaller, professional armed forces with modern equipment and armaments.
- The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact have brought about a block monism (NATO) on the one hand, and made the USA a single military superpower, on the other.

2.2. The Impact of these Changes on Contemporary Security Concept

One of the key questions of our modern world is how to ensure a level of security that will provide the preconditions for creating an optimum quality of life for the individual, society and nature. Modern societies attempt through their national security systems to ensure various aspects of security at the level of society at large. However, experience

shows that most states are not very successful in accomplishing their security functions. It should however be noted that, first, it is impossible to guarantee the absolute security of a society by any system; we can only approximate this goal to a lesser or greater degree; and, second, the states have devoted their greatest attention to the strengthening of their armed forces.

There are certain signs that an increasing number of modern states are becoming ever more aware that even at the level of present development of civilization, the content of security is structurally linked with other basic needs of the social community, and that it has become significantly extended. Every society - the state and the whole international community - is faced with an imperative to reshape the content of security following two concepts. The first is universality, i.e., taking into account the notion of security in all its complexity, and the second, demilitarization, which can abolish the hitherto asymmetric ways of ensuring national and international security, which have so far relied nearly exclusively upon military mechanisms.

The existing circumstances in the world require a new approach to modern security. This is a fact which has been stressed before by scholars. The essence of this "new" view of security as being the basic ingredient of the life and work of an individual lies in the fact that it represents a step forward from the merely narrow solutions of the problems of security at the level of the nation-state (where armed defence seems to be the prevalent element in a national security system) towards the attainment of integral security, which takes into account various aspects of the quality of life and security in individual society as well as in the whole international community.¹⁹

¹⁹ S.P.Huntington, too, believes that in order to realize the interests of the USA in the emerging "new world" it is necessary first to form "institutionalized means" for the development of a more complete approach in devising national security policy, which would entail various dimensions of

Thus, along with the traditional system of security at the level of the nation-state and of the international community, various alternative schemes have been continuously emerging. An important attempt to establish an alternative international security system is represented by the collective security measures within the League of Nations, which were carried over through the process of internationalization during W.W. II, and have since been sustained through the UN, re-emerging as the present ideas on "common security",²⁰ "alternative security", "shared security", "non-provocative" defence etc.²¹

A common denominator of various ideas on an alternative scheme for modern security is a transition from the traditional models of national and international security (based on the principles of armed national defence, deterrence and competition among the states) to the modern model of national and global security which would be to a higher degree geared towards the common interests of the states.²²

national security (internal and external, military, economic etc.). S.P.Huntington, *ibid.* p.15.

²⁰ One of the proposals for forming a common security system within a reformed security system of the UN contains the following elements: • qualitative disarmament, • new agreements and treaties in the area of security, • minimum deterrence, • civil defence, • common defence, • measures to solve conflicts, • peace-keeping measures, • control, • permanent (regular) financing, • consent of the states to the common security system. See: Harry B. Hollins, Averill L. Powers, Mark Sommer, *op. cit.* pp.182 - 191.

²¹ For more on that see Anton Grizold, "Defense Initiatives of Western European Countries - Members of NATO", *Theory and Practice*, March-April, 1988, pp.456-462.

²² The idea that security is something for which states compete has been expressed by Herz and Butterfield as a security dilemma: in the absence of a supreme power which might be capable of securing order, individuals and groups are forced to seek protection on their own. In doing this, in order to avoid the influence of others, they are compelled to gain ever greater power. However, this puts others in a situation of threat and forces them to prepare for the worst possible situation. Since in this world of competing entities no

2.3. The Structure of the Existing National-Security System of Slovenia

With the departure of the last YA soldier from the territory of the Republic of Slovenia, (December 1991) the Slovene state has also assumed effective and complete responsibility for the maintenance of its sovereignty and independence, and for its national security. The content of this responsibility as regards the national-security area will be framed in the political-strategic document - the concept of national security - which is due to be passed upon by the Slovene parliament. This concept will be the foundation-stone of the formation of our future national-security system.

The present national-security system of Slovenia has its normative legal basis in the Decree on Defence and Public Security, the Law on Military Service and in the Law on Internal Affairs. The above Acts represent only transitional solutions in the area of defence-security organization in Slovenia. The structure of the existing Slovene national-security system consists of the following elements: defence, security, protection and salvation.

2.3.1. The Defence Element consists of the following elements: the Territorial Defence (armed forces), the National Guard (national protection force) and the Communications Control System. The basic functions of the defence element in the national-security system of Slovenia are: to act as a deterrent against armed aggression, to ensure organized

one ever feels completely secure, this competition results in a vicious circle of security and power. Peter Mangold, *op. cit.*, p.10. A well-known Polish expert on security issues, Janusz Symonides, is also convinced that the existing security system in the world - which is based on the balance of power and deterrence - has not succeeded in solving the basic security dilemma of the present nuclear age, i.e., how to ensure common security. Modern states, according to him, are today for the first time in human history impelled to take into account or even to cater to the security of their possible enemy, if they want to survive. For more on that see: Robert D. Blackwill, F. Stephen Larrabee (eds.), *Conventional Arms Control and East - West Security*, New York: Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, pp.40-41.

resistance to armed aggression against the state in a timely manner, and to organize transition and adaptation of all resources and facilities to war-time conditions in order to provide for material and medical supplies to the armed forces and to the population.

- a) Territorial Defence: The Slovene armed forces are formally called the Territorial Defence, which has two basic functions: first, (in peace-time): organization and training of its units for armed struggle, as well as education and training the citizens for other forms of active defence; and second, carrying out defence operations in case of aggression.
- b) The National Guard is constituted to organize the activities of the civilians to carry out certain security operations during peace-time and to take part in the armed struggle or other forms of resistance in war-time.
- c) Communications Control System - is a special system of communications which operates at both republican and communal levels. The system ensures the communication lines of the state bodies and of its special agencies in the sphere of defence and security, monitoring, information gathering and intelligence, and command units of the armed forces.

2.3.2. The Security Element of the present national-security system of Slovenia is embedded in an organization concerned with the detection and prevention of all activities which may threaten the integrity of society, its people, their property, the social infrastructure and public order. The security element carries out the following basic activities: security-informative services, police activities, and prosecution. These activities are carried out by the following elements of the structure: the police, the intelligence-security office, other agencies of control, and the courts.²³

²³ The existing security sub-system has its normative and legal basis in the Law on Internal Affairs (Official Administrative Gazette of R. Slovenia No.28/80 and 38/88) and the Law on the Changes and Amendments to the

2.3.3. The Element of Protection and Salvation has the following basic functions:

- detection of threats and dangers, public alerting;
- preparations for protection and rescue;
- repairing loss or damage caused by natural and other accidents or by a war.

DIRECTIONS OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM OF SLOVENIA

On the basis of the existing changes and our experience derived from the activities of the international community in the settlement of the Yugoslav crisis, (military intervention by the YA in Slovenia, the war in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina) and on the basis of some theoretical and empirical findings resulting from the analyses of the security systems of modern societies, it is possible to delineate some starting-points for the further development of the Slovene national-security system in the future.

The neo-detente between the two superpowers - the USA and the U.S.S.R - (by the end of the 80s) had triggered the rearrangement of the power-relations among the entities (states) of the international community. These changes, however, require a redefinition of some of the traditional elements of the international order (e.g. sovereignty, balance of power, national and global sources of threat, etc.), within which individual states operate. The present experience in ensuring national and international security indicates that the international community has found itself in a situation which on the one hand leads to a higher level of cooperativeness among the majority of its members (e.g. collective response to Iraqi aggression in Kuwait, settlement of the Yugoslav crisis by UN forces) and, on the other hand, to the structural changes of the

Law on Internal Affairs (Official Administrative Gazette of R Slovenia No. 19/91).

international order. This instills insecurity and poses a series of new threats to individual nation-states in their continuous endeavors to achieve most favorable positions in the international community.

We are in the era of a new "turning point" in the process of "reforming" the structure of the international community and of (re)shaping the mechanisms for ensuring national and international security, which should - in contrast to the past, in which the logic of ideological and geopolitical globalism of two continuously antagonistic super powers prevailed - to a greater extent be geared towards the assertion of some of the common interests and common security of all the members of the international community. Otherwise, the structure of the international community will again be "reshaped" merely in line with the interests of a smaller group of modern states, with the USA being at the forefront. This would mean only a new asymmetric form of the existing "international order", which is based on the rule of the economic, ideological-political and above all on the rule of the military power of the modern states which ensure their security interests at the expense of other less powerful states. The endeavors for a democratic international order, based on common security are therefore also an element of the Slovenian national- security strategy.

For Slovenia, as a small community, it is important that the activities which should ensure security at the level of the whole community, should become not only a part of Slovenian political sovereignty, but also a part of its common awareness and culture. By achieving this long-term aim, the security issue would, in addition to its institutional (state) basis, also gain its civil foundations. This would encourage rational direction of a part of the national resources to an efficient, systemic way of ensuring security (in its broadest sense) to the Slovenian society.

Therefore, in shaping the concept of the national security of Slovenia, it is necessary to pay particular attention to the following:

First, despite the universal character of modern security systems, the national dimensions of security still remain very important. National

security is most often linked with the concern of national survival in a potentially or effectively different, dangerous or even hostile international environment. However, perception of hostility and threat from the outside world (i.e. outside a particular social system) is a function of imagined (assumed) and actual situations. An exact and clear distinction between these two criteria (assumed/actual) is not as yet possible. Consequently, in modern states there exists a danger that the security of society may be modeled according to the interests ("image") of the ruling political elite. In this case, the actual security of the population - the citizens - is very often sacrificed to the magic word "national security". The institution of secrecy in the field of national security allows not only for the protection of national secrets against a possible aggressor, but also for the shielding of the executive branch of power from the control of the legislative branch and the public.²⁴ In order to avoid the above dangers, it is necessary to ensure constitutionally, legally, and by other means the realization of the basic values of the modern Slovene society, which should also be the basis of its national-security system. In other words: democracy as a form of rule is most efficient not as the ultimate goal but merely as a political tool which, through political, socio-economic, educational, informational, cultural, and other elements, can ensure the secure life of the members of the society.²⁵

Second, with regard to the actual sources of threat to the security of the Slovene state, it will be necessary to provide for such mechanisms in our security system as would ensure internal security, safeguard and rescue people and their material goods, and ameliorate the consequences of natural and other disasters, and also establish the mechanisms for ensuring the external security of the state.

Third, a national-security system which would enjoy the support of the Slovene population should, - like the national-security systems of other modern states - most probably contain the following elements: a

²⁴ Amin Hewedy, *op. cit.*, p.98.

²⁵ Amin Hewedy, *ibid.*, pp.96-97.

national-security policy, internal security, protection and rescuing of people, their material and other goods, and a defence system involving both civil and armed defence.

Fourth, such a structure of the Slovene national-security system will open the possibilities for its inclusion into the emerging all-European security system and into the system of the universal collective security. At the same time it will be an expression of the existing cultural conditions and the level of civilization in the world in which the balance between the military and non-military mechanisms in ensuring national and world security would seem to be an imperative.

Fifth, only a structurally linked security and foreign policy (including policies from the other spheres of social activities) can open the way for the earliest possible international recognition and affirmation of Slovenia. This also concerns the area of security, in which the Slovene national-security system (based on the security needs and capacities of Slovenia and on the principles of the modern concept of security) may represent an initiative for forming new and more efficient national and global security structures in our modern world.

Giuseppe Caforio

MILITARY UNIONIZATION IN WESTERN COUNTRIES:

THE STATE OF STUDIES

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This article is intended as a contribution to the discussion emerging in some Western European countries (Spain, France, Italy, Greece, for instance) concerning the unionizing of the military. The discussion may well widen within a few years to include the Eastern European countries too. Furthermore, we believe that the decision taken by the United States in 1977 only set the problem aside, without solving it.

Extensive literature exists on this topic in West Europe and in the United States and we think that a first step towards meeting the problem is to make a wide-ranging survey of that literature. This is the purpose of this article.

The survey and an analysis of the current situation do not give us any clear indication of opinion either in favor of or against unionization. For this reason we intend to report the different positions without stressing our own opinions. Insofar as the following report is the work of one person, his own opinion is bound to show through, but we have tried to be as downbeat as possible so that the reader will have the best chance of forming his/her own opinion.

1. Historical Outline

Emerging and developing first in Scandinavia at the beginning of this century, the phenomenon of collective representation of military personnel was initially considered to be a personal matter which was tolerated by the state, although with some initial conflict, within the bounds of the broad liberties guaranteed by its system of advanced democracy. It was only later that union-like organizations of military personnel began to be regulated and recognized by the state in a way not dissimilar to other unions in category.¹

¹ In the Scandinavian countries, as it was there that for the first time forms of industrial democracy developed in the civil sphere. Laurie A. Broedling writes on the subject (Broedling, 1977, page 21): The Scandinavian countries have been in the forefront of the industrial democracy movement and their industries were the first to become actively involved in experiments in increased employee participa-

In Scandinavia, this process has been gradual and can be considered to have been completed around the time of the second world war. But in the same period, the fall of totalitarian regimes and the consequent growth of democracy in Western Europe, the disappearance of the function of guarantor that some forms of government (such as monarchies) or regimes (such as Nazism) carry out towards uniformed professionals, and the general demilitarization of single national communities, have all increased the problem. This problem become typical of practically all the countries of Europe where the free expression of the requirements and wishes of citizens is possible.

In this situation, which according to some scholars is the expression of a "secularization of the profession of arms", a sharp contrast emerged between conservative trends which consider any form of unionization of personnel to be incompatible with the military institution, and to progressive trends which, with the disappearance of royal armed forces and ascriptive armed forces, considered it both possible and necessary to bring the military profession into line with other professions and occupations.

2. Motives for Opposition

Two questions arise at this point: why has this thrust, or at least concern, for forms of independent protection of the interests of military personnel emerged and become widespread (more or less all western countries, including the United States, have had to face the problem in the period after World War II)? And why has the representation of the interests of military personnel come to be seen as a problem and to meet certain resistance?

tion... The labor confederations have had a great deal of influence in seeing legislation passed to benefit their employees".

2.1. The Push for Unionization

We have said that historically the disappearance of some forms of government (or regime) that performed a function of guarantor towards the professional members of its armed forces was one of the causes of the widespread surge of unions beyond the Scandinavian countries. This assertion will now be further explained. What has actually more directly influenced this trend appears above all to have been the new situation in which professional military personnel found themselves in their communities.

It is in fact the change occurring in society that has produced the phenomenon. The essential feature of this change, as far as it concerns us here, was the loss of the prestige and social esteem of the military community and the consequent sense of frustration among the personnel. As Harries-Jenkins (1977) wrote, "The mood to unionize, in the armed forces as in other organizations, arises when the general feeling of individual deprivation is converted into the rarer sense of collective deprivation".

The thinking of other authors, Philippe Manigart and Lucien Mandeville, has followed the same lines. The latter writes (Mandeville 1976a): "The continual decline in the standard of living in the military establishment, combined with the general trend towards a new kind of relationship between a superior and his subordinates, is beginning to produce new expectations among military personnel". Manigart (1984) also states that "the process of unionization of the armed forces writes itself into the general evolution of work associations in western society. This evolution is characterized by a major participation by citizens, by the inclination of different social groups to organize themselves into pressure groups for the protection of their interests, and by a substitution of collective work organizations for the former individual organizations."

As a consequence of this social change, the internal features of the armed professions are also changed. David R. Segal writes (Segal, 1977): "Three inter-related trends are transforming the vocation of military service into a secular occupation. The first is a changing technology of warfare that,

making civilian populations as vulnerable to attack as are front line troops, has socialized the danger of war"; secondly, the change in the nature of the work of the military individual which has become appreciably closer to work in business; and thirdly, the progressive acceptance of this assimilation on the part of those responsible for the management of military personnel.

A further feature of this social change has been recognized by Roger J. Arango (1977), who observes the changed social background of today's (1977) intake of officers, and how they are coming, to a much greater extent, from those social classes or ranks where there is already a long custom of unionization.

A further cause of the trend towards unionizing the armed forces is recognized by David Cortright (1977c) with reference to the American situation, in the notable growth in unionization of public employment after the sixties; a growth that could not have a pulling effect on military personnel as well.

That the thrust of unions has come directly from change in social positions is shown clearly, but with contrasting results, in the examples of two countries where there have not been institutional changes, Belgium and Great Britain.

"Before World War I," writes Victor Werner (1976), "the military profession enjoyed quite an enviable status. At every level of the social hierarchy, the armed forces occupied a privileged position." The officers formed a caste, but even the other ranks in the profession were satisfied with their status. "At every hierarchic level the personnel in permanent service were conscious of belonging to one of the most important organizations in the state, an organization that enjoyed the highest public regard." But on a concrete level too, such personnel "enjoyed certain privileges that were at that time not conceded to workers, such as job security, free medical care, the provision of board and clothing, paid holidays and guaranteed pensions. According to the writing of the same author, the situation seems to have been completely different after World War II; at that time "the state enjoys a situation of full employment and social achievement in the industrial sector is spectacular.

The material position of military personnel in permanent service becomes, from this point of view, relatively less advantageous". So there is a social change which leaves out of consideration institutional changes (although in countries where these have occurred they have not been without influence), and this alters the existing equilibrium, does away with preceding systems of protection and hence produces new applications even in the military sphere.

The British situation is a contrasting example where a permanence in the form of government and of regime is accompanied (along with social change in general) by a substantial maintaining of the positions and above all of the forms of protection already in force for military personnel in permanent service. In fact, G. Harries Jenkins (1977) writes of the problem of the union in Great Britain where the armed forces have "a special relationship with the civil power whereby the rights and privileges of the dominant social group are automatically guaranteed to members of the military: in this relationship there is no need to seek unionization to provide the political, social and economic rights of members of the organization, for these will always be protected by the power elite with which the military is closely associated".

2.2. The Opposition to a Unionization of the Armed Forces

If a convergence of the military institution and the civil community is occurring and has brought together the two spheres of life and work, why does the problem of unionization of the armed forces arise, and why has substantial opposition to a system of union negotiation for military personnel developed?

The fundamental motivation is inherent in the uniqueness of the military institution, thus summarized by David R. Segal (1977): "Because of its unique social function - the legitimate management of violence - the military requires of its personnel a degree of commitment that differs from that required by other modern organizations. Military personnel, unlike their civilian counterparts, enter into a contract of unlimited liability with their employer. They cannot unilaterally terminate their employment any time

they wish. They are subject to moving and working in any environment where the service decides they are needed. They are required to place the needs of the service above the needs of their families, and must frequently endure long periods of separation. They are often called upon to work more than an eight-hour day, for which they receive no additional compensation. And, in time of war, they must face prolonged danger, and may even forfeit their lives. Obviously, the man on the firing line is required to make a commitment of a different order from that made by the worker on the assembly line".

Bernard Boëne is also very precise and useful on the differentiation between the military "job" and the civil, in a study dedicated among other things to a new area of enquiry (Boëne 1989). "Military specificity" he states, "does not dwell only in the field of the risks to which the combatant is subjected, but also in the limits of application of rationality in combat and in the situation of habitual transgression from social norms which that implies. This implies a particular type of socialization"...."Despite slight similarities, even civil emergencies are not truly in the same field as those that are military." An officer, in particular, "is not an ordinary public employee; he must respond to a "call" with particularly military concern, be dedicated to the common good, accept the risks of military life and submit to a series of obligations particular to the military profession..".

Political reasons are also added by Carlo Jean (1991) who writes: "In itself, the creation of unions would inevitably settle a greater number of conflicts; without these conflicts union representatives would have neither prestige nor credibility. However, I do not consider that the greatest inconvenience that resulted would be that of undermining the internal cohesion of the armed forces and their operative capacity. By force of circumstances, those responsible within the military would align themselves with the demands of the union in order to avoid internal disintegration. An unacceptable corporative force would result which would, sooner or later, inevitably clash with the political power. The implicit danger that a military union would hold for

the civil community is, in my opinion, much greater than its negative implications for the efficiency of the military organism."

On the same lines we could quote the opinion expressed by United States Senator Thurmond (reported by David Cortright, essay quoted), which fears that unionization could reinforce the military institution and increase its influence on society in general, diminishing political control.

2.3. Intermediate Positions.

David Segal (1977), with reference to a sample survey, observes how, in the absence of a union for military personnel in the USA, they have a notable "misfit" between their perception of the characteristics of their role and their "preferred characteristics" of that role, while in an analogous sample of the civil work force this misfit is much reduced. Examining the remedies attempted, Segal states that "Any change to be achieved through organizational intervention, however, is likely to be incremental, and not to resolve the discrepancy between the characteristics that military personnel would like in their jobs and the characteristics that they perceived their jobs to have". Unionization may, according to Segal, resolve this problem, but it presents two dangers that need to be carefully examined. The first is that it tends to extend its own influence to matters of management and direction of the military apparatus; the second is that it implies a politicization of personnel.

Gwyn Harries Jenkins (1977) examines the consequences that unionization would have on the operative efficiency of the armed forces and identifies three that are fundamental:

1. The creation of a structure of dual authority. In fact, "Since there has been a change in the basis of authority and discipline in the military establishment and a shift from authoritarian domination to greater reliance on manipulation, persuasion and group consensus, unionization extends the boundaries of these changes; it brings into armed forces the full effects of the organizational revolution which pervades contemporary

society, creating a dual authority structure while modifying the traditional basis of compliance".

2. Bringing closer the style of military command to that of civil management. In fact the new duties and the introduction of unionism would require a capacity and leaning in those in command that was more and more similar to that of civil managers.
3. The officer's relinquishment of his traditional image. If in fact the officer "wishes to retain these self-images and ideas of honor the introduction of trade unions into the military creates a conflict situation with substantial dysfunctional consequences".

According to William Taylor and Roger Arango (1977), in the USA many justifications made for or against the unionization of military personnel couple rhetoric with too little enquiry. Those who take the negative position, for example, state that unionization would bring about an erosion of discipline, a threat to the hierarchic chain, and, above all, would undermine the capacity of the military instrument to carry out its entrusted mission. By means of a concrete analysis of the subject, these authors consider that they can show the advantages and disadvantages of such a process. Among the advantages are the gaining of a major sense of personal security, an increase in the value of the individual's dignity, improved social communication, and a greater competitiveness with other professions and occupations in the recruitment of personnel. The disadvantages are, essentially, reduced to only two: danger of internal division of the unit due to new inter-rank conflict, and an increase in the cost of personnel.

3. Development and Position of Representation in Some Western Countries.

Of the countries from which we have been able to obtain information, the following have unions for military personnel: Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium and Holland. Union membership is forbidden in Great Britain, the USA, Canada, Portugal,

Turkey and Greece; France and Italy have a different form of representation. Strikes are permitted in Austria and Sweden only.

There are some critical dimensions in the military unions figures and we try to apply them to 8 different case studies in the following paragraphs. These critical dimensions are:

- a. the origins of the military unionization movement;
- b. the solution realized to face the advent of this movement. We think we can distinguish, generally speaking, three modes of solution:
 - civilian type trade-unions;
 - an "institutional" solution (or French/Italian one), i.e., mandatory exclusive representative bodies which belong to the military organization;
 - no union at all, i.e., military unions are forbidden;
- c. the personnel who are represented (topic especially significant where there is a conscription system);
- d. the organizational structure;
- e. the ways of acting (where military unions exist).

3.1. Sweden

a. The military union was founded in Sweden in 1908 when non-commissioned officers of various regiments were said to have met in Stockholm to organize their first union. Naturally, the process of unionization met initial difficulties and obstacles, both internal and external. The last to unionize themselves were the officers, with the foundation of S.O.F. (Union of Officers) which was organized at a national level only in 1932. Unionization of officers had been delayed mainly for two reasons: the fact that officers were linked to the ruling elite via royal connections and the strong resistance put up by the political left and civil trade unions to the unionization of officers.

b. The Swedish solution submits military unions to the same rules created for trade unions.

c. There are separate forms of representation of interests for professional military personnel and for conscripts: conscripts are organized at different levels and a central level, a "parliament" for draftees meets annually. There are no differences among various categories of professional personnel.

d. The officers unions belong to the central organization of Swedish professional (S.A.C.O.); unions of other categories of military personnel are affiliated with a single, central civil union of wage-earners, the T.C.O.. The internal organization is similar in all three categories. It consists of a union assembly where all the local units are represented and which meets at different intervals (every two or three years) according to category. During the intervals there is an executive council which meets whenever necessary. The military unions of rank deal with a special state body, the S.A.V. (Council for Collective Agreements).

e. The unions of professional military personnel have the same union powers, including strike action, as civil organizations.

(Sources: D'Addio, 1989; Brickman, 1976: "Systems of representation of military personnel in selected foreign countries", working document produced by Italian General Staff).

3.2. Germany

a. Immediately after its founding the Bundeswehr saw the birth in July 1956 (thanks to the work of a group of servicemen) of the Deutscher Bundeswehr-Verband (DBwV), an association for the protection of the professional, social, and economic interests of military personnel. Although an association that protected the interests of the ranks, and having considerable power, the DBwV was not considered a union. Since in Germany membership in unions for military personnel is free, in 1964 the union of public services, the Öffentliche Dienste, Transport und Verkehr (Ö.T.V.) set up a section for military personnel and tried to make converts; this was at first impeded by the hierarchy. However, even after the removal

of the obstacles, the Ö.T.V. had only modest success, in respect to the DBwV. There are different reasons for this disparity in their success. The main is certainly the historic hostility between the German armed forces and unions.

b. The German solution is theoretically similar to the Swedish one, but de facto it pertains only to a union representing military personnel.

c. The FRG does not have union type representation for conscripted personnel. However there exist in the different units representative delegates (Vertrauensman) for the different ranks, who, with the responsible commanders, deal with problems of a local nature.

d. The DBwV consists of regional representatives who are elected by all members region by region and of a national Management made up of 30 members who are elected every four years during the Congress of regional delegates. This management reports in its turn to a national Secretariat of nine members. While it also accepts discharged personnel, the DBwV consists mainly of soldiers in active service.

e. In principle military unions have the same rights and way of acting (except for striking) which trade unions have. But the DBwV has some privileged ways of influence, like the obligatory consultative function of laying out the law in matters of interest of the military personnel.

(Sources: Fleckenstein, 1976 b; "Systems of Representation." a working document of the Italian General Staff, op.cit; report of the Italian Military Attaché on the R.F.T., 1989.)

3.3. Belgium

a. The first body for the protection of the interests of the ranks in Belgium was a welfare-type association created by a group of officers in 1961 and called the A.O.S.A. (Association des Officiers en Service Actif). Faced with various forms of pressure, the government created, by Royal Decree on 20 October 1964, a consultative committee for the three armed forces. This

committee was composed of members chosen by the A.O.S.A. for the officers and by the other associations that had been set up in the meantime for NCOs (the R.A.M.S.O.B. and the U.P.S.O.B.) and for the long-serving troops (the A.S.C.C.B.). In 1972 these welfare organizations became true union organizations both in name and in fact: the "Syndicat Belge des Officiers" (S.B.O.), the "Syndicat National des Sous-Officiers" (S.N.S.), the "Syndicat National des Militaires" (S.N.M.) which was linked with the "Centrale Générale des Syndicats Militaires" (C.G.S.M.). Two years later, by the law passed on 19 December 1974, they were recognized as having a negotiating function, and in 1975 the new disciplinary rules established the rights of military personnel to join political parties (art.25) and unions (art.26). The matter was finally regularized with the law of 28 June, 1978, in "Union Statute for Military Personnel in the three armed forces". In 1984 another kind of military union arose, which was an extension of the unionization of public services to the area of the military; see, for example, the "Military Section" of the C.G.S.P. (Centrale Générale des Services Publiques).

b. The principle of a free military unionism is in Belgium limited by the law, which considers as qualified to act and to negotiate for military personnel only those unions that have government authorization; those, that is, that are in agreement with the precautionary inclination of the law and which show themselves as such by means of registration of their statutes with the ministry of defence. Thus two different kinds of military unions are now present in Belgium: the first one which preserve a corporate-professional character, the second one which is an extension of civil trade-unions and has more civilian features.

c. Military unions in Belgium represent only professional personnel.

d. Negotiation is always at a central level and is divided between two committees, a "Negotiation committee" which discusses the general matters of a body of legislation (the drawing up of fundamental laws or rules), and in which the union delegates face the Ministry or delegated under-secretary

directly; and a special committee for questions of detail and workings at a minor level.

e. The most powerful instrument of acting for military unions is the obligation of the government to negotiate both laws and rules dealing with matters concerning military personnel, and to justify any disregard of union proposals. The prohibition of any right to strike is sanctioned by law.

(Sources: Werner, 1976; Marigart, 1984; Caforio, 1978; report from the Italian Military Attaché in Belgium, 24/10/1984).

3.4. France

a. The first agitation for unionization of military personnel was noticeable in France in the second half of the 1960s. The position of the establishment, whether political or military, has been from the first firmly opposed to unionization of the armed forces. To cope with the push for greater protection of the interests of the ranks the government gave approval (in the law of 21 November, 1969, no. 69-1044) to the creation of a consultative body, the "Conseil Supérieur de la Fonction Militaire", for the protection of the interests of officers and non-commissioned officers in permanent service. However this council is really representative of retired personnel only, who have delegates elected by their associations. The members who "represent" personnel in service are chosen by means of draws from military summits. In 1974, public demonstrations by conscripted personnel and the fear that the protest would extend to regular personnel brought about two measures, the first being the creation of a protective body that also included conscripts - the "Conseil Permanent du Service Militaire". This body, too, was not representative; in fact drafted personnel did not actually appear themselves, but had members nominated by the government. Their function was similar to that of the German or Scandinavian ombudsman. The second measure was the creation of "Consultative Commissions" of officers and non-commissioned officers from every unit,

from which the government, by means of the "Conseil Supérieur", solicited, routinely but not by regulation, an opinion of plans for laws concerning military personnel.

b. The French solution is typically an institutional one. It is also not representative in the proper sense of the word. Military personnel are forbidden to join or to set up unions.

c. Only the professional personnel are in some way "represented".

d. The Conseil Supérieur is made up of 49 representatives from regular personnel and 5 from discharged personnel. The members of the Conseil stay in office for three years but the draws are alternated so that half of the C.S.F.M. is changed every 18 months.

e. The only way of acting for the above quoted representative bodies is to influence the military hierarchy, to whom the protection of the professional interests of personnel is fully committed.

(Sources: Lucien Mandeville, 1976 a; Caforio, 1973; Systems of Representation. A working document by the Italian General Staff, op.cit; report of the Italian Military Attaché in France, 1989).

3. 5. United States

a. The debate on unionization of military personnel in the USA arose in the 1970s, and was awaited by many "as a corollary to the plan to create a professional armed force".² This debate developed intensely in the space of a very few years (from 1973 to 1977),³ and then died down suddenly in 1977 once the decision had been made not to unionize the armed forces. The conclusion of the debate was summarized by Roger Manley (Manley, McNicols and Young, 1977) with the statement that the unionization of

² Introduction by William Taylor and others (eds), to MILITARY UNIONS, see bibliography.

³ In the Attached bibliography there is a clear indication regarding the dates of American political journals.

military personnel appeared to be projected for some years from now. An opinion poll conducted among air force personnel also contributed to this evaluation, revealing that among the troops there are three different positions regarding union membership, around a third of respondents taking each view. One is favorable, one uncertain and one against. If we consider that in the USA the average ratio of membership of civil trade unions is 60%, then 37% of soldiers in favor is not particularly high. It sinks even further among officers, where the ratio is only 18%. Another piece of research, carried out, however, on a less representative sample of an operational unit of the army by D. Segal and R. Kramer (1977a) gives even more significant data: only 14% of personnel were in favor of union membership while 64% were against. The uncertainty of military personnel adds to (and perhaps even strengthens) the opposition of the union world: the "American Federation of Government Employees" after having decided in 1976 to add military personnel to its membership, then decided almost unanimously (79% of delegates against 21%) in September 1977 that it was against the notion of extending its representative function to include service personnel. The Senate and United States Congress voted in the same month to forbid union membership for military personnel.

b. As we have just said, military unions are forbidden.

c. There remains therefore only one way of protection of individual interests for service personnel: through "complaints departments" which are established at each headquarters and, in the second instance, the "Inspector General" of the armed force.

(Sources: McNicols, Manley and Young (eds), 1977; Taylor and others, 1977; Arango, 1977; Cortright and Thurmond, 1977; working document of Italian General Staff, op.cit.).

3.6. Holland

a. In this country too the first forms of unionization go back to professional associations of the ranks which, progressively and with the deterioration of the social and economic position of personnel in permanent service, also took on a function of protecting interests. The first of these associations goes back to 1883, most arose before the World War I, but it was only in more recent times and in particular after World War II that they took on the true features of a union. There are twelve associations recognized today.

b. The principle of a free military unionism is - like in Belgium - limited by the need to obtain the government recognition, for the associations representative of the military personnel.

c. All categories of military personnel are represented. Conscripts too have their "Vereniging voor Dienstplichtige Militairen" (V.V.D.M., founded in 1966), which has aroused the general interest; whether because it is one of the few union organizations for drafted personnel in the western world, or because of the positions and actions that it has taken, there has been wide public interest.⁴

d. The present situation is characterized by a dual system: the first, and much more important, protects the general interests of personnel of different ranks through the action of the recognized associations which are given union-type features; the second, set up in 1985, protects the local interests of personnel, and is a body that collaborates with the unit commander, takes the name "Consultative Representation of Personnel" and is elected in each barracks, ship and air-base. For problems specifically concerning a particular armed force, the commission is divided into "Special Commissions" of the

⁴ They took on particular strength in the 1970s, both because of the numbers of members (25,000 in 1976, around 60% of the ranks) and because of the greater liberty with which it was able to demonstrate and maintain its functions, dealing with non-career personnel. In this role it attracted more members than other organizations.

armed force which operate autonomously. The associations may also join civil trade union confederations.

e. The representatives of the recognized associations, assembled in a "Central Consultative Commission", must by law be heard by the Ministry regarding the whole body of legislation that comes within its sectors of competence; if the Ministry moves away from the recommendations of the Commission, it is obliged to justify the decision and to explain its motives to the Commission.

(Sources: Teitler, 1976; Cortright, 1977 c; Teitler, 1976 b; Olivier and Teitler, 1982; working document of Italian General Staff, op.cit.; report of the Italian Military Attaché in Bonn).

3.7. Austria

a. The beginnings of unionization of military personnel in this country are found in the creation after World War I of soviets of soldiers who were elected from each unit and who had, initially, executive powers. They were, obviously, an import from the U.S.S.R., the result of the numerous Austrian prisoners-of-war who were interned there and who returned home at the end of the conflict. With the re-establishment of the Austrian armed force, the soldiers' councils were maintained and regulated, but with the functions of protecting the rights and the interests of personnel and of defending within the units the spirit of the new republic.

b. Union membership for military personnel is, at present, free for all ranks and categories.

c. The present system provides for a complete separation of the protection of the interests of regular personnel and those in conscripted service, even when this has been extended on request.

d. Officers and non-commissioned officers have full liberty to join the state employee trade unions which are so structured that they also protect the interests of military personnel. For personnel in conscripted service there is

an alternative form of military representation which has a different structure for personnel in normal drafted service and those in long service (the latter may be contracted for up to 15 years, thereby making for a true relationship of employment, even if this is of limited duration). The former elect their representatives only at company level and all their functions are carried out in collaboration with the company commander. Those in long service have three levels of representation, one local, one intermediate, and one central, the "Central Commission for long-serving military personnel". This commission works on a level with the Federal Ministry of Defence.

In 1982, following the example of Holland, an association was established for conscripts, the "Vereinigung Demokratischer Soldaten Österreichs" (V.D.S.O.).

(Sources: Bell jr., 1977; Report from the Italian Military Attaché in Vienna).

3.8 Italy

a. In Italy, the first public sign of the wish of military personnel to have some kind of representation of their professional interests was seen - as had already happened in some other European countries - in the federations of retired men at the end of the 1950s. Their activities spread, in the next decade, to men in service. These initiatives were first echoed in parliament in 1973, in two bills presented, one shortly after the other, and after full parliamentary discussion emerged as the law dated July 2, 1978, No.382, dealing with military representation (articles 18, 19 and 20). A regulation of the Military Representation Act (RARM) was then published on January 12, 1980, and an internal regulation (RIRM) was delivered in 1985.

b. The representative bodies of the Italian military personnel are set as mandatory institutional bodies: they have the exclusive right of the representative function, and any other form of union associating among military personnel is prohibited.

c. They include representatives of all categories of military personnel, both professional and conscript.

d. The representative bodies are divided into three levels: basic, intermediate and central. The basic level is formed by collegiate boards called COBAR (Basic Representative Councils), one for each military unit (battalion level) or equivalent body. The intermediate level is formed by collegiate boards called COIRs (Intermediate Representative Councils), one for each regional area or equivalent extent, which have jurisdiction over a very different number of COBARs. The central level is formed by only one superior body, the COCER (Central Representative Council). They include representatives of all classes of personnel and classes have been established as follows:

A: regular officers

B: NCOs

C: long term volunteer and military cadets

D: reserve officers in draft service

E: rank and file draftees

The Italian representative bodies are elective: the elections occur according to category and are stepped according to the different levels. That is to say that each personnel category elects, by means of a primary election, within the limits of the single military unit, its representatives in the COBAR; in turn the elected members, according to their own category, choose, by means of a secondary election, the members of the COIR of the military region to which they belong. Delegates of the COIRs throughout Italy choose among themselves the members to send to the COCER, by means of a third election.

e. The law gives real proposal power (but not bargaining power) of a syndicalist type only to the COCER, which may be heard by the Joint Chief of Staff, and by observing certain procedures, by the Defence Minister and by the Parliament. The other two levels (COBAR and COIR) have a proposing and stimulating function vis-a-vis the central council and some powers of suggestion with the unit commander or military region commander.

4. An Analysis of Historic Experience Deriving from the Thinking of Various Authors.

The Austrian case is interesting for two reasons in particular: the first is that it is the first example of unionization until now that has occurred in an armed force where recruitment is exclusively voluntary. The second is that it represents, I believe, the only case of a unionized armed force that has faced conflict situations.

There were two situations to face: a conflict, however limited, with Hungary (1921-1922) for the borderlands known as Burgenland, which, notwithstanding the fact that it was limited, at its peak employed more than a third of the Austrian army. The second situation was massive intervention in public order in 1924, against Social Democratic demonstrators who had taken possession of Vienna, barricading the streets. The army intervened with a force of 9600 men and suffered 31 killed and 170 injured.

The significant aspects of these interventions are, according to Raymond Bell (Bell, 1977):

- in spite of the ideological divisions in the country at that time (and he notes too that there were two opposing unions within the armed force), there is nothing to indicate a diminished efficiency of the military apparatus. In both types of intervention the Austrian army appears to have performed extremely well;
- the unions, in the operational periods mentioned, never interfered with the chain of command.

The Austrian experience would indicate then, according to the author, that "a clear line can be drawn between exercising union prerogatives and the execution by commanders of lawful and necessary commands". This evaluation is shared by David Cortright (1977c) who, in analyzing the by now historic experiences in Sweden and West Germany in the light of the fear of diminished efficiency in the military apparatus, says "It should be obvious from our discussion of the professional unions of West Germany and Sweden that no such negative effect exists".

In the present situation a strange coincidence has occurred: all the armed forces that have union-type bodies, or simply even some kind of personnel representation, depend on conscription whereas no army which is completely voluntarily recruited (apart from the Austrian army) is unionized. Gwyn Harries Jenkins (1977b) poses the question of whether there may be a causal connection between these two facts. His conclusion, after examining a number of different cases, is that there is no direct link between the two phenomena and that the coincidence is due to the fact that the forces with completely voluntary recruitment are the Anglo-Saxon ones where there is a quite different concept of the development of military service: "The available evidence suggests that two distinct cultural models can be envisaged. In the first of these - the continental model - the ongoing relationship between military institution and citizenship creates a very specific political culture in which military service in the mass army is defined as an integral part of citizenship." In the Anglo-Saxon model (or "insular" model, as Harries Jenkins calls it), the protection of the rights of military personnel is automatically guaranteed by the fact that the officer corps is part of the governing elite of the country.

According to Philippe Manigart (1984), however, the line of demarcation between countries that have open forms of representation, elected by military personnel, and countries where this is not permitted, passes through different causal areas which only partly and incidentally correspond with the division between drafted forces and forces based on volunteers. Given the fact that the effective representation of the interests of the ranks has always had to be forced on the military top brass (who resist it as a ceding of power) either from within, by pressure from below, or from the outside, by pressure from political parties, Manigart maintains that wherever the military establishment still enjoys a wide autonomy and effective power (the USA, Great Britain and France, for example), the military leaders have up till now been able to oppose any form of unionization of the armed forces. The opposite pertains in those countries where the situation is different.

A recurring opinion is that the professional section of the armed forces and the conscript section, where it exists, have and need to have distinct bodies of union protection. For example Gerard Perselay (1977) states that: "the European experience is that conscripts or draftees generally have their own labor organizations to represent them. Part of this separation is based on a lack of a community of interest with career military. This can be interpreted to mean that the conscripts have different interests and purposes, many of them not lying wholly within their relatively short term of service in the military". One fairly constant factor is to be noted wherever, in a union-free organization of military personnel, there co-exist associations that in origin and typology are typically characteristic of the institution, and sections of general unions dedicated to military personnel. This is the prevalent adherence of personnel to the former (significant data regarding this can be found especially in Belgium and the F.R.G., but the tendency is also observable in Holland and the Scandinavian countries). It appears, then, at least for the moment, that a corporate-professional tendency is ascendant, probably due to the consciousness on the part of professional military personnel of a true specificity of military institution. This phenomenon is also noticeable in the sphere of civil unions which may as a consequence also place itself in a contrasting position to the kind of representative associations already mentioned. It is interesting to quote one of the few opinion polls carried out in armed forces where a system of unionization has emerged. The A.O.S.A. (Association des Officiers en Service Actif) of the Belgian armed forces was polled in 1980 and the poll's results are reported by Manigart in the appendix to his frequently mentioned essay. The most interesting data are:

1. the division of respondents according to their membership of unions: 48% belonged to the AOSA (a corporate-type representative association as already mentioned); 3% to intercategory civil unions; 45.5% are not members of any union;
2. the opinion of respondents of the unionization of military personnel: 82% responded positively to the idea of corporate-type unions, while only

25.5% expressed the same support for joining intercategory civil unions.

3. the classification of representational objectives. The most meaningful are, in order of importance:
 - the protection of moral and professional interests;
 - the protection of material interests;
 - the esteem of the profession in the eyes of the public;
4. the means of performing the representative function: these are seen mainly as against the military authority, participation in committees provided for by law, actions towards the press, interventions in confronting political power.

5. Conclusions

Many of the scholars included here conclude their contributions on a note of positive expectation of the unionization of the military. Two examples can be cited. Roger Manley and others conclude the aforementioned study *MILITARY UNIONIZATION* by affirming that probably, "some form of unionization, or at the minimum, some form of effective representation of the interests of military personnel is inevitable". As has happened in civilian industry "so might we now be witnessing an inexorable trend toward representation of the military which will continue even though the courts hold that there is a clear and present danger associated with organization of the military". For Manigart (1984) also, "it is false to state that unionism is by definition incompatible with the mission of the armed forces"; on the other hand, "being the Western armed forces intended to defend democracy, it seems logical that they should apply democratic principles to themselves", and also to avoid the isolation from society that non-participation in social change would imply for the military institution.

But the specificity of the military already suggests prudence about accepting these conclusions, and the empirical research seems to point us in the same direction. If we look at the opinions of military personnel, in fact,

no clear indication emerges. A recent (1992-93) opinion poll we carried out in collaboration with other ERGOMAS⁵ scholars among officers from nine European countries⁶ produced a mean trend in agreement with the existing system of representation in each of the countries involved. So, whereas Swedish officers seem to be satisfied with their military unions, their British colleagues are on average against any suggestion of unionization. French and Italian officers, on the other hand, seem to prefer an institutionalized internal system of representation of their professional interests: more or less the system as it is. As far as European officers are concerned, therefore, we could state that there is no remarkable thrust towards a change in the manner in which their professional interests are represented. Officers are not of course the totality of military personnel, and this observation has a limited value only. However it is at least one datum.

In conclusion, we believe that:

1. the problem of the representation of the military's professional interest exists and cannot be set aside;
2. since the 1970s there has been a lack of studies on the topic;
3. it would seem to be the task of social scientists to provide wider and more updated analysis and data on this topic for "those in authority". We hope to have been able to provide a valid working basis for achieving just that.

⁵ European Research Group On Military And Society (ERGOMAS) is a study group on European military, which was created in 1986 by a number of social scientists.

⁶ Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland.

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*TOWARD A THEORY OF WOMEN IN THE ARMED FORCES:
APPLICATIONS TO THE FUTURE*

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ABSTRACT

This paper outlines a theory of the variables that affect the degree and nature of women's participation in the armed forces through history and across nations. The aim is to build on empirical evidence by proposing a systematic theory of the conditions under which women's military roles expand and the conditions under which their participation in armed forces contracts. The theory includes (and the paper defines) the following variables: national security situation, military technology, military accession policies, demographic patterns, cultural values regarding gender, and structural patterns of gender roles (such as women's labor force participation and sex segregation in the occupational structure). The theory is then applied to analyze women's likely future role in armed forces.

1. Introduction

The military has been defined traditionally as a masculine institution; indeed it may be the most prototypically male of all social institutions. Therefore, in order for women to participate, either the military has to be perceived as transformed in ways that make it more compatible with the way women are (or are perceived to be) or women have to be perceived as changing in ways that make them more suited to military service - or both.

History tells us that women's military roles go through cycles of expansion and contraction (not unlike some of their civilian roles, such as labor force participation). The past 20 years have witnessed a great increase in women's participation in the armed forces in many nations, while in other nations no such changes have occurred. The United States was at the forefront of the recent changes and research attention in the U.S. to women's military roles has grown in response. Other nations have been experiencing similar increases in public discourse, policy at-


tention and change, and research on the processes and outcomes. However, there have been few attempts by social scientists at systematic explanation of how women's military roles change over time and in different cultures.

This paper outlines a theory of the variables that affect the degree and nature of women's participation in the armed forces through history and across nations. The aim is to build on empirical evidence by proposing a systematic theory of the conditions under which women's military roles expand and the conditions under which their participation in armed forces contracts. Subsequent research can then test and expand the propositions presented in this paper. Researchers who concentrate on the historical and contemporary changes in women's roles in the armed forces of a particular nation can apply their findings to the theory; cases that do not fit the theory can serve to modify the theory.

A large number of factors are involved in determining the nature and extent of women's military participation. For purposes of organization and simplification, the theory divides the explanatory variables into three categories: Military, Social Structure, and Culture (see Figure 1). The Military dimension consists of those characteristics of the nation's security situation and aspects of military organization and activity that impact women's roles. The Social Structure category includes aspects of women's civilian roles and more general civilian social structural variables that affect women's roles. The Culture dimensions concern the social construction of gender and family roles; the reasons for including family will be discussed later.

In the rest of the paper, for each of the variables included in each of the three categories, I define the variable and, on the basis of analysis and the results of past research, I hypothesize a relationship between the variable and women's military participation.

Figure 1



At the end, I attempt to assess the relative effects of the variables under various conditions. That is, when conditions are such that some variables have values that would lead to high levels of women's military participation and other variables have levels that would lead to lower levels, I will try to predict which ones would have greater effects. A

common bifurcation has occurred in history between the military's needs for people (of whatever gender) and cultural values limiting women's roles. When these two sets of variables are at odds, interesting things happen - and they are often difficult to predict and to understand. Perhaps the specification of the values of all of the relevant variables simultaneously will aid our understanding - and our predictions in the future.

2. The Military Variables

National Security Situation

Of major importance in determining women's military roles in a society is the security situation of the society. The relationship is a complex one. Let us take a look at what conclusions are warranted from the past and see if we can develop some more general principles.

When there are shortages of qualified men, especially during times of national emergency, most nations have increased (and will increase) women's military roles. Under some conditions, women have participated in combat; more often, their non-combat military functions increase. Many nations currently conscript men, but few require women to serve in the military. Further, where women are drafted, the conditions of their obligation often differ from those of men. However, women have been conscripted in the past during wartime - and are likely to be again in the future.

Examples of conscription (including actual conscription and laws allowing conscription) during the World War II era can be found in France, Greece, Norway, Germany, and the U.K. In the U.S., had the war in Europe not ended, civilian nurses would have been drafted.

The situations during World War II of both conscription and military service in Germany and the U.K. provide interesting examples of the social construction of women's military roles. Germany conscripted women into what were labeled as civilian jobs, though many women wore

uniforms, were under military authority, and performed functions considered military in other nations. But they were labeled civilians.

In the U.K., women volunteered for and were conscripted into both civilian and military service. Even uniformed women were defined as noncombatants. The definition of the line between combatant and non-combatant involved the actual firing of weapons. For example, women performed all tasks associated with the firing of anti-aircraft weapons except the actual firing: they moved ammunition and even loaded the weapons, but, to continue to view them as noncombatants, they were not allowed to fire the weapons they had loaded.

Whether or not they conscripted women, nations have greatly increased their participation (in terms of both numbers and roles) during wartime. For example, in the U.S., large numbers of women served during World War II and, in fact, women served in all specialties except direct combat. For example, women were employed as parachute riggers, airplane mechanics, and gunnery instructors. Thus, although women were still concentrated in a few job classifications, wartime necessity opened other jobs to them.

A common pattern is the active involvement of women in revolutionary movements. Women have been in partisan and guerilla operations, including as combatants, in, for example, Algeria, China, Nicaragua, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia.¹ However, after the guerrillas have successfully overthrown the government and formed a new one with a more

¹ Nancy Goldman, ed., *Female Soldiers - Combatants or Noncombatants? Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982; Mady Wechsler Segal, Xiaolin Li and David R. Segal, "The Role of Women in the Chinese People's Liberation Army," In: Eberhard Sandschneider/Jürgen Kuhlmann (eds.), *Armed Forces in the USSR and PRC*, *Forum International* 14 (Munich 1992): 116-126; Sandra Carson Stanley and Mady Wechsler Segal, "Women in the Armed Forces." *International Military and Defense Encyclopedia*. Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1993.

conventionally organized armed force, women go back to more traditional social roles and leave the military - voluntarily or not.

Similarly, the end of World War II saw a return to limitations on women's military jobs. When women are no longer needed, their military activity is reduced. Women serve as a reserve labor force, both civilian and military.

Women's military role is socially constructed. This is evident in public discourse about women's military role. What has happened in the past in many nations is that when the armed forces need women, their prior military history is recalled to demonstrate that they can perform effectively in various positions. There is a process of cultural amnesia of the contributions women made during emergency situations - until a new emergency arises and then history is rediscovered.

How does the level of military threat affect women's military participation? The relationship appears to be curvilinear and to have an interaction effect with social values about gender. At the high end of threat to the society, women's military roles seem to increase. If the very existence of the society is imminently threatened, many women are involved in military operations including as combatants.

There are times when women's military involvement may be seen as an extension of women's roles as mothers protecting their children; such may be the case in partisan activities of women drawn from the ranks of the poor. This can occur even when cultural values support traditional and limited roles for women.

In societies with low threats to national security but with cultural values supporting gender equality, women's military participation also increases. Contemporary examples include Canada and Sweden. These nations allow women to volunteer for combat jobs. It may be that the low likelihood of these countries fighting a war on their own soil enables them to eliminate gender distinctions in military service.

The effects of this variable of security situation seems to involve the degree to which participation in the military would place women at risk

more than they would be as civilians. Under some conditions, the greater the difference, the less likely the society will place them in military positions that increase their danger (such as being taken prisoner). This is not to say that women are protected; they do serve in risky military jobs and locations. Women's lives are risked if the society is threatened. But there seems to be resistance to risking large numbers of women casualties unless there is severe threat.

I would hypothesize that the extent of women's participation in combat jobs will be minimized when there is a medium threat. Medium threat is the situation where the society is not threatened with extinctions, but the likelihood of military action on one's soil is high. This characterization may apply best to Israel (although some would argue that the society is in constant danger of being destroyed.)

The nature of military missions also affects the degree of women's participation. The greater the relative importance of actual war fighting (especially ground combat), the less the participation of women. Women's participation is likely to be greater when military forces are involved in peacekeeping operations or disaster relief activities, as well as in operations that resemble domestic police functions (such as drug interdiction and quelling civil disturbances). Women can also be expected to be increasingly involved in military aviation - even in war fighting, as evidenced by the opening of fighter pilot position to women in several nations (e.g., Canada, the Netherlands, and the U.K.) and movements in that direction in others (e.g., the U.S.).

Military Technology

Technological changes of various sorts have enabled the greater participation of women in the armed forces over the past century. Some developments have led directly to changes in the individual characteristics necessary to be a warrior while others have indirectly led to changes in

women's military roles by changing either the way warfare is organized or women's social roles or both.

Some technological developments have led to the substitution of brainpower for brawn in the warrior role. Since, on the average, men have greater upper body strength than women, tasks requiring high levels of such strength will be more likely to be performed by men. Weapons of destruction (and protection) no longer all require such strength. Among the changes that have led to increased ability for women to participate in armed forces, including in combat, are the miniaturization of weapons and the development of air power and nuclear technology.

Industrialization created a revolution in the way warfare is conducted, as well as fundamentally altering civilian society in a host of ways including those with importance for women's military roles. Replacement of capitol for labor in industry led to a surplus labor supply that is available to serve in the armed forces without disrupting economic survival.

Industrialization also brought with it changes in women's societal roles. The movement of work away from the home had major, long-lasting effects. Women have always contributed to economic production, but pre-industrial society concentrated such production in home-based labor. Early industrialization created a demand for labor in factories and opened the way for young women to leave their homes for employment. But the movement of work away from the home also made it more difficult for mothers of young children to be employed. Technology has also enabled women to control reproduction. This includes both contraceptives and lower infant and child mortality. Women can have fewer children - and still have more survive to adulthood. Women can spend less of their time in childbearing roles.

During World War II, mobilization of men for the mass armed force required women to replace them in the factories. In post-industrial society, the number of manufacturing jobs is dramatically decreased and war can be fought without replacing industrial workers. This allows women

to participate in the actual war jobs, rather than having to replace men in the civilian economy.

Military jobs have become increasingly specialized over time.² Many have also become more similar to civilian occupations. Both of these trends have increased the potential for women being in the military.

The impact of current and future technological developments on the participation of women in the armed forces is not likely to be a linear relationship. Many military jobs require individuals to have certain technical abilities and skills. To the extent that men and women differ (on the average) in these traits, there will be a gender difference in job incumbents. For example, if today's young girls lag behind boys in their abilities to operate electronic and computer equipment (and their interest in doing so), then military jobs requiring such traits will continue to be filled in the near future more by men than women.

But perhaps the greatest change of all that industrialization brought to the armed forces has to do with technological effects on the combat to support ratio. Let us examine this variable.

Combat to Support Ratio

Women's involvement in military operations is currently negatively affected by the proportion of combat jobs and positively affected by the proportion of support jobs. This is because combat has been viewed as (and has been primarily) a man's activity. Even when women are excluded from direct offensive combat positions, their military roles will rise as the number and proportion of personnel with primarily support functions rises.

The proportion of military personnel who are in support jobs has risen dramatically over time. Goldich shows that the greatest change occurred for the U.S. between the Civil War in the 1860s and subsequent

² Harold Wool, *The Military Specialist: Skilled Manpower for the Armed Forces*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968.

wars.³ While 93 percent of Army personnel during the Civil War served in individual combat skills, this figure decreased to 34 percent by World War I and to 22 percent during the Vietnam War. The percentage of U.S. Army personnel in combat categories increased between 1974 and 1988 from 53 percent to 62 percent in the active forces, but decreased in the reserves from 88 percent to 84 percent. (The proportion of support personnel rises during wartime.) Specifying the factors that account for increases in support personnel over the long term helps us to anticipate changes in the future (and in different countries).

Technological developments in warfare account for the lion's share of the trend towards a higher proportion of support personnel.

To the extent that armed forces engage in warfare on their own land with a supportive civilian population, they can use the civilian infrastructure for support functions. In contrast, for military engagements away from home, military forces must deploy with support personnel. The likelihood of such deployment increases the necessity for putting these people in uniform and subject to military authority. Peacekeeping operations (including multi-national ones), which are increasing in frequency, require such deployment of support personnel.

Goldich also argues that the U.S. must always deploy with support personnel to maintain the high standard of living for military personnel that is viewed as legitimate by the American people; that is, the population would not tolerate our troops living with greater hardships than necessary.

The impacts of combat to support ratio on women's military roles are affected by what military functions are open to women -and which ones they actually fill. Under conditions where (as has happened in many nations) women are concentrated in support roles, we will continue to see greater percentages of support personnel lead to more women in uniform. For those nations where women fill combat jobs, this variable will

³ Robert L. Goldich, *U.S. Army Combat-to-Support Ratios: A Framework for Analysis*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1989.

be less important. At least some combat positions recently have been opened to women in several nations, including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and the U.K.

Force Structure

Various aspects of military force structure affect women's participation. Some are related to the combat to support ratio. To the extent that support functions are concentrated in the reserves, compared to active duty forces, women will have higher representation in the reserves. The greater the reliance on reserves for support in war mobilization, the greater women's participation in such mobilization. In the U.S. currently, such reliance is great and resulted in women constituting larger percentages of reserve forces deployed to the Persian Gulf than active duty forces.⁴

There is a way in which reliance on the reserves may, in some cultures, decrease women's participation. Reserve personnel tend to be older and therefore are more likely to have families. In those cultures where mothers are not viewed as deployable, and the reserves constitute a large proportion of military forces, women will be less represented in military operations. This situation is evident in Israel, for example, where men and women are conscripted and men have long reserve obligations, male reservists serve on active duty frequently and for virtually their entire adult lives. Though women are conscripted, both their active duty and reserve obligation is shorter than men's and ends when they become mothers.

⁴ Mark Eitelberg, *A Preliminary Assessment of Population Representation in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm*. Paper presented at the Biennial Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, MD, October 1991.

Military Accession Policies

In general, modern nations that have voluntary systems of recruitment of military personnel (notably Canada, the U.K., and the U.S.) have been increasing women's military roles more rapidly than those with conscription. Demographic patterns also play a role here when combined with voluntary accession (see below). Israel conscripts both men and women, but places strong limitations on women's military positions.

Nations considering a transition from conscription of men to a voluntary system often include in that consideration expanding women's military participation (e.g., as is now occurring in France). Sometimes the policy is changed without the policy makers anticipating the increased reliance on women necessitated by the change (as happened in the U.S. in 1973). Regardless of the method of accessing personnel, the crucial determinant of the number of women brought into the armed forces is whether the supply of men meets the number needed to fulfill the military's mission(s). The greater the need beyond available male labor, the greater the number of women. What military roles the women actually play is also affected by this variable, but is more affected by other variables, such as cultural values.

3. Social Structure

Demographic Patterns

Demographic patterns shape women's roles in various ways. Women serve as a reserve source of labor, both civilian and military. When the supply of men does not meet the demand for military labor, women are drawn into service. Thus, when small birth cohorts reach military age, unless there is a concomitant decrease in demand for military personnel, opportunities for women in the armed forces seem to increase. This im-

pact was evident, for example, in the U.S. in the 1970s and the U.K. in the later 1980s and early 1990s. Other nations show similar trends.

Labor Force Characteristics

Various characteristics of the labor force affect women's military roles. The greater the percent women constitute of the labor force, the larger their concentration in the armed forces. As the proportion of women employed has increased in many nations, their representation in the armed forces has also increased. This occurs partly because the same factors affect both activities (such as a shortage of male labor) and partly because women's greater involvement in the work place brings structural and cultural changes in the society that make military service more compatible with women's roles - and makes excluding them from military service less justifiable. Such changes have been evident in, e.g., the Scandinavian countries and the U.S. over the past 20 years. Women's labor force participation in France has also been increasing and so have movements toward increasing their representation in the armed forces. The percentage of women in the labor force in the U.K. has been relatively lower and their military roles have been limited; both are now increasing.

The degree of sex segregation in the occupational structure also affects women participation in the military, though the relationship is not linear. When sex segregation is extremely high, the military must rely on women to perform military functions that are dominated by women in the civilian work place. This is why, e.g., the U.S. drafted women civilian telephone operators in World War I. In general, however, sex segregation in the civilian labor market is negatively related to women's participation in the military. A more gender integrated occupational structure is indicative of more gender equality in the culture which in turn is related to greater acceptance of women in military roles. Further,

if women are in similar civilian occupations to men, then women are more likely to have the skills required for military jobs.

Economic Factors

The state of the civilian economy affects women civilian and military employment. In periods of economic expansion, women are drawn into employment. In contracting economies, women tend to leave the work force. High unemployment rates (especially among young men) are associated with a ready supply of men to serve in the armed forces. Periods of low unemployment, especially with volunteer militaries, sometimes lead to expanded military roles for women (and women more motivated to join).

In the U.S., for example, major growth in the representation of women in the military occurred in the late 1970s, when unemployment had declined. When unemployment rose in the early 1980s, the expansion was stalled.

Family Structure

Family roles need to be considered for two reasons. First, there is a strong tendency in most cultures for women's roles generally to be intricately linked to family values and norms. Second, the nature of military activity is socially constructed in many cultures as negatively related to family roles.

There are several family structural variables that affect women's military roles. In general, the greater the family responsibilities for the average woman, the less women's representation in the armed forces. Women's participation in the military is positively associated with later age at first marriage, later age at birth of first child, and fewer numbers of children. The average age at onset of family responsibilities is even more important for women's military roles than for civilian employment

because of the emphasis on youth for military personnel. In those nations where there has been a delaying of family formation there has also been an increase in women's representation in the military (examples are Canada and the U.S. in the 1970s and 1980s).

To the extent that armed forces are increasingly composed of older, career personnel, other family variables, such as number of children, become more important for the retention of female military personnel. (Policies such as the provision of parental leave also affect the retention of personnel with children.)

4. Culture

Social Construction of Gender and Social Values about Gender

The meaning of gender is socially constructed. The degree to which people are assigned to social roles on the basis of gender, and the particular roles that are seen as appropriate to each gender, is social determined - way beyond the impact of biologically based determinants.

A division of labor based on sex may have been functional for the society in earlier times, but is clearly less so now.⁵ To the extent that individual traits for which there are large average differences by sex are important for the organization of activities, a sex-based division of labor may be functional. Technology has diminished the importance of two types of physically based traits, namely physical strength and reproduction.

What is important for this paper is the way in which the culture deals with sex differences. A culture can exaggerate or minimize the importance of sex differences (in physical or psychological traits) and thereby justify or reject a sex-based division of social roles. Thus, we are

⁵ Gerald Marwell, "Why Ascription? Parts of a More or Less Formal Theory of the Functions and Dysfunctions of Sex Roles." *American Sociological Review* 40 (August 1975):445-455.

concerned not with what is "correct" in any objective sense. Rather, we look at the discourse about gender, the importance attached to gender differences, and the implications for women's roles (including in the armed forces) of the cultural interpretation of gender. Cultures can stress gender equality or differences between the genders and this has strong impacts on women's military roles. The greater the emphasis on ascription by gender (and thereby the less the emphasis on individual differences), the more limited women's military role.

It is important to recognize that each society can go through cultural changes in the definition of gender and that such changes are not always linear, but are cyclical. The causal direction of the link between culture and structure is not always clear. Sometimes cultural change drives structural change. At other times, structural changes are caused by other factors (such as war) and then the culture changes to justify the structural changes. When the structure changes again, so can the culture (as happens after a war).

Analysis of women's military roles benefits from examination of this process of the social construction of gender - and the analysis of the social construction of women's military roles adds to our knowledge of the social construction of gender in general. For example, we can analyze the public discourse about women's military roles for the underlying constructions of gender and the rationales for the policy positions.⁶

There are some interesting examples of the social construction of women's military roles, including several where women performing functions that are considered military in other societies are labeled civilian. As described earlier, some German women during World War II were uniformed and under military authority, but were not considered military. Another World War II example is the American WASPs (Women's Airforce Service Pilots); these women ferried planes - and

⁶ Mady Wechsler Segal and Amanda Faith Hansen, "Value Rationales in Policy Debates on Women in the Military." *Social Science Quarterly* 73 (June 1992):296-309.

some were killed in the line of duty - but were treated as civilians. Congress granted them military veterans benefits in the 1970s, an example of reconstruction of social status.

The more egalitarian the social values about gender, the greater women's representation in the military. On the other side, cultures that support traditional divisions of labor based on gender will tend to exclude women from the military or limit their roles substantially.

As social values have become more egalitarian in societies, women's military roles have expanded. The citizenship revolution has been expanding to previously disenfranchised social groups. During this century, many nations have enfranchised women in the political system - and cultures increasingly have supported their participation in other social institutions (such as the economy). Given the traditionally masculine nature of the military institution, it is one of the last bastions of male domination and there are forces resistant to gender integration.

A driving force toward increasing women's representation in the military has been laws prohibiting discrimination based on gender (which sometimes apply to the military). For example, Canada's Human Rights Law has been directly responsible for breaking down some of the barriers to women's full participation in the armed forces. The European Community is undergoing some similar effects of gender discrimination laws.

It is not yet clear how far social values will go toward full gender equality. Substantial segments of many societies' populations remain more traditional. One force for tradition is religious fundamentalism; the greater the proportion of religious fundamentalists in a country, the less women's representation in the military is likely to be.

Social Construction of Family and Social Values about Family

The social construction of family also needs to be considered because women's social roles are affected by anything having to do with the family. Women's historical primary societal function has been associated with reproduction and child rearing. The extent to which a culture continues to assign women this primary role affects women's military roles. Cultures often see the mothering role as antithetical to the warrior role; the giving of life in childbirth is seen as the opposite of the taking of life in war. In addition, the long dependence of young children on an adult caretaker (traditionally the mother) has precluded those caretakers from participating in activities that take them away or require their uninterrupted attention (such as hunting or war). As conceptions about family and the structures of families have changed, so have cultural expectations about women's devotion to family - and their inclusion in wider social roles increases.

Social values about family in many societies have been supportive of family forms that differ from traditional structures. The greater the cultural acceptance of a variety of family structures, the less everyone is expected to fit into one pattern, and the less gender will determine social roles.

The greater the movement away from traditional family forms, the greater the representation of women in the military. This does not mean the demise of family values, but a transformation in the structures that are seen to support such values. Indeed, included here can be government sponsored parental leave and/or community supported child care that enables parents to be involved in their societies without neglecting children. To the extent that societies support diverse family forms, women will be more likely to participate in the military.

5. Conclusions and Theory Modification in The Future

The theory presented in this paper is an attempt at systematic theory building regarding the roles women play in armed forces. While it is based on some empirical cases, no doubt other cases will require modification of the theory and further elaboration of the conditions under which certain relationships hold.

One important question concerns the relative weight of the variables discussed here. For example, when the values on one variable or set of variables would lead to increased military roles for women, but the values on other variables would lead to more limitations on women's military roles, which causal factors seem to affect the outcomes more? The various combinations of values need to be tested on many cases, both historical and contemporary.

As an example, I would hypothesize (on the basis of historical examples) that when cultural values favor limited military roles for women, but the national security situation presents a need for military labor, the threat to security would override the cultural values. Indeed, we have seen cultural values change to support such expanded roles for women (in both military and civilian institutions).

The next steps in building this theory include testing in different countries. It is my hope that others who analyze women's military roles will place their cases in terms of the values on the variables specified here. This will help to develop a more valid and elaborated theory. The social construction of women's military roles also needs to be analyzed at the following levels: global, societal, institutional, organizational, interpersonal, and individual.

The near future holds some interesting prospects for testing some of the hypothesized relationships. The end of the Cold War has decreased demand for military personnel. A possible consequence is a slowing down (and even reversal) of trends toward increased military roles for women. The likelihood of this happening depends, at least to some ex-

tent, on the cultural values regarding gender in each nation. What actually happens can provide partial tests of the theory presented and can serve to elaborate the relationships. If the demand for military personnel decreases in a nation that is moving towards social values favoring greater gender equality, what happens with regard to women's military roles tells us a great deal about the relative importance of these two variables. If women's roles in the armed forces are expanded, then this demonstrates the importance of cultural values. If, on the contrary, women's military roles do not change or decline, then this shows that military personnel needs drive women's representation in armed forces.

Another scenario provides a test of the relative importance of predictors under a different set of conditions. Suppose the need for military personnel rises in a nation that has relatively traditional gender roles and values. Increases in women's roles in the armed forces would show that military personnel needs are more important than values; we could also examine subsequent change in cultural values concerning gender for the effects of the behavioral changes. If, on the other hand, women's roles are not increased, then this would demonstrate the importance of social values in determining women's military roles.

In the previous scenario, the level of the military threat would also need to be considered. The theory predicts that a shortage of men available for military service under severe threats to security would be more likely to result in increased military roles for women than a similar shortage under conditions of medium threat. (Under low threat conditions, cultural values would have to be supportive of gender equality.)

Future conditions in each nation (and even in subcultures within geographic boundaries) can be categorized according to the variables considered here - and the theory modified to incorporate the results.

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In most countries armed forces have to meet the challenges of a rapidly transforming world. They must adapt to a totally different global political-strategic landscape. Former dictatorships have to redefine the status of their military forces on democratic lines. VOLUME 16 of the FORUM international contains 13 articles on the problems and demands which the military will face in the years ahead. These contributions result from the 1992 Valparaiso Interim Conference held by the Research Committee 01 "Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution" of the International Sociological Association (ISA).

In den meisten Ländern treffen die Streitkräfte auf die Herausforderungen einer sich wandelnden Welt. Sie haben sich auf eine völlig veränderte politisch-strategische Landschaft einzustellen. Frühere Diktaturen müssen ihr Militär demokratiekonform gestalten. Band 16 der Reihe FORUM international enthält 13 Artikel zu den Anforderungen, denen sich die Streitkräfte in den nächsten Jahren gegenübersehen werden. Die Beiträge sind Ergebnis der 1992 in Valparaiso durchgeführten Interim Conference des Research Committee 01 "Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution" der International Sociological Association (ISA).