

Civil-Military Relations in an Age of Turbulence:
Armed Forces and the Problem of Democratic Control

Opinions expressed are solely
those of the authors.

Die Verantwortung für den Inhalt liegt bei den Autoren.

Copyright by
SOWI 2000
All rights reserved
Alle Rechte vorbehalten
ISSN 0177-7599

Sozialwissenschaftliches
Institut der Bundeswehr
Prötzeler Chaussee 20
15344 Strausberg
Tel.: 03341/58-1801
Fax: 03341/58-1802
www.sowi-bundeswehr.de

FORUM	internationales	Band	21
	international	Cahier Volume	

Gerhard Kümmel & Wilfried von Bredow

**Civil-Military Relations in an Age of Turbulence:
Armed Forces and the Problem of Democratic Control**

Table of Contents

Introduction

Gerhard Kümmel & Wilfried von Bredow 7

Post-Cold War Trends in the Civil Control of Armed Forces in the West

Bernard Boëne 11

Civil-Military Relations: Separation or Concordance? The Case of Switzerland

Karl W. Haltiner 33

The Democratization of the South African National Defence Force

Rialize Ferreira 53

The Need to Re-examine Civil-Military Relations in Israel

Amir Bar-Or 73

Changing Civil-Military Relations in Eastern Europe: The Case of Romania

Marian Zulean 87

New Roles for the Armed Forces and the Concept of Democratic Control

Wilfried von Bredow & Gerhard Kümmel 109

About the Authors

133

Introduction

Gerhard Kümmel & Wilfried von Bredow

Civil-military relations have long been a primary focus of military sociological research, in particular in democratic societies. This is due to the ambivalent character of the armed forces. In the long history of the military there have been numerous cases in which the armed forces acted in non- or even anti-democratic ways. On the one hand there have been cases in which the military was an instrument to overthrow democratic political regimes; on the other hand there have been cases in which the military was crucial in defending a democracy against its attackers or even served as a supporter of a transition to democracy.

Thus, the military is a double-edged sword. In turn, this makes the relationship between the armed forces and society a major societal concern - all the more so because the trend toward a military-free world identified by the protagonists of the „democratic-peace assumption“ (Russett 1993) amounts to jumping to conclusions. „Mankind has always lived dangerously“ as the late Raymond Aron once wrote and, for us, his diagnosis is valid for the present as well as for the foreseeable future. This means, that societies are still in need of the military, in need of maintaining armed forces and in need of providing them with sufficient resources. Particularly in democracies, there is a basic feeling that the existence of the military requires institutions for the political and democratic control of the armed forces. To take this seriously is a major task for a given democratic government as well as for the society at large.

The collection of articles published in this volume deal with this issue of civil-military relations from various angles. A more general and thoroughly intriguing analysis of civil-military relations in the Western world after the collapse of the East-West conflict is provided by Bernard Boëne. The bulk of papers deal with civil-military relations in specific countries. Each of them has been written by an expert in his or her fields. Karl Haltiner examines the Swiss militia model of civil-military relations which is in need of adapting to changed conditions whereas Rialize Ferreira analyzes the severe problems the post-Apartheid and newly democratic South African government faces in establishing one single military. Amir Bar-Or writes on the strains on the relationship between the armed forces and society in Israel, a country, where the armed forces traditionally have been playing a major role in society. A look at the specific problems of a newly democratizing country in establishing democratic civil-military relations is undertaken by Marian Zulean. The book closes with an article by the editors on the problem of democratic control in the face of military multinationalism.

Although the approaches differ, the articles and their authors share a basic assumption and this assumption is the observation that, in recent years, civil-military relations all across the globe have entered into an era of turbulence challenging the established patterns of civil-military relations of the past. This new turbulence is aptly described in the words of Don Snider and Miranda Carlton-Carew and traced back to four trends which are „potentially responsible for strains in civil-military relations: (a) changes in the international system (...); (b) the rapid drawdown of the military; (c) domestic demands on the military and society’s cultural imperatives; and (d) the increased role of non-traditional missions for the military“. (Snider/Carlton-Carew 1995 as cited in Sarkesian/Connor 1999: 81)

All the contributions collected here to the ongoing and intense debate on civil-military relations have been presented on the occasion of the Biennial International Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society in Baltimore, Maryland, 22-24 October 1999. We, the editors, are glad to be able to present these papers to a larger public and wish to thank all the authors for their readiness to provide revised versions of their papers to this volume.

References

- Russett, Bruce (1993). *Grasping the Democratic Peace. Principles for a Post-Cold War World*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Sarkesian, Sam C./Connor, Robert E., Jr. (1999). *The US Military Profession into the Twenty-First Century*. War, Peace and Politics. London - Portland, OR: Frank Cass.
- Snider, Don M./Carlton-Carew, Miranda A. (1995a). *The Current State of US Civil-Military Relations: An Introduction*. In: Snider/Carlton-Carew 1995b: 8-14.
- Snider, Don M./Carlton-Carew, Miranda A. (Eds.) (1995b). *US Civil-Military Relations in Crisis or Transition?* Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies.

Post-Cold War Trends in the Civil Control of Armed Forces in the West

Bernard Boëne

1 Basic Principles and Historical Perspective

The theoretical justification for civil control of martial institutions is twofold. Subordination of the military to the highest political authorities derives from the consideration that, as Clausewitz emphasized, the use (or mere existence, and configuration) of armed forces is not an end in itself. It has meaning only in relation to the future political landscape intended by sovereign polities in the international arena (notably, but not necessarily, when a conflict is involved). Moreover, when internal political institutions function normally, the wielders of sovereign power are the natural arbiters of last resort among competing (security, economic, cultural) interests and values in the polity.

These norms apply universally: they are hardly specific to democracies. Under any regime, violating or overlooking them carries the risk of aberration (constitutional disorder, unrest, political division and functional ineffectiveness of armed forces).¹ Democracies distinguish themselves only by renouncing the harshest methods of control (police surveillance, terror, etc.), and by relying instead on law, values, interests, and public opinion pressure. They also usually resort to executive, parliamentary or judicial monitoring, and indirect methods such

¹ Such norms even apply to military dictatorships, which can hardly afford to let go of control over their very power base. There are few examples of stable, long-term deviation from them, and then only in cases where the military (as in Turkey) enjoys political legitimacy of its own, allowing it to settle into a supraconstitutional role - a situation that is not exactly unproblematic.

as keeping police and military functions separate, and allowing inter-service or interagency rivalries some play; in many countries of Europe, filling the ranks with drafted citizen-soldiers representative of society as a whole has long been an effective device of sociopolitical control over large military bureaucracies. While democratic regimes do not deny soldiers their freedom of conscience, they require partisan neutrality on their part so as to guarantee institutional expression to the political pluralism which is one of their most distinctive features. (Boëne 1996; Boëne forthcoming)

For over a century in advanced nations, the advent of complexity in military affairs, and the emergence of career officers who were apt to outclass their political superiors in mastering that complexity, have led to situations in which, because the classical panoply of external controls had lost some of its former effectiveness, internal controls had to be devised. Such internal controls have for the most part been grounded in the basic features and norms of military *professionalism*: exclusive expertise derived from a lengthy education; a service ethic calling for personal sacrifice in the cause of society's higher good, in exchange for a degree of public recognition and social honor; delegation of public authority in the discharge of military roles, and the internal management of the profession, thereby fostering corporate feeling among professionals - chiefly officers.

As long as the danger of total war and the charisma of the nation-state loomed large, military professionalism was *radical*. Distinctive military values and the sacred myths of the profession were exalted, which (together with their rather narrow base of social recruitment) set professional officers somewhat apart from civilian society and culture. Due to external as well as internal circumstances, political and military roles were clearly demarcated. Control was objective: political leaders fixed the goals and mobilized material, human and symbolic

resources to achieve them; the military were judged on their organizational merits in action. Under pain of losing a then high level of prestige, their conservative realism made them both functionally effective and sociopolitically faithful to the objectives set for them by liberalizing societies which did not share their ethos. (Huntington 1957; Larson 1974)

Over the last three to four decades of the Cold War in most democratic countries, military professionalism turned predominantly *pragmatic*: while not absolutely impossible, total war was made unlikely by fears of Armageddon which drove expectations of political-strategic gain below zero. Military action was scant and mostly on the periphery, with (ideally) limited goals, means and duration - and no guarantee that it would be functional. As an instrument of policy, resort to military force sought viable international relations rather than total victory, which turned military establishments into 'constabulary forces'. Public sentiment was by now ambivalent at best: anxieties generated by even the remote possibility of nuclear war or accident, plus heavy defense burdens (high budget levels, individual and social costs of conscription, seeming militarization of society), clouded the relationship between armed forces and national publics. With the erosion of the nation-state's charisma over time, much of the military's former prestige was gone.

The civil-military equation was further altered by the massive if gradual onslaught of technology. This, among other things, made for a more representative base of social recruitment and more liberal leadership styles. It also favored, among officers, the rise of 'managers' as the dominant role model at the expense of 'warriors', and at all levels heightened the need for acquiring civilian-type skills in military establishments where pure combatants were now a clear minority. For the first time in history, by far the better part of military roles had

counterparts in civilian society. Comparisons could now be made across the civil-military interface, which provided military personnel at varying skill levels with new, differentiated social standings. Military retirees soon transferred without problems to successful second careers.

This produced a slow, painful shift from the splendid isolation of pre-World War II days to a rather close social integration of military cadres in terms of lifestyles, residence and expectations. Master trends in civilian society also played a part. The emancipation of women, translating into growing proportions of gainfully employed military wives, and the general impact of competitive individualism all pointed in the same direction. As a result, officer corps became culturally representative, too, and their substantive conservatism of the previous period was considerably toned down.

In the shift from radical to pragmatic professionalism, the profession substituted for its previous place in society, symbolically central but socially and culturally peripheral, another standing to which the reverse now applied. This change carried an important consequence: a military distinct, but much less distant from its parent society, fulfilled a necessary condition for a more cooperative culture.² In particular, it made officers more sensitive to the political repercussions of military action both on the domestic and international scene. This had the effect of enabling an otherwise frustrated officer corps to bear the reduced professional autonomy which stemmed from more frequent interference by political elites in military affairs - itself an outcome of the potential political fall-out of military initiatives down to the tactical level. Conversely, the military hierarchy's better social integration and more cooperative culture lessened the traditional suspicion of

² This occurred in most developed countries. However, due mainly to the lingering effects of the Vietnam syndrome, this development was less manifest in the United States.

military motives. In a context marked by a less clear separation of political and military considerations, the same process also made more palatable to politicians as well as public opinion the participation of military elites, albeit as junior partners, in the decision-making process at the highest levels with regard to issues of doctrine and the use of force. (Janowitz 1960; 1971; 1974)

2 The Post-Cold War Context

Against this background, the passing of the Cold War has produced new trends, but also confirmed and deepened older ones.

In an international system now dominated by democratic capitalism, but marred by an imperfect world order in which local and regional conflicts are less easily regulated by structural constraints, democracies have an interest as well as a moral responsibility in avoiding destabilization. They employ force not to obtain total strategic victory, but in appropriate, measured amounts in order to ensure viable international relations and, increasingly, the viability of weak or failed states. In other words, their armed forces have seen their constabulary roles confirmed and redoubled, mostly in the form of peace-support operations, in which they intervene not as belligerents but as third parties (see also the chapter by Wilfried von Bredow & Gerhard Kümmel in this volume).³

Likewise, domestic trends already apparent in the 1980s have accelerated and hardened. Free from the internal restraints imposed for several decades by the East-West confrontation, democracies have

³ A consensus is reported to have recently emerged in the US intelligence community, to the effect that no major war is to be expected before 2020. While the prediction, like all predictions, is fragile, the consensus is nonetheless impressive.

continued to evolve into post-deferential societies marked by weak citizenship norms. Increased individualism, generated by specialization of roles, affluence, the security afforded by welfare, and greater social equality, undermines the strength of institutions. The nation-state, in particular, has lost the remaining vestiges of its former charisma as individuals become skeptical of its ability to affect their lives positively. This translates into more relativism. Institutions and their leadership are judged on their merits: legitimacy is more conditional than it has ever been. As a result, minorities, now defined by an element of choice (identities, lifestyles, agendas) rather than by pure ascription, push for increased cultural diversity. They regard attempts to reinvigorate citizenship (other than local) as new forms of majoritarian tyranny. Mainstreams become fragmented, and there is a real possibility that we may one day live in what a French sociologist has called the „age of tribes“. (Maffesoli 1996)⁴

The third trend affects organizational formats. The absence of any major military threat has meant a sharp drop in manpower requirements. This creates problems in those countries which rely on the draft inasmuch as only minority fractions of successive age cohorts are inducted, thereby throwing doubt upon the equity of conscription - unless complicated compensation schemes are introduced; the overseas location of post-Cold War missions likewise de-emphasizes the utility of draftees.⁵ So does the impact of high technology assets, best entrusted to professionals. As a consequence, armed forces have

⁴ While the analysis offered by Maffesoli is illuminating, as the subtitle indicates, he interprets the rise of ‘tribes’ - communities based on shared values, tastes, lifestyles and agendas, irrespective of ascriptive influences - as a sign of declining individualism. In the author’s estimate, however, individualism (together with collective affluence) is the necessary condition for the relative freedom from ascriptive socialization mechanisms which makes chosen identities the basis of a differentiation which is now cultural as much as social. If anything, individualism has increased rather than declined in the last decade.

⁵ Conscripts are traditionally at their best in the defense of national sanctuaries, and ill at ease (unless they can be persuaded to volunteer for such duties) when sent overseas as part of expeditionary forces.

abruptly moved toward smaller, more professionalized formats in which conscripts will be the exception rather than the rule. In western Europe, current trends have led to the prediction that by the year 2010 conscription will only be retained in peripheral nations with real or supposed security problems such as Greece, Turkey and Finland (plus Switzerland if the militia tradition is upheld, which is by no means certain). (Haltiner forthcoming)

Finally, a technologically-induced revolution in military affairs, detected by numerous analysts, appears under way. Battlefield communications, favoring lateral coordination among hosts of specialized role-holders, give pride of place, at least in action (as opposed to garrison life), to networks and matrix organizational structures over traditional pyramidal structures and vertical chains of commands. Satellites and real-time media coverage mean that any field incident media operators deem worth covering will be made known worldwide, often before the military has had time to get its act together. Still in its initial stages, information warfare (IW) promises to alter the military equation substantially - if the technologies involved work as well as their boosters claim. Defined as a mode of coercion which consists of disrupting the flow, and manipulating the content, of information circulating through electronic networks, IW will seek to guarantee 'dominant battle space awareness': exceptional clarity on the battlefield, leading to higher lethality, at less risk and with much smaller forces. (Feaver forthcoming) At stake here is the elimination of uncertainty in military action through technological means.⁶

⁶ Such at least is the ambition of true believers in the so-called revolution in military affairs. Without denying that revolutionary developments are taking place, there is room for doubt, as previous historical experience has strongly suggested, as to whether what Clausewitz named the 'fog of war' or 'friction' can be eliminated through technology (see Owens 1998).

3 Impact on Civil Control and Civil-Military Relations

Approached from a sociological perspective, with the emphasis on emergent changes in structure, culture, and the nature of control processes, and with preferences treated as endogenous to civil-military relations, the study of the ways in which the post-Cold War context impacts on political control yields several well-delineated developments.

The first resides in a rise in the level of prestige enjoyed by the military. Approval ratings are now in the 70-80 percent range, which in some countries means a 20, 30 or even 40 percent improvement over a decade. Armed forces are now among the most trusted public institutions. One of the reasons behind the phenomenon is no doubt the fact that peace-support operations in the cause of stability and suffering humanity are regarded as noble by public opinion both at home and abroad. True, the popularity of such missions is mitigated by the prospect or reality of casualties. But withdrawing troops from a theater of operations (as in Somalia), while it may bring discredit on the politicians who made the decision to intervene, hardly affects the public image of soldiers in a negative way.

The second development is related to considerably diminished defense burdens. Lower budgets, and far fewer people personally affected by the use of force and its attendant risks or discomforts, have answered the widespread desire for peace dividends vocally expressed earlier this decade in all but a handful of developed nations. The steep draw-downs which have taken place in most such countries now mean, paradoxically, that military personnel and installations are seen as a rare, endangered species, generating nostalgia for the days when they played locally important social and economic roles.

Third, in the light of the rejection of *raison d'État* and correlative imposition on states of imperatives of conscience, the old civilian distrust of military power has been waning in the new context. The reason is that such power is now limited and used to fortify justice rather than to justify force. Likewise, there is less distrust of military culture: armed forces are seen as a tribe among tribes, free to cultivate their own values and lifestyles as long as they renounce normative school-of-the-nation self-concepts, and do not antagonize central values such as tolerance, sanctity of life and equal treatment.

Renewed military prestige is also a function of the discredit civilian institutions and politicians have brought upon themselves in the last few decades. Disinterested, non-partisan military elites compare rather favorably with civilian counterparts who, because they seem bent on pursuing personal advantage rather than the common good (politicians), because the institutions they direct are seen as dysfunctional (judiciary), because they no longer appear to believe in the values or traditions they are supposed to uphold (teachers, clergy, journalists), or sacrifice the long-term social benefits of the many for the short-term economic gains of a privileged few (corporate leaders), suffer from a lack of public confidence.⁷

Other trends affect both structure and process. To begin with, peace-support operations possess characteristics which make for increased latitude for political action and influence on the part of armed forces. For instance, their multinational nature means that functional command relations are supplemented by quasi-diplomatic relations among national contingents and the umbrella organization which has man

⁷ A new generation of politicians in western Europe (Tony Blair of Britain, Romano Prodi of Italy, Lionel Jospin of France, and others, all representative of a realist-pragmatic center-left) seem in a position to restore some credibility to politics. It remains to be seen whether this is a true reversal of the trend, or only a passing phenomenon.

dated the mission or is entrusted with it. Owing to contradictions between national and international chains of command, officers sometimes face the dilemmas of dual allegiance: they find themselves in a position to arbitrate between conflicting orders or interpretations of the mission (see also Elron/Shamir/Ben-Ari 1999). The multifunctional character of peace support - the fact that the military is often led to assume non-military roles such as repairing roads and bridges, school-teaching, operating local radio stations, organizing and monitoring markets or elections, sometimes even arresting war criminals - brings uniformed personnel into contact with local populations and politicians.

This comes at a time when military professionals have acquired political skills such as negotiation, public relations, etc., as part of their normal education and when, in the wake of reductions in force, they have learnt the art of institutional survival. Real-time media coverage leads to situations in which any incident at the tactical level can have strategic and political repercussions that no politician in his right mind can afford to ignore. Indeed, the urge for political leaders to control and interfere in tactical operations has become stronger, thereby giving low-level commanders in the field more responsibility in sizing up difficult situations, and more autonomy from their first-line and middle-range superiors. Such a state of affairs further blurs the lines between functional levels (tactical, operational, strategic) and between military action and diplomacy or policy. In some circumstances, modern satellite television reporting is apt (in the somewhat hyperbolic words of Dr. Reid (1997), until recently Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defense) to equalize the private in the field and the Prime Minister.

The coming of information warfare (IW) will only serve to harden and compound this difficulty.⁸ One of the problems anticipated is that confidence in the information possessed will require decompartmentalization of IW capabilities, for fear that inaccurate or false information provided by one channel may remain undetected and infect decisions based upon it. Giving all levels in the hierarchy equal access to overall situational awareness will tempt many low- or mid-ranking actors to influence or second-guess high-level command decisions. Likewise, IW will make direct interference by senior political leaders more attractive as a way to centrally manage critical situations (and avoid the political costs of casualties).

Finally, smaller armed forces and more frequent opportunities for service members to see military action, albeit of a constabulary character, will mean more time spent away from home. This is already reported to be a problem in the British Army, where fatigue from too many missions overseas has deleterious effects on soldier and family morale (Dandeker forthcoming). Such a predicament threatens the close social and cultural integration which was one of the pillars of pragmatic professionalism in the previous period.

The medium- and long-term political effects of reductions in force should not be overlooked. Smaller all-volunteer forces (AVFs) may see an increase in the proportion of those in the rank and file who are single-mindedly promilitary, and possibly alienated from society, entailing the emergence of far-right ideologies and politicization. Furthermore, small AVFs, together with the nature of post-Cold War

⁸ Feaver (forthcoming) notes that a parallel can be drawn between the nuclear revolution of fifty years ago and the revolution of military affairs still in its early stages today. But one major difference stands out: nuclear weapons could not be used except in the most dire circumstances when all else had failed, whereas IW will be much less subject to such restrictions, and will tempt political elites to use it for demonstration effects. (See also Eliot Cohen forthcoming)

missions, make for a more unified military establishment (witness the 'purple' culture, and amalgamated service war colleges, which have now become the norm in many countries' armed forces), with the consequence that the potential for political control through the traditional means of inter-service competition is greatly diminished. Last but not least, and holding the promise of more frequent political-military misunderstandings, is the future lack of first-hand military experience (already exemplified by the United States, Britain or Canada) among politicians in countries which no longer rely on the draft.

4 Problems and Remedies

Because prestige is back, and encourages the cultivation of values and lifestyles apart from those dominant in society, there now exists a distinct possibility that radical professionalism and a more uncooperative military culture will return. Prestige also means more influence on public opinion, which may lead politicians to change their preferences and defer to military judgment on doctrine and the use of force. The fact that in the long run all-volunteer forces will deprive the political class of personal experience in the military field will only accentuate the trend. Already, senior military leaders speak and act with more self-assurance on topics of a political nature. Though they have so far remained within the bounds of sound democratic debate, incidents tend to multiply.

The clearest case of new military assertiveness recently was that of U.S. Army general Colin Powell who, basking in the glory of success in the Gulf War as chairman of the Joint Chiefs in the early 1990s, presumed to spell out what the missions of the military ought to be, to state conditions for the use of force, and to reject the idea of trends going against the grain of an entrenched military self-image (Powell

1992).⁹ Later, he briefly considered riding the wave of popularity to run for the presidency as a candidate of either party, but then declined (thereby inadvertently belittling the political process). This is only one episode in a larger series of incidents in which recognized academic authorities have labeled a crisis in American civil-military relations (one that can be traced all the way back to military perceptions of civilian betrayal in Vietnam, and attests to long memories). (Weigley 1993; Kohn 1994; Snider/Carlton-Carew 1995; Feaver 1996)

So far, West European countries have mostly been spared the bitterness of open conflict; but there, too, examples can be found of rising political-military tension. In the 1990s, Dutch and Belgian chiefs of staff routinely threatened to resign in protest over drawdown decisions of which the military disapproved; in Germany, the Bundeswehr chief was reprimanded by his Minister of Defence for anticipating the government's lead in providing guidance for German participation in peace support operations; in the spring of 2000, following release of an independent review body's conclusions on Germany's future organizational format, the Minister went so far as to sack the military chief for negative public comments on the force levels envisaged (*Germany Replaces Army Chief of Staff*, International Herald Tribune, 25 May 2000). In France, the then newly appointed Army Chief of Staff hit the front-page in 1997 (with prior clearance from his minister) when he publicly warned the President that the reforms he had initiated would not be implemented if the Prime Minister's recent budget decisions were carried over to Fiscal Year 1999. This was widely interpreted as an attempt, the first of its kind, to drive a wedge, in a period of cohabitation, between a conservative President and a leftist Cabinet (*Le chef d'État-major de l'armée de terre interpelle*

⁹ In Powell's defense, it must be said that he was merely reiterating, though in a more forceful manner, principles that had been accepted ever since 1984, when Caspar Weinberger, then Secretary of Defense, followed military advice in setting rules for future use of force.

Lionel Jospin sur la baisse des crédits militaires. Le Monde, 17 November 1997: 1).¹⁰ More recently, public expression has been given to the sour mood of French generals, who feel that something is amiss in the fact that important decisions regarding defense have been made without consulting them (Isnard 1998).¹¹ Nor are senior officers alone in defending corporate identities and interests: junior officers in many countries tend to exhibit more conservative attitudes, reflecting in part the narrower social base of recruitment that comes with much smaller formats.

These trends coincide in time with more frequent opportunities for political-military conflict. With the lines separating military from political domains more blurred than ever, the distribution of responsibilities is unclear not only at elite level, but further down the military chain of command. Politicians, in some countries, are worried and frustrated by the political resonance of field incidents, by the increased political latitude, self-assurance and unresponsiveness of officer corps, but also by their own relative weakness in the face of military assertiveness. Members of the military, for their part, are (classically) frustrated by resource and mission allocation, but also - and herein lies the novelty - by the imposition of civilian norms they regard as unwarranted or dangerous (as when it comes to female, gay or, in some countries, minority soldiers).¹² Most of all these feelings apply to political objectives that, in operations other than war, do not

¹⁰ Little notice seems to have been taken of the fact that the socialist Minister of Defense felt obliged to authorize publication of the interview, which confirms that the military wield more clout in their relationship with politicians than at any time since the beginning of the Fifth Republic.

¹¹ Interestingly, Isnard, the defense correspondent, (who ought to know better) depicts generals as preoccupied by their loss of influence. In fact, the influence of generals in the last decades has been minimal (see Cohen 1994). And the correct interpretation is that they feel strong enough today to make their dissatisfaction with such a state of affairs publicly known through resignations, lectures and statements or leaks to the press.

¹² There exists a marked reluctance, in such matters, to let the military be turned into a 'social laboratory'. This is notably the case with regards to women in combat roles, or open homosexual behavior among uniformed personnel. (See also van Creveld forthcoming)

translate well into military objectives, and thus threaten to generate ineffectiveness.

Unlike problems of rank and file recruitment, which can be made hard to solve if military culture strays too far for no good reason, and in that case will oblige the system's leaders to introduce corrective measures, civil-military relations at the political level are not susceptible to such automatic stabilizing mechanisms. A spiral of mutual resentment is a possibility, though the more likely course is a crisis that smolders on without breaking out into the open, simply because naked political confrontation would be against everybody's interests. If the worst comes to the worst, for instance in the wake of a major incident, public opinion will be the final arbiter. The side in the dispute which will be seen to be at fault, because it is being either ineffective or arrogant, will go under. Image, and jockeying for the principled high ground, will be the name of the game; on both sides of the political-military divide, good communicators will be at a premium.

Are there remedies? The answer to that question is: probably not if what one has in mind are short-term solutions. In the medium to longer term, applying Janowitzian prescriptions to human resource policy and management may work, because they would favor a return to a more cooperative culture: to firmer norms of pragmatic professionalism (Janowitz 1973). These include short careers, mobility of officers as in exchanges between the services, large firms, public administration or academia at one or more stages in military career paths, lateral entry into the profession, effective mechanics of transfer to civilian second careers (notably in the civil service), more university education, etc. The expected result would be to foster role models that strengthen dual identities as soldiers *and* citizens, to the detriment of hardened corporate identities.

The difficulty, of course, is that such strategies are likely to be resisted by the military: in periods when a social group is looked upon favorably, accentuating its differences from its surroundings generates more societal regard, both collectively and individually. It is true that pragmatic professionalism has worked best when prestige is low, as professionals are then induced to make concessions in order to ingratiate themselves with the parent society.¹³ If such is the case, then perhaps the civilian community of defense scholars has a useful role to play as a fire-alarm and go-between which both sides can trust. This has the advantage of not letting the media alone steer the debate. As it is rare for that community to be unanimous in its analyses and pronouncements, it can provide a neutral ground on which informed, rational debate can be carried on. The American example, from that point of view, is heartening inasmuch as a vibrant scholarly community producing quality research of relevance to the major issues in hand has time and again proved its usefulness in that regard.

5 Conclusions

If all of the above is correct, the political control of armed forces in liberal democracies promises to be both more complicated and more problematic than was the case during the Cold War, from the 1960s onward. This paper has argued that the future will see a return to radical professionalism, due mostly to the restoration of prestige, more frequent opportunities for military action, drastically reduced military establishments, and societal contexts for which the ‘post-modern’

¹³ That the mechanism outlined here is not peculiar to the military is suggested, for instance, by a comment made by a colleague, a French sociologist teaching in an architectural school, who remarked that when the prestige of architects in France was at its lowest, in the 1970s, they tended to tone down their exaltation of the profession's sacred myths, and to take a genuine interest in sociology as a means of understanding society and their place in it. Since, in the wake of a new appreciation of the quality of their work, prestige has been restored, in the last decade or so, their interest in society and sociology has gone.

label provides a convenient short-hand description. In terms of civil-military relations, the consequences will include - on the military side - stronger identities, more forcefully expressed interests, and less flexibility; while politicians, as is already the case in a number of countries, will exhibit a degree of diffidence, or at least less assurance, in dealing with military matters.

However, it may be in order to qualify those statements lest they be construed as overly alarmist. The return of radical professionalism, in the present and future circumstances, can only be partial. For one thing, the constabulary operations which will keep the military busy for the years to come place a premium on civilian skills, and restrict the emphasis on violence as a universal means to solve problems. For another, it is unlikely that military families will renounce the comforts of social integration and return to the isolation that prevailed before World War II. Moreover, in considerably reduced armed forces, uniformed personnel must necessarily concentrate on military functions which they alone can perform. As a consequence, they no longer assume a variety of support functions, which have to be contracted out to civilian firms.

The military thereby becomes to some extent dependent on society in that regard, just as it is when the problem is to recruit qualified rank and file soldiers. Last and most important of all, aggressive nationalism is no longer a factor in developed societies, and the legitimacy of military action and institutions is conditional upon their conformity to central values. This sets rather powerful limits on the extent to which military professionals can afford to ignore society and evince an uncooperative culture which might be interpreted as arrogance - a sin unlikely to be forgiven.

As a result, the odds are that pragmatic professionalism will not entirely vanish from the scene. A return to the kind of civil-military relations that were common at the turn of the twentieth century is therefore unthinkable. It is even possible to say that during the latter half of the Cold War, military advice was not sufficiently taken into consideration because politicians, owing to both internal and external contexts, so dominated the relationship as to make it difficult for uniformed elites to make themselves heard. If that is the case, then the new-found assertiveness on the part of dignitaries in uniform is to be welcomed.

Yet, it is important to avoid misunderstandings and confrontational styles of interaction, if only because the functional imperative (effectiveness) and the sociopolitical imperative (responsiveness) must be met together if political-military failure or dysfunctions are to be avoided. An appropriate balance of professional autonomy and influence within the broader framework of subordination to lawful political leaders is the ideal to strive for. And from that standpoint, in an age of blurred division of labor and lines of responsibility, a less cooperative culture on the part of military establishments should probably be a source of concern. While somewhat more difficult to achieve than previously, dominance of pragmatic professionalism remains the solution best adapted to present circumstances, and should be encouraged whenever possible.

6 References

- Boëne, Bernard (1996). Les rapports armée-Etat-société dans les démocraties libérales. *Revue Tocqueville / Tocqueville Review*, 17: 1, 53-81.
- Boëne, Bernard (forthcoming). Western-Type Civil-Military Relations Revisited. In: Maman/Rosenhek/Ben-Ari forthcoming.
- Boëne, Bernard/Dandeker, Christopher (Eds.) (forthcoming). The European Military. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers. (The French version of that edited volume has already been published: Les armées en Europe. Paris: La Découverte, 1998)
- Cohen, Eliot (forthcoming). Technology and Supreme Command. In: Stuart Cohen forthcoming.
- Cohen, Sammy (1994). La défaite des généraux. Paris: Fayard.
- Cohen, Stuart (Ed.) (forthcoming). Democratic Societies and their Armed Forces: Israel in Comparative Context. London: Frank Cass.
- Dandeker, Christopher (forthcoming). In: Boëne/Dandeker forthcoming.
- Elron, Efrat/Shamir, Boas/Ben-Ari, Eyal (1999). Why Don't They Fight Each Other? Cultural Diversity and Operational Unity in Multinational Forces. *Armed Forces & Society*, 26: 1, 73-97.
- Feaver, Peter D. (1996). An American Crisis in Civil-Military Relations? *Revue Tocqueville / Tocqueville Review*, 17: 1, 159-182.
- Feaver, Peter D. (forthcoming). Information Warfare and the Political Control of Coercion. In: Boëne/Dandeker forthcoming.
- Haltiner, Karl W. (forthcoming). The Final End of the Mass Army. In: Boëne/Dandeker forthcoming.

- Huntington, Samuel P. (1957). *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Isnard, Jacques (1998). Des généraux inquiets de leur perte d'influence. *Le Monde*, 13 June 1998.
- Janowitz, Morris (1960). *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. (Subsequent augmented editions have been published in 1971 and 1974.)
- Janowitz, Morris (1973). U.S. Forces and the Zero-Draft. *Adelphi Paper 94*. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.
- Kohn, Richard H. (1994). Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations. *The National Interest*, 35: Spring, 3-17.
- Larson, Arthur D. (1974). Military Professionalism and Civil Control: A Comparative Analysis of Two Interpretations. *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, 2: 1, 57-72.
- Maffesoli, Michel (1996). *The Time of the Tribes: The Decline of Individualism in Mass Societies*. London: Sage. (Original edition: *Le temps des tribus: Le déclin de l'individualisme dans les sociétés de masse*. Paris: Meridiens-Klinksieck, 1988)
- Maman, Daniel/Rosenhek, Zeev/Ben-Ari, Eyal (Eds.) (forthcoming). *The Military, State and Society in Israel: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Owens, Mackubin Thomas (1998). Technology, the RMA and Future War. *Strategic Review*, 33: Spring, 63-70.
- Powell, General Colin L. (1992). U.S. Forces: The Challenges Ahead. *Foreign Affairs*, 71: 5, 32-45.
- Reid, John, M.P. (Labour) (1997). The Armed Forces and Society. *RUSI Journal*, April, 32.

Snider, Don M./Carlton-Carew, Miranda (Eds.) (1995). U.S. Civil-Military Relations: In Crisis or in Transition? Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

van Crefeld, Martin (forthcoming). Women in the Military: Gain or Regression? In: Stuart Cohen forthcoming.

Weigley, Russell F. (1993). The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell. *Journal of Military History*, 57: 5, 27-58.

Civil-Military Relations: Separation or Concordance? The Case of Switzerland

Karl W. Haltiner

1 Prologue

For two reasons the issue of democratic control of armed forces is becoming more important in Western and Eastern Europe since the end of the East-West conflict: (1) The democratization of Eastern European countries formerly under communist rule demanded an institutional revision of the political control of the formerly party-dominated armed forces. Examples were needed. The models of NATO-members, especially of the USA and of Western Europe, were recommended to these new democracies. Arising questions about the possibility of a transfer of institutional models of control - such as for example the model of *Innere Führung* of the Bundeswehr or the Swiss militia army model - intensified at the same time the reflexion on the institutional conditions of these models in the respective countries of origin. Evidently, the latter themselves had to become aware again of the normative and institutional rules before clearing them for transfer (Carrel et al. 1977; Brecht/Klein 1994). In the course of this process it became clear that in Western Europe, other than in the United States where Huntington and Janowitz have defined the landmarks of scientific debate on civil-military relations to the present day, comparative research in this field is lacking.

(2) The end of the East-West conflict has brought closer the end of mass armies (Haltiner 1998). Europe's armed forces have been reduced and will be further reduced and restructured in order to take on new missions. In six Western European countries compulsory military service was abolished (Belgium, The Netherlands) or its abolition

formally decided (France, Italy, Spain, Portugal). In other countries (Austria, Denmark, Germany, Sweden) a public debate on compulsory military service is going on. Citizens liable for service will rather become exceptions to the rule in the increasingly smaller and more professionally organized forces-in-being. The reduction of forces and the lowering of armament spending are a strain on civil-military relations. As a rule, the military resists the abolition of compulsory military service (Haltiner 1998: 31) and the disarmament steps are often more motivated by financial than by security reasons. The abolition of conscription in Belgium, for instance, led to conflicts with chief of the general staff Charlier (Manigart 1993: 15). In the Netherlands as well, the abolition of compulsory military service took effect only due to the ever-increasing pressure of the government (Rosendahl Huber 1999: 57). The transfer to actual voluntary armed forces holds the danger of enhancing the development of politically right-wing sub-cultures and of islands of values and lifestyles that are estranged from civil society (Boëne 1998: 7). The military is inclined to become a „counterculture“ (Vogt 1986). By abolishing compulsory military service and reducing and professionalizing the armed forces the latter are newly positioned in politics, the economy, and society as a whole. Thereby, the inherent normative tensions between the political and military elites may become more severe as can be seen when looking at the US case (Snider 1995: XIII). This means that democratic control is not solely a matter of concern to the new democracies of the post-communist East, but something that the stable Western European democracies have to deal with as well.

2 Separation or Concordance? - Models of Democratic Control of Armed Forces

Since 1945 a number of theoretical approaches have been developed classifying both descriptively and normatively the nature of possible relations between civil society and the military. The works of Huntington, Janowitz and Finer stand out especially. There are hardly any newer studies that are not based in some way on these „classics“ of civil-military-relations. The model of Huntington (1957), especially, has enlivened the debate to the present day. He tries to resolve the conflict of goals between the social and functional imperatives of civil-military relations. Only an efficient military is capable of protecting a society (functional imperative). At the same time, an efficient military poses a potential threat to its very own society (Feaver 1996). Thus, the social imperative calls for normative as well as institutional mechanisms securing the primacy of civil society. It is crucial to find an optimized balance between a military credibility, outwardly guaranteeing security, and the subordination of the military under the political primacy.

If political control is maximized, and thereby a lessened military efficiency accepted, we are dealing with what Huntington calls „subjective control“. In the model of subjective control of the military there is no clear separation of the military from the civil sphere, the boundaries between the two remain vague. In the model of „objective control“, preferred by Huntington, an autonomous military sphere is stipulated as a kind of „insular culture“ allowing the military to develop maximum efficiency. What guarantees the primacy of the political is the professionalization of the officer corps. Professionalization thereby means the development of a politically neutral body of military experts who are ready, by assignment, to enforce legitimate political

decisions autonomously.¹ The professional ethos neutralizes the armed forces, so to speak. Thus, „objective control“ results from the process of professionalization. According to Huntington an optimization of the functional efficiency of the military, while accepting the need for a political primacy, can only be guaranteed in a model of „objective control“.

Several newer approaches to an explanation of civil-military relations take up the idea of a separation of spheres implying a division of labour. An overview is given by Luckham (1971: 21). He develops a classification of all conceivable civil-military relations consisting of nine types on the basis of the relative power (high versus not high) of civil institutions as compared to the power of military institutions and the extent of permeability between the boundaries of the civil and the military spheres. The school of thought inspired by Huntington implicates separability and relative autonomy of the military sphere as prerequisites for its control by the civil side. Only a clear separation allows the subordination of the military under civil control. This separation-approach is contrasted by Renate Schiff's (1995) model of concordance. According to the latter, an effective civil control of the armed power is better guaranteed if a consensus between the civil and military elites as well as the citizenry is sought and developed as a form of political-military culture. If a basic concordance between the three mentioned actors exists concerning (1) the social composition of the officer corps, (2) the political decision-making process, (3) the recruiting method of the military, and, (4) the military style, there is a maximum guarantee of political neutrality and subordination of the military. Clear boundaries between the civil and the military sphere

¹ Especially Peter D. Feaver (1995: 113f.) has pointed to the fact that it is not so much the institutional framework, but the question of the formulation of the armed forces' mission and the delegation of instrumental power that can become the actual problem of well-functioning civil-military relations.

become obsolete. Schiff demonstrates her model by using Israel and India as examples.

With these theories in mind, we analyze the Swiss case. This paper does not focus on the well-functioning of civil-military relations in Switzerland. It rather serves to outline the distinctive institutional and process-referred features of the civil-military culture in an old plebiscitary democracy. In the course of this, it becomes clear that many aspects of Swiss civil-military relations are unique and too complex to be easily integrated into one of the models discussed. Components of the separation-model as well as of the concordance-model can be found.

3 Pillars of Democratic Control of the Military in Switzerland

When speaking of the democratic control of the armed forces in Switzerland it is necessary, first, to observe the specific - and probably truly unique - structural prerequisites which let the civil-military relations and the army format appear as a consequence of a special political culture. An *institutional* curtailment of the military body is revealed, which in this extent would not be expected from a nation, which, due to its centuries-old tradition of mercenaries, has always been regarded as especially military-friendly. When considering the *processual* aspects, however, differences between Switzerland's and the generally widespread liberal-democratic mechanisms of executive and legislative control turn out to be differences in degree only. What is probably unique is the direct-democratic influence on security and military matters through referenda.

3.1 Institutional Conditions: Constitution and Tradition

The Swiss constitution of 1848 (totally revised in 1874 and updated in 1999), which is to a great extent still in use today, resulted basically from different preceding models strongly influenced by the thoughts of the French Revolution. Also, the US constitution served as a model (Kölz 1992: 562). The two chambers of parliament, to which every canton sends two delegates, closely resemble the American model. Considerations on the separation of powers, similar to those of the creators of the US constitution (Kohn 1991), were probably only of very limited importance in establishing the constitutional control of the military in Switzerland. Not theoretical liberal considerations but rather the political-historical conditions of the founding of the Swiss Federation are defining, up to the present day, the army format and civil-military relations. These conditions are the principle of federalism on the one hand and the century-old tradition of citizen militia in connection with a deeply rooted distrust of military professionalism on the other hand.

3.1.1 The Federal Structure of the State and of the Armed Forces

Switzerland is the only federal state in Europe that managed to grow from a century-old loose association of sovereign states, each one with its own armed forces, into a federation without any major armed conflicts.² However, the price of the unification of sovereign states on an almost voluntary basis was a federal constitution that left to the

² The federal unification was not achieved without any military pressure at all. In 1847, the liberal coalition of the cantons had to use military force to have the unwilling catholic cantons accept the founding of the federation. Thanks to the intelligent warfare by the commander-in-chief of the supporters of the federal unification merely skirmishes took place. This war cannot, however, be considered a nation-building unification war. (Cf. Jaun 1998)

cantons two features essential to sovereign - the word is indeed used in Article 3 of the Swiss federal constitution of 1874 (Kölz 1992: 543ff.) - states: The rule over armed forces of their own and the right to raise taxes. Efforts to strengthen the unitarian idea of a strong central state failed also because they entailed a transfer of military rule from the cantons to the federation (1874, 1903, and 1907). The „construction of the relationship ‘military and nation’ turned out to be far more problematic in Switzerland than in countries where the development of nation-states was based on a successful act of nationalized armed forces“ (Jaun 1998: 150; translated by the author). Important constitutional regulations that still define today’s civil-military relations can only be understood in the light of the cantons and the peoples refusals to hand over the sole authority in military matters to the federation, thereby strengthening centralistic rule in general (Jaun 1997).

In March of 1999, the Swiss people in a referendum accepted a formal update of their constitution of 1874 still in force. Thereby, the content-matter of the 1874 constitution remained materially unchanged. Article 13 of the federal constitution of 1874 (Article 58.1 of the 1999 update) prohibits for any central ruling power to hold a regular army while at the same time allowing the cantons just that (up to 300 men, especially for police matters).³ Infantry troops are mainly cantonal, specialized troops are mainly federal. This is why not only the federation but also every single canton has a ministry of defence. The system of cantonal troops resembles to a certain degree the British regimental system differing from the latter insofar as the roots of Switzerland’s system do not lie in specific troop formations but in cantonal criteria. An infantry officer receives his commission from a cantonal government, an officer in a specialized troop from the Swiss

³ The fathers of the constitution set a limit to the number of regular troops in the cantons in the interest of „liberal institutions“ (Kölz 1992: 599).

federal ministry of defence. The central command and the establishment of law on military organization, however, as well as the acquisition of equipment and arms have been federal matters since 1874. The original motives for forbidding standing troops in the constitution were mainly to impede a force-in-being from „oppressing the people’s liberty“ (Schollenberger 1905: 190).

3.1.2 Political Legitimation of the Military Commander-in-Chief in Times of War

Switzerland does not have a military commander-in-chief in times of peace. This is a consequence of the federal decentralization of the military and the lack of a regular army in Switzerland. The command and control over the armed forces, especially the right to declare war or make peace and the right to mobilize the militia, lies in the hands of the parliament. The seven-member federal government’s immediate command is limited to a small draft of troops that can be called at short notice („2000 men“ for less than three weeks, Art. 102 of the federal constitution of 1874). It is also responsible for the administration of the armed forces. Any further mobilization of troops requires the approval of the parliament that must be called in especially for that matter.⁴ A military commander-in-chief, *the* general in Swiss terminology, is only elected by a parliamentary vote in the case of a mobilization of a considerable draft of militia-army members and only for the time of this specific joining order.⁵ Obviously, he is thereby given the same democratic legitimation as the seven members of the federal executive body. As in times of peace, he must report to the latter.

⁴ The Swiss parliament holds no more than four meetings of three weeks a year.

⁵ Notably, generals were elected for the mobilization enacted to occupy the borders during the French-German War (1870/71), World War I (1914-1918) and World War II (1939-1945). The tradition of electing a general stems from Ancient Switzerland.

However, he receives far-reaching strategic authorization, especially in the event of war activities on Swiss territory. According to the law, the federal government hands the mission over to *the* general (Art. 86 of the military law) and grants him the utmost liberty as far as actual means and operations are concerned. Precise regulations, however, are lacking. Because these procedures of authorization are difficult to enact and because of the considerable political legitimation potential of the general-elect, tensions between the federal government and the elected commander-in-chief have come up in the past.⁶ The Swiss military commander-in-chief elected by parliament is undoubtedly a political figure. It is almost self-evident that not only military but also political and linguo-cultural aspects play a role in the parliament's election of the military commander-in-chief. The constitutional curtailment of the military body in times of peace, which is considerable by international standards, is not so much the result of the separation of powers but is mainly due to the members of the federation not wanting to hand over the sole command and power to a centralized state. It is ultimately an immediate consequence of Switzerland's federal structure of state.

⁶ The relationship between charismatic general Henry Guisan and the Swiss federal government in 1939-1945 was often overshadowed by tensions. In parts, the general followed a different strategy of foreign policy than the federal government. A low point in this relationship was reached when the Germans, after the French defeat in 1940, found documents that proved military arrangements between the Swiss commander-in-chief and the French general staff that were partially in violation of neutrality. The general also made a call for determined resistance in the event of a German invasion. He thereby symbolically embodied the spirit of resistance predominant in the Swiss population. The Swiss government, on the other hand, preferred a policy of low profile in order not to provoke Hitler. It was the same government that ordered Guisan to keep aerial combat with German fighter aircrafts crossing Swiss territory at a minimum.

3.1.3 The Tradition of the Citizen Army

This second constituting determinant of the Swiss army format is also deeply rooted in the historical conditions surrounding the creation of Swiss political culture. In the medieval agricultural republics, the heart of today's Switzerland, forms of cooperative auto-administration and outlines of a direct democracy successfully resisted feudalism. The belligerent, rebellious peasant defending himself against any authority's making up his mind for him as well as resisting foreign dominion is symbolic for Ancient Switzerland (Hertling et al. 1998: 100). The right to carry weapons was seen as an expression of freedom as well as of honourable citizenship.⁷ At the same time, most old cantons had a compulsory military service (Führer 1999: 85). It consisted in times of war of a conscription of all men fit for service and of a liability for compensation for those freed from service. Resistance against taxes may have contributed considerably to the fact that the main characteristics of the modern state - a regular army and professional bureaucracy - could not develop as elsewhere in Europe and led Switzerland to establish militia land forces and a lay-bureaucracy (Peyer 1978: 119; Riklin 1982). Compulsory military service was not strictly enforced in all cantons at all times. Yet, the tradition of the citizen forces has become part of Switzerland's national identity and its political-egalitarian culture. The historical succession of vassalage, knight forces and mercenary forces that can otherwise be observed in Europe is unknown to Switzerland.⁸

⁷ With his well-known drama *Wilhelm Tell* Friedrich Schiller secured Switzerland's heritage of associating personal freedom with the right to bare arms - a popular association in the USA as well - its place in literary history.

⁸ This is not opposed to the fact that mercenaries, with which the economically poor Switzerland supplied the land forces of most European rulers from the medieval to modern times, were the most important export-product!

No other country, apart from Israel perhaps, has so rigorously enforced the constitutional principle of compulsory military service for all men as modern Switzerland (Article 18 of the constitution of 1874 respectively 59 of the 1999 update). Who is freed from service for medical reasons pays a compensation tax. Several attempts to establish an alternative service for conscientious objectors before 1990 failed because of the extensive interpretation of the military burden-sharing in Swiss public opinion (Haltiner 1993). While today's law allows for a civilian service it is still the exception to the rule. Because a classic system of feudal estates could not be established on Swiss territory Switzerland lacked the social prerequisites for the development of a broad nobility and therefore of officers of noble birth. The elected political leaders most often also served as military leaders in times of war. The egalitarian nature of the country's cooperative past implies a traditional distrust of a professional caste of officers and of the professionalization of the forces in general until today.

3.1.4 Institutional Primacy of the Militia and Lack of a Professional Body of Officers

The two civil-military parameters according to the current Swiss constitution, the „prohibition of a regular army“ on the one hand and „compulsory military service“ on the other, do not allow any other military system than the present militia force. This makes Switzerland the only country in Europe having as its regular armed forces a classic militia army. A militia consists by definition of non-permanent mobilization-based forces; i.e. it is of low immediate presence. In times of peace it has at its command only a rudimentary framework of personnel. The Swiss militia system differs from the European standard military organization, which is based on career soldiers as the regular army and draftees in rank and file as the transitory element, in the

following aspects: (1) Regular officers and regular non-commissioned officers are militia soldiers. The few professional officers and non-commissioned officers serve as instructors to the militia cadre and are themselves subordinates to the militia primacy; (2) troops are mobilized for training purposes only. An uninterrupted service, creating a standby army from which the personnel is later transferred to a reserve force, does not exist,⁹ and, (3) the conscripts' active membership in a branch of service lasts over a long span of life.¹⁰ They keep their equipment, including automatic rifle and ammunition, at home.

What all these aspects have in common is the rigorous minimization of military presence in the troops and their cadre and the maximization of civil control: In Switzerland conscripts remain liable for military training for many years of their lives. Schools and troop-courses have as their goal, with few exceptions, *not a standby service* but serve only training purposes. Troops continuously being called and dismissed for reasons of training deny the militia the characteristics of an organization of regulars.

Undoubtedly, the most salient feature of the Swiss militia in comparison to other armed forces is its low degree of professionalization in the military cadre. The regular officers and non-commissioned

⁹ All in all the minimal time of compulsory service is 300 days. 105 of these days are served at the age of 20 in recruit school. The other 195 days are served in two-week portions every other year. Active membership in the military ends at the age of 42. Officers serve until the age of fifty.

¹⁰ Officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers take their small arms and the respective ammunition as well as their personal equipment home after their basic training. Correct maintenance is checked in periodic inspections. As a rule, people discharged from compulsory service keep their weapon together with parts of the equipment. Today Switzerland is probably the country with the highest density of weapons per household worldwide. Because they are registered in lists and are heavy to handle military weapons are rarely used in criminal circles. They are, however, frequently used as suicide weapons.

officers are conscripts who are ready, on a voluntary basis,¹¹ to serve a multiple of the obligatory service-time and who used to be able to expect an increase in their social prestige in return. It is true that the need for cadre-members could hardly ever be fulfilled without the help of persuasion and lawful obligation. But the majority of officers and non-commissioned officers decide, up to the present day, of their own free will on their extended military engagement. The few professional officers and non-commissioned officers - 1.800 for a militia of 380.000 persons - serve as instructors to the militia cadre. Nothing could underline the wilful primacy of the militia more clearly than the fact that professional officers can follow their careers only on the militia-track. They earn their promotions in militia services, in refresher courses of their militia-army formations joined by their militia-colleagues. An actual military-academy for professionals that serves as a think tank for military policy and as a guardian of a military unité-de-doctrine is missing to the present day. In higher positions of command, which after a decision in 1912 have to be taken on professionally, mainly professional officers are to be found. This is the case because, as a rule, a change of profession is hard to realize for militia-officers of higher age. However, as a principle, all positions are open to militia-officers. A rule of quota keeps professional officers from occupying more than half of the positions in the general staff. For the filling of the highest command posts aspects of party-, language- and cantonal proportion are usually more important than the military qualification.

The decision to do without a professional body of officers and without hired longer-serving personnel at the non-commissioned-officer-level

¹¹ The law includes the possibility of forced compliance in taking on the position of non-commissioned officer or officer entailing the obligation to visit the necessary military schools. Especially for the conscription of squad leaders in the rank of non-commissioned officers, this possibility is made use of more often these days.

and the crew-level deprives the militia of an inner focus. Some 1800 professional cadre-members are, in terms of their critical mass and their function as military instructors, not form-giving to the system. *Thus, the leadership system of the militia army and thereby its control remains ultimately in an immediate way in the hands of the citizen.* Up to the present day, there is a high degree of personal identity between the civilian elite in politics and economy and the military elite. This primacy of the civil is additionally strengthened by the aforementioned partly historically reinforced, partly constitutionally achieved equal authority of the federation and the cantons over the military administration and by doing without a commander-in-chief in peaceful times. One may also regard the Swiss militia army members' keeping their army weapons at home as an aspect of political control. This is correct if the personal ownership of weapons is viewed as an expression of the citizen's freedom. Today, however, mainly functional reasons, namely the acceleration of mobilization, are given for the storing of weapons in the home.

3.2 The Processual Framework: The role of the Plebiscite in the Process of Controlling the Armed Forces

As far as the role of the government and the parliament in controlling the armed forces is concerned Switzerland hardly differs from other parliamentary democracies. The executive body is in charge of the supreme command and plans and carries out armament procedures and can call smaller troops temporarily. The parliament is in charge of the budget and has insight into the core-organizational life of the armed forces. The annual armament program as well as operative-strategic concepts - so called army guidelines - need parliamentary approval. Other than in parliamentary democracies there also exists a plebiscitary control. Since 1872 constitutional amendments and bills

passed by parliament can be subject to a referendum if 50.000 signatures are collected. In 1891, the constitutional initiative was established. The latter makes it possible, by collecting 100.000 signatures, to bring to a public vote a suggested constitutional amendment. Both plebiscitary rights define Switzerland's political system. Votes on factual matters are more important than elections. The executive and legislative bodies make all of their decisions anticipating the possibility of the electorate having the final say.

The plebiscitary rights include security and military issues. Since the founding of the federation, all major revisions of the so-called military organization - the term used in Switzerland for the legislature on armed forces and their control - had to pass a public vote. Since 1845 all efforts to make military affairs solely a concern of a central ruling power have failed. Important votes on military issues were: (1) several referenda on a limitation of armament exports after the Second World War; (2) an explicit refusal of Swiss nuclear armament in the 1960s; (3) two refusals of an alternative service on the basis of free choice (1976 and 1983); (4) an refusal of an initiative to abolish the army (1989); (5) an refusal of an initiative wanting to prevent the acquisition of F/A 18 fighter aircrafts (1993); and, (6) an refusal of the establishment of a battalion of blue helmets in favour of the UN or the OSCE, respectively (revision of the military organization 1994).

As a rule, the electorate has turned out to be the most conservative element in the several phases of the political process of decision and control. It proved to be just as sceptical towards revolutionary innovations as towards an expansion of military authority. Nevertheless, the planned reform of the militia forces under the acronym „Swiss Army XXI“ aims for a substantial decrease of the militia's strength and an increase of the amount of contract and professional soldiers. Moreover

Swiss troops are engaged today as peacekeepers of the OSCE in Bosnia and are participating in NATO's KFOR-mission.

4 Conclusion: Separation or Concordance?

Can the Swiss model of civil-military relations be assigned to one of the basic models of democratic control of armed forces outlined above? The separation-model postulates a clear division between the military and the civil sphere and the subordination of the former under the latter. Paradoxically, the first criterion - the clear drawing of boundaries between the civil and the military sphere - does not apply to the Swiss citizen-soldier model while the second criterion, the strict subordination of the military under civil control, does: The relatively strong curtailment of military power and the clear primacy of the civil authorities in terms of control as well as the civilianization of the bodies of officers do justice to the postulate of subordination of the military under the civil authorities. It is here that Switzerland conforms to the separation-model.

However, this does not apply to the demand for a clear separation of the spheres. The rigorously applied citizen-soldier system does without a permanently organized division of labour between the civil and the military sphere. It demands of a large part of the male population of many age groups a regular, if only temporary, change of roles from citizen to soldier or officer, respectively. The armed forces serve as an on-call potential from the civil sphere but not as a regular organization. Therefore, the boundaries between the civil and the military remain somewhat unclear. The militarization of the population is the price to be paid for a civilianization of the military.

The nation-in-arms principle is still very much in force in Switzerland and characteristic for its format of controlling the forces. It is the primacy of the citizen as a militia man/woman that dominates the institutionalized civil-military relations; the principle of civilian control is guaranteed more on the level of the soldierly role, the soldier is denied any permanence, than on the level of formal institutions. The military does not exist as a standing professional body separated from the civil sphere but only as a part-time organization coming into action when needed. The fact that, especially in modern times, problems of military efficiency and political credibility have come up needs no additional emphasis. The militia may be an apt emergency-organization for national defence. It cannot, however, meet the requirements of extended military missions out of area and a cost and risk effective maintenance of a modern domestic security under the new threat perspective. There is therefore hardly any future for the 'true militia' that Switzerland has allowed itself to have up to the present day. Conscription as well as the prohibition of standing troops are becoming issues of public debate in today's Switzerland.

The Swiss model is largely and almost paradigmatically identical to Huntington's model of „subjective control“. Military effectiveness is subordinate to the primacy of politics; military professionalism is met with fundamental distrust. At the same time, the Swiss model of civil-military relations fits almost all criteria listed by Renate Schiff as characteristic of the model of concordance she stipulates. The requirements of this model are met when the political and military elite as well as the citizenry agree on security-political issues, models of drafting of the armed forces, social composition of the officer unit and military style (Schiff 1995: 12). As was shown above, the tight civil-military interweaving of elites is one of the key elements of the Swiss model of civil-military relations. The history of public votes and decisions proves the citizenry's unaltered high support of the political and

military establishment's defence policy. The present culture of militia, the compulsory military service, and the composition of the officer unit are met with more criticism than they used to be but remain, in principle, unchallenged. Obviously, the Swiss model of democratic control does not fit neatly into one of the currently dominating models.

5 References

- Altermatt, U. et al. (Eds.) (1998). *Die Konstruktion der Nation - Nation und Nationalisierung in der Schweiz, 18.-20. Jahrhundert*. Zurich: Chronos.
- Boëne, B. (1998). Trends in the Political Control of Military Institutions in the Post-Cold War Era. Paper presented at the ERGOMAS-Meeting in Sweden, September 1998.
- Brecht, R./Klein, P. (1994). *Streitkräfte in der Demokratie. Die Kontrolle des Militärs in Frankreich und Deutschland*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Carrel, L. et al. (1977). Demokratische und zivile Kontrolle von Sicherheitspolitik und Streitkräften. *Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung, No. 41*, Zurich: Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktanalyse der ETH Zurich.
- Feaver, P. D. (1995). Civil-Military Conflict and the Use of Force. In: Snider/Carlton-Carew 1995: 113-144.
- Feaver, P. D. (1996). The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz and the Question of Civilian Control. *Armed Forces & Society*, 23: 2, 149-178.
- Frevert, U. (Ed.) (1997). *Militär und Gesellschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
- Fuhrer, H. R. (1999). Wehrpflicht in der Schweiz - ein historischer Überblick. In: Haltiner/Kühner 1999: 67-78.

- Haltiner, K. W. (1998). The Definite End of the Mass Army in Western Europe? *Armed Forces & Society*, 25: 1, 7-36.
- Haltiner, K. W. (1993). Questioning the Citizen Soldier. In: Moskos/Chambers 1993: 135-145.
- Haltiner, K. W.; Kühner, A. (Ed.) (1999). Wehrpflicht und Miliz - Ende einer Epoche? Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Hertling, M. et al. (1998). Eine kleine Geschichte der Schweiz. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Huntington, S. P. (1957). *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge, Mass.: Belnap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Jaun, R. (1997). Vom Bürger-Militär zum Soldaten-Militär. In: Frevert 1997: 48-77.
- Jaun, R. (1998). Armee und Nation. In: Altermatt et al. 1998: 149-166.
- Kölz, A. (1992). *Neuere schweizerische Verfassungsgeschichte*. Bern: Stämpfli.
- Kohn, R. H. (1991). The Constitution and National Security: The Intent of its Framers. In: Kohn 1991.
- Kohn, R. H. (Ed.) (1991). *The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States 1789-1989*. New York: New York University Press.
- Luckham, A. R. (1971). A Typology of Civil-Military Relations. *Government and Opposition*, 6.
- Manigart, Ph. (1993). Die belgischen Streitkräfte im Umbruch. In: Europas Streitkräfte im Umbruch, *Beilage zur Allgemeinen Schweizerischen Militärzeitschrift (ASMZ) No. 11*.
- Moskos, Ch. C./Chambers, J.W. II (Eds.) (1993). *The New Conscientious Objection*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Müller, G. et al. (Eds.) (1982). *Staatsorganisation und Staatsfunktionen im Wandel. Festschrift für Kurt Eichenberger*. Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhahn.

- Peyer, H. C. (1978). Verfassungsgeschichte der Alten Schweiz. Zurich: Schulthess.
- Riklin, A. (1982). Milizdemokratie. In: Müller et al. 1982.
- Rosendahl Huber, A. (1999). Erste Erfahrungen mit der Berufsarmee in den Niederlanden. In: Haltiner/Kühner 1999: 43-53.
- Schiff R. (1995). Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance. *Armed Forces & Society*, 22: 1, 7-24.
- Schollenberger, J. (1905). Comment on the „Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft“. Berlin.
- Snider D. M. (1995). Preface. In: Snider/Carlton-Carew 1995: XIII-XV.
- Snider, D. M./Carlton-Carew, A. (Eds.) (1995). U.S. Civil-Military Relations in Crisis or Transition? Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic & International Studies.
- Vogt, W. R. (Ed.) (1986). Militär als Gegenkultur. Opladen: Leske & Budrich.

The Democratization of the South African National Defence Force

Rialize Ferreira

1 Introduction

The major determinants of the security position of the Republic of South Africa (RSA) have changed considerably in recent years. There has been a complete change in the strategic environment within which the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) operates, due to precipitating events such as the end of the military conflicts in Angola and Namibia in April 1989, the demise of the major communist states, State President De Klerk's statement on 2 February 1990 to unban the African National Congress and to release Nelson Mandela from prison, and consequent internal changes in South Africa since the first democratic elections in April 1994. These changes have made it necessary to revise the whole defence strategy. The new democratic South Africa required a new defence mission, roles and tasks and a new force design. As the democratic societal needs have changed, so the nature of the Defence Force also had to change. The SANDF was constitutionally obliged to transform. A new *White Paper on Defence* was needed. A draft of the latter document was published and, in line with democratic practice, civilian input was invited in order to democratize defence policy. After additional comments by the Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD) and the Portfolio Committee on Defence, the final draft of the *White Paper* was submitted to Cabinet and approved in May 1996 (Frankel 1998:149). The *Defence Review*, based on the *White Paper* was completed in 1998.

However, South Africa currently faces realities such as large scale unemployment and consequent internal instability because of car

highjackings, robberies, assault and murder. These realities are dominating the security situation in the country. The government's budget priorities, human resources composition, control over the SANDF and logistic capabilities also need to be considered in the development of a new Defence Force. Historical and emotional factors unfortunately also distort realities and their influence on the institutional transformation of the SANDF (Meiring 1993: 1).

2 Research Methodology

This paper is based on a qualitative documentary study, conducted by means of content analysis of secondary sources regarding the democratization process in the SANDF. Underlying this methodological technique is the functionalist perspective. The main premise is that military matters of institutional nature are regarded as an organized system of activities directed to reach specific goals or functions in order to survive as a system in the greater South African society.

3 Change in the South African Military

Like many other state institutions, the South African Department of Defence (DoD) is in a process of far-reaching change. The new vision for the SANDF is one of broad representativeness of all people at all ranks in a defence force of national unity that is credible and legitimate in the eyes of all people. The point of reference for change is the *South African Constitution*, which provides the framework for transformation. Transformation of the SANDF includes the following interrelated issues: (1) the South African White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review; (2) the integration of seven armed forces into one single national Defence Force; (3) affirmative action and equal

opportunity programmes; (4) rationalization; (4) activities aimed at improving and perpetuating the effective and efficient functioning of the Department; and (5) ensuring the institutionalization of civilian control over the military institution (Cilliers et al. 1997: 26).

The main framework for the transformation of the DoD has been the reformulation of the South African defence policy, as encapsulated in the *South African White Paper on Defence* and the subsequent *Defence Review*. The major institutional changes flow from the policy and the Review (Kasrils 1998:18).

4 The South African White Paper on Defence

The *White Paper on Defence* presents the defence policy of the Government of national unity. It serves to inform citizens and other states of South Africa's new defence policy. Any national policy is the product of a process of goal setting and devising means of achieving such goals. The two major goals emphasized in the *White Paper* are essentially the constitutional functions of defence, namely to firstly, loyally defend and protect the sovereignty, territory and people of the country against external aggression, and secondly, to assist the civilian authorities in maintaining the rule of law when necessary. Underlying these goals is the guiding principle of democratization of the South African society.

The DoD, furthermore, strives to maintain peace and security in a democratic society, so as to establish an orderly environment for the improvement of people's lives and for the development of the country. To best achieve this goal, the armed forces should reflect the character of the new democratic society in order to ensure reliable, effective and loyal defence. Central to this abovementioned goal of transformation

in the armed forces is the consolidation of civilian control over the military, the advancement of representativeness at all ranks to reflect the demographic composition of the population and the establishment of a new military culture that is in line with the democratic values of the new South Africa. In order to abandon the previous apartheid militarism and defence ethos the *White Paper* was formulated through a wide consultation process involving civilian society and was unanimously adopted by parliament in May 1996 (South African Department of Defence 1996: III). The *White Paper* consists of nine chapters which address diverse issues like the challenges of transformation (chapter 2), the important issue of civil-military relations (chapter 3), the role, functions and strategic environment of the armed forces (chapters 4 and 5), human resources and budgetary issues (chapters 6 and 7), arms control and defence industry (chapter 8) and land and environmental matters of relevance to the military (chapter 9) (Frankel 1998: 149).

In the following sections, special attention is paid to the two central themes of the defence policy, namely democratization and transformation, which are regarded as mutually reinforcing processes. Turning to the issue of democratization first, it should be emphasized that the South African government's policy on defence has „defence in a democracy“ as its central theme. It has been prepared in „the spirit of the new democratic era in South Africa“ (South African Department of Defence 1996: 1). It discusses a number of principles of defence in a democracy. Democracy is considered the ideal political situation in the SANDF, since it means, according to Parsons (Ritzer 1992: 241), the inclusion of all categories of the population within the political system by extending them the right to vote and partake in political decision making. For the first time in our history, a *Defence White Paper* reflects the interest of the majority of the people of South Africa, represents national consensus and has been subject to an unprece-

dedented degree of transparency, consultation and debate. This new democratic approach to defence policy, as set out in the *White Paper*, has totally changed South Africa's former military posture and has contributed to peaceful defence cooperation in the region. It has provided the basis for the country's first ever *National Defence Review*.

The *Defence Review* elaborates on the defence policy in terms of the SANDF's role, function, posture, doctrine, force design, equipment levels and budgetary implications, as well as the human resources issues such as the details and practical implementation of integration, affirmative action and effective transformation. The review has thus determined the size, type and personnel of the SANDF, its command and control structures, as well as its primary equipment and related budget requirements. (South African Department of Defence 1996: V). The review has been hailed as the most consultative, inclusive and transparent of its kind anywhere in the world. It included three national consultative conferences, a host of regional workshops in all provinces and public hearings in Parliament. It drew together a wide range of interest groups, including academics, clergy, industrialists, media, pacifists (gay society), members of parliament, and members of the defence establishment.

The second central theme to be highlighted is that of transformation, since the general theme of the *White Paper* is transformation - in institutional, structural, cultural and personnel terms. According to the *White Paper* (South African Department of Defence 1996: IV) major policy changes have been made and include the introduction of the following principles. These principles constitute the conceptual framework for transformation upon which the *Defence Review* was built (Frankel 1998: 150):

„National security shall be sought primarily through efforts to meet the political, economic, social and cultural rights and needs of South Africa’s people and through efforts to promote and maintain regional security in Southern Africa;

South Africa shall pursue peaceful relations with other states. It will seek a high level of political, economic and military cooperation with Southern African states in particular;

The SANDF shall have a primarily defensive orientation and posture and be fully subordinate and accountable to Parliament and the Executive;

South Africa’s force levels, armaments and military expenditure shall be determined by defence policy which derives from an analysis of the external and internal security environment;

The SANDF shall be a balanced, modern, affordable and technologically appropriate military force, capable of executing its tasks effectively and efficiently;

The SANDF shall operate strictly within the parameters of the Constitution, domestic legislation and international humanitarian law;

The SANDF shall respect human rights and the democratic political process;

The SANDF shall develop a non-racial, non-sexist and non-discriminatory institutional culture, and its composition shall become broadly reflective of the population through the introduction of Affirmative Action and Equal Opportunity programmes“ (South African Department of Defence 1996: IV).

The process of transformation is envisaged as constituting many steps. Stemming from the *White Paper* and *Defence Review* a fundamental, structural reorganization and transformation across all the hierarchical ranks of the military is underway, with attention now focused on the restructuring and streamlining of territorial headquarters at provincial level, and below them group headquarters, and the Part Time Defence Force system. It also involves reorganization for more cost-efficient management to cope with the reduced budget and new requirements of the SANDF.

5 Integration

Initially, much of the transformation has revolved around the integration of the so-called statutory and non-statutory forces. The primary objective of the integration process was to peacefully unite soldiers from various military backgrounds to establish an institution that was professional, efficient and representative. However, the integration of former statutory (SF) and non-statutory forces (NSF) was a complex process, because it involved different organizational structures and political affiliations of former adversaries, who still distrusted each other. The general belief was that integration on the political, practical and the administrative level had to be enmeshed to be successful all over. Integration did not merely mean to combine five NSF and two SF into a single force, the new SANDF. It was a complex process which consisted of: (1) the registration on the PERSOL system; (2) determining the bridging training requirements and where necessary, undergoing specified bridging training; (3) entering into a contract with the SANDF, and (4) placement in a specific SANDF post and rank by the Placement Board.

Furthermore, it was not meant that any of these forces should retain their original form or structure, but that they would contribute their best attributes to the SANDF. The SF were the former South African Defence Force (SADF, 85.000) and the four homeland armies or TBVC armies (10.000), which included the Transkei, Bophutatswana, Venda and Ciskei armies. The NSF included Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK, 20.000) and the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA, 6.000). These seven forces all became part of the SANDF on 27 April 1994. After negotiations with the Inkhata Freedom Party the Kwazulu-Natal Self-protection Police (1.800) members were later on directly incorporated, not integrated, into the system on a preferential basis (Cilliers et al. 1997: 26). Although there was a difference in the manner in which these members were integrated into the new SANDF, all were integratees and all were equally new in the SANDF.

The first intake of NSF occurred during April 1994 at Wallmansthal and the last intake was only during July 1998. In total twenty-four intakes were processed. Eighteen intakes were processed at Wallmansthal, five at De Brug and one at Hoedspruit. These processes were assisted by the British Military Assistance and Training Team (BMATT) which served to certify, oversee and adjudicate the processes. Approximately 25.000 members of MK and APLA were assembled from a total estimated list of 42.266 (the final figure of the Certified Personnel Register [CPR]). After resignations, discharges, deaths, desertion and demobilization 19.000 former guerrillas had been integrated into the SANDF by July 1998. The vast majority (90.5 %) were integrated into the SA Army (Cilliers et al. 1997: 26). The integration of these seven armies into a single national Defence Force carries enormous political, racial and ethnic implications that can effect the survival of the new democratic government (Southall 1992: 26). Research has proven that the integration process was far from trouble-free, because it was a complex process which involved

different organizational structures and political beliefs of former adversaries (Ferreira 1999: 22). Reports of racism were also received from integratees in the lower rankings, especially in infantry training units. Officers, however, were politically more conscious than they were willing to admit, since politics as such was a greater controlling factor amongst them than racism.

The common perception that integration was a short term process, was obviously incorrect. The physical part of integration took members about three years to complete, but the political part, also called the psychological dimension, where mind sets and attitudes had to be changed, would still take much longer. Administratively integration was noticeably successful, but integration has still not been fully completed after five years (Ferreira 1999). However, as a process of social change, integration was regarded as functionally effective, sufficient and necessary for the SANDF, because it contributed to the peaceful and orderly change in the defence system. It is also obvious at this stage that the SANDF has an institutional challenge to correct the representativeness, equality, racial problems, discipline and standards of training of all integratees to secure the democratic future of the new SANDF.

6 Affirmative Action and Equal Opportunity Programmes

According to democratic principles, the DoD is addressing incongruities in the levels of training and competency of all integratees/members of the new SANDF by means of programmes for equal opportunities (EO) and affirmative action (AA). EO means equality of treatment, which strives to rectify the disadvantages of the past, while AA means the preferential treatment of integratees, who were previously disadvantaged or delayed in their education and training. AA is

the program of corrective action, striving to dismiss hindrances to unequal employment by deliberately preferring members from underprivileged backgrounds by recruiting, educating and appointing them in specific high level positions. The EO and AA programmes are specifically used to develop the potential of disadvantaged members without affecting the morale of other military personnel or neglecting internationally accepted standards of proficiency, professionalism and safety.

These programmes are guided by the principles that standards will not be compromised, but members with potential must be identified and given every opportunity to achieve the required internationally accepted standards of the new SANDF. The aim of the programmes is that all integratees meet the various course prerequisites of their rank group before being appointed substantively in a particular rank. However, research showed that some integratees have been fast-tracked through the system and appointed in higher positions without first doing courses, because of a backlog in bridging and staff training courses (Ferreira 1999). This was a source of unhappiness among other members who did complete courses and who were not promoted yet.

7 Budget Reform and Financial Planning

Since 1989, the defence budget has decreased in real terms by more than 49 %. Massive budget cuts slashed defence spending from 4.3 % of the GDP in 1989 to 1.6 % or R8.7 billion in 1997. All indications are that this downward trend has not yet reached its lowest point. Furthermore, the integration of the seven different armed forces into the new SANDF has led to an almost 35 % increase in personnel numbers (Uys 1997: 58). The result has been increasing financial

pressure. Inevitably, this has led to the need for rationalization and the demobilization of soldiers. After the announcement of the defence allocation of the budget for 1997/98 the SA Army had to announce the disbandment of twelve group headquarters, the rationalization of eight full-time units, the restructuring/transformation of 21 part-time forces motorized infantry battalions, the disbandment of four part-time support units, the amalgamation of two part-time force parachute battalions and the rationalization of 48 commando units. This obviously affected thousands of part-time and full-time members. These changes were accompanied by the restructuring of the defence headquarters and command and control function, which would yield another R300 million in savings (Cilliers et al. 1997: 27).

8 Rationalization

Rationalization of the South African military started immediately after the Namibian/Angolan war in April 1989 when supernumerary posts, which had not been budgeted for, had to be filled by returning soldiers, previously paid by the Namibian government. Rationalization was again instituted after the April 1994 elections by way of natural attrition (resignations, deaths and discharges and freezing of these posts). However, as the defence budget was once again cut, it was inevitable that the existing human resource structure had to be reduced accordingly. At the same time, seven armed forces were integrated into one single united SANDF according to the Interim Constitution of 1993. Obviously, the establishment of the new SANDF led to an oversized and unaffordable force. It has also caused imbalances in the staffing of the new SANDF, especially among soldiers of the former SA Army. Simultaneously with the physical integration of forces, the rationalization of the organizational structure of the SANDF was debated and planned, based on the *White Paper* and guided by the

Defence Review process, which paid specific attention to military strength, possible external threats to South Africa and the role of the military in the country's new democratic society. This process determined the size and shape of the new Permanent Force, derived from the force design and force structure, which will direct the guidelines for rationalization. This will take into account budget constraints, as well as the government's overall socio-economic policy (Van Stade 1997: 37). The SANDF has managed to keep its total numbers down to 90.000 members, from a potential figure of 140.000 which could have been the result of the integration process. The goal is to rationalize members to a total number of 70.000 by the end of 2000.

Rationalization is an unavoidable process although it is also regarded as ambivalent, in the sense that it is functional for the military system itself but, simultaneously, dysfunctional for the individual members whose posts are terminated hereby (Ferreira 1994: 213, 215). In itself, rationalization is not a democratic process, as it is enforced on people through the new requirements for a smaller force structure and the imbalances between structure and personnel of the SANDF. The rationalization imperative focuses on aspects of efficiency and calculability, whilst it does not take personal expectations and goals of members, as well as human dignity, into account (Gerth/Mills 1977: 50). In the SANDF it is purely finance driven.

9 Actions to Perpetuate Effective and Efficient Functioning of the Department

The South African military has developed from an aggressive forward defence position, based on white male conscription and self-sufficiency in providing defence equipment in a hostile-threat environment, to a peacetime military force with a defensive military

position based on an all-volunteer system. In the absence of a clearly defined external military threat, and in accordance with many armed forces internationally, the DoD has adopted what it terms a „threat-independent“ approach, based on the retention of balanced core force defence capabilities. It is from this core force capability that the SANDF plans to expand its war-fighting capabilities efficiently over time to meet any future external military threat and to ensure that modern, sophisticated military requirements can be rapidly met. Such an approach relies on the adequate early warning of an impending military threat, to allow the core force capacity to be expanded to the advanced level required (Cilliers et al. 1997: 27). The issue of sustainability in conditions of a reduced budget was addressed in the redesign of the SANDF. The SANDF is now based on a new mission, new roles and tasks and force design, as well as on the savings required to make it sustainable (Uys 1997: 59).

10 Institutionalization of Civilian Control over the Military

Much has been said about civilian control of the military. Unfortunately, many perceptions do not necessarily coincide with facts. It is a fact that, in the past, the SA Army was subject to civilian control. There were various mechanisms in existence at the political level to control the military. Surely the military cannot be blamed if these mechanisms have not been used (Otto 1995: 55). Therefore, the advent of the Secretariat of Defence to provide a visible bridge between the military and civilian sectors was to be welcomed.

Civilian control over the SANDF must not be confused with civilian command of the SANDF. The military must be allowed to execute its task according to its own doctrines or principles and specialized training, and under its own command system. It must remain the expert in

the application and managing of military force to support the national strategy as set out by parliament. Professional soldiers must be allowed to wage war professionally. Civilian control, however, should be of a technical, managerial and bureaucratic nature (Otto 1995: 55). It has legislative powers, approves the defence budget and review in parliament the president's decisions to deploy the SANDF in critical functions.

Civilian control is regarded by Cilliers/Sass (1994: 4) as a condition to be achieved which ensures that the military operates according to the constitution and parliament. Civilian control thus refers to control of the military by the elected representatives of the people, as opposed to control by appointed officials. The way to manage defence in the future will have to adapt to this principle of civilian supremacy. The SA Constitution of 1996 lays out the basic design for civilian control by using a pluralist perspective which entails that many different political parties have an input to influence military decisions (Popenoe et al. 1997: 363). Constitutional checks and balances keep the legislative, the executive and the judiciary branches of government from gaining too much power. This encourages decentralization of political control. Thus, the mechanism used to bring about civilian control, provides for the shared overseeing or control of the military, by the legislative, the executive and the judiciary in order to assert democratic control over the armed forces and defence policy.

This civilian control mechanism is aimed at integrating the military into a democratic society, strengthening mutual trust between the South African public and the military and promoting a sense of dignity within the military in that it is serving a democratic, constitutional state. This sort of civilian control mechanism is not aimed at usurping or interfering with the military chain of command, or with the military disciplinary code. Defence policy should thus be determined

by parliament, debated and agreed upon by the Standing Committee on Defence in parliament and accepted by cabinet (Cilliers/Sass, 1994: 4).

Since the elections in April 1994 the SANDF had to redefine its role and transform its structures to meet the demands and pressures from the wider South African society to conform to civilian control and values, such as equality and a political democracy. To achieve this, two *fields of constraint* which confront the military in a democratic state should be reconciled: (1) the concentration of power in military assets, which makes a defence force effective, versus the restrictions on power required by democratic control; and (2) the freedom and rights of the individual versus the requirements of authoritarian-type military discipline and order. The problem of armed forces in a democracy, therefore, is how to manage the power of the central executive on the one hand, and that of military commanders on the other, while still ensuring that it serves purposes of the nation effectively.

A democracy needs civilian control of the military since military forces have been and always will be manipulated by political groupings who may want to use force to control or replace parliament. Equally, individual military commanders could abuse their power and authority and turn their forces against the government and thus seize power. Civilian control exemplifies the principle that military force is not an end in itself but a means that the civil authority may use to bring about political objectives. In parliamentary democracies the parliament as supreme authority of the people, decides on the allocation and control of resources for defence. Responsibility at the highest level for broad defence policy and the provision of resources for defence, is typically assigned to civilian administrative authorities, as opposed to military bodies. Detailed defence planning to satisfy such defence policy requirements is usually characterized by close coordi-

nation between civilian and military authorities. Therefore, the Minister of Defence is responsible for conveying the needs of the DoD to the elected government, while also conveying political guidelines and policy regulations to the DoD. The Defence Secretariat advises the Minister of Defence „on all aspects of defence policy, performs the financial accounting within the DoD and takes responsibility for inter-departmental and parliamentary liaison on behalf of the DoD“ (Frankel 1998: 159). The CSANDF is responsible for decision-making in areas that relate directly to the execution of tasks within the framework of civilian supremacy. Civilian control, therefore, entails that the military is not only subordinate to political leadership, but will have to submit to intervention, in what it may consider to be professional military matters, insofar as these affairs have political implications. Obvious aspects in this regard include the role and mission of the military, its human resource policies, force structure and armaments. Civilian control then, is wide-ranging and pervasive.

Such control does not, however, imply interference in the tactical decision-making of military operations in the field. These must be left to the appropriate military commanders, though civilian control will still ensure a closer linkage between military operations and political objectives (Cilliers/Sass, 1994: 4f.). Since April 1997 an integrated defence headquarters was established, within which the Defence Secretariat and the Chief of the SANDF shared staff for: (1) financial management; (2) joint personnel policy; (3) joint training; (4) defence liaison services; (5) legal services; (6) communication; (7) defence intelligence; and (8) inspectorate and internal audit. This new system represents an important change from the previous civil-military organization in the SANDF. The idea of an essential functional equality between the military and its civilian overseers is, however, still relatively new to many important military leaders at this stage of transformation and democratization. But, despite differences between the

Defence Secretariat and the mainstream military establishment over conceptions of 'good policy' appropriate to the new system of civilianization, there are strong commitments towards a democratic agenda (Frankel 1998: 166).

11 Conclusion

The transformation and democratization of the DoD are virtually unprecedented in South Africa, and perhaps even internationally. Thus far, the process has been remarkably successful. The DoD has striven to involve a wide range of people and consult broadly. The Department has been rewarded by an emerging national consensus on defence priorities and a greater degree of trust between various stakeholders, such as parliament, civil society, the academic community and international defence analysts, as well as between the Defence Secretariat, the SANDF and the Ministry itself.

However, there are also some worrying tendencies emerging. Operational standards are under pressure, while highly qualified members are leaving the SANDF. Expertise has been lost and morale is wavering (Ferreira 1999). In fact, the DoD is showing the first clear signs of institutional overstretch (Cilliers et al. 1997: 28). The belief also exists that the Defence Secretariat is not very successful at the moment, since it is already seen as losing power and is fast becoming a technocratic institution with little civilian control. Another problem is that the *Defence White Paper* and *Defence Review* relate to defence requisitions which are considered inappropriate by the military for their mission, roles and tasks. Political considerations are regarded as impractical. We knew that the creation of a functioning democracy in a hitherto severely divided country such as South Africa, would be no easy task (Southall 1992: 26). How successful the entire transformati-

on and democratization processes will be, is still too early to pronounce.

12 References

- Cilliers, J./Sass, B. (1994). Proposed Structures for the Department of Defence (DoD) and Office of the State Secretary for Defence (SSD) of the Future South African National Defence Force. *African Defence Review*, 16, 1-16.
- Cilliers, J./Schutte, C./Liebenberg, I./Sass, B. (1997). Public Attitudes Regarding the Image and Future of the South African Military and Defence Industry. *African Security Review*, 6: 5, 25-35.
- Ferreira, R. (1994). Die invloed van rasionalisering op die beroepsmobiliteit van offisiere in die Suid-Afrikaanse Leër: 'n sosiologiese ondersoek. Potchefstroom: PU for CHE. (PhD thesis).
- Ferreira, R. (1999). The Integration of the Armed Forces into the South African National Defence Force: A Sociological Investigation. Paper presented at the SASA congress at the Military Academy, Saldanha 6-9 July 1999.
- Frankel, P. (1998). Marching to the Millennium: The Birth, Development and Transformation of the South African National Defence Force. Pretoria: SADF Communication services.
- Gerth, H.H./Mills, C.W. (Eds.) (1977). From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Kasrils, R. (1998). Progress in Transformation. *ISS Monograph Series*, 26. 15-24.
- Meiring, G. (1993). Taking the SA Army Into the Future. *African Defence Review*, 14, 1-6.
- Otto, R. (1995). Preparing the South African Army for the Next Century. *African Security Review*, 4: 6, 51-57.
- Popenoe, D./Cunningham, P./Boult, B. (1997). Sociology: First South African Edition. South Africa: Prentice Hall.

- Ritzer, G. (1992). *Sociological Theory*. 2nd edition. Singapore: McGraw-Hill.
- South African Department of Defence (1996). *South African White Paper on Defence 1996*. Pretoria: Department of Defence.
- South African Department of Defence (1998). *South African Defence Review 1998*. Pretoria: Department of Defence.
- Southall, R. (1992). The Integration of Armies and Civil-Military Relations in Post-Apartheid South Africa. *South African Defence Review*, 6, 26-32.
- Uys, F. (1997). The SANDF Transformation Process. *African Security Review*, 6: 1, 58-63.
- Van Stade, L.B. (1997). Rationalisation in the SANDF: The Next Challenge. *African Security Review*, 6: 2, 37-44.

The Need to Re-examine Civil-Military Relations in Israel

Amir Bar-Or

1 Introduction

The appointment of the Israel Defense Force's (IDF) 16th Chief of the General Staff (CGS) took place close to Israel's 50th Independence Day celebrations, yet the link between the two events does not necessarily symbolize a landmark date for re-appraising Israeli civil-military relations. The main reason for embarking on a review is that major political processes crystallizing throughout the 1990s have called into question the army's traditional and 'unique' status in Israeli society and the state's political system. This article will describe and analyze some of the political processes made during these years and suggest ways for correcting deviations.

2 Israeli Civil-Military Relations in the 1990s

During the 1990s Israel went through a turbulent period of social transformation that included a re-evaluation of its traditional attitude toward the military. Although the essence of this social change is still under study, increased criticism toward the army can already be discerned. One of the most truculent expressions, with its accompanying political implications, of this change of view was directed at the 15th CGS, Lt. Gen. Amnon Shachak. Shortly after his appointment he was labeled a 'traitor to his country'. This 'edifying' epithet was voiced because certain aspects of the Rabin government's policy were unacceptable to various political groups. Even though the anathema was recognized as the product of fringe elements, it pointed to the

direction that the present attitudinal change toward the military was capable of taking.

The army's visible presence in the eye of the political hurricane also contributed to stoking the flames of anger and criticism. Harsh attacks were leveled at the army's inability to quell the *Intifada*, the IDF's nearly two decades-long failure to extirpate the terrorist Hizbullah group on the Lebanese border, and the military's responsibility for the moral implications of these unsuccessful struggles. Furthermore, because of the High Command's direct involvement in negotiations with the Palestinians and Syrians, the army was transformed into a key partner in a political process that was opposed by large segments of the Israeli public. In recent years, the IDF also found itself caught in a cross-fire between the political establishment, citizen groups, and the media. Public sentiment, emanating from various quarters, brought the military's exalted position in Israeli society into rigorous accountability. This has awoken serious concern because the public criticism cast the army into an unprecedentedly exposed position.

A significant expression of the changed perspective was echoed in Lt. Gen. Shachak's speech on the first anniversary of Itzhak Rabin's assassination in November 1996. *Inter alia*, the CGS stated: „The bitter criticism [aimed at the IDF] stems from the will to reform [the army]; and to a great extent, love has been overtaken by alienation. The informal relationship between the IDF and civil society, which has been a hallmark of the army's uniqueness, and an integral part of its moral strength, has turned into a nuisance, at times irrelevant, occasionally intolerable. Social polarities, hedonism, sectarianism, apathy, and manipulative opportunism have inveigled their way into the mainstream of national consensus. Here, in the center arena, a scapegoat has been found for castigation (...). Shirking military service is no longer a blot on one's record, whereas volunteering, the conscious

desire to contribute, no longer receives the recognition it once held (...). The glaring admissions of the IDF's diminishing status in society, and of society's growing weakness and reduced ability to call up its inner strength in crisis situations, are serious causes for concern. We must constantly deal with them despite the mutual inclination to rest on our laurels." (Shachak 1996) 18 months later as his fourth and final year in command was drawing to a close, the 15th CGS revealed on a number of occasions that positive changes had taken place since he last spoke.

3 Explaining the Change in Israeli Civil-Military Relations

Was the change really as significant as the CGS described? To answer this, I believe, a careful examination of the Israeli public's evolving attitude towards the IDF is necessary. Recently, a methodical study has been launched, under the auspices of the IDF's Behavioral Sciences Department, intended as a long-term survey for gaining an accurate understanding of those changes in Israel's social environment that have influenced the public's view of the army's image and status. This study will serve a steering committee headed by the Deputy CGS who has also enlisted the army's own professional staff for improving relations with society.

It seems to me that as long as this comprehensive research project remains in its preliminary stage, the CGS's claim cannot be firmly substantiated, and the reasons for the increased alienation toward the army must be sought elsewhere. Scholars familiar with this phenomenon offer various explanations. Yoram Peri, for example, asserts that the IDF no longer exemplifies the dominant social ethos, and has ceased to be involved in the process of nation building. These are only two of Peri's observations from his list of socio-political develop-

ments that have created the widening gap between the IDF and the Israeli public. The distancing will be reduced, according to Peri, only when the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is resolved. (Peri 1998) Yoav Gelber, who has studied the relations between political and military echelons from an historical perspective, claims that the source of the IDF's alienation from both general society and the political establishment is rooted, *inter alia*, in the nature of Israel's present political structure. (Gelber 1998)

I would add that the main causes of this situation might be traced to the long and arduous process that brought the army to a dominant and crucial position on national security issues. Paradoxically, the military's enormous leverage contained the potential of being regarded as a threat to the very political system that had retreated and abandoned the front lines to the army's responsibility. This was the state of affairs up to the summer of 1996 when a new government came into power.

In the mid-1990s two works were published by members of the inner circle of the political and military systems. Yehuda Ben-Meir, a past Deputy Foreign Minister, claimed that while it was still undeniable that Israel's elected government retained control over the IDF, recent study had shown that behind the scenes the army was fully in charge of its own affairs. (Ben-Meir 1995: XII) Maj. Gen. (res.) Israel Tal, also, found that despite nominal civil control of the military in Israel, the IDF had in fact been transformed into an independent, self-directing institution whose autonomy and influence exceeded the state's original designs. (Tal 1996)

This situation contradicts the principle canonized by Ben-Gurion in a document sent in 1949 to Lt. Gen. Yadin upon his appointment to the IDF's second Chief-of-Staff. Ben-Gurion stated that „the army determines neither the policies, administration, nor the laws in the state.

The army does not even determine its own structure, missions, modes of operation, or peace treaties. The army is nothing more than the executive arm for the defense and security of the State of Israel. Organizing the army (...) [is] the sole responsibility of the civilian authorities who form the government, the Knesset, and the voters (...). The army is unconditionally subordinate to the government.“ (Ben-Gurion 1971: 82)

According to Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, the need to stabilize civil-military relations while Israel was engaged in a long and violent conflict necessitated the creation of a control system adapted to interminable crises situations. The continuous external threat to Israel's survival caused many security issues to become dominant factors in national life and served to enhance the army's influence. (Horowitz/Lissak 1989)

The government alone decides when to mobilize the army, and no one can assert that national security policy should be the sole responsibility of the army. The national leadership is responsible for formulating the security doctrine that is essentially the basic strategy for national preparedness. The political echelon is also supposed to determine the nature, scope, and framework of the national defense system, as well as its political and military objectives. It has been shown that the planning of a national security doctrine must be left to civilian leaders because it reflects their beliefs and perceptions of reality which in turn guide their political and strategic decisions. Each government's success or failure is the acid-test for evaluating its particular contribution.

These observations rang true in large measure during the first years of the state when Ben-Gurion was both prime minister and Minister of Defence. In later years, at times of war and in the intervals between hostilities, the government had difficulties defining political objectives

despite Rabin's claim that the government's defense policy is expressed primarily in the army's „(...) training, and its readiness to follow guidelines determined by the government“. Rabin also stated that „(...) when the issue concerns the military's execution of the civilian authority's defense policy, then the army's main objective is to defend the state and its essential interests as well as to protect its territory and inhabitants“. (Rabin 1987: 4) This definition indicates the way in which the government directs the army, though the actual picture is hazier and less clear-cut. But, as the Israeli case shows, in the absence of a clearly defined national security policy, the army was forced to define the parameters of a national security concept according to its understanding of its basic needs.

This also holds true regarding the tension between political and military objectives in wartime situations. The tangled process of defining objectives was highlighted during the 1996 *Operation Grapes of Wrath* in Lebanon, as was the incompatibility between the government's goals and the army's capabilities. Together, the obfuscation crippled the management and conclusion of the entire campaign. The IDF's involvement in the operation also underscored the errors resulting from the omission of clearly defined political directives. The army was forced to bridge this gap by its own initiative that was generally influenced by the nature of the ground fighting.

Following the 1996 elections, a new chance appeared for redesigning Israel's civil-military relations through the inception of a National Security Council (NSC). The establishment of this institution had been one of the cornerstones in the *Basic Law: The Government*. The new prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, planned to appoint as its director, Maj. Gen. (res.) David Ivri, previous head of the air force and one of the most distinguished figures in the Israeli Defense Establishment. Ivri's presence was expected to create long-sought changes in national

security policy issues by furnishing the Prime Minister with instant and accurate assessments regarding intelligence estimates, military expenditure prerogatives, and nuclear developments. The NSC was also intended to take over other tasks such as counter-terror, the Arms Control Steering Committee, and the programming of a strategic partnership with the United States of America.

Concentrating all these enterprises in the office of the Prime Minister would have bequeathed him with the unparalleled direction of national security issues, and as a corollary it would have diminished the army's hegemony in defense matters. It should be recalled that this was the first time in Israeli history that the Prime Minister was elected by direct vote, further adding to the predominance of the office. If previously the status in government of Israel's Prime Minister had been 'primus inter pares', the newly acquired authority invested in his hands, via the vehicle of the NSC, would have dug deeply into the turf of both the Minister of Defence and the CGS. In this light, it was only natural that the Minister of Defence and military establishment were dead set against seeing the fetal NCS come to the light of day. The Minister of Defence charged that the NSC should be a subsidiary colloquium, albeit headed by Maj. Gen. (res.) Ivri.

4 Recent Developments

The power struggle over the NSC was won by the Minister of Defence, Itzhak Mordechai, who was new to politics after his recent discharge from the IDF with the rank of major general. Actually, the Council began to operate shortly after General Mordechai left office as Minister of Defence in Netanyahu's government, just prior to the 1999 general elections. The NSC was still struggling for its position of

influence on security matters, when the Barak government ascended to power in July 1999.

Netanyahu's government was chiefly characterized by the breach between the army's general staff and the political leadership, as the IDF High Command was no longer called before government committees to offer their expertise on politically related military issues. The results of this 'no military interference' policy associated with Netanyahu were soon felt:

During the cabinet debate over plans for the Hebron withdrawal, the IDF regional commander was left in the dark on the outcome. Prior to the opening of the 'tunnel' adjacent to the Western Wall in the Old City of Jerusalem (September 1996), the political leadership failed to notify the army when the operation would commence. The IDF was thus caught off-guard with disastrously little time to station sufficient troops at the site. Now that military commanders were no longer privy to sensitive governmental decisions, they were forced into the tense spot of having to respond immediately to political emergencies they had no advanced warning of.

These two cases are sufficient to illustrate the Netanyahu Administration's trend of relegating the army to the 'sidelines' and interfering in its defensive role, due to political reckoning. Critical reaction from unnamed sources within the IDF was forthcoming and they enlisted the media in their campaign. In acerbic tones, these anonymous voices from the military revealed Netanyahu's biased attitude towards the army general staff, and attacked his public censure of top officers during a military ceremony. They criticized the trenchant, almost inflammatory rhetoric, he employed to browbeat the High Command's professional calculations during a tense debate in 1998 over the IDF's annual expenditures.

The insistent marginalizing of the army naturally widened the gap between the Prime Minister and the CGS. To recall, Netanyahu had singled out Lt. Gen. Shachak for disparagement because of his close involvement with the Rabin Administration's efforts at negotiating the Oslo Accords. Netanyahu's disdain of Shachak's professional advice corresponded with the attempt to devalue the general's position and authority, and coincided with the freeze in the decision to confer him with an additional year as CGS. Not only was the CGS ignored by the Prime Minister, but the Minister of Defence, Itzhak Mordechai, also found himself alienated within the Netanyahu Administration. But here another element was involved: Mordechai's public popularity that added a political threat to Netanyahu's status. Mordechai harbored his own dreams for political prominence, and had no qualms over denouncing the cabinet's execution of major security matters. His outspoken manner eventually led to his removal from office.

Summing up the dynamic interplay of forces, it becomes apparent why Mordechai sought to consolidate his sway over the IDF High Command. This tendency may be observed in his choice of appointments for top promotions (including the 16th CGS), and his selection to leading roles of high-ranking officers whose loyalty to him had been proven. One of key appointments in this period, decided by the highest echelon in Israel's Security Establishment, was abrogated for the first time in the state's history by a Supreme Cruling. The Court had been asked to intervene in the promotion of a brigadier general convicted on charges of sexual harassment within his command, a promotion the IDF High Command stubbornly insisted should go into effect for professional military reasons. The Supreme Court's willingness to accept the female soldier's request to block the officer's promotion exposed the army to withering social criticism in light of the military establishment's insensitivity to the normative change in rulings on sexual harassment. In another case, the Supreme Court

stopped short of getting involved in the CGS's decision to promote an officer charged with questionable professional judgement in the course of a military operation.

The demand for Supreme Court rulings on the opening of pilot training and naval command courses to young women, on expulsions from officer's courses, or the refusal of academic studies during military service, all point to the profound change in the state and society towards the army. Two facets of this change are observed. On the one hand, as a large, bureaucratic, conservative establishment, the army finds it difficult to keep 'in tune' with the continuous changes taking place in society. On the other hand, the state's legal system is highly critical of the army and gives precedence to considerations of justice and morality over purely security matters that, in the not too distant past, were generally not taken into account.

Ehud Barak's entrance into office in the 1999 elections added another dimension to the erratic relationship in Israel between the government and the military. Barak follows the policy of Prime Minister Rabin (1992-1995) that when crucial decisions are to be made with Israel's neighbors, the Prime Minister also holds the security portfolio. Both Barak and Rabin arrived at the office of Prime Minister after serving as CGS. (Rabin had also been Prime Minister between 1974-1977 and Minister of Defence between 1984-1990.) Although their administration of both offices led to wide public criticism, the dual role allowed them to make major decisions while linking the army, in various degrees, to the political process.

Rabin appointed the Deputy CGS to lead the Israeli delegation to peace talks with the Palestinians in 1993, and Barak appointed high-ranking reserve officers to head the negotiations with Syria and Lebanon. But the public's discomfort with these appointments was further

intensified by the fact that again it was mainly reserve officers who staffed the Prime Minister's Office. Running the Prime Minister's Office in military fashion revealed one of the basic problem of Israeli politics: the military's deep involvement. „The transition of retired officers into full-time politicians, and the involvement of active officers as full-time politicians (...)“ is unique to Israeli politics, has existed since the establishment of the state, and is now in unprecedented proportions. „They fill leading roles in the elections, government, public sector, state companies, local municipalities, etc.“ (Sheffer 2000)

5 Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, changes in social norms, characteristic of the current transitional period, have placed the Israeli army in an unfamiliar position, far different from what it was accustomed to for decades. Political processes, stemming from both external changes and internal political developments, have also contributed to this 'displacement' and have led the public to questioning the army's 'special' status in Israeli society. While responsible public criticism of the IDF should be voiced, nevertheless, developments over the last few years have pushed the army into an unprecedented vulnerable position. Ironically, as the peace process progresses, following the 1999 elections, it would be to the IDF's advantage to regain public confidence. The Jewish people in Israel have no 'alternative army'. If the IDF is to remain a unifying force in Israeli society, then it must be neutralized from involvement in politically explosive issues. This will require taking steps on a number of fronts.

On the legal front, *Basic Law: The IDF* must be expanded and reformed so that a precise demarcation between political and military turf

will be drawn up, as well as a clear definition of joint-responsibility in national defense.

On the political front, the IDF must avoid sensitive ideological issues, and focus its full concentration on military matters only. For example, in confrontations with Jewish settlers in the Occupied Territories, responsibility should fall on the shoulders of West Bank units of the Israeli police that were originally set up for dealing with this type of contingency. In addition, the army should eschew both over-involvement in negotiations with Syria and Lebanon, and divulging its professional recommendations to the public before presenting them to the government. This would allay decision-makers' feeling of pressure from an external influence.

On the bureaucratic front, it would be worthwhile for top government officials to announce that critical decisions will be made in the near future and that they will have recourse to the advisory mechanism granted them according to the *Basic Law: The Government*. This would require strengthening and enhancing the authority of the NSC that has lapsed into a deep crisis with the transfer of its director to another role. Attempts to usurp the NSC's independent functioning by high level elements in the Prime Minister's Office with military and security services backgrounds, appears to be a stumbling block in the decision-making process that the national leadership will soon require.

Also, socio-economic realities pose challenges that the political leadership will have to take into account. Economically, there is no guarantee that the army will continue to receive finances at the present level (almost 10 %) of the annual budget. Socially, a government-appointed, blue ribbon committee has pointed to the imbalance in IDF enlistment. Its recommendations could serve as a catalyst in the long run for ending obligatory military service. Even today, despite

compulsory enlistment into the regular army, nearly 50 % of the nation's manpower is not required to don uniform. The day is approaching when the IDF will find itself initiating a comprehensive study on the transition from a people's army to a volunteer professional army.

Last, but not least, a change must be made in the army's relations with the media. The IDF must be attentive to media's needs and the major role it plays in a democratic society, the army must learn to co-operate with it and derive benefit from its services.

This study has attempted to examine some of the processes and phenomena comprising the complex relationship between military, society, and state in Israel in the 1990s. A detailed, comprehensive survey, however, would be required for the entire picture to come into focus. One basic condition for a re-appraisal would derive, in my opinion, from the national leadership's capability, for the first time since the establishment of the state in 1948, to formulate a national security policy agreed upon by a majority of the social and political sectors in Israel. As long as society remains divided over the central questions facing the government, those in office will be hard pressed to fulfill their tasks. A generally accepted national security policy would allow its realization by the army and thus guarantee that preparations for the state's future challenges would be carried out properly. The IDF's status in society is indeed a major issue in Israeli history. Professional studies by the military will not suffice. Public discourse is necessary, now more than ever, for seeking answers to questions on the future of Israel's civil-military relations.

6 References

- Ben-Gurion, David (1971). Yichud Vi'Yi'ud. Ma'arachot Publishing House. [In Hebrew].
- Ben-Meir, Yehuda (1995). Civil-Military Relations in Israel. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Gelber, Yoav (1998). Civil-Military Relations in an Historical Perspective. Lecture Delivered at Haifa University during a Seminar on *The IDF and Society in Israel*. Haifa, 3 May 1998.
- Horowitz, Dan/Lissak, Moshe (1989). Trouble in Utopia - The Overburdened Polity of Israel. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Peri, Yoram (1998). The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations. Lecture Delivered at Haifa University during a Seminar on *The IDF and Society in Israel*. Haifa, 3 May 1998.
- Rabin, Yitzhak (1987). Israel's Security Policy after the Six-Day War. *Ma'arachot*, Vol. 34, No. 3-4, May 1987.
- Shachak, Amnon (1996). Speech at the First Annual Memorial of Rabin's Assassination. Tel Aviv, 3 November 1996.
- Sheffer, Gabriel (2000). Enough of Having the Country Run by Generals! *Ha'aretz*, 13 February 2000, Section B, p. 1. [In Hebrew].
- Tal, Israel (1996). The Few Against the Many. Tel Aviv: Dvir Publishing House. [In Hebrew].

Changing Civil-Military Relations in Eastern Europe: The Case of Romania

Marian Zulean

1 Introduction

After the end of the East-West conflict the Eastern European countries have been struggling to build market economies and democratic institutions. An important issue of democratization is the reform of the armed forces and changing civil-military relations. No one can assess the level of democratization without taking into consideration civil-military relations. Thus, the civilian control of the military has been seen as an important indicator of democratization. Internal and international actors have required the transformation of this relationship as well. In the case of Romania, public opinion as well as NATO have been asking for such a radical change. Now, after 10 years, it is very challenging to see how Eastern European countries, and Romania in particular, have succeeded in changing civil-military relations.

There is a scarcity of studies in Western literature dealing with the reform of the Romanian armed forces and the new Romanian civil-military relations. There are few studies on civil-military relations in Eastern Europe, for example articles in journals like *Armed Forces & Society* or anthologies like *Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist States* edited by Anton Bebler. None of them, however, mentioned the Romanian case. In 1989, the Romanian army contributed essentially to the overthrow of Communist dictatorship and the re-establishment of a democratic regime. Some expected that the military would establish a dictatorship. But the Romanian army, on the contrary, guarded the achievements of the revolution and contributed peacefully to democratization. The military leadership started a process of

reform back in 1990 and of building democratic civil-military relations after 1992 - before NATO's specific requirements for eligibility.

The aim of this study is to describe the dynamics of creating democratic civil-military relations in Romania in the context of globalization. What were the prevailing constraints on shaping the new civil-military relations? How does this relationship look like? These are the main questions this study will address. The study is descriptive and explorative. The first part of the study presents the theoretical framework. It elaborates more on factors such as public opinion, historical legacy, globalization and budgetary constraints. The second part is a description of the main achievements in issues like democratic control, civilian control of the military and the changes in structures and human resources.

2 Theoretical Framework

The state still remains the main actor in shaping security policy, but other actors, such as individuals, minority groups or international organizations are increasingly becoming relevant, too. Civil-military relations as an institutional component of a democratic security are understood as a complex mechanism to exercise democratic oversight over the army, civilian control by elected politicians, a more professional army and competent civil servants able to deal with security issues. But the process of transforming security policy and civil-military relations is a dynamic process in a dynamic world. Some factors facilitated by globalization have a great influence on the process. However, the transition has a cost and matching the transformations with the available resources is a great task for local policy-makers. Thus, the main factors that have influenced the shaping of a democratic security policy and democratic civil-military relations for Romania have been:

historical legacy, globalization (technological change, transnational and internal threats and collective efforts to combat them), public opinion and budgetary constraints. They will be discussed in detail below.

2.1 Historical Legacy

As Grzegorz Ekiert (1999) has shown, the historical legacies do matter in Eastern European transitions. First, these countries lacked middle and entrepreneurial classes, private property, legal tradition, pluralist political cultures and civil societies. Second, they were burdened by victimization, intolerance, and mistrust in authorities, political passivity and excessive welfare. Third, the rapidity of change produced uncertainty, power vacuums and a de-legitimization of public sphere. And lastly, the task of simultaneously changing the political, economic and social structures was overwhelming.

Historical tradition and cultural factors were also taken into consideration in the public debate on the institutionalization of the civilian control of the military. Despite the dictatorial rule in Romania, the country does not have a tradition of militarism. A regular army was established very late, in the third decade of the 19th century under the rule of Alexandru Ioan Cuza (1859-1866). Emerging norms of democratic control, such as the right of parliament to make inquiries and question the ministers, could be found in the first Romanian constitution of 1866. The most liberal constitution before the communist regime (1923) installed a real democratic control. Thus, the Supreme Council for Defense of the Country was established consisting of the Crown Prince, the President of the Council of Ministers and a few ministers. Also, a Court of Audit had the right to control all ministries. Unfortunately, this democratic pattern did not last long because the

Royal dictatorship established in 1938 changed the democratic Constitution and democratic control. A democratic civil-military relationship was re-established only after 1989.

The communist regime dismantled the existing professional army and established a unique party control through ‘commissars’, in the early stage, and the BOB secretaries¹ later on. Members of the Communist Party replaced the professional officers. The system of recruiting officers from the ‘working class’ weakened in the late 1960s. But the need to be member of the Communist Party and to have 2 years of experience as a worker in order to be eligible for a military career has continued until 1989. After 1965, Ceausescu adopted a more independent security policy inside the communist block. At the same time, he heightened his grip of the country and the Romanian people through the secret service (*Securitatea*). The military doctrine switched to a more ‘national’ orientation because Ceausescu realized that the ‘Communist’ ideology alone did not produce support for his personal dictatorship. Under Ceausescu’s tight control, the military lost power and influence. The majority of the armed forces accomplished economic tasks in agriculture and industry. The *Securitatea* became the main component of security policy. These policies led to a de-professionalization of the military.² In the meantime, civil society was also annihilated. Therefore, the major problems in reforming civil-military relations after 1989 were: (1) re-animating the tradition of democratic control; (2) a weak civil society and a lack of civilians

¹ BOB = Bureau of Basic Organization. Each military unit was a basic organization of the Communist Party. The party’s representative could control the commander of the unit and had a parallel chain of subordination directly to the Communist Party. It was one of the two means for controlling the military. The second one has been the counter-intelligence, another parallel service in the army, subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (*Securitatea*).

² For a more detailed description of civil-military relations during communism see, among others, the book written by Timothy Colton and Thane Gustafson *Soldiers and the Soviet State*, published in 1990, or Rudolf Joo’s (1996) *The Democratic Control of Armed Forces*.

with security expertise; and (3) an over-dimensional and mostly de-professionalized military.

2.2 Globalization

Changes in the security environment after the end of the East-West conflict have challenged the way in which both Western and Eastern Europeans shape their security policies. The nation-state and its traditional security policy are challenged by the increasing interdependence among states, and by the process of fragmentation. The process of increasing interdependence introduced new kinds of threats to the 'national' security. In the security area, people have become more aware of the forces of globalization. The time of relative certainty during the East-West conflict is over. New transnational and internal threats have emerged. As Jeffrey Simon has put it, „a security policy is more complicated to be realized now due to the fact that public perception of threats extends beyond the responsibility of a traditional military force“ (Simon 1998: 1).

Throughout history, the dissolution of the state has usually been a consequence of wars between states. Traditional explanations of why a state splits or disappears usually focus on historical cleavages along the lines of religion, ethnicity, language and culture. Another cause is an invasion by or departure of a foreign power. But the driving force that facilitates a country's disintegration and affects its sovereignty after the end of the East-West conflict is globalization. The more globalized the world becomes, the less traumatic it is for nationalists or social groups to split from their states. Globalization implies that borders become more porous to goods, ideas, capital and people. Moreover, country disintegration is enabled by integration on a supranational level.

Internal threats have been considered in Romania during the dictatorship, but the chances to prevail as a source of state failure have increased after 1989. If the government in transition, as in Romania, communicates that its mission is just to privatize, eliminate bureaucrats as requested by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank, those areas and citizens that most benefit or suffer from globalization may question how the state helps them (see Enriquez 1999: 44). The main forces that could challenge the Romanian state from within are ethnic minorities and losers of the transition to a market economy. Ethnic Hungarians make up for 8 % of the Romanian population and they represent 15 % of all the Hungarians living outside Hungary. The Romanian-Hungarian rivalry has historical roots and Hungarian revisionism was a main point of dispute during the Second World War. How Romanian policy-makers address these issues will be discussed below.

The main non-traditional threats triggered by globalization that affect Romania are: global terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime. Terrorism is as old as history is. It is not a new threat brought by globalization, but some characteristics of globalization such as open borders, free trade and the end of bipolarity have influenced the way in which the terrorists act. Before 1989, terrorism was a way to fight for 'national' identity as in liberation movements of the 1960s or in Northern Ireland and the terrorism was a one-way road. The targets were mostly the people of great powers. In modern times, dominated by nation-states, when a state was labeling a person a terrorist another state was calling him a hero. People like Golda Meir or Yasser Arafat were categorized both as terrorists and heroes. The new terrorism in a more interdependent world has two main characteristics: deregulation and privatization. The millionaire Osama ben Laden, a former CIA collaborator whose \$300 million fortune has been used to create terrorist training camps in Afghanistan, Somalia, Pakistan and Yemen,

epitomizes the privatization of terrorism. As a conclusion it can be stated that the globalization of terrorism is a consequence of its deregulation and adaptation to the effects of a globalizing world. Transnational terrorists benefit from modern communication systems and transportation, have global sources of funding, and are more familiar in the use of weapons. Romania has not been an important target of terrorist groups but the historical legacy of Ceausescu's friendship with leaders of 'rogue states', such as Gadaffi or Saddam Hussein, the infiltration of Kurds in Romanian small businesses and its strategic position as a bridge between Asia and Western Europe has increased the danger of terrorism for Romania.

Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking: Drug trafficking is a special case of organized crime. The international drug trade becomes more and more complex as new areas of drug cultivation and transit continue to emerge and international criminal syndicates take advantage of global communications, transportation and banking to mask their operations. During the communist regime Romania has been a drug free country. New for Romania is that the underground networks of the socialist economy have easily been involved in organized crime and drug trafficking. Opportunities for criminality and terrorism increased as a consequence of democratic freedom and openness. The transition to a market economy started from a scratch and presented a security void which was eagerly filled by organized crime.

The main source that is encouraging organized crime on Romanian territory is the war in former Yugoslavia. Russia is also a major source of the organized crime. In 1995, some 5.700 Russian criminal groups, with an average membership of 20, dominated major aspects of political, economic and social life in the former Soviet republics. The recent news on money laundering in a New York based Bank reveals the global dimension of Russian organized crime. As a result of organized

crime, political corruption in Romania is on the rise. Romanian territory is used as a transshipment route for narcotics after the break-up of Yugoslavia. One main logistic artery of the 'Balkan route' transports heroine from Southeast Asia to Turkey and runs from the Black Sea through Romania, Hungary to Western Europe. Therefore, Romanian policy-makers must take into consideration transnational threats and the new system of international security that is addressing those threats. In order to cope with these challenges Romania decided to apply for collective security within NATO. With NATO eligibility came new constraints, one being the necessity to create a democratic civil-military relationship. The NATO Engagement Study of 1995 indicated that civil governments should control their militaries, and possess certain levels of military capabilities and NATO interoperability.


2.3 Public Opinion and Security Policy

In democracies, public opinion influences government policies, and decision-makers who attempt to re-invent democratic civil-military relations have to be aware of this. Three major public opinion issues have had a strong influence on security policy: (1) confidence in the military; (2) threat perceptions; and (3) support for collective security (NATO).

The first issue is confidence in the armed forces. Beginning in 1995, the Soros Foundation has been publishing a quarterly Public Opinion Barometer. This barometer reveals an extraordinary thing: Regarding institutions, the Romanian public shows the most confidence in the church and in the armed forces (see for example Figure 1). It has to be mentioned that the May 1999 poll has been realized in a critical moment (the crisis in the Kosovo), when the Romanian government took

a decisive position, in a way against half of the population, and supported NATO actions. This confidence in the military can be explained either by cultural factors, such as historical legacy, patriotic education during the military service, or as a sign that the armed forces are one of the few institutions that can offer some model of order in a world in transition. The role of the military in the overthrow of Ceausescu's dictatorship also contributed to the positive attitude of the public towards the armed forces. This confidence has allowed decision-makers to start the process of reform and constitutes a benign factor in changing civil-military relations.

Figure 1: Confidence in Institutions



Source: Public Opinion Barometer, Open Society Foundation, May 1998 and May 1999

As regards the second issue, the perception of external threats, it can be stated that they influence civil-military relations through pressures for an obsessive security or a false one. Because in the last part of his dictatorship when Ceausescu realized the lack of popular support for communist ideas, he shifted the public discourse to a kind of

'national' communism. His propaganda exacerbated the danger of external threats in order to hide the weaknesses of the regime. This has created a very sensitive public perception of external threats. The public opinion barometer produced by the Paul Lazarsfeld Society in Vienna under the supervision of Richard Rose from Strathclyde University, in 1992 and 1996 shows the development of threat perceptions. How does the Romanian public perceive the danger of war? In 1992, the Romanian public was *obsessed* by: (1) a Russian danger (more than 60 % of population); (2) a war with an unspecified neighbor country; and (3) the danger of minorities as illoyal citizens (see Appendix 1). This could be explained not only by the influence of pre-transition variables (the influence of Ceausecu's obsessive propaganda as mentioned earlier) but also by the post-transition public debates on Russia's involvement in the Romanian revolution. The inter-ethnic strife, such as the street fights of Romanians and ethnic Hungarians in Tirgu-Mures in early 1990, has contributed to that obsession as well. In general, the perception of external dangers has decreased from 1992 to 1996 - with the notable exception of the perception of a Russian danger which still has been very high in 1996 (55 %).

How do Romanians perceive external threats compared to other Eastern Europeans? The general trend is similar. The only important difference is that Romanians perceive Russia as a great threat in 1992 and this perception remains high in 1996, while the other Eastern Europeans' perceptions regarding a Russian danger have slightly increased from 29 % to 39 %. But the opinions vary among countries. The leading group with extremely high levels of military distrust about Russia consists of Croatia and Poland (71 % in 1996) and Romania, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (around 60 %). The historical legacies can easily explain these data. The conclusions of Haerpfer, Wallace and Rose in their study on public perceptions in post-communist Europe is well to the point: „What is noticeable is that the region


divides into distinct blocks. The former Soviet states have far less fear and anxiety than do buffer zone states of Hungary, Poland, Czech and Slovak republics. High anxiety can also be found amongst Romanians and Slovenians. These are countries most eager to join the EU and NATO. They are also the countries, which have 'westernized' most in their economic and political reforms." (Haerpfer/Wallace/Rose 1997: 18) The last point is the perception of collective security as an instrument to resolve those security concerns. Is the elite proposal to join the most powerful alliance, i.e. NATO, shared by the public? In recent years, NATO has faced a kind of race among Eastern European states for admission. It seems that NATO is considered a sort of panacea to solve not only security concerns but also economic ones. A constantly high percentage of 75-80 % of the Romanian public support NATO membership which is the highest support among the Eastern Europeans (Central and Eastern Eurobarometer No. 7, 1997). The reasons given to explain the attitude vary. Half of the respondents consider NATO a guarantor of their security. Also, more than 11 % expect NATO to bring more general progress and cooperation.

2.4 Budgetary Constraints

One of the main constraints faced by Romanian decision-makers when reforming civil-military relations is how to match the available resources to an increasing request for security. The country's GDP has decreased continuously, with the exception of 1994-1995 when it grew slightly. This influenced the defense expenditures in real terms (Figure 2). In the early stage, the budgetary constraints have obliged the governments to pursue a re-allocation of resources to other economic sectors and to start an early reform of the armed forces. Thus, budgetary constraints have had a benign influence in beginning the reform and, indeed, the reduction of the military even went beyond the

Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) commitments. The reform impacted both on quantity and on quality and, for example, entailed the introduction of civilian control (in 1998 civilians occupied more than 600 positions of different level in the Ministry of Defence), the introduction of more sophisticated armaments and the process of professionalization.

Figure 2: The Evolution of Romanian Defense Expenditures (1990-1998)



Source: Ministry of National Defense Hyperlink. Available: <http://mil.loginet.ro>

3 The New Romanian Civil-Military Relations

Broadly speaking, civil-military relations are those interactions between the armed forces and society. They look different in different types of societies. The Western societies have developed a democratic civil-military relationship. The main indicators in describing the new pattern are: (1) the government direction of the military and the parliament's role in overseeing the executive branch and the military in particular; (2) the increased role of civil society; and (3) the reform of the structures with a focus on human resources reform.

3.1 Democratic Control

After 1989, Romania has, in general, been putting in place the democratic control of the armed forces, as codified by the OSCE. The missions of the armed forces are always to be consistent with the constitution, in execution as well as in planning. Of all the forms of democratic control the role of the parliament is the most complex and far-reaching one. The parliament continues to promulgate a host of laws in national defense, ranging from the organization of the Ministry of National Defense and Armed Forces to procedures for defense planning and the protection of conscripts. The parliament sees its authority as that of overseeing the activities of the military. It exercises its authority by requiring reports on military programs and activities and through its committees on Defense, Public Order and National Security. It also calls upon government officials such as the Minister of National Defense to answer specific questions related to national security. Romania's legislative approves defense budgets, which are kept low given the current economic environment. Defense expenditures are fully transparent to elected officials, including parliament. Members of the armed forces have to be politically neutral by law.

On the other hand, ethnic conflict is an important threat to security in the Balkan area but if ethnic minorities have all the rights and participate in political life the danger is reduced. The most important minority in Romania is the Hungarian one (see above). This minority established its own party (UDMR) and became part of the ruling coalition after 1996. The newly created agency, the Department of National Minorities is the governmental body in charge of promoting policies and strategies for the 17 national minorities that make up for 11 % of the Romanian population. The European and international community has positively appreciated this approach. During the Kosovo crisis, US President Bill Clinton congratulated the Romanian people and praised the political measures taken as a model for solving ethnic problems in the Balkans.

3.2 Civilian Control

The legal foundation for the civilian control of the military is rooted in the December 1991 constitution and elaborated in the July 1994 law on national defense. The President, the Defense Committees of parliament, and the Ministry of National Defense, including the General Staff and the military are primarily responsible for the country's defense. A civilian Minister of the Interior controls the Border Guard Forces which are the day-to-day monitors of Romania's borders and will be assigned to the Ministry of National Defense in times of war. The President is Commander-in-Chief and Chairman of the CSAT, an agency with responsibilities similar to those of the U.S. National Security Council (NSC). The President's position as Chairman of the CSAT gives him a major influence on national security affairs.

The General Staff is part of the Ministry of Defense and is subordinate to the civilian Minister of Defence. The Minister of Defence and his

civilian deputies have successfully asserted their control over the Ministry of National Defense bureaucracy and Romanian military officers have accepted the principle of civilian leadership as established by law. General Staff officers are becoming more effective at working together with civilians. Over 150 military positions in the Ministry of National Defense have been civilianized and the number is still increasing. In order to further civilian expertise, the Ministry of National Defense sends civilians as well as military officers to its National Defense College. The Ministry is concentrating on attracting young professionals into positions as career civil service employees. There are quite a few foundations and organizations interested in security policy, such as the Manfred Woerner Association, the Civil Society Foundation and the Eurisc. At the same time, the influence of civil society is growing in this field.

3.3 Reform of the Military Structures

The reform of Romania's armed forces began back in 1990. A lot has been accomplished in a relatively short time and with few resources. However, resources have also been directed to costly new technologies rather than to less glamorous but more essential restructuring programs. This has complicated the effort to complete the restructuring by the target date of 2005. The reform priorities have focused on four key areas: (1) human resources reform, especially involving the officers and the NCO corps; (2) upgrading national C3I systems and making them interoperable with NATO standards through the acquisition of the STAR system; (3) enhancement of air defense capabilities, including installing new FPS 117 radar sets and IFF equipment and opening the Air Sovereignty Operations Center (ASOC); and (4) infrastructure upgrading oriented toward NATO forces operating in Romania.

The armed forces are directed by a General Staff and consist of three Services: land forces, air and air defense forces, and naval forces. In addition, protection forces are organized for the immediate local defense in times of hostilities. All the units of the three services are attached to one of four operational categories: surveillance and early warning forces, reaction forces, main defense forces, or reserve forces. Assignment to one of these categories determines a given unit's access to resources, personnel, equipment and training. Romania established the rapid reaction force (RRF) in April 1997 and it is still in development. It is designed to be a joint force of land, air and naval forces and is scheduled to be complete by the year 2000. However, it is not expected to be fully operational until 2003. A total of 23.000-25.000 servicemen in single service brigade-size units are to be assigned under a joint headquarter. While the RRF is conceptually sound and will be adequately sized for Romania's immediate security needs, most units earmarked do lack basic equipment. For example, peacekeeping units lack modern ground surveillance radars or night vision devices, and logistics units are rather fix-based than mobile providers.

On the other hand, Romania has broadened its international commitments by participating in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, such as UNOSOM II (Somalia), UNAVEM III (Angola), ALBA (Albania), and SFOR and IFOR (Bosnia). However, funding constraints continue to be a serious brake on all aspects of the reform process, including restructuring, training, maintenance, modernization and procurement programs, quality of life enhancements, and base realignment. The most important issue in changing civil-military relations is the reform of human resources. In 1997, the Ministry of National Defense elaborated a *Concept of Human Resource Management* which is very clear-cut. The human resources management system is integrated into the global system of military body management; these resources have the same status as other resources of the defense

strategic management. The new concepts and principles of the military careers are, among others, the following: (1) re-definition of each military category; (2) re-dimensioning of the officers/NCO ratio; (3) re-hierarchization of ranks and functions in order to re-establish motivation; (4) adoption of short-career as complementary for the only existing long career; (5) re-conversion of de-mobilized personnel; and (6) a new status for civilians.

The restructuring of manpower of the armed forces is solved by promoting the quantitative decrease of forces and technique and the simultaneous qualitative improvement of the acquisitions. Also, personnel training is optimized as well as the conceptions for the use of force and for the application of procedures. Recently Minister of Defence Victor Babiuc presented *The Program of Re-structuring and Modernization of Romanian Armed Forces*. According to this program, by the year 2003 the total personnel will comprise 112.000 militaries and 28.000 civilians. The main way to de-mobilize a surplus of 14.000 officers is by retirement and by a step-by-step demobilization. The last strategy allows the creation of an active reserve. Almost 5.000 officers will be included in that reserve annually. By the year 2010, more than 50 % of the armed forces will be professionals. This applies equally to the three services: the army, the air force and the navy, each one with its particular organization, logistics and missions, but acting in a unified manner under the principles established by the Romanian Military Strategy.

4 Conclusions and Policy Implications

After ten years of transition it can be stated that democratic civil-military relations have been put in place in Romania as well as in Eastern Europe at large. The Romanian way of doing so has been diffe-

rent compared to the other Eastern European countries, depending on the specific Romanian circumstances, but the outcome is relatively similar. In the case of Romania, historical legacy has been a negative issue only in the early stage of changing the civil-military relationship. The most important influence of moving to more democratic civil-military relations has been the NATO policy of enlargement. If the NATO requirement for a democratic civil-military relationship has been the 'carrot' for initiating change, the awareness of transnational threat has been the 'stick'. Public opinion, by its high confidence, supported the reform of the military, but the 'obsession' of external threats was a real obstacle in the early 1990s. The project of NATO integration has been highly supported by the public, too. Unfortunately, the budgetary constraints were and still are a big issue on rapid change.

The spotlight of the Romanian reform of the military is the human resources reform. The goals are very clear-cut and the legal framework has been established, but there are financial problems to put it in practice. The study showed that there is an imperious need to define a clear concept of democratic security and, subsequently, a democratic civil-military relationship. Since NATO enlargement has been the most important factor in moving the reform forward, the concept of democratic civil-military relations could be seen as an effect of globalizing forces. In order to work properly further efforts have to be undertaken. First of all, policy analysts should operationalize the concept of civil-military relations and come up with an instrument to measure the quality of civil-military relations. Also Romanian decision-makers should be aware that civil-military relations are dynamic and not static. Thus, the civil-military relationship is something which needs to be constantly worked at, enriched and improved. Its institutionalization has to move from a 'legal' approach of establishing the institutions

to an 'educational' approach of training and experiencing the mechanism of democratic civil-military relations.

For the West, the policy implications seem to be the following: During the Kosovo crisis Romania has proved its strategic importance and the fact that civilian control worked. Since democratic civil-military relations are a desirable goal in the transition to democracy a coherent and substantial program to give financial assistance for specific projects, such as the Romanian Human Resources Management, should be promoted through the World Bank or bilateral assistance (USAID). As regards the policy implications for *Romanian policy-makers* the following seems appropriate: Since the democratic civil-military relationship is still fragile the decision-makers should analyze the weaknesses and strengths and continue to improve it. It seems that some measures taken and the involvement of minorities in security policy have been implemented under external pressures. A more coherent and pro-active policy is necessary.

5 References

- Babiuc, V. (1999). Un mare avantaj al MapN - o reforma a inceput din proprie initiativa. (A Great Advantage of MoD - the Reform Started on its Own Initiative). *Revista*, 22: 14, 6-7.
- Bebler, A. (1997). *Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist States*. Westport, Conn. - London: Praeger.
- Bugajski, J. (1998). *Key Elements of Romania's Security Strategy*. *CSIS Policy Paper*.
- Buzan, B./Weaver, O./de Wilde, J. (1998). *Security. A Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, Col. - London: Lynne Rienner.
- Colton, T.J./Gustafson, T. (1990). *Soldiers and the Soviet State*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

- Cotidianul (1999). Reforma fara bani sub mandatul lui Babiuc (The Reform without Money under the Babiuc Mandate), October 15.
- Cunningham, G. (1997). EU and NATO Enlargement: How Public Opinion is Shaping up in Some Candidate Countries. *NATO Review*, 45: 3, 16-18.
- Diaconescu, G./Serban, F./Pavel, N. (1996). Democratic Control over Army in Romania. Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedica.
- Donnelly, C. (1997). Developing a National Strategy for the Transformation of the Defense Establishment in Post-Communist States. *Central European Issues*, 3: 2.
- Ekiert, G. (1999). Do Legacies Matter? Patterns of Post-Communist Transitions in Eastern Europe. *Woodrow Wilson Center Occasional Paper* No. 53, June, Washington, D.C.
- Enriquez, J. (1999). Too Many Flags? *Foreign Policy*, 116, 30-40.
- Haerpfer, C./Wallace, C./Rose, R. (1997). Public Perceptions of Threats to Security in Post-Communist Europe. Glasgow: University of Strathclyde.
- Huntington, S.P. (1957). *The Soldier and the State*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Huntington, S.P. (1997). The Erosion of American National Interest. *Foreign Affairs*, 76: 5, 28-49.
- Joo, R. (1996). The Democratic Control of Armed Forces. *Chaillot Paper 23*, Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies.
- Kaplan, R. (1998). Europe's Fulcrum State. *The Atlantic Monthly*, 282: 3, 28-36.
- Mediafax News Agency. (1999). Russia e cea mai mare amenintare militara pentru Romania (Russia is the Biggest Military Threat to Romania). April 21.
- Open Society Romania. Public Opinion Barometer (1995-1997). <http://www.sfos.ro/pob/jun98/index.html>
- Public Relations Directorate, Romanian Ministry of Defense (1998). *Romanian Armed Forces - A Partner For the Future*. Bucharest.

Simon, J. (1998). Central And East European Security. New National Concepts and Defense Doctrines. *Strategic Forum* No. 151, December, Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Security Studies.

New Roles for the Armed Forces and the Concept of Democratic Control

Wilfried von Bredow & Gerhard Kümmel

1 Introduction

According to Clausewitz, the armed forces function as an instrument of the modern state. They are formed, paid for and utilized in the name of the state's security, primarily but not exclusively for its external security against threats by other states. This *defensive* role is complemented by another one which has gradually lost its legitimacy during the 20th century - the role of attacking another state's territory in order to incorporate it into one's own realm or to gain or exercise hegemony (*aggression*).

Towards the end of this century, these traditional roles seem to have lost some of their political relevance. This is the case in some macro-regions of the world, Europe among them. The public discourse in many European countries tends to dismiss the armed forces as a central institution of state. Without a direct potential threat or the intention to use the armed forces as a means to threaten other states, governments and public opinion alike are drawn to reduce and restructure the armed forces.¹ There is a popular demand for further steps towards disarmament. The number of armed conflicts and wars in the world, especially those at the periphery of Europe are, however, a serious

¹ Currently, the most devastating debate (from the armed forces' perspective) seems to be in Sweden. The insecurity about the future scope and profile of the military organization in this country is enhanced by rising doubts about the traditional concept of neutrality and non-alignment in the country's security policy. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Feb. 1, 1999.

warning. These conflicts and wars develop a considerable spill-over effect into the zones of peaceful everyday life. There is also a rather dark side of globalization, as threats and risks of security have also grown to global dimensions. No safe fire-walls exist between conflict regions and the rest of the world. Peaceful societies have become more vulnerable to various sorts of violent threats.

In order to prevent these negative effects and to contain local violence, concepts of humanitarian intervention, peacemaking and peacekeeping missions are discussed and prepared. These missions usually comprise civil and military elements. With regard to the long history of warfare and military actions, the roles of the military in such missions are not completely new, but they are, indeed, in many respects different from the military roles we usually think of when dealing with modern armed forces. This is especially true for the North Atlantic theater of the East-West conflict after 1945.

The armed forces of the states in this area (some of which are among the leading actors in the international system) are thus far from losing political relevance, while gaining new importance by taking over new and non-traditional roles. This concerns not only the armed forces of the great and middle powers but also those of smaller states which are trying to redefine their place in the international order in an affirmative and constructive way. The various aspects of change in the national and international politico-military balances are difficult to identify and disentangle. Contradictions and wishful thinking characterize many contributions to the current debate. In this paper, I discuss some of the political changes which affect the arms profession in most Western societies. Their military forces are becoming increasingly involved in multinational missions which are quite different from traditional warfare or deterrence. One of their salient features is the entanglement of

civil and military aspects of the missions. This creates problems both on the normative and the operational level.

These problems do not only challenge the conventional wisdom of the practitioner in the field, but also of the military sociologist. For some of the more fundamental concepts of the discipline, among them the concept of national legitimacy of the armed forces and the concept of civilian control, have to be reconsidered.

2 Organized Violence in a National, Regional, and Global Framework

Before looking more deeply into the consequences of this new or at least recently reemphasized set of military roles in politics, it may be helpful to think about the structural changes in the sphere of politics. Any challenge of the armed forces as an instrument of politics and as an organization performing certain missions is defined by the political system of a society. Societies, organized as states, and the international system are the principal sources of change in the military.

The nature of politics has certainly not changed but that is probably the only stable continuity upon which we can build. The end of the East-West conflict is more than just the end of one specific conflict between great powers and their respective alliances. It is the beginning of a post-modern interlude in world politics. The current international system is different from the bipolar system we were used to. Not only has the number of actors in the international system grown considerably, but also the number of categories of actors. This demonstrates that the states seem to be losing a certain part of their structural strength in politics.

In order to have a name for these changes, some scholars in International Relations use the term *end of the Westphalian system*. This system developed in the 17th century in Europe. At its core is the sovereign state, defined by territory, borders, population, and internal order. The state exercises a monopoly over legal physical violence and is responsible for law-making, the settlement of disputes, and law enforcement. The international system is mainly an inter-state system. It is anarchical in as far as there are no political authorities above the state. States can rely on their power and on their leaders' ability to make rational use of it. International politics are dominated by the national interests of states and how to best realize these interests. Conflicts between states are settled by power either in a diplomatic or, if regarded as effective and comparatively cheaper, in a military way.

The Westphalian system is characterized by the actors' attempts to mutually balance their power, political and military alliances to provide for collective defense, and a minimalist set of binding rules for the behavior of states. The principles of this modern state system have frequently been disregarded in the centuries following the 1648 peace treaty of Münster and Osnabrück. Using this model as a basis, one can analyze how this system expanded from Europe to the rest of the world.

During this century, however, the structures and principles of the globalizing Westphalian system changed deeply. And in the recent past, the key pillars of the Westphalian system even seem to be cracking. The main reasons for this development are the growing difficulty of (most) states to effectively organize their societies, to remain the central institution of their citizens' loyalty, and to provide sufficient protection against risks and threats from beyond the borders. National economies are becoming increasingly interdependent which diminishes the ability of a state bureaucracy to plan and implement a national

economic policy. Ecological problems can only be dealt with on a macro-regional or global scale - states as single actors are mostly incapable of ecological problem-solving. To resort to war as a traditional step in a mixed strategy in order to realize national interests has become either illegal or much too expensive. (Bredow 1998)

This development includes both optimistic and pessimistic aspects. A bleak outlook into the future stresses the anarchical and disorderly features of the current international system, in which violence remains a most important ingredient of power. On the other hand, optimists among political science experts point to the wave of democratization after the end of the East-West conflict. They claim that democratic societies would have serious problems mobilizing their citizens for the purpose of waging war if the military enemy were also a democratic society. They conclude that the risk of war among authentic democracies is almost zero. (Russett 1993) Even if it is still too early for the assumption of a universally valid 'law' of democratic peace, it is hardly contestable that inside some macro-regions of the planet (such as North America since the 19th century or Western Europe since the end of World War II) inter-state war is no longer a meaningful political option for policymakers. This is, however, only part of the overall assessment of future violence. In some regions, organized violence and war will accompany human kind into the next millennium. Even in Europe, border conflicts and inter-ethnic wars continue to occur. On some continents, internal wars have become quite 'normal', as have military coups and periods of military dictatorships.

In an attempt to give an overview of the various names and concepts of the military conflicts that fall into this category, Roger Beaumont lists among others: *dirty war*, *guerilla war*, *insurgency/counterinsurgency*, *limited war*, *proxy war*, *surrogate war*, and *low-intensity operations*. (Beaumont 1993: 20-23) These wars are to a

large degree intrastate conflicts between comparatively weak governments and comparatively strong opponents, and they are, indeed, predominantly *small wars*. They may, however, easily escalate into major threats for third parties, either in the neighborhood or elsewhere. The conflicts in question become militarized not because of the strength of a state but instead due to its instability and weakness. When a state is unable to integrate the interests of different groups, when it lacks the ability to contain internal tensions and sustain law and order, the consequence might well be the outbreak of internal clashes and civil wars. Small wars or *wars of a third kind* are usually local wars. Territorial control plays an important role in these wars, but mainly on the level of official war objectives and the motivation to fight. The fighting itself can be transferred into other regions, e.g. into the urbanized parts of the world. There are enough examples which illustrate this horizontal escalation - the struggle between radical Kurds and Turks in Germany, acts of terrorism of certain African fundamentalist groups in Western Europe, etc.

These wars are certainly not a completely new phenomenon, and the literature on guerilla warfare of the past few decades provides a vast array of empirical material to study their tactics and strategy. They combine primitive warfare and cruelty with high-tech sophistication and ultra-modern propaganda and their intensity ranges from sporadic terrorism to secretly prepared genocide.

3 The End of the Mass Army and the Extended Set of Roles for the Military

A generation of military sociologists and military practitioners has been discussing the consequences of the decline of the mass armed forces in modern (Western) societies and of the bureaucratization of

their organization. In 1981, one observer expressed the dominating wisdom of the discipline in the phrase: „In short, the military profession as a whole has become similar to large bureaucratic, non-military institutions. It has, in effect, become civilianized.“ (Harries-Jenkins/Moskos 1981: 11) This organizational evolution has continued. The trend towards smaller, highly professional armed forces received a strong push at the end of the East-West confrontation. The majority of NATO countries either have abolished general conscription or are, with few exceptions, on the brink of doing so. (Haltiner 1998)

The military element of a modern state's security policy is embedded in a larger set of non-military doctrines on the protection of national interests in international relations. „In assessing international power today, factors such as technology, education, and economic growth are becoming more important, whereas geography, population, and raw materials are becoming less important.“ (Nye 1990: 179) This is probably too rash an evaluation of recent developments in international politics. It is, however, a wide-spread opinion among policy experts. And it provides the basis for most of the concepts of peace among democracies, the further rise of the trading state, and the decline of military power.

All this, however, does not mean that the process of *civilianization* of the armed forces will eventually lead to the dissolution of the essentially military nature of the armed forces. On the contrary, the most sophisticated armed forces of the next decades will be characterized by both military professionalism and the integration of typically *civil* perceptions and attitudes in their performance. This central hypothesis is surrounded by others like the following:

- a) The period of large-scale inter-state wars seems to have come to an end.
- b) Organized violence and war are going to accompany human kind into the next millennium. The kind of war which will be most prominent in the years to come will be quite different from traditional inter-state warfare. It will be a small, mostly intra-state kind of war.
- c) The violence which emerges from such a constellation is ignited by the enormous energy of collective hatred. Ethnic cleansing has become an ordinary end of such violence which turns into the most terrible violation of human beings short of genocide. The fighting in such *small wars* is also characterized by a kind of semi-professionalism in terrorizing and killing people. The individuals and groups taking part in these actions are often civilians, and their violence is mainly directed against other civilians. Compliance with international conventions and war-conduct law is often neglected in wars of this kind.
- d) Most of these conflicts are decidedly of a local nature. It is, however, hardly - or even not at all - possible to contain them in their local environment.
- e) The violation of local or regional peace can easily escalate into threats to international security and order. This is one aspect of the current and not really satisfying debate about the possibilities and limits of military intervention. (On this debate see, inter alia, de Bressy 1995; Hoffmann 1995/96; Mott 1996; Chavret 1997; Moore 1998; Kümmel 1999; Daniel/Hayes/De Jonge Oudraat 1999) Globalization may breed spill-over crises. It is therefore reasonable for governments with an interest in the maintenance of international order to think about military intervention in the name of international order. The United Nations Organizations should be the most suitable institution for debating and possibly preparing such interventions.

- f) Besides political reasons *strictu sensu* (motivations of national interest in the functioning of the international system), there is also another category of reasons which may induce a government to intervene with armed forces in a local war - moral reasons. Globalization and the mobilizing power of globalized media reports on atrocities against human beings in a violent local conflict generate a fragile and superficial, but sometimes also highly emotional determination in the public of other countries to provide humanitarian help and to punish the perpetrators and mass murderers - if necessary using military means. When the political and moral reasons for such government or the somewhat euphemistically named *international community* do not converge, the result is an embarrassment which everyone tends to forget as quickly as possible.
- g) The armed forces of several countries have entered a process of deep structural changes which already allow for a broad range of military missions beyond traditional missions of deterrence and defense. Charles Moskos has pointed to the fact that the armed forces of the United States have, in the two years following the end of the Gulf War in March 1991, been deployed in more than 20 different operations, few of which had traditional objectives. „To the success of most of these operations, administrative and logistical skills, not to mention health-care and social work skills, were far more important than tactical insight, marksmanship, or courage under fire.“ (Moskos 1993/94: 84)

The Swiss military writer and former general, Gustav Däniker was one of the first to paint the outline of the new soldier of the 21st century. Although he did not shy away from some occasionally irritating radical idealism, his depictions are provocative in the most positive sense. Here are (with some additions) some of his propositions for the future (or futuristic?) soldier:

- The armed forces will have to fulfill mainly functions of prevention, intervention and restoration of order. Deterrence and traditional fighting will become secondary.
- The ultimate goal of the military theater is no longer victory, but the creation of suitable conditions for comprehensive and stable peace settlements which integrate former enemies.
- War criminals will have to be caught by the armed forces which will act like a police force. These persons will be brought before an international criminal court and will be held personally responsible for their violations of the law.
- Military intervention by third parties in a local conflict is the first step of a reconciliation process.
- The 'enemy' is not to be defeated and destroyed, but his actions have to be stopped in order to prepare him for a kind of reeducation.
- The soldiers are not allowed to think and behave according to purely military norms and rules. At least among the officer corps a genuine ability to think in political and diplomatic terms will become part of their education and training.
- Flexibility and multi-functionality are becoming as important on the battlefield as fire and mobility.

The essence of the new missions is captured in the terms *protect, help, save*. In a less romantic terminology, we speak of *Military Operations Other Than War* (MOOTW). The keyword for these changes would be *constabularization* of the military. It is important to keep in mind that this element of the armed forces' functions does not *replace* their traditional missions (deterrence and defense) but *complements* them.

4 Cooperative Security and Military Multilateralism

A more penetrating analysis of the extended set of roles of the armed forces and their new missions reveals that there are only few genuinely new functions for the military. What is usually referred to as *new missions* today does not necessarily mean that it is non-traditional. On the other hand, these new missions present themselves as considerable challenges for the self-perception and the organization of the armed forces of most countries in Europe as the armed forces in Europe were mostly concentrating on deterrence and defense from 1945 until the end of the East-West conflict.² It may, therefore, be justified to call these missions new and non-traditional, but only in this limited sense.

Watching the development of the security landscape in Europe, the Transatlantic macro-region and world-wide, it becomes clear that it is not so much the set of missions itself which is new and non-traditional but the political and military-strategic context in which the armed forces are bound to perform their operations. The contextual change can be traced on two levels, the emergence of macro-regional *cooperative security* and the necessity of *military multilateralism*.

4.1 Macro-regional cooperative security

With several important exceptions (mostly deriving from the breakdown of multiethnic Soviet-style socialist regimes) the security landscape of the Transatlantic macro-region³ is characterized by the firm

² Most people use the term Cold War when talking about the period from 1945 to 1990. In order not to level the distinction between less and more cooperative phases of that period (which were, at the time, called respectively Cold War and Détente) we prefer the term East-West conflict.

³ The territorial range of this region reaches from Vladivostok to Vancouver. The various documents by the CSCE/OSCE on principal political issues can be regarded as its political „constitution“.

and basically reliable determination of the states involved to take part in a multilevel effort to maintain peaceful intra-regional relations. This implies the renunciation of intra-regional violence and of military threats against each other. In spite of the already mentioned important exceptions and the severe problems concerning the social and economic stability of some countries, the general tendency towards a macro-regional system of common and cooperative security is indisputably dynamic. This is, *inter alia*, reflected in the structures of security relations in the region, by a host of organizations, multilateral agreements and attempts to integrate the security interests and outlooks of all parties concerned.

The exceptions and problems in the territories of the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia overshadow, up to a certain degree, the otherwise optimistic perspective on the future of Transatlantic macro-regional security cooperation. There is no easy solution for them, which means that they will accompany us into the next decade. As tragic as they are for the innocent people at the trouble spots, it is also evident that they provide an intra-regional trial-and-error demonstration for extra-regional militarily-enhanced peace diplomacy. Furthermore, the relative assurance⁴ of cooperative security is a kind of prerequisite for the armed forces of the countries in the region to redefine their missions and redirect their priorities. One step in this double process is to recognize that the traditional mission of territorial defense has lost its highest-priority status.

⁴ In politics, relative assurance is probably the best you can get. What Baroness Thatcher likes to call Thatcher's First Law of Politics - the unexpected happens, and when it does, you had better be prepared - sums up old political wisdom in the Hobbesian tradition.

4.2 Military Multilateralism

Military multilateralism itself is all but a new phenomenon. The most important wars of the past centuries have been wars between coalitions of states. International security organizations like NATO or WEU are only the most advanced examples of this tradition. Governments want to lead their states into such alliances because they are convinced that this fits the national interest.⁵ Common military operations under the mandate of the UN Security Council or one of their regional organizations have to be distinguished from those traditional coalitions and alliances. Peacekeeping and peacemaking, humanitarian intervention and the surveillance of peaceful transformations in a battered society are multilateral military operations where the national interest of the participating states is *secondary*. Primarily, they are performed in order to serve the interests of the victims of violent local conflicts. They are also motivated by a strong albeit not very consistent and patient normative interest on the parts of the intervening states. Their leaders and in most cases even more fervently the public do not want to become bystanders to a humanitarian catastrophe.⁶

These operations are by definition multilateral operations. Their legitimation rests upon: *first* the affirmation of the world opinion that something has to be done. *Secondly* it depends upon the successful efforts to form a coalition of states whose governments agree to have

⁵ Recent examples for this kind of political move in the name of the national interest are the proclaimed intentions of countries like Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and others to become members of NATO.

⁶ Humanitarian catastrophes like those in Somalia or Rwanda still have to be perceived as being „likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security“ according to Article 37 (2) of the Charter of the United Nations. It is only then that the Security Council is free to act. These terms refer to a world of sovereign states which is, of course, partly fictitious. They are, however, easily transferable to the more realist world of state and non-state actors in which we live today. It is hardly conceivable how anyone today could perceive a genocidal situation or a civil war with thousands of people being killed, mutilated or starved to death as not endangering international peace and security.

their armed forces participate in an operation which is supported by the *international community*. On balance, peace operations and other non-traditional missions of the armed forces have not been very successful. The general expectations of immediate positive results have for the most part not been met. In many instances the intervening armed forces were not only unable to restore peace, but actually created new problems. Some of these problems emerged as political scandals in their home countries, e.g. in the case of the Canadian Airborne Battle Group in Somalia in 1993, or in the case of a Dutch Battalion with UNPROFOR in Bosnia in 1995.

In spite of these events, peace operations with military components remain popular. Nearly all important groups⁷ in the public debates *before* the start of such operations want to bring armed forces into the conflict zone, although usually for quite different reasons. Once the general decision to send an armed contingent into a conflict zone has been made, a host of difficulties arises. The mandate has to be defined as clearly as possible. Command relationships must remain as simple as possible despite the multilateral character of the operation. The rules of military engagement must be understood by all actors in the conflict zone. Communication with the political managers of the mission and with the international media has to be institutionalized. Communication and cooperation with non-governmental organizations and the conflicting parties have to be deepened. (Allard 1996; Moskos 2000)

⁷ Orthodox pacifist groups and some grumbling traditionalists in the officer corps of the armed forces are probably the only exceptions.

4.3 Organizational Aspects

NATO can certainly be regarded as a multinational security alliance. The limits of multinationality were, however, always quite clear and visible. „By not pushing ‘multinationality’ below the corps level (of course, not taking into account ACE Mobile Force (Land) and Corps LANDJUT), the Alliance conveniently avoided contentious debates over the exceedingly sensitive and complicated matters.“ (Whitford/Durell Young 1997: 35) It is still difficult to deal with these „sensitive and complicated matters“ in the framework of a successful military alliance after half a century of cooperative experience. From this, we can suspect that for military contingents in peace support operations the demand for „instant multinationalism“ poses a nearly unsurmountable problem. The experience of the UN in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s did not boost confidence in the effectiveness of multinational forces.

An example from one peace operation may illustrate the enormous difficulties in forging „instant multinationalism“ of the various national contingents. When IFOR (NATO’s first „out-of-area“ military operation) was about to start, an immediate and paramount necessity was to install communications interoperability. The operation Joint Endeavour Interoperability eventually managed to do this, but it took months of coordination and planning among the participating nations and NATO. A multitude of communications systems had to be brought together to form a cohesive and effective communications and data exchange network capable of supporting the IFOR commander and his staff. (Swan 1997: 187) And this is only one aspect. A thoroughly composed recent study lists the following challenges for an ad hoc multinational peace force (Palin 1995: 34-50):

- the rules of engagement;
- headquarters organization and structure;

- intelligence;
- standardization;
- language;
- logistics;
- deployment;
- training and exercising;
- personnel policies;
- attitudes towards the media.

A Swedish study presents a slightly different list of key issues in multinational peacekeeping (Ahlquist 1996):

- cooperation between civilian and military components of a peace mission;
- UN versus national control of troops;
- quality of troops and equipment;
- language and cultural differences;
- control of logistics;
- the impact of information;
- cooperation with and coordination of specialized agencies and NGOs and PVOs (Private Voluntary Organizations).

Evidently, the problems of cooperation between armed forces of different nationalities can be minimized by their institutionalization, which is important. However, this is not the only motive for the process of transforming the existing superficial multinationalism of NATO or of some European countries into some kind of new military inter/multi/transnationalism. NATO thus underwent an impressive structural transformation. NATO's combined joint task forces (CJTF) can be described as multinational, multi-service, task-tailored forces capable of rapid deployment to conduct limited duration peace operations beyond Alliance borders, under the control of either NATO's integrated military structure or the Western European Union (WEU).

However, a recent account of the still considerable gap between the „theory“ of CJTF and their build-up comes to rather skeptical conclusions about their real capacities. (Barry 1997) NATO is a transatlantic and interregional alliance, and one of its most important political and military functions remains to form an institutional bridge between the USA and Europe. This sometimes interferes with the attempts by Europeans to create a regional European security zone. (Howorth 1997)

The most spectacular effort to multinationalize national armed forces has been undertaken by the French and Germans in creating the German-French brigade. (Klein 1998) In today's Europe, national armed forces are often integrated on the Corps level - there is Eurocorps (with French, German, Belgian, Spanish and Luxemburgian contributions), there is a German-Netherlands Corps, and there is also a German-US Corps, which emphasizes the traditional transatlantic links of Germany's security policy. Supporting the concept of NATO enlargement, a multinational corps with Danish, German, and Polish contingents is being formed. The common *contingent language* of its staff will be English. (Klein/Kümmel 2000)

5 Democratic Control

Military sociologists use the concept of *civilian control* in order to describe the norms, attitudes and rules which should guarantee the primacy of the political (civil) over the military leadership of the armed forces. The armed forces are obviously a *dangerous* organization - they are supposed to be well equipped with instruments for violence, they are well trained, easily mobilized and placed in a position to threaten potential or actual enemies. Every society and every political system therefore needs some efficient devices to keep this organization under control. As David Segal has put it: „The central issue in

theories of civil-military relations is that of civilian control of the military.“ (Segal 1994: 40) When *civilian control* is overruled by the military, it usually results in the imminent danger of military coups or military dictatorships. The attempt to integrate a society by means of military norms and values (often accompanied by virtual or openly demonstrated terror) can be called *militarism*. (Bredow 1983)

The concept of *civilian control* is useful when we analyze civil-military relations on a relatively general level. It does not, however, provide distinctions between societies according to the degree of their democratization. Totalitarian dictators in the 20th century were very successful in domesticating the armed forces. They used instruments such as ideological infiltration, propaganda, positive sanctions and also terror and purges in order to keep the armed forces under tight control.

Civilian control refers only to the formal relations between a society, its political system and the armed forces. If we want to find out if a given model of civil-military relations is compatible with the fabric of the democratic society, we need a more normative concept. It may not come as a surprise that I propose to call this concept *democratic control*. Democratic control comprises all formal norms and rules, laws and regulations which are designed to integrate the organization of the armed forces into the democratic political system and the soldiers, especially the officer corps, into the democratic political culture.

6 Outlook: Democratic Control of Multinational Missions

Multinational peace missions are characterized by the cooperation of armed forces of different nations. Their military and civil components must be fine-tuned in order to avoid misunderstandings and

counterproductive actions. The objectives of such peace missions (humanitarian help; stop the violence; surveillance of cease-fires; mediation between the local war parties, etc.) are usually surrounded by an aura of *dense legitimacy* and operating under enormous time pressure. The expectations in those countries which send the troops into the trouble spot are high. This implies the danger of a sudden change in public opinion. If the mission is becoming „too expensive“ (e.g. in terms of lives of soldiers) or the local parties are „ungrateful“, the same public which just recently pressed for humanitarian intervention is now pressing for a withdrawal. Difficulties within the mission or severe problems and scandals in the ranks of the multinational force can quickly darken the image of the armed forces. „Peace angels“ may thus become „traitors“ of the mission. These soldiers may then be regarded with mistrust after returning home, as were the veterans from the Vietnam War.

It is not difficult to compose voluminous lists of shortfalls and mistakes that multinational missions have to avoid. They fall into two categories. First, organizational difficulties, and secondly difficulties of democratic control. Democratic control of multinational peace missions refers to every one of their components, not just the armed forces, although the armed forces are often the most consequential and most visible part of such missions. They are also their most powerful part, thus it is only logical that they are the main objective of democratic control.

It should be mentioned that in some countries with a traditionally strong democratic control of the armed forces the distance between civilian society and the military has increased. This is demonstrated in part by the abolition or suspension of universal conscription in some European countries. This debate is also occurring in the United States, and not only among experts. (Holsti 1998/99) These developments are

caused by many different factors. However, they do not yet indicate a breakdown of democratic control of the armed forces in Western nations, but do indicate that democratic control of multinational peace missions is going to become even more difficult. Cultural differences, different political and military cultures and a different understanding of norms, values and the common interest of the intervening forces demand permanent supervision. This is even more necessary when the peace mission is also permanently scrutinized by the international media.

Democratic control therefore has to be institutionalized in the mission itself, in such a way that even during stressful times of a difficult mission, this control does not break down. Furthermore, the national mechanisms of democratic control have to function without any interruption during those missions. Special attention must be paid to the political aspects of the mission, as well as to the training of soldiers in order to develop in them a special politico-diplomatic sensibility before the mission starts.

In such missions, the *media* have become indispensable actors. This is true not only on the local level but in the international, global context as well. Every move by the intervening forces is closely watched. If the representatives of the media do not understand what is going on they are likely to de-legitimize the mission in the long run.

Peace missions of a variety of scope and with different macro-regional orientation are a characteristic feature of the 1990s. Only a minority of them can be regarded as truly successful. In some cases the armed forces' performances was hurt by demonstrating a lack of democratic control. It seems to be important to look more deeply into methodology of democratic control of multinational missions. These missions are only legitimate when the intervention is not only attempting to

contain the violence, but also to foster and promote social and political values tied to modern democracy.

7 References

- Ahlquist, Leif (Ed.) (1996). Co-operation, Command and Control in UN-Peacekeeping Operations. A Pilot-Study from the Swedish War College. Stockholm: Swedish War College.
- Allard, Kenneth (1996). Co-operation, Command and Control - Lessons Learned or Lessons Identified? In: Ahlquist 1996: 94-101.
- Barry, Charles (1997). Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Practice. In: Gordon 1997: 203-219.
- Beaumont, Roger (1995). Small Wars: Definitions and Dimensions. *The Annals*, 541: September, 20-35.
- Boëne, Bernard/Dandeker, Christopher (Eds.) (1998). Les armées en Europe. Paris: Editions La Découverte.
- Bredow, Wilfried von (1983). Moderner Militarismus. Analyse und Kritik. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
- Bredow, Wilfried von Bredow (1998). Comment sortir de l'ère Westphalienne? In: Boëne/Dandeker 1998: 55-67.
- Chavret, John (1997). The Idea of State Sovereignty and the Right of Humanitarian Intervention. *International Political Science Review*, 18: 1, 39-48.
- Daniel, Donald C.F./Hayes, Bradd, C./De Jonge Oudraat, Chantal (1999). Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International Crises. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- De Bressy, Bernard (1995). Intervenir dans le chaos? *Défense Nationale*, 51: 5, 85-91.

- Friman, Henrik et al. (Eds.) (1997). ILIC '97. The Second International Workshop on Low Intensity Conflict, Stockholm, Sweden, 4-6 June 1997. Stockholm: AFCEA Stockholm Chapter and the Royal Swedish Society of Naval Sciences.
- Gordon, Philip H. (Ed.) (1997). NATO's Transformation. The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Haltiner, Karl W. (1998). The Definitive End of the Mass Army in Western Europe? *Armed Forces & Society*, 25: 1, 7-36.
- Harries-Jenkins, Gwyn/Moskos, Charles C. (1981). Armed Forces and Society. (*Current Sociology*, 29: 3). London: Sage.
- Hoffmann, Stanley (1995/96). The Politics and Ethics of Military Intervention. *Survival*, 37: 4, 1995/96, 29-51.
- Holsti, Ole H. (1998/99). A Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society? Some Evidence. *International Security*, 23: 3, 5-42.
- Howorth, Jolyon (1997). National Defence and European Security Integration. An Illusion Inside a Chimera? In: Howorth/Menon 1997: 10-22.
- Howorth, Jolyon/Menon, A. (Eds.) (1997). The European Union and National Defence Policy. London: Routledge.
- Klein, Paul (1998). Vers des armées postnationales? In: Boëne/Dandeker 1998: 161-169.
- Klein, Paul/Kümmel, Gerhard (2000). The Internationalization of Military Life. Necessity, Problems and Prospects of Multinational Armed Forces. In: Kümmel/Prüfert 2000: in print.
- Kuhlmann, Jürgen/Segal, David R. (Eds.) (1994). Armed Forces at the Dawn of the Third Millennium (*SOWI Forum International* 16). Munich: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr.

- Kümmel, Gerhard (1999). Die Teilbarkeit der Menschenrechte. Menschenrechte und nationalstaatliche Souveränität. *SOWI Working Paper*, No. 118. Strausberg: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr.
- Kümmel, Gerhard/Prüfert, Andreas D. (Eds.) (2000, in print). *Military Sociology: The Richness of a Discipline*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Moore, Jonathan (Ed.) (1998). *Hard Choices. Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Moskos, Charles C. (1993/94). From Citizens' Army to Social Laboratory. *The Wilson Quarterly*, 17: 1, 83-94.
- Moskos, Charles C. (2000). *The Media and the Military in Peace and Humanitarian Operations (Cantigny Conference Series, Special Report)*. Chicago: Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation.
- Mott, William H., IV (1996). The Paradoxes of Intervention. *Defense Analysis*, 12: 2, 189-204.
- Nye, Joseph S., Jr. (1990). The Changing Nature of World Power. *Political Science Quarterly*, 105: 2, 177-192.
- Palin, Roger H. (1995). *Multinational Military Forces. Problems and Prospects (Adelphi Paper 294)*. Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute of Strategic Studies.
- Russett, Bruce (1993). *Grasping the Democratic Peace. Principles for a Post-Cold War World*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Segal, David R. (1994). Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Societies. In: Kuhlmann/Segal 1994: 37-48.
- Swan, Peter W.H. (1997). Operation Joint Endeavour Interoperability. In: Friman et al. 1997: 187-188.
- Whitford, John/Durell Young, Thomas (1997). Multinational Command Authorities: The Need for Change in NATO. *Defense Analysis*, 13: 1, 35-57.

About the Authors

Bar-Or, Amir, (Israel), Professor of Political Science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and at the Ben-Gurion Research Center of the Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.

Boëne, Bernard, (France), Professor of Sociology at the University of Toulouse II and at the Military Academy of Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan.

Bredow, Wilfried von, (Germany), Professor of Political Science at the Philipps-University in Marburg.

Ferreira, Rialize, (South Africa), Dr., Lecturer at the Department of Sociology at the University of South Africa, Pretoria.

Haltiner, Karl W., (Switzerland), Professor at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and at the Swiss Military College, Zurich.

Kümmel, Gerhard, (Germany), Research Associate at the German Armed Forces Institute of Social Research (SOWI).

Zulean, Marian, (Romania), Romanian Ministry of Defence, Master of Public and International Affairs at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh (USA).