

Europe's Common Security

Attitudes and Opinions in France, Germany and Italy

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Europe's Common Security: Development, Status and Prospect

Sven Bernhard Gareis

When compared with the high level of integration that the EU has already reached in such fields as the Common Market or the currency policy, European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is still in its infancy. Compared with NATO, European military capabilities appear modest since the EU remains unable to control military operations without support from the Alliance. But taking into consideration that now 25 EU member states have to harmonise their – sometimes even contradictory – points of view and interests on the tremendously complex field of security policy, then to co-ordinate them with further member candidates and with NATO partners, it must be conceded that much progress has already been made. Given the present conditions the EU has created security-political structures and competencies of its own under the overarching roof of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) at according to the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, Javier Solana, “the speed of light”, and by December 2004 was engaged in three European-led missions.¹

In December 2003 the European Council adopted in Brussels the European Security Strategy (ESS)², which was largely based on a draft paper Solana had presented at the EU summit in Thessaloniki in June 2003. Besides an analysis of the global political challenges, this strategy paper contained consisted principally of security-political options and maxims for an enlarged Europe. Indeed, since the accession of ten new partners in May 2004 the EU comprises 25 states with about 450 million citizens and produces nearly one fourth of the world's Gross National Product. Certainly for its own security as well

¹ These are the European Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the European Police Mission *'Proxima'* (subsequent to the EU-led peacekeeping mission *'Concordia'*) in Macedonia, and the military operation *'Althea'* in Bosnia-Herzegovina (the former NATO-led SFOR).

² The European Institute for Security Studies (ed.): A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy. Paris 2003.

as for world-wide peace and stability the Union will have to engage itself more extensively than hitherto.

About twelve years after a rather halting start of the CFSP by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the EU is now demonstrating a will to play a more independent role in world policy and to increase its own weight in the transatlantic relations. Certainly, ESDP as well as the whole field of EU foreign relations will remain subject to the complex and complicated procedures of intergovernmental harmonisation between the member states, and thus rather ponderous. Nonetheless, the step toward a deeper integration also on the field of security and defence policy seems to have been taken irreversibly.

1 The Development of European Security Policy

Over the decades of the Cold War NATO was responsible for maintaining Europe's security. Efforts to establish a European Defence Community (EDC) had failed in 1954. Subsequently, the Western EU, a defence alliance of ten full members and a corona of about 20 observers, associate members, and partners, was quietly placed in suspended animation. So Europe mainly developed as an Economic Community under the shield of the North Atlantic Alliance. But Europe also turned out to be a most successful arrangement for the preservation of a lasting peace. The Community not only grew step by step, it created through growing political integration and economic interdependence a zone of stability and prosperity such as the continent had never known.³ But until the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 European Political Co-operation (EPC) over and beyond questions of the Common Market remained just a very loose co-ordination framework.

The global security situation after the end of the East-West conflict confronted Europe with new challenges and requirements. The

³ For the stabilizing implications of the European integration process, see Varwick, Johannes (2002): Die ESVP – Eine folgerichtige Weiterentwicklung der Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (GASP)? In: Hoyer, Werner/Kaldrack, Gerd F. (eds.) (2002): Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik. Baden-Baden, 99f.

Maastricht Treaty based the EU on three pillars, with the CFSP as the second one between Economic and Currency Union (ECU) and the co-operation in home and legal policy issues. To shape a more active European security policy the WEU was reanimated early in the 1990s and became the military arm of the EU. In 1992 the WEU declared its willingness to take over a wide spectrum military tasks within reaching from humanitarian and relief missions over peacekeeping up to combat missions for peace enforcement (the so-called ‘Petersberg tasks’ named after the German conference center where the Declaration was signed).⁴

In the first half of the 1990s the WEU, together with NATO, took over peacekeeping operations for the support of UN missions in former Yugoslavia. In 1997, the Petersberg tasks then incorporated into the Amsterdam Treaty on the EU.⁵ As early as 1996, the Alliance, EU and WEU had agreed at a NATO Council meeting in Berlin to intensify co-operation on the field of security policy within the framework of a so-called European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). This co-operation between NATO and WEU was aimed at military operations where the ‘Alliance as a whole’ would not participate, but the forces involved are enabled to use NATO’s headquarters and logistic structures. The initial intention was to strengthen the European pillar within NATO. But step by step German, French and (after a remarkable shift by the British government in St. Malo, in December 1998) British initiatives then focussed on greater European independence in security issues. The Kosovo crisis of 1998/99 painfully demonstrated to the Europeans their weaknesses in technology, equipment and political determination. Under the German EU-Presidency, work on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) had been consistently pushed forward. At its summit in March 1999 NATO promised to support the EU with Alliance-owned structures and forces within the framework of a ‘Berlin-plus mechanism’. The EU Cologne summit declaration of June 1999 outlined the future profile of the ESDP.⁶ In a major step, the EU

⁴ Declaration of the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the WEU states on the WEU and Security in Europe, dated June 19, 1992, at Königswinter (Petersberg Declaration).

⁵ Article 17, para. 2.

⁶ See Presidency Conclusions. Cologne European Council 3 and 4 June 1999, Appendix III <http://ue.eu.int/en/Info/eurocouncil/index.htm>, as well as Stützel, Walter (2001): Die Euro-

decided to practically incorporate the WEU and take over its tasks and functions. Due to the position of the four neutral EU member states, the collective assistance guarantee of the WEU Treaty did not become part of ESDP, so that EU actions remain limited to those defined by the Petersberg Declaration.

Six months later in Helsinki the European Council agreed on the European Headline Goal, determining the European capacities for crisis response missions: Until the end of 2003 the states agreed to ready “to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year military forces of up to 50,000–60,000 persons capable of the full range of the Petersberg tasks.”⁷ These forces, which were still under development in late 2004, will not constitute a European military. They are rather contingents maintained within national armed forces for integration in ad hoc operational task forces. Whether to participate in an operation and the size and structure of these task forces will be determined mission requirements and political decisions of the participating nations. At Feira in June 2000 the European Council decided to pay more attention to the civilian aspect of crisis management in four decisive fields: police forces, strengthening of the rule of law, strengthening of civil administration, and civil defence/disaster prevention. For these tasks, the EU member states will make available 5,000 policemen and more than 2,000 other civilian specialists. Thus, the EU was the first international body to take precautionary measures to cover the complex and task spectrum of ‘peace operations of a new type’⁸.

2 The Security Policy Architecture

With the assumption of security-political tasks and competencies the EU had to establish appropriate leadership and planning bodies. The

päische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik. In: Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik (ed.) (2001): Sicherheitspolitik in neuen Dimensionen. Hamburg, 73.

⁷ See Presidency Conclusions. Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999, # 28; available at <http://ue.eu.int/en/Info/eurocouncil/index.htm>.

⁸ For the civilian implications of modern peace operations, see Gareis, Sven Bernhard (2002): Frieden als komplexer Auftrag – Zur wachsenden Bedeutung ziviler Dimensionen in VN-Friedensmissionen. In: Reader Sicherheitspolitik 2/2003.

corresponding bodies of the WEU as the former military arm of the EU had been dissolved, and the WEU as a whole had been reduced essentially to the with the collective assistance guarantee of the Brussels Treaty without any operational functions. According to the December 2000 Nice decisions of the European Council new permanent political and military structures were within the EU Council under the purview of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. These bodies became functional during 2001, namely

- the Political and Security-Political Committee (PSC) working at the level of the Ambassadors or the Political Directors of the Foreign Ministries. Under the authority of the Council (which retains final decision-making authority), the Committee, with expert advice from the EU Military Committee drafts proposals for the further development of ESDP as well as action options for concrete measures. The PSC can also be charged with the political control of military operations. Within the framework of ESDP the PSC plays a role that can be compared with the Permanent NATO Council.
- Like the NATO Military Committee, the EU Military Committee EU (EUMC) consists of the chiefs of staff of the member states. Daily work in Brussels lies in the hands of their permanent military representatives to the EUMC. The EUMC constitutes the highest military body of the EU. It is led by a Chairman EUMC who simultaneously acts as the highest military advisor to the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and represents the EUMC in every respect.
- The EU Military Staff enjoys the status of a directorate-general in Secretariat of the EU Council. The EUMS is in charge of all military tasks, from early warning over planning of exercises and operations to the formulation of requirements regarding the size and equipment of units to be deployed.
- The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management is attached to the PSC and provides advice on all the questions of civilian aspects of crisis prevention and post-crisis care.

A police staff and a common situation centre were also established at the Secretariat of the Council. Thus, the EU has built up an organisation which, in its functioning, can be compared with that of NATO. In their size and structure, though, these bodies constitute a compromise between the EU requirement to have its own institutions and the desire (by both EU and NATO) to avoid any duplication of structures. To this end both organisations strove to enable the EU to have permanent access to existing NATO structures within the framework of 'Berlin-Plus'. Though differences between Turkey and Greece blocked this 'Berlin-Plus' mechanism over an extended period, EU access to NATO planning capacities has been free since the Copenhagen summit of December 2002. Operation 'Concordia' (Macedonia, March to December 2003) put this principle into practice for the first time. This first EU military operation made use of the Alliance's capacities, operational command being exercised by Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (DSACEUR), and the operation was controlled from an integrated staff in NATO headquarters SHAPE, near Brussels.

Despite all effort to avoid duplication the EU member states will not be able to get along without additional financial resources and capacities to offset at least the most glaring strategic deficits. Among these are the establishment of a European airlift capability, the backbone of which will consist of military transport aircraft Airbus A 400M (which is still under development), and a European composite reconnaissance system based on its own satellite system. An operational headquarters to control European missions and operations will also be required. EUMC/EUMS have already begun to investigate such installations in several countries; in Germany, the Bundeswehr Operational Command at Potsdam is a possible site.

Like ESDI, ESDP is anchored under the NATO roof (the two are often confused), and is a project intended to increase Europe's weight in security politics within the transatlantic framework without any intention to compete with NATO. However, the kind and volume of the acquisition and modernisation tasks to be accomplished by the Europeans, as well as the lasting discussions on NATO future show that this will remain a rather delicate claim.

3 Euro-Army – A Realistic Perspective?

Certainly, the EU has established a European Security and Defence Policy – but the aspects of defence remain excluded in consideration of the neutral member states. Thus, the EU does not constitute a military power, nor is it even an alliance. Nevertheless, further integration in the military field is going to be indispensable. In a comparison, Johannes Varwick revealed that the Europe of Fifteen with 375 million citizens maintains only 1.6 million of soldiers compared to 1.4 million US soldiers out of a population of 275 million, and that defence expenditures reach only a little bit more than 50 per cent of the US defence budget. At the same time, the European combat potential amounts to only around 10 per cent of that of the US.⁹ From this perspective Europe is often blamed from the other side of the Atlantic for not spending enough for its own security and defence. One lesson learned from the Kosovo crisis is that European influence on strategic decision making correlates closely with its willingness and capability for political and military action. There is little outlook in most European countries for any increase in military expenditures, so continuous efforts are being made to create additional multinational military structures, establish European armament and logistics arrangements, etc. Identification and release of synergetic effects will more and more characterise the European Security and Defence Policy of the future. In a coalescing Europe, the armed forces will probably come to lose more and more of their character as a symbol of national sovereignty, being subject to new functional definitions and patterns of legitimisation.¹⁰

In this context there also should a more intensive discussion of whether each European state needs to maintain complex navy, army and air force capabilities. Perhaps it might be more efficient to organise these forces, in a first step, in a task-sharing compound of national contingents, and than proceeding step by step towards the fully integrated European capacities. Eventually, this process could

⁹ Varwick, Johannes (2001): Toward a 'Euroarmy'? In: Internationale Politik – Transatlantic Edition (4) 2001, 33–37.

¹⁰ Cf. Gareis, Sven Bernhard/vom Hagen, Ulrich (2003): Conditions of Military Multinationality. Strausberg, particularly chapter 1.1.

lead to the creation of Pan-European armed forces, a so-called 'Euro-Army'. Thus, about fifty years after the failure of the European Defence Community, and under completely new auspices, Europe is on the way again towards creating common security arrangements. Contrary to the early 1950s though, this time the intentions do not aim at setting a visionary plan into politics. The task at hand is rather to develop the vision step by step, keeping it open for realistic modifications and different development speeds. ESDP will take shape through the solution of all the political, military, financial and technological details, on the basis of continuous integration. Thus, both the militaries and the societies of Europe will more easily become acclimated to a new type of trans-national armed forces.

Common Defence and Public Opinion: The German-French-Italian Research Project

Sven Bernhard Gareis

Since 1999, the development of the European security and defence policy did make remarkable progress, and the establishment of common European armed forces seemed to be a realizable vision after all. To the present day though, this process has been on a more abstract level so typical for the area of European policy. Governments, military elites as well as experts of all the disciplines dealing with the legal and political questions have been determining direction and contents of the development, whilst public discourse on this new orientation of security and defence policy under European signs has been for the most part lacking. Both public opinion on ESDP as well as attitudes within the – more or less immediately concerned – national armed forces still remain a rather neglected topic.

This was not always the case. During the East-West confrontation opinions and attitudes concerning security-political strategy and decision-making numbered among the most studied topics of public opinion research in all the West European countries.¹ Though – as it was remarkably underlined during the years 1979 – 1983 by the discussions on NATO modernisation decision – the topic ‘security policy’ in this phase was perceived by many citizens as a rather existential one; it constituted a central matter of public debate on policy – thus, the positions within an often polarised opinion climate were correspondingly accentuated. Most opinion polls and scientific studies, however, focussed on the respective national perceptions of threat. Accordingly, questions of NATO doctrines, nuclear deterrence, and disarmament had been discussed mostly from the perspective of

¹ Cf. (exemplary): Zoll, Ralf (ed.): Public Opinion on Security and Armed Forces. Analyses and Data from Eight Countries. Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, series Forum International, Munich 1982.

individual-state concerns.² Common European defence effectively played no role in the discourses in both in politics and society.

Once the East-West conflict had been overcome however, the focus of perceptions on security policy has been shifting. In the political as well as scientific discussion, the lack of any immediate threat by an antagonistic superpower has led, to an intensive turn towards the rather indirect risks affecting the security of countries and regions in the framework of a decentralised global scenario of conflicts and crises. Greater understanding for the need of deeper international security co-operation is an essential consequence of this development. This applies particularly to the EU, which has been working to accentuating its common foreign and security policy and the security and defence policy since its creation in the early 1990s.

In the social field, however, also an immaterial peace dividend could be earned: With the lack of existential security issues, public attention and opinion could turn to other pressing problems and challenges such as unemployment, economic development, social security systems. Interest in external security and defence issues has been changing from an acute to a latent one, it nevertheless can be reactivated whenever events such as September 11 or the Iraq war come onto the agenda.³

Not least the discussion about the military intervention against raised the issue of which risk perceptions and security notions, but also which expectations from European institutions in the European populations concerned should have to be taken into consideration if the EU intends to be successful in the formulation of common policies and strategies. To examine this question within a complex research project was the aim of an initiative started in 2002 by the Italian strategy research centre CeMISS (Centro Militare di Studi Strategici) in Rome and by the University Roma Tre. The first steps of this project then were realised in collaboration with the Bundeswehr

² Cf. Munton, Don/Rattinger, Hans (eds.): *Debating National Security: The Public Opinion*. Frankfurt am Main – Bern – New York 1991.

³ Cf. Gareis, Sven Bernhard: *Sicherheitspolitische Kommunikation. Eine Annäherung an ein schwieriges Thema*. In: Gareis, Sven Bernhard/Zimmermann, Rolf (eds.): *Sicherheitspolitische Kommunikation*. Baden-Baden 1999, 9–17.

Institute of Social Sciences (Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr – SOWI) at Strausberg, and with the Centre d'études en sciences sociales de la défense (C2SD) in Paris.

1 The theoretical framework: Risk Society and European Defence

The theoretical reference outline chosen for this analysis was the Risk Society model. For a long time now, sociological theory⁴ has been considering 'risk' as one of the more significant variables to characterising contemporary societies. The events subsequent to the fall of Berlin Wall and the end of the international bipolar order revealed that great expectations of a long period of world-wide peace and stability were illusionary. The historical caesura of 11th September has increased external and internal uncertainty dramatically: in this context the 'latent threat' becomes the protagonist of present history.

Environmental pollution, exhaustion of natural resources, epidemics, food risk and terrorism are included in this typology of threats, additional to more 'traditional' risks such as international armed conflict, economic precariousness and uncontrolled migration. From a sociological point of view, the main characteristic of these threats, apart from the material damages they can produce, lies in their mediatic, cognitive and social 'resonance'. This aspect involves the spread of uncertainty and instability undermining quality of life and comfort even in countries not directly affected by dramatic events. This is in the nature of a 'global village' turning against its inhabitants.

In this context the social construction of security/insecurity binomial and institutions capable of controlling these threats is becoming more important. In fact, collective representation of security perception is not a mere subjective reflection of external reality; it is a social

⁴ Cf. Bauman, Zygmunt (2000): *Liquid Modernity*. Polity Press, London; Beck, Ulrich (1986): *Risikogesellschaft: Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne*. Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main; Giddens, Anthony (1990): *The Consequence of Modernity*. Polity Press, London.

'construction' built up by the action/reaction system of individual and collective actors. One of these actors is *political leadership*, which seeks to provide a meaningful definition of 'being safe' by emphasising particular internal and international issues such as the fight against criminality and terrorism, defence of national territory, reduction of unemployment and so on. Other important actors are the mass media, which present the 'risk agenda' to the population and political system. Finally, it's the citizens' reflections and actions which contribute to a societal understanding of risk and security, which might be incoherent and disparate, but which nevertheless influence the construction of reality.

In such a complex scenario the citizens of the EU might consider it as an agency able to provide security for its member states by common efforts and co-operation. Europeans' attitudes towards this particular EU function, to reduce risks and increase security, then might have a strong impact on the further development of the ESDP.

2 Research Design and Development of Instruments

As with its subject the study design was comprehensive and complex: A comparative analysis to examine perceptions, attitudes and opinions towards ESDP in the populations of France, Germany and Italy. A complementary survey would be conducted within the armed forces of the three participating countries. As for the content, focus lay on respondent perceptions of risks and threats as well as on prevailing attitudes towards ESDP and possible European armed forces. Furthermore, these perceptions and assessments were considered in a comprehensive perspective on visions on and expectations of Europe and its institutions.

In a first step, data were collected in the form of standardised interviews across the populations and the armed forces. Later phases, particularly in the armed forces and/or societal/political elites and decision-makers, will also make use of more qualitative methods such as semi-structured or open interviews.

The overall project had a modular structure so that the individual steps could be taken independently in the participating countries. Such a flexible procedure is due to the differences in the institutes conducting the research. To guarantee the comparability of the data only commonly developed instruments were to be used. Due to its own peculiar working procedures the French C2SD had to use its own instruments, but these were very similar to the common questionnaire. For the transnational evaluation only those data were used which were collected in parallel surveys over the same periods.

This paper represents the results and findings of the study's first step, an opinion poll conducted in France, Germany and Italy, during the summer/autumn of 2002. The questionnaire used was based on the one used for 'Eurobarometer Survey 54.1' of the autumn of 2000⁵, although it had been developed further on in a common working process of the scholars from the participating institutes (see Appendix) and then translated into the languages concerned.⁶ As a basis there was created an English master version of the questionnaire. Instead of the usual re-translation⁷, the research team discussed the English master version item per item, term per term, thus guaranteeing that each national version would use terms of the same meaning.

3 The Conduct of the Survey

Once the common English version had been agreed upon the questionnaire was translated into the three relevant languages and the poll was conducted according to principles and regulations valid for all the respective partners. In the case of the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences (SOWI) the final German questionnaire was sent INRA Deutschland GmbH, an institute specialising in opinion polls

⁵ Cf. Kernic, Franz/Callaghan, Jean/Manigart, Philippe (2002): Public Opinion on European Security and Defense. Frankfurt am Main – Berlin etc.

⁶ As for the necessities and possibilities of harmonising international poll instruments, see Meulemann, Heiner (2001): Perspektiven und Probleme der internationalen Umfrageforschung. In: Statistisches Bundesamt 2001, 13–38; Bechtold, Sabine/Günther, Roland (2001): Input versus Ex-Post-Harmonisierung: Das Forschungsprojekt CHINTEX. In: Statistisches Bundesamt 2001, 39–47; Glagow, Hella (2001): Organisation von Mehrländerumfragen. In: Statistisches Bundesamt 2001, 60–71.

⁷ See Glagow (2002) (FN 6), 66.

located in Mölln. INRA prepared questionnaire formed and gauged it according to the its own standards for personal paper & pencil polls.

All German-speaking persons from 16 years on living in private households in the Federal Republic of Germany constituted the basic entity of the survey. Within the frame of a master sample, a three-step procedure (sample points, household selection, target person selection) served for making up a representative random multiply stratified sample. Through a net sample of 1,400 usable and at least once contacted addresses, 877 interviews were finally conducted constituting a representative cross section of the population over 16 years of age. 185 interviewers carried out the poll between September 7 and October 11, 2002. INRA collected the interviews, examined and transformed them into a SPSS data set which was sent to SOWI for further evaluation.

In Italy the survey of 1,600 respondents was conducted country-wide between June and September 2002, and was representative for Italian adult population aged over 14. Fifteen interviewers and four university researchers, co-ordinated by Maria Luisa Maniscalco, submitted face-to-face, paper & pencil interviews to this sample.

In France a different method of realising the project's first module was chosen than in Germany or Italy. Instead of conducting a particular survey, the C2SD resorted to a secondary analysis of comparable studies e. g. the Eurobarometer or national polls. In order to make possible despite the unavoidable differences a comparison between the French data and those collected in Germany and Italy only similar or identical items as in the trinational questionnaire were considered. Furthermore, only data collected at the same time as in the other two countries were used for the French contribution.

French Survey – Findings and Results

Barbara Jankowski

What is the French perception of the European integration process and what do the French think about the European security and defence policy? What are the characteristics of French public opinion, compared to that of Germans or Italians? These are the two main questions that shaped our contribution to this comparative project. The objective of the comparative questionnaire built jointly by the SOWI, the

CeMISS and the C2SD was to improve our knowledge about perceptions of European integration by the different national public opinions, and to analyse similarities and differences between the three national approaches. Because C2SD were unable to conduct an equivalent representative survey of the French population, the analysis French public opinion is more limited than that of German or Italian. This analysis was not based on the common questionnaire, but on available surveys carried out by other institutions. For the most part, data gained through Eurobarometer surveys was used for this purpose. These data allow us to question in a broad outline most of the topics that formed the focus of the common survey. As the questionnaire was inspired by questions about European integration that have been surveyed in the past, comparisons are possible on certain points, even if in a more limited way. For example, no cross breakdown was carried out. On the whole, two thirds of the twenty questions of the common questionnaire are completely or partly discussed in this paper.

The analysis which follows will relate to six dimensions: the perception of threats and dangers, the priorities that French give to the EU policies, their support for European common security and defence policies, perceptions about the military, the Europeanisation of the armed forces and finally, the feeling of attachment to a territory and feelings about European identity.

1 The Anxieties of the French

Two surveys have been used to assess the risks and threats that the French fear the most: the Eurobarometer survey and a French survey called “The French and the national defence”. Let us point out that in these two surveys, the questions related to the perception of the threats are not formulated exactly the same way as in the common survey. Certain topics do not appear in it (environmental disasters, food risks, economic crisis), while others that appear in the Eurobarometer survey, are not present in the common questionnaire, e. g. the increasing number of ethnic conflicts in Europe, for example. However, ten threats appear under an identical or very close formulation in the three surveys. This allows us to compare French fears with Italian and German ones.

Table 1: “Here is a list of things that some people say they are afraid of. For each of these, please tell me if, personally, you are afraid of it, or not?” (answers in per cent)

	Afraid	Not afraid
International terrorism	88	10
Organised crime	80	18
An accident in a nuclear power station	77	21
Spread of nuclear, bacteriological or chemical weapons of mass destruction	75	22
Ethnic conflicts in Europe	66	29
Epidemics	56	40
The accidental launch of a nuclear missile	55	40
A world war	52	45
A nuclear conflict in Europe	39	57
A conventional war in Europe	38	56

Source: Eurobarometer 58, November 2002. French results.

For the French, terrorism represents the greatest threat since the end of the cold war. Unlike in all other EU countries, where the fear of

terrorism strongly increased between 2001 and 2002, the events of September 11th did not amplify this concern, which has been strongly anchored in French public opinion for the past fifteen years. For the past fifteen years in fact, terrorism has been well ahead of all other potential threats.

Three other dangers are present in the mind of many French: organised crime, civilian nuclear accident and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Nuclear or conventional war in Europe are threats the French fear least, even if one French out of four is personally anxious about them.

The fears expressed by the French are closely similar to those expressed by Italians. More significant differences are observed between France and Germany, as can be seen from the following table.

Table 2: “Here is a list of things that some people say they are afraid of. For each of these, please tell me if, personally, you are afraid of it, or not?” (answers in per cent)

	France	Italy	Germany
International terrorism	88	92	75
Organised crime	80	89	70
An accident in a nuclear power station	77	74	66
Spread of nuclear, bacteriological or chemical weapons of mass destruction	75	72	68
Ethnic conflicts in Europe	66	62	46
Epidemics	56	51	41
The accidental launch of a nuclear missile	55	55	53
A world war	52	59	52
A nuclear conflict in Europe	39	51	50
A conventional war in Europe (not nuclear, bacteriological or chemical)	38	50	48

Source: Eurobarometer 58, November 2002.

The Italians perceive the same hierarchy of threats as the French except for the fear of a world war, which is higher in Italy than in France (6th place/59 per cent in Italy vs. 8th place/52 per cent in France). The significant difference is the intensity of the feelings. Italians are more afraid of international terrorism than the French (92 per cent as opposed to 88 per cent), organised crime (89 per cent/80 per cent), but also of nuclear conflict in Europe (51 per cent/39 per cent) and conventional war in Europe (50 per cent/38 per cent).

With regard to Germans, the general level of anxiety seems lower than among the French: 75 per cent of Germans fear terrorism against 88 per cent of the French. 70 per cent fear organised crime against 80 per cent of the French. For the most alarming threats spreads between 10 and 13 points are observable between the two countries. On the other hand, Germans and Italians are more sensitive to the risks of nuclear or conventional war in Europe than are the French.

2 Priorities of the EU

One of the questions of the common survey related to opinions about the priorities of European integration process. Which EU policies do the citizens of the three countries feel have the highest priority? The question asked in the European barometer differed slightly from that the common survey. The Eurobarometer includes security policies which are not quoted in the common survey such as the 'fight against terrorism', 'maintaining peace in Europe', or 'fight against organised crime'. The common survey mentions those policies in a more general fashion: 'defence' and 'homeland security'. A strict comparison between the countries is therefore not possible.

96 per cent of the French respondents place the 'fight against terrorism' at the head of their list of EU priorities. In second position, 95 per cent of them put equally 'fight against unemployment', 'fight against poverty', and 'maintaining of peace and security in Europe'.

Lastly, more than 90 per cent of the French regarded the ‘fight against organised crime’, ‘food safety’ and ‘environmental protection’ as priority EU policy areas. The following table specifies French priorities for the EU in a descending order. The percentages of the two other countries are mentioned irrespective of hierarchy.

Table 3: “I am going to read out a list of actions that the EU could undertake. For each one, please tell me if, in your opinion, it should be a priority or not?”

EU Actions	% of people for whom this is a priority		
	France	Germany	Italy
Fight against terrorism	96	88 (3)	93 (1)
Fighting unemployment	95	90 (1)	91 (3)
Peace and security in Europe	95	89 (2)	92 (2)
Fight against poverty	95	87 (4)	91 (3)
Fighting drugs and crime	93	84 (5)	90 (5)
Food safety	92	84 (5)	87 (6)
Protecting the environment	92	84 (5)	87 (6)
Guaranteeing the rights of the individual and respect for the principles of democracy in Europe	90	72	87 (6)
Protecting consumers and guaranteeing the quality of other products	88	79	83
Fighting illegal immigration	86	77	87
Information about the EU	77	70	75
Affirmation of the EU in the world	64	43	61
Reforming the institutions of the EU and the way they work	51	46	53
EU enlargement	20	25	35

Source: Eurobarometer 58-1, 2002.

If one compares French expectations with those of Germans or Italians, one observes that they are rather homogeneous. In fact, in a different order, three priorities occupy the first three places: the fight against unemployment, the fight against terrorism and maintaining peace and security in Europe. A difference exists between the three countries: the fight against terrorism is considered to be priority in and France, while Germans appear to favour the fight against unemployment.

Table 3a:

	France	Germany	Italy
Fighting terrorism	1	3	1
Fighting unemployment	2	1	3
Maintaining peace and security in Europe	2	2	2

Disregarding those concerns which did not appear in the common survey (fight against terrorism, fight against the crime, maintaining peace in Europe), public opinion in all three countries favours three types of: employment policy, environmental protection and social policies. Of a dozen priorities suggested, these are at the head in all three countries as the table below indicates. Note however that Eurobarometer did not survey any item relating to public health policies, so no predictions can be made as to how such concerns would have placed in France.

Table 3b:

Very high priority	Germany	Italy	France
Employment policy	1	1	1
Public health	4	2	-
Protecting the environment	3	3	2
Food safety	2	4	2

Source: Common questionnaire for Germany and Italy, Eurobarometer for France.

The fights against terrorism and unemployment are the top concerns in all three countries. The question arises whether people make any distinction between what they expect from their national government and what they expect from the EU.

3 Support for Europeanisation

How willing are the French to pursue the process of European integration in the field of the defence and security policies? In the common survey, the respondents gave their opinions on a number of statements regarding the Europeanisation process. What is the French public opinion on the four following aspects: the common foreign policy, the common defence policy, the European constitution and finally, the enlargement of the EU?

3.1 The support for a common foreign policy

In 2002, two thirds of the French supported a common European foreign policy (CEFP) in principle. 67 per cent of the respondents were for and 27 per cent against (Eurobarometer 58). These scores were lower than those in Italy or Germany, where 80 per cent and 74 per cent were in favour of such a policy, respectively. France is much more reticent in its attitude than its two partners, support for a CEFP being about the average for the then 15 EU member nations, where 67 per cent of the public opinion favour a common foreign policy. On the other hand, we find more opponents to this policy in France than in the average of EU countries (27 per cent against 21 per cent), even though fewer are not in favour in France than in the UK, Finland or Sweden. These data of 2002 have been corroborated by more recent surveys.

3.2 The support for a common security and defence policy

In France, a large majority agree with the principle of a common security and defence policy, with 77 per cent of the respondents in favour (Eurobarometer 58). In the same survey, 85 per cent of the Italians and 79 per cent of the Germans supported the idea of a common security and defence policy. These three countries are largely above the average of the 15 EU members which accounts for 73 per cent. However, even if the gap is less strong than for foreign policy, French public support remains lower than that observed in Italy and in Germany. In the annual poll called “the French and the national defence” carried out in 2002, 91 per cent of the respondents believed that a European defence is ‘a good thing’. This was 9 per cent higher than in 2001.

The French are increasingly ready consider that a European defence might include French and English nuclear forces (39 per cent for and 31 per cent of against in 2002). One can notice that a common defence alerts more the European reflexes of the French than a foreign policy and that it mobilises them more and more, as the progression of the records during the two last years shows it.

3.3 A constitution for Europe?

In 2002, the majority of the French wanted the EU to have a constitution. However, they are fewer than the Italians, 68 per cent of French people being in favour as opposed to 79 per cent of the Italians. 66 per cent of Germans declared their support for such a political project. These three countries are more convinced of this than the average EU citizen, support for a constitution averaging 65 per cent EU-wide. If few French are hostile to the idea of a European constitution, quite a strong percentage (one third) does not have any opinion on the question. This proportion remained stable and is still valid in 2003.

3.4 Attitudes towards EU enlargement

France remains in 2002 the only country in which a majority of the population is hostile to EU enlargement. 49 per cent of French are opposed to the entrance of new countries in the Union, whilst 41 per cent agree. France in last position amongst the fifteen Convention countries on this topic. 64 per cent of the Italians favour enlargement, much more than the European average of 52 per cent. German attitudes are closer to the European average, since only half (51 per cent) agree with the enlargement. Confronted with concrete political choices, public opinion is more cautious in France than in Italy or Germany. To conclude, the only subject on which public opinion in the three countries largely agrees is that of a common European defence.

4 The French opinion on the institutions

4.1 Attitudes towards European institutions

What influence do national and European institutions have on the daily life of Europeans? Eurobarometer surveyed a similar question which however did not include national institutions such as Parliament, the Bank of France, the French military, or the French government. Also, Eurobarometer did not probe “the impact on the everyday life”, but rather the degree of “importance in the life of the EU”. The European Parliament is the European institution considered most influential by the French. 85 per cent of them believe it plays a significant role. The Commission arrives in second position, 81 per cent of respondents considering it significant. The European Central Bank, the Council and the Court of Justice occupy the intermediate places before institutions considered to be much less influential, such as the Economic and Social Committee, or the European Mediator.

In their opinions about the influence of the European institutions the French are not much different from the Italians and the Germans. The order of importance of the institutions is the same in France and Italy.

In Germany, the classification differs from the two other countries. The Court of Justice and the German Bank are more important than the Commission or the Council. In addition, the Germans are less likely than the French and the Italians to consider these institutions as significant (10 point difference).

Table 4: Percentage of people who think these five institutions play an ‘important’ role in the life of the EU

	France	Italy	Germany
European Parliament	85	88	77
European Commission	81	80	66
European Central Bank	71	74	77
EU Council of Ministers	69	73	56
Court of Justice of the European Communities	67	65	76

Source: Eurobarometer 58.

4.2 The legitimacy of the use of force

Under which circumstances can the use of force be considered legitimate? In the common survey, people were called upon to assess ten kinds of missions, in which the military can be engaged in (question 2.2.). A quite similar question exists in an annual French poll, in which people answer whether or not they approve nine missions in which French armed forces might be engaged. The results of this poll cannot be compared directly with the common survey however it is possible to compare the French expectations with those of their allies. The responses clearly indicate that not all missions have the same degree of legitimacy, differences of more than twenty points between the most legitimate situation and the one considered least legitimate. Four military missions have a very high level of legitimacy (more than 90 per cent): ‘aid the French population in case of disaster’ (98 per cent French approval), ‘provide humanitarian assistance’ (95 per cent approval), ‘assure domestic security’ (92 per cent approval), ‘save lives of nationals abroad or obtain the release of

French hostages' (92 per cent approval). Above all, the French approve the use of military force to protect or provide assistance at home or to French citizens abroad. Humanitarian aid provided by soldiers is also adjudged very positively, taking second position. Some interventions appear less legitimate, such as: honouring defence agreements with African countries or intervention in the event of an economic blockade.

For the French public opinion, the most legitimate missions are those that impact closely on the populace, and thus are the less military ones.

How to these attitudes compare with opinions about the role of the military in the other countries? The standard Eurobarometer did not include any question on this point. One survey conducted in 2001 gives us the main trends. The defence of the territory remains the priority mission in which armed forces should be involved in (this mission did not appear in the questionnaire used in France, as such). In second position we find assistance to the population in case of disaster, at home or abroad. Maintenance or restoration of peace in the world is a mission quoted by eight Europeans out of ten. On these two aspects, the French perceptions are equivalent to those prevailing throughout Europe.¹

5 Opinions about Europeanising the military

5.1 The European rapid reaction force

At Helsinki in June 1999 the European Council decided to create a European rapid reaction force of 60,000 soldiers. What do the French think about this initiative? In June 2002, 84 per cent of the French thought that it was 'a good thing'. This percentage has grown by eight points since 2000. While most Europeans in favour of establishing this force, the Italians and the French are at the top of countries supporting this initiative most, with more than 80 per cent in favour. German opinion is less favourable, with a rate of approval below the European

¹ Eurobarometer "Public opinion and European defence", July 2001, 7.

average (70 per cent against the 73 per cent EU average).² No information is currently available on French opinion about the role of a European army, nor about its possible relationship with national forces or with military alliances like NATO.

5.2 The decision-making on European defence policy

At what level should decisions regarding European defence policy be taken, by the national governments, the EU or NATO? In 2002, 49 per cent of the French thought that decisions concerning European defence should be made by the EU, that is to say a percentage much lower than in Italy (64 per cent) but slightly higher than in Germany (41 per cent). The average of the fifteen European countries accounts for 44 per cent.³ 21 per cent of French prefer a national level of decision-making and 15 per cent think that decisions concerning European defence should be taken by NATO.

6 The feeling of being an European

Since its creation, Eurobarometer has been assessing the attachment of Europeans to various territorial entities and the development of a European identity.

6.1 Attachment to the territory

In the Eurobarometer survey, the respondents expressed their attachment towards four geographical entities. They were not asked to place these entities in any particular order. The word ‘attachment’ is thus more neutral than that of homeland used in the common survey.

² Eurobarometer “Public opinion and European defence”, July 2001, 15.

³ The question is “Who should take decisions concerning European defence: EU, national governments or NATO?”.

Table 5a: “People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town, village, region, country or the EU. Please tell me how attached you feel to ...” (answers in per cent)

	Your country	Your region	Your town or village	Europe
Very attached	58	44	45	13
Fairly attached	34	40	38	40
Total	92	84	83	53

Source: Eurobarometer 58. France.

Table 5b:

Total ‘very’ and ‘fairly’ attached	France	Germany	Italy
Town or village	83	89	92
Region	84	88	88
Country	92	89	94
Europe	53	46	61

Source: Eurobarometer 58.

In this survey, the French are more attached to their country than to their city (or village) or to their region. 92 per cent feel attached to their country, 84 per cent to their region and 83 per cent to their town or village. The Italians and the Germans make less distinction between those levels than the French.

More than half of the French feel attached to Europe, which places France in third position after Luxembourg and Italy. In France, feelings of attachment to Europe have been increasing regularly since 2000. In another survey, in which the question was more similar to that of the common survey, people were asked to specify the geographical level to which they feel they most belong. 43 per cent of the French declare they felt attached to the city or village where they live, 28 per cent to the country. 12 per cent chose the region and only 4 per cent feel they belonged to Europe.

6.2 European and national identity

In France, 3 per cent of the respondents feel European, 9 per cent feel European first, then as French citizens, 54 per cent feel French first, then European, and 31 per cent feel only French. A large majority of French have no difficulty combining the two identities, since 63 per cent feel at the same time French and European. The feeling of being European is stronger in Italy. In the three countries, the feeling of belonging only to the country is lower than in the European average.

Table 6: “In the near future, do you perceive yourself as ...” (answers in per cent)

	France	Italy	Germany	average EU
Nationality	31	22	37	38
Nationality and European	54	65	47	49
European and nationality	9	8	10	7
European	3	3	3	3
Don't know	2	2	3	3

Source: Eurobarometer 58.

German Survey – Findings and Results

Sven Bernhard Gareis, Paul Klein

1 German or European? Attitudes Towards Political or Territorial Affiliation

While people from many nations like to talk of ‘fatherland’ or ‘motherland’, building their national consciousness on this term, the word *Heimat* has become customary in the German language use. This term, rather hard to translate into other languages, is often highly emotionally charged; it is linked with memories of the own childhood and may but need not be used in connection with the nation. An American, for instance, might convey the same sentiment by referring to ‘my home town’, ‘where I come from’, or ‘where I grew up’. Germans use the word *Heimat* in different ways. Some use the term very narrowly, thinking in the smallest geographical categories, even down to individual villages, others use it in very large categories.

The feeling of affiliation to a living space is based on sentiment. Rational aspects may also contribute to the feeling of affiliation – but they are not for the satisfaction of an individual with his living space, and is not a product of environmental criteria which can be collected empirically.¹

Thus, economic pressures might motivate a person to settle at a given place – but it cannot be predicted whether or not he will feel at home there. Such a case, narrow emotional links to the former home and grief at having left it behind may result in inability to develop any attachment to the new place.² On the other hand, it is conceivable that he might like the new place better than the former one, depending on how easily he establishes contacts with the locals, whether the

¹ See also as an introduction: Weichhart, Peter: Raumbezogene Identität. Bausteine zu einer Theorie räumlich-sozialer Kognition und Identifikation. In: Meynen, Emil (ed.): *Erdkundliches Wissen. Schriftenreihe für Forschung und Praxis*, Heft 102, Stuttgart 1990, 14ff. In the following quoted as: Weichhart 1990.

² See Weichhart 1990, 53ff.

infrastructure satisfies his requirements and/or how intense his links to his former domicile remain.

The nearly inexhaustible possibilities of identification between individuals and a single domicile underline the existence and the functions of the categories and dimensions of the living space. Dimension here must be understood as a spatial variable (such as local, regional, national, international etc.),³ whereas the term of category is intended to define the – more or less artificial – limitation of living spaces by their denomination (e. g. Hanover, Germany, Western Europe). Accordingly, a citizen of Dortmund is at the same time might also consider himself to be one of the Ruhr District, of North Rhine-Westphalian, of Germany, of Europe or as a cosmopolite,⁴ thus would correspond with several roles. Identification⁵ with defined living spaces however does not necessarily mean that it includes all the categories which are immanent to the place concerned. Thus, it is even possible to feel good in one's own role as a Dortmund inhabitant, but at the same time to dislike being German or European.

When asked about their emotional links to a definite living space, the participants in a representative survey conducted by SOWI in 1995⁶ revealed a high degree of emphasis on the current place of residence (see table 1 below). 65.9 per cent of the overall population and 70.5 per cent of juveniles expressed particular attachment to their current home. Childhood memories and the fact of knowing a town or village well (security (of orientation)) also constitute important aspects of a *Heimat* feeling. This is underlined by the preference given to the place where the respondents have been living since (or lived) their childhood.

³ Only some of the denominable dimensions of the living space are to be quoted here; there are, of course, numerous other dimensions without any denomination, e. g. since they are perceivable just individually.

⁴ The quoted categories could be even more sub-divided, e. g. in boroughs, specified parts of a continent etc.

⁵ For the perception of the terms 'identification' and 'identity' in this study, see: Esser, Hartmut: Lokale Identifikation im Ruhrgebiet. Zur allgemeinen Erklärung einer speziellen Angelegenheit. In: Bundesforschungsanstalt für Landeskunde und Raumordnung (ed.): Informationen zur Raumentwicklung. Lokale Identität und lokale Identifikation, No. 3, Bonn 1987, 109–118.

⁶ See Spangenberg, Stefan/Klein, Paul: Heimat und Verteidigung. SOWI-Arbeitspapier No. 102, Strausberg 1997.

More than half of the respondents had never moved away from their home towns. The ratio of those feeling good about their new environment after relocating (24 per cent) was rather high compared to the number of those who had failed to readjust (11.6 per cent). The response attitudes shown by juveniles did vary widely; this was essentially due to the fact that they were not as often affected by relocations as the elder age groups.

Table 1: “Please, choose from this list the place to which you feel the strongest emotional link.”⁷ (answers in per cent)

Place	Overall Population	Youths
The place, the town, the area I have been living in since my childhood	41.9	56.1
The place, the town, the area I live in today	24.0	14.4
The place, the town, the area I lived in during my childhood but not today	11.6	8.3
The original Federal Republic of Germany (the ‘ <i>Alte</i> ’ <i>Länder</i>)	2.6	2.6
Former GDR (the ‘ <i>Neue</i> ’ <i>Länder</i>)	2.0	0.4
Germany as a whole	7.8	7.7
Eastern Europe	0.3	0.2
Western Europe	1.9	2.2
Europe as a whole	3.6	3.6
The World	4.0	4.3

Spontaneously, 7.8 per cent of the respondents expressed strong emotional links to Germany as a whole. Only very few of them identified themselves with one of the former parts of Germany. More Germans were likely to feel rather as Europeans or cosmopolites. Overall, emotional attachment was found in 1995 to be strongest at the

⁷ An answer list was handed over to the interviewees, so they could see all the possible pronunciations when deciding. Thus, the procedure could be called a ‘backed-up spontaneous’ one.

local level, and it is this level that has the greatest impact on everyday life.

Table 2 gives an overview of what the German population perceived as *Heimat* in 2002, to which category they felt affiliated.

Table 2: “What do you consider your ‘*Heimat*?’” (answers in per cent)

The city where I was born	21.0
The city where I live	32.2
The region where I was born	9.9
The region where I live	18.4
Germany	13.7
Europe	2.9
World	1.7
Others	0.2

A strong majority of Germans do not feel any links to Germany in a national sense, not to speak of thinking in a wider framework. More than half of the respondents consider the city they were born or they live in to be their *Heimat*, another third think of the region their city of birth or where they reside, and nearly none see their *Heimat* in Europe or even the world.

The elder generation’ roots in the narrow geographic space given by the city of birth or the domicile and/or the corresponding region are particularly deep and strong. Among the interviewees over 25 years old, 83 per cent see their *Heimat* there, this ratio running up to only 74 per cent among younger respondents. On the other hand, 18 per cent of the younger respondents profess Germany as their *Heimat* against only 13 per cent among the elder ones. There are also differences between the education levels: 16 per cent of high-school graduates call Germany their *Heimat*, 5 per cent see it in Europe and 6 per cent the World, whilst the corresponding answer ratios among the respondents without that graduation were only 13, 3 and 1 per cent, respectively.

Irrespective of the close affective links to *Heimat* the feeling of being European is not particularly characteristic of Germans. But, nevertheless, it is remarkably developed.

Table 3: “Do you feel yourself European?” (answers in per cent)

Very European	29.4
Quite European	42.1
A little European	19.0
Not European at all	8.0
No opinion	1.5

All in all, about one third of Germans feel very European and another 42 per cent consider themselves quite European. Some 27 per cent indicate that they feel only little or not at all European.

The idea of being ‘European’ is most widespread among high-school graduates, 41 per cent of them feeling themselves ‘very’ European. Only 27 per cent of the non-graduates gave the same answer. Moreover, young people feel better about Europe than their elders. Whilst 36 per cent of the respondents under 25 years feel themselves ‘very’ European, only 29 per cent of the elder ones do.

People in the so-called *Neue Länder* the former East Germany, have some problems with Europe. Only 20 per cent of the citizens of the former GDR feel ‘very’ European, this answer being represented at a 33 per cent level among West German respondents.

Table 4: “In your opinion is it easy or difficult to feel at the same time as German and European citizen?” (answers in per cent)

Very easy	21.8
Rather easy	44.4
Rather difficult	21.0
Very difficult	7.0
No opinion	5.9

Most respondents had no problems linking Europe and Germany. Two thirds indicated that it would be very or rather easy to feel as a German and a European at the same time. Younger respondents and those with a high-school graduation are significantly more often represented among the group choosing this answer than the elder ones and the non-graduated. Citizens from the *Neue Länder* also often have difficulty feeling themselves both as a German and at the same time as a European. 55 per cent of them think it very or rather easy to link the two categories, whilst this ratio ran up to 70 per cent in the original Federal Republic of Germany.

Those who feel themselves as Europeans have no difficulty linking their feelings of being German with those of being European. 99 per cent of those feeling themselves very European indicate they find it very easy to feel German at the same time. On the other hand, only one of 136 respondents who felt not at all European found it easy to link being German with being European.

2 Perceptions of Europe and its Institutions

The relatively high readiness of Germans to consider themselves as Europeans might be expected to find its expression in a significant impact of European institutions on every day life in Germany. But according to the respondents this significance is considered as rather low.

Table 5: “For each of the following institutions, please tell me their impact on your life.” (answers in per cent)

Institutions	very high	high	average	low	very low	no opinion
Council of Europe	1.7	12.7	21.9	24.8	29.1	9.7
European Parliament	3.1	12.5	24.9	25.9	25.9	7.8
European Commission	4.1	11.8	25.4	23.1	26.7	8.9
European Court of Justice	4.4	13.8	25.3	21.6	28.1	6.9
European Central Bank	10.1	22.9	24.1	17.3	18.9	6.7
German Parliament	15.3	36.6	24.5	10.7	10.3	2.6
German Justice	12.6	30.2	26.4	14.9	13.2	2.8
Federal Bank	11.5	32.0	26.1	15.5	12.1	2.8
German Government	20.5	39.3	20.0	9.2	8.8	2.2
German Armed Forces	6.5	16.8	26.9	21.3	25.4	3.0

Fewer than 20 per cent of the respondents saw a high impact of the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, the European Commission or the European Court of Justice on everyday Germans life. The European Central Bank constitutes the exception among the European institutions. This is certainly due to the introduction of the Euro. One third of Germans acknowledge a high impact on everyday life by this body. (This may also reflect the high degree of national identity many Germans feel with the post-war ‘economic miracle’ and the strong and prestigious D-Mark.)

Leaving the Bundeswehr out of account, the impact of this institution being perceived as low, everyday life in Germany is seen as being determined by national institutions, not by the European ones. Thus, more than half of the respondents see a high impact of the German Parliament and government, and more than 40 per cent do so with German justice and the Federal Bank.

There are only insignificant differences in the evaluation of the impact by European and German institutions between the age and education level groups as well as between East and West Germans. At a first glance, however, the German attitudes towards Europe are distinctive.

Table 6: “The impact of European and German institutions on everyday life and according to ‘feeling European’.” (answers in per cent)

	Answers of ‘very high’ and ‘high’	
	Feeling very European (n = 255)	Not feeling European at all (n = 70)
Council of Europe	15	11
European Parliament	18	7
European Commission	19	7
European Court of Justice	22	7
European Central Bank	39	19
German Parliament	55	35
German Justice	48	27
Federal Bank	46	33
German Government	66	43
German Armed Forces	28	10

As can be easily seen, those respondents who feel very European assess the impact on everyday life by both German and European institutions as well significantly higher than those who do not feel European. Since this difference applies equally to both German and European institutions, it seems rather unlikely that they are caused by the attitudes towards Europe. It is more likely that feeling European is accompanied by a stronger interest in politics, the latter guiding the perception of all the institutions' work and impact.

As for the priorities assigned to individual topics and items within the EU, the response attitudes of Germans were obviously influenced by domestic policy debates that were ongoing at the time of the survey.

Table 7: “In your opinion after the European single currency what kind of priority should be given to the following items in the EU?” (answers in per cent)

Items	very high	high	average	low	very low	no opinion
Food security policy	46.4	35.8	13.0	3.1	0.5	1.3
Employment policy	50.7	28.2	14.1	4.7	1.3	1.0
Social policy	37.2	36.6	18.4	5.6	1.0	1.3
Protection of the environment	42.6	37.4	14.9	3.4	0.2	1.4
Defence	28.2	31.2	28.7	8.8	1.3	1.8
Public Security	34.8	38.1	20.3	4.4	0.8	1.6
Public Health Policy	39.5	37.7	15.4	5.1	1.5	0.8
Education and Culture	25.9	36.4	27.6	7.3	1.5	1.4
Foreign policy	25.9	39.6	25.4	5.8	0.9	2.4
Scientific and technological research	24.5	39.0	26.3	7.9	0.5	1.8
Co-operation with developing countries	20.2	33.8	30.8	12.0	1.9	1.4
Common Agricultural policy	18.0	39.7	29.5	8.8	1.9	2.1

Germans obviously want European institutions to deal primarily with those affairs that impact on everyday life. Considering the various food and agricultural scandals of recent years and the unemployment situation the emphasis placed by Germans on these issues is hardly surprising. The protection of the environment, public security, social policy and public health are issues the Germans recommend the EU focus on. Foreign and security policy, education and culture as well as scientific and technological research are fields perceived as being less important. According to German respondents, the EU should deal least with the co-operation with developing countries and a common agricultural policy, this latter perhaps reflecting widespread German frustration with the existing European system of agricultural subsidies.

Particularly female respondents want safe foodstuffs. They also place higher emphasis than men on social policy, protection of the environment and public health policy. Scientific and technological research on the other hand is more important to men than women. Elder respondents weigh the protection of the environment, but also defence and public security, heavier than the younger ones do. Defence is stronger longed for in the *Neue Länder* than in the original ones, but it is less important for high-school graduates than for the non-graduates. It is the other way round for education and culture. Whilst 72 per cent of those with a higher education level lay high importance on these items, this ratio only runs up to 60 per cent for the non-graduates.

Those respondents feeling European take all the items dealt with in table 7 for significantly more important for the EU than those not feeling European do.

As for the tasks of the EU, it is particularly remarkable that Germans are considerably sceptical about the Union's enlargement.

Table 8: “For each of the following statements, please tell me how much you agree.” (answers in per cent)

Statements	totally agree	partially agree	indifferent	partially disagree	totally disagree	no opinion
The EU should have one common Foreign Policy	31.1	36.6	20.9	5.1	3.3	3.0
The EU should have one common Security and Defence Policy	33.9	40.0	17.2	4.5	2.3	2.2
The EU should have one common European Armed Forces	22.0	28.1	27.0	11.4	7.3	4.1
The EU should have one common Internal Security and Justice Policy	23.0	33.9	25.6	10.6	4.1	2.7
The EU should have one common Constitution	22.3	25.6	23.8	15.3	9.5	3.5
The EU should be enlarged and include new countries	12.1	21.6	31.5	15.9	14.1	4.8

Only one third of all respondents agree at least partially with the EU enlargement, and nearly the same ratio of Germans more or less disagree. Enlargement meets disagreement particularly in the *Neue Länder* as well as among those who do not feel European. While 13 per cent in West Germany totally agree with enlargement, only 9 per cent of East Germans do so. Those respondents feeling European support this statement by 18 per cent, with only 14 per cent of those not feeling European. High-school graduates support enlargement more than non-graduates do. One common foreign policy, but also one common security and defence policy meet with clear approval. 68 and

74 per cent of Germans agree with these fields, respectively, at least in part.

More sceptical attitudes, however, are shown towards common armed forces, common internal security policy and a common Constitution. About half of the respondents agree with these items at least partially. The common foreign policy finds most of its supporters among men, elder respondents and graduates. 75 per cent of those feeling European agree with these items, whilst only 52 per cent of the 'non-Europeans' at least partially do so.

78 per cent younger respondents approve of a common security and defence policy compared with 64 per cent of elder respondents. The difference between 'Europeans' and 'non-Europeans' is particularly significant. Whilst the former approve a common security and defence policy by 84 per cent, the latter only do so by 51 per cent.

Common European armed forces find their supporters also among those feeling European. 59 per cent of them at least partially agree with this idea, with only 39 per cent of 'non-Europeans'. As for the approval of a common policy of internal security and a common Constitution, there are nearly no differences between men and women, elder and younger respondents, graduates and non-graduates as well as East and West Germans. Similarly to all the other items, however, those respondents feeling European obviously more agree with than the 'non-Europeans' do.

3 Risks, Threats and the Security Institutions

Although Germans felt acutely threatened by invasion from the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War, and still express strong anxieties about the threat of a nuclear conflict, these risks have fallen in importance continuously, at the latest during the 1990s. At the beginning of the 21st century, international terrorism, organised crime, environmental disasters, uncontrolled migration and economic crises have become the foci of perceived threat.

Table 9: “For each of the following threats to the security, please tell me your opinion about their danger level for you.” (answers in per cent)

Threats	very high	high	average	low	very low	no opinion
Nuclear Conflict	7.3	20.6	28.1	25.9	14.9	3.2
Conventional War in Europe	5.4	13.0	31.6	29.0	18.6	2.5
World War	7.8	15.5	29.5	26.1	19.0	2.1
Accidental throwing of a nuclear missile	8.3	20.2	27.5	26.0	14.5	3.5
Proliferation of Nuclear, bacteriological and chemical weapons	13.1	31.0	25.1	19.0	8.3	3.4
Epidemic	5.5	19.5	31.7	25.7	14.4	3.3
Terrorist attack	17.6	29.2	25.3	18.9	7.1	1.9
Organised crime	14.7	32.4	26.2	18.0	6.6	2.1
Accident in a nuclear plant	8.0	23.7	35.8	21.0	9.4	2.2
Uncontrolled migration	11.3	26.2	28.7	20.3	12.0	1.5
Environmental disasters	15.7	35.8	28.3	13.5	5.5	1.3
Food risks	2.7	8.0	23.8	25.2	38.9	1.4
Economic crisis	9.2	28.5	31.0	21.3	7.9	2.1

In 2002 fears of environmental disasters and organised crime are clearly in the foreground of the Germans’ threat perceptions since 52 and 47 per cent of the respondents feel these issues are important, respectively, and feel very highly or highly threatened by them. Terrorist attacks and the proliferation of nuclear, bacteriological and chemical weapons are perceived as a threat by nearly half of Germans. About one third number economic crises and uncontrolled migration

among their threat perceptions. Only a quarter or even less of Germans are concerned about the threat of nuclear or conventional war in Europe, even fewer a new World War. Much the same is true for the threat of epidemics or accidental missile launch. Food risk presents the least of security concerns.

Apart from environmental disasters, with 56 per cent of women feeling a threat of against only 47 per cent of men doing so, there are no differences in the threat perceptions between men and women. There are also only minor differences between age groups: elder respondents feel more threatened by WMD proliferation than do the younger, whilst the latter perceive organised crime as more dangerous than the former do.

The education level becomes obvious only for the uncontrolled migration item. Non-graduates see a higher threat in it than graduates do. Respondents from the *Neue Länder* distinguish from the West Germans by only 21 per cent of them seeing a threat in an accident in a nuclear plant whilst 35 per cent of West Germans feel a danger in it. Organised crime constitutes a danger for 51 per cent of the respondents in the West but only 35 per cent in the East. On the other hand, environmental disasters are a threat for 54 per cent of the *Neue Länder* citizens and only for 44 per cent of West Germans – what certainly is due to the recent flash flood disasters at the rivers of Odra and Elbe. Those assessing themselves as Europeans perceive for nearly all the items higher threats than the non-Europeans. Nuclear conflicts, conventional wars, World War, accidental throwing a nuclear missile, proliferation of NBC weapons, accidents in a nuclear plant and environmental disasters first of all constitute a higher threat for the ‘Europeans’ than for those respondents not confessing to Europe.

Thus, the confession to Europe is probably due to the threat perceptions since the idea suggests itself that only a common larger Europe would be in a position to master all these threats.

In order to face all the risks and threats perceived by the Germans, there are different possible measures, reaching from diplomatic

actions to military intervention. The following table 10 shows the activities and instruments assessed as appropriate and optimal by the Germans.

Table 10: “Peace and stability are jeopardised by a variety of risks and threats. How do you estimate the following political and military activities and instruments?” (answers in per cent)

Political and military activities and instruments	indispensable	useful	without effect	useless	harmful	no opinion
Coercive military measures in order to protect human rights	15.8	34.7	23.0	17.6	6.3	2.6
Diplomatic actions	45.2	36.5	11.6	3.0	0.6	3.2
Supporting democratisation processes	35.5	38.8	15.1	4.8	0.8	5.1
Military peacekeeping	27.7	41.4	16.9	8.8	2.3	3.0
Strict border controls to stop migrations	30.0	36.7	19.2	9.0	2.1	3.1
Increasing efforts to help developing countries	23.7	37.9	22.5	9.8	1.7	4.4
Deterrence of potential aggressors	21.3	35.9	19.5	10.7	3.2	9.4
Fighting a war for legitimate reasons	10.0	13.9	26.5	22.1	22.3	5.1
Combat terrorism by military means	20.6	31.9	22.1	14.3	6.8	4.2

The responses show clearly that most respondents prefer non-violent measures to face the threats and risks, with diplomatic actions heading the list. A large majority consider support for democratisation processes and stricter border controls to stop unwanted migration

indispensable or at least – of the more non-violent measures increasing assistance to developing countries meets with the least approval. Nevertheless, nearly two thirds of the respondents view this as an appropriate measure.

Far fewer respondents consider military action appropriate compared with the non-violent measures. War, even whether fought for legitimate reasons, is rejected by a majority. Only half of the respondents view other military means such as military intervention to protect human rights or to combat terrorism, as at least rather appropriate. On the other hand, military peacekeeping and deterrence of potential aggressors are supported by about two thirds of the Germans.

Education level is particularly distinguishing for German attitudes about these issues. 80 per cent of the high-school graduates support democratisation processes, but only 72 per cent of the non-graduates. The latter, though, are more likely to support military peacekeeping (71 per cent), stricter border controls (69 per cent) and deterrence (58 per cent) than do the former (with respective ratios of 62, 57 and 51 per cent).

There is also an East-West dichotomy to be found for the supporters of border controls and deterrence, since East Germans approve these measures by 72 and 63 per cent, while approval rates in the West were only 65 and 55 per cent.

Those respondents indicating themselves as Europeans differ from the ‘non-Europeans’, showing more support for greater efforts to help developing countries (64 vs. 57 per cent), and are more concerned about the legitimacy of armed force (25 vs. 18 per cent), while less supportive of stricter border controls (59 vs. 79 per cent).

Traditionally, military forces have been organised, trained and equipped to threaten or apply organised violence in the service of the state. Recently though, nearly every country in the world has used its military other, more benign tasks. Table 11 below shows which tasks Germans feel are appropriate to the military.

Table 11: “For each of the following tasks, please tell me how much Armed Forces are appropriate.” (answers in per cent)

Tasks	very appropriate	appropriate	neither/nor	partially inappropriate	completely inappropriate	no opinion
Assistance in disaster relief	64.8	28.3	4.9	0.9	0.3	0.8
Evacuation of citizen from conflict areas	54.5	31.8	9.4	3.1	0.2	1.0
Peacekeeping operations	46.3	36.3	11.1	4.0	0.6	1.8
Humanitarian assistance to other countries	43.6	37.6	11.3	5.9	0.7	0.9
Defence of national territory and interests	50.6	30.4	11.7	4.0	1.0	2.2

Until very recent times, the defence of the national territory undoubtedly constituted the main task of the German armed forces in the public mind. A poll conducted by the German Emnid Institute 1991 found that 91 per cent of Germans felt that the military should deal with defence within the borders of the Federal Republic of Germany.⁸ This changed dramatically at the beginning of the 21st century. Several other tasks now rank higher than home defence in the appropriateness list. When adding the table values of ‘very appropriate’ and ‘appropriate’, the following result is obtained:

⁸ Hoffmann, Hans-Viktor: Demoskopisches Meinungsbild in Deutschland zur Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik. Akademie der Bundeswehr für Information und Kommunikation. Waldbröl 1992, 12.

1.	Assistance in disaster relief	93.1 %
2.	Evacuation of citizens from conflict areas	86.3 %
3.	Peacekeeping operations	82.6 %
4.	Humanitarian assistance of other countries	81.2 %
5.	Defence of national territory	81.0 %
6.	Co-operation with police	70.2 %
7.	Defence of allies' territory	69.5 %
8.	Fighting terrorism	68.3 %
9.	Supervision of border to control migration	67.8 %
10.	Defence of European interests	63.2 %
11.	Protection of human rights	55.0 %
12.	Peace enforcement	54.0 %

Disaster relief and evacuations from conflict areas are clearly seen to be preferred military missions. The former primary mission of home defence meanwhile takes only the fifth place, even behind humanitarian assistance for other countries.

Given the ongoing debate in Germany over the domestic use of the Bundeswehr, which currently is possible only under a declared state of emergency is proclaimed, public attitudes are rather surprising since more than two thirds of the respondents support co-operation with police forces, fighting terrorism and supervision of the border. The defence of allies' territory in this list 'only' takes rank 7, but nearly 70 per cent would consider this an appropriate mission for the German military. Using the armed forces to protect human rights or peace enforcement is seen more sceptically, with just a little more than half of the respondents viewing this as an appropriate military mission.

Across the sub-groups according to statistical characteristics, there are only small variations in the appropriateness ranking. Contrary to expectation, those respondents perceiving themselves as Europeans do not support military action in stronger the defence of European

interests significantly more than the overall population, with a respective ratio just 2 per cent more than respondents overall.

The table results and the ranking derived from the data might lead to the impression that Germans see their military foremost as a disaster relief organisation, perhaps thinking them insufficiently capable of combat. This impression seems at least partially confirmed in the following table 12.

Table 12: “For each of the following statements on German Armed Forces, please tell me how much you agree.” (answers in per cent)

Statements	totally agree	partially agree	indifferent	partially disagree	totally disagree	no opinion
Armed Forces help young people to become more integrated in the society	12.2	31.6	23.8	16.9	11.1	4.4
Armed Forces are National Unity Symbol	17.1	34.0	27.1	12.9	5.2	3.6
Armed Forces teach discipline and respect to the young people	18.6	29.0	29.5	11.6	8.1	3.2
Armed Forces are useless	2.6	6.5	18.2	31.5	38.7	2.5
Armed Forces stand up for values like freedom and democracy	15.8	31.8	31.2	11.6	5.6	3.9
Armed Forces prepare for war and fighting	10.5	25.8	31.6	18.1	10.7	3.3
Armed Forces make useful peacekeeping missions	25.3	39.1	26.5	5.8	1.5	1.8
Armed Forces help German people during disasters and emergencies	52.5	32.7	11.5	1.8	0.2	1.3
Armed Forces defend their country and its territory	41.0	35.1	18.0	3.0	0.7	2.2

Actually, a large majority (85 per cent) of the German respondents agree at least partially that 'armed forces help Germans during disasters and emergencies'. The second place, though, is already taken by the statement that armed forces defend their country and its territory, with 76 per cent of German supporters. More than half of the respondents approve moreover the items 'armed forces are a national unity symbol' and 'armed forces are useful for peacekeeping missions'. For all the other task fields however, the agreement rates stay below the 50 per cent mark – including the idea that 'armed forces prepare for war and fighting'. This once typical task of all the armed forces in the world finds even fewer supporters than the items 'armed forces help young people to become more integrated in the society' and 'armed forces teach young people discipline and respect'. Also the notion that armed forces stand for values such as democracy and freedom is more represented in the population than is the idea of war and fighting. Only a small minority of even less than 10 per cent see the army as useless, whilst the large majority contradict this statement. The predominate view seems to be ambivalent, accepting the concept of defence while rejecting the thought of war and combat. This is particularly clear for the respondents over 25 years, supporting this item only by 35 per cent, whilst the supporters' rate among the younger ones runs up to 46 per cent. The high-school graduates, with 41 per cent of approval, see war and fighting more clearly than those with a lower education level (35 per cent). The difference between East and West Germans is particularly great. The item 'armed forces prepare for war and fighting' obtains an agreement ratio of 47 per cent in the *Neue Länder*, and of only 32 per cent in the West, although the citizens of both parts are nearly unanimous about rejecting the notion of armed forces being useless: In the West as in the East, this item finds a supporters' ratio of only 9 per cent each.

4 National Armed Forces or an Integrated All-European Army?

As we have already noted, the armed forces of Europe are coalescing, binational and multinational higher formations have become the rule rather than an exception in some countries. It is, however, still doubtful whether these developments point towards a future common European army. Opinions on this issue are divided across the population.

Table 13: “Looking in the future, what kind of armed forces would you prefer?” (answers in per cent)

An integrated European force instead of national forces	14.5
A standing European Rapid Reaction Force parallel to the national Armed Forces	31.6
National Armed Forces, Rapid Reaction Forces on an ad-hoc basis	36.0
Only national armed forces	5.7
No armed forces at all	3.0
No opinion	9.2

Certainly, in the populations’ eyes the era of national armed forces seems definitely to be coming to an end, since only a small minority of less than six per cent prefer this type as the model of the future. But it remains doubtful, the opinions across the population taken as a base, whether it shall be immediately followed by integrated European armed forces. Only 14.5 per cent agree with this type. According to the respondents’ opinions, national armies will continue to exist in Europe, side by side with integrated units either permanently organised or assembled *ad hoc*. More than two thirds of the respondents support such a model. There are nearly no differences across the various statistical population groups, except for the model of integrated European forces, support for which is half again higher among those perceiving themselves as Europeans than among the general population. Conversely, support for exclusively national

armed forces is preferred by 14 per cent of ‘non-Europeans’, this is a figure almost three times higher than among Germans generally. As for the possible employment of European troops, the era of purely national decision-making and command also seems to be running out, since a large majority of the Germans prefer that decision-making on such missions be taken by European institutions.

Table 14: “In your opinion, decisions to send European troops into missions should be taken by:” (answers in per cent)

The National Governments according to their legal rules	21.4
The European member states by unanimous vote	32.0
The European member states by majority vote	36.4
No opinion	10.1

The German population obviously wants the decision to deploy European troops to be made by Europe and not by national governments. The disagreement lies in whether such decisions should be taken by unanimous vote. Only 36 per cent of German respondents prefer a decision by majority vote, with 32 per cent pleading for consensus. In any case, the desire is that decisions on the European security and defence policy should be made in Europe by Europeans.

Table 15: “In your opinion, decisions on European Security and Defence Policy should be made by:” (answers in per cent)

Majority vote by the EU member states	40.4
Majority vote by the Council of European Union	15.2
NATO Council	13.9
United Nations Security Council	14.0
No opinion	16.5

Respondents clearly prefer that questions involving security and defence issues should be decided by a majority vote of the national governments of Europe. Only minorities of 15 per cent or less would care to see this competency transferred to the Council of Ministers, the

North Atlantic Council or the UN Security Council. It should not be inferred however that the wish to have Europeans make their own decisions implies any growing distance between Europe and NATO or the UN. These remain the institutions of choice for many key problem areas. Particularly in the military realm is NATO still seen to be an indispensable partner. Asked who should have primary responsibility for countering which risk, respondents provided the following answers:

Table 16: “For each of the following risks, what level do you consider more important?” (highest values highlighted; answers in per cent)

Risks	Germany	Europe	NATO	UN	none of these	no opinion
Uncontrolled migration	35.8	40.4	5.9	5.8	5.5	6.6
Accident in a nuclear plant	26.1	25.4	9.4	10.4	17.0	11.7
Organised crime	21.4	37.3	15.5	9.2	8.7	7.9
Economic crisis	21.0	41.3	6.8	10.3	11.2	9.5
Environmental disasters	18.5	33.8	6.2	18.2	15.8	7.5
Food risks	17.4	31.2	6.5	27.6	8.0	9.2
Terrorist attack	12.7	16.6	34.1	18.1	10.8	7.6
Epidemics	10.7	22.9	9.8	29.1	14.4	13.1
Proliferation of nuclear, bacteriological and chemical weapons	4.6	10.3	31.1	31.4	10.0	12.7
Accidental throwing of a nuclear missile	3.6	8.8	33.3	15.6	23.0	15.6
Conventional War in Europe	3.4	28.2	44.8	11.3	4.0	8.3
World War	2.6	7.3	38.3	34.9	7.4	9.5
Nuclear Conflict	2.3	11.2	43.2	25.2	6.3	11.9

Clearly, Germans see their own national government as most competent for the control of migration. Nuclear accidents, organised crime, and the economy follow by a good margin. On the other hand, Germans view the classic defence and security concerns better served by other agencies such as NATO and the UN. Those who consider themselves as ‘European’ do not very much differ in their opinions. However, they do see Europe as the best address in case of an accident in a nuclear plant, and not the national government.

Europe meanwhile has decided to raise own Rapid Reaction Forces to include about 60 thousand personnel. Germany’s contribution to this force meets with approval by the majority of respondents, but particularly among those feeling themselves as Europeans.

Table 17: “What do you think of Germany’s contribution to the European Reaction Forces?” (answers in per cent)

	Overall Population	Respondents feeling themselves as Europeans
I support	28.3	33.7
I rather support	44.1	46.1
I rather disagree	13.2	12.0
I disagree	6.2	3.1
No opinion	8.2	5.0

More than two thirds of the respondents across the overall population at least ‘rather’ support the decision of Germany to contribute to the European Reaction Forces, with only a little bit less than 20 per cent of against. Among those feeling themselves as Europeans, the support runs up to nearly 80 per cent, with just 15 per cent of opponents. For the overall population, it is significant that West Germans are much more for a German role than East Germans, their support being only 66.8 per cent. High-school graduates favour this role significantly more (80 per cent) than non-graduates (70.4 per cent). These findings similarly apply to a comparison between male and female

respondents, 78.7 per cent the former agreeing with a German role by but only 65.6 per cent of women.

Table 18: “These European Crisis Reaction Forces should be:” (answers in per cent)

Considered less important than NATO	20.0
Considered as important as NATO	58.3
Considered more important than NATO	8.2
No opinion	13.6

Respondents consider European reaction forces equally important to those of NATO (almost 60 per cent). Only a fifth of respondents consider them less important, and 8 per cent find them more. This overall assessment is shared by those respondents feeling themselves as Europeans, with 19 per cent considering the less important, 60 per cent being convinced of an equal importance and 8 per cent favouring greater importance. Table 18 below reflects the tasks expected of these European reaction forces according to the opinion of the German population.

Table 19: “The European Union has decided to establish a common Crisis Reaction Force, consisting of up to 60.000 soldiers from the EU-Member states. For each of the following tasks, please tell me how much you think these European Armed Forces are appropriate?” (answers in per cent)

Tasks	very appropriate	appropriate	neither/ nor	partially inappropriate	completely inappropriate	no opinion
Assistance in disaster relief	58.8	30.9	5.9	2.7	0.7	0.9
Evacuation of citizen from conflict areas	51.0	34.9	8.6	3.8	0.7	1.1
Peacekeeping operations	45.2	36.3	11.4	4.3	1.6	1.3
Humanitarian Assistance to other countries	43.0	37.9	12.3	4.9	0.9	1.0
Fighting terrorism	41.6	31.6	15.4	6.8	2.3	2.3
Defence of European territory and interests	38.0	37.7	12.5	5.8	2.9	3.1
Supervision of border to control migration	33.5	32.0	18.7	11.4	2.7	1.6
Fighting international organised crime	33.4	33.5	16.8	10.1	3.4	2.7
Defence of allies' territory and interests	33.0	37.5	15.7	5.5	4.2	4.1
Defence of national territory and interests	32.6	35.9	17.0	8.1	3.6	2.7
Co-operation with Police to keep public order	30.3	37.7	18.0	9.2	2.6	2.1
Protection of Human Rights	26.6	35.0	21.9	11.4	3.1	2.1
Peace Enforcement operations	24.4	30.8	21.6	13.1	6.3	3.9

As can be seen, German respondents consider disaster relief the main task of the European Crisis Reaction Force, nearly 90 per cent seeing this mission as being the most appropriate, followed by the evacuation of citizens from conflict areas and peacekeeping operations. Humanitarian missions for other countries take the fourth and the fight against terrorism the fifth place. Germans expect the European Reaction Force to undertake much the same tasks as national armed forces, and in much the same order of priority (see table 11). The exception is the fight against terrorism, which is seen as a higher priority for European forces than for the national military. The opposite is true for national defence in the narrower sense and the defence of national interest, these still being considered a primary mission for national forces. The 'Europeans' among the respondents include the defence of Europe among the main tasks of these Rapid Reaction Forces: They place it behind assistance in disaster relief and evacuation on the third place, together with humanitarian assistance to other countries.

5 Conclusions

The responses provided to the questions posed above indicate that Germans have definite views on the current European situation and on the forthcoming processes in connection with European unification. These opinions and perceptions should be taken into account in the debate over future in European policy in general and over the European Security and Defence Policy in particular.

Although the huge majority of Germans does not at all dislike the EU and the process European integration, they do not perceive Europe as a visionary idea which drives and motivates people to become personally engaged. Affective links as an expression of a feeling of personal belonging to a larger social unit are reserved for much narrower spheres. In the eyes of most Germans the EU and even their own national state are perceived foremost as functional organisations for undertaking a wide range of tasks and obligations on behalf of their citizens, deep emotional ties being reserved to the narrower *Heimat*. German respondents attempt to differentiate rationally

between the kind of work national institutions might perform more successfully than the European ones and vice versa. Consequently, most German respondents have no problem with feeling both as Germans and Europeans: both conditions being widely considered emotionally neutral.

As far as practical competencies are concerned, expectations and hopes with regard to Europe are rather extravagant. In most of the relevant dimensions of daily life respondents would appreciate a greater impact by European institutions to complement inadequate national efforts. They do not consider the existing influences and interdependencies between European and national institutions as being very great. Although the Euro is tangible symbol of Europe in everyday-life, even the European Central Bank, which replaced the German Federal Bank in all decisive operational fields in 1999, is still considered less influential than its national predecessor. The significance of other European institutions is assessed as low despite any real degree of importance. Obviously, German respondents still perceive Europe more as a project, a work in progress, than an accomplished reality with an impact on daily life, no matter its achievements nor however problematic German respondents the implications of EU enlargement to be.

This perception is certainly due to the fact that Europe and its institutions remain rather abstract creations, inaccessible to direct influence by individual referenda or general elections. Furthermore, whilst national politics are largely shaped by the ubiquitous politicians in the media, Europe largely is widely lacks any form of common representation by real personalities, having no president, chancellor or foreign minister of its own. So for most respondents, the national is highest level of political organisation which they still can comprehend. Beyond this national sphere matters become more or less incomprehensible. The public debate in and surrounding the Convent to draft a European Constitution pointed in the right direction. The more tangible Europe appears to its citizens the more clearly its real present and future significance on daily life can be recognised. This might also impact on those political fields which, like the Security and

Defence Policy, are not yet considered to be tasks for which Europe has developed any particular capability thus far.

When asked directly for their opinions about a common European Foreign, Security or Defence Policy an overwhelming majority favoured a unified position and strategy for the European nations. On the other hand, most respondents do not consider this field of activity to be a high priority for the Union. At first glance this seems contradictory. But for Germans, interest in foreign or security policy issues is largely latent, and usually manifests itself only in crisis situations. Usually the focus of public interest remains fixed on questions of direct or even existential concern such as unemployment, health, pensions, etc.⁹ Furthermore, common European approaches in foreign affairs remain underdeveloped, as was seen during the debate over Iraq, which was at its height when this survey was conducted in Germany. So what was said with regard to European politics in general can also be seen to be true for foreign and security policy: German respondents would appreciate more European efforts, but they still have little faith in Europe's competency to formulate common perspectives and implement them in a co-ordinated manner.

Nevertheless, if the organisations and structures were seen to be reliable, Germans seem to be prepared to approve development towards more European military institutions and organisations. Lacking existential national threat, reduced costs and positive experiences with multinational security co-operation might cause the national military to be less important as a national symbol. Again, even in the security and military field hopes and expectations are high. If Europe is successful in establishing security structures of its own, nearly 60 per cent of the respondents think that European security institutions and forces should be equal to NATO. Only about one fifth of the German respondents think that the Alliance should be considered as the predominant security agency in and for Europe, and some 8 per cent even think that European structures should be considered as more important than NATO. Since German respondents

⁹ See Gareis, Sven Bernhard: Sicherheitspolitische Kommunikation – Eine Annäherung an ein schwieriges Thema. In: Gareis, Sven Bernhard/Zimmermann, Rolf (eds.): Sicherheitspolitische Kommunikation. Baden-Baden 1999.

clearly reject a competition between NATO and EU, a concept of complementary role sharing between the two agencies should find broad acceptance.

German are realistic regarding the complex security environment which has developed during the last decade, which is characterised by new risks and threats. It seems that the majority of the German population is fully aware of the matters of concern in and around their country. They understand that the world is interdependent, where national sovereignty is eroding and transnational solutions must be found, even in the field of security and defence, which for centuries has been the exclusive domain of nation states. German respondents therefore call for the establishment of European Rapid Reaction Forces, a German role in these forces, and European disposition of these forces, but they still reject the idea of replacing national militaries by European ones entirely.

According to the German interviewees the complex global security situation requires multifaceted responses and initiatives, including military action. The military is considered by Germans as a political tool, which should be applied if necessary. While there is some discussion in the political sphere, whether or not the German military should be allowed to take over certain security tasks in the interior, the population seems to have arrived at a pragmatic point of view in that regard: If a given situation requires the employment of the military, this step should be taken. Obviously the German respondents find military missions more acceptable, the less violent and combat-orientated these missions are expected to be. In the eyes of the Germans the characteristics of armed forces have changed from traditional combat readiness towards capabilities in policing, as well as technical assistance in post-war res. disaster scenarios. This attitude, which is widespread among the German respondents, might be due to the fact that although the German military has been participating in multinational peace operations for years it has been spared the direct experience of combat. The discussion over the use of force against Iraq, which was ongoing at the time of our survey, might have reinforced existing notions about a peaceful military. In any case, the military is seen as an integrative element of an European Security

and Defence Policy, and within that framework German respondents accept military missions.

What does this mean for the continuing European efforts to establish common security structures? First of all, the European states and governments need to empower their citizens' trust in European institutions, be it by increasing transparency of European procedures and mechanisms, or be it by improving decision making and facilitating the realisation of common projects. Visible changes in European politics and more development of self-sustaining institutions will be needed if German citizens are to come to accept European competencies in an existential field like security and defence.

German respondents tend to regard the military more as a disaster relief agency than as a combat-ready armed force, and this reveals some need for a European strategic concept which analyses existing and forthcoming challenges to European Security and Defence Policy and formulates options and necessary measures. In that context, the different roles and functions of the military could be defined as well.

Perhaps an enlarged EU would not be the appropriate framework within which integrated armed forces beyond a task-force-style combination of national contingents should be created. The mechanisms of deepened co-operation between some European states in the fields of armament, logistics and multinational/integrated military bodies might serve as a nucleus for a more comprehensive European Security and Defence Policy, including armed forces. If the will exists to improve European capabilities a certain duplication of structures and resources in the fields of intelligence, logistics and transport parallel to NATO will probably be unavoidable. Progress towards closer co-operation and integration between European countries will help to reduce costs and allocate spending on military capabilities more efficiently.

It would be illusory to expect military service in European Forces to take on the affective dimensions of defending one's *Heimat*. What will be required of European Forces will be professional soldiers to fulfil a complex and challenging job at the call of a democratically

legitimised body. Considering the way in which Germans view their nation and Europe as functional organisations, they can justifiably expect a European military to cope with security matters professionally. This impacts on the self-image of soldiers, especially so long as European forces are made up of national contingents. To avoid role conflicts and clashes of military cultures it might be appropriate in the long run to create an European all volunteer force based on European law and European resources similar to the different public services already existing within the EU.

Italian Survey Findings and Results

Francesco Antonelli, Giulia Aubry, Maria Luisa Maniscalco, Alessia Zaretti

1 Italian or European? The sense of belonging and national pride¹

Italy has long been considered a country with a strong ‘pro European vocation’. Many surveys have shown that Italians have a very positive view of the EU.²

This survey however has shown that when individual feelings of belonging to a specific community are tested, contradictions emerge that are typical of the complex society in which we live.

In the face of systemic contradictions, argues the German sociologist Ulrich Beck, ‘individualisation’ is transformed into a sort of safety anchor, and individuals become the autonomous arbiters of their own existence, increasingly detaching themselves from external conditioning, and at the same time from the security of the social bonds. In this view, the traditional attachment to the great political communities, whether to the nation-states of the modern era or the mass parties of the twentieth century, decline, and identity becomes mainly elective, the result of a process of self-definition.

In consequence, belonging to a community, as the central element of every political identity, also ceases to have an exclusive character, and the State, excluding the possibility of multiple membership, is no longer the sole focus of group feeling, but is itself ‘deconstructed’, allowing the formation of superimposed and often ambiguous political identities. One should therefore refer not to sense of belonging, but to senses of belonging, sometimes very diffuse laden with contradictions.

¹ By Giulia Aubry.

² See, for example, the ‘Eurobarometer’ surveys over the last five years, www.eurobarometer.com.

This being the context of our survey, not only is the choice of questions put to the sample of interviewees, and the use of terms like, city, region, Italy, Europe and world justified – but the particularly ‘European’ nature of Italians is also revealed.

Table 1: “What do you consider your homeland?” (answers in per cent)

The city where I was born/live	11.1
The Region where I was born/live	2.0
Italy	64.6
Europe	4.9
World	15.4
Others	0.4

65 per cent of the respondents stated that they thought of Italy as their homeland, confirming the fact that national identity is still a very widespread value.

In second place, in some ways surprisingly, comes ‘world’ selected by 15 per cent of the sample. In parallel with a ‘universalist’ view that is increasingly becoming established as an Italian peculiarity one finds 11 per cent of the interviewees who selected ‘the city where I was born/live’. The scarcely 5 per cent of the votes given to the homeland ‘Europe’ must be considered a very interesting figure, especially considering the ‘European vocation’ of our country, while only 2 per cent chose ‘the Region where I was born/live’.

In spite of the fact that the majority selected ‘Italy’ as their homeland, it is evident that the sense of belonging is complex, fuzzy and continually changing. This fact not only confirms the process of individualisation just referred to, but also that characteristic view of Italy as the ‘country of a hundred parochial loyalties’, parish in this sense meaning municipality, town or city, an Italy therefore that seems to identify itself more with its Renaissance city-state heritage than to its modern and artificial administrative division into Regions.

Age does not appear to be a particularly important determinant. A majority of interviewees both the under forty and those over chose 'Italy' in almost equal percentages (66 per cent of the former, 65 per cent of the latter). The older respondents were slightly more inclined to choose 'world' (18 per cent as against 14 per cent for those under forty). The response 'Italy' was represented similarly in all the educational categories, with 68 per cent of the non-graduates; 64 per cent of the high-school graduates and 68 per cent of those with a higher education level chose this option. 18 per cent of the post-graduate interviewees take a more 'universalist' view, selecting the option 'world', whereas only 6 per cent chose the option 'the city where I was born/live', against 12 per cent of non-graduates and 13 per cent of the high-school graduates.

It is then interesting to note that for those who chose the city as their homeland, there are two types of 'localism'. The first is associated with gender; in fact 13 per cent of the women chose 'the city where I was born/live' against only 9 per cent of the men. The second, on the other hand, could be called 'apolitical'. In fact there is no marked predominance of a political component within the opinion expressed. In this way the city as homeland seems to be a sort of 'local world' set to defend the individual from external threats, from whatever direction they may come.

A necessary second aspect whenever conducting opinion polls in Italy is analysis of the data on the basis of political inclination. The choice of 'homeland' is in fact strongly influenced by political views. Italy is seen as homeland above all by right wing (80 per cent) and centrist (73 per cent) interviewees. Left-wing respondents, too, showed a certain propensity towards 'Italy' (55 per cent) though less than those of other political views. On the other hand, the choice of 'world' is characteristic of respondents who stated that they belonged to the left (27 per cent), to the point that the 'universalist identity' – also confirmed by those who chose the United Nations as the operating level for international crises – assumes a strong political connotation in a sort of affirmation of the 'global responsibility' to which the most recent debate must have contributed.

Table 2: “Do you feel yourself European?” (answers in per cent)

Very European	19.1
Quite European	32.6
A little European	35.4
Not European at all	7.9
No opinion	4.8

The majority of Italians feel ‘a little’ (35 per cent) or ‘quite’ (33 per cent) European, indicating a tendency very different to that which emerged from other surveys present our country as a ‘European’ country *par excellence*. The reality that emerges from the survey is not only of a spread over the first three options, but a sense of belonging to Europe – when it is defined as ‘homeland’ – that is much fuzzier and less widespread.

The idea of being ‘European’ is most widespread among the post-graduates; 24 per cent of those with a higher education level feel themselves ‘very European’ and 40 per cent of them ‘quite European’. This perception is much lower among those who are non-graduates; only 19 per cent feel themselves ‘very European’ and 20 per cent chose the option ‘quite European’. On the other hand, age does not appear as an important determinant; young and old are split similarly between the different opinions.

Once again, the political component plays a very important role. The sense of belonging to Europe increases as one moves from the right to the left of Italian politics. 51 per cent of those who stated that they vote for the right felt ‘not European at all’ (11 per cent) or only ‘a little European’ (40 per cent), whereas 57 per cent of the left-wing respondents stated that they felt ‘very’ or ‘quite’ European, demonstrating the fact that the vision of Europe as a political-cultural community of reference (but not an alternative to Italy) is distinctive of this political grouping.

Table 3: “In your opinion is it possible to feel at the same time Italian and a European citizen?” (answers in per cent)

It's very easy	48.4
It's rather easy	35.5
It's rather difficult	10.1
It's very difficult	2.0
No opinion	3.3

Italians think it possible to feel oneself an Italian and a European citizen at the same time. Almost half the sample (48 per cent) consider dual citizenship a natural consequence of the process of political, economic and cultural integration we are experiencing, whereas 35 per cent consider it a possibility, even if on different grounds. Only 12 per cent of the sample consider it difficult or downright impossible, demonstrating the fact that the cultural field of ‘senses of belonging’ is growing ever wider.

Dual citizenship is not seen as an alternative to national or local identity, but rather, especially when one compares the answers to this question with those to the previous one, as its natural complement, and as a further certainty of rights, guarantees and opportunities. This seems to be true not only for the young, but also for the less young. Both the categories, as for the previous question, are distributed in the same way between the various opinions. The situation is different when one looks at level of education. Those with at least a high-school qualification say that ‘to feel at the same time Italian and European citizen’ could be ‘very easy’ (49 per cent of high-school graduates, and 58 per cent of those with a higher education level) or ‘rather easy’ but not the same thing (36 per cent of high-school graduates, and 32 per cent of those with a higher education level). Non-graduates seem to harbour many more doubts, 16 per cent of whom selected ‘it’s rather difficult’ as opposed to 10 per cent of those who are high-school graduates, and 6 per cent of those with a higher education level.

In this case too, as in the selection of ‘Europe’ as homeland and of feeling European, the political left shows enthusiasm. 59 per cent of

left-wing voters considered it ‘very easy’ to feel at the same time Italian and European citizen.

Finally, those who replied that they felt ‘very’ or ‘rather’ European are those who accepted dual citizenship most naturally (74 per cent). It is interesting to note that among those who feel themselves ‘very European’, only 6 per cent think that ‘to feel at the same time Italian and European citizen’ could be possible even if it is not the same thing. Those who think it ‘rather difficult’ are chiefly those who replied that they felt themselves ‘a little European’ (57 per cent), while those who did not feel European at all had no doubts: it is not possible ‘to feel at the same time Italian and European citizen’.

2 Perception of Europe and its Institutions³

The uncertain and limited sense of belonging to Europe expressed by Italians tends to translate into a medium-low perceived impact of European institutions on their lives.

Table 4: “For each of the following institutions, please tell me their impact on your life.” (answers in per cent)

Institutions	very high	high	average	low	very low	no opinion
Council of Europe	6.8	14.4	31.8	25.6	14.4	6.9
European Parliament	8.6	19.1	29.6	25.3	12.8	4.5
European Commission	7.8	19.1	31.9	24.1	11.4	5.4
European Court of Justice	9.5	15.1	30.4	23.0	14.3	5.8
European Central Bank	19.8	29.8	24.8	11.4	9.1	4.4
Italian Parliament	33.9	37.5	18.1	3.5	3.9	2.5
Italian Justice	31.3	31.4	18.6	10.0	5.1	2.8
Bank of Italy	23.6	31.8	26.1	8.9	6.0	2.8
Italian Government	46.3	28.9	12.3	5.1	4.4	2.3

³ By Francesco Antonelli.

Italian Armed Forces	11.1	16.1	28.3	22.1	17.4	4.5
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In short, while Italian institutions maintain their central position, European ones are beginning to advance in the consciousness in the people of Italy. Though less than 10 per cent of the interviewees state that the Council of Europe, the European Commission, the European Parliament and European Court of Justice have a ‘very high’ impact on their lives, and less than 20 per cent a ‘high’ impact, more than 30 per cent hold that the impact of these institutions is ‘average’. Separate consideration must be given to the European Central Bank, which a little less than 20 per cent of the interviewees consider has a ‘very high’ impact and 30 per cent consider has a ‘high’ impact. These data can probably be considered as a consequence of the introduction of the Euro.

Turning to Italian institutions, we find that although the interviewees considered their impact to be higher than that of the European ones, there is nevertheless a considerable degree of variation. At one extreme we find the Italian government, which over 46 per cent of the sample state has a ‘very high’ impact on their lives and, at the other, the Italian Armed Forces, which only 11 per cent consider to have a ‘very high’ impact and 16 per cent to have a ‘high’ impact. These data can probably be explained by the increased visibility and central role of the government in public life and the perceived invisibility of the Armed Forces. Between these two extremes we find the ‘Italian Parliament’ and ‘Italian Justice’, with figures approaching those for the government, while, unexpectedly, the values for the Bank of Italy are closer to those for the armed forces.

It should then be emphasised that a relatively low proportion of the interviewees – in all cases under 40 per cent – hold that an institution (Italian or European) has a ‘low’ or ‘very low’ impact on their lives. This fact might be evidence of a rooted conviction of the power and capacity of political institutions as such to affect the life of society and of every individual by their decisions.

In perception of the impact of the various institutions, one finds some differences by sex, age and political area, though not great ones. Thus, the political Left tends to see European institutions as having a higher

impact than does the Right. Women tend to assign a lower impact to Italian and European institutions than do men, and finally, those under forty assign a lesser impact to European institutions than those over that age. These data can be explained in part by reference to the degree of politicisation. Respondents who state they do not belong to any political area are predominantly under forty and women. The differences between those who feel ‘very European’ and ‘not European at all’ are more interesting.

Table 5: “The impact of European and Italian institutions on everyday life according to degree of ‘feeling European’.” (answers in per cent)

	Answers of ‘very high’ and ‘high’	
	Feeling very European	Not feeling European at all
Council of Europe	30.7	24.1
European Parliament	34.9	36.2
European Commission	38.9	32.8
European Court of Justice	33.1	23.7
European Central Bank	54.9	50.8
Italian Parliament	69.9	74.2
Italian Justice	59.5	66.1
Bank of Italy	53.6	60.0
Italian Government	77.0	73.3
Italian Armed Forces	27.6	30.9

As can be seen from the table above, these data provide important information. The first point is the marked difference between the figures for the sample in general and those for the two sub-groups. The second is the fact that those who feel ‘very European’ tend to assign a higher impact to European institutions than do those who do not feel European at all, while the opposite applies to Italian institutions. The third point is that in spite of the tendency differences are much less marked than one might expect, so that what leaps to the eye in this comparison is the relative similarity.

All this might lead suggest two hypotheses. The first, based on differences between the groups, is that the sense of belonging to EU constitutes a determinant in perception of its institutional impact; thus those who feel very European estimate the impact of European institutions as greater and that of Italian institutions as less, while the opposite applies to those who do not feel European. The second, based on the similarities, is that in both groups there is a strong and shared conviction regarding the institutional impact on the lives of the people *per se*. Thus the ‘not Europeans’ and the ‘convinced Europeans’ are perhaps the two most politicised groups, even if in opposite directions.

On the question of the political priorities that the European Union should have in future, the interviewees show that they have great expectations in all fields.

Table 6: “In your opinion, after the European single currency, what kind of priority should be given to the following items in the European Union?” (answers in per cent)

Items	very high	high	average	low	very low	no opinion
Food security policy	39.8	40.3	15.9	2.4	0.4	0.4
Employment policy	59.0	32.6	7.1	0.4	0.1	0.3
Social policy	30.3	42.6	22.0	2.1	0.6	1.0
Protection of the environment	51.8	34.9	9.6	1.5	0.4	0.5
Defence	22.9	30.4	33.8	7.5	3.9	0.8
Public security	38.5	37.0	19.5	3.1	0.8	0.4
Public health policy	57.5	29.5	10.1	1.4	0.1	0.4
Education and Culture	38.3	38.8	17.4	2.9	0.8	0.9
Foreign policy	21.0	42.1	28.1	4.6	1.6	1.8
Scientific and technological research	35.0	41.3	16.9	3.5	1.0	0.6
Co-operation with developing countries	33.9	37.5	20.9	4.5	0.9	1.1

Common Agricultural Policy	20.1	32.5	30.8	9.1	3.0	2.4
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There is thus a generalised call for action in all sectors. However, there are some policy areas that are considered more important than others. Employment Policy and Public Health Policy are seen as by far the most important, followed by Food Security Policy, Public Security Policy, and Education and Culture. The policies assigned the lowest priorities are the Common Agricultural Policy, Foreign Policy and Defence. All this seems to indicate a relatively stronger preference of the interviewees for a greater commitment by the EU in social and domestic policies.

In general, it can be said that the call for greater attention by the Union to social and domestic policies is slightly stronger from women, from those over forty, and from the political left. On the other hand, the difference between those who feel 'very European' and those who feel 'not European at all' is not significant.

What emerged from the replies regarding political priorities of the Union may seem to contradict the high degree of agreement expressed by the interviewees with the statements 'The EU should have one common Foreign Policy' and 'The EU should have one common Security and Defence policy'.

Table 7: “For each of the following statements, please tell me how much you agree.” (answers in per cent)

Statements	totally agree	partially agree	indifferent	partially disagree	totally disagree	no opinion
The European Union should have one common Foreign Policy	55.0	35.4	4.1	3.3	0.9	1.0
The European Union should have one common Security and Defence Policy	60.1	29.9	4.4	3.5	1.1	0.9
The European Union should have one common European Armed Force	29.9	30.8	13.6	12.6	10.9	1.6
The European Union should have one common Internal Security and Justice Policy	39.0	36.9	7.3	9.9	4.0	1.8
The European Union should have one common Constitution	35.9	31.4	7.9	11.4	9.9	2.9
The European Union should be enlarged and include new countries	33.1	31.5	13.4	10.5	9.0	2.4

However, this apparent contradiction may easily be explained by looking at the relatively wider range of responses to the statement ‘The European Union should have one common European Armed Force’. It seems that, overall, Italians are not against a common defence and security policy, nor against a single common policy, considering them on the contrary to be desirable. But they do not put them in first place among their own desires for the future of the Union. It is therefore a consent in principle, one that divides into different opinions when more specific questions are involved. On the

same wavelength one finds the questions on a common constitution and enlargement of the Union. Opinions are in large part favourable – more than 60 per cent of the interviewees declared that they ‘totally’ or ‘partially’ agreed – even though 30 to 35 per cent declared themselves indifferent or in disagreement. Thus there also seems to be a strong agreement in principle on these two questions.

On this particular question, there seems to be a more marked difference between those who state that they feel ‘very European’ and those who feel ‘not European at all’. The first group shows a much higher degree of agreement, with a difference of between 15 and 25 percentage points from the rest of the sample, whereas the second group registers a difference of about 10 percentage points in the opposite direction. The difference between the two groups is particularly marked on the question of a common constitution. Of the group that feels ‘very European’, 80 per cent ‘totally agree’ or ‘partially agree’, whereas only 42 per cent of those who do not feel European at all state that they agree ‘totally’ or ‘partially’. On the other hand, the differences between men and women and between political left and political right are not particularly significant, though the comparison between those over forty and those under that age shows that the latter agree more with each of the statements to a significant extent.

3 Risks, Threats and the Security Institutions⁴

Following the end of the cold war the fear of a nuclear conflict between the two blocks, a conflict that would have involved Italy both because of its strategic geographical location but as a member of the Atlantic Alliance, has finally disappeared.

At the beginning of the new millennium, the fears of Italians reflect the new international situation, characterised by new emerging risks.

⁴ By Alessia Zaretti.

Table 8: “For each of the following threats to security, please tell me your opinion about their danger level for you.” (answers in per cent)

Threats	very high	high	average	low	very low	no opinion
Nuclear conflict	39.8	20.1	17.1	14.1	8.6	0.3
Conventional war in Europe	8.0	22.1	18.8	25.6	23.4	1.1
World War	22.0	15.9	18.6	23.5	18.6	0.5
Accidental throwing of a nuclear missile	21.3	19.9	22.8	19.9	13.1	1.6
Proliferation of nuclear, bacteriological and chemical weapons	49.8	34.3	10.9	2.4	1.3	0.9
Epidemics	23.8	30.3	26.6	13.5	3.8	0.6
Terrorist attack	60.1	27.5	9.0	2.5	0.3	0.3
Organised crime	43.6	41.6	11.6	1.3	0.5	0.3
Accident in a nuclear plant	26.6	29.4	23.9	14.1	4.0	1.4
Uncontrolled migration	33.4	33.6	19.1	8.3	4.4	0.9
Environmental disasters	49.4	35.9	10.9	2.5	0.5	0.6
Foods risks	30.6	36.1	24.6	5.9	1.8	0.6
Economic crisis	25.5	37.0	28.1	5.9	1.8	0.8

Fears of terrorist attack and environmental disasters are in the foreground of the Italians’ threat perceptions, since 88 per cent and 85 per cent of the respondents take these risks as important, and feel a very high or high threat from them. Two other types of risk follow: organised crime (85 per cent) and the proliferation of nuclear, bacteriological and chemical weapons (84 per cent).

A second group of risks are considered important by well over half the Italians: uncontrolled migration (67 per cent), food risks (67 per cent), economic crisis (62 per cent), nuclear conflict (60 per cent), accident in a nuclear plant (56 per cent) and epidemic (54 per cent).

There are few risks considered of little importance by the majority of Italians; these are the accidental launch of a nuclear missile (41 per cent), world war (38 per cent) and conventional war in Europe (30 per cent).

Apart from environmental disasters, of men consider a greater risk than do women, though only by a small margin, perception of risk is higher among the women. The difference ranges from 5 to 15 percentage points, with the greatest difference being in the perceived risk of war. There are also differences between the age groups: older respondents fear the risks affecting daily life – uncontrolled migrations, food risks, epidemic – more than do the younger ones. On the other hand there is a more widespread awareness of the risks associated with terrorist attacks and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction among younger respondents.

Education level becomes very relevant for some items. The risks affecting daily life are much more feared by respondents with the lowest level of education. Uncontrolled migration is seen as a very high risk by 44 per cent of those with the lowest level of education, but only by 22 per cent of the graduates. There are also marked differences in the percentages for other risks (such as that of economic crisis with respectively 37 per cent and 20 per cent), food risks (41 per cent against 26 per cent), accident in a nuclear plant (31 per cent against 19 per cent) and environmental disasters (54 per cent against 42 per cent). The general trend is for respondents with a lower level of education to indicate all the risks suggested in question 3.1 as having a 'very high' level of risk, though the differences are less marked than those just referred to.

Those seeing themselves as Europeans have a more optimistic outlook on the levels of risk to which they feel exposed. In the Italian sample this trusting approach declines on all aspects with a declining sense of belonging to EU. Those who stated that they felt themselves 'not European at all' were the most pessimistic about all the risks in the questionnaire.

To address the risks and threats perceived there are different possible measures, ranging from diplomatic actions to military intervention. The following table 9 shows the activities and instruments assessed as appropriate and optimal by the Italians included in the survey.

Table 9: “Peace and stability are jeopardized by a variety of risks and threats: How do you estimate the following political and military activities and instruments?” (answers in per cent)

Political and military activities and instruments	indispensable	useful	without effect	useless	harmful	no opinion
Coercive military measures in order to protect human rights	16.6	40.3	17.1	9.9	12.8	2.6
Diplomatic actions	48.6	39.4	7.5	1.8	0.4	1.9
Supporting democratisation processes	40.4	44.3	8.3	3.0	0.4	2.6
Military peacekeeping	25.3	52.8	11.0	2.5	2.3	3.5
Strict border controls to stop migrations	27.1	36.3	20.8	9.1	3.9	1.4
Increasing efforts to help developing countries	48.3	37.6	7.9	3.6	1.1	0.8
Deterrence of potential aggressors	21.4	44.0	15.1	8.1	3.1	6.1
Fighting a war for legitimate reasons	11.1	23.0	18.1	17.0	25.0	5.0
Combat terrorism by military means	23.0	31.9	14.6	13.1	13.3	3.0

As can easily be seen, respondents in the first instance support non-violent measures to face threats and risks, with diplomatic action heading the list (49 per cent ‘indispensable’). More effort to help developing countries and support of democratisation processes are considered by a large majority of Italians as indispensable or at least useful. Among the more non-violent measures, stricter border controls

to stop unwanted migrations meet the least approval. Nevertheless, nearly a quarter of the respondents see them as indispensable measures and 36 per cent as useful ones.

Compared with the non-violent measures, military actions are less viewed as indispensable. War in particular is rejected by the majority, even if fought for legitimate reasons. As regards the other military measures such as military intervention to protect human rights, and combating terrorism, respondents take them as indispensable (respectively 17 and 23 per cent) or useful (40 and 32 per cent). The deterrence of potential aggressors is considered indispensable by 21 per cent and useful by 44 per cent. On the other hand, military peacekeeping is supported by over two thirds of the Italian interviewees.

The opinions of the Italian sample on measures to protect peace and stability found only small differences between men and women, but significant ones between the various political groupings. Non-violent measures were supported by 90 per cent of those belonging to the centre and left and by 82 per cent of those on the right. The most significant differences of opinion regarded coercive military measures, which found 86 per cent of those on the right, 68 per cent of the centre and 40 per cent of the left in agreement. On military peacekeeping the differences were less conspicuous but nevertheless present, with 89 per cent of the centre, 83 per cent of the right and 78 per cent of the left in favour.

The level of education differentiates the Italian sample of respondents significantly. Thus 94 per cent of the post graduates, 86 per cent of high-school graduates but only 71 per cent of non graduates approve supporting democratisation processes. The same trend is found for military peacekeeping with 82 per cent (post graduates), 78 per cent (high-school graduates) and 72 per cent (non graduates). Differences of the opposite sign are found for strict border controls with respective ratios of 69 per cent (non graduates), 66 per cent (high-school graduates) and 51 per cent (post graduates). These figures are consistent with a higher perception of risk from uncontrolled migrations on the part of the respondents with the lowest level of education. The deterrence of potential aggressors shows a difference

exclusively between non graduates (61 per cent) and post graduates (53 per cent).

Those respondents indicating themselves as Europeans distinguish themselves clearly from those who do not feel at all European through their marked support for non-coercive measures. Some differences seem particularly notable. 52 per cent of those who feel European consider support for democratisation processes indispensable, while only 30 per cent of those who do not feel at all European do so. The figures for diplomatic action are respectively 58 per cent and 24 per cent, and for development assistance 56 per cent and 37 per cent. The situation indicates reverse positions to those on military measures, though there are minor differences. Those who do not feel European at all are more favourable to the use of armed force and to border controls. Only opinions on military peacekeeping reveal fewer differences, with the greatest degree of approval from the convinced Europeans, 75 per cent of whom consider it indispensable or useful, against 69 per cent.

4 Armed forces⁵

As for the use of armed forces, these are traditionally seen as the institution charged with applying legitimate violence. From the last decade, however, the non violent tasks of the armed forces have been significantly expanded. They no longer comprise only the usual actions to assist those affected by disasters, but include a rather wide range of tasks of a rather peaceful nature.

Table 10 below indicates the tasks the Italians perceived armed forces as appropriate to perform.

⁵ By Maria Luisa Maniscalco.

Table 10: “For each of the following tasks, please tell me how much Armed Forces are appropriate.” (answers in per cent)

Tasks	very appropriate	appropriate	neither / nor	partially inappropriate	completely inappropriate	no opinion
Assistance in disaster relief	38.6	48.6	7.8	3.4	1.0	0.4
Evacuation of citizens from conflict areas	39.8	45.9	7.1	3.3	1.6	1.0
Peacekeeping operations	40.3	37.9	9.9	4.6	2.9	3.6
Humanitarian assistance to other countries	34.1	50.6	9.1	3.9	1.6	0.1
Defence of national territory and interests	42.6	39.4	10.4	4.3	1.6	1.5

On adding the table values for ‘very appropriate’ and ‘appropriate’, the following result is obtained:

1. Assistance in disaster relief 87.2 %
2. Evacuation of citizens from conflict areas 85.7 %
3. Humanitarian assistance to the other countries 84.7 %
4. Defence of national territory and interests 82.0 %
5. Peacekeeping operations 78.2 %
6. Defence of European territory and interests 75.9 %
7. Peace enforcement operations 72.1 %
8. Defence of allies’ territory and interests 71.0 %
9. Supervision of borders to control migrations 62.5 %
10. Fighting terrorism 60.9 %
11. Co-operation with police to keep public order 56.5 %

12.	Protection of human rights	53.3 %
13.	Fighting international organised crime	50.5 %

Assistance in disaster relief and evacuation of citizens from conflict areas are undoubtedly, for Italians, in the foreground of appropriateness. Humanitarian assistance to the other countries takes the third place. These are humanitarian tasks that come before the traditional task of the armed forces, that of protecting the interests and territory of the homeland, which comes in the fourth position. Of the humanitarian tasks, only protection of human rights arouses some perplexity and appears at the bottom of the list, probably because of fears of it being used as an argument to camouflage international actions that infringe the sovereignty of individual states.

Typical military activities are listed from the 4th to the 8th place: defence of 'European territory and interests' and 'defence of allies' territory and interests' take the 6th and 8th places, whereas use of the armed forces to assist in traditional police tasks encounters less agreement on its appropriateness. Overall, the data bear witness to a sort of transition that has taken place in public opinion, from exclusively national to 'post-national' armed forces. This transition is one of the factors underlying consent to a European armed force.

Of those respondents perceiving themselves as Europeans 80 per cent support the defence of European territory and interests. As we have already noted, belonging to a particular political area influences opinions, especially on certain items. For example, only 65 per cent of those who say they are on the political left support peace enforcement operations, whereas 85 per cent of those in the centre and 88 per cent of those on the right do so. There are also very marked differences on the items regarding fighting terrorism by military means and supervision of borders to control migrations. On the first item, 46 per cent of those on the left, 70 per cent of those in the centre and 75 per cent of the respondents on the right are in favour, while on the second, the corresponding figures are 44, 70 and 83 per cent.

The differences between men and women are not very marked, but the level of education does show some differences. In general, more

widespread support (by about 5 per cent) for the armed forces is found among the post graduates than among the non graduates. However one also finds more incisive differences on the items 'peacekeeping operations' and 'peace enforcement operations', with 88 per cent and 80 per cent of the post-graduate supporting these operations, as against 71 per cent and 65 per cent of the non graduates. There are also some reversals of the trend in the replies. 63 per cent of non graduates support supervision of borders to control migrations versus 55 per cent of post graduates. Per the protection of human rights the percentages are 54 per cent of non graduates and 48 per cent of post graduates, but what changes above all is the quality of support; only 12 per cent of the post graduate respondents 'totally agree'.

The following table shows the replies obtained when interviewees were asked their opinion of their own country's armed forces.

Table 11: “For each of the following statements on Italian Armed Forces, please tell me how much you agree.” (answers in per cent)

Statements	totally agree	partially agree	indifferent	partially disagree	totally disagree	no opinion
Armed Forces help young people to become more integrated into society	7.0	28.3	9.8	20.1	32.8	1.6
Armed Forces are national unity symbols	29.5	36.4	9.0	10.1	13.5	1.3
Armed Forces teach discipline and respect to young people	17.4	29.4	7.5	18.3	25.5	1.0
Armed Forces are useless	6.4	17.5	6.4	21.3	46.3	1.5
Armed Forces stand up for values like freedom and democracy	22.8	40.8	8.1	14.5	11.3	1.9
Armed Forces prepare for war and fighting	18.4	35.1	7.3	17.3	17.4	3.9
Armed Forces conduct useful peacekeeping missions	39.4	39.8	6.0	6.5	4.5	3.1
Armed Forces help Italian people during disasters and emergencies	57.6	35.0	2.4	2.8	1.3	0.5
Armed Forces help people of other countries during disasters and emergencies	40.0	44.6	4.8	6.1	2.8	1.3
Armed Forces defend their country and its territory	52.3	34.4	5.3	4.6	2.3	1.1

A large majority (93 per cent) of Italian respondents agree at least partially with the item ‘Armed Forces help Italian people during disasters and emergencies’. The second place is taken by the statement that Armed Forces defend their country and its territory, with

87 per cent of Italian respondents. The third place (85 per cent) is taken by another statement which emphasises humanitarian aspects ('Armed Forces help people of other countries during disasters and emergencies').

Peacekeeping occupies the fourth place with 79 per cent of the Italians respondents agreeing at least partially. For the other task fields cited ('Armed Forces are national unity symbols', 'Armed Forces stand up for values like freedom and democracy' and 'Armed Forces prepare for war and fighting'), the agreement rates stay over the 50 per cent mark. The items 'Armed Forces help young people to become more integrated into society' and 'Armed Forces teach discipline and respect to young people' have fewer supporters (respectively 35 per cent and 47 per cent). Finally, 24 per cent consider that the Armed Forces are useless.

In brief, the functions and actions of the Italian Armed Forces are appreciated by public opinion. The functions of defence and of humanitarian aid within the national territory are the most appreciated, followed by humanitarian relief in other countries during disasters and emergencies and by peacekeeping missions. On integration functions, the highest degree of agreement is with political integration ('National unity symbol' and 'Defence of values like freedom and democracy'), whereas the function of social integration obtains less support. There are some differences between the age groups. A higher percentage of the older group are more attached to the idea of a social integration function being performed by the Armed Forces, whereas the younger group are more realistic in more frequently sustaining that 'the Armed Forces prepare for war and fighting'.

Examination of the results by level of education reveals some significant differences and similarities. For the typical and traditional tasks of the Armed Forces ('Armed Forces defend their country and its territory' and 'Armed Forces prepare for war and fighting') the percentages are practically the same, whereas there are differences regarding the functions of political and social integration. The items 'Armed Forces help young people to become more integrated into society' and 'Armed Forces teach discipline and respect to young

people' have more supporters among non graduate respondents (36 per cent and 50 per cent) than among post graduate ones (27 per cent and 46 per cent). Peacekeeping operations, on the other hand, are more appreciated by the post graduates (85 per cent) than by the non graduates (78 per cent).

The differences between political areas are rather great, except for the function of humanitarian assistance (that is for the two items 'Armed Forces help Italian people during disasters and emergencies' and 'Armed Forces help people of other countries during disasters and emergencies') for which the differences are minimal. In general, one finds a trend to polarisation between left wing respondents on the one hand and those of the centre and right on the other. The first express much lower levels of agreement with all the statements on the Armed Forces, with a difference ranging from 6 percentage points from the right wing respondents (as in the case of peace support operations) to a maximum of 35 percentage points from those of the centre (as in the case of the item 'Armed Forces are a national unity symbol'). The results obtained indicate that the Italian left's traditional distrust of the Armed Forces, though attenuated in some cases, has not entirely disappeared.

5 National Armed Forces or integrated All-European Army?⁶

The Armed Forces of Europe are progressively coalescing. In some countries, binational and multinational major units constitute the rule and not the exception. It is, however, still doubtful whether these mergers already point at a common all-European army of the future. Opinions in the Italian population are split.

⁶ By Maria Luisa Maniscalco.

Table 12: “Looking to the future, what kind of Armed Forces would you prefer?” (answers in per cent)

An integrated European Force instead of national Forces	25.5
A standing European Rapid Reaction Force parallel to the national Armed Forces	44.4
National Armed Forces, Rapid Reaction Force on an ad-hoc basis	16.9
Only national Armed Forces	2.5
No Armed Forces at all	7.3
No opinion	2.9

In Italian respondents’ opinion the era of exclusively national Armed Forces seems to come to a definite end. Only a very small minority of less than 3 per cent prefer this type as the model for the future. 25 per cent of respondents express the opinion that national Armed Forces should be replaced by an integrated European Force. However most support, from over half the sample, goes to the model that envisages national Armed Forces and a parallel European Rapid Reaction Force, while about 17 per cent prefer integration in the form of Rapid Reaction Forces formed on an ad hoc basis. Combining the support for these two models a little over 60 per cent of the Italian respondents expressed a view in favour of integration of Italian Armed Forces with European units.

There are significant differences between those who perceive themselves as Europeans and those perceiving themselves as ‘not European’. 40 per cent of the former, but only 16 per cent of the latter support the model of an integrated Armed Force. Vice-versa, exclusively national Armed Forces are preferred by 13 per cent of those perceiving themselves as ‘not European’, whereas only 2 per cent of the ‘European’ respondents express that preference.

On the question of sending European troops abroad, the great majority of the interviewees think that it should be ‘Europe’ and not national governments individually, that should take the decision.

Table 13: “In your opinion, decisions to send European troops into missions should be taken by:” (answers in per cent)

The National Governments according to their legal rules	12.8
The European member states by unanimous vote	33.3
The European member states by majority vote	46.0
No opinion	7.8

Furthermore, as table 13 shows, the majority criterion is considered the most appropriate, markedly strengthening the role of the Union in any decision to send European troops on a mission. While there are no significant differences by age and political grouping, there are differences between men and women; the latter are more favourable to decisions on sending European troops abroad being taken by national governments. Moreover, there is a certain difference between those who feel themselves ‘very European’ and those who feel ‘not European at all’. The former are more favourable than the rest of the sample to decisions being made by majority vote – which increases the role of the Union at the expense of the member states – whereas the latter are more favourable to the unanimity rule – which ensures a greater role for the member states. Thus both are in favour of a European decision on this point, but with a different emphasis.

Views on decisions on common defence and security are also decidedly ‘European’ in tone.

Table 14: “In your opinion, decisions on European Security and Defence Policy should be made by:” (answers in per cent)

Majority vote by the EU member states	51.5
Majority vote by the Council of the European Union	26.4
NATO Council	2.9
United Nations Security Council	10.6
No opinion	8.3

A striking aspect of these data is the very low number of interviewees indicating NATO as the seat for decisions on European Security and Defence Policy and the relatively high number indicating the United Nations Security Council, an extra-European international body. No significant differences by sex, age, political area or sense of belonging to Europe are to be found between the interviewees.

The question of which institution or which country should be competent for which risks gave the following result.

Table 15: “For each of the following risks, what level do you consider more important?” (answers in per cent)

Risks	Italian	European	NATO	UN	no opinion
Nuclear conflict	1.4	7.0	41.6	41.8	6.0
Conventional war in Europe	2.3	42.1	26.6	20.6	6.8
World war	1.1	4.5	36.4	50.0	6.3
Accidental throwing of a nuclear missile	2.8	9.0	34.8	36.4	14.5
Proliferation of nuclear, bacteriological and chemical weapons	1.6	10.8	31.6	46.8	6.9
Epidemic	5.0	24.4	11.9	48.3	8.1
Terrorist attack	6.8	19.9	28.9	36.1	6.4
Organised crime	22.9	36.9	8.8	20.6	8.3
Accident in a nuclear plant	5.3	30.5	15.4	32.4	13.6
Uncontrolled migration	17.6	44.5	5.3	22.4	7.9
Environmental disasters	13.8	31.4	7.6	37.6	6.5
Food risks	11.6	38.9	6.6	34.4	6.4
Economic crisis	9.3	44.9	6.4	29.0	8.1

Only a small percentage of Italians expressed the opinion that Italy should be competent for the various risks, with only ‘organised crime’ reaching 20 per cent and uncontrolled migration, environmental disasters and food risks scored between 10 and 20 per cent. For many risks, the United Nations was seen as having primary responsibility, whereas ‘Europe’ should take the lead for control of migrations, fighting against organised crime and economic crisis. For the possibility of a conventional war in Europe responsibility and competence should be European. NATO is seen as competent chiefly for questions of military defence, though the percentages are similar to those for the United Nations, exceeding them only for the item ‘conventional war in Europe’. Once again one seems to find confirmation of the ‘universalist’ view of Italians, favourable to the widest possible multilateralism.

The European Rapid Reaction Forces

Europe has decided to raise its own Rapid Reaction Forces comprising about 60,000 personnel. The contribution of Italy to these forces meets with approval by the majority of respondents, but particularly among those feeling themselves to be ‘Europeans’.

Table 16: “What do you think of Italy’s contribution to the European Reaction Forces?” (answers in per cent)

	Overall population	Respondents feeling themselves Europeans
I support	27.8	39.2
I rather support	41.3	52.3
I rather disagree	18.9	5.2
I disagree	3.1	1.3
No opinion	8.4	2.0

More than two thirds of respondents across the overall population at least ‘rather’ support the decision of Italy to contribute to the European Reaction Forces, while only 22 per cent oppose it. Among

those feeling themselves to be Europeans, the support ratio rises to 91 per cent, with just 6 per cent of opponents. Support for this Italian contribution to the European Reaction Forces is positively correlated with level of education, rising from about 86 per cent to over 92 per cent. Comparing male and female respondents, more than 89 per cent of the former support an Italian contribution, while 87 per cent of the women do so.

Differing political affiliations are associated with significant differences. Over 96 per cent of respondents from the political centre approve, to a greater or lesser extent, while for those on the right and left the figures are about 92 per cent and 82 per cent respectively. The difference between these groups emerges more clearly if one looks at the 'I support' replies only. In this case the figures are 83 per cent for the centre, 76 per cent for the right and 62 per cent for the left.

Compared with NATO, European Reaction Forces are not at all considered less important. A majority of more than 50 per cent of respondents sees the European Crisis Reaction Forces as important as NATO.

Table 17: "These European Crisis Reaction Forces should be:" (answers in per cent)

Considered less important than NATO	14.4
Considered as important as NATO	52.8
Considered more important than NATO	17.0
No opinion	15.4

Only 14 per cent consider them less important; 17 per cent have the opposite opinion. 20 per cent of the respondents perceiving themselves as 'Europeans' chose the reply 'considered more important than NATO', whereas 29 per cent of those who do not feel European at all stated that they had no opinion on the question.

The differences between political areas are still more marked. Moving from the political left to the centre and then to the right we find the following percentages who consider the European Crisis Reaction

Forces more important than NATO: 26 per cent, 13 per cent and 10 per cent. Moving in the same direction, the figures for those who consider the European Crisis Reaction Forces less important than NATO are 11 per cent on the left, 15 per cent in the centre, and 20 per cent on the right.

Table 18 below reflects the tasks to be fulfilled by these European Reaction Forces, according to the opinion of Italian respondents.

Table 18: “The European Union has decided to establish a common Crisis Reaction Force, consisting of up to 60,000 soldiers from the EU-Member states. For each of the following tasks, please tell me to what extent you think these European Armed Forces are appropriate.” (answers in per cent)

Tasks	very appropriate	appropriate	neither/nor	partially inappropriate	completely inappropriate	no opinion
Assistance in disaster relief	49.0	39.8	6.5	1.9	1.9	0.9
Humanitarian assistance to other countries	41.1	42.8	9.3	3.1	2.4	1.1
Fighting terrorism	34.4	33.9	14.0	7.9	7.6	1.6
Co-operation with police to keep public order	16.1	37.6	16.8	12.4	14.5	2.1
Supervision of borders to control migration	25.9	35.8	14.4	10.3	11.0	1.8
Fighting international organised crime	27.1	34.0	16.1	10.9	9.8	1.5
Protection of human rights	24.5	37.8	19.0	7.8	8.4	2.0
Evacuation of citizens from conflict areas	42.8	43.4	6.0	3.1	2.1	1.6
Peacekeeping operations	42.8	38.0	7.8	3.3	2.9	3.6
Peace enforcement operations	36.6	35.8	10.9	4.6	4.4	5.5
Defence of national territory and interests	30.5	39.3	14.9	6.9	5.8	2.1
Defence of European territory and interests	41.5	41.4	9.0	3.9	2.3	1.8
Defence of allies' territory and interests	33.3	44.5	10.5	5.8	3.5	1.9

When the table values for ‘very appropriate’ and ‘appropriate’ are added, the following result is obtained:

1.	Assistance in disaster relief	88.8 %
2.	Evacuation of citizens from conflict areas	86.2 %
3.	Humanitarian assistance to the other countries	83.9 %
4.	Defence of European territory and interests	82.9 %
5.	Peacekeeping operations	80.8 %
6.	Defence of allies’ territory and interests	77.8 %
7.	Peace enforcement operations	72.1 %
8.	Defence of national territory and interests	69.8 %
9.	Fighting terrorism	68.3 %
10.	Protection of human rights	62.3 %
11.	Supervision of borders to control migrations	61.7 %
12.	Fighting international organised crime	61.1 %
13.	Co-operation with police to keep public order	53.7 %

Assistance in disaster relief constitutes the most widely approved task for the European Crisis Reaction Forces; nearly 89 per cent of the respondents view it as appropriate. The second place is taken by evacuation of citizens from conflict areas, followed at the third by humanitarian assistance to other countries. Thus, Italians entrust the common European Crisis Reaction Force with the same tasks as the national armed forces, in nearly the same ranking. In fourth place, instead of the reply ‘defence of national territory and interests’ there is, unsurprisingly, ‘defence of European territory and interests’, while ‘peacekeeping operations’ are in fifth place, just as for the national armed forces.

Interesting differences emerge between the subgroups of respondents who perceive themselves as Europeans and those who do not feel European at all.

When the table values for ‘very appropriate’ and ‘appropriate’ are added for the two groups, the result shown in table 19 is obtained.

Table 19: “The European Union has decided to establish a common Crisis Reaction Force, consisting of up to 60,000 soldiers from the EU-Member states. For each of the following tasks, please tell me to what extent you think these European Armed Forces are appropriate.” (answers in per cent)

Tasks	Feeling European	Not feeling European at all
Assistance in disaster relief	89.5	77.8
Humanitarian assistance to other countries	92.2	67.7
Fighting terrorism	68.4	65.1
Co-operation with police to keep public order	53.6	46.8
Supervision of borders to control migration	56.6	54.8
Fighting international organised crime	55.6	63.5
Protection of human rights	62.9	61.9
Evacuation of citizens from conflict areas	92.1	74.6
Peacekeeping operations	85.1	73.0
Peace enforcement operations	76.5	64.5
Defence of national territory and interests	71.7	60.3
Defence of European territory and interests	88.9	65.1
Defence of allies’ territory and interests	81.0	67.7

There are some indications that further clarify the significance of the support for the process of European integration and more specifically for the European Crisis Reaction Force. As the table shows, with the

exception of the item 'fighting international organised crime' the respondents who perceive themselves as Europeans express higher percentages of support for all the tasks indicated for the said Armed Force. Furthermore, when this last table is compared with the percentages for the overall population, one notes greater emphasis on humanitarian tasks, with the item 'humanitarian assistance to other countries' in the first place with 93 per cent approval. The data confirm a tendency that emerges from the whole survey, the view of some of the respondents that the function 'Europe' can perform at both political and military level is that of a peaceful power promoting universalist values.

6 Conclusions

In their replies to the various questions in our comprehensive questionnaire, the Italian respondents expressed, clearly and coherently, their views on present Europe as well as on the forthcoming processes in connection with European unification. These opinions and perceptions are important for an understanding of the position taken by Italians on the future development of European policies in general and of European Security and Defence Policy in particular.

Although the huge majority of Italians do not at all dislike the EU and the European integration process, the results from the survey demonstrate the complexity and peculiar nature of Italian feelings about EU. On the one hand, the EU is considered as a functional organisation to perform a great number of tasks and obligations on behalf of its citizens. However, a certain number of respondents, typically on the political left, emphasise the universalist, democratic and multicultural aspects of a 'Europe' seen in its dimension as a political and social project, in which desires and expectations condense. The result is a complex physiognomy comprising two different representations of a care community and a great idealistic project; in both cases it is hard for 'EU' to be seen as the homeland. Other collectives— in the first place Italy — play that role.

In most of the relevant dimensions of daily life the respondents see Italian institutions – and in the first place the Italian government – as very significant in their impact. Italian institutions therefore retain their central role in people’s perceptions, whereas European ones are seen as distant from every day life. The only important exception is the European Central Bank, which about half the respondents see as having a high impact. The introduction of the Euro has contributed to spreading the idea through the Italian population that monetary sovereignty has been transferred. However, the idea of the EU as a political entity with a strong impact on the lives of the population has not been strengthened. Italian respondents still perceive ‘EU’ more as a project, a work in progress, than as an established reality.

In spite of that, expectations for EU public policies are high and extensive. They are reflected in the high degree of concern shown by the Italian respondents over the current economic and social situation. This concern translates into a generalised demand for action by the EU, in the first place in employment policy and public health policy. The latter can be associated with environmental and food safety policy. Both express the desire for an overall improvement in the quality of life for the individual, and uncertainty about the future, about work, and about personal safety, that globalisation seems to bring, and feed expectations regarding the capacity of ‘EU’ to deal them. It is in this context that one must view the question of dual citizenship, which is understood as a way of enlarging one’s rights and better protecting one’s own necessities. However this is a hope, an expectation that has not yet been fully realised. The strong demand for commitment to ‘EU’ also expresses a widespread sense of dissatisfaction over the way in which the building of ‘EU’ has proceeded, and a call for a more direct impact on the life of the people, for a higher degree of transparency and participation and a greater commitment to protection from risks of every type.

The high level of expectations from ‘EU’ are confirmed by the high degree of support Italians give to policies for institutional integration. In the first two places they put integration in the field of foreign policy and of the common security and defence policy. But the same policy fields are not mentioned when the question is on the most important

fields of action for 'EU'. In this case, as we have seen, other fields appear in the top positions. This finding is contradictory only at first glance. In reality, the importance of a European commitment to integration in the field of foreign policy and in that of the common security and defence policy decreases only when it is compared with other requirements considered more urgent, specifically employment policies, public health policy, protection of the environment and food safety policy. These last impinge on every day life and as such are seen as priorities.

Overall, the results of the survey have highlighted expectations for a Europe committed to protect its own citizens both on the home front and externally. On this latter front the hope is for actions based on different principles from those of the traditional power politics of nation-states.

The widespread call for integration in the field of security and defence policy and in that of foreign policy rests on the idea of strengthening us where we are weak and better addressing our insecurities. The cultural, democratic and participative significance of European integration provides reassurance on the role of the EU as a pacific power.

Against the backdrop of a scenario full of risks and threats, Italian respondents seem largely ready for closer integration between the military institutions of the various countries. In fact, Italian respondents draw a picture of the complex security environment which has developed during the last decade and which is characterised by new risks and threats. They express a mature awareness of an profoundly changed international geo-strategic framework and of an interdependent world in which national sovereignty is being eroded. They express the opinion that in the face of the new global challenges transnational solutions have to be found, even in the field of security and defence.

The European Crisis Reaction Force appears the most satisfactory solution, meeting both the need for greater integration in the field of security and defence, and that of finding a more balanced solution to

the two extreme alternatives of purely national armed forces and completely unified European armed forces, for which most Italians do not yet feel ready. Italian interviewees support Italian participation in these European Crisis Reaction Forces and even European decisions on the use of these Forces, but they still reject the idea of entirely replacing national militaries by a European one. For the majority, the foremost reference community remains Italy. 84 per cent of the respondents stated that they were proud of being Italian and consequently, at the still initial level of European integration, they hold that national armed forces are those most indicated for the defence and security of the country. However, even in the limited ambit of the European Crisis Reaction Forces, expectations are very high. Nearly 53 per cent of the respondents think that these European Crisis Reaction Forces should be considered equally important with NATO and 17 per cent think that this Force should be considered as more important than NATO. The majority of Italians are opposed to a competitive relationship between NATO and EU, but favourable to greater European autonomy; a concept of complementary role sharing between the two organisations should find broad acceptance.

According to the Italian respondents, the complex global security situation requires multifaceted responses and initiatives including military missions. Mediation capacity, diplomacy, struggle against poverty and support to democratisation processes are regarded as the most useful instruments to ensure effective global governance. To the interviewees, the EU seems the supranational institution most indicated for a policy that conforms to the said principles. From this point of view the military is considered a political tool which should be applied if necessary. Obviously Italians more easily accept missions for the Armed Forces that appear as less violent and less combat-oriented. In fact peacekeeping missions are well accepted by the majority of the respondents who see them as an important commitment to peace on the part of their own country. However, it is also true that nearly two thirds of the respondents are in favour of armed deterrence of possible aggressors and about one third support war for legitimate reasons. In brief the prevalence of pacifist and co-operative attitudes does not mean (for at least some of the

interviewees) lack of support for combat-oriented military activities, provided these are undertaken for legitimate reasons and for defence.

As regards development of a common European security and defence policy, the strong support given by the Italian respondents should be sustained and developed, clarifying the lines of a European Security and Defence Policy that also includes Armed Forces. Roles and functions for these last need to be redefined. The fact that public opinion prefers to view the Armed Forces more as a disaster relief agency than as a Armed Force prepared for combat missions reveals the need for a European strategic concept which analyses existing and forthcoming challenges to European Security and Defence Policy and takes the necessary measures to address them.

If EU takes this step, the 'Europeanism' of those Italians who have developed an essentially utopian image of the EU as a power devoted exclusively to assistance and co-operation will be put to the test. But it will be the task of another survey to verify this.

Comparative Consideration of the Findings and Results in the National Surveys

Paul Klein

When trying to compare the results from Germany, France and Italy with each other, one meets the methodological problem that data from Italy and Germany derive from two parallel poll surveys, whereas French data are being based upon several different sources. Certainly, many of the questions to be dealt with do not differ basically by their meaning or their sense – but either the wording is different throughout the individual polls, or the questions had been asked in a different context. Thus, a statistical comparison covering all the three nations is out of the question. What remains is to get a consideration of either common or deviating trends or tendencies.

1 The Perception of Europe and the Own Home Country

Even at a first glance the fact becomes obvious that the State constitutes an important social reference point for the Italian and French respondents, whilst a national consciousness related to country seems to be less pronounced among Germans. Germans develop feelings of attachment in the first place to the narrowly limited geographical area of the own place of residence or birthplace, or the corresponding region. This phenomenon certainly can be regarded as a kind of after effect of nazism and its perversion of patriotism. The long period of regional particularism and national fragmentation probably plays less of a role, because German and Italian historical experience has been similar and thus attitudes similar, while different from the French, but the data do not show this to be the case.

For the Germans, however, the lack of national consciousness seems to have the consequence that it comes easier to them to feel as Europeans than it is for French or Italians. At least, the Germans indicate more often than the citizens of Italy that they have only little

difficulties to link their adherence to their nationality with the parallel adherence to Europe.

This difference, though, does not influence the European sentiment of the Italians and French. Similar to the Germans, those feel in their majority as members of his country also as Europeans. This quite pronounced attitude, however, is in Italy and Germany only scarcely being reflected in the evaluation of the importance of European institutions for everyday life. The influence of these is regarded across the two countries as inferior to comparable national bodies. This applies even to the European Central Bank – though, after the introduction of the common European currency, one could have expected probably this body being the first to have an important input into everyday life.

The perceived influence of European institutions and bodies is, across all the three States, in an extreme contradiction to what people of the three nations concerned expect from these institutions. These expectations are in part more than lofty and leave out no conceivable field of European responsibility.

On a wide range of policy fields reaching from food security through employment policy, environment protection and public health to foreign, security and defence policy, including internal security and antiterrorist operations, respondents from all three countries, and foremost the Italians want the European Community to play an important role.

Generally, citizens of the three States also plead for more common European regulations and greater commonality of political action. This is particularly the case in Italy, while Germans and French are more sceptical. They show less trust than their Italian counterparts in common European armed forces and a common Constitution. However they share the more negative attitudes against an enlargement of the EU by new members.

2 Risks, Threats and Law Enforcement Agencies

Together with the evaluations of threats and risks that could be faced by the people of the three countries, general perceptions of Europe characterised by a clear differentiation between expectations and real experience form the background of the attitudes towards the military and security policy.

With regard to security and defence policy, German responses indicate a clear conception that corresponds to a large extent with the actual situation in the world and in Europe. As do the French, Germans have the greatest fear of organised crime, terrorism, uncontrolled migration and environment disasters. War in Europe, be it nuclear or conventional, or even a world war, are viewed as most unlikely. Italians and French people see a similar ranking of threats and risks, but generally consider them more likely to actually occur than their German counterparts. Namely the fear of terrorist attacks and organised crime, but also the proliferation of NBC weapons are significantly more pronounced in Italy and in France than in Germany.

There are many perceptions common to the three countries regarding the question of how to counter these threats and risks. In the foreground are notions of non-violent activities such as diplomacy, support of democratisation processes, economic aid to developing nations, and stronger border controls. Violent military measures are only second choice in Italy, in France, and in Germany as well. The first thing the respondents think of when considering their military is safeguarding peace, and the less supporters are to be found over the three countries for any war, even if fought for a just and good cause.

Also with regard to the possibilities of the armed forces to counter threats and risks, opinions scarcely differ among the respondents of the three countries. They see the armed forces best suited to respond to disasters, for evacuate people from conflict areas, provide humanitarian aid to other countries, defend of the home territory, keep the peace. On the other hand, they believe the armed forces less capable of protecting human rights co-operating with the police to (re-) establish law and order, and combating terrorism.

There are differences between the three countries with regard to peace enforcement missions. In Germany, nearly half of the respondents do not see these as being an appropriate military task. In France and in Italy, however, such measures meet – fully in the political tradition of these two countries – with broad approval.

It cannot be said that there has been any general change in perceptions of the armed forces' tasks in the three countries, since in all cases the military mission of national defence, but also of peacekeeping operations, are in the foreground of the supporting answers. It is remarkable, however, that this rather traditional perception of the military meanwhile is complemented, in Italy, in France, and in Germany as well, by quite civil tasks in cases of emergency and disasters.

It is rather surprising that for Germans the military, which traditionally and also according to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany are charged only with external defence is also called upon to co-operate with the police and to safeguard intern security. In this, Germans and French are far in front of Italian respondents who, despite the fact that Italy and French both have paramilitary police forces – Carabinieri and Gendarmerie – organic to the Ministry of Defence.

3 National Armed Forces or an All-European Army?

The 2000 Eurobarometer showed that, when taking the opinions of European people as a basis, the time of a national army seems to have run out. At this date, only 12 per cent of the respondents in Europe supported purely national armies. The remaining large majority, however, either preferred European armed forces intended to exist aside the national ones, or even called for a common European army.¹

The 2003 poll surveys at hand from Germany and Italy show a similar picture. There are only small minorities of less than 10 per cent still in

¹ Manigart, Philippe (2001): Europeans and a common defense policy: a comparative analysis. Paper to be presented at the IUS biennial International Conference, Baltimore, 19.

favour of exclusively national armed forces. Certainly, the large majority want the national armies to continue to exist alongside of European mixed response forces of some kind. Most of Italian respondents want such forces on a permanent basis, while Germans rather tend to favour European response forces organised at need. Supporters of a purely European army to fully replace national armed forces find themselves, in Italy and Germany, in the minority, as do those who reject military co-operation, not to speak of amalgamation, and favour maintaining existing national armies.

The majority of respondents from all three countries agree that the European response forces, whatever their shape and organisation, should be committed to action by a majority vote of the European States and not by individual national governments.

When considering the division of responsibilities between NATO, United Nations, and EU, Italians and Germans think that European armed forces should be assigned first to migration control and to fight organised crime. NATO is seen as best qualified in case of nuclear conflict. Incidentally, it is remarkable that Italian respondents place such a high degree of trust in United Nations. This is not at all the case in Germany, German respondents conceding a leading role to that organisation only in the area of the non-proliferation of WMD. In this particular case, Italians share the German view, but for other questions, where the Italians place their first trust in the UN, Germans trust NATO.

The majority French opinion is that Europe should be defended by the EU. Only a small minority thinks that defence should be undertaken by NATO.

4 The European Response Forces

The majority of respondents across all the three nations want their own armed forces to participate in the European Response Force. The ratio of supporters is particularly high in France. However, the Italian and German respondents agree to a large extent, seeing these forces

first of all as means to fight disasters, to lend humanitarian aid, evacuate people from conflict areas and to undertake peacekeeping operations, European and national defence and the participating in peace enforcement being secondary. Migration control, combating organised crime, and co-operation with the police also just secondary importance only. The Germans, and to a lesser extent Italians, also consider antiterrorist measures for an important task for the European response forces.

At least in Germany and in Italy, support for European armed forces does not mean rejecting NATO. Majorities of respondents in both countries are on the contrary of the opinion that European response forces should stand side by side with NATO as an equal partner. A clear minority (one fifth) of German respondents see European response forces as subordinate to NATO. On the other hand, particularly in France, but in Italy as well, there are pronounced convictions that European response forces should be more important than NATO. There are only very few in Germany expressing this opinion.

Generally, calls for European armed forces are becoming louder. At least in Germany and in Italy this wish has not progressed to the point of calling for All-European armed forces. As with other European institutions, the respondents rather support a cautious approach, maintaining national structures and existing integration within the alliances, but not discounting European initiatives.

5 Conclusions

The conclusion seems permissible that expectations of Europe including a common independent European security and defence policy are without exception very high. However, these expectations are far above the level that the respondents believe European institutions and politics in the European countries being capable of reaching. Thus, it is to be concluded that the European States and their governments have to work much harder to strengthen popular trust European institutions and their capability to act. Their work processes

must become more transparent, and what Europe already has accomplished and what it will be able to accomplish in the future, assuming co-operation can be improved, must be communicated effectively to the people.

This applies to areas of policy, but particularly to common security and defence policy. Many Europeans do not know enough about what co-operation already exists, particularly on the military field. Who in Germany, in France or in Italy is really aware of the common military formations to which the three armed forces contribute, whether their soldiers are serving in combined organisations and how well these are accomplishing their missions once deployed?

Certainly, the idea of All-European armed forces is not yet really anchored in the peoples' opinions across France, Germany and Italy – but the high level of support for European response forces alongside of existing national and international structures does indicate that the notions of an intensified co-operation and of more widespread integration already exists. The task at hand is to nurture and grow this kind of thinking by showing citizens clearly the Where, When and How of a European military, what successes have been achieved, and what should be done to improve performance on this field.

Given the fact that Germans, French and Italian respondents still have difficulties feeling themselves as a citizens of Europe first, developing among soldiers a kind of affection towards Europe, a spirit of commitment, will not be easy for any foreseeable period. The conclusion is that the common mission should be the moral focus for European response forces which will continue to be made up of national contingents. Mission fulfilment will depend upon mustering the entire scope of soldierly professionalism, which might provide the glue capable of binding such a disparate forces into an effective military entity. But to avoid creating an army of mercenaries and maintain compatibility between military and European society, soldiers will have to agree with the political aims of their missions and

assignments.² The best way to achieve this lies in convincing the citizens, not the soldiers, of the rightness and justice of these aims.

Certainly, a common European army is a rather utopian idea in Italy, Germany and France. According to data collected over all Europe, the citizens of these three countries, as well as Belgians, Dutch, Luxemburgers and Greeks, show very progressive attitudes towards this aim, but scepticism persists among Danes, Finns, Spanish, Irish, Austrian, and particularly the British.³

² See Kutz, Martin (2004): *Innere Führung in der Bundeswehr. Auf andere Streitkräfte übertragbar?* SOW- kontrovers, No. 1/2004, Hamburg, Führungsakademie, 4.

³ Manigard, Philippe, *op. cit.*, 27.

FIRST SECTION
EUROPEAN BUILDING PROCESSES

1.1 In your opinion after the European single currency what kind of priority should be given to the following items in the European Union	Very high	High	Average	Low	Very low	No opinion
Food security policy						
Employment policy						
Social policy						
Protection of the environment						
Defence						
Public Security						
Public Health Policy						
Education and Culture						
Foreign policy						
Scientific and technological research						
Co-operation with developing countries						
Common Agricultural policy						

1.2 For each of the following statements, please tell me how much you agree	Totally agree	Partially agree	Indifferent	Partially disagree	Totally disagree	No opinion
The European Union should have one common Foreign Policy						
The European Union should have one common Security and Defence Policy						
The European Union should have one common European Armed Forces						
The European Union should have one common Internal Security and Justice Policy						
The European Union should have one common Constitution						
The European Union should be enlarged and include new countries						

SECOND SECTION
INSTITUTIONS AND CITIZENS

2.1 For each of the following institutions, please tell me their impact on your life	Very high	High	Average	Low	Very low	No opinion
Council of Europe						
European Parliament						
European Commission						
European Court of Justice						
European Central Bank						
German Parliament						
German Justice						
Bank of Germany						
German Government						
German Armed Forces						

2.2 For each of the following statements on German Armed Forces, please tell me how much you agree	Totally agree	Partially agree	Indifferent	Partially disagree	Totally disagree	No opinion
Armed Forces help young people to become more integrated in the society						
Armed Forces are National Unity Symbol						
Armed Forces teach discipline and respect to the young people						
Armed Force are useless						
Armed Forces stand up for values like freedom and democracy						
Armed Forces prepare for war and fighting						
Armed Forces make useful peacekeeping missions						
Armed Forces help German people during disasters and emergencies						
Armed Forces defend their country and its territory						

THIRD SECTION

THREATS TO SECURITY AND THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES

3.1 For each of the following threats to the security, please tell me your opinion about their danger level for you	Very high	High	Average	Low	Very low	No opinion
Nuclear Conflict						
Conventional War in Europe						
World War						
Accidental throwing of a nuclear missile						
Proliferation of Nuclear, bacteriological and chemical weapons						
Epidemic						
Terrorist attack						
Organised crime						
Accident in a nuclear plant						
Uncontrolled migration						
Environmental disasters						
Food risks						
Economic crisis						

3.2 Peace and stability are jeopardised by a variety of risks and threats. How do you estimate the following political and military activities and instruments	Indispensable	Useful	Without effect	Useless	Harmful	No opinion
Coercive military measures in order to protect human rights						
Diplomatic actions						
Supporting democratisation processes						
Military peacekeeping						
Strict border controls to stop migrations						
Increasing efforts to help developing countries						
Deterrence of potential aggressors						
Fighting a war for legitimate reasons						
Combat terrorism by military means						

3.3 For each of the following risks, what level do you consider more important	Germany	European	NATO	UN	Non of these	No opinion
Nuclear Conflict						
Conventional War in Europe						
World War						
Accidental throwing of a nuclear missile						
Accidental of Nuclear, Bacteriological and Chemical weapons						
Epidemic						
Terrorist attack						
Organised crime						
Accident in a nuclear plant						
Uncontrolled migration						
Environmental disasters						
Food risks						
Economic crisis						

3.4 For each of the following tasks, please tell me how much Armed Forces are appropriate	Very appropriate	Appropriate	Neither/ nor	Partially inappropriate	Completely inappropriate	No opinion
Assistance in disaster relief						
Humanitarian Assistance to other countries						
Fighting terrorism						
Co-operation with Police to keep public order						
Supervision of border to control migration						
Protection of Human Rights						
Evacuation of citizen from conflict areas						
Peacekeeping operations						
Peace Enforcement operations						
Defence of national territory and interests						
Defence of European territory and interests						
Defence of allies' territory and interests						

FOURTH SECTION
EUROPEAN ARMED FORCES

4.1 The European Union has decided to establish a common Crisis Reaction Force, consisting of up to 60,000 soldiers from the EU-Member states. For each of the following tasks, please tell me how much you think these European Armed Forces are appropriate	Very appropriate	Appropriate	Neither/nor	Partially inappropriate	Completely inappropriate	No opinion
Assistance in disaster relief						
Humanitarian Assistance to other countries						
Fighting terrorism						
Co-operation with Police to keep public order						
Supervision of border to control migration						
Fighting international organised crime						
Protection of Human Rights						
Evacuation of citizen from conflict areas						
Peacekeeping operations						
Peace Enforcement operations						
Defence of national territory and interests						
Defence of European territory and interests						
Defence of allies' territory and interests						

4.2 What do you think of Germany's contribution to the European Reaction Forces?

- I support
- I rather support
- I rather disagree
- I disagree
- No opinion

4.3 These European Crisis Reaction Forces should be:

- Considered less important than NATO
- Considered as important as NATO
- Considered more important than NATO
- No opinion

4.4 In your opinion, decisions on European Security and Defence Policy should be made by:

- Majority vote by the EU member states
- Majority vote by the Council of European Union
- NATO Council
- United Nations Security Council
- No opinion

4.5 In your opinion, decisions to send European troops into missions should be taken by:

- The National Governments according to their legal rules
- The European member states by unanimous vote
- The European member states by majority vote
- No opinion

4.6 Looking in the future, what kind of armed forces would you prefer:

- An integrated European Force instead of national forces
- A standing European Rapid Reaction Force parallel to the national Armed Forces
- National Armed Forces, Rapid Reaction Forces on an ad-hoc basis
- Only national armed forces
- No armed forces at all
- No opinion

FIFTH SECTION
TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL BELONGING

5.1 What do you consider your homeland?

- The city where I was born
- The city where I live
- The region where I was born
- The region where I live
- Germany
- Europe
- World
- Others

5.2 Do you feel yourself European?

- Very European
- Quite European
- A little European
- Not European at all
- No opinion

5.3 In your opinion is it easy or difficult to feel at the same time as German and European citizen?

- It's very easy
- It's rather easy
- It's rather difficult
- It's very difficult
- No opinion

5.4 What political affiliation do you belong to?

