05-XX COMBINATORICS (For finite fields, see 11Txx)
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Institute
One quarter of Europe's energy demand is provided by natural gas distributed through a vast pipeline network covering the whole of Europe. At a cost of 1 million Euros per kilometer the extension of the European pipeline network is already a multi billion Euro business. The challenging question is how to expand and operate the network in order to facilitate the transportation of specified gas quantities at minimum cost. This task can be formulated as a mathematical optimization problem that reflects to real-world instances of enormous size and complexity. The aim of this thesis is the development of novel theory and optimization algorithms which make it possible to solve these problems.
Gas network topology optimization problems can be modeled as nonlinear mixed-integer programs (MINLPs). Such an MINLP gives rise to a so-called active transmission problem (ATP), a continuous nonlinear non-convex feasibility problem which emerges from the MINLP model by fixing all integral variables. The key to solving the ATP as well as the overall gas network topology optimization problem and the main contribution of this thesis is a novel domain relaxation of the variable bounds and constraints in combination with a penalization in the objective function. In case the domain relaxation does not yield a primal feasible solution for the ATP we offer novel sufficient conditions for proving the infeasibility of the ATP. These conditions can be expressed in the form of an MILP, i.e., the infeasibility of a non-convex NLP can be certified by solving an MILP. These results provide an efficient bounding procedure in a branch-and-bound algorithm.
If the gas network consists only of pipes and valves, the ATP turns into a passive transmission problem (PTP). Although its constraints are non-convex, its domain relaxation can be proven to be convex. Consequently, the feasibility of the PTP can be checked directly in an efficient way. Another advantage of the passive case is that the solution of the domain relaxation gives rise to a cutting plane for the overall topology optimization problem that expresses the infeasibility of the PTP. This cut is obtained by a Benders argument from the Lagrange function of the domain relaxation augmented by a specially tailored pc-regularization. These cuts provide tight lower bounds for the passive gas network topology optimization problem.
The domain relaxation does not only provide certificates of infeasibility and cutting planes, it can also be used to construct feasible primal solutions. We make use of parametric sensitivity analysis in order to identify binary variables to be switched based on dual information. This approach allows for the first time to compute directly MINLP solutions for large-scale gas network topology optimization problems.
All the research in this thesis has been realized within the collaborative research project "Forschungskooperation Netzoptimierung (ForNe)". The developed software is in use by the cooperation partner Open Grid Europe GmbH.
Parts of this thesis have been published in book chapters, journal articles and technical reports. An overview of the topics and solution approaches within the research project is given by Martin et al. (2011) and Fügenschuh et al. (2013). Gas network operation approaches and solution methods are described in detail by Pfetsch et al. (2014) and with a special focus on topology optimization in Fügenschuh et al. (2011). The primal heuristic presented in this thesis is published by Humpola et al. (2014b). The method for pruning nodes of the branch-and-bound tree for an approximation of the original problem is described in Fügenschuh and Humpola (2013) and Humpola et al. (2014a). The Benders like inequality is introduced by Humpola and Fügenschuh (2013).
We introduce the class of spot-checking games (SC games). These games model
problems where the goal is to distribute fare inspectors over a toll network.
Although SC games are not zero-sum, we show that a Nash equilibrium
can be computed by linear programming.
The computation of a strong Stackelberg equilibrium is
more relevant for this problem, but we show that this is NP-hard.
However, we give some bounds on the \emph{price of spite},
which measures how the
payoff of the inspector
degrades when committing to a Nash equilibrium.
Finally, we demonstrate the quality of these bounds for a real-world application,
namely the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways.
Network Spot Checking Games: Theory and Application to Toll Enforcing in Transportation Networks
(2014)
We introduce the class of spot-checking games (SC games). These games model
problems where the goal is to distribute fare inspectors over a toll network.
In an SC game, the pure strategies of network users correspond to
paths in a graph, and the pure strategies of the inspectors
are subset of edges to be controlled.
Although SC games are not zero-sum, we show that a Nash equilibrium
can be computed by linear programming.
The computation of a strong Stackelberg equilibrium is
more relevant for this problem, but we show that this is NP-hard.
However, we give some bounds on the \emph{price of spite},
which measures how the
payoff of the inspector
degrades when committing to a Nash equilibrium.
Finally, we demonstrate the quality of these bounds for a real-world application,
namely the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways.