Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- ZIB-Report (26)
- Article (13)
- In Proceedings (13)
- Other (1)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (53)
Keywords
- Optimal Experimental Design (3)
- SDP (3)
- Flows in graphs (2)
- Game Theory (2)
- Hilbert's projective metric (2)
- Integer Programming (2)
- Mixed Integer Programming (2)
- SOCP (2)
- Semidefinite Programming (2)
- Stackelberg Equilibrium (2)
Institute
- Mathematical Optimization (52)
- Mathematics of Transportation and Logistics (28)
- Mathematics of Health Care (16)
- Network Optimization (2)
- Visual Data Analysis (2)
- Visual and Data-centric Computing (2)
- Computational Medicine (1)
- Numerical Mathematics (1)
- Visual Data Analysis in Science and Engineering (1)
Network Spot Checking Games: Theory and Application to Toll Enforcing in Transportation Networks
(2014)
We introduce the class of spot-checking games (SC games). These games model
problems where the goal is to distribute fare inspectors over a toll network.
In an SC game, the pure strategies of network users correspond to
paths in a graph, and the pure strategies of the inspectors
are subset of edges to be controlled.
Although SC games are not zero-sum, we show that a Nash equilibrium
can be computed by linear programming.
The computation of a strong Stackelberg equilibrium is
more relevant for this problem, but we show that this is NP-hard.
However, we give some bounds on the \emph{price of spite},
which measures how the
payoff of the inspector
degrades when committing to a Nash equilibrium.
Finally, we demonstrate the quality of these bounds for a real-world application,
namely the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways.
We present a game-theoretic approach to optimize the strategies of toll enforcement on a motorway network. In contrast to previous approaches, we consider a network with an arbitrary topology, and we handle the fact that users may choose their Origin-Destination path; in particular they may take a detour to avoid sections with a high control rate. We show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed with an LP (although the game is not zero-sum), and we give a MIP for the computation of a Stackelberg equilibrium. Experimental results based on an application to the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways are presented.
Network spot-checking games: Theory and application to toll enforcing in transportation networks
(2015)
We introduce the class of spot-checking games (SC games). These games model problems where the goal is to distribute fare inspectors over a toll network. In an SC game, the pure strategies of network users correspond to paths in a graph, and the pure strategies of the inspectors are subset of arcs to be controlled. Although SC games are not zero-sum, we show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed by linear programming. The computation of a strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is more relevant for this problem and we give a mixed integer programming (MIP) formulation for this problem. We show that the computation of such an equilibrium is NP-hard. More generally, we prove that it is NP-hard to compute a SSE in a polymatrix game, even if the game is pairwise zero-sum. Then, we give some bounds on the price of spite, which measures how the payoff of the inspector degrades when committing to a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we report computational experiments on instances constructed from real data, for an application to the enforcement of a truck toll in Germany. These numerical results show the efficiency of the proposed methods, as well as the quality of the bounds derived in this article.
We present a game-theoretic approach to optimize the strategies of toll enforcement
on a motorway network. In contrast to previous approaches,
we consider a network with an arbitrary
topology, and we handle the fact that
users may choose their Origin-Destination path; in particular they may take a detour to
avoid sections with a high control rate. We show that a Nash equilibrium can be
computed with an LP (although the game is not zero-sum), and we give a MIP for the computation
of a Stackelberg equilibrium. Experimental results based on an application to the
enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways are presented.
We propose a game theoretic model for the spatial distribution of inspectors on a
transportation network.
The problem is to spread out the controls so as to enforce the payment of a transit
toll. We formulate a linear program to find
the control distribution which maximizes the expected toll revenue,
and a mixed integer program for the problem of minimizing
the number of evaders. Furthermore, we show that the problem of finding an optimal
mixed strategy for a coalition of $N$ inspectors can be solved
efficiently by a column generation procedure. Finally, we give experimental results
from an application to the truck toll on German motorways.
We propose a game theoretic model for the spatial distribution of inspectors on a transportation network. The problem is to spread out the controls so as to enforce the payment of a transit toll. We formulate a linear program to find the control distribution which maximizes the expected toll revenue, and a mixed integer program for the problem of minimizing the number of evaders. Furthermore, we show that the problem of finding an optimal mixed strategy for a coalition of $N$ inspectors can be solved efficiently by a column generation procedure. Finally, we give experimental results from an application to the truck toll on German motorways.
We present the problem of planning mobile tours of inspectors on German motorways to enforce the payment of the toll for heavy good trucks. This is a special type of vehicle routing problem with the objective to conduct as good inspections as possible on the complete network. In addition, we developed a personalized crew rostering model, to schedule the crews of the tours. The planning of daily tours and the rostering are combined in a novel integrated approach and formulated as a complex and large scale Integer Program. The main focus of this paper extends our previous publications on how different requirements for the rostering can be modeled in detail. The second focus is on a bi-criteria analysis of the planning problem to find the balance between the control quality and the roster acceptance. Finally, computational results on real-world instances show the practicability of our method and how different input parameters influence the problem complexity.
We present the problem of planning mobile tours of inspectors on German motorways to enforce the payment of the toll for heavy good trucks. This is a special type of vehicle routing problem with the objective to conduct as good inspections as possible on the complete network. In addition, the crews of the tours have to be scheduled. Thus, we developed a personalized crew rostering model. The planning of daily tours and the rostering are combined in a novel integrated approach and formulated as a complex and large scale Integer Program. The paper focuses first on different requirements for the rostering and how they can be modeled in detail. The second focus is on a bicriterion analysis of the planning problem to find the balance between the control quality and the roster acceptance. On the one hand the tour planning is a profit maximization problem and on the other hand the rostering should be made in a employee friendly way. Finally, computational results on real-world instances show the practicability of our method.
We study an extension of the shortest path network interdiction problem and present a novel real-world application in this area. We consider the problem of determining optimal locations for toll control stations on the arcs of a transportation network. We handle the fact that drivers can avoid control stations on parallel secondary roads. The problem is formulated as a mixed integer program and solved using Benders decomposition. We present experimental results for the application of our models to German motorways.
We study an extension of the shortest path network interdiction problem and present a novel real-world application in this area. We consider the problem of determining optimal locations for toll control stations on the arcs of a transportation network. We handle the fact that drivers can avoid control stations on parallel secondary roads. The problem is formulated as a mixed integer program and solved using Benders decomposition. We present experimental results for the application of our models to German motorways.