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We propose a game theoretic model for the spatial distribution of inspectors on a
transportation network.
The problem is to spread out the controls so as to enforce the payment of a transit
toll. We formulate a linear program to find
the control distribution which maximizes the expected toll revenue,
and a mixed integer program for the problem of minimizing
the number of evaders. Furthermore, we show that the problem of finding an optimal
mixed strategy for a coalition of $N$ inspectors can be solved
efficiently by a column generation procedure. Finally, we give experimental results
from an application to the truck toll on German motorways.
We propose a game theoretic model for the spatial distribution of inspectors on a transportation network. The problem is to spread out the controls so as to enforce the payment of a transit toll. We formulate a linear program to find the control distribution which maximizes the expected toll revenue, and a mixed integer program for the problem of minimizing the number of evaders. Furthermore, we show that the problem of finding an optimal mixed strategy for a coalition of $N$ inspectors can be solved efficiently by a column generation procedure. Finally, we give experimental results from an application to the truck toll on German motorways.