Refine
Document Type
- ZIB-Report (11)
- In Proceedings (6)
- Article (5)
Language
- English (22)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (22)
Keywords
- Game Theory (2)
- Integer Programming (2)
- Mixed Integer Programming (2)
- Netzwerkaggregation (2)
- Stackelberg Equilibrium (2)
- Vehicle Routing Problem (2)
- network aggregation (2)
- Controls in transportation networks (1)
- Duty Roster Planning (1)
- Duty Rostering (1)
- Fallstudie (1)
- Operations Research (1)
- Polymatrix game (1)
- Price of Anarchy (1)
- Security Games (1)
- Simplon Korridor (1)
- Simplon corridor (1)
- Stackelberg game (1)
- Toll Enforcement (1)
- Trassenallokation (1)
- bicriteria optimization (1)
- case study (1)
- crew rostering (1)
- integer programming (1)
- macroscopic railway modeling (1)
- makroskopische Bahnmodellierung (1)
- railway models, railway capacity, track allocation framework (1)
- railway track allocation (1)
- vehicle routing (1)
Institute
In this paper we present the problem of computing optimal tours of toll inspectors on German motorways. This problem is a special type of vehicle routing problem and builds up an integrated model, consisting of a tour
planning and a duty rostering part. The tours should guarantee a network-wide control whose intensity is proportional to given spatial and time dependent traffic distributions. We model this using a space-time network
and formulate the associated optimization problem by an integer program (IP). Since sequential approaches fail, we integrated the assignment of crews to the tours in our model. In this process all duties of a crew member must fit in a feasible roster. It is modeled as a Multi-Commodity Flow Problem in a directed acyclic graph, where specific paths correspond to
feasible rosters for one month. We present computational results in a
case-study on a German subnetwork which documents the practicability of our approach.
We present a game-theoretic approach to optimize the strategies of toll enforcement
on a motorway network. In contrast to previous approaches,
we consider a network with an arbitrary
topology, and we handle the fact that
users may choose their Origin-Destination path; in particular they may take a detour to
avoid sections with a high control rate. We show that a Nash equilibrium can be
computed with an LP (although the game is not zero-sum), and we give a MIP for the computation
of a Stackelberg equilibrium. Experimental results based on an application to the
enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways are presented.