Refine
Document Type
- ZIB-Report (11)
- In Proceedings (6)
- Article (5)
Language
- English (22)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (22)
Keywords
- Game Theory (2)
- Integer Programming (2)
- Mixed Integer Programming (2)
- Netzwerkaggregation (2)
- Stackelberg Equilibrium (2)
- Vehicle Routing Problem (2)
- network aggregation (2)
- Controls in transportation networks (1)
- Duty Roster Planning (1)
- Duty Rostering (1)
- Fallstudie (1)
- Operations Research (1)
- Polymatrix game (1)
- Price of Anarchy (1)
- Security Games (1)
- Simplon Korridor (1)
- Simplon corridor (1)
- Stackelberg game (1)
- Toll Enforcement (1)
- Trassenallokation (1)
- bicriteria optimization (1)
- case study (1)
- crew rostering (1)
- integer programming (1)
- macroscopic railway modeling (1)
- makroskopische Bahnmodellierung (1)
- railway models, railway capacity, track allocation framework (1)
- railway track allocation (1)
- vehicle routing (1)
Institute
This paper proposes the first model for toll enforcement optimization
on German motorways. The enforcement is done by mobile control teams and our
goal is to produce a schedule achieving network-wide control, proportional to
spatial and time-dependent traffic distributions. Our model consists of two
parts. The first plans
control tours using a vehicle routing approach with profits and some side
constraints. The second plans feasible rosters for the control teams. Both
problems can be modeled as Multi-Commodity Flow Problems. Adding additional
coupling constraints produces a large-scale integrated integer programming
formulation. We show that this model can be solved to optimality for real
world instances associated with a control area in East Germany.
In this paper a bottom-up approach of automatic simplification of a railway network is presented. Starting from a very detailed, microscopic level, as it is used in railway simulation, the network is transformed by an algorithm to a less detailed level (macroscopic network), that is sufficient for long-term planning and optimization. In addition running and headway times are rounded to a pre-chosen time discretization by a special cumulative method, which we will present and analyse in this paper. After the transformation we fill the network with given train requests to compute an optimal slot allocation. Then the optimized schedule is re-transformed into the microscopic level and can be simulated without any conflicts occuring between the slots. The algorithm is used to transform the network of the very dense Simplon corridor between Swiss and Italy. With our aggregation it is possible for the first time to generate a profit maximal and conflict free timetable for the corridor across a day by a simultaneously optimization run.
This paper presents a case study on a railway timetable optimization for the very dense Simplon corridor, a major railway connection in the Alps between Switzerland and Italy. Starting from a detailed microscopic network as it is used in railway simulation, the data is transformed by an automatic procedure to a less detailed macroscopic network, that is sufficient for the purpose of capacity planning and amenable to state-of-the-art integer programming optimization methods. In this way, the macroscopic railway network is saturated with trains. Finally, the corresponding timetable is re-transformed to the microscopic level in such a way that it can be operated without any conflicts among the slots. Using this integer programming based micro-macro aggregation-disaggregation approach, it becomes for the first time possible to generate a profit maximal and conflict free timetable for the complete Simplon corridor over an entire day by a simultaneous optimization of all trains requests. This also allows to to undertake a sensitivity analysis of various problem parameters.
Today the railway timetabling process and the track allocation
is one of the most challenging problems to solve by a railway company.
Especially due to the deregulation of the transport market in the recent years several
suppliers of railway traffic have entered the market in Europe. This leads to more
potential conflicts between trains caused by an increasing demand of train paths.
Planning and operating railway transportation systems is extremely hard due
to the combinatorial complexity of the underlying discrete optimization problems,
the technical intricacies, and the immense size of the problem instances.
In order to make best use of the infrastructure and to ensure economic operation,
efficient planning of the railway operation is indispensable.
Mathematical optimization models and algorithms can help
to automatize and tackle these challenges.
Our contribution in this paper is to present a renewed planning process
due to the liberalization in Europe and an associated concept for track allocation, that consists
of three important parts, simulation, aggregation, and optimization.
Furthermore, we present results of our general framework for real world data.
Network Spot Checking Games: Theory and Application to Toll Enforcing in Transportation Networks
(2014)
We introduce the class of spot-checking games (SC games). These games model
problems where the goal is to distribute fare inspectors over a toll network.
In an SC game, the pure strategies of network users correspond to
paths in a graph, and the pure strategies of the inspectors
are subset of edges to be controlled.
Although SC games are not zero-sum, we show that a Nash equilibrium
can be computed by linear programming.
The computation of a strong Stackelberg equilibrium is
more relevant for this problem, but we show that this is NP-hard.
However, we give some bounds on the \emph{price of spite},
which measures how the
payoff of the inspector
degrades when committing to a Nash equilibrium.
Finally, we demonstrate the quality of these bounds for a real-world application,
namely the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways.
We present a game-theoretic approach to optimize the strategies of toll enforcement on a motorway network. In contrast to previous approaches, we consider a network with an arbitrary topology, and we handle the fact that users may choose their Origin-Destination path; in particular they may take a detour to avoid sections with a high control rate. We show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed with an LP (although the game is not zero-sum), and we give a MIP for the computation of a Stackelberg equilibrium. Experimental results based on an application to the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways are presented.
We propose a game theoretic model for the spatial distribution of inspectors on a transportation network. The problem is to spread out the controls so as to enforce the payment of a transit toll. We formulate a linear program to find the control distribution which maximizes the expected toll revenue, and a mixed integer program for the problem of minimizing the number of evaders. Furthermore, we show that the problem of finding an optimal mixed strategy for a coalition of $N$ inspectors can be solved efficiently by a column generation procedure. Finally, we give experimental results from an application to the truck toll on German motorways.
Duty rostering problems occur in different application contexts and come in different flavors. They give rise to very large scale integer programs which ypically have lots of solutions and extremely fractional LP relaxations. In such a situation, heuristics can be a viable algorithmic choice. We propose an mprovement method of the Lin-Kernighan type for the solution of duty rostering problems. We illustrate its versatility and solution quality on three different applications in public transit, vehicle routing, and airline rostering with a focus on the management of preferences, fairness, and fatigue, respectively.
We present the problem of planning mobile tours of inspectors on German motorways to enforce the payment of the toll for heavy good trucks. This is a special type of vehicle routing problem with the objective to conduct as good inspections as possible on the complete network. In addition, we developed a personalized crew rostering model, to schedule the crews of the tours. The planning of daily tours and the rostering are combined in a novel integrated approach and formulated as a complex and large scale Integer Program. The main focus of this paper extends our previous publications on how different requirements for the rostering can be modeled in detail. The second focus is on a bi-criteria analysis of the planning problem to find the balance between the control quality and the roster acceptance. Finally, computational results on real-world instances show the practicability of our method and how different input parameters influence the problem complexity.
In this paper a bottom-up approach of automatic simplification of a railway network is presented. Starting from a very detailed, microscopic level, as it is used in railway simulation, the network is transformed by an algorithm to a less detailed level (macroscopic network), that is sufficient for long-term planning and optimization. In addition running and headway times are rounded to a pre-chosen time discretization by a special cumulative method, which we will present and analyse in this paper. After the transformation we fill the network with given train requests to compute an optimal slot allocation. Then the optimized schedule is re-transformed into the microscopic level and can be simulated without any conflicts occuring between the slots. The algorithm is used to transform the network of the very dense Simplon corridor between Swiss and Italy. With our aggregation it is possible for the first time to generate a profit maximal and conflict free timetable for the corridor across a day by a simultaneously optimization run.
Today the railway timetabling process and the track allocation is one of the most challenging problems to solve by a railway company. Especially due to the deregulation of the transport market in the recent years several suppliers of railway traffic have entered the market in Europe. This leads to more potential conflicts between trains caused by an increasing demand of train paths. Planning and operating railway transportation systems is extremely hard due to the combinatorial complexity of the underlying discrete optimization problems, the technical intricacies, and the immense size of the problem instances. In order to make best use of the infrastructure and to ensure economic operation, efficient planning of the railway operation is indispensable. Mathematical optimization models and algorithms can help to automatize and tackle these challenges. Our contribution in this paper is to present a renewed planning process due to the liberalization in Europe and an associated concept for track allocation, that consists of three important parts, simulation, aggregation, and optimization. Furthermore, we present results of our general framework for real world data.
This paper proposes the first model for toll enforcement optimization on German motorways. The enforcement is done by mobile control teams and our goal is to produce a schedule achieving network-wide control, proportional to spatial and time-dependent traffic distributions. Our model consists of two parts. The first plans control tours using a vehicle routing approach with profits and some side constraints. The second plans feasible rosters for the control teams. Both problems can be modeled as Multi-Commodity Flow Problems. Adding additional coupling constraints produces a large-scale integrated integer programming formulation. We show that this model can be solved to optimality for real world instances associated with a control area in East Germany.
In this paper we present the problem of computing optimal tours of toll inspectors on German motorways. This problem is a special type of vehicle routing problem and builds up an integrated model, consisting of a tour planning and a duty rostering part. The tours should guarantee a network-wide control whose intensity is proportional to given spatial and time dependent traffic distributions. We model this using a space-time network and formulate the associated optimization problem by an integer program (IP). Since sequential approaches fail, we integrated the assignment of crews to the tours in our model. In this process all duties of a crew member must fit in a feasible roster. It is modeled as a Multi-Commodity Flow Problem in a directed acyclic graph, where specific paths correspond to feasible rosters for one month. We present computational results in a case-study on a German subnetwork which documents the practicability of our approach.
Duty rostering problems occur in different application contexts and come in different flavors. They give rise to very large scale integer programs which ypically have lots of solutions and extremely fractional LP relaxations. In such a situation, heuristics
can be a viable algorithmic choice. We propose an mprovement method of the Lin-Kernighan type for the solution of duty rostering problems. We illustrate its versatility and solution quality on three different applications in public transit, vehicle routing, and
airline rostering with a focus on the management of preferences, fairness, and fatigue, respectively.
We present the problem of planning mobile tours of inspectors on German motorways to enforce the payment of the toll for heavy good trucks. This is a special type of vehicle routing problem with the objective to conduct as good inspections as possible on the complete network. In addition, the crews of the tours have to be scheduled. Thus, we developed a personalized crew rostering model. The planning of daily tours and the rostering are combined in a novel integrated approach and formulated as a complex and large scale Integer Program. The paper focuses first on different requirements for the rostering and how they can be modeled in detail. The second focus is on a bicriterion analysis of the planning problem to find the balance between the control quality and the roster acceptance. On the one hand the tour planning is a profit maximization problem and on the other hand the rostering should be made in a employee friendly way. Finally, computational results on real-world instances show the practicability of our method.
We introduce the class of spot-checking games (SC games). These games model
problems where the goal is to distribute fare inspectors over a toll network.
Although SC games are not zero-sum, we show that a Nash equilibrium
can be computed by linear programming.
The computation of a strong Stackelberg equilibrium is
more relevant for this problem, but we show that this is NP-hard.
However, we give some bounds on the \emph{price of spite},
which measures how the
payoff of the inspector
degrades when committing to a Nash equilibrium.
Finally, we demonstrate the quality of these bounds for a real-world application,
namely the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways.
We introduce the class of spot-checking games (SC games). These games model
problems where the goal is to distribute fare inspectors over a toll network.
Although SC games are not zero-sum, we show that a Nash equilibrium
can be computed by linear programming.
The computation of a strong Stackelberg equilibrium is
more relevant for this problem, but we show that this is NP-hard.
However, we give some bounds on the \emph{price of spite},
which measures how the
payoff of the inspector
degrades when committing to a Nash equilibrium.
Finally, we demonstrate the quality of these bounds for a real-world application,
namely the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways.
Network spot-checking games: Theory and application to toll enforcing in transportation networks
(2015)
We introduce the class of spot-checking games (SC games). These games model problems where the goal is to distribute fare inspectors over a toll network. In an SC game, the pure strategies of network users correspond to paths in a graph, and the pure strategies of the inspectors are subset of arcs to be controlled. Although SC games are not zero-sum, we show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed by linear programming. The computation of a strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is more relevant for this problem and we give a mixed integer programming (MIP) formulation for this problem. We show that the computation of such an equilibrium is NP-hard. More generally, we prove that it is NP-hard to compute a SSE in a polymatrix game, even if the game is pairwise zero-sum. Then, we give some bounds on the price of spite, which measures how the payoff of the inspector degrades when committing to a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we report computational experiments on instances constructed from real data, for an application to the enforcement of a truck toll in Germany. These numerical results show the efficiency of the proposed methods, as well as the quality of the bounds derived in this article.
In this paper we present the problem of computing optimal tours of toll inspectors on German motorways. This problem is a special type of vehicle routing problem and builds up an integrated model, consisting of a tour
planning and a duty rostering part. The tours should guarantee a network-wide control whose intensity is proportional to given spatial and time dependent traffic distributions. We model this using a space-time network
and formulate the associated optimization problem by an integer program (IP). Since sequential approaches fail, we integrated the assignment of crews to the tours in our model. In this process all duties of a crew member must fit in a feasible roster. It is modeled as a Multi-Commodity Flow Problem in a directed acyclic graph, where specific paths correspond to
feasible rosters for one month. We present computational results in a
case-study on a German subnetwork which documents the practicability of our approach.
We present a game-theoretic approach to optimize the strategies of toll enforcement
on a motorway network. In contrast to previous approaches,
we consider a network with an arbitrary
topology, and we handle the fact that
users may choose their Origin-Destination path; in particular they may take a detour to
avoid sections with a high control rate. We show that a Nash equilibrium can be
computed with an LP (although the game is not zero-sum), and we give a MIP for the computation
of a Stackelberg equilibrium. Experimental results based on an application to the
enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways are presented.