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We propose a game theoretic model for the spatial distribution of inspectors on a
transportation network.
The problem is to spread out the controls so as to enforce the payment of a transit
toll. We formulate a linear program to find
the control distribution which maximizes the expected toll revenue,
and a mixed integer program for the problem of minimizing
the number of evaders. Furthermore, we show that the problem of finding an optimal
mixed strategy for a coalition of $N$ inspectors can be solved
efficiently by a column generation procedure. Finally, we give experimental results
from an application to the truck toll on German motorways.
This paper proposes the first model for toll enforcement optimization
on German motorways. The enforcement is done by mobile control teams and our
goal is to produce a schedule achieving network-wide control, proportional to
spatial and time-dependent traffic distributions. Our model consists of two
parts. The first plans
control tours using a vehicle routing approach with profits and some side
constraints. The second plans feasible rosters for the control teams. Both
problems can be modeled as Multi-Commodity Flow Problems. Adding additional
coupling constraints produces a large-scale integrated integer programming
formulation. We show that this model can be solved to optimality for real
world instances associated with a control area in East Germany.
Network Spot Checking Games: Theory and Application to Toll Enforcing in Transportation Networks
(2014)
We introduce the class of spot-checking games (SC games). These games model
problems where the goal is to distribute fare inspectors over a toll network.
In an SC game, the pure strategies of network users correspond to
paths in a graph, and the pure strategies of the inspectors
are subset of edges to be controlled.
Although SC games are not zero-sum, we show that a Nash equilibrium
can be computed by linear programming.
The computation of a strong Stackelberg equilibrium is
more relevant for this problem, but we show that this is NP-hard.
However, we give some bounds on the \emph{price of spite},
which measures how the
payoff of the inspector
degrades when committing to a Nash equilibrium.
Finally, we demonstrate the quality of these bounds for a real-world application,
namely the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways.
We present a game-theoretic approach to optimize the strategies of toll enforcement on a motorway network. In contrast to previous approaches, we consider a network with an arbitrary topology, and we handle the fact that users may choose their Origin-Destination path; in particular they may take a detour to avoid sections with a high control rate. We show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed with an LP (although the game is not zero-sum), and we give a MIP for the computation of a Stackelberg equilibrium. Experimental results based on an application to the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways are presented.
We propose a game theoretic model for the spatial distribution of inspectors on a transportation network. The problem is to spread out the controls so as to enforce the payment of a transit toll. We formulate a linear program to find the control distribution which maximizes the expected toll revenue, and a mixed integer program for the problem of minimizing the number of evaders. Furthermore, we show that the problem of finding an optimal mixed strategy for a coalition of $N$ inspectors can be solved efficiently by a column generation procedure. Finally, we give experimental results from an application to the truck toll on German motorways.
We present the problem of planning mobile tours of inspectors on German motorways to enforce the payment of the toll for heavy good trucks. This is a special type of vehicle routing problem with the objective to conduct as good inspections as possible on the complete network. In addition, we developed a personalized crew rostering model, to schedule the crews of the tours. The planning of daily tours and the rostering are combined in a novel integrated approach and formulated as a complex and large scale Integer Program. The main focus of this paper extends our previous publications on how different requirements for the rostering can be modeled in detail. The second focus is on a bi-criteria analysis of the planning problem to find the balance between the control quality and the roster acceptance. Finally, computational results on real-world instances show the practicability of our method and how different input parameters influence the problem complexity.
This paper proposes the first model for toll enforcement optimization on German motorways. The enforcement is done by mobile control teams and our goal is to produce a schedule achieving network-wide control, proportional to spatial and time-dependent traffic distributions. Our model consists of two parts. The first plans control tours using a vehicle routing approach with profits and some side constraints. The second plans feasible rosters for the control teams. Both problems can be modeled as Multi-Commodity Flow Problems. Adding additional coupling constraints produces a large-scale integrated integer programming formulation. We show that this model can be solved to optimality for real world instances associated with a control area in East Germany.
In this paper we present the problem of computing optimal tours of toll inspectors on German motorways. This problem is a special type of vehicle routing problem and builds up an integrated model, consisting of a tour planning and a duty rostering part. The tours should guarantee a network-wide control whose intensity is proportional to given spatial and time dependent traffic distributions. We model this using a space-time network and formulate the associated optimization problem by an integer program (IP). Since sequential approaches fail, we integrated the assignment of crews to the tours in our model. In this process all duties of a crew member must fit in a feasible roster. It is modeled as a Multi-Commodity Flow Problem in a directed acyclic graph, where specific paths correspond to feasible rosters for one month. We present computational results in a case-study on a German subnetwork which documents the practicability of our approach.
We propose an algorithm to approximate the distribution of the completion time (makespan)
and the tardiness costs of a project, when durations are lognormally distributed. This problem arises naturally for the optimization of surgery scheduling,
where it is very common to assume lognormal procedure times. We present an analogous of Clark's formulas to compute the moments of the maximum of a set of
lognormal variables. Then, we use moment matching formulas to approximate the earliest starting time of each activity of the project by a shifted lognormal variable.
This approach can be seen as a lognormal variant of a state-of-the-art method used for the statistical static timing analysis (SSTA) of digital circuits.
We carried out numerical experiments with instances based on real data from the application to surgery scheduling. We obtained very
promising results, especially for the approximation of the mean overtime in operating rooms,
for which our algorithm yields results of a similar quality to Monte-Carlo simulations
requiring an amount of computing time several orders of magnitude larger.
We study an extension of the shortest path network interdiction problem and present a novel real-world application in this area. We consider the problem of determining optimal locations for toll control stations on the arcs of a transportation network. We handle the fact that drivers can avoid control stations on parallel secondary roads. The problem is formulated as a mixed integer program and solved using Benders decomposition. We present experimental results for the application of our models to German motorways.