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Optimizing control in a transportation network when users may choose their OD-path

Please always quote using this URN: urn:nbn:de:0297-zib-42330
  • This thesis represents a game-theoretic investigation of the allocation of inspectors in a transportation network, comparing Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium strategies to a strategy in which inspections are conducted proportionally to the traffic volume. It contains specifications for the integration of space and time dependencies and extensive experimental tests for the application on the transportation network of German motorways using real data. Main results are that - although the formulated spot-checking game is not zero-sum - we are able to compute a Nash equilibrium using linear programming and secondly, that experimental results yield that a Nash equilibrium strategy represents a good trade-off for the Stackelberg equilibrium strategy between efficiency of controls and computation time.

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Author:Julia Buwaya
Document Type:Master's Thesis
Tag:Game Theory; Linear Programming; Mixed Integer Programming; Nash Equilibrium; Optimization; Security Game; Stackelberg Equilibrium; Transportation Network
MSC-Classification:90-XX OPERATIONS RESEARCH, MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING
CCS-Classification:G. Mathematics of Computing
Granting Institution:Technische Universität Berlin
Advisor:Martin Grötschel, Ralf Borndörfer
Date of final exam:2013/06/07
Publishing Institution:Zuse Institute Berlin (ZIB)
Date of first Publication:2013/09/04
Page Number:81
Licence (German):License LogoCreative Commons - Namensnennung-Keine kommerzielle Nutzung-Weitergabe unter gleichen Bedingungen
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