A Stackelberg game to optimize the distribution of controls in transportation networks
- We propose a game theoretic model for the spatial distribution of inspectors on a transportation network. The problem is to spread out the controls so as to enforce the payment of a transit toll. We formulate a linear program to find the control distribution which maximizes the expected toll revenue, and a mixed integer program for the problem of minimizing the number of evaders. Furthermore, we show that the problem of finding an optimal mixed strategy for a coalition of $N$ inspectors can be solved efficiently by a column generation procedure. Finally, we give experimental results from an application to the truck toll on German motorways.
Author: | Ralf BorndörferORCiD, Bertrand Omont, Guillaume Sagnol, Elmar Swarat |
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Document Type: | In Proceedings |
Parent Title (English): | Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Game Theory for Networks (GAMENETS 2012) |
Volume: | 105 |
First Page: | 224 |
Last Page: | 235 |
Series: | Lecture Notes of the ICST |
Year of first publication: | 2012 |
Preprint: | urn:nbn:de:0297-zib-14995 |
DOI: | https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_17 |